Chapter II
U.S NUCLEAR POLICY: An Overview

The United States was the first country in the world which developed nuclear weapons and also used nuclear weapons against Japan during World War II under the order of President Franklin Roosevelt. Between 1945 and 1990, more than 70,000 total warheads were developed, in over 65 different varieties, ranging in yield from around .01 kilotons (such as the man-portable Davy Crockett shell) to the 25 megaton B41 bomb. Between 1940 and 1996, the U.S. spent at least $8.78 trillion in present-day terms on nuclear weapons development. Over half was spent on building delivery mechanisms for the weapon. The groundbreaking developments of the late 80s and early 90s have shattered the foundation of the post-war international system characterized by a bipolar distribution of power between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The two superpowers had hitherto been engaged in an intensive political, economic, ideological and technological struggle which had brought the world to the brink of potentially devastating nuclear war. After the sudden demise of its competitor, the U.S. found itself in a unique position in the international system, unparalleled in modern history. Many authors have come forth with their definitions of the newly achieved status of the U.S. Charles Krauthammer wrote about the — unipolar moment, attributing to the U.S. the role of the sole superpower as in the mid-term horizon. There was no other international actor with a potential to rival its military, diplomatic, political and economic predominance (Krauthammer, 1990). Samuel P. Huntington (1999) had more or less accepted the same assumptions but claimed that the current international system was unimultipolar since there were many other regional powers exerting influence on the course of international politics, although limited in robustness and geographical scope. After the end of the cold war, the U.S. nuclear program was heavily curtailed, halting its program of nuclear testing, ceasing production of new nuclear weapons, and reducing its stockpile by half by the mid-1990s under President Bill Clinton(Arms Control Association: 1994). Many of its former nuclear facilities were shut down, and their sites became targets of extensive environmental remediation. During the presidency
of George W. Bush, and especially after the 11 September terrorist attacks of 2001, rumours have circulated in major news sources that the U.S. has been considering design of new nuclear weapons ("bunker-busting nukes"), and the resumption of nuclear testing for reasons of stockpile stewardship.

The Cold War has been over for more than a decade now, and the world has moved on. A lot has been written about what that means for U.S. nuclear policy. Two interesting trends have emerged so far. First, there is widespread agreement among quite disparate parts of the defense community on some important issues. In particular, nearly everyone agrees that U.S. nuclear forces can be reduced drastically compared to Cold War levels. Second, even that degree of consensus masks remaining deep philosophical differences on the most basic concepts of nuclear strategy, the nature of the risks, and practical steps that the United States should take with respect to its nuclear forces. US nuclear policy and its responses to global proliferation is one of the decisive factors influencing nuclear proliferation across the world. This section presents the major developments in US nuclear policy after its historic Manhattan project. US nuclear policy entered its decisive stage during the Presidency of Ronald Reagan because of the intense arms race between US and Soviet Union. Reagan was under the impression that there existed a nuclear threat from Soviets and this made him more aggressive in pursuing much more defense science projects and trying to develop long range ballistic missile arsenals to fight against the Soviets. This had made an increase in the tensions between both nations and their top most leaders began to engage in conversations. Reagan and Gorbachev came into an agreement on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement, and established the foundation for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which was concluded in 1991 and these agreements made Reagan administration to revive the weapon systems because these agreements were not capable of placing peace between both nations. Once Reagan took office he resumed talks with Soviets on the matter of eliminating intermediate range missiles and launch systems. But Soviets rejected the plan. This made United States to bring improved systems for nuclear warhead delivery. During the mid 1982 Reagan initiated the talks for nuclear arms reduction which was dubbed as START. The US proposal was one sided and
it wasn’t designed to reduce the number of cruise missiles and bomber planes in US side but it was mainly to control soviets. Soviets rejected the plan. And United States began to deploy ground and launched cruise missiles in Europe. This made an end to their fruitless negotiations with the US. (Schwartz Stephen:1998)

In the era of Reagan many scholars had a view that there was a high tension between both US and USSR on the matter of possibility of inadvertent nuclear exchange. The raise in the number of US nuclear exercises after 1983 was a high tension factor. These new levels of nuclear exercise from the part of US led the Soviets to improve their nuclear capabilities. Reagan claimed that the highest priority of US-Soviet relations should be about avoiding a nuclear war and also about reducing their nuclear arsenals. In a speech delivered to the United Nations, just six weeks before the 1984 presidential election, Reagan positioned himself as a peacemaker by calling for a new round of comprehensive arms negotiations with the Soviets. Reagan initiated a new chapter in the strategic debate on March 23, 1983, when he announced his plan to develop space-based anti-ballistic missile systems that would render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” (Powaski Ronald:2000). But at the same time the Reagan administration tried to convince the world that it is their job to put Soviets under pressure there by making the Soviets to fund more on these obsolete technologies on space and other fields so that their concentration on developing nuclear arsenals will be lowered eventually. Reagan’s national security adviser, Robert C. McFarlane, claimed that the administration “primarily committed to launching it with the expectation that we would never have to build it because the Soviets would come our way in the arms control setting.” That was not the public case made by the administration at the time. Reagan and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger repeatedly held out the promise of an anti-ballistic missile defense system that could provide a “security shield” to protect the population and eliminate the prevailing strategic situation of mutually assured destruction.

The critics of Star Wars see this policy in a different way. According to them it will lead to further arms race which are both offensive and defensive. And there is always a chance of preemptive attacks. SDI also threatened the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which was designed to constrain such a programme and which would have to be abrogated or violated long before a deployment decision could be made. To circumvent these constraints, the Reagan administration in October 1985 advanced a controversial reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty that would allow for the development and testing of space-based and other mobile ABM systems and components. This so-called broad interpretation actually contradicted the treaty, which prohibited the testing and development of space-based defenses and/or development of a nationwide missile defense system. (George P Shultz:1993). In January 1985, as the United States deployed new missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union agreed to Reagan’s proposal for resuming arms control negotiations on strategic, intermediate, and defensive weapons. In November 1985, Reagan held a summit meeting with the new Soviet premier, Mikhail Gorbachev, which was Reagan’s first with any top Soviet leader. The Geneva meeting brought a new note of civility to superpower relations but achieved no immediate results. Both sides continued publicly to advocate radical, presumably non-negotiable, solutions to the nuclear dilemma. At the same time, each side continued to develop and deploy new and more advanced weaponry. During Reagan’s time US was able to build massive strategic nuclear build up against any nuclear threats form Soviet Union. This made the Moscow to be more tensed and there raised a new level of anti-nuclear activism that increased political dialogues on the matter. Yet, Reagan’s unconventional leadership style and determination also allowed him to reach out to the Soviet leadership and relate to Gorbachev’s new and bold thinking. Together the two leaders set their nations on a path toward arms control arrangements that reflected their personal abhorrence for nuclear war and addressed domestic and international concern about where Cold War nuclear rivalry might eventually lead without such restraint. (George Shultz:1993)

2.1 Bush Administrations Nuclear Doctrine

Since the Bush administration took office, and especially since excerpts of the Nuclear Posture Review were released, there have appeared in America some heated arguments about the Bush administration’s changes to the Clinton administration’s nuclear strategy, what consequences these changes would produce,
and what influences they would exert on international and regional security. The US president Bush’s foreign policy had made some radical changes that created a boost in global arms trade which made the US-Soviet arms race looked weak. In his only significant public pronouncement on the subject, Bush put forward a schizophrenic view of the nuclear conundrum. He even implied that the cold war doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD—the doctrine that spurred the U.S and the Soviet Union to build thousands upon thousands of nuclear weapons as a way of ensuring that neither side would dare attack the other for fear of being annihilated in return) was a “dead relic” of a bygone era. (Henry Sokolsky:2001). President Bush initiated the deployment of a massive missile defense programme on the scale of Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars” plan. But now it has been completed with interceptor missiles based on land, sea, air and in outer space. The main contradiction in the Bush view taking reassuring steps by downsizing the size of the U.S arsenal and taking forces off alert on the one hand, while provoking other nuclear powers with a massive Star Wars programme on the other disappeared if one looked at the common thread uniting these proposals. (Keith B. Payne:2005)

Spurred on by the ideological ratings of conservative think tanks like the Heritage Foundation and Frank Gaffney’s Center for Security Policy, a powerful bloc within the Republican Party has increasingly come to treat negotiated arms control arrangements like the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II), and the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban treaty as obstacles to U.S supremacy rather than guarantors of a fragile but critical level of stability in the nuclear age. The right-wing always called these treaties and talks as immature because they were having an attitude of “peace through strength, not peace through paper.” Republicans have always meant shredding two decades of international arms control agreements and most of which were negotiated by Republican presidents which was a contrary to their political stand. Bush advisers like Stephen Hadley have suggested that the U.S can significantly reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons in its current arsenal of 8,000 to 10,000 strategic warheads. Simultaneously, the U.S would need to modernize the force by developing low yield nuclear weapons that could be used for missions like
destroying hardened underground command centers or hidden weapons facilities. The barely concealed premise of this emerging nuclear doctrine is a desire to make U.S nuclear weapons more usable. This dubious proposition is grounded on the notion that a low-yield weapon could more readily be used as a threat, or actually dropped on a target, without sparking nuclear retaliation by another nuclear power. Conservative analysts have even suggested that low-yield nukes are a “humanitarian” weapon, claiming that they can be used to take out underground biological warfare laboratories, for example, with less loss of life than would result from other approaches to destroying such facilities. The scaring aspect of this new doctrine of making nuclear weapons more usable is that the Bush administration tried to sell it to the American public as a forward-looking, responsible approach to nuclear arms control. It entailed reductions in the numbers of U.S nuclear weapons, it was presented as a step forward from the nuclear gridlock of the Clinton/Gore administration, a fallow period during which not a single significant nuclear arms reduction agreement was negotiated. The fact that it might provoke nuclear buildups in Russia and China provoked the nascent nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, terrifying European allies. Ronald Reagan came to office in 1981 with guns blazing, pushing for a new generation of nuclear weapons and a Star Wars system. By the end of his second term, however, he had put Star Wars on the shelf and signed on to two major nuclear arms reduction treaties, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Reagan’s historic reversal came as a direct result of pressure brought to bear by the nuclear freeze campaign, the European Nuclear Disarmament movement (END), and pressures from European allies and Mikhail Gorbachev, who would not take no for an answer. (Arnett Eric:1996)

2.2 Post Cold War U.S Nuclear Policy

The relationship between democracy and nuclear weapons is extremely ambivalent. On the one hand, in the theory of democratic peace, democracies are regarded as afraid of risk and cost-conscious: their citizens strive to avoid the threat which brings with it the war for life, limb and property. Their orientation around welfare, moreover, causes them to limit the burden of armament costs and defense
expenditure to what is necessary to safeguard the existence of the nation-state. The fall of the super power Soviet Union opened new, incalculable chances for the leading democracy, the United States, to reconsider its relationship with nuclear weapons. Recognition of these new opportunities was slow to grow during the first tenure of the Bush government. Nuclear planning was executed as before, oriented towards a super power, whose military especially nuclear equipment was to be deemed vulnerable in the face of American nuclear weapons. This strategy was continued even after the first breakthrough in arms control, the INF Treaty, came to fruition; nor was it abandoned when both sides negotiated and concluded the START treaties and clearly reduced tactical nuclear weapons on the basis of unilateral, yet parallel political declarations. The government revived nuclear non-proliferation which until the Gulf War had remained neglected. At the end of its term in office, the government declared a nuclear test moratorium, after which it put up a strong fight against the proposed conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Early plans for the broad modernization of the nuclear weapons arsenal were also abandoned as was the deployment of a new short-range weapon in Europe. The structure of the American nuclear forces remained, however, intact like the strategy. The first Bush government considered employing nuclear weapons as deterrence, preemption, warfare and retaliation against states possessing weapons of mass destruction. This debate began to find its way into strategic planning. The Clinton government’s hopeful, multilateral start gave way to growing signs of unilateralism. However, the government never completely gave up arms control and multilateralism. It reinforced the efforts of the “Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme” that aimed to help Russia and other successor states to deal safely with their dangerous inheritance of Soviet weapons of mass destruction. The Clinton government led an energetic campaign to obtain the unlimited extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and successfully concluded negotiations on the Test Ban Treaty. Yet, the Senate refused to consent to ratify this treaty, which was attributed not least to the half-hearted advertising attempts of the administration. Under Clinton, the U.S endeaverer to increase the transparency in the nuclear sector, and achieved temporary agreement with Russia to further reduce strategic arsenals. Also, the
nuclear bureaucracy extended the traditional philosophy, strategy and weapons structure of the nuclear sector in the “Nuclear Posture Review”. Counter proliferation”, i.e. military options versus weapons of mass destruction and missiles of “rogue states”, was officially part of the Pentagon’s strategy; nuclear planners also contemplated the option of first strike against these “new enemies”. The violent removal of the Iraqi regime was discussed inside and outside the administration. It thus emerges that the second President Bush regime went along with his unilateral path of security policy. September 11 likewise changed nothing in Bush’s nuclear strategy. The “hawks” in the government pursued their old objectives only with greater determination; this is where the difference between “before” and “after” lies. The security strategy of the Bush government was based on absolute military superiority. As the new Nuclear Posture Review reveals, this refers first to a smaller arsenal of active and operational nuclear weapons, and secondly to a reserve of several thousand warheads, enabling rapid development into a “Cold War” arsenal. In so doing, the administration aimed to maintain complete freedom of action. (Scott Sagan:1997) Against such a background, the Bush government was against legally binding disarmament treaties. Its concession, to conclude the SORT Treaty, reflected this position in a subtle way. The treaty aimed at a reduction in the active, operational, strategic arsenals of 2,500 warheads by 2012. The reserves are not affected by the reductions, the nature of the implementation is open, short-term cancellation of the treaty is permitted; the treaty ends on the date on which it is fulfilled, after which the parties are free to rebuild their arsenals. Bush also announced the ABM Treaty and set about building the first elements of a missile defense system. The administration claimed to have the right to make pre-emptive and preventive military strikes against states with weapons of mass destruction and prepared its troops for such missions. This could involve the use of nuclear weapons, should their employment be considered necessary to destroy the enemy’s underground command facilities or weapons of mass destruction. The administration examined whether new nuclear weapons, the effects of which would be optimized for the job, were needed for this purpose. Bush’s security policy has almost no place for multilateral arms control and non-proliferation. A review of 14 years shows a
number of telling patterns. There was a steady reduction in the number of deployed nuclear weapons. The structure of the armed forces in the nuclear sector has, on the other hand, remained the same. The list of objectives in Russia no longer determines the permanently applicable objective planning; this is flexible and adaptable to the security situation at the time. The operational arsenal would nevertheless cover the objectives of an attack directed against Russia’s strategic forces. The supposed democratic preference for minimal deterrent arsenals determined the direction but not the substance of the study. The arsenal, for the next decade, is clearly bigger, by far more operational and expandable, than numerous non-government experts had recommended and Russian partners had suggested. Clearly, the political and bureaucratic preferences which have determined American nuclear policy in 14 years do not match the model of nuclear policy which is derived from the axioms of “democratic peace”. This applies to the negative trend of arms control, which started promisingly but which stagnated in the mid-1990, despite the best framework conditions. (Eric V Larson:1996) Today, we face the new position of a nuclear-armed, pre-emptive, unilateralist, democratic philosophy of superiority, in no way the minimalist, multilateral concept of cooperative security which we expected. Yet, democracy plays the role of supporting the argument of the policy, in quite unexpected way. While the supposed enemy has changed on a few occasions and emphasize on who the main enemy is has also varied, the basic pattern remains – an enemy exists and is totalitarian and therefore dangerous and not trustworthy – a constant in the structure of American nuclear weapons policy. (Joseph.S.Nye:1990). In the present context, nuclear weapons represent an option in the preemption strategy and preparations to develop new nuclear weapon types are under way. The deterrent side is gaining acceptance in the relationship between democracy and nuclear weapons. The arms control strategy was successful only at the start, to stagnate and disappear altogether. Also, the nuclear establishment perceives non contradiction between democratic values and the murderous character of the deterrent apparatus. (James A.Baker:1995)
2.3 Nuclear Policy under Obama

Barack Obama is the first post Cold War U.S President who truly embraces the issue of nuclear prohibition, and to pursue a policy to reduce U.S reliance on nuclear weapons. When Obama assumed the President’s office he promised considerable change in U.S nuclear weapons policy, the centerpiece of this was his very public desire to reignite the quest for “global nuclear zero”. The new US president wanted progress made towards this goal by embarking on a three-pronged strategy during his first year in office. First, this would involve a concerted effort with Russia to make further cuts in both powers’ strategic nuclear arsenals a prerequisite for any further multilateral nuclear reductions involving the other seven nuclear powers. (Barry R Posen/Andrew L Ross:2012) Second, Obama intends to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S security policy by gradually increasing the role of advanced non-nuclear weaponry to perform functions previously covered only by nuclear weapons. Third, he wants to stop the spread and possible use of nuclear weapons by actors hostile to the United States through a renewed approach to nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. The Obama administration’s approach to nuclear policy has been framed by the changing nature of United States power, and threats approach to its security in the post Cold War, and post 9/11, and possibly in the post unipolar world. The past two decades had seen a gradual shift in U.S policy from the centrality of great power politics and nuclear rivalry with Russia and China, towards a greater focus on rogue state and terrorist nuclear threats, and this is strongly reflected in Obama’s approach to U.S nuclear weapons thinking. In addition to the U.S and Russia, Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel are nuclear weapons states and Israel remains an “undeclared nuclear power”. It would appear that his determination to reduce and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology to these actors is a direct result of the belief that other counter-proliferation choices are perhaps no longer open to him, and that reliance upon nuclear deterrence is no longer sufficient. In this sense, Obama’s room for manoeuvre in nuclear policy has been limited both by the changing nature of threats to U.S security in the 21st century, and by perceptions of U.S power in a post-Bush, and particularly post-Iraq, international context.
Even after the efforts made by the world to reduce the nuclear arsenal since the cold war in the year 2009 it was estimated that around 20000 nuclear warheads are being kept by the worlds nine super powers which includes Russia and United states. But among this estimated nuclear arsenal a huge amount of weapons are waiting to get destroyed. And these weapons are enough to destroy the whole world. During the presidential election’s rally many times Obama had showed his willingness to co-operate for a world which has zero weapons. After becoming president he even publically announced about his policy for a nuclear free world in Prague in the year 2009. He took his first step on reducing nuclear weapons when he signed the New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty with Russia to replace START 1. START 1 got expired on December 2009. The new treaty has the ability to limit the number of nuclear warheads deployed by U S and Russia in strategic areas.

After the efforts made by Obama after he was elected as the president many people hopes that U S will consider the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons in any situation. The reality of his effort is mainly that he is striving to balance the need of missile defense which can be used against all sorts of rogue nuclear threats. Although the Obama’s policy is a follow up on the policy of former U S president George W Bush, Obama stands strongly on the matter of zero nuclear weapons agenda. When the U S announced the setting up missile defence in entire Europe it was seen as the U S commitment on nuclear warhead reduction. (Robert S Litwak:2010)

Obama’s nuclear policy has changed the utility of nuclear weapons to mere security thinking. This has given the think tanks an opportunity to theoretically assume that there will be a reduction in U S nuclear stockpile. At the same time U S focusing more on conventional weapons will create a difficulty in reducing the arms race around the world. When U S posses more of conventional weapons and the advantages it have with conventional weapons both in qualitative and quantitative terms will make other nations more attached to nuclear weapons. The major issue faced by the Obama’s new policy is that it will be very difficult to keep a balance between domestic and international nuclear disarmaments. In the modern age of international climate, U S is facing more nuclear threats from terrorist organizations
rather than any particular country. In the post 9/11 world U S policy makers are now reviewing the policy of Mutually assured destruction because there are more non state actors whom are trying to acquire nuclear weapons rather than some nation states. So this has led the U S planners to review several post cold war nuclear policies regarding the first use of nuclear weapons and also about MAD. Even the number of nuclear weapons has gone down when compared to cold war period but the risk has increased due to the roles of non state actors.(Barry Schneider:2008) Obama has recognized this and his initiative about signing START with Russia is a key player. But to continue with his plans he will have to address two major issues. The first issue is how he is going to convince Moscow to agree to reduce its nuclear stockpile. If he is able to convince Russia about reducing their nuclear stockpile then eventually he can convince the domestic population of U S about unilaterally cutting down the nuclear stockpile. The second biggest problem that Obama faces is that how he is going to redirect the U S security policy with non nuclear conventional weapons as the centre of U S security policy. This policy will make nuclear war heads cut down more acceptable in the U.S, but there is a bigger problem of diplomatic and strategic issues as a stumbling block standing against the disarmament agenda internationally. The reason for such a block is that the great U.S conventional superiority will eventually make nuclear weapons more important to her competitors and other actors who challenge the U S.(C.F Nolan:2008)

2.4 Nuclear Weapons in U.S National Security Policy

Nuclear weapons have always been a key issue in the U S national security policy for more than 50 years. From the end of World War II, and, particularly, from the first explosion of a Soviet nuclear weapon in 1949, until the end of the Cold War in 1991, the U.S relied on nuclear weapons to deter Soviet aggression and forestall the outbreak of a global war between itself and the Soviet Union. (Casper Weinberger:1984)Normally the U.S security policy always sought to make it a priority that nuclear and conventional capabilities of U S armed forces are sufficient to hold back any potential aggressor by making the aware that the cost of aggression would exceed any potential gains that it might achieve. Before and during the time of cold war Soviet Union was the only nation that was able to compete with U S and
her allies in the matter of nuclear weapons. Other nations, such as China and Soviet allies in Eastern Europe, were included in the U.S nuclear war plans, but the Soviet threat dominated U.S defense planning. Nuclear forces were sized to deter the Soviet threat; these were then thought to be sufficient to deter or respond to the “lesser included cases” of threats from other nations. Although there were debates about the numbers and types of weapons that the U.S should deploy in its nuclear arsenal, there was little doubt, or debate, among analysts, experts, and government officials about the need for it to deter the Soviet threat. (Sydney D Drell:2005)

This widespread opinion about the nature of the threat to the United States and its allies, and the need for nuclear weapons to deter and respond to this threat, began to dissolve during the period of 1990s, when the Soviet Union got disintegrated. When there was nobody else to compete with U.S. Some argued that in the absence of the U.S threat of global nuclear war, it should declare that her nuclear weapons should serve only as “weapons of last resort”. On the other hand there were another group of people who argued that the United States needed to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent to “hedge” against the possibility of a resurgence of the Russian threat. United States began to maintain nuclear forces with almost as of the same size and shape as it did during the 1990s. Nevertheless, the George W. Bush Administration has continued to emphasize the need to size and shape U.S. nuclear forces to deter emerging threats from a growing number of potential adversaries. Specifically, the Bush Administration has indicated that the United States would employ a strategy of “tailored deterrence” where the weapons and attack strategies guiding U.S. nuclear forces would be “tailored” to address the specific capabilities and goals of emerging adversaries. (Jason Sherman:2005)

2.5 U.S and Nuclear Deterrence.

Deterrence, is the theoretical construct of strategic deterrence, describes an ongoing interaction between two parties. In a deterrent relationship, there will be one or both parties seek to persuade the other party to refrain from harmful actions either by threatening or by promising the other party that the costs of action will outweigh the benefits. This strategy can be done by threatening to impose high costs on the acting nation, threatening to deny the benefits the other nation may seek
through its actions, and promising to withhold the costs if the nation forgoes the expected action. There were a lot of Questions about the credibility of U.S deterrent policy persisted throughout the Cold War, with the U.S adjusting its doctrine, targeting strategy, and force structure periodically in an effort to bolster its credibility and enhance deterrence. U.S did not try to maintain a “one size fits all deterrent,” but sought to “tailor” its forces and attack strategies to affect the perceptions of the S.U, and other potential adversaries, by making them believe that the U.S had the will and the weapons, and also the plans needed to make sure that it would respond if attacked and that the level of destruction on enemy would be unacceptable to the opposite party. The George W Bush Administration’s focus on well defined and precise deterrence follows the same logic with the focus on planning attack strategies and weapons which creates a credible deterrent threat. (Jaison Sherman:2005) The Bush Administration’s theory of “tailored deterrence” is quite different from the classic “strategic deterrence” in two ways. First, the Bush Administration is arguing that the U.S must prepare to face a wider range of threats from a greater number of potential adversaries, so it is seeking to assess weapons capabilities, operational plans, and targeting strategies to counter the capabilities of “advanced military powers, regional WMD states, and non-state terrorists.” Second aspect is that tailored deterrence focuses less on maintaining a deterrent relationship with any specific nation than it does on acquiring the capabilities to attack and destroy valued targets in another nation. (Jaison Sherman:2005)

Although the period of the Cold War ended, the challenge on U.S nuclear policy was to make the threat of nuclear retaliation, and thereby the U.S deterrent posture will become credible. The U.S repeatedly sought to sharpen and adjust its forces and targeting strategy towards this end so that the S.U would believe and heed its threat to retaliate with nuclear weapons. The 1950’s doctrine known as “massive retaliation” which was designed for “simultaneous, massive, integrated” U.S nuclear strike against targets in the S.U, Eastern Europe, and China if the S.U or its allies tries to start any nuclear or conventional attack against the U.S or its allies. In the late 1950s, many scholars and policy makers began to question on the matter that whether the S.U would believe that the United States would launch a massive
nuclear attack against it in response to any level of aggression against Western Europe, particularly when it became evident that the Soviet Union could strike back with nuclear weapons against us cities. (Amster Warren:1995).

Even after the decline of threat from S U, The U S reportedly continued to get ready for a range of attack options, from limited attacks involving a minor number of bombs to major attacks involving thousands of nuclear and non nuclear warheads, and it also had several plans to carry out attacks against military targets, nuclear forces, and civilian leadership sites in Russia. During the period of the Clinton Administration, even they did not ruled out the possible use of nuclear weapons against nations that were not armed with nuclear weapons themselves. Specifically, it maintained the long-standing U.S policy of reserving the right to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis or conflict “if a state is not in good standing under the Nuclear-Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or an equivalent international convention.” Furthermore, the United States did not rule out the possibility of retaliating with nuclear weapons if a nation attacked it or its forces with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). (Grug Miller:2002) The United States did not, however, directly threaten to use nuclear weapons in retaliation of non-nuclear attacks. Its policy, consistent with the long-standing U.S approach, was one of “studied ambiguity,” neither ruling in nor ruling out the possible use of nuclear weapons in any given circumstance. The United States did, however, reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal, to around 6,000 warheads deployed on strategic delivery vehicles, according to the provisions outlined in the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Even with these reductions, however, the United States continued to maintain a triad of strategic nuclear forces, with warheads deployed on land-based ICBMs, submarine launched SLBMs, and heavy bombers. According to the Department of Defense, this mix of forces not only offered the United States a range of capabilities and flexibility in nuclear planning that complicated an adversary’s attack planning, but also hedged against unexpected problems in any single delivery system. Moreover, the United States still maintained detailed, tailored attack plans that were intended to enhance the credibility of its deterrent posture.(Hans M Kristensen:2005)
NOTES

1. The New York Times of March 8, 1992 first revealed this new U.S global policy. The strategy was to legitimize the use of force and intimidation; to dominate the Western World; to exact acknowledgment of the U.S’s global policing role; and to neutralize the former Soviet Union as a potential nuclear contender. This last objective involved buying of large numbers of technical nuclear experts; radically reducing the Soviet arsenal; and ascertaining that it no longer targeted the United States.

2. “Reed panel” had prepared a top secret report describing a comprehensive nuclear targeting plan for the post-Cold War era, which was leaked to the Washington Post, January 5, 1992. This new policy is the clearest formulation for saving the Cold War, but with new emphasis of nuclear war-fighting directed against Third World insurgencies.

3. The Bush Administration has continued to emphasize the need to size and shape U.S nuclear forces to deter emerging threats from a growing number of potential adversaries. Specifically, the Bush Administration has indicated that the United States would employ a strategy of “tailored deterrence,” where the weapons and attack strategies guiding U.S nuclear forces would be “tailored” to address the specific capabilities and goals of emerging adversaries.

4. The 1950’s doctrine known as “massive retaliation” envisioned a “simultaneous, massive, integrated” U.S nuclear strike against targets in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China if the Soviet Union or its allies initiated any nuclear or conventional attack against the United States or its allies. In the late 1950s, many began to question whether the Soviet Union would believe that the United States would launch a massive nuclear attack against it in response to any level of aggression against Western Europe.

5. Deterrence, or more precisely, the theoretical construct of strategic deterrence, describes an ongoing interaction between two parties. In a deterrent relationship, one or both parties seek to persuade the other to refrain from harmful or
dangerous actions by threatening or promising the other nation that the costs of acting will far outweigh the benefits.

6. The Bush Administration’s concept of “tailored deterrence” is different from classic “strategic deterrence” in two ways. First, the Bush Administration has argued that the United States must prepare to deter a wider range of threats from a greater number of potential adversaries, so it is seeking to tailor weapons capabilities, operational plans, and targeting strategies to counter the capabilities of “advanced military powers, regional WMD states, and non-state terrorists.” Second, tailored deterrence focuses less on maintaining a deterrent relationship with any specific nation than it does on acquiring the capabilities to attack and destroy valued targets of another nation.

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