International politics is characterised by cooperative and competitive behaviour between and among nation-states which produces a complex and dynamic interdependence. While it is true that interdependence is a model widely believed to represent contemporary international relations, it is a fact that interdependence under conditions of power and resource inequalities itself leads to conflicts and crises. Some scholars are of the opinion that crises are inevitable as long as there are sovereign nation-states. It must be added that when crises do erupt, the terms of inter-state relations need to be renegotiated. Although every crisis does not lead to war, the historical experience of the two world wars and the recent war in the Persian Gulf is a reminder of the dangerously close relationship between crisis and war. Herein comes the importance of managing crises effectively.

A crisis is generally regarded as a breakpoint along the peace-war continuum and reflects the expectation of war. A crisis is neither intrinsically bad nor intrinsically good. Whether it leads to violence and war, or whether it produces a better form of interaction depends, inter alia, on the way it is managed. It is interesting to know that original meaning of the word ‘crisis’ comes from a Greek medical analogy of ‘a turning point’, a decisive moment in the patient’s illness when he or she would irredeemably take a turn for the better or for the worse within a
which means both danger and opportunity.

A common assumption of crisis researchers is that the phenomenon of crisis, in one form or another, is an endemic feature of global politics and that 'crisis' can be extracted and studied separately from the rest of state behaviour. Scholars and statesmen have shown keen interest in the study of crises and on ways of evolving effective techniques of crisis management. The study of crises and crisis management as a legitimate focus of rigorous political inquiry drawing upon inter-disciplinary approaches is well established in the last three decades of international relations research.

Crisis management studies gained currency in the immediate aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when nuclear brinkmanship between the United States and the then Soviet Union brought into stark reality the danger of a crisis escalating into a war, albeit a nuclear war. The statement attributed to the then U.S. Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, "there is no longer any such thing as strategy, only crisis management"1 is an important caveat that during crisis situations diplomacy and political ends should maintain ascendancy over military means.

The Concept of Crisis

Concepts such as 'crisis' belong to the ambiguous category of social science terminology. The diversity of analytical approaches to the concept present a problem of achieving an acceptable definition. A critical review of some scholars' definitions would make this clear.

C.A. McClelland is of the view that "a crisis is, in some way, a 'change of state' in the flow of international political actions ... Acute international crises are 'short burst' affairs and are marked by an unusual volume and intensity of events." 2 E.E. Azar defines a crisis in terms of interaction above the threshold of a "normal relations range" (NRR): "Interaction above the present upper critical threshold ... for more than a very short time implies that a crisis situation has set in." 3

These two definitions can be categorised as 'situational' definitions of crisis. McClelland and Azar describe the various symptoms which are likely to constitute a crisis situation. For instance, the 'unusual volume and intensity of events'. Crisis is seen in quantitative terms such as frequency of hostile statements, deployment of


troops etc. While such an effort helps in distinguishing a crisis from a non-crisis situation, the description of the crisis is itself vague since it does not discuss as to when a crisis begins and when it ends. Moreover, the 'situational' definitions do not deal with types of crises and they fail to inform about the causes and effects of crises and their relation to the structure of the international system. As there is no effort in quantifying the time/duration of crisis, these definitions are inadequate in explaining the occurrence of protracted crises.

Another approach to the concept of crisis is that of C.F. Herman and Oran Young. C.F. Herman points out that "in any given international political system, critical variables must be maintained within certain limits or the instability of the system will be greatly increased - perhaps to the point where a new system will be formed. A crisis is a situation which disrupts the system or some part of the system". According to Oran Young, "a crisis in international politics is a process of interaction occurring at higher levels of perceived intensity than the ordinary flow of

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4 'International System' is defined as a set of actors who are situated in a configuration of power, are involved in regular patterns of interaction (process), are separated from other units by boundaries set by a given issue, and are constrained in their behaviour from within (context) and from outside the system (environment); for further exposition on the concept, see Michael Brecher and H.B.Yehuda, "System and Crisis in International Politics", Review of International Studies (London), Vol.1, 1985, p.17.

events and characterised by ... significant implications for the stability of some system or subsystem".6

These 'systemic' definitions, an improvement over the 'situational' ones, enhance the understanding of a crisis by introducing a qualitative aspect. They consider the causes and effects of the crisis in terms of implications for the stability of the international system or some part of the system. Considering the crisis as a process of interaction, constituting a sequence of events (that is, action-reaction-interaction), the 'systemic' definition explains the dynamics of a crisis situation. However, the 'critical variables' are not identified.

Combining the best of 'situational' and 'systemic' definitions, Michael Brecher attempts a conceptualisation of crisis at two levels: system (macro-level) and the state (micro-level). At the macro-level, "an international crisis may be defined as a situational change in an international system characterised by two individually necessary and collectively sufficient conditions: (i) distortion in the type and an increase in the intensity of disruptive interactions, with a high probability of military hostilities; and (ii) a challenge to the existing structure of the system". And then, from the perspective of a single state, "a crisis is a situation with three necessary and

sufficient conditions, deriving from a change in its external or internal environment. All three are perceptions held by the highest decision-makers: (i) a threat to basic values; (ii) a simultaneous or subsequent high probability of involvement in military hostilities; and (iii) the awareness of finite time for response to the external value threat".  

Brecher insists that this definition refers to international crisis in the military-security (war-peace) issue-area only. And the severity and importance of crisis is measured in terms of (a) number of crisis actors (b) geostrategic salience (c) extent of heterogeneity among crisis adversaries (d) extent of superpower involvement (e) issues, and (f) extent of violence.  

With the attempt to introduce a typology of crisis, namely unit-level and system-level, Brecher adds analytical strength to his definition. However, the analysis poses empirical problems because of the intangibles included in the meaning of 'perceptions' of decision-makers. It should be noted that the assessment of threat perceptions is a subjective matter.

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7Michael Brecher and Patrick James, Crisis and Change in World Politics (Colorado, USA, 1986), pp.22-26.

8ibid., pp.31-54.
This brief analysis reveals that definitions of crisis are vague, imprecise or varied in empirical referents, and therefore the difficulties in arriving at an acceptable definition. Consequently, as one scholar remarked, "there is no such thing as a theory of crisis or even theories of crisis." Nevertheless, Michael Brecher's definition will be considered as sufficiently comprehensive to be a starting point for the present study.

Crisis Diplomacy

Crisis diplomacy presents a challenge about whether to use force or negotiation, or a combination of the two. Crisis diplomacy relies upon some mix and sequencing of persuasion and bargaining, threats and bluffs, rewards and punishments, fear of or the use of force and chances of escalation and also positive offers and concessions with the purpose of affecting the opponent's utility calculations. In a crisis, parties' perception of the stakes is focused active elements of honour, prestige, reputation and resolve come into play. macy has an essentially signalling, bargaining, negotiating character and

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thus offers an opportunity to meet the problem of managing the inherent tension between the avoidance of war and the preservation of substantive interests.

**Crisis Management Studies**

Given the plethora of writings on the subject, following three dominant approaches to the study of crisis management can be discerned:

(i) Crisis management studies from the perspective of decision-making.\(^\text{10}\)

(ii) Crisis management studies from the perspective of coercive diplomacy.\(^\text{11}\)

(iii) Crisis management studies from the perspective of foreign policy objectives and achievements.\(^\text{12}\)


The context for most of these writings was provided by the periodic crises that characterised much of the post-second world war great-power relationship, namely Korea, Berlin, Suez and Cuba. Not surprisingly, the literature on crisis management exhibits (a) an obsessive concern with the problems of managing U.S.-Soviet crises so as to avoid an accidental nuclear war and (b) is replete with prescribing procedures for controlling and regulating a crisis. As a result, research has emphasised on such factors as the skill, know-how and judgement of the decision-maker, the role of bureaucratic politics and organisational pressures, information management, effect of stress and fatigue on decision-making, contingency planning, command and control, and so on. The end result of all such studies has been a systematic use of specific case histories to develop generic knowledge about conventions or principles of crisis management. These prescriptive studies list a number of political and operational requirements of crisis management as specific guidelines for the crisis-manager. While the political requirements for crisis management are limitation of objectives pursued in the crisis, and limitation of means employed on behalf of the objectives, operational requirements are identified as political control of military options; keeping channels of communication open; pauses in military operations; military

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actions coordinated with political-diplomatic action; clear, appropriate and cautious application of coercive diplomacy to protect one's vital interests; the avoidance of impression of resort to large-scale warfare; scope of an 'honourable retreat' for the opponent, so on and so forth.

**Diplomatic Management**

There is no denying the fact that the available literature has immensely contributed to the understanding of crisis and crisis management by providing theoretical insight and practical guidance. Nevertheless, the following points may be made as criticism:

a) Crisis management studies so far have been 'prescriptive' that basically fit into a two-actor model. They encounter difficulties when more than two actors are involved in a crisis.

b) The usual mode of analysis is that of the study of a single crisis rather than comparing two or several crises together.

c) Crisis management studies have largely ignored the study of regional crises. For instance, how salient (in the perception of decision-makers) are the tacit 'rules of prudence' that govern nuclear adversaries in the context of regional crises?
The available studies on crisis management emphasise that crises can be effectively managed by (a) adjusting foreign policy goals, (b) rational ordering of various bureaucratic and organisational structures, and (c) proper balance between military and diplomatic strategies. Such a perspective enlightens about policy-making in a crisis, but does not inform about the negotiation process by which the conflicting and common interests of the parties to a crisis are reconciled.

Crisis management studies are marked by an absence of negotiation analysis, and hence the need for an alternative approach. The alternative approach chosen here is that of diplomatic management. By diplomatic management is meant an emphasis on the systematic study of crisis management with special reference to negotiation - the chief instrumentality of diplomacy - analysis. In other words, the research focus is on the critical analysis of the structure, process and outcome of negotiations which contribute substantially to the management of crises. However much research is done into crisis, each new study is a learning process.

Against the backdrop of this approach, crisis is seen as a bargaining process and by 'negotiation' is meant the process of explicitly communicating to try to arrange a solution to the bargain. A bargaining situation is the overall picture of the
problem.\textsuperscript{14} Negotiation analysis will necessarily involve a critical study of proposals and counter-proposals of the parties concerned.

A well-known definition of negotiation is that it "is a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realisation of a common interest where conflicting interests are present."\textsuperscript{15} Henry Kissinger expresses the view that "negotiation is a process of combining conflicting positions into a common position, under a decision rule of unanimity, a phenomenon in which the outcome is determined by the process".\textsuperscript{16} Thus, international negotiations in their essence are an exchange of information about positions and demands of states or participants - that is, a process of comparing demands and of achieving compromise solutions through concession-making, for the benefit of all sides.

The study of negotiations has now become a subject of systematic inquiry drawing from such disciplines as economics, social psychology, organisational

\textsuperscript{14}Negotiation analysis does not ignore 'tacit bargaining' and 'the diplomacy of violence' as elements of the overall negotiation process; See Thomas Schelling, \textit{The Strategy of Conflict} (Cambridge, 1960).


behaviour, law and policy studies. As a result of this inter-disciplinary character, there are several approaches to negotiation analysis.

**Approaches to Negotiation Analysis**

The basic analytical question for all approaches to answer is: How are negotiated outcomes explained? There are broadly five contending approaches to the study of negotiations: (i) Structural Analysis (ii) Strategic Analysis (iii) Process Analysis (iv) Behavioural Analysis, and (v) Integrative Analysis. Each of these approaches will be briefly discussed.

(i) **Structural Analysis**

According to the structural analysis, the process and outcome of negotiations is explained in terms of the power configuration of the parties. The use of power in negotiation is reflected in the employment of rewards and punishment. This analysis can be termed the "realist" approach to negotiations.

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'Power' is seen as the determining factor even for the onset of negotiations. Arthur Lall argues that the more powerful actor vis-a-vis the smaller power even controls the option of whether or not to negotiate.\(^{19}\) According to William Zartman, "shifts in the power position of the parties toward balance (strengthening of the weaker, weakening of the stronger) create conditions favourable to negotiations."\(^{20}\) Such an analysis is amply reflected in arms control negotiations being successful in the context of nuclear parity.

However a question can be asked: How does one account for situations wherein a smaller power gets much of what it wants in negotiations with the stronger? The better performance by the weaker in situations of asymmetry needs to be explained. For instance, Israel in its dealings with the United States is able to exercise bargaining influence disproportionate to its 'objective' capabilities. Yet another example is the use of oil as a weapon by the Arab states in the early 1970's.

The structural analysis is inadequate as it excludes the important role of personalities, perceptions of stakes, values and interests involved and the consequent

\(^{19}\)Lall, n.18, p.136. "Power controls or contains the situation, and the stronger country has no drastic or compelling need to discuss the issue".

resolve or political will of various actors. \textsuperscript{21} Thus, the element of power in negotiations must be treated as relative and not absolute. The structural analysis is a \textit{post facto} analysis: it is simply the analyst's opinion about who "won" the negotiation after the fact.

W.M. Habeeb has contributed to the structural analysis by distinguishing two kinds of power: structural and behavioural. While structural power denotes the configuration of power balance between and among actors, by behavioural power is implied the negotiating "tactics" of the actors such as threats, warnings, walkouts, promises, predictions, coalition building, stalling, etc. "Tactics" are seen as means to persuade and pressurise the opponent to fulfil one's preferences and thus serving to restore structural equality of power. \textsuperscript{22} However, here too the element of power "is treated as a responsive, incidental and situational characteristic rather than as an element in a theory of conceptualisation of the negotiation process". \textsuperscript{23}

While the structural approach allows the analyst to compare the amount of

\textsuperscript{21} According to Charles Lockhart, the U.S. defeat in Vietnam reveals that "an asymmetry in the evaluation of stakes may offset an asymmetry in the national power of the participants in a struggle", cited in his book \textit{Bargaining in International Conflicts} (New York, 1979), p.93.


\textsuperscript{23} Zartman, n.17, p.244.
movement effected by each party, the 'effect' is not the same as 'cause'. The study of process is as important as the outcomes. Also, would it not be possible, to accept the logic of structural analysis, for the stronger side to achieve i outcomes unilaterally? If yes, that would imply the opposite of negotiati negotiation implies reciprocity.

(ii) Strategic Analysis

Strategic analysis explains the negotiations as a product of rational choices made by the parties. The assumption is that the parties to a negotiation invariably behave and act rationally and possess complete information of each other. "It focuses on the element of choice, as determined by the structure of the values at stake and also by the other party's pattern of selection... Skill and power are purposely abstracted from the analysis, and indeed the parties are considered to be interchangeable, each making the same choice in the same situation under the assumption of rationality. It is also assumed that values can be clearly, unchangingly, and quantitatively established and preferentially ordered."24 Rational choices entail making a substantive concession or a substantive attack on the other's interests, by changing the adversaries' expected payoffs or by choosing a less favourable non-cooperative outcomes than be tricked in search for cooperation. Such analysis is seen in the formulation of game theory models such as prisoner's dilemma and chicken

paradox, exemplified in the works of Anatol Rapoport, Thomas Schelling, Howard Raiffa and others.²⁵

Strategic analysis assumes values as fixed and situation as static. Negotiation, however, is a process of altering and modifying values. The second assumption that the parties possess complete information about each other is also flawed as negotiation is a communication encounter where the controlled exchange of partial information is the very essence of its decision-making process.²⁶

The strategic analysis does not take into consideration the role of personalities, cultural factors and other human imponderables. And moreover, the definition of rationality is itself relative. As the game-theoretical models have largely emanated in the context of rigid bipolar cold war period, they limit their area to mainly explaining the issue of nuclear deterrence and 'deadlock/stalemate' in arms control negotiations. The strategic approach treats negotiation as a confrontation between


two parties and a multi-actor model has not yet been successfully developed. Also, the analysis perceives the negotiation process as if there is only 'one' negotiation in a linear fashion. The reality is that several negotiations are taking place simultaneously which are linked in one way or the other. That bargaining occurs from one area to another is evident in the linkage between arms control and human rights in most nuclear negotiations.

The game-theoretical models find negotiation outcomes as zero-sum but this runs counter to the positive-sum nature of negotiation process. Zartman points out that when the rigorous assumptions of game theory are relaxed, strategic analysis shows that "the only way to break out of deadlock is ... to alter the payoff or perception of payoffs associated with non-negotiated or unilateral outcomes ...."27

(iii) Process Analysis

Process analysis explains negotiation outcomes in terms of the rate of concession-making by parties through interaction for building up trust and exchange of information. This analysis treats the interaction as an action-reaction encounter of responses to each other's concession-rate behaviour in which the cost-benefit calculations are inputs and negotiation becomes a learning or a trial-and-error exercise. The parties freeze the process at a mutually desirable outcome.

27Zartman, n.17, p.245.
The process analysis is useful in the sense that it throws valuable insight into the fact that negotiation is an incremental process and points to the possibility of studying even specific negotiating phases. A popular contribution of this approach has been Ottomar J. Bartos's concept of "end game" in negotiations: process characterised by a long holdout and then, in the final stages, rush to an agreement with high concession rates.28

The process model is deterministic with its emphasis on concessions leading to convergence logic. It describes what, when and how concessions are being made, but does not explain the reasons for such concession-making. The process model has been developed further by Zartman which shall be discussed later.

(iv) Behavioural Analysis

The behavioural analysis, drawn mainly from social psychology (besides diplomatic histories), emphasises the unique role of the skill, attitude and personality of the negotiators themselves in contributing to the negotiation process. The negotiators are seen as a product of their national and cultural setting possessing specific personality traits. A prominent example of the approach is found in Harold

Nicolson's warrior and shopkeeper type of negotiators. Some writers have pointed to the use of symbolic and non-verbal tools by leaders as an art of diplomatic signalling.  

Scholars have pointed out that different cultures attribute different meanings to the same word and such cognitive and cultural differences between parties have a bearing on international negotiations. The significance of cultural-comparative analyses of negotiations should, therefore, not be underestimated.

The behavioural analysis seeks to include the individual and situational factors in explaining the process of negotiation but an analyst points out that by analysing the agent rather than the process this theory focuses on the secondary rather than the primary.

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30 For instance, the word 'compromise' means mutual accommodation in the North American tradition but is seen as a 'defeat' by the Arab Community; See D.A.Summers and Others "Interpersonal conflict in Heterocultural Dyads", International Journal of Psychology, no.3, 1968, pp.191-96.

the primary elements of negotiation. Also, as there are no ideal personality types, one encounters difficulty in categorising personality traits.

(v) Integrative Analysis

The Integrative analysis, as advocated by Zartman, considers negotiation as a process of combining conflicting positions into a common outcome by joint-decision, allowing more specific focus of attention on how this is done, whether by power, by restructuring stakes and values, by patterns of movement, by interacting personality types, or by a series of steps. This approach, he says, permits many approaches to coexist and reinforce each other.

Based on a study in which diplomats with negotiation experience were questioned about their perception of the negotiation process and asked to take part in a number of mini-scenarios, Zartman and Berman present negotiation as a three-stage process: the diagnostic phase, the formula phase, and the implementation phase.\(^\text{32}\) By explaining the outcome in terms of the performance (of the negotiating parties) identified as specifically appropriate to each phase of the negotiation process, Zartman and Berman introduce a rigorous analytical tool. Zartman and Berman opine that a negotiation process has to meet certain procedural imperatives.

(diagnosis, formula, implementation) in order to arrive at mutually satisfactory outcomes.

In the ‘diagnostic’ phase, the parties use and generate information base to evaluate a negotiating problem. It is the phase in which each side explores the costs and benefits of a negotiated solution. The ‘diagnostic’ phase is analogous to the concept of ‘prenegotiation’. Prenegotiation is the phase in which parties can move from unilateral to joint strategies. During this process, parties can generate a great deal of useful information ("learning"), reduce their fear of risk and uncertainty about negotiations, and explore possibilities for joint problem-solving. Articulating overt and hidden conflict issues, agreeing on participants, agreeing on agendas, structuring discussions and even anticipating aspects of possible solutions constitute necessary prenegotiation efforts.33

In the formula phase, the task is to find an overarching principle or formula which will define the problem, since problems can be defined in many ways. This formula is to define an area of agreement and provide a conceptual referent from which the details of the agreement can be deduced. In this phase parties engage in bargaining and trade-offs to reach a consensual problem-definition and

33See the Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, vol.13, no.1, 1991. It is a special issue on the study of prenegotiation.
joint-solution. Two examples to illustrate this may be pointed out: the successful formula in the Cuban missile crisis was "no offensive weapons in exchange for no invasion" and exchanging "security for territory" was the overarching formula for trade-offs between Egypt and Israel.

The final phase is to apply this general principle (formula) to a particular detail from which an agreement between the parties can be constructed. In this phase, the parties send offers and demands, make concessions, arrange details and finally bring the negotiation to an end. This phase is closer to the process analysis view of negotiation discussed earlier.

Zartman and Berman also point out that the phases of negotiation are not to be considered as neat, clearly delineated and rigid. One phase may merge into the other and may go on throughout the entire course of the negotiations: such a warning note is a reminder of the fact that negotiations are embedded in a ‘context’ and the dynamics of the negotiation process are to be related to contextual changes.

The integrative approach is an improvement over the structural, strategic, process and behavioural analyses mainly because it avoids the deterministic and partial explanations in accounting for negotiated outcomes. This is evident in the due weightage given to the various factors that are inherent in a negotiation process; in
its focus on the search for joint gains and common interests; and explanatory power of the process whereby conflicting positions are translated into common agreement. The integrative approach thus offers a satisfactory tool for negotiation analysis.

The Role of Third Parties

Apart from negotiation, third-party intervention is yet another technique of peaceful crisis management. Crisis management studies reveal that third-party intervention is, more often than not, required to initiate negotiations or resolve deadlock in negotiations once begun. In this context, the role and significance of third parties is briefly discussed.

It is the considered opinion of many writers on the subject that the third-party intervenes between the structure of states' power and the process of inter-governmental negotiation and helps in bringing about a perception among the parties that the negotiated outcome is legitimate.34

34See Oran R.Young, Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises (Princeton, 1967); S.Bailey, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (New York: UNITAR, Study no.1, 1971);
Third party intervention (by individuals/representatives of states/international institutions) occurs when (a) a dispute is drawn out and complex (b) the adversaries’ own conflict management efforts have reached an impasse (c) neither side is prepared to countenance an escalation of the dispute, and (d) the adversaries are sufficiently cooperative and are prepared to break the stalemate by having some contact and communication. Third party intervention can be in the form of good offices, fact-finding, mediation and conciliation.  

It is not always simple to break a deadlock even when the parties are prepared to make concessions in order to move forward. They may accept that concessions are unavoidable but find it difficult to convey the readiness to compromise without losing face. It is at such a juncture that third party intervention proves highly useful.  

The third parties’ possession of resources - organisational, informational, financial - are an important source of their influence which is generally brought to bear upon as ‘leverage’ while dealing with tactical rigidities in negotiating positions. An external, impartial authority (that is, third parties) proves very useful when parties are deadlocked over contestable and unverifiable assertions.  

As to the limitations of any third-party role, all such interventions are based on the consent of the parties concerned and, any successful conclusion of third-party intervention is largely dependent on the political willingness of the parties themselves to effect an agreement. Nevertheless, third parties present a variety of techniques in crisis management which are flexible, informal and non-authoritative, and is appropriately called "the quiet approach".

**Analysis of Time Factor**

The rationale for the study of time-factor in negotiations is that time is increasingly used by the parties. While the various approaches to negotiation analysis attempt to grasp the onset, process and outcome of negotiations, they do not quite deal with time as a 'factor' in guiding the negotiation process. Real-life negotiations exhibit use of the time factor for the purpose of side-effects (that is, negotiation as a delaying tactic); to keep up the facade of negotiations and play to the domestic and international public opinion (i.e. propaganda); and proposing "deadlines" so as to display ones seriousness about negotiations and to put pressure on the other party to conclude an agreement. "Deadlines" are laid down by the political leaders themselves and this activates the negotiation process.
Also, scholars have expressed the view that successful negotiation outcomes are largely dependent on the time being "ripe" for such efforts. There is the analytical and empirical problem of defining the "ripeness" of a particular situation though it is taken to mean that the time is right for de-escalation (which does not entail the surrender of one party to its adversary, but which involves substantial degree of mutual concession and/or satisfaction). The relative nature of the concept of "ripeness" - what is right for one party may not be seen as such by the other - is to be emphasised. Some argue that de-escalation occurs when the relatively weaker party is approaching parity with the stronger.

In many situations, getting the parties to agree on negotiation is likely to prove more difficult and time-consuming than the actual process of negotiation itself. This is demonstrated in the concept of prenegotiation mentioned earlier.

The relation between time factor and outcomes is brought out by Frank Edmead when he claims that mediation is more likely to succeed if it is attempted at an early stage before the adversaries cross a threshold of violence and begin to

inflict heavy losses on each other. On the other hand, Northedge and Donelan insist that mediation can be effective only with the passage of time and certainly after each side has shown a willingness to moderate its intransigence and revise its expectations. In other words, passage of time allows ideas to mature and positions to mellow. But the very passage of time may well legitimise a status-quo.

This brief analysis reveals that there is more scope for studying the relationship between time factor and negotiation outcomes.

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38 F. S. Northedge and M. D. Donelan, *International Disputes: Political Aspects* (London, 1971); also see Raman, n.34, p.86, "...in some instances the passage of time may bring pressure on the parties to come to an agreement before their costs have mounted so high as to destroy benefits of settlement."