CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Integration vs. Nationalism

The history of Europe testifies the truth of the assertion that the idea of a unified Europe and nationalism have been like two sides of the same coin since the collapse of the Roman Empire. The Roman Empire was by far the most universal state the world had known.\(^1\) Even though it did not spread further north of the Rhine and the Danube\(^2\), the Roman Empire had all the charms of a cosmopolitan culture. It moderated national and race distinctions and spread homogeneous culture and organization all over the Empire and beyond.\(^3\) It further displayed splendid civic structure, public spirit and one unified law. However, when the hostile Germans, Visigoths and others attacked and ate into the vitals of the state, the Empire crumbled. The Western half of the Empire bore the major brunt of repeated invasions and as a result grew weak in comparison with the Eastern half. Furthermore, while the richer and stronger Eastern half of the Roman Empire remained a monolith through the Middle Ages in the form of the Byzantine Empire, the Western half fell in 410 A.D. itself.\(^4\)

A distinctive feature of Western Europe was its political fragmentation. The basic political power unit was always small and localized. E. L. Jones attributes this political fragmentation to the manner in which States formation took place in Western Europe. According to Jones, there were scatter of regions which had “high arable potential”, were “densely settled” and had the “largest tax basis to sustain offence and defence”. In other words, these scatter of regions were the “core-areas”. Nature separated these “core-areas” from each other by way of forests, mountains, marshes, sandy heaths, and so on. Further, ruling families erected their political fortunes as they united the “core-areas”, which in turn “liberated the impulses to expand and fuelled the outward spread whereby the ‘core-area’ swelled into a State and then a Nation State”. However, amalgamation went so far but no further: never to a single empire. This was mainly because, as mentioned above, the geography provided a check on expansion. At the same time, expansion under such geographical conditions raised the costs of the conflicts. Furthermore, an effective check was the “ethnic and linguistic apartheid”, which was in existence since the early settlement history. But most importantly, expansionism by one entity was checked by the collective or individual efforts of the others.

Similarly, Paul Kennedy also attributes Europe’s political diversity to its geography. According to Kennedy, Europe’s landscape was fractured, with mountain ranges and large forests separating the scattered population. Further, its climate altered considerably from one end to the other. While this made the establishment of unified control difficult, it also minimized the possibility of an external force over-running the continent. As a result, “a political map of Europe drawn at any time after the fall

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5 E. L. Jones, The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of
of Rome looked like a patchwork quilt. The patterns on that quilt might vary from century to century, but no colour could ever be used to denote a unified empire."\(^6\)

Though Western Europe was characterized by politically fragmented units, these units were in contact with each other. Europe's differentiated climate meant differentiated products that could be exchanged. Exchange of goods led to the development of market relations and also the means of transportation, especially along the rivers. As trade increased so did the prosperity of Europe.\(^7\) Sustained economic growth made possible in such a manner engineered institutional changes, which in turn was a crucial factor that led to the rise of the Nation State.\(^8\)

At the same time, the art of war in Europe changed from cavalry to infantry to siege cannon. The composition of military also changed from *ad hoc* to permanent forces, from unpaid obligatory services to paid volunteers, from semi private to public control, from multinational to national armies.\(^9\) These changes saw a sharp increase in the size of the armies and the revenues of central governments and their expenditures on military affairs. These factors had an important role in the European Nation State coalescing under the control of central authority. The changes in the art of war guaranteed the concentration of power within each State and the reduction of the number of States.\(^10\)


\(^2\) Kennedy, n.2, pp. 21-5.

\(^3\) Ibid.


While geography, economic growth and change in the art of war were crucial factors that contributed to the separate existence of political entities, the one factor that was responsible for cementing this separateness was nationalism. Nationalism has been defined differently by different people. Anthony D. Smith defines nationalism as “an ideological movement, for the attainment and maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’ like others”.\(^1\) According to Hans Kohn, nationalism is a “state of mind, permeating the large majority of a people, and claiming to permeate all its members; it recognizes the Nation State as the ideal form of political organization and the nationality as the source of all creative cultural energy and economic well being. The supreme loyalty of man is therefore due to his nationality, as his own life is supposedly rooted in and made possible by its welfare”.\(^2\) Ernest Renan believed that the important basis of separate existence of a nation was the past and the present. One is the common possession of a rich legacy of memories; the other is actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage that has been received in common. The nation, like the individual, is the outcome of a long and strenuous past of sacrifices and devotion. A heroic past of great men, of glory: this is the social capital on which a national idea is established. To have common glories in the past and common will in the present, to have done things together and to will that we do them again: these are the conditions essential to being a people.\(^3\)

According to John Stuart Mill, “the strongest cause for the feeling of nationality ... is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasures and regret,


connected with the same incidents in the past”.

According to Frederick Hertz, “the subjectivist definition of a nation, i.e. as a community formed by the will to be a nation is essentially correct, but it needs careful formulation .... Will ... in a whole people [is] but a multitude of feelings and vague ideas, animating a large and influential part of the people, that tend to crystallize in a will in certain conditions.

The decisive criterion is whether the idea of a duty to sacrifice particular interests to the national has become dominant in the people”.

In other words, the essence of nationalism does not rest with the existence of ethnic groups, the members of which exhibit sufficient similarity and coherence among themselves and sufficient differences from members of other groups to warrant objective recognition, but with the consciousness of belonging to a nation, coupled with an active urge to perpetuate and strengthen national bonds. A common language, common literature, common inspiration of great ideas, a common heritage of songs and folk tales embodying, and impressing upon each successive generation, the national point of view, a common religion, a common heritage of glory and grief, collective pride and humiliation, and so on, bind the people together and arouses the need for separate existence.

As a result, the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be owed to the Nation State. This is the first stage of nationalism and is described by Carlton J. H. Hayes as the “Dormant-Elemental” stage, wherein the attachment to the nation and proclivity

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for defending national territory exists but mainly on the subconscious level. This dormant nationalism finds expression as a "spontaneous national response" to a threat from outside. A prior faint consciousness of ethnic and linguistic unity flares up in the nation manifesting in defending the nation.\textsuperscript{18}

This is followed by the "Emotional-Cultural" phase wherein the individual experiences an exhilarating emotional bonding to his/her people, language, culture, traditions, institutions and history. Once this cultural nationalism is reached, it graduates to the "Rational-Doctrinal" phase where nationalism acquires a political dimension. The people strive for national liberation, socio-economic modernisation, territorial expansion, building up arms, and so on.\textsuperscript{19} In other words, they strive for separate political existence. Once the nation unites and organises itself into a Nation State, nationalism is no longer only about separate existence. The nation then experiences an overwhelming urge for collective action, be it colonial expansion, military aggression to acquire greater wealth, territory, people and power, or economic expansion.\textsuperscript{20}

The first of the European peoples to attain to the full stature of organised and conscious nationhood were the English and the first result of this unity was a series of attempts to impose an English dominion upon neighbouring peoples not yet so firmly organised.\textsuperscript{21} For example, the conquest of Wales, the long war of independence in Scotland and the Hundred Years' War in France. This in turn had the effect of conjuring up a spirit of nationality among the oppressed people. While Scotland

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Muir, n.17, p.57.
became truly a nation in resistance to the English attempt at conquest, in France the passion of the spirit of nationality was roused.

In the Iberian States of Portugal and Spain, the national spirit was set afire during the long drawn out crusade against the Moors. It was later sustained by the achievements of their navigators and their attempts at world mastery. These Nation States were intoxicated with the pride of their own strength. Similarly, the Dutch organised themselves as a nation in response to the Spanish rule. It is important to note that the cause of the Dutch revolt was not oppression of the people under Spanish rule. In fact the Low Countries enjoyed a very wide autonomy and the Spanish sovereignty was exercised in a very cautious way. Nevertheless, the Dutch revolted due to various reasons but most significantly due to incompatibility of the national character of the two peoples. The Dutch went on to become a Great Power, possessed numerous colonies and made their own attempt at mastery of the world. It is significant to note that the Dutch became powerful by plundering the Spanish ships laden with wealth from all over the world. Other examples are Wilhelmenian Germany, Napoleon’s France, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and so on.

The most extreme phase of nationalism is when the nation turns irrational. The nation could be “overwhelmed by the piercing pain of wrongs committed against it, whether real or imagined”. These acute national fears tend to make the nation paranoid with time, and may exhibit in wholly unrealistic utopian dreams and/or messianic longings for “saving the world”. It transcends all accepted norms of rationality, tradition and

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23 Hertz, n.15, p.153.
24 Hayes, n.18, p.11.
morality, which result in destructive warfare. The most outstanding example of such irrationality is that of Hitler’s Germany.

Therefore, the underlying feature of nationalism is that the nation strives to make the State the basic unit of the international order. The State is all powerful. Man’s loyalty to the State is supreme, such that he/she is ready to lay his/her life for the State. Niccolò Machiavelli’s lone voice in the sixteenth century stressed the significance of the State as a self-sufficient entity. According to Machiavelli, the State was in continual conflict with other States and therefore in need of power. Power of the State is an end in itself, and all means to this end are justified.25 Europe seems to have emulated Machiavelli’s teachings well and in the resulting world, the ideal of a unified Europe got completely lost.

Charlemagne, who reigned from 768 A. D. to 814 A. D., revived the old idea of a single emperor over all Christian people. He was a mighty warrior and within Christianity he forced all the Western people to acknowledge his authority.26 Recognising this achievement as a renovation of the Roman Empire, whose unity and peace were still yearned for, the Pope crowned Charlemagne on Christmas day in 800 A. D. as the new Roman Emperor. With all of Christendom under the joint authority of the Emperor and the Pope, the idea of European unity was revived in the realm of political authority. However, the Frankish administration had seeds of its own fragmentation. “While successful as long as new lands were conquered by the king, the practice of remunerating staff with land rather than money promoted the fragmentation of authority in the long run, since it endowed its recipients with a self-
renewing source of income that enabled them to build independent power bases from which to defy a central ruler.²⁷ Moreover, as the invasions from outsiders increased, the tendency of the Emperor to grant the defence responsibilities too to the feudal lords, transferred imperial rule from one centre to local rule at each locality. Furthermore, man’s outlook was constrained to the provincial and parochial interests such that all these factors added up to a structural constraint for political fragmentation.

The century following Charlemagne’s death witnessed a steady progress of division and sub-division of his Empire. After the reign of his son, Louis the Pious (814 A.D. to 840 A.D.), three of his grandsons agreed by the Treaty of Verdun (843 A.D.) to divide the inheritance between them. The Treaty of Verdun cemented the political fragmentation as the Empire was divided into the Western Frankish Kingdom (France), the Eastern Frankish Kingdom (Germany), and the Middle Kingdom, which split into Lotharingia, Upper Burgundy, Arles (Lower Burgundy), and Italy.²⁶

In a world by conquerors which displayed an increased sense of separatism and disintegration, only a highly emotional religion, strong enough to inspire constructive action, could be a unifying factor.²⁹ Since, Christianity was a religion that preached salvation for all mankind, it spread among the gentiles as well as the invaders. The invaders absorbed and integrated themselves in the Christian way of life, so that

Christian influences extended beyond the Rhine and the Danube.\textsuperscript{30} As a result, Christianity could have been the unifying factor in Europe.

When Constantine confessed to the Lord, "through Thy power have I become great; I fear Thy power", he removed all impediments on Christians. When Constantine's successors declared that as there was one Empire, there must be but one faith, Christianity became the religion of the Empire.\textsuperscript{31} However, the first divide in this Christian unity came with the first schism, wherein the West under the influence of Arius, proclaimed the supremacy of God, while the East, followers of Athanasius, claimed the Son was one in essence with the Father. This became the major divide between the Catholic Orthodox Western Church and the Eastern Church. This divide widened as the Pope became the official head of the Catholic Church and the Byzantine Emperor could not and would not owe allegiance to the Pope. The growing ecclesiastical hostility between Rome and Constantinople became permanent with the crowning of Charlemagne as the Holy Roman Emperor By Pope Leo III.\textsuperscript{32}

The crowning of the Emperor by the Pope could have finally meant that the spiritual and political capitals would coincide. But it was not to be. During most of the Middle Ages, the Pope in Rome was beyond the reach not only of the Emperor but also of any other secular ruler. European emperors kept moving from one place to another.\textsuperscript{33} In modern times, few Popes ventured explicitly to re-affirm the supremacy of the religious over civil authority. But none of them ever conceded inferiority. The farthest


\textsuperscript{31} Pflugk-Hartlung, n.3, pp. 283-4.


\textsuperscript{33} Martin van Creveld, \textit{The Rise and Decline of the State} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 59.
they were ready to go was to allow the State to "co-ordinate authority" with the Church and to recognise them both as stemming directly from "natural law", i.e. from God. As a result, the Church had the undisputed control of purely spiritual affairs which in turn recognised the ultimate sovereignty of the State. In fact, the Church unwittingly encouraged national considerations. For example, the author to the preamble to the Salic Law, enumerated the virtues of the Franks thus:

This is the people which, valiant and strong, shook off the Romans' heavy yoke in battle. After accepting baptism, the Franks heaped gold and costly jewels in order to adorn the bodies of those holy martyrs whom the Romans had destroyed by fire, mutilated by the sword or thrown to be devoured by savage beasts.

Since then the idea of God's deeds through the Franks has been the keynote of French national history. Similarly, the crusades may have been in theory the only true "international" wars of the Middle Ages, but there was no much strife based on national considerations between the Christians. One participant of the fourth Crusade wrote to the Pope that "it is very important for this business that the Germans should not march with the French: for we cannot find in history that they ever were at accord in any momentous common enterprise".

When the Portuguese Emperor, John II, contested Columbus' discoveries as being part of the Azores, over which Portugal had the right, Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain appealed to the Pope. The Pope, also a Spaniard, confirmed Spanish possession of Columbus' discoveries and gave Spain authority over all territory that lay beyond

35 Cited in ibid., p.13.
hundred leagues west or south of the Portuguese Cape Verde islands or Azores.37

Even the nationality of the Pope was contested. In 1305, the cardinals, divided between Italians and French, elected Clement V as Pope, who moved the Papal residence from Rome to Avignon in 1309. A bid for independence from the French came when in 1378 the Romans elected the Italian Urban VI to be Pope and the French cardinals elected Frenchman Clement VII. Two Popes existed simultaneously in the Christian world – one in France and one in Italy. The Christian world was truly divided. The Roman line and The French line of the Schism was maintained till 1408.38 However, it was the Reformation that was the central factor which led to the development of a system of sovereign states.39 Though Martin Luther’s fight was primarily against the repressive measures of catholic princes, he was the chief moulder of early German nationalism. He aroused the passion of the Germans with words such as: “the distress and oppression which weigh down all the Estates of Christendom, especially of Germany, and which move not me alone, but every one to cry out time and again, and to pray for help, have forced me even now to cry aloud that God may inspire someone with His Spirit to lend this suffering nation a helping hand”.40 Furthermore, in the long run, Luther’s translation of the Bible made possible the subsequent evolution of a uniform German literature which, more than any other single factor, paved the way for ultimate German unity.

The political theology of Reformation stressed that Christianity was not a united institution under a single human authority. By separating, for good, the spiritual and

37 Green, n.22, p.74.
38 Encyclopaedia of Religion, n.32, pp. 105-6.
40 Baron, n.34, p.119.
political capitals, the Reformation essentially prescribed sovereignty. Charles V’s bid to crush this heresy, among other things, led to the Thirty Years’ War, which culminated in the Treaty of Westphalia, which in turn was the initiator of the system of sovereign States. As a result, Westphalia finally brought wars based on religion and also the idea of Christianity as a unifier to an end.

The Habsburg’s probably had the best chance of unifying Europe with centralised rule. Never had the Holy Roman Empire, the Netherlands, Hungary and Bohemia, Castile and Aragon, and Naples and Sicily, been brought together under one rule. However, Charles V’s bid for consolidation and unification had the opposite effect of arousing passions along national lines and struggles for sovereignty. The sheer heterogeneity and diffusion of the lands led to its disintegration. Therefore, first the Austrian and Spanish line of the Empire was divided such that “like the double headed black eagle in the imperial coat of arms, the Habsburgs had two heads at Vienna and at Madrid, looking east and west”. The Habsburg reign is characterised with constant lengthy wars. Spain’s attempt to crush the Revolt of the Netherlands lasted from the 1560s until 1648; while the great multidimensional conflict undertaken by Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs against successive coalitions of enemy States from 1618 to 1648, lasted for thirty years and is known as the Thirty Years’ War. As mentioned earlier, the Treaty of Westphalia, signalling the end of the Thirty Years’ War, ushered in the era of sovereign states. Therefore,

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41 Philpott, n. 39, p.223.
42 Kennedy, n.2, p.47.
... had the Habsburg rulers achieved all of their limited, regional aims – even their defensive aims – the mastery of Europe would virtually have been theirs. The Ottoman Empire would have been pushed back, along the North African coast and out of Eastern Mediterranean waters. Heresy would have been suppressed within Germany. The Revolt of the Netherlands would have been crushed. Friendly regimes would have been maintained in France and England. Only Scandinavia, Poland, Muscovy, and the lands still under Ottoman rule would not have been subject to Habsburg power and influence – and the concomitant triumph of the Counter-Reformation.\textsuperscript{44}

Similarly, Napoleon Bonaparte, mounting on the spirit of nationalistic self-sacrifice unleashed by the French Revolution (1789-99) took French national power to amazing dimensions. The defensive nationalism of France metamorphosed into aggressive nationalism. France claimed it had the right to “attain her natural frontiers.” Hence, nationalism revealed the “seamy, aggressive tendency clearly inherent in it – the desire of the nation to conquer more and more territory, even at the expense of callously dominating neighbouring peoples, all in the name of ‘sacred national rights’.”\textsuperscript{45}

Napoleon succeeded in establishing his direct or indirect rule over a greater part of the continent, however, he was not able to unify the continent. More than anything else, Napoleon’s reign was instrumental in engendering the rise of nationalism in Europe. His was a French Empire in which all conquered countries were ruled according to the dictates of the Emperor. “Both the annexed countries and the vassal states had to pay enormous contributions, and to place at his disposal large contingents of troops which were used as cannon fodder. The conquered peoples were thus forced to make great sacrifices in blood and wealth for further conquests. This enabled him to spare the French people the greater part of the burdens of war, and thereby to maintain his

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p.44.
\textsuperscript{45} Endre B. Gastony, \textit{The Ordeal of Nationalism in Modern Europe 1789-1945} (New York: Edwin
The subjects were forced to introduce French laws and administration; were controlled by French ministers; had to employ French as an official language; their frontiers, constitutions and rulers were changed arbitrarily; and they had to admit French products freely to their markets while their products were kept out of the French markets by way of high tariffs. In short, the ultimate aim of the Napoleonic system was to destroy the nationality of the subject people. This in turn, stimulated the growth of nationalism in Europe. In countries such as Britain and Spain, which had long been independent, nationalism took the form of a determination to fight France as a single united “nation” and to work together to preserve or restore what had existed before the wars. In other areas, which had previously consisted of a number of smaller states, such as Italy and Germany, or had been ruled over by another power, such as the Austrian Empire and Poland, the nationalists realised that Spain, France and Britain were each a “nation state”, an independent country in which the people shared the same linguistic, cultural and national heritage. Nationalism, therefore, arose in these regions seeking to establish such independent and self-ruling states, in order that they too could become Nation States and occupy their “rightful place” alongside the English and The French.

Once Napoleon was defeated by the united efforts of Britain, Spain, Austria, Portugal, Prussia, and Russia, at the Congress of Vienna the Great Powers suspected nationalism as being dangerous and hence felt the need to suppress it. But the

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47 Hertz, n.15, p.162.
48 Ibid., pp. 162-3.
49 Ibid.
“ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of self-government and independence” had started and the nineteenth century witnessed numerous revolutions which led to the birth of new Nation States.

The southern part of the Netherlands had been under first Spanish and then Austrian control. But the people of Southern Netherlands were neither Spanish nor Austrian nor were they Dutch. They were a mix of Flemish and Walloons. In July 1830, they revolted and independent Belgium was born. The Poles also revolted around the same time. In the eighteenth century, Poland had been partitioned and the Polish State was destroyed. After 1815, Tsar Alexander I became constitutional King of Poland. When the Poles revolted they were harshly treated and the revolt was crushed. Poland became another Russian province. Italy, which was merely a geographical expression, was divided into numerous states. These states had been under the Austrian or French influence. Austrian paramountcy in Italy helped the growth of Italian nationalism. A national movement began in Italy and culminated in the establishment of a Republic in Rome in 1848. Germany too consisted of numerous small principalities. During the period 1850-70, the master political strategist, Bismarck, shaped the national movement in Germany. He tapped the desire and longing of the people for power and prestige and skilfully used wars to arouse national passions. In 1871, Germany came into being. Similarly, in 1830, the sovereign state of Greece emerged from the Turkish Empire and the Scandinavian Union dissolved in 1904 when the Norwegians

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asserted for a separate nationality. Even in the United Kingdom, the Irish people rose in revolt against the dominance of England. As a result, the map of Europe showed not a united Europe but a Europe of numerous Nation States.

Once a reasonable degree of unity was achieved, these new Nation States, especially Italy and Germany, set out to attain what they believed was their rightful place on the European and world stage. They competed with the Great Powers for extra European Empires and attempted to complete unification by claiming areas of German or Italian cultures not yet within the national state. This self-assertion promoted in its turn a more “conscious and bombastic” nationalism on the part of the older Nation States as a response.\textsuperscript{53} At the same time, they disturbed the power structure of Europe considerably. Italy was a big country with thirty million people. It threatened the position of Austria-Hungary by its ambitions in the Balkans, the Adriatic and its claim over 800,000 Italian-speaking people under Austrian rule. In addition, its interest in the Mediterranean and in North Africa led to increasing rivalry with France.\textsuperscript{54}

Germany, on the other hand, emerged right in the centre of the European core. Since Germany was formed only after it defeated Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-71, it upset the Continental equilibrium. Consequently, the pressure on the existing powers was enormous to maintain their previously dominant positions. In an atmosphere of looming threat and distrust, all powers entered into numerous alliances to protect their interests in the event of a war. When the Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated on 28 June 1914 at Sarajevo, it triggered into a large scale war and all powers were voluntarily or involuntarily involved. Many historians blamed the Germans for the

\textsuperscript{53} Orridge, n.50, p.44.
\textsuperscript{54} Grover Clark, A Place in the Sun (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937), pp. 8-20.
First World War naming their plans of Mitteleuropa and the policy of Weltpolitik as the main reason. But once the coalition defeated Germany and Austria, they were subjected to great humiliation, were forced to reduce their armaments, were subjected to the “War Guilt Clause” and reparations were forced on them. Out of the ruins of the First World War arose Hitler who unleashed the most demoniac face of nationalism. “Hitler’s broom, intensified national sentiment; for the Nazi doctrine of the Herrenvolk, ruling over inferior races, was a direct provocation to national resistance”. In Hitler’s self-appointed task of uniting Europe under his rule, he drew upon the arrogance, the unlimited pretensions, and the unbridled assertiveness of Western nationalism. To these he added German nationalism, which was suffused with the added bitterness of defeat in the First World War. The end result was nationalism stripped to its bare and vicious form – revolutionary, extreme, irrational. Instead of helping to unify Europe, Hitler aggravated its centrifugal tendencies. A European unity was forged in common hatred for Hitler and Hitler was defeated in the Second World War. But two World Wars in the space of two decades saw the Nation States of Europe completely devastated, which in turn triggered a debate on the end of the Nation State.

**Realism vs. Neo-Realism**

The Realist School of thought explains States’ behaviour as a means to achieve power. According to Hans J. Morgenthau, the main proponent of Realism, international politics is a struggle for power. Power is always the immediate aim.

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56 Snyder, n.20, p.72.
57 Ibid., p.73.
Statesmen and people may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity, or power itself. They may define their goals in terms of a religious, philosophic, economic or social ideal. They may also try to further its realisation through non-political means, such as technical cooperation with other nations or international organisations. But whenever they strive to realise their goal by means of international politics they do so by striving for power. 58

In Martin Wight's words, "modern times have been a dynamic, tumultuous period of economic expansion and social change, during which agreed moral standards and political beliefs have become increasingly rarefied, as a multitude of powers have each claimed independence of the rest and driven forward upon their own paths. Modern history is a history of powers, forces, dynasties, and ideas ... Wars are wars of unprovoked, ... of idea, of liberation, or of glory, or of nationality, or of propagandism". 59 Further, according to Wight, "what distinguishes modern history is the predominance of the idea of right; the very term 'Power' to describe a state in its international aspect is significant". 60 "The world community is still an anarchy, lacking a common superior, and international politics are still power politics. Every power has an interest greater than welfare, an interest on which it believes that welfare depends and to which welfare must in the last resort be sacrificed – the maintenance of power itself". 61 Robert Gilpin goes a step further when he says, "although ... peaceful adjustment of the systemic disequilibrium is possible, the principal mechanism of change throughout history has been war, or what we shall call

60 Ibid., p.18.
hegemonic was (i.e., a war that determines which state or states will be dominant and will govern a system).\textsuperscript{62}

In other words, the basic assumptions inherent in the realist view are: first, States are coherent units that are dominant actors in world politics i.e. States are predominant; and they also act as coherent units. Second, force is a usable and effective instrument of policy. Other instruments may also be employed, but using or threatening force is the most effective means of wielding power. Third, there are a hierarchy of issues in world politics. The "high politics" of military security precedes the "low politics" of economic and social affairs.

The Realist view is criticised on the basis that interests cannot be derived, simply on the basis of national calculation, from the external positions of states, and that this is particularly true for great powers. As a result, Realist analysis has to retreat to a "fallback position": that, given state interests, whose origins are not predicted by the theory, patterns of outcomes in world politics will be determined by the overall distribution of power among states.\textsuperscript{63} Secondly, Realists have a unitary notion of power as being homogeneous and usable for a variety of purposes, but close examination of the complexities of world politics induces caution about such an approach. Any given international system is likely to have several structures, differing by issue-areas and according to the resources that can be used to affect outcomes. Differing sets of capabilities will qualify as "power resources" under different

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., p.21.


\textsuperscript{63} Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond", \textit{American Political Science Association Annual Meeting} (Denver), September 1982, p.183.
conditions. This brings us to Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye's "Theory of Complex Interdependence". The main characteristics of the theory are: first, states, non-government actors, transnational actors are connected to each other through "multiple channels"; second, issues are not arranged in any hierarchical order; and third, military security does not consistently dominate the agenda. Based on these characteristics they explain regime change with the help of four models.

An Economic Process Explanation
Technological and economic changes are brought about by various means like advances in transportation and communication technology, which reduces the costs of distance. Governments, at the same time, are drawn into agreements, consultations, and institutions to cope with rapidly expanding transactions. And thus it helps in regime change. But, this is not always true. Governments continually sacrifice economic efficiency to security, autonomy and other values in policy decisions. Further rising economic interdependence can create fear and insecurity among politically important groups, for example, industries threatened by imports press for governmental protection.

Overall Power Structure Explanation
This explanation assumes that power will find a common level. As interdependence increases hegemony is eroded. It does not differentiate significantly among issue areas in world politics but predicts a strong tendency towards congruence of outcomes among issue areas. Further, hegemonies will be willing to forego short term gains in

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64 Ibid., p.184.
66 Ibid., pp.33-6.
bargaining to preserve the regime. When the hegemonial power does not seek to conquer other states, but merely to protect its favoured position, other states may benefit as well. Similarly, as the economic power of secondary states increase, no longer do they have to accept a one-sided dependence.\textsuperscript{67}

\textbf{Issue Structure}

Different issue areas often have different political structures that may be more or less insulated from the overall distribution of economic and military capabilities. Power resources in one issue area lose some or all of their effectiveness when applied to another. Thus within each issue area states will pursue their relatively coherent self-interests and stronger states in the issue system dominate weaker ones and determine the rules of the game.\textsuperscript{68}

\textbf{An International Organisation Model}

Along with governments, linked by formal relations between foreign offices, they are also linked by inter-governmental and trans-governmental ties at many levels. The multi level linkages, norms and institutions are collectively called international organisations. The international organisation accounts for failures of the basic structural models of regime change. Regimes are established and organised in conformity with distributions of capabilities, but subsequently the relevant networks, norms, and institutions will themselves influence actors' abilities to use these capabilities. Power over outcomes will be conferred by organisationally dependent capabilities, such as voting power, ability to form coalitions, and control of elite

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., pp.36-42.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 43-7.
networks, i.e., by capabilities that are affected by the norms, networks and institutions associated with international organisation.\(^6\)

**Post-War Europe**

The post-War period saw Europe in a state of desperate crisis. Winston Churchill aptly describes the plight of the Europeans as "vast quivering mass of tormented, hungry, care worn and bewildered human beings" living in constant fear of the "approach of some new peril, tyranny of terror".\(^7\) In 1946, the European economy was in shambles. The level of agricultural production was a third below that of 1938, industrial production never reached the 1938 level till 1948 and consumption per head of basic foods was much below 1938 levels, even in 1949-50.\(^7\) Not a single nation was confident to carry out on its own the defence of its citizens and the proper management of its economy. At the same time, the Nation States of Western Europe were aware that another war of similar intensity would surely spell the end of the Nation State. They also realised that the only way to "rescue" the Nation State was integration.\(^7\)

The role the United States played in the eventual integration of Western Europe is well known. Its offer of the Marshall Plan stimulated the re-construction of the European economy but more than that it paved the way for the economic and political cooperation among the Member States. The US was motivated by its need to curb the expansionism of Soviet Union and the expansion of the Communist ideology. The material misery and hunger experienced in Europe, according to the US, was perfect

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\(^6\) Ibid., pp.47-50.


breeding ground for Communism. Along with this external threat, the threat within Europe that both Europe and the US feared alike was Germany. Though divided and stripped off its sovereignty, West Germany was soon becoming the dominating influence on the remarkable expansion of intra-Western-European trade. Germany's efficient industries had led the reconstruction of its war-damaged economy and soon became the pivot of growth and modernisation in the region. At the same time, the US was aware that Germany would gain more autonomy and sovereignty soon, therefore it was imperative to bind Germany in a supranational set up. As a result, when Robert Schuman proposed the Schuman Plan for coal and steel, both the Americans and the Europeans welcomed it.

The European Coal and Steel Community
The Schuman Plan was a proposal to "place Franco-German production of coal and steel under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organisation open to the participation of the other countries of Europe". The plan envisaged the creation of certain common institutions to which the participating states would transfer a certain, though very small, portion of their sovereignty. These institutions would not be endowed with any general political functions but only a strictly limited competence in the narrow sector of coal and steel.

Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, and the likes believed that ECSC was "a first step in the direction of European federation" and that it would lead them towards a complete

74 Milward, n.72, p.134.
economic and political unification of Europe. However, the nations of Europe viewed it merely as a means to protect their national interests. Britain, the sole victorious power in Europe after the Second World War, was not willing to participate in any post-War arrangement in Europe. The widespread assumption at the time was that Britain would assume a leadership role in Europe. In fact, there "were many in France and in other European countries who were ready to accept it [British leadership], who even yearned for it". Nevertheless, Britain was not interested. This was mainly because Britain had not suffered the same disillusionment and political convulsions before and during the War as the states of continental Europe, whose institutions had been found wanting and hence were ready for new institutions and new loyalties. Whereas the War left the continental countries with a sense of national failure and a feeling of national inadequacy, it left Britain with a "sense of national achievement and cohesion and an illusion of power". Hence, joining with the "continentals" was considered a bad idea. Secondly, Europe as a "Third Force", under British leadership, in a bipolar world, was attractive to all but Britain because of its close relationship with the United States. Britain truly believed its interests lay more with the Commonwealth and the United States than with continental Europe. Lastly, by nature, the British were distrustful of general concepts and distant objectives. As a consequence, Britain was not willing to commit itself to a hitherto undefined Europe.

79 Robertson, n.77, p.3.
For France, the Schuman Plan meant protecting the French economy from the effects of a reviving German competition in Europe. In the case of the coal and steel industry, which still represented the foundation of the military strength of a nation, the Germans were re-building an efficient new industry but France was still working with obsolete production facilities. When they could in no way bring German production under control, the French agreed to a supranational solution. Secondly, the Schuman Plan meant, “exorcising French fears of the military and political consequences of German recovery”. On the other hand, for Germany, a country that not only had been beaten but also was guilty of Nazism and Holocaust, integration with Europe meant equality and dignity among other European countries. Moreover, confronted with the Soviet threat, Germany knew that the only way of avoiding war and occupation was by staying close to the United States and to a western defence.

In the case of Italy, even after signing the peace treaty after the First World War, Rome was not trusted in European circles. The aim of the foreign ministry was to re-insert Italy into the West European Community. When the French officially asked Italy to participate in the Schuman Plan, there was never the question of not joining

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84 R’eat, n.82, p.3.
85 Marion Miller, “The Approaches to European Institution Building of Carlo Sforza, Italian Foreign Minister, 1947-51”, in Deighton, n.76, n.56.
it;\(^8^6\) though there were apprehensions that the Schuman Plan was “dangerously slanted on the side of French national interests.”\(^8^7\) According to Monnet’s plan, all strip mill plants and heavy steel-making capacity were to be concentrated in France; and Italy would be allowed only a small number of plants for special steel production.\(^8^8\) But, otherwise for Italy, the Schuman Plan meant modernisation of production, removal of tariffs on coal and steel and improvement of living conditions of labour in these industries. Hence, Italy was the first to accede to the Schuman Plan. Finally, the three Benelux nations. They were the leading proponents of Western European unity. There was a strong political reason behind this. The Second World War proved that these small nations could not remain neutral and the big powers of Europe would never respect their neutrality. However, a unification process would create a “working place system” in Europe which would prevent them from being occupied and exploited in future.\(^8^9\) Moreover, since the Schuman Plan was a peace proposal to end the centuries-old conflict between France and Germany, the Benelux countries agreed to accede.

Hence, on 18 April 1951, the Treaty establishing the Coal and Steel Community was signed by six nations – France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg – and it came into effect by the end of July 1952. The Treaty contained provisions for the creation of:

\(^8^7\) Ibid., p.126.
\(^8^8\) Ibid.
• A High Authority, with powers of an executive character, responsible for the establishment and operation of the Common Market for coal and steel;

• A Parliamentary assembly, before which the High Authority would be responsible, which would thus ensure the principle of democratic control over the executive;

• A court of Justice to ensure the rule of law in the application of the Treaty; and,

• A council of Ministers to represent the national governments and secure coordination between the policies of the Community and of its constituent states.

The Council of Ministers consisted of representatives of the member states and they ensured that the decisions of the High Authority did not run contrary to the interests of the individual members. In other words, though the High Authority had supranational powers, it had no means of exercising them. Enforcement was possible only through the medium of national governments, i.e., in effect, it meant a limit on the supranational. Also, the Common Assembly of Parliamentarians was consultative and was never a legislative body. It had no power to take decisions that were binding on the High Authority or other organs of the Community. It did not even have control over finances.\(^9^0\) Hence, national control was ensured in this first step during unification.

**The European Defence Community**

During the negotiations over the ECSC, the international climate was deteriorating. In 1950, there was the renewed threat of a third world war as conflict broke out in Korea.

\(^9^0\) Robertson, n.77, p.28.
In line with its Truman Doctrine, the United States supplied money, supplies and troops in a bid to expel the communist forces from Korea, which imposed an extra demand upon American financial resources and, therefore, was faced with an allocation problem. This directly affected Europe as the US expected and demanded that the Western European governments strengthened and enlarged their own military forces to contribute to the NATO forces stationed in Europe to ward off the Soviet threat. As the Western European governments could not meet this demand, America urged the rearmament of Germany.

The US suggestion aroused all the old fears of German hegemony and German aggression, especially in France. Britain and the US felt NATO was the appropriate forum for Germany to be re-armed but France thought otherwise as NATO armies were essentially national armies, though under the integrated command. France was adamantly opposed to an independent German army. As a result, they took the lead in drawing plans for a European Defence Community (EDC). This was called the Pleven Plan.

According to the Pleven Plan, the EDC would be structured along the lines of the ECSC but the “supranational executive”, the Board of Commissioners would have considerably less advantage against the Council of Ministers. Another difference was that whereas ECSC consisted of six equal partners, EDC was designed to prevent German parity in the military sphere. Britain once again stayed away as it was never so obsessed with German resurgence to find it worthy enough to surrender

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92 Ibid., p.150.
independent decision-making. Moreover, Britain felt Germany could be rearmed under appropriate safeguards via NATO and the Pleven Plan and other delays simply revealed French weakness. Since a unified army could not exist in an institutional vacuum, plans were undertaken to set up a European Political Community (EPC). The EPC would not be a third community but would be the beginning of a European federation and the ECSC and EDC would be subsidiary parts of the new EPC.

With Britain opting out, the six ECSC members signed the draft treaty and by 1954, all except France had ratified it. Finally, on 30 August 1954 the French National Assembly rejected the draft treaty. Numerous reasons are cited for this French action, like the continued French mistrust of the Germans, French nationalism, and the French foreign obligations especially concerning its dependencies overseas. Whatever the reason, this French action confirmed the fact that if any decision did not suit a Member State, then it would not hesitate to put the existence of the entire Community in jeopardy.

The European Economic Community

With the route towards a military as well as a political Europe barred indefinitely, there remained only the path towards an economic Europe. The initiative of relaunching Europe was taken by the Benelux countries in the form of a general Common Market. In May and June 1955 the Six Foreign Ministers met at Messina and drafted a joint proposal for the pooling of information and work concerning the use of atomic energy and the establishment of a comprehensive Customs Union leading to a Common Market. An inter-governmental committee headed by Paul-

93 Paul Cornish, "The British Military View of European Security, 1945-50", in Deighton, n.76, p.73.
94 John W. Young, "British officials and European Integration, 1944-60", in ibid., p.93
Henri Spaak was established to develop the proposals further. Finally, on 25 March 1957, the Six signed two treaties, one establishing a European Economic Community (EEC) and the other a European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in Rome. The National Parliaments ratified the Treaties by 10 July 1957.

According to the Treaty of Rome, "The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a Common Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the Member States belonging to it". In order to achieve this aim the Treaty envisaged the elimination of customs duties and quantitative restrictions among the Member States; the establishment of a common customs tariff and a common commercial policy towards third countries; free movement of persons, services and a Common Agricultural Policy, Common Transport Policy; fair competition, coordinated economic policy; the creation of a European Social Fund and a European Investment Bank. The institutional set up of the EEC consisted of the Assembly, known as the European Parliament; the Council of Ministers; the European Commission, the European Court of Justice; and the Economic and Social Committee. Hence the Member States chose to transfer sovereignty over certain policy areas to common institutions. According to Alan S. Milward, if the members did make this choice then the principal national interest, along with defining and

96 Article 3, EEC Treaty.
97 Article 4, EEC Treaty.
limiting that transfer of sovereignty very carefully, would be to structure the central institutions in such a way that the balance of power within the integrationist framework would be preserved in their favour.\textsuperscript{98} The Treaties of Paris and Rome are perfect examples. The Member States have themselves stated the powers of the institutions and the relationship between them. The Commission, which is a permanent body, i.e., the executive, was actually merely an administrative and technical body. In addition, the Council of Ministers which was the non-permanent body was actually the main political body. The Commission's powers were very circumscribed and limited as compared to the High Authority of the ECSC. On the other hand, the Council of Ministers had a greatly expanded role as compared to its ECSC counterpart.\textsuperscript{99} Moreover, the Commission had only the power to recommend and advice.\textsuperscript{100} All these were essentially to ensure that control over the future developments of the Community remained with the Member States. In 1965, a situation threatened this control of the Member States when there was an attempt to pass Council decisions by majority vote rather than the usual unanimous vote. The Member States, especially France, opposed this move. The French opposition led to a grave constitutional crisis as France, in protest, refused to participate in any Community deliberations. The situation was finally brought under control via the "Luxembourg Compromise". As a result of the Compromise, majority voting was limited to market liberalisation measures alone and not extended to any matter that any Member State felt was of vital interest to its nation.

\textsuperscript{98} Alan S. Milward and Vibeke Sorensen, "Inter-dependence or Integration? A National Choice", in Milward and others, n.86, p.4.
\textsuperscript{99} Coombes, n. 75, p.24.
\textsuperscript{100} Leon N. Lindberg, \textit{The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), p.31.
Control over the Community by Member States is evident from: (a) the reluctance to specify a more detailed goal for the Community rather than the vague commitment to an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. (b) There is no intention whatsoever to destroy completely the sovereignty of nation states. There is only an attempt to develop some type of a central organisation as the need arose. Even the word “supranational” was eliminated from the provisional drafts of the Treaties of Rome. (c) The central institutions which were meant to take over more and more formal powers of decision from the member governments, were in no way directly responsible to the people or even to the European Parliament which represented the people directly.

Hence, the integrationist approach adopted by the Europeans, in the form of Community Building, was a bid to “rescue” the nation state. Once the nation state was on the road to recovery, Member States of the EC continued with the arrangement as now they viewed the Community as an appropriate platform to preserve their identity and national interests. The present study examines this pursuit of national interest by Member States in five policy areas: Free Movement of Goods, Common Agricultural Policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Economic and Monetary Union, and Social Policy.