Chapter VI
MANAGING REGIONAL CRISES: AN ASSESSMENT

Ever since the occurrence of the Afghanistan and Kampuchean problems, the state and non-state actors, at regional and global levels, systematically evolved and adopted methods for the diplomatic management of the crises to prevent through two means: (a) by employing the diplomacy of propaganda, of military and economic aid, of overt and covert assistance to insurgent/resistance groups, and maintaining a strategy of low-intensity conflict, and (b) by initiating dialogue, chiefly through non-state actors, to explore the possibility of achieving their goals and objectives by the process of negotiation.

External powers were involved in these regional crises as they were called in to lend strength to the parties to the crisis or were involved themselves because of their own perceived interests in the parties or the outcomes. At issue in both the crises situations, were stakes of high political values such as legitimacy, territorial integrity, political independence, and regime stability or domestic political consolidation.

Afghanistan and Kampuchean crises are a product of intervention and insurgency. There has been a structural polarisation of parties along the following lines. For the sake of convenience, the governments of Soviet Union and Afghanistan can be referred to as pro-interventionist forces, Pakistan and the
United States as pro-insurgent forces in the Afghanistan crisis. Similarly, the
governments of Vietnam, People's Republic of Kampuchea and Soviet Union can
be seen as pro-interventionist, and Thailand, China and the United States as pro­
insurgent forces in the case of Kampuchea. Intervention in both cases has been
military in character, and the immediate response to the intervention-induced
crises has been in terms of a resort to propaganda and mobilisation of
international public opinion. While the primary objective of the pro-interventionist
forces has been to consolidate the regimes, the chief concern of the pro-insurgent
groups has been to weaken and, if possible, overthrow the regimes.

Due to these opposing strategies, the negotiation process was considerably
delayed. Diplomacy at the level of regional organisations such as the Organisation
of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) in the case of Afghanistan and Kampuchea respectively, is conspicuous
by an emphasis on propagandistic posturing to internationalise the issue and tc
put the opposite side on the defensive. This contributed to the rigid negotiating
strategies and an emphasis on military and coercive dimensions of diplomacy. The
issue of legitimacy and recognition which was placed high on the agenda was
central to both the Afghanistan and Kampuchean problems. In the perception of
the pro-insurgent forces (and the insurgent groups themselves), negotiations with
the regime in question were ruled out as that could imply recognition and granting
of legitimacy itself seen as a concession and this made difficult any possibility of mutually productive bargaining in the early stages. Given Pakistan’s refusal to participate in direct talks with Afghanistan, a negotiating position maintained throughout the period of the crisis (1979-1988), and similarly the absence of direct talks between the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and the Kampuchean Resistance (i.e. the Democratic Kampuchea/Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea), the task of getting the parties together to consider the benefit of accruing from dialogue and negotiation (as against the costs of a low-intensity conflict and protracted guerilla warfare) was stupendous.

The question of seat in the United Nations can also define the range of the problem. In the case of Afghanistan, self-determination issue did not take much shape as Afghanistan government remained seated in the UN. Whereas in the Kampuchean problem, the issue was very complex. The seating of Democratic Kampuchea instead of People’s Republic of Kampuchea not only kept away Vietnam, for long time, from accepting the UN role but also resulted in the issue of self-determination receiving international attention. Thus the issue of withdrawal merged with that of self-determination. The shuttle diplomacy of the UN Secretary-General’s personal representative Diego Cordovez led to the acceptance and initiation of indirect talks. The Soviet Union was willing to accept UN as a third-party intervener as long as such a multilateral negotiating forum
treated the Kabul regime as the sole interlocutor and thus denying any recognition to the Afghan Resistance. According to the innovative procedure of UN sponsored indirect talks, the UN mediator Diego Cordovez held separate, confidential meetings with the two delegations (Pakistan and Afghanistan) led by their respective foreign ministers at Geneva, conferring with one in the morning and the other in the afternoon. To meet the persistent demand of Afghanistan for direct talks, the technique of indirect talks was modified to that of 'proximity talks'. In practical terms, it meant that the two delegations will sit in separate rooms at the same time with Cordovez shuttling between them instead of holding alternate meetings at different times. The strength of the procedural technique lay in getting the parties to the negotiating table, but the problems encountered in the same explain the long pre-negotiation process. Given the context in which technique of indirect/proximity talks were evolved, it meant that indirect talks were better than no talks. At the same time, the indirect talks were not as good as direct talks. It is possible to conjecture that the direct talks would have made the easy and non-coercive flow of information possible to influence both the parties, and also reduce the time spent by the mediator in shuttle diplomacy and communicating proposals to the parties directly concerned and as well as the interested external parties such as Iran, Soviet Union and (sometimes) the United States.
Having the manager intervene, structuring the problem, as a number of issues - foreign troop withdrawal; non-interference; international guarantees; voluntary return of the refugees; elections; national reconciliation; neutrality; cessation of external aid, and interim administration - were to be negotiated with each party declaring a different set of mediators. The Secretary achieved a negotiated agreement facilitated by the Hun S talks (JIM) in 1985. The Vietnamese Kampuchean or Cambodian mediation role was crucial. In the resistance for
priorities in both the Afghan and Kampuchean cases. It is in this context that the procedural technique of integration of negotiations on the various issues was suggested by the UN Secretary General to arrive at a comprehensive settlement of the Kampuchean problem. The idea of integration of negotiations has some very important implications: concession-making/compromise in one issue area perceived as one of primary interest by one of the parties to the conflict is dependent on concession-making/compromise in yet another issue-area held as primary interest by the other side. This is similar to the technique of 'package deal' evolved by Diego Cordovez in the case of Afghanistan. Package technique envisages a pooling together of issues (withdrawal, non-interference, international guarantees, and voluntary return of refugees, all of which were the four-part agenda) in such a manner that the acceptance of one is conditional on the fulfilment of the entire package. The choice of such a procedural technique envisaged a negotiation process where movement towards an agreement is based on concessions spread over wide range of issues and involving two or more actors.

While the Afghan problem was a two-party crisis situation, the Kampuchean case was different. The three resistance groups which formed a coalition (CGDK) to strengthen their bargaining power and their alignments with both regional and big powers, in opposition to the PRK, Vietnam and Soviet Union on the other, created a multi-actor crisis situation in the Kampuchean case. The adoption of
conference diplomacy in the case of Kampuchea was in sharp contrast to the ‘indirect proximity talks’ at Geneva on the Afghan problem. Conference diplomacy or multilateral negotiation to settle the crisis was beneficial for the following reasons: (a) it made possible the participation of many parties representing the local, regional and global powers; (b) the conference techniques provided access to a negotiating forum to work more comfortably with PRK, Vietnam and Soviet Union as the CGDK and other regional actors refused any bilateral negotiations due to the legitimacy and recognition issue; and (c) it facilitated the mechanics of coordinating negotiating positions of parties directly involved and the other interested parties on both procedural and substantive issues, i.e., joint-problem solving.

Multilateral negotiation served the fundamental purpose of building and bringing together a consensus for agreement as it ensured free communication, discussion of trade-offs, full-fledged bargaining and making of substantial concessions. The consensus so evolved represented a collective stand that could help legitimise a concept or condemn it: the success in bringing the parties to agree on such issues as the non-return to the genocidal past and respect for human rights; neutrality of Kampuchea; interim administration by the Supreme National Council with an unprecedented UN role is a case in point. In sum, the techniques such as shuttle diplomacy, proximity talks, cocktail diplomacy, package deal,
integration of negotiations, conferencing were appropriate to tackle multiple issues simultaneously and arrive at a comprehensive settlement to the satisfaction of all parties in both the Afghanistan and Kampuchean crises.

As the Afghanistan and Kampuchean negotiations involved many issues or highly inter-related issues, the process of first developing a formula or a principle and then moving on to the details became important. At the same time, strategy of co-ordinating force (military dimension) and diplomacy in order to avoid the tension between a possible escalation and military defeat by both the pro-insurgent and the pro-interventionist forces created a situation of stalemate. When an exchange of concessions does not take place (i.e. resulting in stalemate/deadlock), the development of common perceptions becomes more important to the negotiation process. Such an exercise would normally require some formula for standardising the approach of different parties. An analogous procedure is the use of negotiating formula for the creation of bargaining language to assist the negotiators to exchange proposals.

A bargaining language essentially consists of cognitive structures or a collection of task-oriented symbols that facilitate exchanges. Such a language can serve as a mechanism for simplifying the information that negotiators must handle in the course of moving towards an agreement. Gorbachev’s diplomacy to settle
regional crises was based on the recognition of the need for withdrawal and national reconciliation. Withdrawal and national reconciliation were the task oriented symbols crucial to Gorbachev’s bargaining language. This had a direct bearing on the Afghan issue and an indirect one on the Kampuchean crises. See against the earlier Soviet (and Vietnamese) stand on the ‘irreversibility’ of the situation in Afghanistan and Kampuchea and a reliance on diplomatic and military tactics to deny any role to the Resistance groups, the decision to withdraw troops and accept national reconciliation, i.e. power-sharing with the resistance clearly stand out as the ultimate language of compromise.

The evolution of the various formulae points to the ranking of priorities creation of hierarchies in relation to the negotiation process. When a crisis situation is considered to be a zero-sum game with each party trying to impose a unilateral solution to the problem (i.e. military victory and defeat of the other side), the diplomatic management of crises is performed by a search for a formula capable of enticing the parties away from competing attempts at imposing a unilateral solution to that of finding a bilateral or multilateral solution to the problem. This generates major trade-offs: trade-offs being the structure around which agreements are built. Gorbachevian diplomacy was based on a powerful bargaining language that had the significant effect of loosening up of the earlier
negotiating positions and added the much needed flexibility and willingness to make concessions on both sides.

Intrinsic to Gorbachev's bargaining language is the employment of the tactic of 'dead lines'. The deadline represents (or is supposed to represent) the 'chance': it is the final determiner of success or failure. The tactic of 'deadlines' employed by both the pro-interventionist forces - Soviet Union and Vietnam - it played an important role in negotiating the Geneva and Paris Accords. Although the deadlines of 15 March 1988 and 30 September 1989 in the case of Afghanistan and Kampuchea respectively were not adhered to, the practice of setting deadlines has had its own advantages: as negotiating position, it meant that interventionist power was setting its own terms for withdrawal and as a tactic it was used to extract maximum concessions from the other side. The unilateral decision to set deadlines may appear as a simplistic formula severely designed to pressurise the other side by manipulations of public opinion and may even be dismissed as propagandistic posturing. Imposition of deadlines have the effect of building up pressures on the other side; of limiting the time factor in negotiations (otherwise the talking or negotiations for side-effects such as propaganda: public opinion may never end); of galvanising the bureaucracies into action so that the decision to compromise has been made at the highest political levels increasing pressure for an agreement and correspondingly an increasing awareness
of the political values (professional and personal investment of diplomats and political leadership) that will be lost if the negotiations fails. In one sense, the function of negotiation is to arrive at an agreement: the adoption of the negotiating tactic of deadlines has the virtue of giving a shape and immediacy to the negotiations. It also provided a way to defer unacceptable and/or time-consuming issues (such as national reconciliation in the case of Afghanistan) and effect an agreement at the earliest. The bargaining language of Gorbachev (which also contributed to the end of cold war and the subsequent de-ideologisation of international relations) provided a sense of moderation in international communication and allowed effective diplomatic management of the regional crises.

The leverage exercised by various parties to the crises to a large extent influenced the course of it management. In the Afghanistan problem, Pakistan gained its bargaining power mainly by supporting and attempting to unite the rebel groups in order to increase the economic and military costs of the foreign troops. To Pakistan, the support of USA and China etc., was further important to face a powerful adversary, i.e., Soviet Union in the neighbourhood. The polarisation of great powers provided an opportunity for Pakistan to negotiate from a position which is evident in its firm stand on the issue of direct talks, national reconciliation, short-time frame for withdrawal etc. Its leverage weakened or was adversely affected when Soviet Union bridged gap with USA, and when USA was
prepared to apply pressure on Pakistan to review its priorities. Similarly in the case of Kampuchea, Vietnam's negotiating position altered with Soviet Union's decision to normalise relations with China and ASEAN, and Moscow's new relationship with Washington.

The linkage formula is a principle normally proposed by each party to the crisis as the most acceptable for resolving the matter. This reflects the goals and objectives that the parties try to achieve by way of making a range of concessions in return for similar responses from the other side. In the case of Afghanistan, both sides tried to link various issues in their formulae: Yes to withdrawal, but only after guarantees of non-interference; No direct talks, no withdrawal; short-term vs long-term time frame for withdrawal; withdrawal after internal political settlement, but no change of the existing regime, etc. In the Kampuchean case also, the formulae had linkages: withdrawal and elections in exchange for elimination of Khmer Rouge; withdrawal for cessation of foreign interference; installation of four-party interim government to precede guarantees of non-interference, etc. Such linkage formulae either add to the rigidity of positions or provide certain breakthroughs in overcoming the stalemate.

The Soviet and Vietnamese decisions to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan and Kampuchea have been interpreted in the available literature as
a defeat and as a product of negotiating from a position of weakness given the vast human economic, military and diplomatic costs incurred as evident in the two interventionist countries’ domestic economic crises. It is argued here that neither Moscow nor Hanoi retreated to a position of weakness. Both Gorbachev and Hô Chi Minh signalled a desire to change course, but in direction of compromise. This is not the same as a surrender or defeat. Their diplomacy was aimed at changing the nature of leverage and yet to sustain and promote Soviet and Vietnamese leverage, and not abandon it. Moscow responded to American escalation of arms supply to rebels after 1986 with arms deliveries and economic assistance to the Kabul regime. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that arms deliveries to Kabul even under Gorbachev between 1986 and 1989 show a 262 percent increase. In 1988 the Soviets refused to accept the American proposal for a mutual cut off in the Soviet delivery of arms to the Kabul governments and the American provision of arms to the Afghan Resistance. Also Moscow did not accept electoral procedures (unlike Vietnam in Kampuchea) that could dislodge its partner in Kabul. In other words, Gorbachev would withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan but hold the line in terms of political support to the Kabul regime. Moscow also chose not to negotiate with the regional actors which dismissed the Kabul regime as illegitimate; it on the other hand exercised the option of encouraging indirect talks under UN auspices. The acceptance of a UN role reflected Moscow’s realism in going for a low-risk (high-gain) option. The UN option offset international criticism and
sidelined the Afghan Resistance. Similarly, when the progress on the policy of national reconciliation was slow and thus retarding the process of negotiations, the Soviet Union dropped the linkage between withdrawal and national reconciliation and set an unilateral deadline to arrive at an agreement. Thus while Moscow was renouncing one of the instruments of leverage (i.e. the military instrument), it was nevertheless retaining the ability to affect the bargaining setting with other negotiating levers such as friendly government in Kabul and international guarantees on non-interference and non-intervention.

In the case of Kampuchea, Vietnam withdrew its forces nearly two years prior to a subsequent comprehensive settlement of the crisis. But Hanoi's interests were later taken care of in diplomatic coordination, with the Soviet Union and the PRK in the conferences at Paris, as Vietnam successfully linked the international aspect of the Kampuchean problem (presence of Vietnamese troops and their withdrawal) to the internal aspect (namely the non-return to power of Khmer Rouge, non-interference in internal affairs of Kampuchea, interim administration and UN supervised elections). Thus in both the crises situations withdrawal/disengagement reflected a search for compromise and not defeat.

Another misconception running in much of the literature is that the management of the regional crises such as Afghanistan and Kampuchean problems
is a function of the cold war and superpower détente. It is considered that as the regional crises are a product of superpower rivalry and cold war, they can be managed and resolved only in conditions of détente: if superpowers achieve consensus, the regional crises stand resolved fully just as they desire and immediately. This is not true. Even though the US-Soviet relations improved since 1985, Afghanistan and Kampuchean problems were resolved only in 1988 and 1991 respectively. While détente may contribute to smooth management of crises, it is not a necessary condition for the same. Similarly the origins of the crises need not be linked to the context of cold war alone. The phenomena of crises is endemic to the international system. It is the clash of interests irrespective of the time and nature of international system (cold war versus détente) that needs to be emphasised. As the regional crises do possess extra-regional (or global) linkages, big power cooperation is likely to influence the process of negotiating the regional crises. But in the course of time and by virtue of the very same extra-regional linkages, the local actors or parties to the conflict acquire sufficient strength and autonomy to bargain and protect their interests. For instance, the Kabul, Vietnam and Phnom Penh governments exhibited a resilience on the issue of power-sharing. The task of diplomatic management in such a situation is reduced to coordinating big power-middle power or big-power-small power or medium power-small power diplomacy. The notion of treating regional and local actors as mere proxies (proxy by negotiation or proxy by war) and characterising the crisis
situation in terms of patron-client relationship, therefore, needs to be questioned. However, the point that needs to be emphasised is that big power understanding as evidenced in the yearly US-Soviet summits since 1985, Sino-Soviet summit and the permanent five consensus at the UN Security Council did contribute positively to influence the process of negotiation but the solutions to the problem have been normally formulated and accepted by the regional or local parties themselves in terms of local conditions. The polarised actors thus take time to adjust to the new changes in the great power relations affecting their corresponding leverages in the crises.

As to the time factor that led to the prolonged nature of the crises and diplomatic management in arriving at the Geneva Accords (April 1988) on the settlement of the Afghanistan problem and the Paris Accords (October 1991) on the settlement of the Kampuchean crises extending the bargaining for nearly a decade, it is stated that the long pre-negotiation process was characterised by 'positional bargaining', i.e. less of communication and more of grandstanding for the benefit of third parties and side-effects. The emphasis on the military dimension of diplomacy ensured that the crisis would complete their life cycle including intensification, escalation, stalemate, turning points and de-escalation. The search for formulae contributed to the endgame in negotiations and the negotiating tactic of deadlines further accentuated the process of negotiations.
A TYPOLOGY OF DIPLOMATIC MANAGEMENT OF REGIONAL CRISIS

In view of the above findings in the present research work, a typology of diplomatic management of regional crises can be developed on three themes: (a) important variables operating at the substantive level (b) variables required at the procedural level and (c) possible outcomes. At a substantive level, four variables have been identified which influence the diplomatic management of regional crises where global powers are involved directly or indirectly: legitimacy and linkage, leverage and language. The pace and nature of such management is determined by a permutation and combination of these factors. Further, the management of the crises through the instrumentality of negotiations can take place mainly when there is a compromise on the issue of legitimacy and linkage, and also where there are changes in the levels of leverage and language. It is however not possible to predict the timing or the ripeness of the moment for settlement.

The movement of the diplomatic process is initially slow and/or static in view of the unfavourable orientation of the four variables. Table I indicates the behaviour of the variables in the process of diplomatic management. In the entire process, the compromises on legitimacy issue and changes in leverage are generally very slow, and the compromises on the linkage formula and changes in language effect are relatively better. However, their rigidity is put to test when the negotiation process is set in motion owing to international pressure.
Table I: Four L's and Diplomatic Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Compromises</th>
<th>Changes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Slow</td>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Leverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slow</td>
<td>Linkage</td>
<td>Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formula</td>
<td>Effect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The variables at the procedural level include: shuttle diplomacy, indirect talks, proximity talks, conference diplomacy, cocktail diplomacy, defining a package agenda, and ordering of the agenda items etc. Table II depicts the suitability of various negotiation techniques when legitimacy is in question. When legitimacy is in question, the parties can be brought to the negotiating table by proposing indirect or proximity talks in the case of two-actor crisis. In the multi-actor crisis, the cocktail and conference diplomacy are very appropriate. They not only help in initiating a dialogue for diplomatic management but sustain the negotiation process until a final comprehensive settlement is arrived at.
Table II: Negotiation Techniques When Legitimacy is in Question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Two-actor crisis</th>
<th>Multi-actor crisis</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>Informal/Cocktail diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity</td>
<td>Conference diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talks</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In other words, certain procedural techniques combined with personality skills of third-party mediators have the effect of exerting pressure on the negotiation process. Such a pressure can result in manipulation of the unfavourably oriented factors of legitimacy and linkage even when the nature of leverage and language aspects remain static. Though the process will appear to have started, the compromises are not possible. There are certain definite limits to the activity of non-state actors like the United Nations. Unless the state actors, namely the regional and global powers attempt to influence the negotiation process by making changes in the leverage and language aspects, the process does not pick up momentum. As negotiations are finally the product of the sovereign will of the nation-states, non-state actors can only exert pressure on the process of negotiations and contribute to the durability or stability of the negotiated outcomes.
(Accords, agreements or treaties). While changes in the leverage and language aspects/factors may or may not result in a compromise on the legitimacy issue, the compromises on linkage formula provides a new orientation which leads to an agreement. What in the ultimate analysis creates conditions for breaking the deadlock is changes in leverage medium which unfolds the linkage impasse. This explanation is amply evident in the case of Afghanistan and Kampucheian problems.

As to the identifying of final outcome of any crisis its nature cannot be predicted, but it does not necessarily result in the status quo ante. Certain possibilities are listed in Tables III & IV.
Table III: Probable Outcomes of Regional Crises when Global Power is Involved Directly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A small power supported by a global power's military intervention directly</th>
<th>Withdrawal</th>
<th>National Reconciliation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>A. Withdrawal only after securing guarantees on non-interference.</strong></td>
<td><strong>A. Such a demand is not acceptable.</strong></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(TOTAL GAIN)</td>
<td>(NO LOSS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>B. Withdrawal without securing guarantees, but after the regime consolidation and weakening of Resistance.</strong></td>
<td><strong>B. Even if acceptable, prepared for changes in the composition of the government but not a change in leadership or the predominance of the government</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(NO LOSS)</td>
<td>(NO LOSS)</td>
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</table>
Table IV: Probable Outcomes of Regional Crises When Global Power is Involved Indirectly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Withdrawal</th>
<th>National Reconciliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Withdrawal before obtaining guarantees, due to costs of engagement, but only after regime consolidation and weakening of the Resistance (NO LOSS)</td>
<td>A. UN-supervised elections for a neutral country; (primary inter-ests are thus secured) (NO GAIN, NO LOSS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Interim/coalition govt. (PARTIAL LOSS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Govt. to be replaced by the previous regime. (TOTAL LOSS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since military interventions occur to achieve specific objectives and that the withdrawal is a certainty, the actors to the crises try to bargain for certain guarantees in exchange for withdrawal. (In the mean time all out efforts are made by all parties militarily to deny total victory to the opponents). A decision to accept a change in government will also involve bargaining for certain guarantees in exchange for abnegation of some power. In the case of a regional crisis where a small power is supported by a global power's military intervention directly, the withdrawal is most likely to take place only when it succeeds in securing its primary interests by way of international guarantees on non-interference. If this is not possible, then the withdrawal may commence once the regime's position is consolidated and the resistance weakened. As to the demand for national reconciliation, it is unacceptable and therefore is ignored. However even if it declares its desire for compromise on the matter, it will insist that the change in the composition of the government is subject to retention of predominance of the existing regime.

Where a small power is supported by a middle power's military intervention directly but a global power supports indirectly, the withdrawal may be effected even before obtaining guarantees, mainly due to costs of engagement, but this takes place only after the consolidation of the regime and weakening of the Resistance. As regards the question of change in the government, there are three
possibilities in the following order of importance (a) abnegation of power in exchange for UN supervised elections for a neutral country (b) accept coalition government and (c) may reckon with replacement of present regime by its predecessor.

Such a typology vindicates the view that the two components —— power and tactics —— are the prime factors in the diplomatic management of crises. Power and tactics reinforce each other: while the components of power is reflected in the legitimacy issue and leverage factor, the linkage formula and the bargaining language is expressed through various tactics. The power measured in terms of ability to give rewards and inflict punishment, militarily and politically, is a strong instrument of global powers directed towards its equals or the weaker powers. The small powers as evident in the role of Pakistan and Kampuchea, compensate the deficiency in power with the use of tactics, employing timely and popular methods of bargaining. This is not to say that global powers do not employ tactics. The methods of Gorbachev’s diplomacy against a relatively stronger power, United States, had far reaching consequences. The gross asymmetry of power between Soviet Union and OIC, or the Vietnam and ASEAN countries, the ability of Soviet Union to dictate the agenda for negotiations are some of the examples which amply prove that the structural analysis of negotiations is quite appropriate to explain the phenomenon of diplomatic management. Similarly the changes occurring in the
negotiating behaviour even when there is no alteration in the power configuration of the parties point out to the importance of process of negotiation which influences the behaviour of the parties to the conflict. The study of pre-negotiation process and the analysis of diagnostic, formula and implementation phases validates the process analysis of negotiations. The personality styles of leaders like Sihanouk, diplomats like Cordovez having a bearing on the events also validates the behavioural approach of negotiations. These various approaches throw light on the multiple variables at work in the process of negotiation and diplomacy facilitating proper appreciation of the dynamics of the great power politics and the diplomatic management of regional crises. Thus the integrative analysis of negotiation which combines various approaches emerges to be the successful tool of research in the study of regional crises.