Chapter IV
U.S POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH ASIA UNTIL POKHRAN II

4.1 Evolution of U.S Nuclear Policy towards South Asia

Realism is always the driving force behind the evolution of U.S policy towards South Asian region. The U.S perennial interest is to preclude any major hostile power from dominating Europe or Asia. In order to maintain such an interest the U.S built a global alliance system to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War period, and it wanted India, one of the most dominant states in South Asian region, to join it. However, India adopted a nonalignment Policy. (Satu P Limaya:1993) Washington was made to choose Pakistan due to the circumstances as an ally for containing the Soviet Union in South Asian region. Many times the U.S-Pakistani relations fluctuated, according to the rise and fall of Pakistan’s strategic value to the U.S. One such instance, the Carter administration which at first adopted a policy of détente and cooperation with the Soviet Union, it downgraded the strategic importance of Pakistan, and in October 1979, suspended economic and military assistance that it gave to Islamabad for its clandestine development of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the U.S has improved relations with India and they continued to supply India with various grades of nuclear fuels for India’s nuclear reactors despite India detonating a nuclear device in 1974. The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in the month of December 1979 restored Pakistan’s strategic value in the region to the United States. Carter offered to renew the already suspended economic and military aid to Pakistan. But Pakistan immediately rejected the economic and military aid as “peanuts”. When the Reagan administration raised the economic and military aid to $3.2 billion for next six years Pakistan suddenly agreed to help the U.S to engage in a proxy war against the S.U in Afghanistan. When Moscow began to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in 1988, Pakistan lost its importance to the U.S. The war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime of Afghanistan in the year 2001 dramatically improved Pakistan’s strategic value to the U.S. The George Bush administration which was carrying out attack on Al-Qaida
refrained from making fundamental changes in its Military and economic policy towards South Asian region. Consequently, there was more continuity than change in the policy. In June 1989, when the Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited the U S and held talks with President George Bush. President George Bush reiterated U S pledges for the security and economic development of Pakistan, and U S agreed to sell twenty eight F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan. He also requested the U.S Congress to provide the Islamabad with $380 million economic aid and $240 million military aid in the financial year of 1990. (Washington post:1989) The Main official rationale that was given for the aid was that the Afghan Communist regime installed by Moscow still existed, and the Afghan resistance forces had not overthrown it yet. Thus the U S was forced to work closely with Pakistan to contain S U influence in Afghanistan. When the U S began to impose sanctions against Pakistan in 1990 in an effort to dissuade the Pakistan from developing nuclear weapons, the U S Department of Defense and military agencies still tried to maintain a genuine and normal military links with their agents in Pakistan. This was partly because Pakistan was still considered very important for U.S military operations in the region of Gulf, partly because they wanted to maintain their long standing influence on the Pakistani military which had a greater role in every developments in these regions, and also because they did not relish the prospect of Pakistan being forced to side with the radical Muslim states for help in its confrontation against India. As a result, the U S began to get itself engaged in a series of selective sales of military spare parts and equipments to Pakistan. (Ibid:1992) One among the main goals of the Bush administration’s in South Asian regional policy was to prevent the illicit proliferation of WMDs. Due to several ranges of strategic considerations, President George Bush at first chose to ignore the Pakistan’s clandestine development of a huge cache of nuclear weapons. As in the case of President Ronald Reagan, Bush’s main goal was to contain U S influence in the Afghanistan and he also needed the cooperation of Pakistan for this matter. In the year of May 1989 CIA Director William H. Webster had warned the U S administration that there were several indications that India was interested in acquiring the capability of exploding nuclear weapons, that Pakistan was obviously engaged in developing nuclear
weapons, and, therefore, that there would soon emerge a nuclear arms race in South Asian region. Even After imposing several ranges of sanctions against Pakistan, the U S asked for permission to conduct several international inspections on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities so as to verify Pakistan’s assertion that it had no nuclear devices. Partly this was happening because of the due consideration of national sovereignty and honor, and along with that partly because of the sanctions, Pakistan turned down the request of U S. Both countries also differed on the definition of a nuclear device. To the U S, nuclear device referred not only to a simple device already assembled and ready for launching, but also to its various types of components. And To Pakistan, it mainly referred to the former. (A.G Noorani:1993) The Washington D.C also called upon the Islamabad to obey the Non Proliferation Treaty. The Pakistan could not accept the Washington’s request because it was against its long held position on the Non Proliferation Treaty. The American sanctions created big impact on Pakistan on various levels. The cut down of American economic assistance eventually resulted in further deterioration of Pakistan’s economy. The suspension of military aid to Pakistan meant that Pakistan could not obtain any of the F-16 fighters it had ordered and also they cannot try to get spare parts to the American made fighters, tanks, and other weapons it had already bought from various other countries. (Washington Post:1992) On the burning issue of missile proliferation in the South Asian region, the U S began to focus its efforts on the Pakistan, mainly because India had already displayed their indigenous capability to produce missiles, and there was no way for Washington to prevent India from carrying out its missile technology programme. The case with Pakistan was different from India. Pakistan had no comparable capability to produce its own missiles. Its missile programme was heavily relied on various outside assistance, and the main source was China. (The New York Times:1992)

4.2 India’s nuclear capability

In the year of May 1989, the George Bush’s administration began the applied limited sanctions against Glavobosmos and Space Research Organization, prohibiting the U S government from engaging in any trade with both organizations. In the year of late May 1989, the George Bush administration also banned the sale of
the Combined Acceleration Vibration Climatic Test System to India as the system that will help to upgrade India’s nuclear and missile capability. (Washington Post:1989) During the Cold War era, the U S efforts to improve any relations with India were Heavily hindered by the strategic goal of containing the S U, since India would not improve relations with Washington at the expense of its tight relations with Moscow. In The end of the Cold War era, both countries were freed from both the United States and India from the Moscow factor and this enabled them to improve their bilateral security relations. In the year of 1991, the U S and the Indian navies gradually began to have increased bilateral links, this included small scale but unprecedented combined joint exercises; this was being code named as Malabar, in the Indian Ocean. Along with this Similar relations were also established between the army and naval departments of the two countries.(The New York Times:1992)

Pakistan always supported the cause of the Muslim separatist movements in Kashmir and they even provided these separatists with several weapons and materials. And India had to accuse Pakistan for supporting the terrorists and interfering in the India’s domestic affairs. Pakistan always maintained a stand or can also be called as a strategy that the people in Kashmir always had the right to determine their political future whether to remain in Pakistan or India. So Pakistan therefore insisted on holding a effective plebiscite in Kashmir which India couldn’t agree because of the agreement made with Raja Hari Singh of Kashmir and Indian government India did not agree. In the month of February 1990, the tensions between both India and Pakistan began to rise because of the Kashmir dispute. India questioned Pakistan of instigating the cross border incursion with proper evidences. Indian Prime Minister V.P. Singh claimed that Pakistan had amassed troops on the border and responded by deploying 400,000 troops in Kashmir. (The United Daily:1990) Both countries were near a war situation. The U S appealed to both nations for restraint because U S knew that if both states began a war then things will be out of control. To prevent both from entering into war, President George Bush sent his Deputy National Security Advisor Robert M. Gates as a special envoy to South Asian Region. Gates led a large group of U.S. officials, including Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Martin Kelly, and senior National
Security Council official in charge of South Asia and the Middle East Affairs agent Richard N. Hass. From May 19 to 21, Gates and his fellow men mediated between both the countries and finally they succeeded in preventing both from entering into a war. The U S feared that since both states had nuclear weapons at their disposal, the outbreak of conventional war between them might lead to a nuclear war that will destroy the region. From the year of 1994 onwards, the Bill Clinton administration began to take various steps to improve Relations with India. On the date May 14, 1994, the Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited the U S, the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister since Rajiv Gandhi’s visit in 1987. Rao gave a speech to the U S Congress it was the first time that a head of a foreign government to do so since Bill Clinton assumed power. Both nations viewed his visit as a great opportunity to change the tense relations between them. With a greater view to create a most friendly atmosphere among both nations, Clinton and Rao began to concentrate their talks mainly on economic and trade cooperation and exchanges, and barely touched upon such sensitive issues as human rights and nuclear proliferation. In late May, Pakistani President Farooq Leghari he too made a private visit to Washington. U S officials at that time virtually ignored his visit, because of the underlying fact that U S attached greater importance to relations with India than with Pakistan. The agreement between them was a breakthrough in their bilateral relations. It meant that both nations decided to end the past and move beyond an economic and trade cooperation.(Sumit Ganguly:2001)

4.3 India’s foreign policy

There were many reasons for the bill Clinton administration to improve the relations with India. First reason is that, the collapse of the S U had destroyed the then foundation of India’s defense and foreign policy. India was not in a position to use S U as a counterweight to U S. At the end of the Cold War it also meant that the U S did not had to be in a suspicious mode about India even if it continued to maintain a close relation with Russia. Second reason was that, after the S U troops withdrew from the regions of Afghanistan, Tthe Pakistan’s strategic value to the U S began to greatly decline. As one of the predominant state in the south Asian subcontinent, India has became more important to the U S for maintaining the regional peace and stability.
Third reason is that, Rao’s reforms had changed India’s economy from a central planning system to a market one. The US began to consider India as a huge potential market for US capital, technology, and goods. Fourth reason is that, India was the largest democracy in the world. And in terms of shared values and other democratic morals the US had a closer relation to India than to the military controlled Pakistan. Finally, the geopolitical considerations and perhaps which also had an effect on bill Clinton’s policy toward India. The bill Clinton administration also had tried to prevent the proliferation of WMD in South Asian region. In the month of December 1995, US received information that India was preparing for a nuclear test in the desert of Rajasthan. The US officials privately warned India that not to hold any sort of nuclear test and they even threatened to cut off economic assistance to India. The information was perhaps false, as India did not conduct any nuclear test. Nevertheless, the Washington began increasingly concerned with the Janata Party that advocated turning India into a nuclear country. In 1998, the Janata party became the largest party in the Indian parliament, and formed a coalition government of more than ten small parties. On May 11, 1998, India surprised the United States by openly testing nuclear weapons, using China threat as an excuse. Washington strongly condemned the test and tried in vain to prevent Pakistan from following suit. The Clinton administration immediately imposed many economic and military sanctions against India and Pakistan. US also pushed through the U.N Security Council resolution and condemned the tests the US then called upon for both countries to stop holding any more nuclear tests and immediately sign the NPT. Pakistan agreed to sign the NPT agreement and give up all its nuclear weapons, provided India also did the same. (Sumantra Bose:1999) India at this point accused the NPT of legalizing the “nuclear apartheid” in the world and would agree to sign it and to give up its nuclear weapons on condition that the five nuclear powers destroy their own nuclear weapons first. Washington rejected the condition naturally. Since the sanctions could not be changed the nuclear policy of both India and Pakistan remained on them. The Bill Clinton’s administration was also severely concerned with the allegation that Pakistan always supported the Muslim terrorists in Kashmir. And it wanted the two countries to solve the Kashmir dispute peacefully and immediately. In order to convince the Clinton
administration that Pakistan had nothing to do with terrorists, the then Pakistani President Nawaz Sharif had sent a special envoy Chaudhury Nisan Ali Khan to Washington in the month of March in 1993. He maintained the stand that the Muslim fundamentalists, who appeared in his country and were accused of engaging in terrorist activities in Kashmir, were foreigners who had fought alongside the Afghan “freedom fighters” in the 1980s and were supported by the U S. (Sumantra Bose:1999)

**4.4 Continued hostilities**

As the hostilities around these nations continued and tensions escalated, Bill Clinton sent the commander of the Central Command General Anthony Zinni to Islamabad. The Zinni reiterated Clinton’s earlier proposal that the Pakistan should withdraw its troops and also the Muslim militants from the mountaintops of Kashmir border. Pakistan maintained their position that they were mere Muslim freedom fighters over whom the Islamabad had no control, and not even the Pakistani soldiers. The Bill Clinton urged both the countries to exercise a self-restraint while keeping pressure on Pakistan about the matter. India redoubled its whole military efforts to expel the intruders from Kashmir region and even threatened to attack Pakistan’s province of Punjab. Since the Pakistan was no match for Indian army in terms of conventional forces, Islamabad threatened to use the nuclear weapons to defend itself. To avert the danger of a nuclear war in the region, Bill Clinton personally intervened in the Crisis of both nations. In a meeting with the Pakistani President Nawaz Sheriff on July 6 at the White House, he was succeeded in obtaining a public pledge from Nawaz Sheriff that the Pakistan would take enough concrete measures to re-establish the LOC in Kashmir, and moreover the Pakistan would Use their influence to advise the so called “Muslim freedom fighters” to stop fighting in the region and withdraw from the Indian side of the LOC. (Sumantra Bose:1999)

**4.5 An “India First” Policy**

On May 1, the then U S president George Bush announced the plan for deploying a national missile defense system. On May 2, the India’s then foreign
The statement which came before America’s allies, including Britain, had supported Bush’s plan. The George Bush administration immediately moved to upgrade the military ties between both countries. In the month of June 2001, both countries held a joint military exercise. In the month of July, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry Shelton visited India, the highest U.S. military officer to visit the country since 1998. Shelton told the Indian leaders that U.S. had already decided to reactivate the “Defense Policy Forum” that has been put on the back of the burner for three years. (Far Eastern Economic Review: 2001) In the month of November, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and CINCPAC Commander Dennie C. Blair separately visited the New Delhi. As Blair said, bilateral cooperation on the military and security issues had reached with India into a new level. In the mid of May 2002, hundreds of Indian and U.S. paratroopers conducted a major joint exercises outside the northern city of Agra. It was one of the largest military exercise ever held between the two countries. U.S. naval ships made several port calls in India. The U.S. sold India sophisticated radar systems in order to pinpoint the origin of hostile artillery fire. After the September 11 attacks of 2001, the then Pakistani president Parwez Musharraf had personally guaranteed that the questionable transactions with North Korea would cease. However, the U.S. officials thought that he was either unwilling or unable to halt the transactions. In the month of November 2002, Powell publicly warned of hardcore “consequences” if the U.S. discovered that Pakistan is continued to make suspect nuclear transfers to North Korea. But the George Bush administration was so reluctant to act against Pakistan for fear that the uneasy alliance with Musharaf would get more worsen. (Far Eastern Economic Review: 1999)

### 4.6 Renewed friendship

The sanctions were imposed against the institute, not the Pakistani government, so as not to embarrass president Musharaf. Moreover, after three days, the U.S. wrote off $1 billion in Pakistani debt. The debt relief was represented nearly one third of total of what Pakistan owed the U.S. The rest of the money was given
The violence led to the tensions between both India and Pakistan in late 2001. On the month of December 13, the five militants who were armed with automatic weapons and grenades stormed into the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, killing more than nine people before they themselves were killed. It was one of the most serious attacks that took place in New Delhi. India blamed that two extremist militant organizations based in Pakistan, the Jaish-e-Muhammad (Army of the Prophet) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) for the Attack. President Musharaf condemned the Parliament attack. And India asserted that Pakistan based militants were solely responsible for the deadly attack and India turned down the Pakistani and U S request for releasing evidence for the allegation. On December 22, two of Indian border guards were killed, because of Pakistani fire. India suddenly moved several divisions of its eastern command to the Pakistan border. India clearly saw the attack on its parliament as a major golden opportunity to end Pakistan’s support for the Kashmiri militants which was continuing for decades. New Delhi even issued a huge list of 20 alleged Pakistani terrorists who India wanted to prosecute. The then British Premier Tony Blair traveled to South Asian region to calm the tension between both states. Following a bilateral meeting in Islamabad on January 7, 2002 with Blair, Musharaf denounced terrorism and pledged to reveal them within days a plan to combat militancy in his country. India and the U S stated that the onus was on Pakistan to make concessions. (Far Eastern Economic Review:2002)

4.7 U.S. strategy

Phone calls by President George Bush and Powell to their Indian and Pakistani counterparts even failed to calm the tensions that rose. The U S was forced to put more and more pressure on Pakistan for more concessions to India. On the month of May 26, U S Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage who arrived in the Pakistan began to threaten Musharaf with going to the U.N Security Council with the charge that Pakistan was not implementing UNSC Resolution 1373, which committed U.N members to fight terrorism. Security Council even began debate that would amount to a global condemnation of Pakistan as a sponsor of terrorism. Armitage’s heavy handed
mediation which eventually resulted in a *quid pro quo*: this made the Pakistan agreeing to stop militants from crossing into Kashmir which was controlled by India and then shut down their training camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir, while even India dropped its demand of extraditing 20 Pakistanis to India and promised to withdraw their troops from several borders with Pakistan. History clearly points out that strategic interest has been the most important element for U S policy towards South Asian Region. That policy change has been a part of a U S global strategy which was to prevent a hostile power that dominates Europe or Asia. From the U S perspective, the S U was the major power in the Cold War era, and China began to emerge as the most likely candidate for that power in the post Cold War Era. By The end of the Cold War which freed both the United States and India from the S U factor. U S and India had already accelerated the pace of improving their bilateral relations and widened the scope of cooperation and exchanges among both nations. With the Pakistan’s strategic value to U S having declined in the new international order, the U S would no longer tolerate the Pakistan’s clandestine development of nuclear weapons and imposed several sanctions on Islamabad. The Bill Clinton administration had adopted a policy of tilting towards Indian side, by considering India as a more important partner than Pakistan. However, the long-standing policy of preventing the proliferation of WMD in South Asian region suffered a quick death when India and Pakistan began to conduct openly and separate nuclear tests in the month of May 1998. (Far Eastern Economic Review:2002)

### 4.8 Sanctions lifted

The U S retaliated by imposing many sanctions on both nations, which failed to change both of their nuclear policy. U S had no choice but to live with the failure that they had with their foreign policy and, within a short period of time, U S even lifted a part of the sanctions. President George Bush and his administration at first adopted an “India First” policy, for treating India as a foil to China, but after the September 11 attacks dramatically restored the Pakistan’s strategic importance to the U S. In order to win the support of India and Pakistan for Anti-terrorist actions carried by U S in the south Asian region and the U S led war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in particular on various fronts the U S even lifted all of the sanctions against them.
4.9 U.S Pakistani Nuclear Relations

The main potential for the intersection of terrorism and nuclear weapons in the hands of Pakistan is the greatest threat to U.S. national security. U.S. even needed to carefully reconsider its policies towards Pakistan as it always seeks to deter the possibility of terrorists gaining access to the nuclear weapons. The major results of investigations into the Pakistan’s nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan’s nuclear black market deals demonstrated in stark terms that the devastating consequences of nuclear proliferation by several individuals with access to state controlled nuclear programs. But the threat of nuclear terrorism within Pakistan is from the danger of radical Islamists whom running the country, and even gaining control of the country’s nuclear assets. Even The religious parties who lack wider popular support and the President Parwez Musharaf and his senior army commanders have often largely opposed the Islamists agenda.

Claims of advanced programme

Pakistan had conducted its first nuclear tests in the month of May, 1998 with response to a round of testing by India after it broke a 24-year self imposed moratorium on nuclear testing. The bills Clinton Administration began to impose fresh sanctions on both Pakistan (and India) following the 1998 tests, but after that gradually U.S. lifted their restrictions. Following the 9/11 attacks twin tower attacks; the George Bush Administration lifted all remaining nuclear sanctions against both the countries Pakistan and India. After the 1998 nuclear tests by Pakistan, A.Q Khan boasted that he made the Pakistan’s programme more advanced and reliable when comparing to the nuclear programs of India. Then He validated this by citing the Pakistan’s mastery of the uranium enrichment process. George Tenet speculates in his report regarding this event that UTN’s contacts with the Taliban and al-Qaeda could have been supported by elements in the Pakistani military’s always and its intelligence establishment. (Paul Leventhal:2001) Tenet continues by saying Pakistani interrogations of the seven board members were insufficient. He further noted that despite the CIA warnings to Pakistani officials about UTN’s activities even before 9/11, it was only when President Bush dispatched him to Pakistan that in November 2001 following revelations of a meeting between Bin laden, Aiman al
Zawahiri, and UTN leaders that Musharaf took serious action. The US officials even had repeatedly raised their voice about A.Q Khan’s activities regarding illicit nuclear technology transfer with President Parwez Musharaf, but it was not until the US provided concrete proof of its knowledge about Khan’s various illicit and illegal activities and they even threatened to go public with the information in late 2003 that President Parwez Musharaf took a direct action that halted Khan’s illegal activities. Even after the details were emerged on the huge damage done by the A.Q Khan on proliferation network, there was no formal prosecution conducted by Pakistani associates of Khan, and Khan himself is merely was under house arrest. President Parwez Musharaf claims he cannot even formally prosecute Khan or even allow him to be questioned by US or any other international authorities just because of the hero status that Khan received for contributing to the development of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme. (Paul Leventhal:2001)

**Anti U.S. sentiment**

Based on the high level of negative consequences arose due to the US cut off assistance to Pakistan in 1990, it was unlikely that a narrow minded policy of cutting down or even conditioning the assistance to Pakistan through US legislation now would help to meet the above goals. The 1990 economic and military aid suspension had cost the US highly valuable leverage with Islamabad, which damaged Army to army relationships, and this stoked strong anti American sentiment in that country. The Efforts that were made to publicly condition the assistance provided to Pakistan could actually weaken President Parwez Musharaf’s hand in convincing that his military commanders that the US is the most reliable partner under the changed circumstances. President Parwez Musharaf already began to contend with public opposition to make his supports for effective US counterterrorism goals in the south Asian region, and conditioning economic aid through the legislation that would awaken the good memories of 1990 and in turn it will weaken Pakistan public support for pursuing relations with the US. Tailoring a CTR programme which would be of assistance for Pakistan would be a most challenging since Pakistan is not at all a signatory to the Non proliferation Treaty. The US is prohibited on both grounds, by legal and by treaty obligations form
giving any assistance for the nuclear program of states that are outside the non proliferation regime. Another major obstacle was the basic premise of the Nunn Lugar legislation which requires the recipients of the CTR assistance that would make “substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or destroying such weapons”. It was important to prevent Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and technology from falling into the hands of regional and global terrorists. It was a top priority for the U S. The major revelations about the most devastating impact of the A.Q Khan’s proliferation network and the activities in the nuclear black market will have to be prevented.

U S formed even a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan similar to that being U S was pursuing with India. The U S policy toward Pakistani nuclear program should have to be specifically on nuclear safety and security cooperation and also encouraging fresh levels of India Pakistan dialogue that will definitely improve the Pakistan’s regional and global security perceptions. U S needs to maintain a continued and robust partnership with Pakistan which is based on mutual trust and mutual understanding. The U S policymakers should stop compartmentalizing the myriad interests that is within the Pakistan but instead it should integrate several components of U S policy towards the Pakistan. In other words, they were pursued to have nuclear safety and nuclear security and signing of nonproliferation in Pakistan which should not be viewed as a “competition” with other U S goals like denying the Taliban and al-Qaeda a safe haven inside the Pakistani territory, shutting down the controversial madrassas that acts as a feeder ground for terrorist groups.(Kumar Dhruba:1999)

4.10 U.S. Nuclear policy towards India

The Western economic and several types of technological sanctions did not contained India’s nuclear weapons development capabilities. The U S and the non proliferation policy has retarded the India’s nuclear energy programme that was relative to similar program elsewhere found in the world. There were not at all any assistance from the part of West for India’s nuclear energy projects and weapons development programs since India had tested its first atomic device in May 1974. These so called sanctions which were forced upon India were further increased and
tightened after the test of 1998. The denial of high levels of external technology assistance had prevented India from fulfilling its nuclear energy ambitions. Indian nuclear energy performance was comparatively minimal. The estimated Projections that were made back in the periods of 1970s that the nuclear energy would constitute 10 per cent of India’s total electric power by the year 2000, had fallen really short of the expectations. In the year 2000, the nuclear power alone constituted about 2.5 per cent of total electricity that was generated in India. India at that time had only 10 operating reactors in 2000, two each at Tarapur near Bombay, Kota in Rajasthan, Kalpakkam near Madras, Narora in Uttar Pradesh, and Kakrapar in Gujarat. On the other hand, the South Korea and Taiwan had far greater nuclear advantage because of their high levels of generating capacity than India. In the year 1998 a news report which indicated that China was in the market for 150 nuclear reactors which led to an extensive lobbying in the U S. Congress which stood by General Electric, and the other nuclear power plant suppliers in U S to ease up Congressional sanctions against China because of China’s controversial human rights record. These figures which indicates that the India’s indigenous capacity for nuclear energy production which has been denied external assistance since its first atomic test of 1974 which needs all sort of foreign assistance that it can get if the nuclear energy is made to have a significant amount of contribution to the severe deficiency in the Indian power sector. (Spector:1998)

4.11 U.S. denies law violation

With accordance to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Agreement, the heavy supply of enriched uranium was withheld by the Jimmy Carter administration. At that point India began to accuse that the U S had violated an international agreement. When the U S denied the violation of the peaceful uses of nuclear uses because U S heavy water technology was allegedly used in the Canadian supplied CIRUS research reactor that India had obtained the plutonium for the 1974 atomic test. In order to circumvent the Nuclear Non Proliferation Agreement and Congressional pressures, and to fulfill the actual contractual obligations that were arising from the 1963 agreement, the Jimmy Carter administration allowed India to acquire the enriched uranium from France, and even after from Germany. Eisenhower’s “Atoms
for Peace” plan that was a controversial move by U S began to appear to have an expression to something totally unavoidable. Eventually, this sort of dilemma about containing the already aroused nuclear proliferation and advancing the new levels of nuclear energy development was codified and encrusted in the Nuclear Non Proliferation Agreement. The Nuclear Non Proliferation Agreement was completed and opened for signature in the year of 1968 and went into effect in the year of 1970. It was a full grown treaty that was drawn up as loosely as possible in order to attract the maximum amount of state signatures and also several numbers of ratifications at that time. Indeed, while Articles 1 and 2 of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Agreement, to join the Nuclear Weapons States and also the Non Nuclear Weapons States that would take several measures in order to prevent the spread of these nuclear weapons among the newly emerged states, in the articles, Articles 4 and 5 even calls for the transfer of civilian nuclear technology from the Haves to those eligible Have nots, this even included the technology transfer for “peaceful nuclear explosions.” When analyzing the given fact that it appears to be little more technological separation between the civilian and military nuclear programs, these above said clauses of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Agreement began to happen to be in contradiction. To increasingly sweeten the treaty and encourage the acceptance of the treaty, Article 10 of the treaty assured that it would be the signatories that they could withdraw from the Nuclear Non Proliferation Agreement by giving a 3 months prior notice if any of the newer circumstances jeopardized according to their national security interests. (Jessica Mathews: 1991)

4.12 Proliferation tide

Even though the roots of Nuclear Non Proliferation in South Asian region are to be found critically in the dynamics of Sino Indian and Indo Pakistani relations perspective, the emerging proliferation tendencies in the other parts of the world such as Middle East, Central Asia and Northeast Asia began to add to the proliferation pressures in the South Asian region. Conversely, it could not be even argued that if the South Asian region is been armed with nuclear capability, holding back a Nuclear Non Proliferation tide elsewhere in the world would become more difficult. Many of these nuclear non proliferation trends would even appear to be
beyond U S control. The North Korea’s earlier efforts to build an atomic bomb at its Yongbyon nuclear complex may not carry any immediate security implications for South Asian region except the fact that it need to demonstrate the failure of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Agreement to check the spread of the weapons spread among the treaty’s signatories. The most worst scenario that might envisage a South Korean response in kind to North Korean nuclear weapons production, followed by Similar nuclear responses in Taiwan and Japan who trying to trigger a complex kind of nuclear arms race among these two countries and along with China. But the more serious Nuclear Non Proliferation linkages with South Asian region were to be found usually from the parts of Middle East and Central Asia. Previously Indian concerns in the 1980s came across from the possible Libyan-Pakistani connections that in the development of an Islamic nuclear bomb. (The international terrald tribune:1991) India even had to alleged in the early 1980s that various Libyan nuclear holding companies were set up by Pakistan to channel the Libyan petrodollars and uranium ore from Niger. Iraq had experienced a high level of crisis during the 1990-91 Gulf war and the war could have provided some Sort of dangerous lessons that the proliferators elsewhere in the world including several states in the subcontinent. Irrespective of all the wrongs doings of the Iraqi invasion and their attempt to annex the Kuwait, one lesson that was learnt by the near nuclear weapons states is that if Iraq had possessed even a small amount arsenal of crude nuclear devices that could have annexed Kuwait, the events would have been different. Either the Iraq was threatened of an attack from the U S lead coalition might have been stopped them or the Iraq attack might have been halted until the security of Iraq’s neighbors, especially country’s like Israel and Saudi Arabia, were assured and until probable casualties to Western forces from Iraqi chemical and nuclear weapons attacks could be avoided. Iran has also made some unsuccessful attempts so far to develop a gas centrifuges for Enrichment purpose, they tried to purchase a small amount of plutonium enrichment reactor from China, and to buy the independent research technology from India.(Andrew Higgins:1992).
4.13 Unstable nuclear relationships

The Proliferation in the West and Central Asian region will eventually constitute to a much more positive trend for the Pakistan but also a disturbing development for India. For the Pakistan the existence of more friendly Islamic nuclear weapons states would reduce the relative strategic nuclear power of India in the south Asian region. It has been faced with multiple deployments of nuclear weapons in China, for Pakistan and also for some of the Muslim countries which had further west, the credibility of an Indian nuclear deterrent policy would become more and more complex, and perhaps even become ineffective. The Israeli reactions to such sort of newly emerging trends would be further making thing more complicated under the delicate circumstances that would affect the balance of mutual deterrent relationships with West, Central and South Asia. The total outcome of these positions would be unstable nuclear relationships all around the regions. The Arguments in India before the year of 1998 was that the south Asian regional security was greatly affected by the unamounted growth of nuclear weapons among the five nuclear weapons states, especially during the period of Cold War. Therefore, the Indian administration had the right to exercise its independent nuclear option if necessary. (New York times:1993) The Global arguments which was in favour for an Indian nuclear deterrent usually revolved around the kind of discriminatory nature of the Nuclear Non Proliferation regime which allowed the pre-1968 five nuclear weapons states (all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council), to expand and improve their nuclear arms buildup unchallenged. India had always called for global security during the Cold War, that global security was not only affected by the increase in the numbers of nuclear weapons among prevailing non nuclear states, but it has also the dimension of unmitigated growth of nuclear weapons for mass destruction among the permanent UN security council members, the unchallenged five nuclear weapons states. Throughout the period of Cold War, the amount of vertical proliferation increased and even continued among the five nuclear “Haves” with the newer areas of weapons development which are not restricted by any sorts of arms control agreements. This has contributed to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks essentially for a controlled S U and U S nuclear arms race. This was kind of hardly disarmament
as required by Article 6, or even any sort of arms control. It was only the INF treaty of 1988 that it was for the first time that eliminated a whole class of intermediate range of nuclear weapons delivery systems of the major two superpowers in Europe, without even touching those of Britain, France and China. The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks had always showed some genuine inclinations towards nuclear weapons reductions but it became more of a reality only after the end of the Cold War period when the disintegration of the S U in 1991 ended the threat aroused to the Western world. (The Defence Monitor: 1992)

4.14 Reduction of nuclear warheads

The START 1 program was duly signed in the year of 1991 and the second phase of it START 2 in the year of 1993. Under the START 2 agreement, the already amounted and procured nuclear warhead stockpiles of the U S and Russia was to reduce to 3,500 within 10 years of time. This arms buildup was still an effective reservoir of total destruction power, exceeding the capability of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs which are several thousand times over the current ones capacity. There is No doubt, that the end of the Cold War was significantly stopped and even reversed the upward image of spiral of vertical nuclear weapons proliferation between the United States and Russia, the successor state to the S U. Both the countries, Britain and France has large amount of nuclear weapons that are kept on hold. The exceptions that are created among the nuclear “Haves” was that China which continued its nuclear weapons and missile development programs. But France and China which are two only nuclear non proliferation treaty “hold out” countries which signed the NPT in the year 1992 and subsequently in the year 1993. Whether the nuclear non proliferation treaty is now strengthened with the inclusion of the remaining two nuclear weapons states will remain somewhat dubious. (John O Pastore:2000) Nuclear non proliferation treaty did not halted France and China from testing their nuclear weapons till adhering to the controversial CTBT in the year 1996. Some of the nuclear tests were conducted above ground, contravening the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty which neither China nor France had signed at the time. Such actions set a precedent for India and Pakistan to conduct further nuclear tests before signing the CTBT. “Going nuclear may well be a function of both
technological capabilities in the making of nuclear weapons and perceptions of security threats to a state.” as long as nations do not hold the needed nuclear weapons technology like Nigeria, or to possess the technological capability but do not have serious threats to itself like Canada, the NPT will remain an acceptable but irrelevant treaty. What is relevant in here is that those states that perceive nuclear threats to themselves and also to possess both the technological and economic capacity to undertake a nuclear weapons and also a missile delivery program.(David E.Sanger:1992)

4.15 Peaceful civilian programme

The India’s indigenous development of various sizes of nuclear weapons is another major advantage of a parallel “peaceful” civilian programme being undertaken by the Departments of Atomic Energy and Space that directly contributes to India’s nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. But Despite all those technical setbacks, that the Indian program had cost overruns and prolonged delays in India’s nuclear energy program and schedules, nuclear reactors and reprocessing facilities have provided India with the crucial plutonium for the development of atomic and thermonuclear bombs. Likewise, the Indian civilian space programme also shares the military missile programs, the common needs for equipments like such as cryogenic booster engines, special aluminum alloys, launch motors, gyroscopes, liquid and solid propellants, stabilizers and guidance systems. The Civilian technological development in these areas of aeronautics, shipbuilding, automotive, and electronics benefits a lot to the defense sector also, but they are not at all comparable in its technical standards as required. (David E.Sanger:1992) India has a growing technological capability and it is even accumulating plutonium stockpiles from its reprocessing facilities all around the country that could have similarities to the Japanese nuclear energy programs which is technologically more advanced and which is in need of routinely stockpiling of large quantities of plutonium. Japan is now using enriched uranium which is supplied by the U S. The fuel that is spent is then reprocessed in Europe and the plutonium will be then transported back to Japan, each shipment is sufficient enough to make 100 to 150 bombs. Due to the safety risks involved in the transportation of this fissile material
over long distances, the Japan has already created its own technology of “plutonium cycle” that would give it an annual weapon making capability several times larger than that of India. But there have been no international pressures over Japan to stop the development and stockpiling of huge quantities of nuclear fissile materials. But India’s main motivation for initiating a peaceful nuclear energy program was always been to keep its much priced nuclear weapons option open. Conversely, the need for maintaining the nuclear weapons option justified the Indian nuclear energy programme. The civilian nuclear energy program which allows India to acquire and maintain a nuclear weapons capacity at huge cost. And It is also important to note that while looking at the total opportunity costs of nuclear weapons and missile programs that India has, the economic burden of such a nuclear defense system may not be as high as it may seem. Consequently, by barring to the marginal effects of international economic sanctions on India after the 1998 nuclear tests, there has been a huge marginal impact on the Indian economy.(Barry Bearek:2000)

NOTES.

1. Realism is always the driving force behind the evolution of U.S. policy toward South Asia. Realists argue that there is no eternal friend or eternal enemy, only eternal national interest. The U.S. eternal interest is to preclude a hostile power from dominating Europe or Asia. In order to maintain that interest the United States built a global alliance system to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War era, and wanted India, the dominant state in South Asia, to join it

2. One of the main goals of the Bush administration’s South Asia policy was to prevent the proliferation of WMDs. Due to strategic considerations, President Bush at first chose to ignore Pakistan’s clandestine development of nuclear weapons. Like President Reagan, Bush’s priority goal was to contain Soviet influence in Afghanistan, Therefore, he needed the cooperation of Pakistan.

3. The American sanctions had great impact on Pakistan. The cut-off of American economic assistance caused the Pakistani economy to further
deteriorate. The suspension of military aid meant that Pakistan could not obtain the F-16 fighters it had ordered and also must try to get from other countries the spare parts to the American made fighters, tanks, and other weapons it had already bought. The sanctions weakened Pakistan’s conventional force deterrence to India and increased its sense of insecurity that strengthened the call in Pakistan for the development of nuclear weapons. Washington’s sanctions not only failed to achieve its objectives, but also weakened its influence on Pakistan.

4. In mid-January 1995, Defense Secretary William Perry visited South Asia. During his stay in India, he signed with his Indian counterpart a security agreement whereby a “Defense Policy Forum” was established to review strategies in the post-Cold War era, promote exchange of senior officials and military officers, and gradually upgrade the scale of training and joint exercises.

5. There were three main reasons for the change in American attitude toward Pakistan. First judging from the effect of sanctions the United States had imposed against Pakistan since 1990, Washington not only failed to realize its objectives, but also greatly weakened its influence in Pakistan. Second, as the armed conflicts and terrorist activities in the Middle East and the Balkans continued to increase, the United States recognized the strategic importance of Pakistan as a moderate Muslim country. Third, the security challenges the United States faced in the 1990s and even in the 21st century included the proliferation of WMD, the international narcotics traffic, and Muslim fundamentalism. In all these issue areas, Pakistan could play an important role.

6. Pakistan would agree to sign the NPT and give up its nuclear weapons, provided that India did the same. India accused the NPT of legalizing “nuclear apartheid” in the world and would agree to sign it and to give up its nuclear weapons on the condition that the five nuclear powers destroy their own nuclear weapons first. Washington naturally rejected the condition.
7. The Bush administration inclined to take an “India First” policy toward South Asia, partly because Pakistan supported the Taliban regime of Afghanistan that backed Al Qaeda. However, the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001, suddenly changed the power context in South Asia. The anti-terrorist campaign in general and the U.S.-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in particular, revived the strategic value of Pakistan to the U.S.

8. The September 11 attacks dramatically changed the focus of U.S. global strategy. The U.S. strategic priority shifted from the concern with the “China threat” to the global war against international terrorism. Pakistan was clearly the crucible of the U.S. campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban for both geographic and strategic reasons. Islamabad was one of the few countries that recognized the Taliban. Though India’s offer of support to the U.S. war against terrorism was immediate and unconditional, it could not provide what Pakistan had: a long border of 2500 kilometers with Afghanistan and a long, close association with the Taliban. Thus the Cold War history was replayed with the United States treating Pakistan as a frontline state facing Afghanistan.

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Jessica Matthews’ advice in her article entitled, “Kick Baghdad Out and Strengthen the Nonproliferation Treaty,” is not likely to help. See *International Herald Tribune* October 18, 1991.


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