CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
South Asia did not attract the attention of the policy makers in Washington in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. It was a low priority area in the U.S. strategic calculus of power. When the U.S. began building its alliance system in Europe vis-a-vis its principal adversary, the Soviet Union, an identical situation was soon to develop in Asia. This became more discernible in the wake of U.S. signing bilateral and collective agreements with its allies in South Asia. Hence emerged the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and a series of other agreements in the region. Pakistan became an anxious partner to join the ranks of an American ally. But, its importance, in the estimate of the United States in South Asia was only of a derivative nature. U.S. interests in "Pakistan have been couched in terms of broader, global strategic priorities, in terms of the maintenance of a particular world order." Its proximity to the oil-rich Gulf nations in West Asia was one such factor that made Pakistan strategically important for the West.

For three and a half odd centuries, British presence in India was dominating. The rule of the Britannia was all pervasive and barely left anything substantive in Indian hands. Security was no exception. Therefore, Britain's enemies became India's enemies and its friends, the friends of

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India. India fought beside its colonial master in all the wars waged by Britain. As a result, there was no scope for the development of any independent security structure in the region. India was tied to a subservient relationship with Britain and it had no independent foreign policy of its own. In contrast, the nations of Europe had their own security structures, with alignments and regional understandings and fighting expansionist wars.

Even in the social realm, the imprint of the British cultural mosaic on Indian society was virtually indelible. Right from the use of the English language to the popularity of its sartorial styles, British traditions were being emulated as symbols of status and prestige by the aristocracy to distinguish themselves from the "natives." The need to behave like "British" was so compelling that this class especially, opted for "British Schooling for its children, and English language for its dinner conversation."² The elite of the subcontinent therefore developed a style and culture which was hardly distinguishable from the British with the Western system of education continuously recruiting increasingly more numbers into their ranks.

Britain, during its rule, also built a strong Indian armed force. It was structured, organised and trained on British pattern. The army

was largely controlled by English officers and, by and large, the armed forces were steeped in Western traditions that remained intact for several years even after the departure of British from South Asia. Moreover, since the armed forces of both India and Pakistan were structured on the English model, they had to depend on Britain for the training of senior military officers. Senior officers of independent India and Pakistan were trained in U.K., and several of them in Sandhurst itself -- the premier British Military Training Institute. They undoubtedly had a continuing sense of attachment and weakness for the West and more particularly their trainees after having been accustomed to thinking along British lines and tradition. Therefore, there was an inbuilt resistance to and dislike for things that were not West-oriented.

Alongside the development of the country's armed forces, the British rule in this country gave South Asia a structure for governance. As a corollary, when the British left the subcontinent in 1947, India and Pakistan which were the two largest nations of South Asia, adopted the Westminster form of Parliamentary System. Both the nations also continued to be critically dependant on Britain for their defence and economic needs. India and Pakistan to develop their economy and defense, soon joined the British Commonwealth of nations. By joining the Commonwealth, they enjoyed the advantages of the Sterling area, obtained easier access to the British market and the arms desperately required to
equip their truncated armed forces. Thus, even after attaining independence, both Pakistan and India continued to have an umbilical relationship with Great Britain. This in turn helped Britain to retain its strong influence in the region even several years after its departure from the subcontinent.

The membership in the Commonwealth had another dimension. During the Second World War, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt proposed, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, accepted a strategy for joint responsibility for the Atlantic and Europe. According to this strategy the U.S. was made responsible for the Pacific and the British, for the Middle East and Indian Ocean. This division of responsibility reflected and recognised the prevailing mutuality of interests of Britain and the U.S. in various regions of the world.2 Even when the war ended, the U.S. continued to focus its attention on the areas in which it had assumed responsibility during the war. Washington tended to evolve a strategy to sustain its supremacy with the calculation that the "British continue to have, from the global point of view, the paramount responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in South Asia."3

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3 "Need for SANACC Appraisal of possible United States Military interests (continued..."
Another contributing factor to the low US strategic interest of the region lay in the fact that the Second World War had not spread to this region. It was also not an area of contention between the great powers. Consequently, at the end of the war, neither the Soviet Union nor the U.S. had any direct presence in South Asia. When India and Pakistan joined the Commonwealth and moved closer to Britain, the U.S. found no significant reason to seek a change in its policy towards the subcontinent. Washington's main objective was to limit Soviet influence in the region and this was accomplished by its major NATO partner, Britain.

Cold War

With the surrender of Germany in May 1945 and that of Japan in September 1945, the world rejoiced at the end of what appeared to be the most devastating and horrendous war in human history. But the relief was short-lived. Out of the debris of the World War emerged a new war -- the Cold War, something volcanic in nature threatening to erupt any time paling into insignificance the ruin begot by the Second World

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in South Asian Region", Draft report prepared and submitted by the office of Near Eastern Affairs, and transmitted to Loy W.Henderson, Chairman SANACC Sub-Committee for NEA, May 19, 1948, Records of the Military Advisor to the office of the Near Eastern and African Affairs, Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
minds of the people after the destruction it rained on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, had become a reality. This added an altogether new and dreadful dimension to war.

The U.S. and U.S.S.R. along with Britain, France and their allies, fought together in the Second World War jointly against Germany, Japan and Italy. The war-time alliance of necessity was only temporal. The Soviet Union and the United States viewed each other as adversaries and inspite of the "rosy pronouncements of President Roosevelt and others", U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations worsened. Both the nations jockeyed to preserve and promote the gains of war. In this effort they sought to exercise complete control over the territories they occupied during the war. The influence of the axis was replaced by the domination of the two great powers.

Strategists in Washington began to feel that the Soviet Union, having been freed from the threat of the axis powers would now concentrate their efforts on "exporting" communism. U.S. strategists viewed that if "international communism" had to be contained, then it would have to abjure its historical rejection of alliance and take the lead in defending what it termed as the "free world." It was feared in Washington that the Soviet Union under Stalin was pursuing the "traditional

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objectives of Tsarist foreign policy.\textsuperscript{5} Further, the Soviet leader Stalin, was suspected to be a kind of "byzantine Hitler pursuing hegemony with more circumspection but no less determination than the Nazis."\textsuperscript{6} The spectre of a Soviet dominated Communist empire stretching from the Baltic to the Pacific Ocean and the Arctic Sea to the Himalayas, began to loom large in the minds of U.S. strategic planners.

During this phase of emerging Soviet-American rivalry, the Indian subcontinent did not figure prominently in American calculations. In the U.S. perception, this area was not crucial to the continuance of American supremacy in the world. Both the Soviet Union and the United States concentrated their efforts on Europe -- the main theater of conflict during the war -- and the Far East. To a lesser extent, Southwest Asia, the oil well of the world, was viewed as a region that had a decisive bearing on the American economy. For this reason Southwest Asia came within the declared protective zone of the U.S. a little later.

The United States responded to the perceived Soviet threat in Western Europe, the area of pivotal importance for the U.S., by evolving the Marshall plan and the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine closely supported by the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, was


\textsuperscript{6} Robert E. Osgood, \textit{Alliances and American Foreign Policy} (Maryland, 1967), p.34.
the result of a "concordance of agreement that the Soviet Union and communism must by publicly quarantined." Although Europe was ravaged, it still was the second most powerful industrial bastion and a repository of highly trained personnel. With Western Europe as its ally, the U.S. felt that it could augment Washington's efforts to checkmate Soviet Union. In addition, the Pentagon also estimated that the area adjacent to its adversary was indispensable for "forward defence." Therefore, Washington found itself enveloped in a paranoid preoccupation of containing what it perceived to be the Soviet ambition in Western Europe. In stark contrast, South Asia remained to be a region very remote in U.S. strategic calculations.

(a) Pakistani Overtures & U.S. Rebuff

It is widely accepted that the British policies in the subcontinent spanning three and a half centuries fuelled and hardened hatred between the Muslim and Hindu communities. Once it became clear that India would be divided into two nations on communal lines, Muslim leaders were engaged in plans to strengthen the emerging nation. Even before the formal division of India, the de-classified U.S. documents revealed that

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Pakistani leaders had established contact with the emissaries of the U.S. government. The message sought to be conveyed was that the emerging Muslim nation would be willing to join the U.S. in its confrontation with Moscow. Few months before the partition of India, on 1 May 1947, the Head of the Department of State division of South Asian Affairs, Raymond A. Hare and Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in India, Thomas E. Weil, met Mohammed Ali Jinnah in Bombay. During the meeting, Jinnah seized the opportunity to impress upon the visitors that the Muslim nation would fight Russian aggression.

Once Pakistan emerged from the pangs of birth as a nation, the efforts were renewed with added vigour and urgency. On 1 September 1947, the Pakistani Finance Minister, Ghulam Mohammed, invited the American charge d'affaires, Charles W. Lewis for discussions. During his meeting, the Finance Minister hoped that he could convince Washington to part with large-scale economic and military assistance by playing on American business and security concerns.

The new Pakistani Ambassador in Washington, M.A.H. Ispahani, was identified as the Pakistani official who would launch the idea of an U.S.-Pak axis. To work in close liaison, Mir Laik Ali was despatched to Washington as the special emissary of Jinnah. To assist the team,

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Pakistan enlisted the services of the Chase National Bank of New York to lobby in the U.S. The special emissary prepared a memorandum and submitted it to the State Department. This paper was primarily an attempt at justifying U.S. assistance for Pakistan's defence and economic development. The Pakistani strategy was to capitalise on the heightening power game between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

The memorandum appealed for a loan of U.S. $2 billion over a period of five years for industrial, agricultural and defence assistance. Pakistani leaders calculated that unless it could convince the U.S. that befriending Pakistan would be in Washington's interests in the context of the superpower rivalry, it stood no chance of receiving any aid from the U.S. Interestingly, in the memorandum submitted to the State Department, Pakistan also attempted to justify aid to Islamabad on the ground that it would enhance India's defence against potential threats from the Soviet Union. By adopting this strategy, Pakistan attempted to portray itself as the important buffer State, the security of which would be important to the U.S. interests in the subcontinent. The memorandum also highlighted the geographical proximity of the country to Russia and how in case it

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9 For details of the memorandum, see: Winthrop W. Aldrich to the Under Secretary of State (Will Clayton), 8 October 1947, 845 F. 51/10-1747, National Archives, Washington D.C.
was unable to defend itself, the entire South Asia would slip into Soviet hands.  

The memorandum, not surprisingly, evoked very little interest in the State Department. The U.S. was already in the thick of evolving strategies to counter what it perceived as Moscow’s attempt to attenuate U.S. influence in its core areas. The epicenter of U.S. attention was Western Europe and Far East and areas like South Asia were considered so unimportant that the State Department did not even have any senior staff member handling matters relating to this region. Pakistan’s request was, therefore, not viewed with any significance or importance as it was just one of the plethora of requests for aid that was flooding Washington after the culmination of the War.

It was viewed unequivocally in Washington that South Asia being an area of British influence, there was little reason for the U.S. to seek a larger role here. At best, the U.S. was only interested in giving "sympathetic consideration"11 to the requests for emergency loans in view of the extremely weak and fragile nature of the Pakistani economy. More

10 Text of Memorandum, attached to the Report of Winthrop W. Aldrich (Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Chase National Bank), addressed to the Under Secretary of State, Will Clayton, 8 October 1947, 845 F.51/10-1747, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

11 Venkataramani, n.8, p.22.
than this they were not willing to consider. Pakistan's requests for military assistance therefore evoked little or no response from Washington.

After having been rebuffed by the U.S., Pakistan was convinced that a new and economically weak nation in an area of little strategic importance for the great powers could not gain from the superpower rivalry. Apart from its disappointment at not being able to elicit positive response from Washington, it had neither any affinity, historical or otherwise, nor any disdain for either of the great powers. Pakistan's foreign policy determinants were clearly identifiable in its historical and geographical moorings, both of which contributed to Pakistan's dread of India. The line of thinking in Islamabad was that in the light of Washington's lack of enthusiasm to Pakistan's overtures, it would have to evolve a foreign policy which would at least win for it friends, irrespective of their ideological disposition.

CHANGING U.S. PERCEPTION OF PAKISTAN

The U.S. continued to view South Asia as a region of low strategic priority till in 1949 and early 1950s, when a series of events in Asia and Europe undermined that belief. These events threatened to spread communism to South Asia. The victory of the Communist
revolution in China led by Mao Zedong in 1949 was a major event that engendered a rethinking of the U.S. policy towards Asia. The United States had steadfastly supported Chiang-Kai Shek through the civil war and his defeat opened the spectre of the new regime led by Mao declaring Washington as its main adversary. It was strongly felt in Washington that it may have to now checkmate the combined strength of China in Asia and the Soviet Union in Europe. China's enormous size, its mammoth population and resources had now to be reckoned by Washington. Moreover, the influence that a revolutionary regime inebriated by victory and hardened in its anti-U.S. militancy by Washington's support to Mao's enemies, could bring to bear upon the Soviet foreign policy now suddenly confronted the U.S.

Despite the major setback the U.S. had to face in the defeat of Chiang-Kai Shek, Washington nevertheless entertained the hope that existing differences would drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. This Washington reckoned would obviate the possibility of these two powers acting in conjunction to challenge American supremacy in Asia and Europe. The U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, entertained such a hope. He believed that the Soviet Union had territorial ambitions and that it was working towards detaching Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and

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Sinkiang from the northern province of China in addition to outer Mongolia which was already in Soviet hands. American planners envisioned that conflicting national interests and territorial issues would prevent the two Communist giants from acting in cohesion towards any defined common objective. Acheson predicted that "Russia’s appetite for a sphere of influence in northern China would alienate Chinese nationalism" and make Mao a "potential Tito." 13

While the U.S. was deliberating how to respond to Mao’s victory, the Korean War of the early 1950s added to the anxiety of the already vexed strategic planners in Washington. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the U.S. had withdrawn its troops from the Korean peninsula under the belief that in case the Soviet Union were to threaten that country, Washington’s superior air force would successfully defeat any adversary. But this doctrine was laid bare when the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950. The U.S. once again found itself directly intervening to save its area of influence from slipping into its adversary’s hands.

The Korean War had far reaching policy implications for the United States. The American public had by the 1950s exhibited signs of war weariness. The end of the Second World War and the sacrifices in terms of human loss in the Korean war which left 33629 Americans dead,

13 Ibid.
surfaced the simmering resentment against committing U.S. troops to active combat abroad. There was a groundswell of public opinion and policy makers were compelled to alter their defense strategies. The evolving consensus was to protect Asian nations from perceived Communist threats by creating "local situations of strength." To implement this strategy, emphasis was laid on the creation of a series of alliances. A collective security organisation similar to the one concluded in Europe was estimated to be the only available option to interdict Communist influence in the Asian corridor. The underlying objective was to warn any American adversary that "if he does not exercise self-control, he may face a hard fight, perhaps a loosing fight."\textsuperscript{14} Thus, the matter of immediate priority for the U.S. after the Korean War was the conclusion of a series of defence agreements in Asia. This brought the Cold War, hitherto considered a European phenomenon, into the Asian subcontinent.

The Eisenhower-Dulles Administration to augment the new strategy, enunciated the nuclear doctrine of "Massive Retaliation." This doctrine declared the U.S. resolve to resort to even the ultimate weapon to counter threats from Communist powers in areas of vital interests for the West. Taken together, the alliance system and the doctrine of massive retaliation were designed to work in conjunction as twin arms of a deterrent policy. The objective of this policy was to obviate the possibilities of the

\textsuperscript{14} Dulles quoted in Osgood, n.6, p.34.
Communist powers, especially China, from gnawing away at spheres of American interest. This declared policy of the United States it was believed, would deter the Communist powers from creating situations that could precipitate into conflicts requiring direct U.S. intervention.

The threat in Asia was viewed as predominantly military in nature. The victory of Mao, the Korean War and the French withdrawal from Indo-China, were attributed to the military weakness of the forces opposing communism. Hence, unlike in Europe where the role of the military was considered only temporal, till such time as it was necessary to facilitate a smooth economic reconstruction, in Asia, the emphasis was on security. Economic development was relegated to a low second position. The developments in Asia that were inimical to U.S. interests had the effect of the hardening American attitudes into "undifferentiated and militaristic anti-communism."\textsuperscript{15}

\textit{Pakistan in U.S. Alliance System}

The U.S. policy makers began paying more attention to Asia by the end of 1954 than at any previous other time in history. The primary objective was to extend its policy of containment to this region. It was believed that U.S. strategic purposes would be best served by creating

\textsuperscript{15} Robert G. Wesson, \textit{Foreign Policy for a New Age} (Boston, 1977), p.22.
pockets of strength that would serve as a bulwark against "Chinese threat." To implement this strategy, Washington for the first time evinced interest in nations willing to assist it in the creation of such pockets. With the American public already weary of alignments that would commit troops abroad, the new strategy was to create "local defence forces ... with the U.S. forces held in reserve." Consequently, in its search for friends in Asia, India and Pakistan which had been considered as safe as they were unimportant, now suddenly attracted U.S. attention. It was conceived that these two nations could assist in the creation of the local areas of strength. The modest economic and humanitarian aid which the U.S. extended to South Asia was now considered to be inadequate in the changing scenario. An increased economic and military aid with a protective "nuclear umbrella" was offered to India and Pakistan.

But, India's vocal condemnation of the polarisation of the world and its announcement of the policy of non-alignment had already rivetted the attention of U.S. strategists to Pakistan. Nehru's views were suspect in Washington. India was deemed to be a nation that would not join the West in its fight against communism. But, Pakistan which was campaigning hard for closer ties with the U.S. since its independence in vain, found the increasing American overtures too tempting an opportunity

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17 Wilcox, n.2, p.128.
to resist. In the emerging new American strategy for Asia, Pakistan became a willing partner.

Pakistan’s efforts of the late 1940s to befriend the U.S. now turned to its advantage. Pakistani support for the U.S. international position also did not go unregistered in Washington. Many Congressmen and policy makers led by military hawks began evincing interest in Islamabad. The Pentagon in December 1951 received approval to negotiate with Pakistan a limited arms assistance agreement. To compensate for the weakness of the policy to limit the introduction of U.S. troops abroad, increased reliance was placed on America’s air power. The U.S. Air Force therefore embarked on a programme to identify bases that would enhance its reach. Bases were identified in Pakistan that could be used as surveillance posts to spy on the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, there was also a change in the Pakistani leadership. The unchallenged supremo and founder of Pakistan, Jinnah had died in September 1948 and a new Prime Minister assumed the reins in Islamabad. In Pakistani politics there could not have been any stronger advocate of closer U.S.-Pakistan relations than the new Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali of Bogra. This change of leadership in Pakistan also came at a time when Harry S. Truman was elected U.S. President in 1945. The new incumbent who himself was a hardliner appointed John Foster Dulles who was known for his visceral abhorrence of communism
as his Secretary of State. The change of leadership in both Washington and Islamabad also took place at a time when the U.S. had re-assessed the threat to Asia. The U.S. hope of containing Communist influence in the world by building a counter-force in Western Europe and the Far East alone had already been shattered by 1954. The new setting and the emerging changes could not be more ideal for Pakistan. In the changing security scenario Pakistan’s strategic importance increased dramatically.

The victory of Mao, the Korean War and the defeat of the French in Indo-China had compelled the military planners in the U.S. to reconsider their strategy. There was already a growing concern in Washington about what it viewed was the relentless pursuit by the Soviet Union and China to export communism. A new dimension to the threat was added when the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear device shattering the U.S. monopoly. The U.S. ceased to be the only power that possessed the awesome strength of nuclear weapons. The feeling of unassailable superiority engendered by its monopoly in nuclear weapons now gave way to a deep sense of insecurity in Washington.

The stage was now set for the induction of Pakistan into American security schemes in Asia. The new Secretary of State in Washington, Dulles, perceived that all nations that opposed Moscow should have a special status in Washington. Washington had already vowed that "wherever the Soviet Government or communism attempted an advance that
United States would combat it." The Secretary of Senate proposed the marshalling of the power of such nations to counter the "Communist threat." The ascendance of the staunch advocate of closer U.S.-Pak ties, Mohammed Ali of Bogra, also helped by creating a meeting of minds. Bogra found in the increasing challenge to U.S. dominance an opportunity to forge closer ties with Washington. He calculated that the long-sought opportunity was now knocking at Pakistan’s doors and providing it the chance to augment its international prestige and strengthen its defence forces.

The U.S. military also showed keen interests in nations with close proximity to the Soviet Union and China. The line of thinking in Washington was that the Soviet Union and China should be encircled by a string of proximate bases to enable the U.S. Air Force to mount surveillance of their military strength. The Bada Ber base in Pakistan later served as the staging area for the high flying U-2 reconnaissance aircraft whose photography missions over Soviet Union and China were considered strategically indispensable. "The U-2 proved to be a source of intelligence on Russian Industrial and military developments of inestimable value to the United States." These bases also served as

18 Fleming, n.7, p.447.
potential offensive staging platforms against the Communist powers. They also enhanced the deterrent capability of the U.S. military power. More importantly, the dispersal of bases was seen as an important strategy necessary to frustrate Soviet efforts to focus targeting of nuclear weapons on the U.S. mainland.

The U.S. did not have any air bases between Turkey and the Philippines. The military facilities that existed in these two friendly countries were considered to be beyond the acceptable range for U.S. aircraft to have sufficient intrusive capability into the Soviet Union and return to the bases safely. To fill this gap, the U.S. Air Force was on the search for staging facilities to overcome this drawback. Hence they highlighted the importance of obtaining military bases in Pakistan. The Air Force contented that "bases in Pakistan (or even the right to land on air strips in war time) would extend America’s power to strike at the USSR thereby adding to the Soviet air defence problems."^20

Pakistan in the meantime read the writing on the walls very cleverly. It lost no opportunity to establish closer ties with other nations which were already linked to the U.S. through military alliances. This was designed to signal to Washington that it was a nation that shared the common fears and perceptions of the West. In April 1954, Pakistan signed a treaty of political consultations and co-operation with Turkey, the

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^20 Barnds, n.16, p.90.
American linchpin in the Middle East. Though this treaty was devoid of any direct military clauses, it enhanced Pakistan's importance for the U.S. By aligning and establishing close ties with the nations that were already members in U.S. alliances, Pakistan carved itself a position where it could not be ignored in the containment schemes sponsored by the U.S. for Asia.

In the light of the Communist phobia gripping Washington in the mid-50s, and the multiplying Soviet military strength, the prospects of using Pakistan's armed forces in regional conflicts as in Korea looked quite appealing. The British had left a strong and well trained army in the subcontinent. These troops were also battle-hardened in wars they fought for Britain. This battle tested 2,50,000 men in the army attracted the attention of the U.S. military planners as a force that could be used as an alternative to U.S. in regional conflicts. Washington found it convenient to subscribe to the thesis of the former Governor of the North West Frontier Province, Olaf Caroe, that Pakistan's geographical and religious factors qualified Pakistan to be made the bedrock of any Western security scheme to safeguard West Asia.\(^{21}\) It was further reckoned in Washington that Pakistan's troops could augment the poorly trained and equipped military forces in West Asia.

In July 1952, monarchy was overthrown in Egypt and Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser who was known for his anti-West attitude came to power. The U.S. which had liberal access to the use of military facility in Egypt was suddenly confronted with the prospect of having to look elsewhere for bases. The American influence in the region was further threatened by the accession to power by Dr. Mossadegh in Iran. Washington estimated that its influence in the region would be further eroded if it continued to discourage nations like Pakistan that were interested in joining the U.S. in military alliances. It was further argued in Washington that U.S. could ill-afford to ignore the overtures from nations located especially in near proximity to the Middle East to join the U.S. in its security schemes.

Washington, in view of the deteriorating geostrategic climate that threatened American influence evolved schemes to enlist the support and cooperation of all willing nations in its encirclement strategy. In contrast to its earlier policy, the U.S. was now willing to extend economic and military aid to Pakistan in return for its strategic cooperation. As a part of the re-assessed strategy, on 19 May 1954, the U.S. signed with Pakistan a Mutual Defence Agreement and agreed to provide military and economic assistance to it.

The U.S. had in fact made attempts to conclude a defence alliance in 1951 with Egypt as its linchpin and Britain continuing its control over the large Suez base. But the Western stand on the Palestinian problem
eroded the support of Muslim nations. Great Britain had countenanced the
division of Palestine and the creation of Israel. This engendered anti-
Western feelings and cemented Arab nationalism in the region. Egypt was
also unwilling to be a part of any American alliance system when anti-
Western sentiments were running high in the region. The tide of public
opinion radically turned against the West and under these circumstances,
Pakistan’s Muslim connection and proximity to the Middle East were
viewed with relief in the U.S. When Western influence was steadily
decreasing, the strengthening of a willing country like Pakistan appeared to
be the best available option that the U.S. could entertain in order to
at least limit the damage caused by the tide of anti-Western sentiment
pervading the region.

Pakistan’s geographic location between South East Asia and the
Middle East added to its importance for the West. In the Far East,
China was seen as making determined attempts to export communism and
bring more countries within the Marxist Leninist system. To the American
policy makers, the Korean War was the most manifest instance of this
perceived effort. The defeat of the French in Indo-China in 1954 only
added a sense of urgency and credibility to the military hawks who
strongly advocated the need to encircle the Soviet Union and the People’s
Republic of China. They called for the involvement of the friendly nations
in the region in the American policy of encirclement. The growing line of thinking was that:

the U.S. should take all affirmative and practical steps, with or without its European allies to provide tangible evidence of Western strength and determination to defeat communism; ... and to secure affirmative association of South East Asian states with these purposes.22

With this objective in view, the American sponsored defence organisation called South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was created on 8 December 1954. Despite intense lobbying by the U.S., it was only able to enlist the membership of Thailand and the Philippines in the new alliance. Pakistan which straddles the Middle East and South East Asia was not initially seen as a country that should be included in the SEATO. But, with only two nations joining the alliance it was assessed that if Pakistan were also included in the alliance, it "would augment its Asian component."23 The American planners had also an interrelated objective of using Pakistan as a potential link between SEATO and any future Middle East defence organisation that the U.S. would sponsor. The emphasis was on making Pakistan play the link role like Turkey which would be the link between Europe (NATO) and any Middle East defence organisation that could be set up in future.

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23 Barnds, n.16, p.98.
After establishing SEATO, the U.S. attention rivetted to the Middle East to fill the gap in the defense perimeter between SEATO and NATO. The U.S. was, however, not new to the area. It had concluded two arms sales agreements with Saudi Arabia and Iran. The agreements were concluded soon after the Soviet Union attempted to gain some foothold in the region by encouraging the separatist movement in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in 1946. Soon thereafter, the U.S. had established a small naval presence in the area in 1949 and later a Strategic Air Command recovery base at Dhahran.

The Cold War increased in ferocity and the stress was on the strengthening and augmenting the weakest link in the encirclement chain that was under implementation. Another defence pact involving the nations of West Asia was seen discerned as the answer. Turkey, Iraq and Iran were identified as the most important constituents of this plank. Turkey was already the most powerful country in the region and also a member of NATO. Iraq was not only willing but was also seen as a large nation whose membership in any alliance pact could prove beneficial to the preservation of Western influence and interests in the region. Iran on the other hand was unwilling to join in any alliance system. Though the anti-West Iranian Premier, Mohammad Mossaddeq, was deposed in 1953, Iran was yet unwilling to commit itself openly to any Western security alliance. The U.S. planners had also desired the inclusion of Egypt as a
senior partner in any security alliance in the region. The strong Pan Arab nationalism sweeping the region made the Egyptian President unwilling to entangle his nation in any security pact designed to protect the interests of the Western powers when West was seen as acting against Arab interests and sentiments.

The U.S. as a consequence, failed in its attempt to enlist the support of the major Arab nations. The Muslim nations of the region were evidently opposed to any American proposal to secure all the nations of the region in a military pact. Only Turkey and Iraq were willing to join in any Western scheme and the major nations like Egypt and Iran continued its disassociation with U.S. military alliances. Given this scenario, the U.S. once again started looking for nations with common interests and propensities to join the alliance.

Pakistan had in the meantime improved its ties with its fellow Muslim countries. Spurned earlier by the U.S., Pakistan had embarked on a policy of enhancing its international links with West Asian nations closely aligned with Washington. Pakistani leaders had calculated that if the U.S. were not willing to assign Islamabad any important role as its ally in the region, it would nevertheless look elsewhere for friends. Thus when the U.S. found that the nations in the Middle East were lukewarm to American proposals for the formation of a defense pact, Pakistan began
to emerge as a potential nation whose cooperation could be enlisted in any of the defense schemes that the U.S. was contemplating.

Moved by the desire to also plug the gap in the Middle East, a Turkish-Iraqi pact was signed in February 1955 with an anxious Britain joining in April 1955 followed by Pakistan in September. Thus was born the last of the Cold War collective security alliance called the Baghdad Pact, which was later renamed as CENTO after Iraq withdrew in 1958. The U.S. therefore succeeded in linking West Asia to NATO through CENTO and Turkey and SEATO through Pakistan.

Nevertheless, Washington in order to obviate the impression that CENTO was an American military creation, did not become a signatory to the pact. It was wholly an American idea evolved in keeping with the overall strategy of creating local areas of strength to prevent situations that would require the direct involvement of the U.S. The thrust of the Western strategy was to keep the American forces in reserve and make the nations of the region safeguard American interests. At the same time, it was felt that CENTO would lack military muscle and cohesion if Washington distanced itself denying the organisation any support. Therefore, after the creation of the Baghdad Pact, the U.S. Congress in 1958 authorised Washington to enter into separate agreements with member nations of the CENTO to bolster the defense preparedness of the allies and to demonstrate its commitment to the alliance. Drawing legitimacy
from the Congressional authorisation, Washington concluded separate bilateral agreements with Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. These agreements came into effect in 1959. Thus by the end of the 1950s, Pakistan was well ensconced in the American Alliance system created to obviate the erosion of Western influence in the Middle East and particularly South East Asia and to create local areas of strength to stymie the growth of communism outside the Eastern bloc.

(a) Strange Bed Fellows

In 1959, the last of the first Cold War defence agreements between the U.S. and Pakistan came into force. In 1977, Jimmy Carter was elected as the 39th President of the United States and U.S.-Pakistan relations touched the lowest nadir. During the nearly two decades since 1959, dynamics of international politics changed drastically buffeting Washington-Islamabad relations in the vicissitudes that characterise foreign relations. Pak-U.S. security relation which had witnessed intense warmth and mutuality of interests in the 50s suffered serious setbacks in the 1970s. With greater swiftness, however, the relations underwent yet another dramatic change in 1979. An analysis of these years of U.S.-Pak security relations from 1959 to 1979, revealed a classical example of an unequal alliance or partnership in operation -- how a great power implements the
often quoted words of Lord Palmerston, the 19th Century British Prime Minister, that there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies, but only permanent interests. This expression of international realpolitik found its ruthless expression in the bilateral ties between Washington and Islamabad with the former displaying little or scant respect for the interests of its small ally which surrogated itself at incalculable cost to the small nation’s economic, social and political development.

From the very beginning of Islamabad’s relationship with Washington, a dual perception characterised the U.S.-Pakistan security relations. For Washington, U.S.-Pak security ties served "the primary purpose of expanding the scope of the policy of containment", for Pakistan, it served "primarily the purpose of increasing her political, military and economic potential vis-a-vis her neighbors."24 Islamabad and Washington had nothing in common either politically, economically and much less socially. During the very initial stage of Pakistan’s birth it had embraced a British Parliamentary form of democracy. But in the late 40s, democracy was only fledgling and was largely untried. Under these circumstances, there was no compelling reason for the U.S. to support the nation as a model of democracy. Economically too there was little, if not, nothing in common between Pakistan and the United States. And socially,

while Pakistan was churned out of communal discords as a nation of Muslims, the United States had a fiercely guarded secular society. Most importantly, when it came to security concerns, the threat perceptions of both the countries never converged.

The historical and other differences, however, did not preclude Pakistan from formulating a policy designed to forge a special relationship with the U.S. In line with this strategy, no sooner was Pakistan born than it steered itself towards the U.S. in an attempt to win a powerful friend that would help strengthen it vis-a-vis India. Islamabad did not share Washington's fear of communism, and the United States, Pakistan's hatred for India. Washington was only pre-occupied with the desire to checkmate any move that could threaten the pre-dominant position which the U.S. attained after the Second World War.

The dichotomy in U.S.-Pakistan treat perception prevented Islamabad from succeeding in its effort to elicit an assurance from Washington that it will receive concrete assistance as a member of SEATO and CENTO, in the event of a war with India. Even in the face of what Pakistan considered was the ambivalent attitude of the U.S., Islamabad did not abandon its quest to bring within the ambit of the security alliances a clause which would compel the U.S. to come to its aid in case of any armed conflict. Ultimately, it received one assurance in the form of an U.S.-Pak cooperation agreement on 5 March 1959.
Under the agreement the U.S. agreed to commit itself to the "preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan." U.S. also consented to incorporate in the agreement an assurance that it will "take appropriate action, including the use of armed force" to fulfil its security obligation. The operational clause of the agreement with Pakistan read:

The government of Pakistan is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against Pakistan, the government of the United States of America, in accordance with the constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces as may be mutually agreed upon and is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the government of Pakistan at its request.25

Pakistan, however, did not succeed in bringing within the scope of the agreement a provision for invoking the assistance clause in case of a war against India. Notwithstanding this, it was revealed that American officials had privately assured Pakistan that their support would also be forthcoming in the eventuality of a war with India, though these officials later admitted that these assurances were not of any binding nature.26

To secure a commitment from the U.S. that it would come to the aid of Pakistan in case of a confrontation with India, Islamabad was manifestly agreeable to compromise its freedom and "was perfectly willing to


exchange base rights, treaty commitments, and her U.N. vote for a reliable flow of weapons and political support against India."²⁷

(b) **Pakistan Benefits**

Though Pakistan failed in its effort to modify the treaty clauses to bind the U.S. to an obligation to render military assistance in case of a conflict with India, Islamabad gained militarily. The alliance with Washington brought in its wake considerable military benefits to Pakistan. In the 1950s, Pakistan was beneficiary of large-scale surplus weapons from the Korean war. It also received almost $2 billion in economic and military assistance from the U.S. during the period 1953-61, of which $408 million were military grants.²⁸ Islamabad was also the first in the region to receive from the U.S. "high performance" jet aircraft, first in the region. They included the famed F-86 Sabres and F-104 interceptors which were considered the top of the line aircraft at that time. In addition, it also received hundreds of World War II and Korean vintage tanks. For the ill-equipped Pakistani forces it was a wind fall that was


to have a profound impact on South Asia. It enabled Pakistan to build a fairly modern army of 300,000-400,000 troops and a medium sized air force of about 250 combat aircraft. The U.S. aid programme had the effect of upgrading and augmenting Pakistan’s military potential.

The military and economic benefits received from its U.S. connection Pakistan included the following:\(^\text{29}\)

- During the period 1951-1981, U.S. economic assistance totaled over $5 billion.
- In the early 1960s, the annual commitments approached the $400 million range.
- During the 1950s total U.S. assistance amounted to around $960 million or eighty percent of total foreign assistance received by Pakistan.
- During the 1960s, U.S. assistance was approximately $2.8 billion and it represented fifty-five percent of the total foreign assistance Pakistan received.
- During the 1970s, U.S. assistance was around $1.5 billion or it averaged less than 20 percent of the total foreign assistance received by Pakistan.

Since 1981, U.S. assistance was limited to "drawdowns" of the existing pipeline, PL480 sales and support for rescheduling.

Once Pakistan became a beneficiary of American arms, the U.S. diplomatic support too followed as a necessary concomitant to its security ties with Islamabad. However, the so far de-classified documents of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations reveal little to support a thesis that the U.S. had adopted a strong anti-Indian posture. In line with its policy of only intervening when faced with any threat from the "Communists", it neither supported Pakistan nor encouraged it to embark on any military solution to the Kashmir problem which till today has defied all attempts at resolution. But it is discernible that Washington's support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue hardened once the Soviet Union supported India's position on Kashmir. The U.S. diplomatic position on the Kashmir issue transformed to a strong pro-Pakistan policy. It can be inferred that the U.S. policy on Kashmir was also influenced by the desire to signal to the smaller nations that Washington would oppose any attempt by the Soviet Union to support a nation which is arrayed against the interests of an American ally.

In return, Pakistan provided America with two military bases in Peshawar though it did not publicly admit to the existence of these facilities. One base was at Bada Ber which was used by the U.S. Air Force for surveillance of the Soviet Union and the other was a monitoring
base. The U.S.-Pakistan military ties continued to strengthen towards the end of the 50s and the early 60s. With the strengthening of its ties with Washington, Pakistan reduced its involvement in the non-alignment movement and supported Western interests in international forums. Islamabad was careful not to ruffle its relationship with the U.S. and withdrew its opposition to the creation of Israel and joined with the West during the 1956 Suez Canal crisis. Similarly, even when it came to its relations with the Peoples’ Republic of China, with which it was carefully nurturing cordial relations, Pakistan reciprocated the American support for Pakistan’s claims against India in the U.N. Thus when the “two Chinas” resolution came up for voting in the United Nations, Islamabad in a sudden reversal of its earlier stand, voted along with the United States.

Once the U.S.-Pak security relations were established, Washington’s support for Pakistan vis-a-vis India became increasingly vocal. This in turn drew the Soviet Union into the region and prompted Moscow to seek closer relation with India to balance U.S. influence in South Asia. The Soviet Union was compelled to look at Delhi with more interest than it had either desired or even intended. Alongside this development, it could also be argued that the continued and open U.S. support to Pakistan also influenced New Delhi’s eagerness to seek closer relations with the Soviet Union and China. For instance, while almost the entire world criticised the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, India responded by taking
sides with the Soviet Union. When the issue came up for voting in the U.N., India was the only non-aligned nation to vote against the resolution calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the holding of elections in that country under the aegis of the international organisation. Thus with the United States increasing its support for Pakistan, and the Soviets to India, South Asia suddenly became yet another theater of great power rivalry.

HIATUS IN PAK-U.S. SECURITY TIES

The 1950s witnessed the blossoming of the Pak-U.S. alliance without any major irritants. But with the dawn of the 1960s, the cordial U.S.-Pak security relations slowly showed inevitable signs of rupture. This was primarily due to the dual perception inherent in the Pak-U.S. alliances. Pakistan and the U.S. were after all strange bed-fellows. They shared the same bed but harboured different dreams. The inherent contradiction in the alliance burst the bubble of cooperation during the 1962 Sino-Indian war.

The Sino-Indian war has so far been the most demoralising and militarily shattering war for India. With the reversals on the war front and an ill-equipped army to respond to the challenge, India was left with
no option but to seek help from which ever quarter it was forthcoming. Faced with a humiliating defeat in the hands of the Chinese, Delhi sent frantic messages to the U.S. for arms and assistance. Washington which had concluded military alliance in the region to curb what it believed to be the expansionist ambitions of the Chinese, responded quickly to India’s appeal. It was felt in Washington that in case the United States remained an impassioned onlooker, then India "would with genuine reluctance approach the Soviet Union, which was now as anxious as the United States to hold China in check." ³⁰

The White House was occupied by an incumbent with known sympathies to India. Therefore when India’s desperate message reached Washington, the United States quickly decided to come to the rescue of the world’s largest democracy from further humiliation at the hands of the advancing Chinese army. The new American President, John F. Kennedy, warned China that the U.S. would even be compelled to use its military might to thwart the "Chinese aggression." The United States followed this warning with an emergency assistance programme. Washington agreed to supply Delhi enough arms for twelve mountain divisions and a radar

³⁰ Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life (Delhi, 1972), p.477.
network at an estimated annual cost of U.S. $75 million for a five-year period.\textsuperscript{31}

The American response to the Sino-Indian war was the first jolt Pakistan received at the hands of the U.S. Islamabad had joined the U.S. alliance system with the singular motive of strengthening itself militarily and economically against its big neighbour, India. But now it was faced with a situation wherein its own ally was arming and strengthening the very nation Islamabad considered as its greatest enemy. American assurances that the arms supplied to India would not be used against Pakistan did very little to allay its trepidations. Islamabad, on the other hand, contented that the Chinese objective during the war was only limited and, therefore, the rushing of the U.S. arms to India was "totally unjustified by the requirements of the situation."\textsuperscript{32}

Once Islamabad realised that it could not prevent the U.S. from supporting India, Pakistan hoped that Washington would use its newly-gained influence to pressurise India and compel it for a change in its policy on Kashmir.\textsuperscript{33} It entertained the hope that its superpower ally would not ignore the interests of Pakistan even in the face of Chinese

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p.475.


aggression. An anxious and hopeful Pakistan was soon to be disappointed as Washington was not prepared to extract any concessions from India on Kashmir. The U.S. did attempt to exert a certain amount of pressure on India, but it did not exercise the option of cutting off aid to enforce it. The U.S. policy in this region was primarily aimed at containing the Communist powers and it was unwilling to over-ride that policy consideration in support of the claims of a member of the alliance system, created paradoxically to check the spread of communism.

This lack of perceived insensitivity to the interest of its ally engendered a change in Pakistani thinking about the "dependability" of the U.S. as an ally. Soon Islamabad began looking for friends to remove the fetter of almost exclusive dependency on the U.S. Islamabad was convinced that Washington was "most unlikely" to sincerely safeguard Pakistan's interests. President Ayub Khan was quoted as saying that "The American policy of encouraging neutrality in areas where we [Pakistan] know it will operate in the long run against their interests and their friends interests is incomprehensible." The Pakistani leadership now realised that it would have to expand its ties with China and other nations in a manner reminiscent of the early 50s before it became a partner in the U.S. alliance, to safeguard its security interests.

34 Khan, n.32, p.153
A visibly disappointed Ayub Khan embarked on the new policy of "bilateralism" aimed at improving Pakistan's relations with the other big powers. Pakistan quickly realised that although its pacts with the U.S. brought it sophisticated arms and bilateral economic aid, its ally exhibited scant concern for Pakistan's security interests. Ayub Khan himself advocated the adoption of the policy of forging "bilateral arrangements" to compensate for the perceived lack of sincerity on the part of the Americans. After the entire West virtually came to India's aid in its war with China, Pakistan learned that it would be pragmatic to reduce its exclusive dependency on the United States for military and political support.

On the other hand, the U.S. was not as much concerned about Pakistan's opposition to American support for India as it was about the consequences of a humiliating defeat India could suffer in the hands of China. Given this perception, Pakistan calculated that it would be in its own self interest to edge closer to its "enemy's enemy." Washington's aid to India estranged Pak-U.S. relations and Islamabad moved to expand its relations with China to "counter what it believed was an increased threat to its own security." With this objective in view, Pakistan

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forged closer ties with China knowing that this policy might invite ire in Washington. But Pakistan's primary concern was its position vis-a-vis India. If the United States showed little concern for Pakistan's sentiments, it was felt in Islamabad that it made better sense to befriend India's enemy -- China. As a consequence, pushed eagerly by Pakistan, the Sino-Pak relations grew "almost in direct relation to the deterioration in the Sino-Indian and U.S.-Pakistan relations."38

Pakistan was willing to pay the price for this friendship with China. In its enthusiasm Islamabad ceded large areas of disputed land to China and followed it up with an air agreement. Though this agreement per se did not symbolise anything dramatic in political terms, the import of this agreement was not lost on Washington in as much as Pakistan was the first non-Communist nation to be accorded landing rights in China. This marked the beginnings of a long and useful relation with China which proved to be more durable and beneficial than its flirtation with the United States.

The wooing of China was not without any repercussions in Washington. In the initial phase of Sino-Pak relations, the U.S. was worried about the "political benefits" China would reap from the increasingly closer relations with its ally. Washington responded by publicly exhibiting its displeasure and disapproval of the new thrust in Pakistan's

38 Burke, n.33, p.153.
policy. U.S. officials came out openly against this new development. Soon after the signing of the air agreement, Washington suspended a promised loan of U.S. $4.3 million for the construction of an airport at Dacca and warned of still further action if the U.S. supplied spare parts were used by Pakistan International Airlines at Chinese airports. But, leaders in Islamabad were now experienced enough to realise that exclusive reliance on the United States was not without pitfalls and continued to pursue its relation with Beijing with added vigour.

**The Indo-Pak War of 1965**

By the beginning of mid-60s, Islamabad became acutely aware of the shifting U.S. policies and was increasingly concerned about the new directions the U.S. policy was taking. Pakistani leaders became extremely anxious about their military strength vis-a-vis India. They felt that they had to find a military solution to the Kashmir issue and decided to take recourse to war as the means to settle the long-standing dispute. It sent trained guerrillas into Kashmir in 1965 precipitating a war in the same year in September. As soon as the war broke out, the U.S. imposed arms embargo in South Asia and declared neutrality in the Indo-Pakistan war. This was a bitter treatment from an ally from which Pakistan had

39 Ibid., p.312.
great expectations. For Islamabad, the U.S. policy during the war, especially the imposition of arms embargo, was seen "at that time as an act of gross betrayal."40

The U.S. was in fact even less sympathetic to Pakistan during this war than in 1962 when the U.S. rushed aid to India over Pakistani protestations during the Sino-Indian War. Washington declined to intervene diplomatically in the conflict despite President Ayub Khan's appeal. Islamabad's pleas went largely unheeded and it did not evoke any positive response from the U.S. The White House spokesman ruled out any unilateral move by the United States to find an end to the conflict and declared that it would only "route" its efforts through the United Nations to end the conflict.41 In fact, it was only the fear that China may intervene militarily that prompted the United States to back even the UN resolution of 20 September 1965 which called for all the states to refrain from any action which might further precipitate the crisis in the region. But no sooner did the conflict end than all the members of the Security Council, including the United States, abandoned all efforts to settle the Kashmiri problem. "Gone were the days when the U.S.A. championed the right of Kashmiris [supported Pakistan] to decide their own future."


41 Burke, n.33, p.341

42 Ibid.
The U.S. interest in Pakistan had evidently undergone a marked change by the mid-60s. By 1965 Washington was deeply mired in the Vietnam War. It had committed large forces and expended billions of Dollars but victory continued to elude Washington despite its vast technological superiority and economic strength. The United States was caught in an imbroglio.43 Pakistan’s importance had already begun to decline with the intensity of the Cold War waning and in the circumstances the U.S. did not want any more local involvements. Writing about the U.S. response to the war, the former Pakistan Ambassador to U.S., U.K. and Minister for Industries, M.A.H. Ispahani, echoed: "The taste in our mouth [of the 1965 experience] will linger for a long time."44 The Pak-U.S. relations which had begun to deteriorate after the Sino-Indian war of 1962, had "greatly accelerated after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965."45

Islamabad realised that it would have to shift its strategies to face the new global reality. In the wake of the shifting U.S. priorities, Pakistan’s policy of bilateralism gained more impetus and relevance. The


policy to move closer towards China gained strong acceptance in Islamabad. Beijing’s stance during the war influenced Islamabad to seek closer relations with China. China had flooded New Delhi with protests and had accused India of crossing the border. It was also revealed that China had privately assured Pakistan that it would have been willing to come to its aid in the war if it were called upon to render assistance.

China too responded warmly to Pakistani overtures. China extended unqualified support to Pakistan during the 1965 war in sharp contrast to the "hands off" policy of the United States. Therefore, at the end of the war, "China ranked much higher in Pakistan’s esteem than the United States and the Soviet Union." 47

_Bangladesh Crisis_

During the 70s, Pak-U.S. relations plummeted to a point that the military alliances concluded in the 1950s looked as if they were vestiges of a bygone era. Even the substantial military and economic aid that flowed into Pakistan during the height of the Cold War had virtually

46 It is also interesting to note that when Bhutto was the Foreign Minister in the Ayub cabinet, he was quoted as saying that China would be Pakistan’s "ally in its war with India". Fred Greene, _U.S. Policy and Security of Asia_ (New York, 1968), p.137.

47 Burke, n.33, p.358.
dried up. The Bangladesh crisis came at a time when the United States was still pre-occupied with the task of re-orienting its Cold War strategies. Moreover, it found itself inextricably enmeshed in the Vietnam quagmire. The United States was also engulfed in a domestic crisis. The presidency was crippled by the Watergate crisis and the authority of the U.S. President was shackled. Thus when the Bangladesh crisis broke out, the U.S. was unable to come to the aid of its ally which had proclaimed itself as the only nation that would "stand by" the U.S. in the event of "real trouble." This War exposed the dilemmas that a small nation would have to bear in a crisis despite the alliances it may have forged with big powers.

During the final days of the War, President Nixon ordered Task Force 74 of the Seventh Fleet of the U.S. Navy into Bay of Bengal in a show of support to Pakistan. But in actual terms it was only symbolic and could militarily have accomplished still less. "The United states 'tilted' toward Pakistan, but tilt as we [U.S] would, we [U.S.] could not affect the war's outcome" despite the Task Force. A study sponsored

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by the Brookings Institute also concluded that the Task Force had no appreciable impact\(^50\) on India's conduct of the war.

The Bangladesh crisis began as a domestic issue of Pakistan. It had its genesis in the demand of the people of Pakistan's Eastern Wing for a larger share in their country's resources and representation in civil and military Administration. East Pakistan was the most neglected but also the most populous region of Pakistan. In comparison to the economic development of West Pakistan, the Eastern wing was totally neglected. The "Bengalis" as the people of West Pakistan called their fellow countrymen separated by 1000 miles to the East, were looked down as people inferior in race and endowments.

When the people of East Pakistan revolted, the Pakistani forces went on the rampage. But the U.S. government was not prepared to pressurise Pakistan to cease its military tactics.\(^51\) Both President Nixon and his Secretary of State were evidently sympathetic towards Pakistan. And when war broke out between India and Pakistan, Nixon accused India of being the "aggressor" and believed that the conflict was the result of

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a "ruthless power play by a nation "aligned" to the Soviet Union despite its official declaration of neutralism."\textsuperscript{52}

The Bangladesh war brought into sharp focus the kind of policies big powers adopt when small nations are faced with a crisis for survival. If a critical assessment of the policy which the United States adopted during this crisis is made, the callousness with which Washington had disregarded the interest of its ally would serve as a lesson for third world nations aligning with big powers. The arms transfer dependance proves disastrous for the recipient nations in times of crisis. This was the experience of Pakistan. Such a relationship decreases the "military readiness and power, and economic waste of imported arms that become inoperational due to lack of spare parts, ammunition, or maintenance capability."\textsuperscript{53}

Throughout the crisis, the U.S. was only content with making noises about its support to Pakistan, but failed to pursue any meaningful policy that would have prevented Pakistan's dismemberment. According to Kissinger's own admission, the U.S. was not willing\textsuperscript{54} to prevail upon Pakistan to exercise restraint in its Eastern Wing. According to him, it

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\textsuperscript{53} Disarmament - Tropical Papers 3: Transparence in International Arms Transfer (New York, United Nations, 1990), p.36.

\textsuperscript{54} Kissinger, n.51, pp.853-4.
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was told in the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) that India would end up winning in East Pakistan.55 But then why Washington did not offer Pakistan saner counselling is unclear and reveals a contradiction in Washington’s response to the crisis. On the other hand, Nixon himself confessed that he was willing to support Pakistan in case it no longer made any efforts to "defend East Pakistan."56

It may even be difficult to give credibility to Nixon’s statement that he did not realise that if Washington continued its policy of restraint in the face of Pakistani outrage in Bangladesh, India would intervene. Nixon himself is quoted as saying that the U.S. did have advance notice of the Indian intervention. On the contrary, by taking a stand that the U.S. would extend unqualified support if Pakistan did not defend East Pakistan, he may have actually undermined the will of the Pakistani leadership to defend East Pakistan and may have inadvertently contributed to Pakistan’s dismemberment, despite his own assurance to Yahya Khan in 1969 that "nobody has occupied the White House who is friendlier to Pakistan."57

Washington’s support to Pakistan was limited to diplomatic moves though Kissinger has himself written that Nixon was giving him "unshirted hell"

to effect a clear "tilt" towards Pakistan. But what the term 'tilt' implied other than the diplomatic noises that were being made by Washington is not known.

**Implications of Vietnam War**

The lessons of the Vietnam war were painful to most Americans. Militarily it implied that the United States would not any more be able to introduce troops in far away regions especially in the absence of any direct involvement by either China or the Soviet Union. A quick and decisive early victory, on the other hand, would have strengthened the hands of the strategists who supported interventionist policies. The ignominious failure of the military to crush the determination of a weak and vastly inferior country cast serious doubts on the wisdom of the military hawks.

Besides discrediting the Pentagon, it left a deep scar on the psyche of the American public affecting adversely the social fabric and creating severe financial problems for the country. The overall effect of the war was that it became a "catalyst for a severe disenchantment with all aspects of foreign policy."

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58 Kissinger, n.51, p.897.

59 Mike Mansfield, "U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing Pacific and Asia", 
discredited that the kind of support that was easily forthcoming in the
heydays of the Cold War was now non-existent. Evidently, "the
bipartisan consensus that once existed for a vigorous American intervention
was ... now torn apart." ⁶⁰

Further, along with the disillusionment with matters relating to
foreign policy, economic issues gained more urgency. Besides the negative
fall out the war had on the domestic economy, the United States had by
the late 60s started facing stiff economic competition from its allies. In
view of these developments, there was a far greater consensus among the
policy makers that economic challenges required greater attention and
should be the focus of American "diplomatic ingenuity." ⁶¹ Given the
prevailing situation, these developments did not augur well for Pakistan.
It signalled that neither the American public nor the Congress would
countenance any support for Pakistan even if it were to encounter any
difficulty with India. Even the friend Pakistan had in Richard Nixon
would not have been able to either turn the tide or even ignore it.
Thus, by the 1970s, U.S.-Pakistan strategic relations had touched a new

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⁶⁰ "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace", A Report
to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, 3 May
1973, in Department of State Bulletin(Washington, D.C.), vol.68, 4 June

⁶¹ Secretary of State William P. Rogers, in Ibid., vol. 67, 23 October 1972,
p.472.
low. The changed international situation and the trauma created by the U.S. involvement in Vietnam signalled that the U.S. would be de-emphasising the importance of strategic alliances except in areas of core interests like Western Europe. Inevitably, U.S. strategic perception of Pakistan plummeted to the position of virtual non-existence.

SINO-U.S. DETENTE AND U.S. OBJECTIVES IN SOUTH ASIA

To meet the changed international situation the Nixon doctrine was enunciated. This doctrine emphasised the creation of local areas of strength to prevent the need for the U.S. to intervene outside its borders. The Nixon Doctrine of creating local areas of strength was an unmistakable signal to China that "Washington had downgraded the possibility of Chinese military aggression or military expansion in Asia." As detente bloomed, it signalled the confluence of interests and an era of cooperation between the United States and China in South Asia.

The monolith Communist bloc had publicly ruptured by 1968 when China and the Soviet Union clashed along the Ussuri river. It offered the United States with the opportunity of befriending the Chinese to out-

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manoeuvre Moscow. The Sino-Soviet clash could not have come at a better time for the U.S.

The Vietnam involvement had sapped the American will to directly intervene in Asia. In fact, it was only after China went "red" that the U.S. started evincing more interest in the region because of the fear that China would henceforth promote and encourage Communist movements in Asia just like the Soviet Union was perceived to be doing in Europe. To the U.S. policy planners, the Chinese involvement in the Korean War was enough evidence of the future challenges they could expect in Asia. The "domino theory" now gained acceptance in Washington and the U.S. decision to get involved in Vietnam was a result of this growing fear.

It appeared to the strategists in Washington that this was the opportunity to shear off the Communist threat from the Asian subcontinent. In the context of the negative fallout of the Vietnam war which would have prevented any more U.S. involvement in local wars, it was indeed exhilarating for Washington to conceive of a development that would by itself foreclose the need to take such a step. The U.S., therefore, went about this option in all earnestness with the obvious objective of seeking China’s collaboration in Asia and more particularly in South East Asia, against the Soviet Union. Indeed, the very essence of Sino-U.S. detente
was that the two former enemies would co-operate in "areas of mutual interest." 63

South Asia was no exception to this evolving joint strategy. Just as the United States and China desired to preclude Soviet influence elsewhere, in South Asia too, the objective was similar. In this effort, however, a role for Pakistan was only natural in view of the close relationship that was extant between Islamabad and Beijing. Therefore, at the end of the Bangladesh crisis, what was in the offing was a Sino-Pak-U.S. axis.

The secret trip which the then American National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, undertook using Pakistan as a stopover and the "invaluable" role that was played by Pakistani statesmen only assured a berth for Pakistan in the evolving Sino-U.S. strategies. Kissinger himself conceded that the Pakistani channel was almost irreplaceable in the Sino-U.S. detente. 64

Chinese leaders on their part found it befitting to remind the American policy makers that Pakistan should not be ignored in the days to come and that the United States should also bear in mind the interests of Pakistan while formulating its policies toward South Asia. Given the


64 Kissinger, n.51, p.854.
Chinese support for Pakistani interests, it is not surprising that during one of Kissinger's visits to Peking, the Chinese Premier, Zhou En-lai exhorted: "do not forget the bridge that you have crossed in coming here."\textsuperscript{65} The import of the statement obviously was that Pakistan should also be a part of the emerging Sino-U.S. schemes and also be a beneficiary thereof.

This perhaps explains in part Kissinger's meeting with the Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations during the Bangladesh crisis to coordinate their response to the crisis. According to Kissinger, the sailing of the task force of the U.S. Seventh Fleet during the 1971 war was partly to demonstrate the American support for any move that China might have taken on Pakistan's side.\textsuperscript{66} Commenting on the Sino-U.S. response to the Bangladesh crisis, the \textit{New York Times} wrote that the "U.S.A. and China recently found themselves virtually co-belligerents when they backed Pakistan."\textsuperscript{67} And when the war ended, China moved in to make up in part for the Pakistani losses suffered with Zhou En-lai assuring Pakistan that it would "firmly support it in its struggle" against what he called "foreign aggression."\textsuperscript{68} The \textit{New York Times} reported that after the war

\textsuperscript{66} Kissinger, n.51, p.910.
\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Asian Recorder} (New Delhi), vol.18, 29 January-4 February 1972, p.10591.
ended, China delivered to Pakistan a substantial quantity of weapons under a military and economic aid agreement worth over $300 million signed during the Pakistani President, Bhutto's visit to China in February 1972. The delivery was reported to include 60 MIG jet fighter bombers, 100 tanks (T-54 and T-59 models) and an unspecified number of small arms and 6 coastal Patrol boats. Further, it was reported that China had stepped up the deliveries of medium-range TU-16 bombers to Pakistan. Although the precise number of the aircraft involved was not available, it was reckoned that Chinese military aid to Pakistan after the 1965 war was the largest it undertook to any nation outside the Communist bloc.

New U.S. strategy in South Asia

In the aftermath of the Bangladesh War, the United States adopted a different strategy to gain new manoeuvrability in South Asia. It apparently ceased identifying with Pakistan's security concerns. The U.S. interest in the region was only to ensure that there is no more conflict in the area that would allow Moscow to have greater influence in the region. Especially in the light of the new found friendship with Beijing, the United States' partial withdrawal from Asia, and the "Vietnam induced

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fear" that made the public and Congress resist U.S. involvement in areas of only peripheral interest. Washington found it only natural to "leave to China the security of Pakistan." Thus, although no formal military relationship existed between China and the U.S., there was a "security relationship implicitly, as it must between any two powers whose interest and policies intersect." That the U.S. and China were tilted towards Pakistan was clearly evident from the joint communiqué issued at the end of Nixon's visit to Peking in 1972. The communiqué declared their support for self determination in the disputed territory of Kashmir. The major thrust of the American policy towards South Asia after the 1971 war was to reduce the enhanced influence Moscow gained in the subcontinent as a result of its close ties with India. Some American defence planners took the view that the Soviet Union's primary aim was to capitalise on its standing in India to acquire a naval base in Vishakhapatnam. Anxieties concerning such developments might have added

71 Kissinger, n.51, p.875


a sense of urgency to American moves calculated to repair its relations with India. Washington embarked on a course apparently designed to convey to India that it was ready to improve its relations with India. President Nixon offered to hold a "serious dialogue" with India to mend the fences damaged during the 1971 crisis. In 1972, President Nixon despatched John B. Connaly Jr., as his emissary to India to what was considered the first major attempt to salvage Indo-U.S. relations from the effect of the 1971 war. In a similar vein, the American Ambassador to India, Patrick Moynihan, indicated that the United States would henceforth conduct its relations with India on the basis of a "new realism." To assuage India's fear of American involvement in the region, Nixon declared that the "United States has no economic or strategic interests in a privileged position, nor in forming ties directed against any country inside the region or outside the region, nor in altering the basic political framework on the subcontinent." On 15 March 1972, it was also announced that the U.S. was releasing the $83 million which had been earmarked for India but was held up because of the 1971 war. He went on to assure India that American interests in South Asia were openly "humanitarian" and related to the "development" of the nations of the region. His primary objective was to convey to India that the United

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76 *Department of State Bulletin*, vol.68, 2 April 1973, p.405.
77 Ibid., n.60, p.719.
States was only interested in making South Asia an "example to the world of peaceful progress." 78

The bottom line of Washington's professed benign intentions in South Asia was to decrease India's dependence on Moscow by also conveying to India that the United States would not lean backwards to support Pakistan or involve it in any of its strategic schemes. To demonstrate its apparent resolve, President Nixon made it clear that the U.S. would not assume the role of a major arms supplier to Pakistan. But in reality, Nixon was quite aware that Pakistan would make up in part from China for the arms that the U.S. was denying Pakistan.

In a further bid to tone down the effect of Nixon's "tilt", Washington recognised the new nation of Bangladesh and became its largest aid donor. 79 This move, as also Nixon's announcement of Washington's desire to better relations with India, came at a very painful time for Pakistan. Islamabad was at that point struggling to reconcile to the loss of its bigger half and was making desperate attempts to limit the number of nations recognising Bangladesh to pressurise India and Bangladesh to secure the release of its 93,000 prisoners of war and to regain the territory lost in the Western sector. But clearly, Washington ignored the Pakistani sentiments as the United States policy was not aimed

78 Ibid., p.789.
79 Ibid., p.791.
so much to support Pakistan in these efforts as to prevent any further increase in the Soviet influence in the region. This the U.S. wanted to achieve by not identifying itself with Pakistan's interests. Washington apparently feared that any increase in tension in the subcontinent would lead to an increased level of Soviet influence in the region. To use Nixon's own words: "unresolved enmities [in South Asia], could make the area vulnerable to an undesirable level of foreign influence."\(^{80}\) It is only in this context that Nixon's call to South Asian leaders to turn the "relationship between India and Pakistan from hostility to co-operation"\(^{81}\) should be understood.

But at the same, the United States made it clear that although it had no intention of assigning Pakistan any special importance, it would not tolerate any further dismemberment of Pakistan. In the aftermath of the war, Nixon declared: "our concern for the well being and security of the people of Pakistan does not end with the end of a crisis."\(^{82}\) In a somewhat similar vein, Henry Kissinger repeated the familiar Nixon theme


\(^{81}\) Ibid.

that "the independence and integrity of Pakistan are a central concern of American foreign policy." 83

The frequent reiterations of American concern for Pakistan's territorial integrity were also made primarily to warn India that although it wanted to improve relations with Delhi, India's evolving relations with Moscow should not assume an anti-U.S. or anti-Pakistani content. Nixon's announcement that "India's policy toward its neighbours in the subcontinent and other countries in nearby parts of Asia is now an important determinant of regional stability, which is of interest to us" 84 supports this thesis. Referring to the Soviet influence, he warned that "no outside power has a claim to a predominant influence" 85 in the region.

The Nixon Administration's policies towards South Asia remained unchanged under the Ford Administration. The re-appointment of Henry Kissinger as the Secretary of State in the Ford Administration ensured the continuity in this policy. Alfred L. Atherton Jr., the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asia Affairs, also harangued that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan remained an important

83 Ibid., vol.70, 10 June 1974, p.639.
concern" of American foreign policy. To improve America's image in the subcontinent, Henry Kissinger undertook a visit to India in October 1974 declaring that the United States recognised the fact that the "size and position of India give it a special leadership in South Asian and world affairs." But he was also quick to add that India had a "special responsibility for accommodation and restraint" -- a subtle yet unmistakable reminder that India should do nothing to undermine Pakistan's stability.

Nevertheless, it was to further Indo-U.S. relations that the Secretary of State visited India in 1974. Talking to press reporters, Kissinger maintained that the primary objective of his trip was to "establish the basis for a new and mature relationship" with India. His concern at the growing Indo-Soviet relations was uncovered while answering a question about the prospect of the United States resuming aid to India. He clearly drove home his idea when he opined that the resumption of aid was not a matter of according India "special favour", but, that the whole question was a case of defining "joint objectives." This clearly implied that

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86 Ibid., vol.71, 14 October 1974, p.52
87 Ibid., vol.71, 24 November 1974, p.741
88 Ibid.
India should tone down its ties with the Soviet Union and make an effort to establish areas of mutual interest with the United States. In pursuance of this aim, an Indo-U.S. Joint Commission was formed on 27 October 1974 and it was hailed by the Indian External Affairs Minister, Y.B. Chavan, as a "landmark in Indo-American relations." 91

The United States had been making a series of efforts to improve its relations with India. It had in February transferred to India a sum of Rs.1,664 crores which represented the lion's share of the accumulated U.S. held P.L.480 rupee payment made by India. Soon after Kissinger's departure, it was also announced in Washington on 30 November 1979, that the U.S. had decided to allocate 300,000 tonnes of wheat to India on favourable credit terms repayable over a period of 20 years. These moves were probably made to convey to Pakistan that Kissinger was interested in promoting "restraint" on India's part while at the same time taking care that they are not contradictory to U.S. commitments to Pakistan's integrity.

However, Kissinger left open one delicate and important question -- American arms sales to Pakistan. Undoubtedly it was the single most important issue that was the major irritant in the Indo-U.S. relations. While Kissinger privately assured Indian leaders that Washington was also of the opinion that there should be no arms induction into the

91 Ibid.
subcontinent, the joint communique\textsuperscript{92} issued at the end of his visit conspicuously omitted any reference to this vexing question. A few months later, when the United States once again resumed arms sales to Pakistan, Washington was not prepared to allow its arms sales policy to Pakistan to be influenced by any private commitments it gave Delhi.

Nevertheless, the U.S. continued to adhere largely to its arms embargo, treating Pakistan, its ally, on par with India -- the non-aligned nation that was hardly restrained in its criticism of U.S. policies. As the U.S. interest was only to maintain the territorial integrity of Pakistan and check the Soviet influence in the region, the Chinese arms supply to Pakistan could be hardly inimical to U.S. interests in South Asia. At the same time, the American refusal to supply Pakistan with the military hardware it requested meant that the U.S. was sensitive to Indian criticisms when Washington was trying to improve its relations with Delhi.

The United States professed that its interests in South Asia rested on its desire to "contribute to a stable balance of power" in Asia as a whole, or in other words, to prevent the Soviet Union from attaining an unacceptable level of influence in South Asia. China too claimed to have the same objectives.

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
U.S. FOCUS ON WEST ASIA

The 1970s saw the United States focusing its attention on West Asia. The U.S. was able to retain its influence in the region during the two-and-a-half decades after World War II without any serious threat to its standing in the region. Hence during this period the U.S. was content with the policy of not playing an active role in the region.

But, the Yom Kippur war in 1973 was a watershed in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab forces combined to form a formidable force spawned by a strong resurgence of Arab nationalism. The Arabs for the first time put up a united front and in a courageous move imposed oil embargo on all nations that supported Israel during the war. This immediately forced a rethinking in the American strategy in the region and emphasis was laid on the prevention of any more crisis that could result in the further consolidation of Arab nationalism and the hardening of the concomitant anti-Western sentiments.

West Asian oil is of critical importance to the sustenance of the Western prosperity. Washington's close allies such as Japan and Western Europe were clearly dependant on the Gulf oil. The U.S. could not afford another crisis of this magnitude that would injure the "jugular vein" of the Western economy.93

93 In 1973, Western Europe's dependence on Arab oil was estimated to be (continued...)
Twin Pillar Policy

A major consequence of the 1973 war was that the United States started shaping a more active policy in the region. The strategy adopted was two fold. The first was the identification of friendly nations in the region which would with U.S. military support, assume the leadership in the region. The second was the resolution of the Arab Israeli conflict.

For the United States, the difficulties engendered by the emerging oil crisis were also compounded by the 1971 British withdrawal from "East of Suez" which left the area without any major Western presence. The immense requirements of the Vietnam war had sharply reduced the military resources that Washington could spare for the West Asian region. In the post-Vietnam Watergate context, Washington was in no position to put forth any fresh programme signifying a deeper involvement in the region. The new policy that the United States embarked upon under the circumstances was to have implications on Pakistan. Islamabad would have in the normal course qualified to be a member in any such scheme by virtue of its proximity to this region. But, after the 1971 war, Pakistan was a demoralised nation, enfeebled and without the financial resources to

93(...continued)
about 73 per cent, that of the United States about a per cent and that of Japan about 42 per cent. U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Impact of the October Middle East War (Washington, D.C., 1973), p.159.
undertake any large-scale arms build up which was a *sine-quo-non* for it to qualify to be entrusted with a new role in the emerging U.S. strategy. Moreover, any large-scale infusion of U.S. aid would have further hardened anti-U.S. feelings in India. It may have even triggered a further strengthening of the Soviet influence in the region, which in any case was at its acme after India emerged as the uncontested dominant power after the 1971 war. The American quest therefore, was to locate other countries that could play a supplementary role during the years immediately ahead. If those countries were also in a position to pay for American military hardware, it would be a far more attractive proposition than a grant or sales programme or concessional credits to a country like Pakistan.

In its search for allies, the United States, therefore, attached great importance to the capacity of identified nations to finance their own military re-armament programmes. With the skyrocketing price of oil after the Yom Kippur war, the oil exporting countries found their coffers filling faster than what they could absorb. The average price of Arab oil which stood at $2.553 per barrel on 1 January 1973, in a matter of two years rose to $12.462 by 1 October 1975, registering an increase of 388.13% percent.\(^4\) Therefore, the need to insulate the region from any more crisis

was high in the U.S. agenda. The OPEC countries accumulated billions of surplus U.S. Dollars. In Washington's search for friends in the region, the oil billions were a definite attraction for the U.S. arms industry which was confronted with the unsavory prospects of a depressing arms market in the aftermath of the Vietnam war. The American choice therefore logically fell on Iran and Saudi Arabia. The arms industry lobby in the United States found these two countries a lucrative market for American arms. In addition, the Pentagon pushed this idea with unbridled enthusiasm as any large-scale arms sales abroad would result in the reduction of the unit cost of defence equipment making cheaper for the United States to sustain its procurement plans.

A study of the Iranian and Saudi military expenditures clearly buttresses this thesis. The Iranian military expenditure which stood at $2093 million in 1970, skyrocketed
to $10996 million\textsuperscript{95} in 1978 (Please see graph-I\textsuperscript{96}). In similar vein, the per capita military expenditure of Iran rose from $119 in 1970 to $302 in 1978. (Please see Graph-II\textsuperscript{97}). This huge defence outlay made the Iranian market a playground for the competing American defence contractors who through "bribery, corruption" and deceit pushed the sale of U.S. weapons. The competition to sell arms to Iran was so paranoid that it frequently went to the most ridiculous extent. In a research article published in the Washington Post\textsuperscript{98} it was revealed that in the early 1970s, an American multi-national giant, Westinghouse, induced Iran to buy $125 million worth of radars for an air defence system. This was done even before the Iranian planners had conceived of the need for such a system that even at the time of the exit of the Shah of Iran in 1978, the unused radars were still stacked away in stores. In the same vein, the lure of the American petro dollars was so irresistible that various defence contractors in their overeagerness to sell to Iran sold more sophisticated systems than those which even the U.S. armed forces were

\textsuperscript{95} In current US $.  

\textsuperscript{96} The data has been taken from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1970-1979 (Washington, D.C., 1982), pp.62 and 75  

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., pp.62-75.  

\textsuperscript{98} Washington Post, 13 January 1980.
yet to receive. Therefore, from the onset of the oil crisis till the down
fall of Shah, Iran was an American defence contractor's dream.

If Iran was a market which the United States could not resist, the Saudi market was a paradise. The growth in the Saudi import of U.S. arms even far surpassed that of Iran. Thus, while the military expenditure of Saudi Arabia was $1531 million in 1970, it rose to $10096 million in 1978 (Please see Graph-I). Similarly, the military expenditure per capita rose from $408 to $1147 during the same period (Please see graph-II100).

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100 For instance, Iran had ordered Spruance class destroyers for its Navy. Litton Industries which were building these ships were fitting these destroyers with an air defence system that was not even ordered by the U.S. Navy.

100 The data has been taken from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, n.96, pp.62-75.
In addition to the advantage of having surplus petro dollars, these two countries gained in importance because of their location in the oil rich Gulf region. The United States therefore planned to secure the two nations from any unfriendly influence. Pakistan, on the other hand, was comparatively far away from this strategic region. It was therefore neither economically nor strategically located to be assigned any similar role by the Americans.

It was deemed that Iran and Saudi Arabia could be enlisted to undertake a major programme of rearmament to safeguard the oil rich region from domestic instability or Soviet influence that could pose a threat to the oil supplies to the U.S. or its allies. This policy, known also as the American "twin pillar policy", from the defence perspective, was designed to maintain a regional balance within the global balance, to enable the United States to play a less active or visible role of only providing guidance and military hardware necessary for the task.\(^1\) In order to strengthen the two nations and enable them to play a more active role, the United States undertook an arms delivery programme that by the end of the 1970's surpassed in quantum, the arms delivered to any North Atlantic Treaty Organisation member, including Germany.\(^2\)

\(^1\) Glen M. Johnson, "Interest Structures: Decision-Making Processes and United States Foreign Policy", *International Studies* (Bombay), vol. 18, no.4, October-December 1979, p.98

\(^2\) During the 1970s, Iran and Saudi Arabia received the largest amount of (continued...)
Iran especially, had clearly become the American "gendarme" and the "Nixon Doctrine ideal" in West Asia -- a role that the Shah took upon with great enthusiasm and a somewhat inflated estimation of his and Iran's potential. To meet the expanded role, the Shah placed military orders worth $18.4 billion with the U.S. Companies between 1973 and 1979, in comparison to the less than $1 billion in the previous six years. Saudi Arabia did not project military airs but proceeded with huge outlays on sophisticated military hardware. Pakistan was hardly in the same league as those two much smaller but much richer Islamic neighbours.

The American goal of equipping Iran and Saudi Arabia was a part of the American strategy to keep the region insulated from Moscow's influence. With this objective in mind, Washington encouraged the Shah's ambitions of turning Iran into the most powerful regional power. Iran was to assume the responsibility of keeping the region secure from any destabilising elements or unfriendly influences. The Shah of Iran became the self-appointed guardian of what he called the "jugular vein" or the oil routes of the Gulf. Just as the British were winding up their naval

102(…continued)
U.S. arms. The United States delivered Iran $9,740,337,000 worth of arms and for the same period, Saudi Arabia received arms worth $8,639,575,000. In contrast, Germany which was the largest recipient of arms among the NATO members, received only 6,046,653,000 worth of arms. Foreign Sales and Military Assistance Facts (DATA Management Division, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Washington, D.C., December 1979), pp.4-6.

presence, Iranian forces occupied the strategically located islands of Abu Musa and Tumbs overlooking the Strait of Hormuz and began constructing a naval base at Chah Bahar in the Baluchistan part of Iran to "guard the entrance to the Straits of Hormuz." Further, when the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Persian Gulf (PFLOAG) threatened Dhofar, the Southern-most province of the Sultanate of Oman, in 1973, Iran sent its crack troops to quell the insurgency. There was a time in the 1950s when Washington believed that an allied Pakistan might provide the muscle to deal with problems in West Asia, including Iran. But the situation had changed so completely, that Iran played this role and was soon to assume the posture of underwriting the territorial integrity of Pakistan itself.

The Shahanshah not only aimed at keeping the Persian Gulf free from Russian influence, but also worked towards limiting Soviet foothold in the adjoining areas of South Asia as well. The Shah reckoned that it would be imperative to reduce the Russian influence in the subcontinent if Iran were to achieve the status of a dominant power as Russian influence would have automatically constituted an impediment to Iran’s aim of becoming the most influential power in the region.

Iran constantly suspected Moscow of aiming for a warm water port in the Indian Ocean, and to achieve this, Tehran believed that Moscow

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would destabilise Pakistan. The 1971 Bangladesh crisis was seen as a Soviet-inspired creation to achieve this objective. The Shah, therefore, embarked on a policy of reducing the role of the Soviet Union as the most influential power in the region. In pursuing this ambitious objective, the Shah turned his attention not only to Pakistan but to India as well. Tehran's primary aim in South Asia was to safeguard Pakistan's territorial integrity and to prevent a further "disintegration of what remains of Pakistan." Iran offered large-scale economic and military aid to Islamabad. Under an agreement signed on 12 June 1974 and another on 18 April 1976, Iran pledged loans amounting to $750 million to Pakistan. Iran also went on to finance several joint industries and technical projects. In fact, the only other nation to receive larger credits from Iran was Egypt.

Clearly, the Shah's role was in consonance with American interests. Not only was the Shah doing for Pakistan what the United States was in no position to do at that time, but he also went ahead to diminish the possible danger to Pakistan's security from its two long term adversaries -

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106 The Muslim (Islamabad), 11 August 1979.

- Afghanistan and India. What the United States had long sought to promote was at this point carried forward by the Shah with the use of his newly acquired money power.

After the 1973 revolution which overthrew King Mohammad Zahir Shah of Afghanistan, the Shah became particularly concerned with Pak-Afghan relations. Afghanistan had been calling for an independent territory for the Pakhtun minority in Pakistan. The close contacts forged by the new government of Prime Minister Mohammad Daud with the Soviet Union was the cause of great concern for Iran. To prevent the Soviet Union from gaining unacceptable influence in Kabul, and to induce Afghanistan -- a land-locked country -- to move in the direction of accommodation with Pakistan, the Shah promised Kabul access to Persian Gulf ports of Bandar Abbas and Chah Bhar that were very important for Afghan trade. In addition, the Shah assumed the task of playing the role of a mediator in the Pak-Afghan dispute and offered Afghanistan $2 billion in aid\(^\text{108}\) in 1974-75, provided it settled its dispute with Pakistan. Iran's underlying objective was to reduce the Soviet influence in Afghanistan so that it would not be used by Moscow to sow instability in Pakistan or threaten Iran. To demonstrate to the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and India, his deep commitment to the preservation of Pakistan's territorial integrity, the Shah gave large economic aid and loaned to Pakistan 10 Helicopter

Gunships to fight Baluch forces and ordered Iranian military to take direct action against the forces when they sought refuge in Iran.¹⁰⁹

With the twin objectives of displaying his own enhanced role and moderating the potential threat to Pakistan from India, the Shah offered Delhi substantial aid for its agriculture and economic development. For instance, in 1974-75, Tehran extended to India $133 million in loans for joint ventures and some $750 million went to India in 1974 in the form of deferred oil payments, with 20 per cent of oil imports moving at the pre-embargo (1973) prices.¹¹⁰ The gradual reduction of the Soviet influence in India also figured in the Shah’s calculations. Iran also began to encourage increased contacts between India and Pakistan so that peace could be established between the two nations. The Shah went to the extent of suggesting that the countries around the Indian Ocean (India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Mynmar, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand) should "combine to guarantee their collective security."¹¹¹ Tehran even toyed with the idea of a "regional common market" to make South Asia less vulnerable to the Soviet influence. In the ultimate analysis, the grandiose schemes of Iran were not viewed with


¹¹⁰ Howard Wriggins, "Changing Power Relations Between the Middle East and South Asia", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol. 20, no.2, Fall 1976, p.796

any anxiety in Washington by the U.S. which was regarded by the Shah himself to be the ultimate guarantor of his regime and dynasty. On the other hand, given the basic anti-Soviet thrust of the Shah's course, his actions were viewed as being in consonance with U.S. interests that Washington itself found very difficult to further in the aftermath of the Vietnam war.

This dependence on Iran and Saudi Arabia to safeguard American interests when the United States was hemmed in by domestic constraints, diminished the already declining importance of Pakistan for the United States. Thus, while in the 1950s the United States had sought Pakistan's help to strengthen the "northern-tier" -- the nations of West Asia -- in the 1970s, the United States was only interested in Saudi Arabia and Iran committing their influence and some of their resources to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining unacceptable level of influence in Pakistan. Further, since the Shah of Iran had resolved after the 1971 war to safeguard the territorial integrity of Pakistan, the United States found it unnecessary to give much attention to any programme of direct assistance to Pakistan. Pakistan's territorial integrity was seen by Iran not only as a necessary adjunct to promote the Shah's regional ambitions but also because of its conviction that if Pakistan "were threatened and some
separatist movement started, this would create an absolutely intolerable situation" for its "eastern frontiers." 112

Therefore, when reliance was placed on "regional influentials", Washington found it perfectly logical to reduce to a trickle, its military supplies to Pakistan. Iran and other friendly nations were any how transferring113 small quantities of arms to Islamabad and helping it establish defence related industries. Washington was also quite aware of the implications of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty of 1971 and the close relationship which Moscow had forged with India. Washington feared that any large-scale American arms sales to Pakistan would only send India closer to the Soviet Union and heighten tensions in the subcontinent when the United States was attempting to "urge restraint to contain or dampen intra-regional hostilities."114


113 For instance, it was reported that Iran had offered to supply Pakistan at least 50 F-5 aircraft in 1975. Turkey was to supply about 100 M-48 tanks after reconditioning and refitting according to Pakistani specifications. *Indian Express* (New Delhi), 8 March 1975. Further, during the visit of the President of Turkey, Fahri Koruturk, in the same year, it was announced by the British Broadcasting Corporation that Turkey and Pakistan had decided to establish joint defence industries. The Shah of Iran also promised assistance in the setting up of a similar industry in Pakistan with the ostensible purpose of reducing their dependence on Western arms. *Asian Recorder*, vol. 22, 15-21 January 1976, p.12977.

114 Statement made by Seymour Weiss, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, on 6 March 1974, before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 70, 8 April 1974, p.372.
The United States was also successful in its attempts to bring within its fold, the largest Arab nation, Egypt. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, demonstrated that his country attached priority to the improvement of relations with Washington and continuing the policy initiated in 1972 to reduce the Soviet influence in Egypt.

Henry Kissinger who was largely responsible for bringing Egypt and Israel together through his "shuttle diplomacy" and the "step-by-step" approach, brought the two nations to an agreement that was signed in Geneva in 1975. Under the agreement, Israel agreed to withdraw from the strip in Sinai. The confrontationist policy of the two nations since the very creation of Israel came to an end. This symbolized the course Egypt-Israeli relations were to take in the coming years.

Ever since the Soviet advisers and military technicians were expelled from Egypt in 1972, the American aim in the Middle East was to capitalise on Egypt's distrust of Moscow and to neutralise the strength of Israel's most powerful enemy in the Middle East. The primary objective was to ease the Egypt-Israeli distrust. American planners calculated that if Israel and Egypt could be made to establish peace between themselves it would weaken Arab strength and seriously affect their resolve to fight Israel. Such a development, it was reckoned, would reduce the possibility of yet another Middle East War that was sure to damage American
standing, jeopardize its economic interests and increase the Soviet influence in the Middle East.

By bringing Egypt and Israel together, the United States hoped to increase its influence in Egypt and subsequently enlist its support in the American Middle East strategies. It was clear that Pakistan's usefulness for the United States would be further reduced if the United States succeeded in making Egypt join its rank of supporters. The other important nations of the Middle East, namely, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel were already in strong league with the United States.

ATTENUATION OF PAKISTAN'S MILITARY IMPORTANCE

With the enunciation of the U.S. "Twin Pillar" policy, there was a significant reduction in Pakistan's military importance for the U.S. During the height of the Cold War, Pakistan was important because of the military contribution it could make to the American containment policy. When the Soviet Union attained nuclear-weapon capability, the United States viewed Pakistan as a nation whose proximity to Moscow could be used for U.S. military purpose. Until the early 60s, U.S. bases at Peshawar served the pentagon well. Peshawar had been the staging ground for many a covert operation against the Soviet Union. U-2
aircraft flew constant reconnaissance sorties over the Soviet Union and the monitoring base constantly fed the Pentagon with valuable information about Soviet military activities. But specially after the shooting down of one of the spy planes over Soviet Union in 1960, the utility of the base at Peshawar began to decline. By 1965 the U.S. military also lost their interest in the "spy-bases and radar installations located in Peshawar and Gilgit."  

Military and allied fields attained such high levels of sophistication that planes were replaced by big satellites which could, unlike the U-2 aircraft, fly with virtual impunity and safety over enemy territories. The satellites were unmanned and they could be placed in orbit for reconnaissance missions to monitor any area on earth at short notice. Therefore, the U-2 flights became largely obsolete as regards the Soviet Union. Even the monitoring base at Gilgit was closed down in 1965. Sophistication in military technology made such a base superfluous. Even the conduct of nuclear blasts could be recorded and transmitted back by satellites. In effect, all the military tasks performed with Peshawar as the base were handled by military satellites. Evidently, by the mid-70s, South Asia's strategic importance for the U.S. had reached a new low.

Washington was conducting its relations with Pakistan largely through "silence and neglect, as if South Asia hardly mattered."\(^{116}\)

 DECLINING MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF ALLIANCES

Besides the decline in the direct contribution which Pakistan could make to the American Cold War efforts, by 1970, there was also a definite vitiation of Pakistan's importance in SEATO and CENTO. All the multilateral alliances which the U.S. had concluded in Asia in the aftermath of the second World War, lost their military importance by the 1970s. The relevance of SEATO and CENTO as military alliances decisively declined. These two military alliances from their vary inception were only uncommitted congregations of nations induced by the United States to form alliances. As a result, when international relations changed, these two alliances became redundant. With few exceptions, American "alliances with Asian States had no solid foundation" with no "mutuality of benefits and liabilities" and therefore incapable of responding to "American interests in the area."\(^{117}\)


SEATO and CENTO were set up when Washington perceived that the threat to U.S. interests would come from conventional military strength of the Soviet Union and China. But, with the advancement in technology and sophistication and the accumulation of nuclear weapons, the fear of a conventional large-scale invasion was discounted. Alliances which derived their strength from the combined power of the armed forces of the aligning nations lost their deterrent value. Moreover, the division of the world into nuclear and non-nuclear states injected a new factor into alliances as "nuclear and non-nuclear powers cannot be real allies in the old sense, since they do not share in the ultimate power."\textsuperscript{118}

SEATO which was the largest multilateral defence organisation, considered by Dulles as a symbol of an "Asian Monroe Doctrine" lost its relevance by the second half of the 1960s. The Vietnam war was largely responsible for exposing the inherent weaknesses of SEATO. All American efforts at shoring up South Vietnam had come to naught. Even at the height of the Vietnam war, unity among member nations was hard to come by. SEATO which was designed to be an answer to Communist "designs" in South East Asia had by the 1970s failed to serve the designated goal. Only Thailand, the Philippines and Australia had offered anything more than token military support. The lack of cohesion in SEATO had become evident as early as in the 1960s. For instance,

\textsuperscript{118} Robert G. Wesson, \textit{Foreign Policy for a New Age} (Boston, 1977), p.90.
when Northern Thailand was threatened by Pathet Lao forces, the United States had to introduce a protocol to the Manila Treaty in 1962 declaring that it would take unilateral action irrespective of the attitude of other SEATO members. "In effect, SEATO in the final years became an alliance between the United States and the remaining Asian members."\(^{119}\)

More than anything else, this spawned the feeling in the United States that primary emphasis on alliances to prevent perceived Communist threats was an ineffective strategy. The Vietnam war had also churned adverse Congressional and domestic reactions to alliances. This necessitated the downplaying of the old pacts. The emphasis was on a gradual evolution of a new concept and strategies that could both be "sold" to the American public and have the potential of future evolution to meet new requirements.

The Chinese threat, the ostensible reason why the United States concluded the SEATO became irrelevant with the Sino-U.S. detente. The new fear propounded was of "internal unrest and guerrilla activities in the member nations."\(^{120}\) While the Kennedy Administration felt that the "national liberation movements" were being exploited by the Soviet Union, and Washington evolved "counter-insurgency strategies", the expectation in

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\(^{120}\) *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, Mass.), 29 June 1977.
Third World countries was for increased economic aid for developmental purposes and not for the complications posed by military alliances. An unnamed Malaysian official was quoted as saying: "we don't expect or want another SEATO military alliance, a major American presence, because we do not expect an invasion." He went on to say:

Our struggles are small ones, internal ones. What is needed to fight this is to build our economies, develop our countries. That's what we need help for. Our insurgencies we can handle with co-operative arrangements among ourselves.\(^\text{121}\)

Though Malaysia was not a member of the military alliance system, the statement of the official indicated a trend towards evolving indigenous organisations to meet common problems. Therefore, it was not only the changing U.S. perception about military alliance in Asia that contributed to a shift in strategy; the growing discontentment among the member nations also significantly influenced the change. Consequently, the emerging strategy was to encourage self reliance and stability in South East Asian nations to meet the perceived Communist threat.

The U.S. took note of these trends and the possibilities that they could open in the future. In the meantime, it realised the import of the expressions of disenchantment over the military pacts that were voiced not only in Pakistan but in Thailand and the Philippines also. Even while pro-Chinese elements threatened Thailand's North Eastern border, its Prime

\(^{121}\) *St. Louis Post - Despatch* (St. Louis, Mo.), 8 July 1977.
Minister found it expedient to call for the dismantling of SEATO. He joined the Philippines' President Marcos "in a public suggestion that SEATO had served its purpose commendably" and that the organisation should be phased out to enable it to adjust to the "new realities in the region." Therefore, the members of the SEATO itself, during the organisation's 1973 annual council meeting, decided to reduce the traditional military role of the Pact and emphasised the need to support national programmes of the two regional members, the Philippines and Thailand. In a move clearly revealing the shift in emphasis, the council decided to integrate the military staff into the civilian staff at the SEATO Headquarters at Bangkok to make it "more relevant to the situation in the treaty area."

In the light of these developments and new demands, the role envisaged for Islamabad in American containment schemes was reapprised. Pakistan's "link" function which Secretary of State Dulles conceived was of crucial importance in Asian alliances no more portrayed the American thinking. CENTO was already struggling to prolong its life while SEATO by 1973 was facing imminent dissolution. Under these circumstances,

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American policy makers believed that no constructive role could be played by Pakistan. Moreover, when Pakistan embarked on a course to establish close relations with China after the 1962 Sino-Indian war, it amounted to a virtual "defection from SEATO." Disillusioned and highly critical of SEATO for its failure to come to the aid of a member nation during its hour of crisis -- the 1971 Bangladesh crisis -- Pakistan, the only South Asian nation in the South East Asian alliance, withdrew from the pact on 8 November 1972.

Pakistan realised that even the remaining security bonds it had with the U.S. would work as links of burden limiting its foreign policy options. It was contended that Pakistan's defense links with the U.S. cast on it the stigma of an aligned nation without bringing the corresponding benefits. Hence the new focus was on disassociating from American alliances in the effort to remove all the legacies "of the past which has outgrown its usefulness." Barely twenty four hours before Pakistan served notice to SEATO, it recognized the Communist government of North Vietnam and soon thereafter, recognised North Korea in an effort obviously designed to declare that Pakistan had an independent foreign policy.

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124 Osgood, n.6, p.68.
125 Bhutto, n.65, p.10
Pakistan was also considering withdrawing from CENTO. Bhutto even included it as an agenda item in his election manifesto. But, later he reneged his promise, though for reasons hardly intended to please the U.S. A major factor that influenced the rethinking in Bhutto was Pakistan's close relation with Iran and Turkey which had helped Pakistan during the 1971 war. Further, Pakistan was linked to these two nations through the Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD), established in 1964. In addition to the fear of displeasing its Arab friends whom Bhutto called "dependable allies", Pakistan was also concerned about Beijing's stand. China had after its detente with the U.S. voiced support for American presence in both South and West Asia. Under these circumstances, Pakistani leaders realised that any effort on their part to withdraw from CENTO would displease China and probably convey to Moscow the wrong signal.

Nevertheless, Pakistan would have withdrawn from CENTO had it not been for the American support towards Pakistan during the 1971 war.

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127 Pakistan was rendered both moral and material support by Islamic states during the 1971 war. When tensions were rising in June 1971, the twenty-two nation Charter Committee of the Islamic Conference which met at Jeddah unanimously expressed "full support and backing to sisterly Pakistan" in the effort to fight what it called "foreign interference in Pakistan's internal affairs". *Asian Recorder*, vol.17, 6-12 August 1971, p.10298. Further, Saudi Arabia "loaned" Pakistan 75 military aircraft, Libya sent a "number" of Northrop F-5 jets, Jordan "some" F-104s and Iran alleviated shortages of ammunition, oil and aircraft. 19-25 November 1971, p.10473.
with India, which Bhutto thought was responsible for securing the Western part of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{128} But even if Pakistan continued to entertain any thought of withdrawing from CENTO after the war, by 1974 it discarded all such moves when India exploded a nuclear device. This heightened Pakistan's security concerns and it began once again looking towards the U.S. for weapons.

However, Pakistan's utility in American alliance system was of no crucial importance to the United States any more. The emphasis had clearly shifted from military links to economic cooperation among member nations. The United States too recognised this fact that military organisations had outlived their utility and that they did not any more "contribute a great deal in security terms."\textsuperscript{129}

Evidently, the U.S. did not favour a dissolution of CENTO. It felt that despite the decline in its military utility, the alliance should not be wound up at least for the reason that "it does not hurt much to have a treaty continue."\textsuperscript{130} The United States perceived that it would act as

\textsuperscript{128} Bhutto is quoted as saying that if the U.S. had not given a "firm warning that hostilities must cease", then a greater tragedy would have befallen Pakistani. Burke, n.33, p.212.


\textsuperscript{130} Statement of Alvin J. Cortell, Director of Research, Center for Strategic and International Studies, George Town University, in, Ibid.
a channel through which co-operation between friendly Arab nations could be achieved and that it could play "a valuable role in promoting the economic and social well being of the peoples in the area." 131

Additionally, it was viewed that the continuation of CENTO would be of some help in case some contingency arose. Even for the stability of the area it was recognized that the United States should not call for the dissolution of CENTO, but only encourage a shift in its emphasis. The conclusion was that although military alliances did not carry the same appeal it had in the 1950s, "regional military alliances have not lost their reason d' etre" and that it could contribute "to peace and stability and developmental efforts in the CENTO area." 132 Washington viewed that CENTO would foster unity among the signatory nations. Detente thus did not mean that the United States was totally and unilaterally withdrawing its support for all its Cold War devices.

Pakistan's attempt to improve its relations with Muslim nations and place it on a sounder footing contributed indirectly to American prescription of "regional co-operation." Therefore, with the dissolution of SEATO in 1973 and the de-emphasis of CENTO's security role, the

131 Statement of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Joseph Sisco, at the CENTO Council Meeting at London, in Department of State Bulletin, vol.67, 3 July 1972, p.25.

132 Statement of James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Near Eastern, Africa's and South Asia Affairs in Hearings, n.129, p.43.
American strategic view of Pakistan was that Islamabad could contribute to increased consultations and co-operation among the pro-American nations of West Asia. But, on the other hand, Pakistan's continued membership in CENTO had little to do with American pressure or persuasion. Pakistan remained in the alliance until its dissolution for reasons little connected with its relations with the United States.

Another important factor that influenced the low U.S. perception of Pakistan was the Egyptian break from the Soviet Union. The United States had tried in vain to enlist Egyptian support in the American containment plan of the 1950s in the Middle East. This was one of the factors that had significantly contributed to the American decision to induct Pakistan in the U.S. alliances. Egypt under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser was steered closer to the Soviet Union. But after his death, Anwar Sadat who came to the helm, in a dramatic shift reversed the policy of his predecessor. In 1972, he expelled the 20,000 Soviet advisers and military technicians who were stationed in Egypt to strengthen its armed forces and signalled a clear break from its old benefactor. This provided the United States with a definite opportunity to capitalise on the vulnerability of Egypt resulting from the severance of its intimate connections with the Soviet Union and deliver a coup de grace to the relations that had caused it considerable anxiety. Therefore, Pakistan was faced with the possibility of a further diminution of its utility for the United States and
consequently a further scaling down in the American need to strengthen Pakistan militarily. In view of these developments, by the 1970s, it became manifest that the U.S.-Pakistan security relations had touched a new low in a manner reminiscent of the American perception of Pakistan in the beginning years of the first Cold War.