CHAPTER V

U.S. - PAKISTAN STRATEGIC CONSENSUS
Once Jimmy Carter lost the election and Reagan assumed power, the nonproliferation goals of the United States were relegated to a position of relative unimportance. In the overwhelming desire to forge strategic alliances against the Soviet Union, the United States' nonproliferation goals ceased to be an issue of much concern or importance for the new Administration. The nonproliferation policy was being used like the arms transfer policy as a means to enhance American power and influence.¹

An analysis of Pakistan's nuclear policy during the presidency of Ronald Reagan revealed that the Administration had adopted a public posture that "preventing the spread of nuclear explosives was a fundamental natural security and foreign policy objective"² of the United States. But, the Administration's actions were not in conformity to its declared policy. Washington secretly ignored both the intelligence reports and evidence that Pakistan's nuclear policy was suspect. Nor did it pay much attention to


a strong media opinion that Pakistan was systematically pursuing a programme to acquire nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Washington was evidently eager to arm Pakistan. The new Administration took steps to ensure that the issue of nonproliferation did not constitute a stumbling block.

In 1979, the U.S. had suspended development assistance and the International Military Education and Training programme to Pakistan. To the new Administration, this resulted in what was regarded as a growing "sense of isolation and insecurity in Pakistan."3 The thinking of the Administration was clearly revealed during the hearings of the House of Representation when the Deputy Assistant Secretary submitted that the waiver provision contained in Section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act should be amended to provide the "President with the needed flexibility and permit him to pursue a consistent nonproliferation policy within the context of our overall national security interests."4 It was further advocated that the passage of the proposed amendment would also "attest to the recognition by the legislative branch of Pakistan's critical position and to the breadth of American support for Pakistan during this time of


4 Ibid.
In stark contrast, during the Carter presidency, after the U.S. convinced France to rescind the contract to construct a nuclear reprocessing plant in Pakistan, the Administration terminated all aid in 1979 in accordance with the Symington amendment. Though the French were initially reluctant, they cancelled the contract after "compelling evidence of Pakistan's true interest" came to light. But this firm stand of the United States did not unduly disturb the Pakistan leaders as the aid flowing from Washington was only a trickle. In 1979, when the Pakistani nuclear programme came in for international criticism, President Zia-ul-Haq struck a very defiant note and stated that "we [Pakistan] shall lift our own burden. We shall eat crumbs but will not allow our national interest to be compromised in any manner whatsoever." The situation, however, changed dramatically with the eruption of the Afghan crises which spawned an almost complete change in certain U.S. priorities. But even in the face of this development, Washington was not willing to blindly pursue a militaristic approach reminiscent of the Cold War years. The Carter Administration evidently attempted to balance the

5 Ibid., p.6.


7 Pakistan Times (Lahore) 28 July 1979.
nonproliferation goals and U.S. security interests.

In contrast, the new Administration did not exhibit any genuine resolve to curb the Pakistani nuclear ambitions despite Congressional support for nonproliferation goals. It convinced the Congress to soften its stand through several behind-the-scene consultations and intense lobbying to support the foreign aid legislation. The subcabinet officials at the State department "Carried the main lobbying burden, with indispensable reinforcement from the White House -- and the President personally -- at key points." The Congress had passed in 1981 a resolution called P.L. 97-113 and amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by adding a new Section 620E to the Act. This Law which came into effect on 29 December 1981, conferred upon the President the authority to waive Section 669 of the act until 30 September 1987, and provide foreign assistance to Pakistan if the President deemed that such aid would be in U.S. national interest.

The new Section 620E also recognised the threat which the Soviet presence posed to Pakistan and reaffirmed the 1959 U.S.-Pakistan bilateral agreement which dealt with U.S. action in the contingency of an armed aggression from a Communist controlled country. Nevertheless, the Congress passed the $3.2 billion aid package predicating it on the

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condition that aid could only be continued if Pakistan would not detonate a nuclear device. This was specifically included into the provisions. For the first time, Pakistan was therefore confronted with the real possibility of losing large quantity of American aid if it decided to pursue the nuclear policy. In comparison, in 1979 the American aid cut-off hardly mattered to Pakistan as the carrot dangled before it in terms of military hardware was not tempting enough for Islamabad to change its priority. But now there was a big difference -- the U.S. had the power to influence Islamabad's policies. It was a different matter that Washington was not willing to use it. The fact was that America was not prepared to use the new-found influence and leverage it had by virtue of its arms supply programme to compel Pakistan to rescind from its nuclear policy.

The result was that the Pakistani efforts to construct a nuclear enrichment plant surreptitiously pursued ever since the 1979 cancellation of the French-Pakistan agreement to construct a nuclear processing plant, continued through the entire Reagan Administration. In the early 1970s, a Pakistani Scientist was employed in the Netherlands nuclear Plant, UNENCO, a British, Dutch and German consortium that enriched uranium for centrifuges. This scientist stole the plans and attempted to replicate the process at Kahuta. But though the U.S. prevented Pakistan from buying certain critical parts for the plant, it was not willing to resort to use the weapon which could hurt most -- the threat to terminate U.S.
arms aid to Pakistan. Consequently, the half-hearted efforts of the U.S. did not bear results.

Pakistan also shrewdly understood and calculated further that the Reagan Administration would not be inclined to cancel U.S. aid. Islamabad thereafter continued to pursue its goal of developing the capacity to produce enriched uranium for manufacturing the bomb. The situation was correctly analysed by Paul Leventhal, President, Nuclear Control Institute. He stated that since 1979, "U.S. offers of aid have worked as leverage against the United States' nonproliferation efforts rather than against Pakistan's nuclear-weapons development program." He further analysed that Pakistan had "correctly perceived that the United States would be prepared to do almost anything to enlist Pakistan to help thwart the Soviets in Afghanistan -- even to the extent of looking the other way while Pakistan builds its bomb."

Therefore with no real pressure from the U.S., Pakistan continued its efforts to build the nuclear plant and succeeded. By 1984, it was reported that the plant was producing weapons-grade material. Pakistan's resolve was unmistakenly clear: it wanted the bomb and was tirelessly

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10 Ibid.
working towards it. Islamabad's true intentions were perhaps best summed up by the Secretary of the Prime Minister Khan Junejo's Pakistan Muslim League Party when he declared that "we [Pakistan] have learned to purify uranium. Now we [Pakistan] should, with the help of God, produce an explosion."\footnote{Quoted in: Hearings, n.2, p.108.}

The Reagan Administration, however, publicly continued to claim that it was making every effort to preclude Pakistan from going nuclear. But the efforts remained at the rhetoric level and very little was done in concrete terms to stop Islamabad. It was only in September 1984 that Reagan due to Congressional pressure wrote to Zia that even the enrichment of uranium to weapons-grade levels might result in the termination of U.S. aid. But, no evidence, existed however, to suggest that Pakistan had taken Reagan's letters seriously. The fact that the Pakistan-born Canadian, Arshad Pervez, was later arrested in 1987 in the attempt to illegally export maraging steel used in the production of nuclear weapons credibility to this premise.

In July 1985, Washington again warned Pakistan that if it acquired nuclear weapons, it would result in the cancellation of the U.S. economic assistance. In the face of increasing evidence, the Congress once again amended Section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1985. It imposed tighter restrictions and pre-conditions on the Administration before it could
transfer arms to Pakistan. The new amendment made it imperative on
the part of the President to certify that "Pakistan does not possess a
nuclear explosive device and that the proposed United States assistance
program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a
nuclear explosive device"\textsuperscript{12} before the release of military aid or
technology for a given fiscal year to Islamabad. In addition, the
Congress also amended Section 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act making
it mandatory for Washington to suspend American assistance to any non-
nuclear-weapon state that attempts or exports illegally any "material,
equipment, or technology"\textsuperscript{13} from the U.S. that would enhance the
country's capacity to manufacture a nuclear device.

The practical utility of the legislation was, however, further
circumscribed. Under Section 670 (a) (1) (B) of the Foreign Assistance
Act, it was the President who had to determine if the "illegal exports"
would enhance the possibility of Pakistan manufacturing a nuclear device.
Therefore, in effect the fetters placed on the Administration were without
any real import. It implied that the restriction would only have effect
if the Administration decided to wear it. Further, Section 670 as

\textsuperscript{12} Richard P. Cronin, \textit{Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance Facts}, (Foreign
affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, The
Library of Congress, Major Issues system, Issue Brief Order code IB

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
amended also gave the Administration the liberty to continue aid to Pakistan even if it chose to wear the fetter by providing yet another device to overcome the difficulty. This was achieved by making the amendment subject to the waiver provisions of Section 670.

The waiver conditions posited the continuation of aid to Pakistan if the President certified to the existence of certain conditions. Accordingly, aid could be continued if the President certified that suspension of U.S. assistance "would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of the United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardise the common and defense security" of Washington.\(^\text{14}\) It can therefore be inferred that the amendments were indeed a sham and without any teeth. The President was provided with the power of being the authority to determine whether the "illegal exports" would contribute to Pakistan's nuclear efforts. Even if the President was compelled to do so by incontrovertible circumstances to make such a public determination, the President had the liberty of escaping that restriction if he certified that continued aid would contribute to U.S. nonproliferation goals or that it would be in U.S. security interests. This meant that in reality every thing was virtually left in the President's hands and with Reagan in the White House, it implied that Pakistan had nothing to fear from an incumbent who subordinated all goals to strategic objectives.

\(^\text{14}\) Ibid., p.8.
As future developments were to reveal, the Reagan Administration was evidently not willing to arm twist Pakistan into compliance. This was in consonance with the declared policy of the U.S. that assistance to Pakistan was based on "certain special considerations." Therefore, whenever any reports appeared in the media or elsewhere pointing to Pakistan's obdurate pursuit of nuclear weapons, the Reagan Administration was only willing to make empty noises. Further, Washington went to the extent of warning other nations not to interfere with Pakistan's nuclear activities. Thus when it was reported that China had transferred to Islamabad nuclear-weapons designs, Washington's response was only a feeble remonstrations to China. The Russians had already got their intelligence reports to the effect that Pakistan was acquiring nuclear weapons. The celebrated investigative journalist, Bob Woodward joined with Don Oberdorfer and wrote in the *International Herald Tribune*, that Moscow had very strongly warned Islamabad that it was aware that Pakistan was on the throes of making a nuclear bomb and that it would not "tolerate" such a development. Surprisingly, an Administration which liked to be seen as one pursuing a vigorous nonproliferation policy,

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reacted strongly and communicated to Moscow to keep its "hands off" Pakistan. This warning was issued even in the face of U.S. intelligence community reports and assessments that Pakistan was very close to making a bomb.\footnote{Ibid.} Frequent official denials, however, continued to emanate from Washington that Islamabad was years away from producing a nuclear explosive. But, they meant nothing in view of the Administration's proclivity to close its eyes to Pakistani efforts.

The Second Aid Package

In March 1986 the Administration had negotiated a $4.2 billion U.S. aid programme as the first package was ending in 1987. The request from the Administration came at a time when evidence was mounting that Pakistan was pursuing relentlessly its goal to produce nuclear weapons. But this did not deter the President who was only concerned with the continuity in the supply of arms to Pakistan which was the inducement to Islamabad to serve American strategic interests. Reagan was even willing to issue the certification required under Section 670 of Foreign Assistance Act despite the admissions of certain key officials of his Administration that such a certification should not be issued. The U.S. National Security Affairs Adviser, John M. Poindexter, was reported
to have felt that the "U.S. may not be able to certify that Pakistan does not have a weapon."\textsuperscript{18}

Nevertheless, the President found it fit to certify to the Congress on 27 October 1986, that Pakistan did not "possess a nuclear explosive device." Reagan apparently found it appropriate to issue the certificate, although there existed a feeling in the Congress that Pakistan was close to building a bomb. It has to be concluded that the President issued the certificate to Congress though he was aware that Pakistan was edging closer to its nuclear goal. For, the certificate was issued "despite the intelligence it [Administration] had that Pakistan was producing weapons-grade enriched uranium."\textsuperscript{19} In fact, as early as 1981, it had become abundantly clear that Reagan was aware that Pakistan would not abjure its quest for nuclear weapons. This became apparent in a televised news interview Reagan gave on 16 June 1981. When he was asked the question whether "Do we [U.S.] have assurances that Pakistan will not seek to build an atomic bomb?", he replied that "I will not answer [this] part of the question."\textsuperscript{20}

If credence was attributable to the investigative talent of Bob Woodward, then it would have to be inferred that Pakistan detonated a

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 16 July 1986.

\textsuperscript{19} Washington Post, 8 March 1987.

high explosive device between September 18 and September 21 in its
effort to build an explosive type nuclear weapon.\textsuperscript{21} Bob Woodward,
quoting unidentified sources said that Pakistan had been conducting tests
for years and the explosion of September 1986 was the second for the
year. He further added that Pakistan had also succeeded in enriching
uranium to 93.5 percent at Kahuta.\textsuperscript{22} In the article, Woodward had
quoted another well informed source as saying that Pakistan was only "two
screw driver turns" from having a fully assembled bomb. Further, ABC
News had reported that Pakistan had obtained U.S.-made electronic triggers
to set off nuclear bombs and had successfully carried out tests in non-
nuclear explosion.\textsuperscript{23} Reagan in keeping with his line of thinking that
Pakistan was too strategically important for the U.S. to be ruffled on such
issues, ignored the intelligence reports.

\textit{Times of India}, a leading Indian news paper also reported that even
during Pakistani Prime Minister Junejo’s visit to the U.S., the nuclear
issue did not figure and that the discussion revolved around only
Pakistan’s urgent need for surveillance planes.\textsuperscript{24} It can also be concluded


\textsuperscript{22} It may be worth recalling that Reagan had written to Zia in 1984 that if the
Uranium enrichment exceeded 5 percent, then it would not be acceptable to
the United States.

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Atlanta Journal}, 11 July 1985.

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{The Times of India} (New Delhi), 26 July 1986.
from the various Congressional Hearings that Reagan was perhaps availing of loopholes in the Pakistan nuclear efforts to continue extending it U.S. aid. In December 1986, when Reagan personally certified to the Congress that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon, he also appended a note "that he was not ruling on whether Pakistan was attempting to develop or had already developed nuclear weapon capabilities." This note was self evident. It clearly was an admission by the Administration that Pakistan was pursuing a nuclear programme. It also left open the question whether Pakistan had already developed a nuclear device. To issue a certificate that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon and at the same time adding a note that the certificate does not rule on the question whether the same country had developed a nuclear weapon was an implicit admission that Pakistan had a nuclear weapon capability. As future events were to reveal, Pakistan had developed all the critical devices for a nuclear weapon but had not assembled it. The Administration could be presumed to have known this fact. Therefore, Reagan was able to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon, but he added that he was not ruling whether the Pakistan had developed a nuclear-weapon capability.

As had been analysed earlier, leaving everything in the hands of a President for whom nuclear proliferation was subordinate to strategic goals made the restrictions imposed on aid to a nation like Pakistan a sham.

The Symington amendment unequivocally posited that aid to any country which acquired unsafeguarded enrichment equipment had to be terminated. Reagan was not apparently hemmed in by the restrictions imposed by legislations. Nor did he attach much importance to even the statements of senior government officials about Islamabad's nuclear quest. Testifying before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Ambassador to Pakistan said that despite the assurances from Islamabad, the President might not be able to issue a waiver as "we believe that the standard which would be required for the Presidential determination as we understand the legislative history, would be absolutely of the orders—we simply could not fully ..." The Ambassador tried to evade the question whether credence could be given to Pakistani assurances. However, when cornered by persistent questioning, he admitted that the assurances given by Pakistani authorities could be accepted but that "we

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[the Administration] also have some reservation about it."\(^{27}\) When questioned further about the point whether Pakistan had been able to enrich uranium beyond 5 percent, he admitted there had been "some occasion on which that has been the case."\(^{28}\) This implied that the Administration was not even willing to divulge the information even to Congress about Pakistan's nuclear activities and that Islamabad's pursuit of a nuclear weapon would not stand in the way of continued U.S. assistance to Pakistan.

Reagan who had been pursuing a hard line towards the Soviet Union during his first term, continued to adopt the same conservative direction with added vigour. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had figured prominently in the second election campaign and this time he promised that the U.S. would not allow the Soviets to continue their presence in Afghanistan with impunity. Pakistan which occupied the *prima dona* position in the American strategic calculus now stood to benefit in a larger way in the light of the hardening U.S. response to Moscow's presence in Afghanistan. If Pakistan's cooperation was considered essential during Reagan's first term in office, now it was considered *sine quo non* for the success of Washington's efforts to "contain" Soviet intentions in South Asia. According to American perception, Pakistan had by 1985

\(^{27}\) Ibid., p.34.

\(^{28}\) Ibid.
been transformed into a front-line state and the leader of the "moderate Islamic nations" playing as an ally, "a significant role in ensuring the security of the Persian Gulf." 29

In 1985, Robert A. Peck, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, submitted before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in unequivocal terms that the U.S. aid to Pakistan was designed to "enable Pakistan to continue its steady opposition to Soviet Aggression in Afghanistan." 30 Reagan also clarified that the United states stood "Squarely on the side of the people of Afghanistan and will continue its support of their historic struggle." 31 This by implication meant that Pakistan’s assistance was indispensable for the United States. Therefore, in 1987, the Reagan Administration once again approached the Congress for a waiver to the Symington amendment and proposed a larger $4.2 billion aid programme over a period of 6 years to Pakistan. This new aid programme was to begin in fiscal 1988. The request to the Congress was made for the authorisation to undertake the aid programme without any restriction. According to the existing law, the six-year waiver to the Symington amendment was to end on 1 October


1987. Under these circumstances the Congress did not have to embrace any further steps to block aid to Pakistan. With the waiver to the Symington amendment expiring, the Congress had to only do "nothing" to block aid to Pakistan.

The aid proposal of the Administration came up for a series of hot debates in the Congress on how the U.S. would pursue its declared nonproliferation goals without compromising U.S. security interests in Afghanistan. The Administration did not want any restrictions imposed that would damage Washington's relationship with Islamabad. It was only concerned with the continued role Pakistan could play as an ally to defeat Soviet moves in Afghanistan. The Administration therefore made a determined effort to muster enough support in the Congress for the passage of the aid proposal. These efforts were, however, blocked by several Congressmen. They contended there was mounting evidence that Pakistan was systematically pursuing a programme to acquire nuclear weapons.

On 1 March 1987, Pakistan's leading nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, in an interview to the London Observer, stated that Pakistan had the bomb and that it had its own enriched uranium. This evoked sharp response from the anti-proliferation protagonists in the Congress. Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio), immediately shot off a letter to Reagan.

He requested that all aid to Pakistan be suspended in the light of the interview, until a re-examination of U.S. information regarding Pakistan's efforts was made. But the Administration was not prepared to relent stating that it would undermine Pak-U.S. strategic collaboration and put at "risk a variety of larger interests."33 The U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Peck, further stated that Pakistan was engaged in talks with the Soviet Union in Geneva and that the previous week itself Pakistan had suffered serious aerial attacks from Afghanistan which had killed more than 100 people and therefore the time was not opportune for such pressures.34

In the face of a restive Congress which was confronted by the increasing evidence of Islamabad's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, the Administration, though forced to concede that Pakistan had the capacity to make the bomb, continuously harped on the point that Pakistan did not have one yet. The Administration had to make this admission in view of the increasing evidence which pointed to the transparent nuclear policy of Pakistan. Leonard S. Spector, a nuclear nonproliferation specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, stated that Islamabad had "effectively crossed the nuclear-weapons threshold" and that the country

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
could fabricate "all of the key components" for a nuclear device. Spector further asserted that Pakistan had the capacity to produce enough weapons-grade uranium at its Kahuta plant to manufacture several Hiroshima size weapons annually. But the Administration continued to argue forcefully that any cut in the U.S. aid will not only jeopardise Washington's strategic interests, but also result in the further loss of leverage with Pakistan. Therefore when the Administration found that opposition to its arms aid to Pakistan was increasing in the Congress and that it could result in a rejection of the proposal, the Administration started playing a new card. The reasoning now being pushed hard was that it was necessary to continue arms aid to Pakistan to prevent Islamabad from going nuclear -- a policy that had miserably failed during the currency of the 1981 aid package. In reality, as a Pakistani scholar conceded, though the "Congress remained unconvinced of the peaceful nature of Pakistan's nuclear programme", the "US administration continued aid to Pakistan and in the process over-looked its growing nuclear capability."  


Though the House panel basically approved the aid proposal, it nevertheless adopted several conditions proposed by the Subcommittee Chairman Stephen J. Solaraz. The following were the conditions.

- The waiver requested by the Administration was limited to two years.
- The waiver would be automatically terminated if India accepted "appropriate, verifiable, and reliable safeguards."
- Weapons unsuited for Pakistan's genuine defense requirements would not be provided to Pakistan.
- No assistance would be provided unless the President certified that Pakistan was willing to hold free and fair party-based elections before 1 May 1990. The President would also have to certify that Pakistan was making significant progress towards the elimination of human rights violation and promoting political freedom.37

With the above conditions attached, the Subcommittee recommended that Pakistan receive $290 million in Foreign Military Sales Loans, $50 million in development aid, $250 million in Economic Support Fund assistance, and $900,000 for military training. In addition, $30 million was approved for the Mujahideen rebels and "several hundred million

dollars" in covert military aid to Afghan rebels through the CIA.  

In contrast, in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the mood was different. The Senate Panel was not inclined to make a serious and dispassionate analysis of the evidence it had regarding Pakistani nuclear program. The dissenting opinions were soon drowned in the panel pre-occupied with the urge to thwart the Soviets in Afghanistan. In line with this thinking, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted on 23 April 1987, by a 11 to 8 margin, not to interfere with the Administration's aid package. Two Democrats Christopher J. Dodd (conn.) and John F. Kerry (Mass.) joined the Republicans in supporting the aid programme to Pakistan. The public mood and the Congress were not at this juncture in favour of any steps that would imperil U.S. interests in South Asia. They were not willing to countenance any move that would impose difficult conditions for the continuance of aid to Pakistan and voted for the "Pakistan language offered by Daniel J. Evans, R - Wash." This version of the bill of the Senate Panel would have extended for two years the existing waiver without imposing on Pakistan the need to adhere to nonproliferation accords. In effect, the Evan's amendment rejected the draft legislation which had sought to axe $100 million from the

38 Ibid.


40 Congressional Quarterly Almanac-1987, n. 37, p.166.
Administration proposal to give Pakistan $290 million in military aid in 1988.

Even the known sympathiser of India and an ardent enthusiast of the U.S. non-proliferation policy, Stephen J. Solarz (D-Ohio), who was also the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, declared that the contradictory interests of preventing Pakistan going nuclear and that of safeguarding U.S. strategic interests had posed a dilemma of "Rubik Cube" proportions. He sided with the Administration and put forth a formula bearing his own name to clear the aid package. According to the formula, the aid could be continued on the basis of a two year waiver of anti-proliferation laws. The House Foreign Affairs Committee also voted 17-2 to approve the foreign aid bill which included funds for Pakistan. Thus what both the Committees did was to issue a warning that Pakistan's production of nuclear weapons would have "adverse consequences" for its relationship with the U.S. The Congress was not willing to risk Pakistan's cooperation by imposing conditions which Pakistan might resist.

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42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 24 April 1987.
The Pervez Case

The Administration was soon once again confronted with a new problem. On 12 July 1987, a Pakistan-born Canadian named Arshad Z. Pervez was jailed without bond by a Philadelphia Court on charges of illegally attempting to procure U.S. material for the production of nuclear weapons. Pervez was nabbed by undercover agents when he paid for the export of special maraging steel — alloys of extremely high strength — that the U.S. customs officials said could only be of use in the production of nuclear weapons. It was also revealed that Pervez sought to export 50,000 pounds of the maraging 350 steel, a super hard alloy that is used in a gas centrifuge nuclear plant like the facility at Kahuta. It was further disclosed that Pervez had also sought the export of beryllium, a rare metal used in the detonation of atomic weapons. But, the "Pakistan Government, beginning in 1985, has [had] provided unequivocal assurances, both in public and in private, that it would not engage in illegal procurement activities in the United States."44

The events revealed that " Pakistani restraint on its nuclear programme was an explicit *quid-pro-quo* for renewed U.S. assistance. But the Reagan Administration had been unwilling to use the assistance program as a lever to force Pakistan to honor its non-proliferation

commitments." Stephen Solaraz who had assisted the Administration in its earlier efforts to steer the U.S. aid programme to Pakistan called for a termination of aid once the Philadelphia Court decision was known. But despite all its high sounding claims of pursuing a nonproliferation policy, the Administration was not willing to jeopardise U.S.-Pak strategic links for the benefit of its nonproliferation goals. All what the U.S. was willing to do was to demand an explanation from Pakistan about the affair and to enter into an "intense dialogue" with Islamabad without rushing to take a decision to cut off aid, -- a transparently lukewarm effort to stave off criticism that the Administration was not seriously pursuing its nuclear policy.

The revelation that Pakistan was relentlessly attempting to acquire nuclear weapons stirred intense opposition in the Congress. The controversy created by the Pervez case was received with considerable alarm in the Congress and the U.S. aid was automatically cut off when the Congress failed to approve another waiver that would have allowed the continuation of aid to Pakistan.

The newspapers in the United States also voiced strong concern about Pakistan's nuclear efforts. Almost all the dailies condemned Pakistan's clandestine nuclear efforts in unequivocal language. The St.


*Petersburg Times*\(^{47}\) termed Pakistan’s nuclear pursuit as an "unabashed pursuit of expanded nuclear war-making capability." *The Orlando-Sentinel*\(^{48}\) in an article titled "Enough of Pakistan’s lies" said that "Publicly, Pakistan assured Washington that it was not trying to build a nuclear weapon. That is boldfaced lie No.1." The respectable and widely circulated, *Washington Post*,\(^{49}\) in an article titled "Pakistan and the Smugglers", wrote that "Pakistan invited ridicule with its protestations that it is not building nuclear weapons." *The Los Angeles (CA) Herald Examiner*\(^{50}\) criticised Pakistan’s behaviour and said that "Pakistan's official assurance that it isn’t preparing to build a nuclear bomb have lost whatever tenuous credibility they once had. The disturbing evidence is overwhelming." The almost unanimous view of the papers was to cut off aid to Pakistan unless it gave an iron-clad guarantee that it would desist from its policy to produce nuclear weapons and that it should subject its nuclear installations to international inspection.

Pakistan’s efforts represented "a flagrant and provocative challenge to U.S. nonproliferation policy", which suggested "... an arrogant contempt for the promises Pakistani officials have repeatedly given concerning their

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\(^{47}\) 13 August 1987.

\(^{48}\) 30 July 1987.

\(^{49}\) 27 July 1987.

\(^{50}\) 21 July 1987.
But despite all the public outcry, the Reagan Administration was not prepared to abandon Pakistan. The Administration continued to resist all attempts that would have resulted in the suspension of U.S. aid to Pakistan stating that a termination would send "the wrong signal about the continuing U.S. commitment to Pakistan security." 52

Islamabad cleverly calculated that it could force the Congress to soften its approach despite a growing anti-Pakistan public opinion and opposition in the Congress against the continuation of military aid to Pakistan. Pakistani leaders shrewdly estimated that Washington could ill-afford to alienate Islamabad as long as the Soviet Union continued its presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan's Prime Minister, Mohammed Khan Junejo, soon began increasing the pressure on Washington. In an interview on 13 October 1987, he stated that "Pakistan was not willing to go any further in re-assuring the U.S. about Islamabad’s nuclear policy" and that though he was hopeful of U.S. aid, "any stern action to block the package would compel Pakistan to draw a new line." 53 He went further and stated that if the U.S. failed to continue its aid to Pakistan, it would generate its own resources and that they "have the capability to


meet our [their] requirements."54 At the same time, Pakistan also began playing the Soviet card and declared that Moscow's attitude towards Pakistan was warm. Pakistan's strategy was very clear. It was aimed at warning Washington that if the U.S. took a recalcitrant attitude towards Islamabad, then it would not only pursue its ambitions of nuclear weapons, but would also be unwilling to cooperate with the U.S. in its security schemes.

The Pakistani attitude was singularly that of over confidence and conceitedness. A Senate staff member was quoted as saying that Pakistani's "have made repeated promises which they have broken" and that Islamabad "out and out lies to you and treats things that are important to you contemptuously."55 But still Pakistan could get away with its apparent arrogance. Islamabad did not even exercise restrain in its statements and virtually blackmailed U.S. to continue its aid package. A Pakistani diplomat was quoted as saying that " If Congress insists on its pound of flesh and stops the aid, they remove the only fig leaf that was stopping us [Pakistan] going all the way and making a bomb. We'd [Pakistan] no longer have any inhibitions."56 At the same time, Islamabad also made it clear that it would resist any attempt to force Pakistan to give up its nuclear effort. Zain Noorani, the Pakistani

54 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs announced in Islamabad that: "We [Pakistan] will not be brow-beaten or cajoled out of pursuing" its nuclear programme. Further, Pakistan also threatened that in case U.S. does not continue aiding Pakistan, then it would cease to be a conduit for U.S. arms to the Afghan rebels.

The uncompromising line of the Pakistani leaders had the desired effect. When the Foreign Aid Authorisation Bill came before the House in the form of HR (House Resolution) 3100 on 18 Nov. 1987, there was a fierce debate regarding the House action to freeze the 1988 funding at the 1987 level. But as regards Pakistan, there was a last-minute deal that avoided a full blown debate. Solaraz proposed an amendment to the bill that would prevent U.S. aid to Pakistan unless the President can certify that Islamabad was not enriching uranium above five percent. The House Rules Committee also prevented Solaraz on Dec. 2, from offering an amendment that would have forced Pakistan to withdraw from its nuclear programme under the threat of an aid cut off. But, he faced stiff opposition from Charles Wilson, D-Texas and Jim Leach, R-Iowa, the known supporters of Pakistan. They proposed an amendment which would link both Pakistan's and India's nuclear policies allowing the President to waive the Symington amendment in either country's case if the other

57 The Times (London), 10 March 1987.
58 Ibid., 21 October 1987.
pursued its nuclear weapon programme. A showdown was averted when Devid R. Obey, D-Wis., who chaired the Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, brokered a compromise between Solaraz and Wilson and proposed the adherence to the two-year waiver in the committee bill.

The Administration which was only paying lip service to the cause of nonproliferation warned the congress that the U.S. could "lose the ball game" by provoking Pakistan to producing nuclear weapons and urged that the Congress should not block the aid proposal. The Senate Foreign Operations Sub-committee acting on the foreign aid appropriations measure on Dec. 3, put forth a complex formula. In its aid bill, the Senate Appropriation Committee agreed to the Administration's request for a new six-year exemption. But it was predicated on a complex set of conditions drawing a direct link between the nuclear policies of India and Pakistan. The committees bill would have:

- Allowed unrestricted aid to Pakistan for six months. But within this period if it were found that any south Asian nation is producing weapons-grade nuclear material, then aid would be cut off. There could only be a resumption of aid if and when the nation ceased the production of such materials or allowed international inspection of its facilities.

- Authorised the President to waive the condition if he found that the other country was producing the materials for

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nuclear weapons and the President deemed it necessary that the waiver was required in the U.S. "national interest."

- Required the President to place reports regarding nuclear-weapons programmes of India and Pakistan.
- Required the President to report on the steps taken by Pakistan to crack down on the illegal import of weapons and technology by Pakistan for the development of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{61}

Yet the general mood was to find a justification to continue the aid to Pakistan. When it became difficult to sweep under the carpet, the mounting evidence of Pakistan's nuclear pursuit, the Senate Appropriation Committee put forth a contradictory argument that "in effect" that "if a nation [India] has nuclear weapons, its neighbors can have the bomb too."\textsuperscript{62} But though the Administration was able to steer the aid package to Pakistan through the Congress without much difficulty, the Reagan Administration had its share of critics for not adopting a strong line against Pakistan to prevent it from going nuclear. In an editorial, \textit{The Washington Post}, wrote that "The United States keeps shaking its finger angrily at Pakistan, but Pakistan has learned that it can safely ignore all finger shaking, Congressional restrictions and presidential warnings."\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Congressional Quarterly Almanac}-1987, n.37, p.169.


\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Washington Post}, 27 April 1987.
Similarly, the New York Times, in an editorial exhorted the Congress not to waive the law because of Pakistan's nuclear activities. 64

The conditions imposed by the Senate Appropriations Committee also implied that under S-620E of the Foreign Assistance Act, the waiver will cease to be effective if the President certified that India had accepted the "application of appropriate, verifiable, and reliable safeguards to all its nuclear materials." 65 At the same time, if Pakistan were to also accept the safeguards, then it would constitute reliable assurances for the purposes of the act. Ultimately, a Senate-House conference committee decided on 17 December 1987, not to penalize Pakistan for its attempt to acquire nuclear weapons and agreed for a two-and-a-half year exemption.

The conference committee decision implied that the Administration did not have to approach Congress again for aid until 1990. It also approved appropriations bill granting Pakistan $260 million in foreign military sales assistance and $220 million in economic assistance for the fiscal year ending September 30. This, however, represented a cut of $60 million from the $540 million proposed by the Administration for fiscal 1988 as part of the six-year, $4.02 billion aid package. The Conference Committee also agreed to drop the complex condition imposed by the Senate linking India and Pakistan. But, despite the waiver,


Pakistan was bound by U.S. laws and unless the President certified, Islamabad would be ineligible for assistance. In the light of the Pervez case, the President had to take recourse to the waiver clause and certify that:

"termination of U.S. assistance to Pakistan would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives and otherwise jeopardized the common defense and security. In other words, this latest affront notwithstanding, Pakistan was to continue enjoying the benefits of American largesse."66

The Pakistani supporters won the day on the reasoning that Islamabad’s "role in assisting the anti-Soviet resistance in neighbouring Afghanistan, and because of its vulnerability to Soviet pressures."67

PAKISTAN AS A CONDUIT AND BASE

One of the critical reasons that influenced the forging of a U.S.-Pak alliance after the out break of the Afghan crisis was the overriding U.S. desire to obtain a base for Washington’s secret operations against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Another important factor was the presence


of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and the need to provide a safe haven for them. U.S. held that its strategic relationship with Pakistan was important because it provided as a "staging area for the supplies, and a sanctuary for guerrilla fighters" and a place for "about the three million Afghan refugees." The U.S. wanted to bog down Moscow in a quagmire and make it "bleed" to impotency in a manner reminiscent of the predicament the U.S. faced in Vietnam. For this purpose, Pakistan's assistance was critical for the United States. Pakistan should tolerate the influx of the refugees whose number had increased to 3.20 lakh by 1988, and had taken on the burden of feeding them. Despite international assistance, Pakistan had to spend millions of dollars every year since 1978 on the refugees. It was assessed that Pakistan was spending $1 million a day in 1985 to house the refugees besides having to suffer several social problems the presence of the refugees was engendering.


70 It was estimated that Pakistan was sustaining the lion's share of the financial burden -- the rest being provided by the international community and other nations. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Impact of the Afghan War on Pakistan", Pakistan Horizon, Part-I, vol XLI, January 1988, p.27-28.
Arms Supplies to Mujahideen

Pakistan bordered Afghanistan and it was identified as the nation which could play a crucial role in frustrating what the U.S. believed to be Moscow’s intention to find access to the warm waters of the Indian ocean. To tie down the Soviet Union, the U.S. sponsored the programme to militarily strengthen the Mujahideen and to provide them with the arms to engage Moscow in a war of attrition. For this purpose it was imperative to have a nation to funnel the arms to rebel forces in Afghanistan. In addition, Washington also wanted a friendly area for the Mujahideens to operate from and to carry out raids on Soviet forces deployed in Afghanistan. With these objectives in mind, as soon as the Afghanistan crisis broke out, the U.S. mounted through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), an operation to supply covert aid to the resistance forces. Besides Pakistan, the U.S. enlisted the assistance of friendly nations such as Egypt to camouflage the source of weapons to the resistance forces.

The strategy was to supply Soviet produced weapons so that it could be claimed that the weapons were those captured from the Soviet forces or abandoned by them. Egypt, which was depending on the Soviet Union before Anwar Sadat turned towards Washington in 1972, had a vast store of weapons of Russian origin. Cairo also had a reasonably large
production facility that manufactured Soviet designed arms and spares. In addition, the Peoples' Republic of China and other European allies of the United States had a definite role in this effort. Practically all the arms supplies to the Mujahideen guerrillas passed through Pakistani territory.\(^7\)

Since the effort was clandestine, data was not available as to what kind of weapons were supplied by which country. There were several nations aiding in the effort. The only factor that was clear was that in large part, this supply effort was funded and supervised by the CIA. The American effort to supply arms to the resistance movement started during the Presidency of Carter itself.\(^7\) Though Carter had started the campaign, during this tenure the American effort was not very extensive. Pakistan President who had dismissed the U.S. aid offer as "peanuts" had imposed a deliberate restriction on the arms that could flow through Pakistan in an effort to pressurise the United States to undertake an elaborate arms aid programme to Islamabad.

In the initial stages, Washington was very guarded about its arms supply to Mujahideen. The information regarding the U.S. role was sketchy. It was only in 1981 when the famous investigative journalist,


Carl Bernstein, published an article in the New Republic that the threads of U.S. covert operations began to surface.\textsuperscript{73} In the article it was revealed that President Carter himself had ordered the operation and that it was monitored by his National Security Adviser, Brzezinski and the CIA Director Stansfield Turner. During a meeting of the National Security Council, that was convened within the first few hours of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Carter ordered that the impression that the war in Afghanistan was anti-Islamic in nature should be fanned.\textsuperscript{74} Bernstein also revealed that the CIA had presented on 9th January 1980, its plans for Afghanistan to the Senate Intelligence Control Committee. But so far the plans had not been de-classified.

There was now, however, circumstantial evidence that the CIA started working out detailed plans for operating in Afghanistan in an active manner as soon as the Soviet intervention started. In accordance with the direction of President Carter, the CIA exploited the Islamic angle and through other secret service organisations, enlisted the support of several Islamic countries.\textsuperscript{75} This was where Pakistan’s role became \textit{Sine-quo-non} for the United States: first because it was an Islamic nation and other

\textsuperscript{73} Wilhelm Dietl, \textit{Bridgehead Afghanistan} (New Delhi, 1986), p.240.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{75} It is understood that Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Oman were the principal players in this role.
Muslim nations would find it easier to join in a secret campaign to supply weapons to the resistance forces though Pakistan; and second, Pakistan bordered Afghanistan which made it a natural supply channel. In addition, Washington believed that if the threat to Pakistan was highlighted, it would be a rallying point for the Islamic countries who would then find common cause with the Americans in opposing Moscow.

Besides Pakistan, the U.S. had also opened another route for the transportation of arms through China. During his visit to China in 1980\textsuperscript{76}, it reported by \textit{Washington Post} that the U.S. Defense Secretary had entered into a secret understanding with China to supply arms through the Sino-Afghan border. This route went from Kashgar in the Chinese autonomous territory of Sinkiang-Uighur through the 70 Kilometer-wide border through the 200 Kilometer-long narrow Wakhan corridor which led into the province of Badakhshan. According to the agreement reported to have been reached between the U.S and China, the former was allowed to use Chinese territory to transport weapons to Mujahideen forces. It was also reported that U.S planes landed in China and unloaded its cargo which was transported through this route. But soon, this route was blocked by Moscow when it realised that arms were being shipped to the Afghan resistance forces through this way. Once this happened, the U.S. dependency on Pakistan increased because supplies to Mujahideens could

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Washington Post}, 15 February 1980.
mainly be routed through Pakistan only. Arms that were earlier shipped through the Wakhan corridor now found their way through the Karakoram highway only about 50 kilometers from the Afghan border. This road which was built by the Pakistani's and Chinese, after struggling for over 20 years, was also "very likely" used by China to help the Afghan freedom fighters. In course of time, U.S. also sponsored direct arms supply to Pakistan using planes with markings of other nations and landing them at Peshawar. In addition the Karachi Sea Port was also used as a major landing site for the supply of weapons.

Peshawar and Karachi were the largest transfer centres for the supply of weapons to the Mujahideens. The Pakistani army was also directly involved in the supply of the weapons. These military equipments were disguised as Pakistani army property and transported to places along the Afghan border for transfer under the supervision of Pakistani Intelligence Services.

In addition to the use of Pakistani territory as a supply line, the 50 odd former British border forts and garrisons along the 1600 Kilometer-long border region were also used as training centres for the Mujahideens. It was reported that the North-Egyptians who with their long beard easily look like Afghans were in the forefront of training.

77 Dietl, n.73, p.243.
78 Ibid., p.245.
In addition military advisers from U.S.A, China, Pakistan and Turkey were also involved in the training. It was also reported that the CIA had even landed some of the jobless Vietnam veterans to help in the training and provide combat advice.

Once Reagan became the President, U.S. assistance to the Mujahideen increased many fold. But as dealt with earlier in the Chapter, the budget provisions were kept secret. All aid to the Afghans were hidden deep within dozens of accounts in the classified portion of the regular defense budget. Both the Administration as well as the Congress safely guarded this information. It only surfaced on 26 July 1984, when the Congress appropriated $50 million for aid to anti-Soviet rebels in Afghanistan in an omnibus spending bill on the request of the Administration for fiscal 1984. Though this was hidden under an account for "other procurement" by the Airforce, "a frequent hiding place for the CIA budget" it leaked out despite the fact that the House Appropriations Committee held its session in closed doors.\footnote{Wall Street Journal, 27 July 1984.} It was also revealed\footnote{Congressional Quarterly Almanac-1984, Vol.XL, p.118.} that by 1984, the U.S. had already provided $200 million to $300 million to the rebels since 1979. The Washington Post also reported that in fiscal 1985, the CIA would be spending as much as $250 million to help
Afghan rebels.\textsuperscript{81} The situation was that there was considerable sympathy and support for the Afghan rebels who were fighting the Soviet Union. These guerrillas appeared to have popular backing and were considered by the American Congress to be important in the fight against the Soviet Union.

Unlike in other areas like Nicaragua where also guerrillas were fighting pro-Moscow forces and the U.S. Congress support was only intermittent, in Afghanistan, there was in a way, a competition between the Congress and the Administration in approving aid to the rebels. The Congress was at times seen to be more aggressive than even the Administration and provided more aid to the rebels than even what the Administration had requested for. In 1983-84, the Congress took the initiative in demanding that rebels receive "effective aid" and it even culminated in the supply of weapons more sophisticated than what the Administration had desired and even over the objections of certain officials of the Administration.\textsuperscript{82} By 1987, the Congress also pushed direct "U.S. aid to an annual level of about $600 million, matched by contributions from Saudi Arabia."\textsuperscript{83} The inference was that Pakistan's usefulness as

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Washington Post}, 13 January 1985.


\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
a staging ground for U.S. led operations continued to rise giving the nation added importance during Reagan’s presidency. The Reagan Doctrine with its declared policy of supporting forces to overthrow Communist regimes which "became the most expensive form of covert action undertaken by the CIA in the 1980s" only increased the importance of Pakistan for the U.S.

Though it is difficult to obtain a precise figure regarding U.S. aid to the Afghan rebels, from the available data, it could be inferred that Washington’s effort was quite substantial and continued to increase every year. Even a staunch protagonist of the nonproliferation policy, Senator John Glenn, speaking in the Senate on the need to take a strong stand towards Pakistan, admitted that he wanted "to see the military equipment flow through Pakistan to Afghanistan" and that "this assistance has been very effective" and that he "did not want to see that aid cut off." The quantum of aid was no doubt increasing substantially and by 1987, the covert aid channeled through Pakistan for the refugees was estimated at around $600 million.

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As the Soviet presence in Afghanistan increased, Washington correspondingly stepped up its covert operations in Afghanistan in close liaison with Pakistani military and primarily its intelligence agencies. Slowly the details of American support for the rebels became open because of the difficulty in keeping hidden the expanding role of the U.S. Intelligence services which were performing as a part of the Reagan Doctrine to help anti-Communist forces. Since the decision was taken to support the guerrillas, the "Central Intelligence Agency had been the Pakistani directorate's main partner. It channels American provided arms, equipment and money through the directorate to the rebels." 88

The situation was such that the U.S. would have not been able to assist the Afghan fighters "if it were not for the willingness of Pakistan to stand the heavy burden of refugees and to risk the threat of retaliation from the Afghan government forces on the Soviets." 89 By 1987, the Pakistani support was considered absolutely indispensable for the success of the U.S. Policies in Afghanistan. The millions of U.S. dollars garnered yearly for covert support could only be funnelled into Afghanistan with Pakistan's support. Covert aid to the Afghan rebels was an

87 By October 1986, it was estimated that there were about 120,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. *Los Angeles Times*, 16 October 1986.


important plank of the U.S. strategy. The quantum of aid was considered one of the biggest ever undertaken by the CIA. By 1988, it was reported that the U.S. alone had pumped aid worth $2 billion to Afghan rebels in an effort, considered to be one of the biggest undertaken by the CIA. It was considered that "Pakistan is absolutely crucial to our [U.S.] 'Covert' support of the anti-Soviet Guerrilla forces ... ."\textsuperscript{91}

For Pakistan its apparent indispensability provided it with a unique opportunity to dictate terms to Washington. The Pakistani President used this pivotal position to extract from the U.S. military aid. This crucial placement was also used by Islamabad to ward off any threat to cut U.S. aid in the face of Pakistan's desire to pursue the goal of being a nuclear weapon country. In realpolitik, this presented a rare opportunity for a small nation to virtually stonewall the efforts of a big power like the U.S. to influence its policy.

**PAKISTANI RE-ARMAMENT PROGRAMME**

Once the 1981 agreement was concluded between the U.S. and Pakistan, the latter became the beneficiary of a variety of weapons from


\textsuperscript{91} \textit{Washington post}, 1 March 1987.
Pakistan’s long-cherished dream of obtaining sophisticated weapons from the United States was never before fulfilled the way it had during the two terms of President Reagan.

An analysis of the re-armament programme which Islamabad undertook since 1981, clearly indicated that it virtually obtained all what it had asked for from Washington. The Pakistani shopping list was largely approved to by the United States. Whenever Pakistan found that the U.S. was dithering, all it had to do was make some noises that Moscow was "warm" towards Pakistan and that it cannot be blackmailed by Washington. The most interesting aspect of U.S. arms supplies to Pakistan was that Washington showed little concern about the suitability of the arms for Pakistan’s defenses against its declared objectives of a defense against Moscow’s alleged drive towards the Indian Ocean.

After 1981, the U.S. arms assistance increased so phenomenally that by 1988, Pakistan became the largest recipient of U.S. security assistance in Asia and fifth, worldwide.\(^{92}\) In the first phase of the assistance programme, from 1983-87, Pakistan was extended a total of $1.51 billion in Foreign Military Sales Credit and in the second phase of the programme, Pakistan was slated to receive $1.74 billion for the years

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1988-93. The second phase of the programme therefore saw an increase of $230 million in FMS credits over the previous programme.

Through these two aid programmes, Islamabad was able to purchase an array of sophisticated military hardware, primarily from the United States. At the same time, it may also be added that the U.S. FMS credit alone did not reflect the size of the Pakistani re-armament programme. Besides the American aid programme, Pakistan was financially assisted by its "Islamic friends", primarily Saudi Arabia which paid for some of the military hardwares Pakistan purchased during this phase. For instance, the first batch of the F-16s purchased by Pakistan was financed partly by Saudi Arabia\(^93\) enabling Pakistan to utilise the FMS credits to purchase other hardware. A fair surmise could be that the quantum of financial help Pakistan received from its Islamic friends in the wake of the Afghan crisis would have amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars. Similarly, for another reason, the FMS cannot be used as a definite yardstick to assess the quantum of U.S. weapons and other military hardware that was added to the Pakistani armoury. Pakistan was known to have spirited large quantities of weapons designated for the Mujahideen rebels. It was estimated by officials that "any where from 20-70 percent of U.S. military aid" was only reaching the real destination as the balance

\(^{93}\) This implied that the initial purchase of the planes was not financed by the 3.2 billion package.
was being "appropriated, traded, sold, or hidden by groups" to the Pakistani armed forces and others in the area.\textsuperscript{94} Further, the United Press International, quoting intelligence sources, said that in 1986 Pakistan diverted Stinger anti-aircraft missiles meant for the Mujahideen and that only one-third of these 600 shoulder fired missiles reached the rebels.\textsuperscript{95}

Nevertheless, the FMS credits enabled Pakistan to upgrade its military by allowing it to purchase new weapons for a variety of mission areas, such as "defense industrial cooperation and infrastructure projects; air defense (early warning aircraft, replacement); firepower (artillery, counter-battery radar); and mobility (upgrade and replacement of obsolete Pakistani armor)."\textsuperscript{96} In 1981\textsuperscript{97}, Pakistan ordered from the U.S. 1005, BGN-71A TOW anti tank missiles, 2, C-130 B Hercules Transport aircraft, a total of 104 self propelled Howitzers (M-109-A2-155mm and M-110-A2-203mm), 100, M-48-A5 medium battle tanks, 10 Model 209 AH-1S Helicopters, 75, M-198-155mm Towed Howitzers, 35, M-88-A1 Armored Recovery Vehicles and 24, M-901-TOW Armored Personnel carriers besides


\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Wall street Journal}, 13 July 1987.

\textsuperscript{96} Hearings and Markup, n.92, p.76.

\textsuperscript{97} The list of items ordered has been compiled from \textit{SIPRI Year Books 1980-1989}. 
40 of the famed F-16A Fighter/strike aircraft.

In 1982, Pakistan's orders from the U.S. included 34, M-109-A2 155mm self propelled Howitzers and another 10 model 209 AH-1S Helicopters. In 1983, Pakistan ordered an undisclosed number of G-134 Mohawk reconnaissance vehicles for border surveillance, 1 Gearing class destroyer, 4, OV-10A Broneo Trainer/counter insurgency aircraft. It was also rumoured that Pakistan had ordered 6, RGM-84 A Harpoon ship to ship missiles to arm the Gearing class ships it had. In 1984, Pakistan ordered 2, E-2C Hawkeye Airforce Early Warning aircraft, 4, G-134 Mohawk reconnaissance vehicles. In 1985, Pakistan ordered 500, AIM-9L Anti-aircraft missiles to arm F-16 fighters at a cost of $50 million, 2030, bgm-71cl-tow anti-tank missiles and it was also reported (though not confirmed) that Pakistan in the same year had ordered 16, RGM-844 Harpoon ship to ship missiles, 110, M-113-A2 Armoured personnel carriers, 88, M-109-A2 155mm self propelled Howitzers.

In 1986, Pakistan ordered 2030, BGM-71CI TOW anti-tank missiles at a cost of $20 million. In 1987, Pakistan was reported to have ordered for 60, M-198 155mm Towed Howitzers, 2386 BGM-71D TOW2 anti-tank missiles with 144, launchers and an unconfirmed number of FIM-92A portable surface to air missiles. In 1988, Pakistan ordered for another 11, F-16A fighter aircraft worth $256 million, 3, P-3C update-2, Maritime Patrol/Anti Submarine warfare aircraft, 20, (unconfirmed) M-109-
A2 155mm self propelled Howitzers worth $40 million, 20, (unconfirmed) M-198 155mm Towed Howitzers worth $40 million, 5, AN/TPQ-36 Tracking radar, 200 AIM-7F Sparrow air-to air missile for arming F-16s, 200, AIM-9L air-to air missiles for arming F-16 fighters, 4, Brook class Frigates (Mix of Brooke and Gracia class frigates) and 1 repair ship to be leased for $6.3 million annually and an undisclosed number of Gracia class Frigates. It had also been reported that 4, of these ships, were delivered in 1988 itself.

Purchases from Outside U.S.

An analysis of the Pakistani re-armament programme revealed another interesting aspect. This was that the strengthening of the Pakistani defence forces could not be estimated by merely taking into account its purchase from the United States. The U.S. aid package had clearly a multiplier effect much more than what the aid package alone revealed. Firstly, once the U.S. assistance programme began, Pakistan was psychologically spurred into a dizzying race for purchase of military hardware to strengthen its defense forces. In the absence of a large assistance programme, Pakistan was satisfied with the moderate quantity of defence related equipment it was purchasing from other countries. Under these circumstances, it could not entertain any serious hope of achieving
either technological or even numerical parity with its arch enemy, India. But once the aid package from the U.S. was approved, Pakistan embarked on a massive effort to enhance its military power. This was for the reason that Pakistan was receiving large quantities of arms from the United States and therefore if it undertook a purchase programme from other nations, it could add to the increasing armed power Pakistan was achieving through its purchases from the U.S. The combined purchases therefore opened the possibility of Pakistan achieving parity with India. In other words, with the sophisticated weapons coming from the U.S., all Pakistan had to do was to reach out to other friendly sources for achieving a new threshold in military strength.

In a submission before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House, Maj General Kenneth Burns, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, stated that though the U.S. arms supply to Pakistan was regionally significant, they comprised only a portion of the arms purchases by Pakistan as it was obtaining "significant additional equipment from China and Western Europe."98 This was further borne out by the sudden increase in the orders which Pakistan was placing with other nations for hardware ranging from trainer aircraft to destroyers. For instance from U.K. alone Pakistan ordered 1 Conty class destroyer in 1982, 3 Amazon class Frigates in 1984, 2 Amazon class Frigates in 1985, 2 EH-101

98 Hearings and Markup, n.30, p.282-3.
Helicopters to equip Type-23 frigate, 24 Seawolf ship to air missiles for arming type-23 frigates in 1987, 2 Lynx class Helicopter to equip 2 Leander Class frigates, 20 Transac GS Armoured Personnel Carriers, 2 Seacat Launchers Ship to air missiles launchers for 2 Leander Class frigates, 24 Seacat Ship to air/ship to ship missiles for arming 2 Leander class frigates, 2 Leander Class frigates in 1987-88. Similarly from France and China, Pakistan ordered large quantities of weapons/weapon systems ranging from various types of aircraft to tanks.99

Secondly, though the U.S. aid package was almost divided 57-43 between military and economic aid, it opened another opportunity for Pakistan to undertake a substantial military re-armament programme. Pakistan could now use the economic support from the U.S. to finance its socio-economic programmes and divert the economic resources that were hitherto used for financing its social programmes for military purposes. It is interesting to note that once the U.S. approved the sale of the F-16s to Pakistan, Islamabad did not wait for the FMS credits, but "employed substantial national funds to initiate the F-16 program."100 The sudden increase in the defense expenditure of Pakistan also bears


testimony to the increased diversion of economic resources for military purposes. For instance, the Pakistani defense expenditure\textsuperscript{101} which was U.S. $1196 million in 1980, increased to $36380 million in 1988. Similarly, there was a substantial increase in the defense expenditure as a percentage of the total central government expenditure. The defense expenditure which as a percentage of the central government expenditure was 23.6% in 1980, rose to 27.1% in 1988. Therefore, it could be concluded that Pakistan was comparatively spending much more on defense than it was doing earlier, using also the U.S. economic support indirectly for its re-armament programme.

Enhancement of Pakistan's Defence Capabilities.

The arming of a small nation was not without consequences especially when the nation harboured traditional rivalry with its neighbours. It had an immediate impact on the security environment in the neighbourhood of that small country. The conflicts of the small nation, as a consequence, become exacerbated to the detriment of peace in the area.

The arming of Pakistan by the United States had an impact on the

\textsuperscript{101} The figures have been compiled/computed from World Military Expenditures and arms Transfers, 1989, (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., 1990).
security environment of the subcontinent. It thrust upon Pakistan the
capabilities which it on its own would not have been able to attain. But
unlike in the 1950s, the U.S. military aid to Pakistan in the 1980s was
both qualitatively and quantitatively different. While in the heydays of the
first Cold War, Pakistan was supplied with liberal quantities of weapons,
it did not have the variety, sophistication and lethality of the weapons
supplied after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

The qualitatively superior U.S. arms supplied to Pakistan had a
"force multiplier" effect. The large-scale supply of such weapons had the
effect of strengthening the defence forces of Pakistan vis-a-vis India. It
clearly disturbed the balance of regional equilibrium. The combination of
weapons supplied by the United States gave Pakistan the flexibility that
it had been looking for in its arms race against India. The arms aid
to Pakistan had the salutary effect of enhancing Land, Air and Naval
capabilities of Islamabad.

In land, the combination of Pakistan’s procurement, gave the army
a new reach and punch power not hitherto seen in Pakistan’s defence
capabilities. The Cobra assault helicopters armed with Tow anti-tank
missiles and heavy self propelled artillery gave Pakistan a formidable
offensive capability. This allowed Pakistan to concentrate its forces in the
areas that could be expected to be the focus of India. At the same
time, it enjoyed the flexibility of deploying its offensive forces anywhere
along the Indian border. India on the other hand had to handle a wider border. This implied that it would be militarily difficult for Delhi to concentrate its forces quickly to counter any possible attack from Pakistan. This was demonstrated during the border tensions that took place in January-February 1987.

In air too, the U.S. arms supply to Pakistan gave Islamabad a technological edge. Pakistan could easily concentrate its forces on two or three fronts. In comparison, India had not only to counter these moves but also safeguard itself against the moves of China. Pakistan also constructed new bases in the Makaram Coast which was close to the U.S. task force assigned to protect the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. The purchase of the center piece of the U.S. aid package, the F-16 aircraft, was the single most item that substantially eroded the Indian air superiority.

Similarly, in regard to naval capabilities, there was a qualitative as well as quantitative jump in the capabilities of Pakistan. Prior to the Afghan crisis, the main thrust of Pakistan Navy was to enhance its defence capabilities achieve a "Sea denial" capacity. Pakistan's naval procurement also revealed this strategy. Prior to the Afghan crisis, Pakistan was primarily concentrating on the procurement of maritime reconnaissance aircraft like the French Briguet 1150, British Sea King Helicopters and aircraft like the French mirage-5s which were armed with
Exocet anti-ship missiles.\textsuperscript{102}

In comparison, during the period between 1983 and 1988,\textsuperscript{103} Pakistan ordered a total of 9 Frigates/Destroyers from the U.S. and U.K. In addition, Islamabad also ordered a wide variety of weapons like the Harpoon ship to ship missiles, EH-101 Helicopters for frigates etc. These defense hardwares gave Pakistan a new sea control capability and the capacity to project its naval capability along India’s shores -- a capability it had lacked earlier. This new found capability enabled Pakistan to attain a new reach and gave it the wherewithal to patrol the sea routes of the Arabian sea. It also gave it the capability of threatening India’s coastal installation and also its strategic oil installations on the high seas in the Arabian Sea.

\textit{Arms race in the Subcontinent}

The large-scale U.S. aid to Pakistan had the consequent effect of inducing a spiralling arms race in the subcontinent. Pakistan which had virtually reconciled after the 1971 Indo-Pak War to a position of military inferiority with India, saw the sudden interest which the U.S. was taking in it after the outbreak of the Afghan crisis, as an opportunity that

\textsuperscript{102} See SIPRI Year Books 1970-1979.

\textsuperscript{103} See SIPRI Year Books 1980-1989.
could not be allowed to pass. It conjured up once again the vision of a militarily superior Pakistan. Likewise, India which had seen its military expenditure plateau under the belief that it had nothing more to fear from a truncated Pakistan after the 1971 Bangladesh War, was awakened to a new sense of insecurity spawned by the new arms supplies from Washington.

Pakistan's military expenditure\textsuperscript{104} in 1970, (in constant 1978$) was $762 million. It rose to $844 Million in 1971 and increased to $980 million in the year 1979 registering an average increase of $24.22 million per year. Interestingly, during the same period, the military expenditure as a percentage of the G.N.P. declined 13.8\% or by an average of 1.53\% per year. Similarly, the military expenditure which as a percentage of the central government expenditure in 1970 was 31.9\% decreased to 21.7\% in 1979, registering a decrease of 31.97\% or an average of 3.55\% per year. The per capita military expenditure which was $11 remained at the same level in 1979 also. Please see Table-I\textsuperscript{105} below.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{104} The figures have been computed from \textit{World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1970-1979}, (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., 1982).
\item \textsuperscript{105} This table has been taken from Ibid., p.72.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
TABLE I.

PAKISTAN

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<th>YEAR</th>
<th>MILITARY EXPENDITURE ($M)</th>
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<td>762</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>13240</td>
<td>2389</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>8437</td>
<td>13285</td>
<td>1937</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>8882</td>
<td>13432</td>
<td>2201</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>10095</td>
<td>14442</td>
<td>2846</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>11614</td>
<td>15179</td>
<td>3032</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>13161</td>
<td>15700</td>
<td>3608</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>997</td>
<td>14545</td>
<td>16509</td>
<td>3819</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>16069</td>
<td>17201</td>
<td>3819</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>18525</td>
<td>18525</td>
<td>3989</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1067</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>21298</td>
<td>19568</td>
<td>4525</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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In comparison, after the outbreak of the Afghan crisis, Pakistan's military expenditure\(^{106}\) (in constant 1988 $) increased dramatically. While in 1980, the military expenditure was $1196 Million, it rose to $2516 Million in 1988, registering an increase of $165 Million per annum or more than an average increase of 13.8% per year. The annual increase of $165 Million took place for an average increase of $1795 million in the G.N.P. During the year 1980-88, the military expenditure as a percentage of the G.N.P., rose from 5.4% in 1980 to 6.9% in 1988 registering an annual increase of 3.47% per year.

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\(^{106}\) The figures have been computed from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1989, n.101.
It was interesting to note that while during the years 1970-79, there was an actual decrease in the military expenditure as a percentage of the Central Government Expenditure, during the years 1980-88, it increased from $23.6 to 27.1 registering an increase of an average of 1.85% per year. This increase could be termed steep as against the period, 1970-79, when there was actually a negative growth of 3.55% per year. Pakistan's defence expenditure continued to rise disproportionately to the increase in other sectors. Thus while in 1980 Pakistan was spending $14 per capita on defence, it increased to a whopping $23 in 1988, registering an average increase of 8.04% per year. The military expenditure per capita during the period 1970-79 was on the other hand only U.S. $11 in 1979. Please see Table\textsuperscript{107} II.

\textsuperscript{107} This table has been taken from: Ibid., p.60.
TABLE II.


PAKISTAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>MILITARY EXPENDITURES and GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (IN MILLION 1980 $)</th>
<th>CENTRAL GOVT. EXPENDITURES (CUR)</th>
<th>MWGNP</th>
<th>MW/GNP</th>
<th>MW PER CAPITA</th>
<th>GDP PER CAPITA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CURRENT/CONSTANT DRE</td>
<td>CURRENT/CONSTANT DRE</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>CURRENT DRE</td>
<td>CURRENT DRE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>845 1196</td>
<td>15570 22020</td>
<td>5.4</td>
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<td>18460 23820</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>15 269</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1210 1468</td>
<td>20900 25350</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>16 278</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1581 1846</td>
<td>23100 26970</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>20 288</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1626 1830</td>
<td>25180 28340</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>19 295</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1905 2082</td>
<td>27840 30430</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>21 307</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2109 2247</td>
<td>30020 31990</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>22 314</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2287 2362</td>
<td>32940 34030</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>23 325</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>2516 2516</td>
<td>36380 36380</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>23 338</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through the arms supply programme, which began in 1980, Pakistan, the small and impoverished nation was lured into the hope of being a big military power. Washington was keen on strengthening Pakistan to act as a buffer in the region against any suspected Soviet moves to gain access into the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. With this objective while it undertook to supply arms to make Islamabad play that role, in reality Pakistan became a power which was enthused by the arms supply to part with a greater share of its resources on defence in the hope of fulfilling its long cherished dream of military parity with India. Inebriated by this hope, Pakistan cut down its expenditure on economy and social sectors and embarked on an unprecedented arms procurement programme (Please see appendix-B for Pakistani orders for weapons).
An analysis of the Pakistani pattern of expenditure revealed that Islamabad's increasing defence outlays ultimately resulted in the reduction of allotments for the social sectors to protect American policy interests. In 1987, Pakistan was spending $23 per head on defense in comparison to a per capita expenditure of $7 on education and $1 on health. Interestingly while the defense expenditure continued to rise, expenditure on health as a percentage of G.N.P declined from 0.3 percent in 1960 to 0.2 percent in 1987. In effect, the people of Pakistan were loosing because of the nation's close military ties with the United States. On deeper analysis, the inescapable conclusion is that the people of Pakistan were sacrificing to protect U.S. strategic interests in South Asia. Unwittingly or wittingly, Pakistan therefore began to attach more emphasis on defense, playing the role of a U.S. surrogate. In addition, the arms Pakistan purchased under the FMS category, increased the debt burden of the nation. The FMS assistance under the 1981 package consisted of guaranteed loans at 10-14 per cent with a three year grace period. These conditions were considered as "tough terms." The effect of the assistance clauses were that debt repayments on the 1981 aid package

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amounted to $2 billion and a further $1.5 billion was eaten away by inflation.\textsuperscript{110}

The arms supply to Pakistan had yet another expected consequence. The sudden rise in the arms supply to Pakistan triggered off an Indian re-armament programme. The superpower patronage fuelled a "costly arms race in a region where large sections of the population lack basic economic and social necessities."\textsuperscript{111} India responded to the Pakistani arms procurement by increasing its defense spending substantially and concluding agreement with the developed world for large-scale imports. (Please see appendix-A for details of Indian defense procurements.) What added a sense of urgency to the Indian re-armament programme was the understandable impression in New Delhi that the U.S. was indiscreet in its arms sales to Pakistan. India continued to mouth its earlier claim that Pakistan was arming itself not against any suspected moves by Moscow, but for strengthening itself against Delhi. These pronouncements by India was based on the quality and type of arms that the U.S. was supplying Pakistan. This opinion was supported by many in Washington itself. It was not only the traditional supporters of India in the U.S. who felt that Washington was exercising no appreciable restrain in selecting the kind of


\textsuperscript{111} SIPRI Year Book 1987(New York, 1987), p.140
weapons to be sold to Pakistan. This concern was also shared by the moderates in the American Congress who felt that Washington was blinded in its perception by the single minded obsession to secure Islamabad’s support for Pentagon’s objectives in South Asia.

An analysis of the arms supply programme left no doubt that the U.S. was unconcerned if the arms sold to Pakistan were suited for Islamabad’s declared objective of dealing with the developments in Afghanistan. In reality, several of the weapon systems supplied to Pakistan could be used only against India. "The Harpoon naval missiles supplied by the Reagan Administration -- hardly suitable for combat along the landlocked Pakistani -- Afghan frontier--were the most egregious case of this kind."\(^{112}\) In addition, the deployment of the dreaded F-16 aircraft also generated considerable fear in India. Though the 40 F-16s were purportedly obtained for defense against Soviet and Soviet backed forces in Afghanistan, the deployment of the aircraft belied that claim. Except for six of the aircraft which were deployed in Peshawar, the others were stationed in bases in Sargodha and Multan\(^{113}\), close to the Indian border. Thus, to counter the indiscreet U.S. arms aid programme to Pakistan, India started an expensive and elaborate re-armament


\(^{113}\) Hearings and Markup, n.92, p.392.
programme.

India's sense of insecurity was also aggravated by certain U.S. pronouncements. Unlike the earlier phase of U.S. arms assistance to Pakistan, where Washington tried to assuage India's fear by saying that U.S. supplied arms would not be used against India, this time the U.S. was apparently not concerned with India's reactions. Washington did not give any assurance to India that American arms would not be used against Delhi. On the contrary, this time, the U.S. was far more open with its support for Islamabad. In a controversial speech by U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Deane Hinton, in Lahore on 10 December 1984, it was stated that the U.S. would not rule out the possibility of supporting Pakistan in a conflict with India.114 The combined effect of the large-scale arms supply to Pakistan and the apparent lack of U.S. sensitivity to India's protestations strengthened the arguments of the military hawks in India for a mammoth rearmament programme to match Pakistani defense procurement efforts. While in 1970, the Indian military expenditure was $2606 million, it rose to $3420 million in 1979 registering an increase of 31.23% over a period of 9 years. During this phase, the military expenditure as a percent of the G.N.P. remained 3% for both 1970 as well as 1979 with only reasonable fluctuations during the intervening years.

For the same period, the military expenditure as a percentage of central government expenditure, moved from 18.8% in 1970 and then settled at 16.9% in 1979 registering a decline of 10.106%. Similarly, the military expenditure per capita which was $4 settled at 5 by 1979. Please see Table III\textsuperscript{115} below.

\textbf{TABLE III.}\n

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|l|l|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{YEAR} & \textbf{MILITARY EXPENDITURES (C. M. 100)} & \textbf{GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (C. M. 100)} & \textbf{CENTRAL GOVT. EXPENDITURES (C. M. 100)} & \textbf{Military Expenditure (M. 100)} & \textbf{Military Expenditure (C. M. 100)} & \textbf{Military Expenditure (C. M. Per Capita)} & \textbf{GNP Per Capita} \\
\hline
1970 & 1574 & 2606 & 52499 & 85883 & 13855 & 3.0 & 18.8 & 4 & 156 \\
1971 & 1999 & 3149 & 56446 & 88883 & 14551 & 3.5 & 21.6 & 5 & 157 \\
1972 & 2026 & 3064 & 58341 & 88231 & 15327 & 3.5 & 20.0 & 5 & 152 \\
1973 & 1835 & 2626 & 64017 & 91578 & 12930 & 2.9 & 20.3 & 4 & 155 \\
1974 & 2148 & 2808 & 70549 & 92209 & 13367 & 3.0 & 21.0 & 4 & 152 \\
1975 & 2847 & 3396 & 84859 & 101230 & 17299 & 3.4 & 19.6 & 5 & 164 \\
1976 & 2904 & 3296 & 90584 & 102816 & 17791 & 3.2 & 18.5 & 5 & 163 \\
1977 & 3037 & 3251 & 103785 & 111098 & 19456 & 2.9 & 16.7 & 5 & 172 \\
1978 & 3495 & 3495 & 118815 & 118815 & 23191 & 2.9 & 15.1 & 5 & 181 \\
1979 & 3722 & 3420 & 123236 & 113229 & 20195 & 3.0 & 16.9 & 5 & 189 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

In comparison, the military expenditure (in constant 1988 $) which was $5549 million in 1980, rose to $9458 million in 1988, registering an increase of 70.45%. When compared to the growth in the military expenditure during the phase 1970-79, the increase during the years 1980-

88 was more than double. Similarly, the military expenditure which as a percentage of G.N.P. stood at 3.2% in 1980, rose to 3.5% in 1988 registering an increase of 9.37%. Though this increase does not appear to be dramatic, the rise had been steep when it was reckoned that during the phase 1970-79, the military expenditure as a percentage of G.N.P. actually registered zero growth. The military expenditure as a percentage of the central government expenditure (CGE), however, declined from 17.2% in 1980 to 15.4% in 1988 registering a decrease of 10.47%. But on deeper analysis this decline concealed the reality. If one looked at the military expenditure as a percentage of the CGE during the period 1970-79 and 1980-88, to understand the trends in military spending, the conclusions would be faulty. It could be true that the defence expenditure as a percentage of the CGE declined 10.106% during the period 1970-79, and during the period 1980-88, there was almost a similar decline (10.47%). But, if the trend during the phase 1970-79 were to continue, then there should have been at least a substantially higher decrease in the spending, for, during the years 1970-79, the CGE grew only by 45.76% while it increased by 87.30% during the period 1980-88.

The per capita military expenditure was another item in which there was a noticeable rise. It increased from $8 in 1980 to $12 in 1988 registering an increase of 50% for the period. This increase appeared very dramatic in comparison to the increase of 25% during the period.
1970-1979. Please see Table \textsuperscript{116} IV below.

TABLE IV.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>MILITARY EXPENDITURES (M$ mil)</th>
<th>FROM NATIONAL PRODUCT (M$ mil)</th>
<th>CENTRAL GOVT. EXPENDITURES (M$ mil)</th>
<th>M%</th>
<th>M%</th>
<th>M$ PER CAPITA</th>
<th>GNP PER CAPITA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CURRENT</td>
<td>CONSTANT</td>
<td>CURRENT</td>
<td>CONSTANT</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>268700</td>
<td>61280</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
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</table>

In conclusion therefore, the Afghan crisis and the consequent U.S. involvement in the subcontinent had the harmful effect of triggering off an arms race in the subcontinent. While from the beginning of 1985 there was a decline in the defence expenditures of other nations in the world, in regard to the developing countries, there was a "pronounced decline in military spending", particularly since 1984.\textsuperscript{117} During the first half of the decade the military expenditure of developing countries rose


\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
at an average of 2.8%. This peaked in 1984 and then declined rapidly through the "end of the period for an average-4.7% rate in the second half of the decade."\(^{118}\) In comparison, the military expenditures in India and Pakistan "experienced rapid growth during the decade."\(^{118}\) (Please see Graph-I) In India, while the spending increased at a rate of 5.8% throughout the decade, for Pakistan it increased at the much more rapid pace of 10% during the decade.\(^{119}\) This only buttressed the thesis that, Pakistan, the poor third world nation was spending more of its money on defence and spending less on other socio-economic activities once U.S. started actively involving itself in the Afghan crisis. Commenting on the second U.S. aid package to Pakistan negotiated in 1986, U.S. Congressman Ted Weiss, revealed the reality when he said that Washington in the effort to sell "$1.5 Billion

\(^{118}\) Ibid., p.1.

\(^{119}\) Ibid., p.3.
worth of new aircraft [F-16s] to a nation which cannot afford them, the United States will become a party to the decision to opt for military improvements at the expense of development needs.¹²⁰ The arms race induced a quantum increase in the import of major weapons in the region. Due to this phenomenon, during 1982-86, out of the total import by third world nations, India's share increased to 70 percent and that of Pakistan to 21 percent.¹²¹ All this added credence to the thesis that despite the euphoria and confidence that are generated in a recipient state when a predominantly security related aid programme is undertaken, it proves detrimental to the third world nations.
