Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

The issue of nuclear proliferation emerged as the most serious challenge to international community today. The growing influence of Non-State Actors into the security establishment has added new dimensions to the problem. Since dawn of the nuclear age, United States and other major powers tried to formulate an advanced strategy with regard to the development of nuclear weapons. The cold war era witnessed intense nuclear arms race between the two Super powers. Most recent projections show that there are approximately 16,300 nuclear weapons located at some 98 sites in 14 countries. The largest concentrations of nuclear weapons reside in Russia and the United States, which possess 93 percent of the total global inventory. The recent estimates shows that the United States stores nuclear weapons at 18 sites, including 12 sites in 11 states in the United States and another six sites in five European countries. There is considerable uncertainty about the number of Russian nuclear weapons storage sites, but the authors estimate that Russia today stores nuclear weapons permanently at 40 domestic locations. This information shows the growing vulnerabilities in the global nuclear security architecture. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty was formulated to stop further proliferation of nuclear weapons. But unfortunately the world witnessed horizontal and vertical proliferation. The main concern of many nuclear non-proliferation advocates is not nuclear weapon proliferation but the policies of a handful of states claiming that only they have the legitimate right own and operate these weapons. The Indian leaders have always advocated against the nuclear apartheid and stands for a global nuclear disarmament. The double standards adopted by US and other nuclear weapon states towards the non-proliferation regime resulted in global proliferation. This is more evident in South Asia. The end of cold war has certainly lowered the possibility of nuclear holocaust, but nuclear war remains a fear in the post cold war era anyway. In addition to give declared nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, including several other nations in the world can now develop and deploy nuclear devices. After more than two decades of secret research and development, bluff and nuclear ambiguity, India and Pakistan have passed a critical threshold by openly
detonating their nuclear capability. The stockpiles of nuclear and fissile materials in
India and Pakistan continue to mount. Both countries are committed to strengthening
their missile programmes. The defence strategies of both India and Pakistan –
together with the problems posed by the unresolved Kashmir dispute, deep
animosity and distrust between them make South Asia a conflict-prone region.
Although both countries had long been suspected of having “recessed” nuclear
 arsenals, their recent nuclear tests now infused their long standing rivalry with new
dangers. It has become common place to think of the South Asia as the most likely
region where a war could escalate at a trigger to a nuclear exchange.

PROFILE OF THE PROBLEM

The United States and India had good relations with regard to nuclear co
operation for peaceful purposes. US helped India to build nuclear reactor in Tarapur
and also provided heavy water for the CYRUS project. US also assisted Indian
nuclear energy projects by training Indian scientists. This cooperation began in Mid
1950s. Later on when there was active negotiations on NPT, India too joined the
negotiations but it didn’t become a member or a partner in NPT (1968). When India
peacefully tested the nuclear weapon in 1974 US congress was alerted and they were
forced to pass a bill Nuclear Non- Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). After the
passing of this act the US government was forced to stop all kinds of nuclear trade
with those countries which are not a part of NPT. The new act made the trades
impossible to non signatories of NPT. United States in 1975 created a Nuclear
Suppliers Group which was capable enough to control all kinds of nuclear trades that
happens around the world. But when the Bush administration came to power they
tried to explore many ways to start the nuclear trade. In 2001 Bush administration
started negotiations with the Indian officials. India was also in need for a full
strength nuclear co operation because of its growing energy demands. In 2004 US-
India Next Step in Strategic Partnership began (NSSP). This initiative boosted trade
in strategic areas. Several equipments which can be used in Tarapur reactor which
are not regulated by NSG was exported to India. On July 18 2005 President Bush
with then Indian prime minister Man Mohan Singh made a joint statement in which
he stated “will work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable
full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not limited
to expeditions consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at
Tarapur.” US asked several nations to support India in its venture of energy
production. US also supported India in delivering 4th generation equipments. Prime
Minister Singh conveyed that India “would take on the same responsibilities and
practice and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries
with advanced nuclear technology, such the United States.” After that Indo- US
nuclear cooperation entered its decisive phase. The US administration formulated its
nonproliferation policy towards South Asia with certain hidden agendas. US gave
more priority to the strategic interest rather than non proliferation interests.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

South Asia inherited a volatile ethnic, religious and social mix that generates
powerful cross-currents of tension between the states of the region. Within the
geopolitics of South Asia, it is apparent that the major nations of this region-
Pakistan and India have been engaging in proliferation of nuclear arms in the
subcontinent. The involvement of these nations in the subcontinent with regard to
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear programmes has generated
serious suspicions among the nations of the world. This potential nuclear arms race
created the most immediate threat to the U.S orchestrated nuclear non-proliferation
regime. Hence, United States has been focusing on nuclear proliferation as a
primary issue in its relation with India and Pakistan and to make the region the
centerpiece and test case for U.S. non-proliferation policy. Various US
administrations had concentrated more sharply on these issues, especially nuclear
and missile programmes of India and Pakistan. This had raised new challenges
further aggravating the mutual relations between India-U.S.-Pakistan. However,
after the May 1998 nuclear test by India and Pakistan Clinton administration began
to follow a more pragmatic approach to the South Asian nuclear issues. Moreover,
the US stopped its policy of equating India and Pakistan and was forced to develop a
strategic partnership with India on number of issues, especially economic and
nuclear. At the same time the US did not ignore Pakistan for its own security and
strategic interests. Developments in Afghanistan and War on Terror further
consolidated the relationship between the two. The study is an analytical study of the problem of nuclear proliferation in South Asia and United States policy responses to Indian nuclear programmes. The choice of this problem is significant because it heralded on the one hand, a renewed American interest in the subcontinent after an era of ‘benign neglect’ and a new assertiveness of India and Pakistan in the region by the proliferation of nuclear and missiles development programmes, on the other. Against the background of a ‘post cold war South Asia’, United States and the two major South Asian countries – India and Pakistan tried to come to terms with their differences and framed some new strategic policy towards this region. This area has been examined variously and the issues separately by Indian, American and Pakistan scholars but in the thesis, the entire gamut of the issues including the security, economic and strategic areas have been covered. The study is also investigating the contradictory policies adopted by US administration in the non-proliferation sector. To obtain and pursue their real strategic interest they perceive non-proliferation goals as secondary to the strategic and national interests. This study is investigating the causes of failure in non-proliferation policies pursued by US administration vis-a-vis South Asia. The policy shift with regard to successive administration will also be probed in depth.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

A plethora of literature is available which analyses nuclearization process from theoretical viewpoint. Two American strategic specialists, Lewis A. Dunn and Herman Kahan have listed as many as fourteen reasons or pressures encouraging a country to go nuclear. They have classified these reasons under several heads such as security, status or influence, bureaucratic and domestic factors. They have also identified eight types of events as ‘trigger’ activating consideration on the pressures or reasons for a country going nuclear. These are: (a) involvement in foreign crisis, (b) reduction in alliance credibility, (c) nuclearization of other countries, (d) weakening or breakdown of international constraints, (e) domestic crisis, (f) technological development, (g) changed perceptions and utility of nuclear weapons. Mayer(2009) noted three basic types of incentives. First, incentives of international political prestige and image building. These can affect the country’s appearance and
Second, incentives to advance national military and security objectives, to minimize external threats to the country and to strengthen its relative power position and strength. Third, incentives to support and promote domestic policies and to prevail in domestic political struggles. Thus four sets of arguments are frequently advanced by threshold states aiming to retain the nuclear option – military security, political prestige and influence, economic gains, and domestic pressures and compulsions. So far as South Asia is concerned, there are several factors which make the presence of nuclear weapons capabilities on the subcontinent more dangerous than the super power nuclear rivalry that preceded it. The frequent conflicts between the two antagonists – India and Pakistan over the disputed territory of Kashmir, reactions of political parties, the nuclear scientific community of the subcontinent, public opinion of India and Pakistan, nuclear China’s Impact on the subcontinent, Indian Ocean, and finally the U.S policy in South Asia, actually provide greater incentives for nuclear proliferation in South Asia.

According to Michael Brecher, “Kashmir symbolizes the root of the conflict between India and Pakistan. Here lies the last field of battle over the ideological cleavage which rent the subcontinent as under in 1947. Here is the final test of the validity of the two nation theory, the basis of Pakistan and its continuing raison d’etre”. Jammu and Kashmir is very important for both India and Pakistan. It is important for Pakistan on economic point of view. Timber used to flow from Kashmir through the river Jehlum up to depots in Pakistan. Moreover three rivers, Indus, Jehlum and Chenab, over which Pakistan enjoys right under the Indus Basin Water treaty. And also Kashmir is crucial for the internal peace and security of India as a whole, because of territorial and boundary contiguity. According to Pakistani point of view the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not added much to India’s security and economy, but has made Pakistan’s defence vulnerable. Kashmir has got crucial strategic importance because it has border links with China, Afghanistan, Soviet Union and Tibet. United States was also for several years interested in Kashmir because of its strategic location, as Kessinger indicated, the interest of the United States presumably arose from Kashmir’s strategic location, close to the USSR and bordering on Afghanistan, Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang), Tibet, India
and Pakistan. Stephan Philip Cohen (1998) says the most problematic regional military development is the slow crawl of India toward a nuclear capability. According to him these are way stations along the nuclear road, although testing may, with some risk be skipped. India could position itself at the edge of weaponisation without any public statement, test or other indication of its plans. K. Subhramanyam (1998) views that in the light of external and internal security problems in the subcontinent that issues of regional Stability and security have to be analyzed. Secondly he has identified a number of external and internal threats that are commonly faced by all the nations of the subcontinent. According to him commonality of perception of and approach toward such threat is a prerequisite for regional stability and security. This in turn presupposes the evolution of a shared world view. Stability and security are value loaded terms. He points out that in their imperial era, the British used to boast of having ensured peace and stability in their Empire. To the anti-colonialist freedom fighters this was the peace and stability of the grave. It is not at all clear that all states in South Asia have shared interpretation of stability and security. Thomas Perry Thornton (1998) noted the ability of South Asian system to assert autonomy in considerable and the basis for an effective co-operative endeavor is present. Rather like the old Indian response to proposal for joint defense of the subcontinent, the question against whom arises. According to him the answer now is much easier — ‘against everybody’. Given a choice among the United States, Soviet Union and China few sub continentals would have difficulty in finding somebody they want to keep out of their affairs. Should the countries of South Asia be able to get together and add up all there outsiders rather than trying to play one off against another, they will have gone a long way toward assuming responsibility for their own fate rather than leaving it to those whose primary concerns be elsewhere.

George Robert Perkovich (2000) mentions four illusions regarding proliferation He says security concerns decisively determine proliferation. Security concerns indubitably created conditions that “allowed” Indian decision makers to develop nuclear weapon capabilities. Had China not defeated India in the 1962 war and acquired nuclear weapon in 1964, India might not have built up on the nuclear
weapon capabilities made possible by the projects planned and initiated in the 1970s. Had India not declared to possible nuclear weapon ambitions in the early 1960s, Pakistan might not have pursued countervailing nuclear weapon capabilities, which in turn intensified India’s motivations to build nuclear weapons in the 1980s and 1990s, although India still eschewed a clear commitment to produce a nuclear arsenal. By the 1990s, Pakistan and China combined to heighten India’s security concerns, as Beijing assisted Pakistan’s nuclear weapon and missile programs. Still domestic — more than international security — factors must be recognized to answer why India began developing the bomb option in the 1950s, and why it moved in fits and starts through the 1960s, 70s, 80s and 90s.

OBJECTIVES OF STUDY

1. To analyze the major challenges faced by the nonproliferation policy at the global and regional level.

2. To critically review the nature and dimensions of nuclear proliferation in South Asia.

3. To study incoherent U.S. nonproliferation policies and in appropriate influence strategies that have encouraged other states to advance their nuclear weapon capabilities.

4. To study the current trends in U.S. nonproliferation objectives in south Asia.

5. To analyze how the paradigm shifts in U.S. nonproliferation policy towards India has occurred.

6. To study how American scholars and policy experts understood and reinterpreted the nuclear estrangement with India that enabled the policy change.

7. To study how the U.S. national interests were constructed that necessitated nuclear cooperation with India.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What are the internal and external factors influencing nuclear proliferation in South Asia?
2. How the paradigm shift in U.S. nonproliferation policy towards India has occurred?

3. How the U.S. national interests were constructed that necessitated nuclear cooperation with India?

4. What are the U.S. non-proliferation policy goals and objectives that are contradictory?

5. How did Indo-US nuclear deal impact on India’s nuclear policy?

HYPOTHESES

1) United States adopted a double standard in its global non-proliferation policy which significantly affected the credibility of the global nuclear disarmament regime;

2) Internal and external factors significantly influence nuclear proliferation in South Asia;

3) US nonproliferation policies in South Asian failed to influence nuclear proliferation in South Asia;

4) Current trends in U.S. nonproliferation objectives in South Asia remain secondary to other perceived political, strategic and commercial goals.

5) Operational nuclear weapons in South Asia tend to destabilize a volatile region and undermine the international nonproliferation regime subverting vital U.S. regional and global interest.

6) Indo-US nuclear deal significantly influenced India’s global nuclear strategy and undermined the global disarmament regime.

Chapter Scheme

Chapter I: Introduction

Chapter II: U.S Nuclear Policy: An Overview

Chapter III: Nuclear Proliferation and security in South Asia

Chapter IV: U.S Nuclear Policy in South Asia: A Brief Analysis
Chapter V: U.S Response to Pokhran II

Chapter VI: Indo-U.S Nuclear Deal

Chapter VII: U.S Nuclear Policy towards South Asia under Obama Administration.

Chapter V111: Conclusion

METHODOLOGY

The study is completed with the help of historical and analytical methods. Scientific methods also used to study the nuclear policy, capabilities and strategies of India and Pakistan. And interdisciplinary approach is made to study the nuclear crisis in South Asia. The method of deductive reasoning applied to study the problems and to draw the inferences. A substantial amount of data is collected from official documents, books and articles collected from Mahatma Gandhi University library, Library of the School of International Relations in MG University, Jawaharlal Nehru University library, New Delhi; IDSA Library, New Delhi. Data collected from web sources is also used in this study.

REFERENCES


