Chapter 4
A Brief Comparative Account

This chapter intends to carry out a brief comparison of some of the aspects of the theories of Hume and Russell. We argue that in the twentieth century Russell reconstructs the empirical knowledge advocated by the British empiricists of the 18th century, among whom David Hume is the most distinguished. In fact Russell’s philosophy is a sophisticated version of Hume’s philosophy. The framework of Hume is psychological; Russell substitutes it with logical. The new logical approach or the old psychological approach, which is pertinent in answering the problems of philosophy is yet to be decided.

This chapter discusses the importance of causation as discussed by these philosophers, and shows that their concept of causation follow from their ontology and epistemology.

Causation is a pivotal concept, which constitutes the foundation of scientific knowledge. Because the acceptance of necessary causal connections implies acceptance of scientific knowledge about objective reality and denial of causal connections implies the denial of objective reality and consequently the knowledge of it. Generally causation refers to the relation between two events or states of affairs such that the first brings about the second.

We begin our discussion with two aspects of cause – uniformity and universality. To affirm that causation is uniform is to affirm that causal relation between changes or states can be expressed in the form of general laws; similar causes always produce similar results. Both Hume and Russell believe that uniformity in the concept of cause is liable to exception. For Hume, this exception lies in the fact that it is not a scientific necessity that future will resemble the past. From our habit we come
to this conclusion, but that does not mean that in all cases we can be certain that same effect will result from same cause. Therefore it is only probable knowledge. Russell also treats this as probable knowledge, for he believes that circumstances may arise such that same cause might fail to yield the same result. Let us begin with Hume.

Philosophers like David Hume (and J.S. Mill) express the principle of uniformity in the dictum, the furter will resemble the past. Hume explains, "...that the supposition, that the future resembles the past, is not founded on arguments of any kind, but derived entirely from habit, by which we are determined to expect for the future the same train of objects to which we have been accustomed. The habit or determination to transfer the past to the future is full and perfect; and consequently the first impulse of the imagination in this species of reasoning is endowed with the same qualities".

Universality of cause says that every effect has a cause. Those who believe that every effect has a cause, are believing so because for them it is implied in the very idea of effect. Effect being the correlative, every effect necessarily presupposes a cause. But for Hume, those who stick to this idea lack a serious purpose in saying so. Because, Hume says, "... this does not prove that every being must be preceded by a cause; no more than it follows, because every husband must have a wife, that therefore everyman must be married. The true state of the question is, whether every object which begins to exist, must owe its existence to a cause; and this I assert neither to be intuitively nor demonstratively certain." Hume defends his position as, "Since it is not from knowledge or any scientific reasoning, that we derive the opinion of the necessity of a cause to every new production, that opinion must necessarily arise from observation and experience." Therefore, for Hume, our belief in the necessity of a cause in further production of an effect is based purely on observation and experience.

2 Ibid., p.128.
3 Ibid.
We have already seen how Hume constructs material substance out of 'impressions' and 'ideas' with the help of associations of ideas. And, with the help of memory and imagination besides association of ideas, he constructs mental substance out of perceptions. It is again through laws of associations that he explains causal relations. He claims that association of ideas is not purposeful, for associations occur mechanically and show the automatic structure of mental process. That is, certain ideas relate themselves to others and these are related and associated mechanically. Hume argues that the qualities from which this association arises, and by which the mind is after this manner conveyed from one idea to another are three viz., resemblance, contiguity in time or place and cause and effect. 

He considers all our reasoning concerning matters of fact are based on the relation of cause and effect. Hume's doctrine of causality denies the necessary connection between cause and effect. In his view we always seek a connection between a present fact and a past one. For instance, we experience that bread nourishes and water quenches thirst. Hume claims that two objects have been constantly conjoined together and we infer that they are causally related. There is no necessary connection between cause and effect. The relation between cause and effect, for Hume, is only psychological which is only an imposition of human mind on different objects and motivated by repeated experience and habit. From our childhood onwards we experience fire as burning, we cannot imagine any other sensation, other than burning sensation from fire. It is a habitual experience. Hume claims that objects are constantly conjoined. This constant association makes us to add a necessary connection between cause and effect. Hume quotes, "For after a frequent repetition, I find that upon the appearance of one of the objects the mind is determined by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stranger light upon account of its relation to the first object. It is this expression, then, or determination, which affords me the idea of necessity". 


5 David Hume, 1962, p.206.
Human beings naturally have the idea of necessary connection between cause and effect. But, Hume is trying to deny the connection. It is the habit of expectation or 'customary transition of imagination' to which we trace the idea of necessary connection between cause and effect. That is, necessary connection between causes and effects are read into our experience or imputed causes and effects, when in fact no such connection exists. Now, the question is, why Hume rejects the necessary connection between cause and effect?

Hume says that we do not see any power or force or efficacy passing from cause to effect. For instance, fire is the cause and heat is the effect. We do not have any sense experience or impression of a third factor comes and intervenes between the fire and the heat. He is of the view that just as we do not have sense experience corresponding to the power or efficacy between cause and effect, we cannot have any sense experience or impression to the necessary connection between cause and effect. Causes and effects are merely changes that we find to be constantly conjoined.

Hume's reason for the negative conclusion regarding the necessary connection is that the idea of cause can be completely and perfectly separated from the idea of effect in our mind. That is, we can easily and without any absurdity or contradiction imagine any cause whatever without its accustomed effect or with some effect, which in fact never accompanies it. There is accordingly no absurdity or contradiction in saying of same cause, that it does not have the particular effect that it does have.

According to Hume, there is no contradiction in saying that water solidifies instead of boiling when heated, man thrives instead of suffocating under water. Hume argues that we learn from experience that such things do not happen, but no experience teaches us that such things cannot happen, i.e., relations of cause and effect are derived aposteriori. It is only probable, not certain or necessary relation.
In Hume’s chapter we have mentioned that his pluralistic position presupposes external relations. This is logically linked with his views on causality. To say that every event is a discrete unit means that there can be no necessary causal connections. In that case there can not be universal and necessary knowledge of the empirical world. Suman Gupta rightly criticizes Hume as follows: “Hume’s views on causation logically follow from his ontology, when there is nothing in the world except fleeting, discrete, ‘impressions’ it logically follows that there can not be necessary causal connections between different phenomena. When ultimate reality consists of discrete, unconnected, isolated units there cannot be interpenetration and interdependence between different processes. Hume holds that the connection we see in different phenomena is not in the nature of things but is due to our habit or expectation. 6

Similarly, Russell’s notion of causality also follows from his ontology and epistemology. We have seen in the chapter on Russell that his ontological position is also pluralism. Pluralism implies reality is more than two in number and for Hume and Russell, reality is discrete, unconnected, particular, subjective units.

Russell tries to construct the mental and material world out of these, separate, non-continuous units. In fact Russell's views on causation is a reformulation of Hume's views on causation. The only addition is that Russell gives importance to scientific interpretation of causality; apparently Russell is inspired by the contemporary scientific developments.

This tendency is very much predominant in his book, *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limitations* (1948). In this book, Russell analyzes, the sense in which causality is involved in scientific method. Russell believes that power of science is due to discovery of causal laws. He asserts that everything that we believe ourselves to know about the physical world is based on the assumption that there are causal laws. Russell says, "Sensations, and what we optimistically call ‘perceptions’, are events in

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us. We do not actually see physical objects, any more than we hear electromagnetic waves when we listen to the wireless. What we directly experience might be all that exists, if we did not have reason to believe that our sensations have external causes. It is important therefore to inquire into our belief in causation...the justification of our belief in causality belongs to the theory of knowledge..."7

As we have seen, for Hume, all our knowledge of matters of facts are based on experience. Similar to this, Russell holds that in our every day experience when one event follows the other, we have them as cause and effect. But, Russell is against the view that same cause always produces the same effect. He remarks that 'fire burns', 'bread nourishes', 'dogs bark' or 'lions are fierce' etc. are all causal laws and all are liable to exception in the sense that the knowledge of cause and effect is only probable, not certain. Russell argues that fire on a plum pudding does not burn you, poisoned bread does not nourish, some dogs are too lazy to bark and some lions grow so fond of their keepers that they cease to be fierce.8 However, he accepts that these are exceptions.

Russell also speaks of two sorts of causal laws: those concerned with persistence and those concerned with change. (The former kind are often not regarded as causal, but this a mistake according to Russell). First law of motion, persistence of matter etc. are examples for the law of persistence. Newton's law of gravitation is an example of causal laws concerned with change.

The concept of causality in some or other form is invariably found in all philosophical systems. And Russell is of the opinion that for most philosophers, 'cause' implies 'something different' from 'invariable antecedent'. Russell explains the difference between 'invariable antecedent' and 'something different from invariable antecedent'. Russell writes, "This difference may be illustrated by Geulinex's two

8 Ibid., p.327.
clocks, which both keep perfect time; when one points to the hour, the other strikes, but we do not think that the one has 'caused' the other to strike.\(^9\)

Now we can see that Russell also like other empiricists (J.S. Mill for instance) believes in the definition of cause as 'invariable antecedent of a phenomenon or event'. But, Russell shows disagreement with the view that it is 'seldom invariable'. Russell claims that even if they are invariable, a circumstance can be imagined which would prevent them from being so. Russell exemplifies, "If you strike a match on a box it usually lights, but sometimes it breaks or is damp if you throw a stone in the air it usually falls down again, but it may be swallowed by an eagle under the impression that it is a bird...In such ways all laws of the form 'A causes B' are liable to exceptions, since something may intervene to prevent the expected result."\(^{10}\)

For Russell, all that are existing are the fleeting sense data; permanent substance is an impossibility.\(^{11}\) The concept of more or less permanent physical objects involves the notion of substance and when substance is rejected, Russell has to find an alternative to define the identity of continuing physical objects of different times. Russell writes, "I think this must be done by means of the concept of 'causal line'. I call a series of events a 'causal line', if given some of them, we can infer something about the others without having to know anything about the environment...When two events belong to one causal line, the earlier may be said to 'cause' the latter. In this way laws of the form 'A causes B' may preserve a certain validity. They are important in connection both with perception and with persistence of material objects."\(^{12}\)

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\(^9\) Ibid., p.332.
\(^{10}\) Ibid., p. 333.
\(^{11}\) As we have already discussed in the chapter on Russell, the only real entities are fleeting sense data, and the concept of persisting thing and/or substance is rejected because even if they exist, they cannot be given in experience. Further Russell considers composite things, objects and persons as a series of classes of sense data.
\(^{12}\) Ibid., pp. 333-334.
Therefore, Russell's concept of causation is only a matter of series of events which occur in an imaginary 'casual line' created by him; this happens because he rejects the notion of substance, only on the basis of which we can explain the interconnection of the necessary relations of cause and effect. As we have already seen, since Russell rejects both material and mental substances, we have to conclude that he is rejecting causation also. Because, we hold that causation is an important concept in knowledge and cannot be explained in terms of external relations and pluralistic world view, as Russell wrongly does. Causation, instead, is the basic reality which helps natural and social phenomena to be coherently and consistently interconnected and thereby helps us to understand the nature of objective reality.

Since Hume and Russell deny a continuing/persisting substance, they deny continuity also. Consequently they deny development. This does not mean that they deny change; it is just that for change, a continuing-substance is not necessary for them. We argue that change happens always in a continuing something; persisting framework is required for the change to happen. Otherwise how do we recognize change itself? Change and development cannot happen in a vacuum; but Hume and Russell wrongly assume that change is possible without a continuing framework.

Now we will discuss Hume and Russell's views on material objects and attempt to show that both are phenomenalist at some point of time in their philosophical career.

As we have seen, Hume claims material object to be a bundle of impressions/perceptions (as he uses them as synonymous). In fact, perceptions are the sole existents, consequently sole entities known by us. Hume writes, "The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connection with objects." 13 We are of the view that Hume shows the phenomenalistic tendencies in two ways.

1. Hume is a phenomenalist when he argues that we could not know anything but 'perceptions', in that restricted sense of the know in which it means 'be certain of without any risk of error'; nor can we even infer by any sort of 'probable reasoning' that anything else exists.

2. Hume believes in the existence both of material objects and of perceptions and considers perceptions as the 'appearances' of material objects. Hume explains, "...no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we consider, when we say, this house and that tree, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or representations of other existences, which remain uniform and independent."\(^{14}\)

Hume considers material objects as bundle of impressions or perceptions: we do not know material objects as such. So, their impressions or perceptions are representations of them, which come to our understanding without revealing their real nature.

Russell is a phenomenalist, in his later stage, when he tries to construct material objects out of their sense data. Russell's sense data are equivalent to Hume's impressions or perceptions. Russell reduces material object to be a series of sense data. To quote Russell, "The things like tables and chairs, are systems, series of classes of particulars, ... the particular being sense-data when they happen to be given to you ... A chair presents at each moment a number of different appearances."\(^{15}\) Therefore, Russell reduces material object statements to a series or classes of sense datum statements without residue and therefore rightly called a phenomenalist.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., p.152.

We designate both Hume and Russell as phenomenalists who believe 'appearances' or 'what is given in experience', to be real. Evidently they neglect the causes of these appearances. (We mentioned that Russell believes in the distinction of appearance and reality in his platonic phase, for a short while). In this context Suman Gupta rightly remarks, "The phenomenalists are empiricists who deny the distinction between appearance and reality. They hold that only what is given in experience can exist."\footnote{16 Suman Gupta, 'A.J. Ayer: A Loss to the World Philosophy', Journal of the School of Languages - Structures of Significance, II(2); 1991; p.309.}

We criticize Hume and Russell alike since they forget the fact that knowledge of the objective reality can be attained only when we pass from appearance to reality, cause to effect, particular to universal etc., knowledge is a synthesis of these categories.

Another point of similarity between Hume and Russell is between Hume's complex ideas and Russell' complex symbols. This can be explained as follows. Hume divides impressions into simple and complex. One consequence of this division is the priority of impressions to ideas. According to Hume all simple ideas are derived from simple impressions; but all complex ideas are not necessarily derived from complex impressions. This is in fact a limitation of the general decision that all our ideas and impressions are resembling.\footnote{17 David Hume, 1961, p.12.} After reflecting on this issue, Hume comes out with the following: "That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent."\footnote{18 David Hume, 1962, p.48.} By constant experience it is observed that 'simple impressions always take the precedence but never appear in the contrary order'.

The generalization about the priority of impressions to ideas is supported by reference to the process of 'ostensive definition', which the analytic philosophers hold
as central to their theory of meaning. According to Hume understanding the meaning of a simple idea is to have some acquaintance with simple impressions. Hume gives the following example. "To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet or bitter, I present the objects, or in other words, convey to him these impressions; but proceed not so absurdly, as to endeavor to produce the impressions by exciting the ideas."¹⁹ By saying that 'it is absurd to produce the impressions by exciting the ideas', Hume means that it is empirically impossible to give the meaning of a simple idea by verbal definitions.²⁰ Implicitly, to teach a child what 'scarlet or orange means, we have to point out to him instances of scarlet or orange colours.

This claim, however, is not made concerning complex ideas. Here Hume says one can understand the meaning of the sentence, "There is a city such as New Jerusalem, whose pavement is gold and walls are rubies, though I never saw any such."²¹ This is only because one is already acquainted with such things as gold, rubies, walls, etc. All simple ideas are originated from simple impressions and all complex ones are ultimately reducible to simple ones.

Here we see the parallelism between Hume’s complex ideas and Russell’s complex symbols. Both contribute to the theory of meaning. Both attempt to connect what is meaningful with experience. However, there are differences also regarding this issue. One difference is that Hume deals with ideas and not with symbols. Symbols in Russell’s terminology can be ‘meaningful’ or ‘meaningless’. But, it will not be appropriate to call an idea as meaningful or meaningless, because meaningless ideas will hardly count as an idea at all. This, however, is not a major difference because

¹⁹ Ibid.
ideas have phrases annexed to them and phrases can be judged as meaningful or meaningless.\textsuperscript{22}

Second difference, which is an important one is as follows. Hume claims that those ideas are meaningless when the phrases attached to them are not derived from impressions (either from sensation or from reflection). But, Russell allows that part of the meaning of a phrase may be less closely connected with experience. And in such instances he claims that one does not know whether any thing in reality corresponds to that part of its meaning. David Pears rightly comments, “Hume in effect, held a verificatonist theory meaning, while Russell never denied that the meaning of a phrase might go beyond what was verifiable and, if part of it crossed that line, he merely professed agnosticism about the existence of any thing corresponding to that part.”\textsuperscript{23} This is a significant difference between the two philosopher's theories of meaning.

Hume and Russell hold similar opinion regarding the range of perception. This does not mean that their theories of perception are the same. It is just that they have one thing in common. Hume believes, like Russell, that perception never goes beyond the screen of sense data. Obviously, Hume calls them ‘impressions’, which he locates in the mind of the perceiver. It is a kind of image stamped in the mind.

Hume and Russell speak about memory\textsuperscript{24} (ideas about past impressions) and also discuss expectations of future impressions (especially in causation). But on the subject of thought, about present impressions, Hume says nothing. The main

\textsuperscript{22} “When one suspects that any philosophical term has no idea annexed to it, one should always ask ‘From what impressions that idea is derived?’ And if no impressions can be produced, one should conclude that the term is altogether insignificant.” (See An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature, p. 251.)

\textsuperscript{23} David Pears, Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1967), p. 27.

\textsuperscript{24} As we have seen, for Hume memory plays an important part in acquiring knowledge and also helps to answer the question of personal identity. For Russell also, as we have discussed memory is a valid method of acquiring knowledge.
deficiency of Hume’s system is that it does not contain complete thoughts, but only isolated fragmented ideas; it contains only phrases, no sentences. This Russell attempts to correct through his system; but fails miserably by considering fleeting, discrete, sense data as reality.

Regarding the concept of self, Hume identifies self or person\textsuperscript{25} with a bundle of perceptions. Because there is no particular impressions or ideas corresponding to the existence of self. Hume says, “For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call \textit{myself}, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure, I never can catch \textit{myself} at any time without a perception and never can observe anything but perception.”\textsuperscript{26}

Russell in his initial position speaks of self-consciousness (consciousness of particular thoughts and feelings) as different from consciousness of our self. Russell claims that it will be difficult to speak positively to the question ‘whether we are also acquainted with bare selves as opposed to particular thoughts and feelings’? Russell writes, “when we try to look into ourselves we always seem to come upon some particular thought or feeling, and not upon the 'I' which has the thought or feeling.”\textsuperscript{27}

Here, no doubt, Russell explores one's own self in exactly the way Hume does. But in his later phenomenalistic position where he reduces human beings also into a series of classes of their appearances. Here he speaks of self as constituted out of entities which are neither mental nor physical in nature. When he finally accepts neutral monism, he constructs self/mind out of sensations and images, which he claims to be neutral in nature\textsuperscript{28}. Therefore the latest position of Russell regarding self is that it is bundle of sensations and images. In this context, Russell does not forget to identify his similarity to Hume. Russell mentions, “... Hume, who gives the names

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{A Treatise of Human Nature, Part IV, Section VI.}
\textsuperscript{26} David Hume, 1961, p. 239.
\textsuperscript{27} Bertrand Russell, \textit{The Problems of Philosophy} (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), p.78.
"impressions" and "ideas" to what may, for present purposes, be identified with our "sensations" and "images"…29

The concept of personal identity is a fiction for Hume. He maintains, "The identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies. It cannot therefore have a different origin, but must proceed from like operation of the imagination upon like objects."30

Russell, constructs human beings out of series of appearances. And he argues that 'that' which collects all these appearances together can not be a persisting metaphysical subject, whether it actually exists or not, for it is not a datum of our senses. Regarding personal identity Russell argues, "You have not only what you look like, you have also your thoughts and memories and all your organic sensations, so that you have a much richer material and are therefore much less likely to be mistaken as to your own identity than as to some one else's."31

Russell claims that you would know it is you, not by a consciousness of the ego but by memory, by the way you look or feel. You can collect a whole set of experiences into one string as all belonging to you and other people's experiences can be collected together as all belonging to them by relations that actually are observable and without assuming the existence of the persistent ego, about which one know nothing and can know nothing.32

29 Ibid., p.145.
30 David Hume, 1962, p.308.
31 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', 1918, p.226.
32 Ibid., p.277.
Therefore Russell concludes about personal identity as, "what we know is this string of experiences that makes up a person, and that is put together by means of certain empirically given relations, such, e.g., as memory."\textsuperscript{33}

Here we also see Russell introduces memory to explain the subjectivity of self like Hume. Therefore, for him person is a logical fiction and his identity is a string of experiences collected together by memory. At the end of his discussion Hume speaks of identity as a quality. "...that identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together, but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination when we reflect upon them."\textsuperscript{34}

About the language of the philosophers also Hume and Russell share similar opinions. Both argue that the language of the philosophers should be somewhat different from the layman's. In his \textit{Essays} Hume divides mankind into two classes: "Shallow thinkers who fall short of truth," and "Abstruse thinkers who go beyond it." A shallow thinker is the one who labours the obvious. "An author is little to be valued who tells us nothing but what we can learn from every coffee house conversation;" whereas abstruse thinkers are "by far the most rare, and may add by far the most valuable...at most, what they say is uncommon; and if it should cost some pains to comprehend it, one has, however, the pleasure of learning something that is new."\textsuperscript{35}

According to Hume philosophical problems cannot be easily expressed in ordinary language; 'common language', being crude and vague is incapable of reflecting the complexities of life.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{34} David Hume, 1962, p. 309.
\textsuperscript{36} See, Farhang Zabeeh, 1973, p. 8.
This opinion of Hume is in conformity with Russell's (and other modern empiricists) regarding the ordinary language philosophers. Russell comments, "They are persuaded that common speech is good enough, not only for daily life, but also for philosophy. I, on the contrary, am persuaded that common speech is full of vagueness and inaccuracy, and that any attempt to be precise and accurate requires modification of common speech both as regards vocabulary and as regards syntax. Everybody admits that physics and chemistry and medicine each require a language which is not that of everyday life. I fail to see why philosophy, alone, should be forbidden to make a similar approach towards precision and accuracy." 37 This way, both Hume and Russell suggest a language specific for philosophy, which is different from common language used in everyday life.

To conclude this discussion on comparison of Hume and Russell, we are of the view that Russell's philosophy stands in the direct line of descent from Hume's. Hume and Russell approach the same issues in more or less the same way. But, differences are also to be found.

Russell is known as a builder of systems and Hume fails in this respect. Because Hume internalizes the objects of knowledge and builds up an elaborate psychological system, in which the laws of association of ideas play a role as Newton's laws of gravitation in external world. His system is egocentric and never explains how minds meet and communicate with one another. So his system does not cover all the ground that he needs to occupy as a philosopher. 38 In this regard Hume is not a system builder.

For us Russell is also not a builder of systems; in comparison to Hume, his could be a more systematic teaching. This can be attributed to the tremendous advance


38 David Pears, 1967, p. 269.
of science during Russell's period. But, we need Russell to address two questions regarding his system:

(1) Can an impersonal system be built on a foundation of essentially private sense-data?
(2) Can such a foundation really support reconstruction of empirical knowledge, which is not ego-centric?

We will not be completely wrong in saying that this chapter in general shows the similarity which empiricism and analytical philosophy hold. Both insist on experimenting facts and observable phenomena. If we take the term 'analytic' to mean decomposition of something into its constituents, the endeavors of classical British empiricists can be considered as a psychological form of analytical philosophy\(^{39}\), for they attempt to analyze what they understand as complex ideas into their simple constituents. According to classical British empiricists such analyses help them not only to clarify philosophically problematic notions of substance, causation, self etc., but also will be handy in illuminating the sources and extent of possible human knowledge.

We conclude that both Hume and Russell's ontological positions as pluralism as they believe in discrete, unconnected, subjective units constituting the reality. Their epistemology is empiricism as sense experience is the only source of knowledge. Again they share similar views regarding the causal connections in the sense that for them such knowledge is only probable, not certain. Since both of them combine the mental aspect of Cartesian dualism and empiricism, they consider sensations in abstractions as the source of knowledge. Therefore, we find them to be idealist philosophers.

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