Chapter VIII
CONCLUSION

Although nuclear weapons may no longer be at the forefront of great power diplomacy with the familiar Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union fading into history, nuclear weapons remain an important consideration for international policy makers. Even though Cold War-era deterrence strategies fall short when faced with non-state nuclear threats because of the underlying state-centric assumptions, the lack of rational motives exhibited by certain non-state groups and the problems of retaliating against an actor with no territorial base, the theoretical framework on which Cold War deterrence rests still offers much advice to policy makers today even when considering threats from non-state actors. The immediate task is to ensure nuclear safety, stability and security in South Asia. This can be achieved through improved bi-lateral relations and the avoidance of another crisis. India and Pakistan should sincerely review the existing nuclear confidence and security building measures and stabilize the existing CBMs. And without nuclear CBMs the dangerous political tensions between the two countries, fuelled by feelings of mutual vulnerability, cannot be mitigated. The time may have come to develop a new balance between the needs of war risk reduction and those of non-proliferation. It is the responsibility of the Indian and Pakistani leadership to come out of their negative nationalistic perspective to a broad national, region and global approach to fulfil the long cherished aspirations of the millions of the people in the sub-continent for peace, prosperity and development. As an influential global power in the South Asian region, the United States needs to play very proactive role in the emerging nuclear scenario in South Asia. Success of any efforts towards curbing the nuclearisation of South Asia will largely depends on the genuine non-proliferation efforts from the part of the US and other global nuclear weapons states.

The United States nuclear non proliferation policy faces serious challenges from South Asian region, since both India and Pakistan continue to threaten to
deploy their respective nuclear arsenals which leads to a crisis situation. Incoherent United States nuclear non proliferation policies and their inappropriate influence strategies have always made both countries India and Pakistan to go on with their nuclear weapons abilities. United States nuclear non proliferation policies will then influence Indian and Pakistani decisions to either to further develop or to curb the nuclear weapons. United States has totally failed in curbing South Asian regional nuclear weapon proliferation because of United States contradictory policies. Although as declared United States policy has began to be emphasized on nuclear non proliferation goals, there are other perceived political, commercial, and strategic interests often took place in the matter, sending a completely mixed signals to both India and Pakistan and United States encouraging them to go on with their respective nuclear weapons programs. More than that, the United States had failed to influence both Indian and Pakistani nuclear decision making because of their inappropriate and not so practical influence strategies. Nuclear Non proliferation sanctions were not at all substantial and rarely sustained inducements were unconditionally extended. In the past United States had tasted failure in pursuing general nuclear disarmament which also gave both countries India and Pakistan a pretext to reject the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime as a complete discriminatory and totally unjust. The Obama administration also failed to curb the nuclear proliferation in South Asia due to its continued incoherent nuclear nonproliferation policy at the global and regional level.

The study finds that the double standard adopted by nuclear weapon states, particularly the US, was the main reason for the failure of the non-proliferation efforts in South Asia. A US sponsored carrot and stick strategy proved insufficient to achieve the desired non-proliferation goals in South Asia. The United States should strengthen the international nuclear non proliferation regimes and make them collaborate with very important external actors in order to contain and eventually put an end to the nuclear weapon proliferation in South Asian region. Even though United States must stick to the ultimate goal of eliminating all sorts of nuclear weapons in the South Asian sub continent, it is also the interim goal of United States policy that should be a hindrance on the nations, India and Pakistan’s nuclear capacities which should be
below the deployment threshold. United States can and should promote a nuclear cap in the South Asian region by employing the strategy of a sustained and highly targeted sanctions and conditional incentives, serving as coherent element for nuclear non proliferation policy and they should be consistent with nuclear non proliferation goals. Technological and financial constraints have always prevented both India and Pakistan from assigning highly operational and survivable nuclear weapons tactical systems in the near future. The Heavily indebted Pakistan economy cannot sustain the heavy financial burden of massive high scale weaponisation process and also the nuclear deployment on its own terms. Since India should have to take her threats, Pakistani and Chinese nuclear capabilities into account, the costs of a full scale weaponisation through several levels of indigenous sources would also strain India’s national resources. And both nations are really in need for external technology and also the hardware to fully engage their nuclear and ballistic missile systems. India and Pakistan are therefore trying to seek the resumption of unrestricted United States economic and technological collaboration by hoping that it would get United States dual use technology, India as a strong nation is constantly pressurizing the Barack Obama administration to remove all sorts of remaining economic and technological sanctions against it. The Indian official spokespersons have repeatedly pointed out that by referring to the “mismatch between sanctions and the new direction of India United States relationships.” But the United States is, deeply interested in India. India expects United States to transfer high technology, conventional hardware, and a resumption of economic loans and grants, Pakistan is also trying to attempt and confront United States which is always living under the fear of Islamic extremism. With a broad international support, the United States should also make sure that the credits and loans from the International financial institutions are not diverted to military spending by Pakistan and eventually these weapons reaching in to the hands of non-state actors. The United States should use its influence in both the countries that their nuclear weapons existence will cost economic and social development objectives. But at the same time, the United States should also offer substantial economic and diplomatic assistance on the matter of nuclear non proliferation progress in South Asian region. The failing Pakistan economy and the state really pose challenges to regional security
and global stability. The study finds that immediate and transparent efforts on the part of the nuclear weapons states to ensure safety, stability and security of nuclear weapons in Pakistan is a vital component in today’s world.

While analyzing, we can see that domestically in both countries of India and Pakistan, the critical issue of a nuclear weapon is ranked far below when we put other societal concerns, including the major need for economic development and poverty alleviation in both countries. A carefully targeted economic incentives strategy which should be based on a “debt for disarmament” plan could definitely help to build a complete domestic pressure in both the cases of India and Pakistan against the possession of nuclear warheads. The major targeted economic incentives could include an incremental forgiveness on both India’s and Pakistan’s all forms of external debts from the part of the advanced industrialized states and the International Financial Institutions, which are really conditional on nuclear non-proliferation progress and even stipulating that reduced debt service payments should be reallocated to address the basic human matters. From the United States perspective, her nuclear non-proliferation policy is also made in context of other foreign and security issues. Thus, United States objectives also should include countering the spread of terrorism from Pakistan, they should ensure that the safety of Pakistan’s heavy nuclear weapons arsenal, and thus by forming a strong strategic partnership with India, which has importance in both conventional military and nuclear cooperation components. In total, the current state of affairs completely shows us that the perceptions of the so-called national interest force consideration of other factors apart from the ideals of nuclear non-proliferation. The biggest nuclear threat that is concerning is with proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states, though that creates a total danger. But the biggest concern is that the individual belief of policy makers from a small number of nations that they have every right to keep nuclear warheads indefinitely and that in their hands nuclear weapons will not constitute any threat either to their own citizens or to the humanity. This is totally a black out belief which discounts the core principle that if there is a chance for something to go wrong then it will definitely go wrong. It has also a hardened belief that it is likely to encourage nuclear weapon proliferation to other states and even its
possible for any terrorist organization as well. But there can be no concrete reason to be given that the nuclear weapons with current nuclear weapons states will definitely not result in a tragedy by surpassing all sorts of imagination. For many years India has been made it clear to the world that it totally supports nuclear weapons disarmament, but that it is not at all willing to live in a world where “nuclear apartheid” exists. Indian leaders have several times even stated that if all other nations will give up nuclear weapons and agree to go to a zero level, India would definitely be happy to join those states. At the same time On the other hand, the Indian national leaders have already said that if the nuclear weapons powers keep on insisting on maintaining huge nuclear arsenals, India will also keep a huge nuclear arsenal. India even gave the world a sudden and swift wakeup call in May when it tested its own nuclear weapons, followed a few weeks later by Pakistan’s nuclear tests. In the light of these testing there are five propositions to make. The very first proposition is that the nuclear weapon testing done by both India and Pakistan does not allow any sort of nuclear proliferation. Both states had nuclear weapons at their disposal for a very long time before the tests. India first tested a nuclear weapon, after which it said the test was for completely peaceful purposes, in the year of 1974. The world completely ignored the possession of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan.

The study also finds that the current global nuclear disarmament agenda sponsored by the US and other nuclear weapon states virtually resulted in the vertical and horizontal proliferation. As long as the nuclear power nations are to be maintained such nuclear arsenals are necessary for their own security, we can even expect that the other non nuclear power countries will also show a desire to have these weapons. Statements that often condemning the nuclear proliferation by the leaders of nuclear weapons states, should not be taken seriously as long as the United States continues its present policy of keeping its nuclear arsenal for the indefinite future. There is only one way in order to prevent the nuclear proliferation. And that is for the nuclear weapon states to make a strong commitment to the complete destruction of their nuclear weapons and in order to take steps, separating nuclear warheads from their respective delivery vehicles, to show that they are really serious about their commitment towards
peace and security. Another major finding of the study is that the nuclear warheads do not even provide enough security. If you possess nuclear weapons, you will become the potential target of a threatened nuclear weapons attack. So if the citizens of a nuclear weapons states really wants to understand the jeopardy in which they are being placed by their own respective governments’ policies. Of course, there are also the risk to the security and peace of the world. Nuclear Deterrence is just a simple theory and it is not at all a shield. One definitely cannot prove that a nuclear war will not occurred just because of the existence of nuclear deterrence. There will be no clear cause and effect linkage. In fact it will not be possible to prove a negative for this that because of just one thing, something else could not happen. We might be just plainly lucky enough that a nuclear war has not yet happened since two or more countries have, been in possession of nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan, the major rivalries in the region, these are the countries that have gone for war three times in the past 50 years, will definitely put an additional strain on the theory of deterrence.

Another notable finding of the study is that the arms control agreements should have served largely as a “fig leaf” of respectability for maintaining a huge two tier structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots,” which have already began to end up in a nuclear apartheid. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that actually enshrines the proposition that there are two types of states those that are possessed with nuclear weapons before January 1, 1967 as one class, and the rest as another class. The only way to get out of this situation is for the nuclear weapons states to pursue a good faith in negotiations for a complete nuclear disarmament which are set forth in the treaty. Unfortunately, all the nuclear power countries do not have done this despite the very strong reinforcement of this treaty provision by the World Court in its 1996. The study also projects that terrorism has become an accepted and completely integrated part in the national security policies of the nuclear weapons states. One aspect that has received inadequate attention is the relationship between terrorism and the regional politics of nuclear weapons. The study reveals that this relationship is more relevant in the case of South Asia. The South Asian region is characterized by the active presence of terrorists who have the potential for indiscriminate mass violence, and by the growth of nuclear tensions, particularly
after the nuclear tests in 1998 by India and Pakistan. The longstanding hostility between India and Pakistan has the potential to facilitate nuclear/radiological terrorism in a number of ways. The scope for terrorists to determine the course of events in the region parallels the nuclear stances of India and Pakistan. Each form of nuclear posture carries some risk of terrorist involvement. This growing danger encompasses much of the world. Lax or inadequate security over nuclear materials and weapons in one country could be exploited to trigger atomic blackmail and terrorism elsewhere. Inadequate security at nuclear facilities also could provide extremists waging a campaign of terror within a nation an opportunity to create a situation of national terror by seizing or sabotaging a civilian nuclear power plant or a research reactor or a laboratory. The increasing level of technological sophistication among terrorist groups, coupled with a renewed determination to achieve political goals, has significantly raised the potential for nuclear terrorism in South Asia. The US should adopt genuine non-proliferation efforts to deal with new and emerging challenges in the sub continent. The most tragic thing is that even an opportunity to abolish nuclear weapons is being squandered in the nuclear weapons states by leaders with lack of futuristic vision.

The study further reveals that the sources of nuclear and other security threats towards India and Pakistan are different. An influential section of the Indian security establishment projects that the greatest threat that they are facing from China. Therefore India’s nuclear and missile development program is geared, in contrast, towards countering the Beijing with a most secured deterrent. However, the Beijing’s primary threat perception comes from the United States role in the Asia Pacific region. Consequently, one must consider that the possibility that China may conduct several nuclear tests in the coming years if United States goes ahead with the strategy to construct newer, and more reliable warheads. The security dilemma that is currently present in the South Asian region operates as a continued chain reaction which includes both regional and extra regional powers with high levels of competing interests. For countries like India and China, it is very important to note that while the goals of nuclear non proliferations are totally crucial; these are perceived with national interests which are a greater factor in shaping the ultimate
policy direction. With this sort of motivational framework in mind, a policy analyzer should examine recent nuclear proliferation related developments in South Asian region, which are likely to have a far reaching problems both in regional terms and in terms of the global nuclear non proliferation regime. These are included in the proposed India - United States nuclear cooperation, which shows the significance of the A.Q. Khan network, and their links between South Asian regional nations and Middle East proliferation potentials. These sorts of developments reflect, partly or in whole, the complete need for a weaker protagonist to the correct and expected security imbalance against a stronger threat. Nuclear Proliferation issues in the South Asian region must be understood in a different context where vertical and horizontal proliferation does exist. Vertical proliferation takes place since nuclear states try to modernize their nuclear warhead arsenals with more and more reliable and capable delivery systems and also the nuclear warheads. There are several countries including the United States, China, India, and Pakistan, are in the process of modernizing their nuclear arsenals through indefinite actions such as proposals for “a reliable replacement warhead”. In the context of South Asian regional security, nuclear modernization is becoming mainly a function of casting threat perceptions that are arising from several levels of security dilemmas. Modernization of nuclear arsenals also includes the development and testing of much longer range of missiles like the Agni 3 by India, and the Shaheen 2 by Pakistan in the beginning of 2007. Horizontal proliferation is one that accounts for the spread of nuclear weapons technology from nuclear states to other types of entities; this includes aspiring for nuclear weapon states, as well as several non-state actors such as hardcore terrorist elements. Horizontal proliferation normally involves an important role for Weapons of Mass Destruction supply networks that may or may not have any connection to official entities in a nuclear powered nation. In the South Asian regional context, this sort of variant nuclear proliferation is specifically pertinent, given the complete history of the A.Q. Khan’s network and its heavy assistance to states like North Korea and Iran. In addition to this horizontal proliferation includes a second tier proliferation, where the developing nations trade and barter nuclear technology with each other. From the sub continental perspective, the major
challenge is the lack of a comprehensive resolution of the disputes between India and Pakistan and India and China. South Asia is one of the most populated regions of the world, with India and Pakistan alone accounting for about 1.35 billion people. Both nations have been bitter rivals since the period of partition in the south Asian subcontinent in the year 1947 which had already led to the creation of an independent Pakistan and independence for India. Both nations have fought two wars over Kashmir (1947, 1965), one over East Pakistan/Bangladesh (1971), one limited war (Kargil, 1999) and also the ongoing insurgency in Kashmir (since 1989). The 2001 - 2002 crisis even further highlighted the heavy dangers of terrorist violence which acts as a provoking conventional conflict that could lead to a bigger nuclear crisis. The role played by China in South Asian regional security issues and also in future conflict scenarios are really crucial when considering two major realities-the historical animosity between India and China; and the long standing ‘all-weather’ political and military alliance between Pakistan and China.

Another notable observation in the study is that the Indo- US Nuclear Deal initiated in July 2005 was a major breakthrough in the global non-proliferation regime. It significantly altered the US nuclear strategy in South Asia. This agreement eventually allows India to get nuclear technology and fissile materials from the US and other Nuclear Suppliers Group members. In return, India will open up its civilian nuclear facilities for IAEA inspections. The basic feature of Indo –US Nuclear Deal is that by acquiring more uranium from foreign sources in order to ease up the domestic supplies and also by placing a set of nuclear facilities on the military list, India can increase its fissile material production for further weaponisation purposes. But there is, a different line of analysis which examines the total implications of increased uranium 235 supplies in the context of India’s ongoing nuclear submarine project. With this perspective in mind, India rather than increasing the amount of nuclear warhead production, India would use its ability to support uranium supplies and its enrichment capacity to fuel its ongoing nuclear submarine project. There are two separate lines of criticism of the deal; the first focuses on the nonproliferation objective, and the second on India’s strategic needs. The first perspective is that the agreement will weaken the global nonproliferation
regime by condoning India’s nuclear weapons program. The argument is that by introducing India-specific changes to global as well as domestic U.S. nonproliferation laws, it will be more difficult to prevent nuclear transfers involving other countries such as China-Pakistan and Russia-Iran. A further objection is that even with 14 reactors under safeguards, 8 others will remain on the military list, free to manufacture plutonium for several nuclear weapons annually. Additionally, critics have stated that the agreement so far does not commit India to eschew nuclear testing formally, or to end fissile material production. The second criticism comes most notably, from members of the nuclear scientific community in India, who contend that elements of the agreement would in effect cap India’s nuclear program and constrain its thorium-based three stage nuclear project. They argue that while New Delhi has maintained a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, it does not want such a clause legalized in a bilateral treaty. The argument here is that India might have to reconsider its moratorium in the event that China or Pakistan conducts a nuclear test. The Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement also demonstrates that changes in the nuclear supplier regimes will not be restricted only to bilateral nuclear trade between the United States and India. Nuclear energy firms from several countries other than the US have already signed agreements with Indian firms for nuclear energy trade. Thus, nuclear energy companies are important players in the future of this agreement as well as the broader nonproliferation regime. Besides deals in the nuclear energy sector, the Indo-US cooperation was further extended to defence and strategic partnerships. Therefore, the study shows that its implications go well beyond the nuclear energy sector.

The study further reveals that proliferation dynamics in the subcontinent are affected by numerous factors centered around security issues, regional and global power politics, and domestic considerations. While both India and Pakistan realize the need to support nonproliferation efforts, agendas driven by national interests take priority. This is especially so considering that long-standing territorial disputes in South Asia have not yet been resolved despite sustained peace talks. Broadly speaking, proliferation dynamics in South Asia are driven by a need to establish some measure of relative parity against their principal adversaries-India against
China and Pakistan against India. Such competing security agendas ensure that nuclear modernization, through production of fissile material and development of more effective delivery systems will continue for the time being. Though there have been significant confidence building measures between India and Pakistan, including an agreement on reducing nuclear risk as well as reestablishment of transport links, they have not yet brought about any significant progress on basic security disputes, such as Kashmir and terrorist violence. Similarly, Sino-Indian negotiations on resolving the border question, while reiterating the need for a long-term solution, have not made any headway. In general, concerns of negative shifts in the future balance of power persuade the protagonists to adopt a more cautious policy. Thus, the driving forces for nuclear modernization remain in place. At the same time, the threat of horizontal proliferation has not abated; even more so given the rising political instability in Pakistan and the growing strength of terrorist networks in the Waziristan area. The fact that there is still much to be uncovered about the A.Q. Khan network adds to the uncertainty.

Finally, the study reasonably surmised that US nonproliferation policy operates in the context of other foreign and security imperatives. Thus, Washington’s objectives include countering the spread of terrorism from Pakistan, ensuring the safety of Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal, and forming a strategic partnership with India, which would have important conventional military and nuclear cooperation components. In sum, the present state of affairs demonstrates that perceptions of national interest force consideration of other factors apart from the ideals of nonproliferation. The study also finds that U.S. nonproliferation policy faces major challenges in South Asia, as India and Pakistan threaten to deploy deliverable nuclear arsenals. Incoherent U.S. nonproliferation policies and inappropriate influence strategies have encouraged India and Pakistan to advance their nuclear weapons capabilities. The double standard in U.S. nonproliferation policies failed to influence South Asian nuclear proliferation. Most of the non-proliferation strategies of the US were guided by political as well as economical interests. Due to this, US failed to influence both Indian and Pakistani nuclear decision making. The lack of commitment and transparency in US non-proliferation
efforts again led to nuclear tests conducted by both Pakistan and India in 1998. This was interpreted as a failure of US non-proliferation policy in south Asia. After its initial rhetoric on the nuclear disarmament and nuclear security agenda, the Obama administration also failed to reverse global nuclear proliferation. The administration also failed to influence South Asian nuclear programme. The U.S. must strengthen international nonproliferation regimes and collaborate with important external actors to influence and eventually reverse nuclear proliferation in South Asia.