Chapter - I

INTRODUCTION
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I noticed in the morning news summary before I left Washington that the President of the Philippines, Mr. Marcos is reviewing the Philippine relationship with the US I think these potential developments to some extent, tend to validate the so-called domino theory, and if we have one country after another, allies of the US losing faith in our word, losing faith in our governments with them, yes, I think the first one to go could vitally affect the national security of the United States.¹

President Gerald Ford, the supreme head of United States of America, made the above statement while answering a question relating to the US national security in Southeast Asia and the survival of a non-communist government in Cambodia in the aftermath of the Vietnam war. After a careful reading of the statement it can be inferred that the US national security has been very much involved in the Southeast Asia which became vulnerable to communism after its defeat in the Vietnam war. It is also clear that the declared intention of reassessing the whole US-Philippines relationships by the Filipino government made the United States very apprehensive about the repercussion of its defeat in the Vietnam war. Thus, the repercussion rather than its

defeat itself made the American President more apprehensive about the validity of the domino theory. But why the Philippines was so important to the United States in the subsequent years after the Vietnam war, is the most important question which need careful analysis.

**IMPORTANCE OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR THE UNITED STATES**

**THE COLONIAL PAST**

The Philippines is the manifestation of divine beauty. It has been called "the pearl of the orient". It was not only its scenic beauty that had attracted the attention of the world but also its location in the world map. It is situated at the apex of the world's greatest archipelago in the Pacific ocean which is highly valued for its potential commerce that is larger than the Atlantic. It extends about 1,770 kms., North to South along the Southeastern rim of Asia, forming a land-chain between the Pacific Ocean on the East and the South China Sea on the West. It is separated from Indonesia and Malaysia on the South and from Taiwan on the North by straits, Vietnam and China are separated on the West by the 966 kms., breadth of South China Sea. The archipelago consists of some 7,100 islands and islets, in which Luzon is the largest island.
As an integral part of the Southeast Asia, it has become more important in the eyes of world's powerful nations. Southeast Asia, enriched by vast mineral potential, lush tropical wealth and vast population was the natural focus of the economic and strategic interests.

Economically, the region is a major source of natural rubber, oil, palm oil, tin, sugar, tea and timber. It is the fifth largest trading partner of the United States. It also serves as a major market for American exports and investment.

There are a series of narrow straits which attract the rival powers as these could be used to monitor the ships moving between the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. There are a few channels through the Indonesian archipelago like Sunda Strait, Lombak Strait, Ombai water strait and most important of all the straits of Malacca which are well suited for the safe passage of submerged submarines. The straits of Malacca is important because the number of ships pass through it double the number of ships that pass through Suez and Panama canals combined.

Thus, lying on a vital zone in the Pacific, the Philippines experienced the jarring interventions by Spain, America and Japan. Describing the interventions
as the sorrow of the Philippines, a Filipino historian Renato Constantino wrote:

The Filipino people have had the misfortune of being 'liberated' four times during their entire history. First came the Spaniards who 'liberated' them from the 'enslavement of the devil', next, came the Americans who 'liberated' them from Spanish oppression, then the Japanese who 'liberated' them from American 'Imperialism', then the Americans again who 'liberated' them from the Japanese fascists.²

**AMERICA TAKES OVER PHILIPPINES**

Philippines was under Spanish rule for three-hundred and seventy-seven years since 1521. But after the Spanish-American war, it came under American colonial administration as Spain ceded the islands to the United States under the terms of the 'Treaty of Paris' on 10 December 1898.

The President of the United States William McKinley proclaimed that his country did not come as invader or conqueror, but as a protector of the Philippines. But it was strange on the part of the United States that neither its President bothered to ask whether Filipinos were in need of his country's protection nor did he explain against whom the protection was being provided.

Enraged by the US decision of not conceding independence to the Philippines, a war of insurrection against the United States, led by revolutionary President Emilio Aguinaldo, broke out in 1899. The hostilities were referred to by many Filipinos as the "Philippine-American war (1899-1902)." But Aguinaldo was captured on 23 March 1901, by Colonel Frederick Funston. On 1 April, he took the oath of allegiance to the United States. On 19 April he issued a manifesto to the people calling upon them to stop fighting and accept American rule.

The administration of the Philippines by the United States was declared to be temporary with its goal to develop the institutions that would permit and encourage the establishment of democratic government. In 1907, the first legislative assembly was elected. The Filipino autonomy was extended by passing the Jones Act in 1916. A bi-cameral legislature by and large, under the Philippine control, was established. In 1935, under the terms of Tydings - McDuffie Act, the Philippines became a self-governing commonwealth. Manuel Quezon was elected President of the new government, which aimed at preparing the country for independence after a 10-year transition period.
WORLD WAR II : THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

In 1942, the Second World War intervened the US rule in the Philippines when Corregidor, the last American stronghold was captured by the Japanese. US forces in the Philippines surrendered to the Japanese. In order to win over the Filipinos, the Japanese granted independence and a constitution. The United States could understand the Japanese tactics of granting independence which had been the most cherished desire of the Philippines.

Therefore, to neutralise the Japanese strategy of winning the Filipinos to their side, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed a resolution setting a date for granting independence to the Philippines. Thus, Filipinos and Americans fought the war together until the Japanese surrendered in September 1945. On 4 July 1946, the Philippine Islands became the independent Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the terms of the Tydings-MacDuffie Act.

THE BACKDROP OF THE US INTERVENTIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

The United States had intervened in the Philippines twice, first, during the US-Spanish war and then the US-Japanese war. The interventions were termed as
"colonisation by Improvisation".\textsuperscript{3} The pre-independence relationships between US and the Philippines termed as colonial relationships. The United States intervened in the Philippines as an imperialistic power like Great Britain, France, Spain and Dutch.

The impulse to share the ample trade opportunities in the richly populous developing countries of Southeast Asia and to secure certain strategic raw materials, the Philippines was brought under the United States. As a rising power, to guard its economic interest, the United States wished to acquire the Philippines as a base in the Southeast Asian region to feed its growing industries. Thus, the motive of 'economic gain' was very much in the mind of the United States when it chose to intervene in the Philippines. But American imperialism in the Philippines was not so exploitative as the European imperialism. It was rather mild and benevolent for the Philippines.\textsuperscript{4}


\textsuperscript{4}For a detailed history of US-Philippine relationship in the pre-independence period see, Theodore Villamore Cortes, \textit{Interaction Patterns in a Big Power-Small Power relationship: The United States, Philippines Experience (1946-78)} (Ann Arbor: University of Microfilms Int., 1972); Louis J. Halle, \textit{United States Acquires the Philippines: Consensus vs. Reality} (Lanham, (continued...)}
Since the defeat of Spain in 1898, the United States has been playing a dominant role in the Philippines. The Philippine Rehabilitation Act and the Philippine Trade Act of 30 April 1946, were the two burning examples of the US domination of the Philippines. The war ravaged economy of the Philippines provided the United States a golden opportunity to exploit the vulnerable condition as the Philippines was looking forward to US assistance to consolidate its economy.

The Philippine Rehabilitation Act provided for $620,000,000 worth of assistance for damaged public and private property during the Second World War. But the promise of US assistance was tied with the approval of the Philippine Trade Act on the part of the Philippines with all its pre-conditions. Section 601 (of the Rehabilitation Act) enumerated the condition as under:

No payment under title I of the Act in excess of $500.00 shall be made until an executive agreement shall have been entered into, between the President of the United States and the President of the Philippines, and such agreement shall have become effective according to its terms, providing for trade

4(...continued)
relations between the United States and the Philippines... 5

The Philippine Trade Act was signed by President Harry S. Truman, which provided for free trade between the two countries for a period of eight years until 4 July 1954. It included many controversial provisions which enabled the United States to exercise pressure on the Philippines.

While it prescribed quotas on several Philippine exports along with a provision that if the goods were exceeded the prescribed quotas, full duty would be charged on the excess. On the other hand, American goods exported to the Philippines were exempted from the quota system. Following Philippine products were subjected to the quotas with the indicated amounts. 6

1. Sugar .. 850,000 long tons
2. Cordage .. 6,000,000 pounds
3. Rice .. 1,040,000 pounds
4. Cigars .. 200,000,000 items
5. Scrap tobacco .. 6,500,000 pounds
6. Coconut oil .. 200,000 long tons
7. Pearl and shell buttons .. 800,000 gross


6 Ibid., p.6.
Section 504 protected the American producers by authorizing the President to make additional restrictions on Philippine exports that would compete with articles produced by the United States. So, the Philippine manufacturers were indirectly debarred from producing goods which were likely to compete with American products.

Section 342 set the rule that the Philippines could not devalue or revalue the Peso without the permission of the President of the United States. The most objectionable provision was enumerated in Section 341 under 'Parity clause' which read as follows:

**Section 341. Rights of the United States Citizens and Business Enterprises in Natural Resources.**

The disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business-enterprises owned or controlled, directly or indirectly by United States citizens. 7

Carlos Romulo, the Resident Commissioner in Washington was compelled to accept the Free Trade Act with its objectionable clauses as the Philippines was in a great need of US assistance to repair the war damaged

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7Ibid., p.7.
economy. So he supported the passage of legislation by saying, "since if we can not have perfection then let us have action".\textsuperscript{8}

Prior to the passing of the Trade Act, 72-9 per cent of all Philippine trade was with the United States but within the prescribed period of Free Trade Act (1946-1955), the trade of the Philippines with the US was 71.4 per cent resulting in a Philippine balance-of-trade deficit of almost $1.5 billion.\textsuperscript{9}

Though the United States granted independence to the Philippines on 4 July 1946, by ending its imperialistic rule, it was in need of the Philippines to perpetuate its hold in the region as a 'Pacific Power'. They were fascinated by the prospect of trade with Imperial China. It had offered a prospect of world's largest single market. To gain the vast marketing opportunity, the United States would have to become a major sea power. So it wanted the Philippine Islands to construct major bases. The 'Military Base Agreement' (MBA), was signed on 14 March 1947 by President Manuel Roxas and President Harry S. Truman. It was to remain valid for ninety-nine years. President Roxas after

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., p.8.

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid.
signing the agreement declared that on every major matter, the essential interests of the United States and the Philippines were identical. In the agreement both the parties agreed for the fullest and closest military co-operation and integration of their military plans for mutual protection. The bases, namely the Clark Air Field and Subic Naval Base were understood to remain under full authority and control of the United States military forces with free access for US ships, air craft and personnel.

In the subsequent years, Philippines became increasingly more important to the United States. Its bases served as logistics adjuncts during the Korean conflict in the early 1950s, when the US fought against the invading North Korean forces by supporting South Korea. After the Chinese forces crossed the Yalu, the Korean war was enlarged.

While the bases in the Philippines were meeting the strategic interests of the United States in the region, the changing international scenario in the subsequent years turned them into the apple of its eyes. The fateful event was, the Vietnam war - the catalyst of changes in the US foreign policy that ended on 30 April 1975.
US INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIETNAM WAR

The 'Domino Theory' played a vital role in the background to stimulate the United States to take a direct plunge in the Vietnam war. The Encyclopedia of Contemporary International Affairs defined it thus:

Domino is a loose cloak with wide sleeves hood and mask, worn at masquerades or a small oblong piece of wood etc., marked with dots. It also implies the game played with such pieces. From this, they built up the doctrine that a certain result (domino effect) will follow a certain cause like a row of upright dominoes falling if only one is pushed. The American crusaders against communism then built up the theory that if a nation becomes communist, the nations nearby will also become communist.10

The 'Domino Theory' was first expounded by US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles in 1954 in the context of preparations for US interventions in Indochina. He entreated the 'Eisenhower Administration' that if Vietnam was allowed to go red, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia and most of the neighbouring countries would fall a victim to communist invasion. The exhortation of the Secretary of State bore its fruit in President Lyndon B. Johnson's voice when he said, "if we

do not defeat them (Communist) in Vietnam we will have to fight them in San Francisco." \(^{11}\)

When communist regime of North Vietnam attacked the South Vietnam, the United States took it as an offence against free world. The 'Domino Theory inter alia argued that if the government fell in one Southeast Asian country, it would trigger a similar fall in other countries. It made the United States jump in to the war with Vietnam. The US foreign policy makers wanted to deter the overthrow of the government by the Communist led insurrections at all cost. Historically, Vietnam had been one of the strongest states in the region. So, if Vietnam were to go communist it was believed that would be difficult if not impossible to safeguard the rest of Southeast Asia from communist absorption. Thus, the 'Domino Theory' got its source in the ideological commitment of the United States to deter the advancement of communism so that the balance of power in Southeast Asia region would not tilt towards the Soviet Union.

In his memoirs President Lyndon B. Johnson reflecting his thinking said, "It became increasingly clear that Ho Chi Minh's military campaign against South

\(^{11}\)Ibid.
Vietnam was part of a larger, much more ambitious strategy being conducted by the communists".  

President Richard Nixon was also very much apprehensive about the communist expansion when he warned about the consequence of the US defeat in Vietnam war. According to him, "An American defeat in Vietnam would encourage this kind of aggression all over the world -- aggression which smaller nations armed by their major allies, could be tempted to attack neighbouring nations at will, in the Mid-East, in Europe and other areas."

**VIETNAM WAR: UPSET THE APPLE-CART OF US FOREIGN POLICY AS WELL AS THE BALANCE OF POWER**

The course of Vietnam war made US Administration to review the foreign policy in the name of "the Nixon Doctrine", proclaimed by President Richard Nixon at Guam in July, 1969. The 'Nixon Doctrine' was made a part of the 'New Approach' towards East Asia by the Secretary of the State William P. Rogers in his report United

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States Foreign Policy - 1969-70. He reported: "The ferment in East Asia has occurred at a time of shifting power relationships. We have moved post-World War II situation of two Super Powers to one, where numerous power centers affect East Asia - notably the United States, Japan mainland China, the Soviet Union. These developments - an emergent dynamic Asia and a shifting balance of power - demanded a new approach from us."  

He discussed five major aspects of the new approach towards Southeast Asia such as, 'The Nixon Doctrine', the 'Vietnamization Programme', a 'Positive Approach towards China', a 'New Relationship with Japan', and a 'more restrained Diplomatic style'.

The 'Nixon Doctrine' was regarded as the most important aspect of the new approach. It was emphasized by Secretary of the State William Rogers that though the doctrine was applicable to all international relationships of the United States it had a special meaning for East Asia. Through this doctrine President Nixon stressed that the United States by remaining a 'Pacific Power' and by continuing to honour its commitment would expect the Asian nations themselves to provide their respective indigenous power for their own defence.

"Ibid., p.35."
The 'Doctrine' was based on three maxims as was enumerated by Rogers:

The United States will keep its treaty commitments.

We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and security of the regions as a whole.

In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defence.16

To give effect to the new approach that was based on the above mentioned maxims, the United States took a bold step to reduce the level of military personnel in East and Southeast Asian countries. While in January, 1969, the level was 740,000, by the end of 1970, it came to a level of 509,000. The 'Table-I' indicates the manner in which the US military personnel were reduced in different countries in Southeast and East Asia.

16Ibid.
Table-I: Key US Military Personnel Reductions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Authorized Strength</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January, 1969</td>
<td>June 1971</td>
<td>Reductions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>549,500</td>
<td>284,000</td>
<td>-265,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>063,000</td>
<td>043,000</td>
<td>-020,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>047,800</td>
<td>032,000</td>
<td>-015,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>039,000</td>
<td>027,000</td>
<td>-012,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>028,000</td>
<td>018,900</td>
<td>-009,000</td>
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While the US forces in the East and Southeast Asia were reduced, the indigenous forces of the concerned region had been increased to a total of 2.7 million, nearly twice the number, ten years ago. A clear picture of it can be ascertained from the 'graph' attached below.

The Vietnamization Programme

The main aspect of the 'Nixon Doctrine', was based on the premise that the US forces in the South Vietnam would be replaced by the indigenous forces. So the 'Vietnamization Programme' showed the way for the US military forces to withdraw from Vietnam.
East Asian Forces

In Millions

2.7 Million

EAST ASIAN ALLIES MILITARY FORCES

790,000

U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN ASIA

680,000

740,000

420,000

A Sino-US Rapprochement

The 'normalization of Sino-US relationship' was developed on the basis of US recognition of China's growing power to influence the region of South and Southeast Asia. The 'Ping-Pong diplomacy' that was enunciated by the Nixon administration had reached its climax with the President's precedent-shattering visit to the Communist China on 21 February 1972. The 'Shanghai Communique' stressed the following points:

- Progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States in the interest of all countries;

- both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;

- neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country group of countries to establish such hegemony; and

- neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states. 18


Taking advantage of Sino-Soviet rift in the following years, the US administration considered China as a powerful counterweight to check the Soviet influence in Asia-Pacific as a whole. Pointing out the advantage of Sino-US relationships, President Jimmy Carter wrote in his 'memoirs': "One of the more interesting potential benefits of having China as a friend would be its ability to quietly sway some third world countries with whom it was very difficult for us to communicate".  

The US-Japanese Co-operation

The US attached even more importance to its friendly relations with Japan because of its strategic importance. It had served as a spring-board for US military operations in Asia. The elaborate naval and air bases at Yokosuka, Sabebo, Iawkuni, Yokota, Yokohama and Okinawa -- constituted strategically the most important US communications logistics and repair complex in Asia. According to the US-Japanese Security Treaty of 1960,


America had the power to use Japanese bases in its military operations anywhere in Asia. Thus, it was also used in US military operations in Vietnam. The importance of these bases reached its climax when in 1973, Yokosuka became the new 'homebase' of US Midway - the first US carrier to be permanently stationed outside US territorial waters.

A More Restrained Diplomatic Style:

It emphasized upon sharing to a great extent the responsibility of their respective security and economic developments by the developing countries themselves. The reduction of the official presence of the United States abroad.

While the US policy-fiasco in Vietnam paved the way for adopting a new approach in the shape of 'Nixon Doctrine' by the United States, its strategic withdrawal from the region upset the apple-cart of balance of power in Southeast Asia. The new drive of communism in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and a warm-up preparation for a new tension between United States and the Soviet Union, through the Soviet occupation of the Cam Ranh and Da Nang Bases in Vietnam went far beyond the predictions of US policy makers. The US policy to restore its
dominant position in the region by increasing its involvement in the quagmire of Vietnam war fell flat.

Thus, here, it would be more appropriate to discuss the changes in the Indochinese states and in the approach of ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Thailand and Singapore) due to the US defeat in Vietnam which, in turn, had played great contributory role in assigning the Philippines a unique place in US foreign policy.

The most affected states due to the US defeat in Vietnam were Indochinese states of Laos and Cambodia.

**LAOS**

During the Vietnam war, the North Vietnamese soldiers stationed in Laos tightened their control over the area and used it as a supply route which was known as 'Ho Chi Minh Trail' to South Vietnam. In response, the United States supported the pro-Western Laos government by providing military assistance on a large scale. But with the collapse of Saigon in April 1975 the monarchy was abolished and the communist Laos

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People's Democratic Republic (CPDR) was established. The new regime proclaimed its alignment with Vietnam. The communist victory in Laos, struck a great blow to America. It was reported in *New York Times* that, the new regime favoured the Soviet Union by replacing US technicians with Soviet specialists. The report noted:

Under political pressure from Laos, the United States agreed to wind up all operations of the Agency for International Development (AID) in Laos and to transfer AID's assets to the Laotian government, and this was accomplished on June 26. The 185-member AID team by report was in due course replaced by 1,500 Soviet technicians and specialists.\(^2\)

**CAMBODIA**

In December 1978, some 200,000 Vietnamese troops invaded Kampuchea in order to remove the atrocious Pol Pot regime. On 7 January 1979, Phnom Penh fell to the Vietnamese. Consequently the Heng Samrin government was installed with the support of Vietnam which also led to the maintenance of Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea.

Thus, while Vietnam invasion of Cambodia went a long way to upset the balance of power in the region, the Sino-Vietnamese war\(^3\) gave a green signal for the


Soviet Union to enter into the arena. In February 1979, upset by the Vietnamese success in tilting balance of power in its own favour, the Chinese troops launched a month-long expedition on Vietnamese provinces 'to teach Vietnam a lesson'. Consequently, Vietnam looked forward for Soviet support. The Chinese influence in Southeast Asia tied the Soviet Union and Vietnam into a close relationship. Vietnam finally joined the Soviet sponsored organization of the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) on 29 July 1978 and signed a full-fledged twenty-five year treaty of friendship and mutual assistance.\textsuperscript{24} Soviet Union so secured the benefit of having access to Cam Ranh and Da Nang Bases in Vietnam. Alarmed by these developments, China accused Vietnam of being the "Cuba of the East" and 'junior partner' in a Soviet plot to control Southeast Asia. The \textit{Peking Review} expressed the Chinese anguish when it stated:

In the Southeast Asia (the Soviet Union) has instigated and supported the Vietnamese authorities which are pursuing a policy of local hegemonism, to make provocations, carrying out armed intervention against Kampuchea and serve as a Cuba in the East. It is precisely because of Soviet Union's rapid

Thus, with Vietnam's accomplishment of installing communist Heng Samrin government in Cambodia a communist bloc of three states comprising Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia was formed that leaned towards the Soviet Union thereby enhancing Soviet influence in Southeast Asia.

**ASEAN's Reaction**

The Nixon Doctrine's proclamation of 'self-help' on the part of the respective countries of the region with the reduction of America's direct involvement in the area on the one hand, and the presence of communist Indochina on the other made the ASEAN group of countries anxious about their own security.

In 1967, the regional organization ASEAN had come into existence.\(^\text{26}\) Its purpose was to achieve greater

\(^{25}\)Cited in Professor B.K. Shrivastava and Christopher Sam Raj, "US Policy Towards Southeast Asia", *Strategic Analysis* (New Delhi), vol.11, no.12, March 1987, p.1409.

\(^{26}\)The Bangkok Declaration of 1967 had mapped out the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), comprising Indonesia Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore and Thailand -- five countries of Southeast Asian region. The sixth member Brunei joined in 1984. For a detailed analysis about the origin and development of ASEAN, see, R.P. Anand and Qaisumbing, ed., *ASEAN: Identity, development and culture* (Hawaii, University of (continued...))
degree of economic integration and co-operation among the members States. The development described in the preceding pages forced the members state to think in terms of greater integration of their security policies as well. They felt that these developments, particularly in Indo-China, posed great threat to their security. Past experience of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines had made them suspicious of communist influence within and outside their country.

At the ASEAN summit meeting held at Denphasar, Bali (Indonesia) on 23-24 February 1976, the prime minister of Singapore and the President of the Philippines reflected with "the greatest sense of urgency" to promote united actions among the member of ASEAN. The Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew said while stressing on the effective action of ASEAN, that

an effective ASEAN would greatly help to ensure that incipient insurgencies did not develop into full-scale revolutions, and that the dangers which had arisen for Southeast Asia in view of the result of the Vietnam war, the US policy of detente and world economic problems could best be met by ASEAN co-operation like the European community,

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26(...continued)
[but] he said, ASEAN had to face the competition of communist countries.\textsuperscript{27}

President Suharto of Indonesia said in his opening address:

It must be clear to us and to the world that we have no intention of establishing a military pact as it was misinterpreted by some people. Co-operation among us in the realm of security in neither designed against other nor certain parties. We have neither the capability nor the intention to have it. Our concept of security is \textit{inward looking} (emphasis added), namely to establish an orderly peaceful and stark condition within each individual territory free from any subversive demands and infiltrations from wherever their origins might be.\textsuperscript{28}

With the promise of economic co-operations, mutual-respect for each other’s sovereignty and extension of friendship towards non-ASEAN members, the ASEAN reacted to the American withdrawal from the region. It became more vital than the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO)\textsuperscript{29}. The demise of SEATO was another outcome of

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\textsuperscript{27}Keesing’s Contemporary Archives (London: Longman), vol.22, April; 9, 1976, pp.27676.
\textsuperscript{29}SEATO: Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formed in 1954 following the Manila Conference with the objective of considering measures for concerted resistance to possible aggression or subversion in Southeast Asia. It consisted of countries like USA, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, The Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan as its members. It was conceived as a Southeast Asian projection of the (continued...
the US pull out from Indochina. It paved the way for ASEAN to play dominant role to influence the policy of the United States.

When ASEAN made up its mind as a group to tackle any untoward situation unitedly, the members of the group, that included the Philippines, did not remain far behind in expressing their reactions in their individual capacity. It will be useful to examine here briefly how the Philippines responded to the US withdrawal from the region. It certainly gave full support to the collective effort of the ASEAN, of which it was an important member. However, the US withdrawal affected each country of ASEAN in different ways. As far as Philippines was concerned, the US still had its two most important bases there but changed stance of the US still demanded changes in Philippines foreign policy.

President Ferdinand E. Marcos had been in office during the period of 1966 to 1986 and he had very cordial and friendly relations with the United States. In turn, every administration in the US during these

29 (...continued)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The alliance had taken birth in the post-Korean war to contain communism. But the Vietnam war made it a fiasco as communism triumphed in the whole of Indochina. France and Pakistan walked out of it in 1966 and 1972 respectively. The remaining six-members began to lose interest and decided to wind it up on 30 June 1976.
years extended its support to Marcos, even when they were critical of his policies. The Marcos regime was very much shocked by the US foreign policy debacle in Vietnam as it had played a vital role in supporting its big ally to deter the communist takeover. The objective of supporting the US had been influenced by the consideration of getting US guarantee against economic and political instability. The statement of Philippine President during his visit to the US in September 1966 reflected these ideas. He said:

Asia today challenges America and the rest of the world in three vital fields: security from aggression, economic co-operation; and the deterioration of the moral and political basis upon which a new, more creative more stable partnership could be built. 30

According to the Philippine President the Vietnam war had exposed the vulnerable position of the Asian countries. Marcos argued:

The war in Vietnam agitates the whole world and has brought in to sharp focus the problems of Asian security. We stand with America in maintaining that aggression, whether perpetrated openly or by proxy, must be deterred and defeated; that all nations Asian or not are entitled to freedom from fear of subversion or overt attack, that they should have the period of peace they need to attend unmolested to their urgent tasks of economic and social development. 31

31 Ibid.
To support South Vietnam, the protege of the United States, President Marcos introduced an aid bill entitled "An Act Appropriating Funds to Increase Philippine's economic and Technical Assistance to South Vietnam". Accordingly, the first contingent of the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) was despatched to Vietnam in August 1966 and an engineering battalion comprising of 2,048 men and some security personnel reached South Vietnam by October 1966.\textsuperscript{32}

The reactions of the Philippines to US defeat were important because of three reasons. First, it was tied with the United States in a historic special relationship. Second, it was a member of the ASEAN. And finally, it was a country that had been badly affected by the communist insurgencies.

In a historic declaration, in April 1975, the Philippine President announced the reassessment of the value of the US bases after the collapse of the United States in Vietnam. The reassessment of the bases was not being done for the first time, it had taken place in 1966. In the 1966 reassessment the original commitment of maintaining US bases for a period of 99 years was amended so as to end in 1991 and certain US military

\textsuperscript{32}Berry, n.5, p.133.
installations were returned to the Philippines. The amendment of that year also had restored the criminal jurisdiction, immigration and taxation over the base area to the Philippines. However, the difference between the earlier reassessments and that followed the fall of Indochina was that in the later case, it was not merely the US military presence, but also the very nature of US-Philippine relationships that came under review for the first time.

The foreign policy of the Philippines changed due to its own perception of the implications of the 'Nixon Doctrine'. The latter pledged US financial, logistical and technical assistance to friendly Asian governments faced with what was understood to be internal instability or external aggression but the concerned nations should take the primary responsibility of providing manpower for its defense. Thus, the term and condition of the 'Nixon Doctrine' raised doubts in the minds of Southeast Asian countries about the merit of having conventional American military forces and military bases on their soil. It led President Marcos to insist that the political leader in the area should be cautious and prudent enough to make a deep study of
their relations with US keeping in view its debacle in the Indochina. 33

The corridors of power in the Philippines reverberated with statements and clarifications concerning its relationship with the United States. In justifying his call for a reassessment of country’s security arrangements with the United States, President Marcos clarified that there was no hostility behind the study of US-Philippine relationships. Calling the United States a closest ally of the Philippines Marcos stated:

It is an enquiry on the part of a younger brother addressed to an older brother on whom he has depended not because of special relations but because of written treaties and agreements, signed by the duly authorized representatives of both governments and ratified and confirmed by the respective Congress of the two governments. 34

The 1951 Mutual Security Treaty was the keystone of US commitments to the Philippines under which it was bound to meet any armed attack on the Philippines. On 30 August 1951, the then US Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Brigadier General Carlos P. Romulo, the Philippine


34Ibid.
Secretary of Foreign Affairs signed the pact. Harry S. Truman and Elpidio Quirino, presidents of the United States and Philippines respectively pledged everlasting friendship between both the countries.

The Mutual Defence Treaty was the manifestation of the Philippines' importance for the United States when on 18 April 1951, President Truman in a public statement stated:

The whole world knows that the United States recognizes that an armed attack on the Philippines would be looked upon by the United States as dangerous to its own peace and safety and that it would act accordingly.36

The three most important provisions of the Treaty are as follows:

1. **Article-IV**: Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.

   Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

2. **Article-V**: For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan

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35 For the detailed provision of the Treaty, see the Appendix.

territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

3. Article-VII: This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.\textsuperscript{37}

General Romulo viewed the Treaty as a stepping stone towards the conclusion of a Pacific security treaty "to overcome the growing menace of totalitarian aggression".\textsuperscript{38}

The Treaty was seemed to be regarded by the Philippines as the US shield to protect it from any attack by the communist countries. Specifying the objective of the Pact, President Quirino said:

We have no aggressive aims against any one. Our purpose is rather to give notice that a potential aggressor must henceforth take due account of our common purpose and united will to act in self-defence.\textsuperscript{39}

The guarantee of immediate US involvement if a situation arose in the Philippines was given by the then President Eisenhower, and President Johnson. But the War Power Act


\textsuperscript{38}The New York Times, 31 August 1951.

\textsuperscript{39}Ibid.
of November 7, 1973, severely restricted the power of the President to involve the United States in a prolonged war without the concurrence of the Congress. The President could no longer use his powers as Commander in Chief as he had done in the Vietnam. Though the validity of the Act has been challenged by Presidents and President Reagan and Bush have ordered US troops in combat situations without consulting Congress. But the Passage of the War Powers Act was sufficient to alarm the Philippines.

The 1951 Treaty had provided iron clad guarantees to the Philippines. But similar guarantees were also given to South Vietnam and Cambodia. When the crunch came these assurances failed to save them. They were abandoned to their fate. The Philippines could not help wondering what importance it should attach to the commitments of any US President. Casting doubt over the value of the statements made by the US Presidents a

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40 The War Powers Act, November 7, 1973: The war power act of 1973 severely restricted the powers of the President as commander in chief to order troops in a hostile situation. He can do so but he has to inform the US Congress within 48 hours in writing. The troops could be there for not more than 60 days, if the Congress did not approve President’s action. If the Congress disapproved, the President has to withdraw troops within 30 days. For details see, Martha J.H. Elliott, The Constitution: That Delicate Balance (New Delhi: Arnold-Heinemann Publications, Pvt. Ltd., 1984), p.279.
senior Philippine Presidential aide noted:

We are disturbed by the emerging view that commitments made by the American Presidents are nothing more than statements of intent that do not bind the American people, the Congress or the government.41

A new situation which exposed the whole of Southeast Asia to a new power front made the Philippines to lose its confidence in its patron's power that got a major shock in the Vietnam war. However, the consequent policy declarations of the United States also shattered the hope of Philippines. So, when John Sparkman, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued a statement in the context of Philippines' reassessment of the bases that the United States had "a special feelings" toward the Philippines, it came under severe criticism from President Marcos. Calling it a 'broad and all-embracing suggestion' he said, "certainly as a leader I can not depend on a statement like that in the event of any aggression...it becomes, therefore, my responsibility as it is the responsibility of every leader now, at the risk of being misunderstood by your friend and brother to protect our people by seeking clarification of these treaties".42

42Ibid., n.33.
The seriousness of the plan of reassessment became evident when Marcos ordered to set up a new strategic study with respect to the US bases, assigning it to answer two questions. The questions were: "(a) What happens in the event that notwithstanding the existence of those bases, the American Congress follows the same course of action that it has followed in Indochina? (b) Certainly we must know if the situation (internally) becomes worse and the danger we face is not merely a matter of civil disorder within the country but that of external aggression, whatever all those signed agreements are of any value. If they are less value than they were before, what steps should we take?" 43

While entrusting the vital questions to be answered by the 'Strategic Study', President Marcos did take a further step which could be considered a major step in foreign policy. He declared that he was calling a meeting of the Foreign Policy Council, the counterpart of the American National Security Council, to discuss a total takeover of Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base by the Philippines, and abrogation of the mutual defence treaties with the US government. According to a government news agency report, he said: "It is my intention to submit to the Foreign Policy Council the

43 Ibid.
various options available to us. If it is to the national interest to discard the mutual defence pact and takeover the bases, we will do so. Let no man, friend or foe think in terms of other than national interest".4

So, it was only to be expected that the Philippines would take appropriate steps to guard its national interest as it confronted the threat that arose from dramatic power upheaval that caused the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia despite the assistance of the United States -- the greatest military power on the earth. It led President Marcos to stress the foreign policy goals of the Philippines in a major post-Vietnam Policy speech.

Addressing the closing session of a 'National Conference of the Philippines Chamber of Commerce' on 24 May, 1975, Marcos stressed: "The United States must understand we can not wait until events overtake us. We reserve the right to make our accommodations with the emerging realities in Asia...I do ask, with all the sincerity of trusted friends, whether the bases have not outlived their usefulness, whether they have not lived beyond their appointed task, I do ask whether our Mutual

4New Strait Times (Kualalumpur), 21 April 1975.
Defence Treaty in the light of Indochina has not become a dead letter".45

In his speech, President defined the foreign policy goals in the changed context. They were:

To intensify its involvement in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); To pursue more vigorous relations with Socialist countries in general and China and Soviet Union in particular; to seek closer ties with Third World; and to maintain the present good relations with the United States and Japan.46

It should be pointed out that the new foreign policy-goals were guided by the following apprehensions on the part of the Philippines: The Filipino-US Mutual Defence Pact did not bind the United States to protect and defend the Philippines against external aggression as American actions depended on the will of the Congress. While the Philippines was not expected to rely on the United States for its defence, the United States would require forces of the Philippines to defend American forces if attacked in the Philippines. And the existence of American forces in the Philippines would likely to be a provocation to China and Vietnam, as well as to the Soviet Union.

45As quoted in The New York Times, 29 May 1975 and See also New Strait Times, 24 May 1975.

The third apprehension seemed to affect the Philippines to a great extent. The opening of a new power front with the communist domination of Indochina\(^7\) compelled it including some of the other states of the region like Malaysia and 'Thailand'\(^8\) to the urgency of establishing a new diplomatic link with China and Soviet Union in particular and Indochina in general.

In order to take a pragmatic step in this regard the Philippines came forward for an understanding with Vietnam a newly emerging power. Accordingly, on 7 August 1975, both Vietnam and the Philippines signed an accord and issued a joint communique in which they pledged not to let any foreign country use their respective country as a base for direct or indirect aggression and intervention against the other country or countries of the region.\(^9\)

As a major thrust of its new foreign policy, the Philippines wanted to improve good relations with China


\(^8\)Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, vol.21, 15-21 September 1975, pp.2733-36.

\(^9\)Ibid., .27334.
and the Soviet Union. There were three important considerations that prompted it to adopt such a policy. Firstly, the Philippines; had apprehension that the presence of American forces on its soil might provoke the communist countries to attack it. Secondly, the close identity with the United States gave the Philippines an image of a client state of America which it wanted to shake off by balancing its relationships with other powers like the Soviet Union and China. The last but not the least, was the factor of insurgency in the Philippines which had been a chronic problem. The Philippine administration thought that the insurgents were getting indirect help from China. It assumed that the communist victory in Indochina might boost the morale of insurgents. Therefore, it desired to counterbalance the insurgents by cultivating Philippines' relationships with the patron country of the insurgents like China.50

President Marcos extended his hand of friendship to China by paying an official visit to on 7 June 1975. The establishment of diplomatic relations was announced by President Marcos and Chou-En-lai, the Chinese Prime Minister, in Peking. A joint communique was issued on 10 June, emphasizing non-interference in each other's

internal affairs. According to the press reports it was made known that the Philippines had bowed to China's demand to break relations with the Chinese Nationalist Government in Taiwan in lieu of Chinese assurances of its respect to the independence and sovereignty of the Philippines. 51

One of the interesting aspects of the communique was that though both the countries were in opposition to hegemony by any country or group of countries, they very ironically avoided mentioning the presence of US bases in the Philippines. The reason for this careful avoidance of the factor of US bases was supposed to be the Sino-Soviet rivalry in the region. "The first Deputy Premier Teng-Hsiao-Ping cautioned Asian nations against letting the tiger in through the backdoor while repelling the wolf through the front gate. This was an obvious allusion to Chinese suspicion of Soviet designs to support US influence in Asia. 52

Thus, though in the past both the countries could not see eye to eye to each other, the Indochinese

51Ibid.

debacle urged them to come closer to each other to safeguard their respective self-interest.\textsuperscript{33}

\textbf{THE SOVIET-PHILIPPINE RELATIONSHIP}

An official communique on 4 October 1975, confirmed that the Philippines was ready to establish diplomatic link with the Soviet Union. In early January 1975, an agreement\textsuperscript{34} was signed in Manila to facilitate the expansion of Scientific and cultural exchanges between the two countries. A delegation of the Soviet-Philippine Friendship Association which came to Manila in connection with the agreement said that the Soviet Union was interested in establishing trade, scientific and cultural exchanges with the Philippines.

\textbf{US POLICY APPROACH TO TACKLE THE NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE VIETNAM WAR WITH SPECIFIC EMPHASIS ON THE PHILIPPINES}

Following the failure in the Vietnam war, the United States patiently observed such adverse developments as the phasing out of SEATO and its closest ally, Philip-pines’ declaration of reassessment.

\textsuperscript{33}For details of the Filipino-Chinese rapprochement in the aftermath of the Vietnam war, see, Ibid., and Times (London), 12 June 1975.

\textsuperscript{34}See, Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, vol.21, 24 February and 2 March 1975.
of its relationships with the US. It too started simultaneously to chart out its own course of policy step by step to tackle each and every development.

When the United States realized the futility of its direct involvement in the Indochina imbroglio the Nixon Doctrine (1969) was declared with the purpose of its indirect involvement in the region by means of its financial and military assistance to the countries of the region. But, the indirect involvement of the United States in the region could not gain confidence of the Philippines which went for a reassessment of its relation with the US. Consequently, it delivered a great blow to its patron - the United States. The statement of President Gerald Ford delivered at a news conference at San Diego on April 3, 1975 exactly reflected US feelings. He was asked by Ms. Helen Thomas of United Press International whether he was actually a believer of domino theory -- "If Southeast Asia falls then perhaps some of the other countries in the Pacific are next?" He answered:

I believe there is a great deal of credibility to the domino theory. I hope it does not happen. I hope that other countries in Southeast Asia -- Thailand the Philippines don’t misread the will of the American people and the leadership of this country to believe that we are going to abandon our position in Southeast Asia. We are not. But I do not know from the things I read and the message that I hear that some of them do get uneasy. I hope
and trust they believe me when I say we are going to stand by our allies.\(^{55}\)

While President Ford was trying his best to convince the allies of the United States that his country was always interested in supporting them and sharing their problems, his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was asked to map out the future course of American action in connection with the emerging situations in Southeast Asia. The question was, what would be the priorities of the United States in recognizing its existing commitments and in making new ones as a result of the emergence of new Asia after the end of the war in Vietnam. In his reply Kissinger said:

"We will have to assess the impact of Indochina on our allies and other countries in [the] area and on their perceptions of United States, we will have to assess also what role the United States can responsibly play over an indefinite period of time because, surely another lesson we should draw from the Indochina experience is that foreign policy must be sustained over decades if it is to be effective, and if it cannot be, then it has to be tailored to what is sustainable."\(^{56}\)

The Secretary of State emphasized on the significance of formulating foreign policies and keeping


\(^{56}\)Ibid., no.1906, 19 May 1975, p.630.
it up till it fulfilled the demand of the situations. He stressed on evolving an "Asian Policy" in consultation with his country's allies to suit the new realities. So, while stressing on the formulation of an 'Asian Policy', he clarified that the United States would be very happy to adjust its policy to suit its allies like Philippines in particular and all other states of the region in general.

The US Congress also reacted to the new policy adopted by the Philippines. It wanted the US to maintain its wholehearted commitments in this part of the region and was very much shocked when America was told to get out of this area. It was considered by Senator James B. Pearson (R., Kan) Pearson in June, 1975 that the great national interests of the United States was involved in the Pacific while he was speaking of Pacific as an American Ocean. He expressed his concern about the probable reduction of the US presence as the countries like the Philippines were going over the reassessment policy. He expressed his profound dismay when he said, "some of this great pressure and talk about pulling in to ourselves is not our rhetoric, but the talk of others", and he added, "You've got Marcos in the
Philippines and the government of Thailand telling us to get out. We’re being pushed out."

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Sparkman (D. Ala.) expressing his concern over the US foreign policy said, "I think that the time has come when we must stop and look closely at our foreign policy". He also emphasized that the Foreign Relations Committee should take up the task to project as best as it could, the part that the US was to play in world affairs over the coming decade.

One more noticeable reaction came in the shape of demand for an indepth review of the US foreign policy by Stephen J. Solarz (D., NY) the then fresh member of the House International Relations Committee. While emphasizing that the Congress and the country should focus their attention on US commitments, he said, "We need a comprehensive national re-examination of our foreign policy -- where our strategic interests are, what countries we have meaningful, moral commitments


58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.
to...we should not willy-nilly be involved in undertakings like we had in Vietnam."  

While the US Congressional members overworked themselves in issuing statements and expressing their comments on US foreign policy, the US President Gerald Ford stepped forward to deal with the post-Vietnam realities.

**PRESIDENT FORD'S CONFIDENCE-BUILDING TOUR: DECEMBER, 1975**

President Ford started off for a ten-day trip to Asia in December 1975. After visiting two important capitals -- that of China and Indonesia -- President Ford touched the soil of the Philippines on 6 December 1975. It should be noted here that the significance of his visit to the Philippines was very much clear when at the start of his historic journey the President declared that his visit to the Philippines symbolized the links and commitments of America to Asia. Through this declaration, he emphasized the vital position of the Philippines. Thus, the US President exhibited a very positive approach. He used his visit as a confidence-building measure for the Philippines by assuring his country's commitment to it.

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60 Ibid.
In the welcome address, President Marcos emphasized that the US-Philippine partnership had served the Pacific and Asia very well. But the emerging new realities in the world came to pose challenges and opportunities to their two countries. So, when their countries were seeking solutions to new problems -- one as a great power and the other as a small developing country, the Philippines wanted to solve the problem by means of securing an authentic role in the future as an independent and sovereign country.\(^6\)

While exchanging toasts with President Ford, President Marcos gave vent to his feelings again. He made it clear that not only the occurrences in Vietnam but also the aspirations of the new nations of Asia were the harbinger of a changed situation which put forward challenges to the US Commitment to the peace and stability of the region. He added that the new countries including the Philippines were trying to come to the mainstream of development. He said that the Third World countries of Asia had been the breeding grounds of various conflicts and made them dependent on foreign assistance,. It also made them vulnerable to internal strife and, worst of all, to the interventions of foreign countries. He tried to convince the United

States that his country was seeking rearrangement of its relationships with its special ally so that their weak relationships could be strengthened.\textsuperscript{62}

While outlining his new course of action President Marcos stated that his plan would take off from the launching pad of 'self-reliance', which should be secured in the field of a social transformation, economic, development, political modernization and indigenous defence capability. He asserted: "America's destiny is that, while she alone may not be able to solve the problems of the world, certainly, there is no serious problem of the world that can be solved without America.\textsuperscript{63}

Thus, while Marcos visualized US role in solving world's problems, he stressed his intention of making his country self-reliant so that it would not be a burden on the United States by seeking its assistance for his country's progress.

After patiently hearing the outburst of feelings of the Philippines, President Ford responded by saying:

We have already observed the common determination of people throughout Asia and the rest of the world to achieve more satisfying life. That determination

\textsuperscript{62}Ibid. 

\textsuperscript{63}Ibid., p.1350.
is shared by you in the Philippines and by us in the United States."  

He supported the desire of the Philippines to become a self-reliant nation and stressed on cultivating the spirit of generosity, mutual benefit and respect. The visit of United States' President successfully conveyed to the Philippines the message that America had no intention to abandon Asia and its allies in the Pacific.

The joint communique that had been issued at the end of the President Ford's visit served as the cornerstone of US-Philippine confidence-building measure in the aftermath of the Vietnam war. Some of the important excerpts of the communique runs as under:

They agreed that it was timely to conclude negotiations on a new agreement on trade, investment and related matters as a means to enhance economic cooperation between the two countries. This agreement would modernize the terms for conducting economic and commercial relations, taking count at the end of the Laurel-Langley agreement and giving due consideration to the requirements for the development of the Philippine economy. The Philippine Government stressed its urgent desires regarding United States tariff treatment for such significant Philippine products as mahogany and coconut oil.

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64 Ibid., p.1351.

65 Ibid., p.1352.
In case of security co-operation they pointed out that:

the treaty of August 30, 1951 enhanced the defence of both countries, strengthened the security of the Pacific region, and contributed to the maintenance of world peace. They agreed that the military bases used by the US, in the Philippines remain important in maintaining an effective United States presence in the Western Pacific in support of these mutual objectives.⁶⁶

President Marcos emphasized the important of military self-reliance for the Philippines. President Ford supported Marcos and assured US assistance to the Philippines.

To sum up, the communique covered the all-embracing relationships between two countries. While the emphasis was given to mutual respect and dignity, they agreed to strengthen their relationships by adapting their policy to the demand of the current situation. The agreement also reached in the sphere of military self-reliance. It recognized the Philippine sovereignty in any forthcoming negotiations on bases in the Philippines. It agreed to go for a new agreement on trade, investment and related matters as the Laurel-Langley agreement⁶⁷ expired.

⁶⁶Ibid, p.1351.

⁶⁷Laurel-Langley Trade and Investment Agreement: The agreement granted tariff and quota preferences for the products of the Philippines in US markets. It also (continued...
THE NEW PACIFIC DOCTRINE:

After giving his healing touch to the wounded feelings of the Philippines, the US President delivered his most famous 'Pacific Doctrine' to remove any misgivings of the people regarding the United States policy towards Pacific region. The 'Doctrine' was based on the universal principle of 'Peace with all and hostility towards none'. It was delivered at Hawaii, the so-called cross-roads of the Pacific.

It was constructed on the following six premises. The first premise emphasized on American strength as basic for stable balance of power in the Pacific. The second premise stressed on partnership with Japan as a pillar of new strategy. The third premise gave importance to normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, The fourth principle stood on continuing US stake in the stability and security in Southeast Asia; The fifth tenet of Pacific policy believed that peace in Asia was very much dependent on a resolution of outstanding political conflicts. Finally, the sixth point of new policy was that peace in

67(...continued)
provide the American investors in the Philippines with the same treatment as Philippine investors used to get, to attract a substantial amount of US investment in the Philippines.
Asia required the fulfilment of the aspirations of all peoples in the region."\textsuperscript{68}

While referring to the continuing stakes of the United States in the stability and security in Southeast Asia, in his address, President Ford made a special reference to the Philippines as he observed: "The Republic of the Philippines is one of our oldest and clearest allies. Our friendship demonstrates America's longstanding interest in Asia."\textsuperscript{69}

The 'New Pacific Doctrine' was built on the foundation of 'Nixon Doctrine' to remind the world that the Asia-Pacific region was indispensable and invaluable to the United States of America. And its time tested relationship with the Philippines was at the core of its policy towards Asia Pacific.

The year 1975, the year of traumatic experience and upheaval in the region merged into 1976 finally, with the refreshing breeze of changes in US foreign policy that started blowing gently through the window of 'New Pacific Doctrine'. A new era was ushered at the dawn of

\textsuperscript{68} For the full text of the 'Pacific Doctrine' See, Department of State Bulletin, vol.72, no.1905, 29 December 1975, pp.914-16.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., p.915.
1976 with the US Congress activating itself again to give its foreign policy a new direction.

A discussion took place in the US Congress under the heading of Southern Asia: US interests and Policies. Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs delivered a detailed statement before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives on 28 September 1976.

While enumerating US interests, the Assistant Secretary of the State emphasized the importance of the Philippines bases that enabled it to keep the balance of power undisturbed in this part of the globe. According to him,

American strength is basic to any stable balance of power in the Pacific and contributes to peace and progress. Our use of bases in the Philippines is important to us as an element of stability not only in Southeast Asia but in East Asia as a whole, as well as being related to the global strategic picture. Similarly we have an interest in maintaining free use of the sea and air lanes through this area connecting the Western Pacific with the Indian Ocean.\footnote{\textit{The statement of Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian & Pacific Affairs, before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, 28 September 1976, Document No.26 -- Statement on Southeast Asia" in Elaine P. Adam, ed., (continued...)}
Apart from the Philippines, Hummel, Jr., presented the 'overall policies in Southeast Asia that was derived from the US interests in the region. The basic policies were as follows:

- To support the sovereignty and independence of the countries in the region and maintenance of an equilibrium which would preserve their independence;
- A desire for friendly political relationship with the non-communist nations which would in turn, facilitate the resolution of bilateral problems.
- A mutual beneficial economic relationship with the non-communist nations in this area;
- Reduction of tensions and an urge for a lasting peace.\(^7\)

The second wave of discussion on US foreign policy followed hard on the heels of the first one. This time the analysis was in the form of a 'Study Report' prepared and presented by Senator Mike Mansfield in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

In his introductory remarks, Mansfield pointed out that with the collapse of US supported governments in Indochina the winds of change was blowing strongly in Southeast Asia. He ticked the factors which appeared to be ushering significant change among the states of the

\(^7\) (...continued)


region. These were: nationalism, neutrality, and regional co-operation with great intensity. The latter, according to him was manifested in the ASEAN. Two principles basically contributed to the success of ASEAN: a unified will to avoid to force an agreement on conflicting issues, and policy of non-identification with any major power. While the report appreciated the ASEAN as a vehicle for a successful regional cooperation, it advised the government of the United States to refrain from forcing its will by directing the pace of the movement.

It had been observed that nations which had aligned themselves with the United States in its attempt to create 'non-neutral regimes' now under the changing conditions preferred to maintain a balanced relationship. This changed approach on the part of the countries of the Southeast Asia made the United States to desire for independent and neutral nations which would co-operate to further peaceful objectives instead of being solely dependent on it for their progress. This new approach on the part of the United States that appreciated regional co-operation, nationalism and neutrality was reflected in the wise observation of the report that:

American policy in Asia is now grounded on the fact that the US is not an Asian power but a Pacific
Power. The difference is more than semantic. It is the difference between a sensible acceptance of the realities of Asia and dangerous illusions of military omnipotence. What takes place in the vast region of Asia, of course, is of concern to Americans. But concern and control are quite different matters. Simply stated, America's principal long range interests in the Pacific are to discourage domination of the region by any single power, to maintain friendly relations with China, Japan and other nations and the lesser tensions which could trigger either a local or a great power conflict in the area.\(^7\)

It can be inferred from the concluding remark that US foreign policy in the Southeast Asian region revolved round the single idea of maintaining its position as a 'Pacific Power'. By insisting to pursue that idea of 'Pacific Power' it would successfully achieve its principal underlined interests i.e., to maintain balance of power without giving any opportunity for any single power to dominate the region; to forge friendship with China and Japan so that it can influence the policy decisions of the two powerful actors in the region; to keep the tensions in the area in abeyance by guarding the region from a close quarter.

When in the aftermath of the fall of Indochina the United States was sailing against the hostile wind of recoilment and was occupied in the herculean task of

restoring its position as a 'Pacific Power' to achieve
the three above mentioned interests, it considered the
Philippines to be the best and most sought after
country. The Mansfield Report maintained that "Subic
Naval Base is the largest overseas military base of any
country. A major station for serving the 7th fleet, the
most important naval base West of Hawaii. US military
strategists consider the base indispensable to a
continued US military presence in Western Pacific."\(^7\)

The Bases also attracted US aid and Security
assistance to the Philippines in the shape of grants in
aid, excess defence articles, FMS (Foreign Military
Sales) credit, FMS agreements, security, supporting
fund, Military Assistant Programme (MAP) etc. Table-II
provides a clear picture of the US Security Assistance
to the Philippines since 1974.

\(^7\) Ibid., p.6.
Table-II: US Security Assistance to the Philippines

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<td>--</td>
<td>00.6</td>
<td>00.7</td>
<td>00.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Philippines had been entirely supported by US assistance and advice. US grant aid and excess defence articles transfers were the source of its equipments. The US Military Assistance Advisory Group played the role of giving advice in training and support areas. The Staff report to US Senate Sub-Committee on Foreign
Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations stated that US assistance had been provided "Primarily as a tacit quid pro quo for the use of US bases in the Philippines".\textsuperscript{74}

The bases also attracted a good amount of US grants and credits to the Philippines. Table-III provides figures of US assistance to the Philippines since 1946 to 1980.

\textbf{Table-III: US Government Foreign Grants and Credits, 1946-1980}

\textit{(In Millions of dollars)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total during the Years</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946-1955</td>
<td>1,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1965</td>
<td>0,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1975</td>
<td>0,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1979</td>
<td>0,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0,033</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Since his election as President of the Philippines in December 1965, Ferdinand E. Marcos, remained a good friend of the United States. The increased importance of the bases with the changing international scenario made the American Presidents backed the Marcos regime in his war of attrition against the communists. The importance of the bases was underlined by the Assistant Secretary of State, Far East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Richard C. Holbrooke in his address before a Western Governors Conference, Honolulu in 1978. He outlined the importance of the bases in the context of base agreement to be amended in 1979. According to him:

With the agreement of the Philippine Government, and with full regard to Philippine sovereignty, we are committed to maintaining the two important US bases in the Philippines. This will enhance our ability to project US military strength into Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and East Africa and to protect Pacific and Indian Ocean shipping lanes over which 90% of Middle Eastern Oil is transported.⁷⁵

When his Secretary of State highlighted the importance of the Philippine bases, President Jimmy Carter unhesitantly accepted to compromise his famous policy of human rights to support Marcos administration which had been denounced for its poor record of human rights. He backed the Philippine administration in the

interest of for the future negotiations on bases. In his reply to a question asked by Joseph O'Hare of America Magazine (New York City) on upholding the bases over the issue of human rights the President said, "I don't think that our displeasure with meeting American-type standards on human rights protection ought to interfere with our consummating this agreement".  

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and taking of American hostages in Iran shocked the United States. The failure of President Carter to free the hostages eventually contributed to his defeat and the election of the Republican Ronald Reagan in November 1980. President Reagan was sworn into power with the objective of reasserting American power and prestige in the global context. The attitude of the American people was very much clear when he was supported by 61 per cent people on his determination to deal with Soviet Union in comparison to Jimmy Carter's 33 per cent and Anderson's 6 per cent during his campaign as a Presidential candidate.

The Reagan administration's foreign policy objective was crystal clear when the Secretary of State

76Ibid., Document No.580, p.1089.

(designate) Alexander M. Haig, Jr., said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 9 January 1981:

The United States has a clear choice. We can continue, if we wish, to react to events as they occur -- serially, unselectively, and increasingly in the final analysis, unilaterally. One lesson of Afghanistan is certainly that few symptomatic crises are capable of effectively rallying the collective energies of the free world. We may wish it were otherwise but wishing will not make it so. Alternatively, we can confront to the fundamental issues I have discussed. We can seek actively to shape events and, in the process attempt to forge consensus among like-minded peoples. Such a consensus will enable us to deal with the more fundamental tasks. I have outlined - the management of Soviet Power; the reestablishment of an orderly international economic climate; the economic and political maturation of developing nations to the benefit of their peoples; and the achievements of a reasonable standard of international civility.73

Thus, the chief objective of managing the Soviet Power fitted well to the objective of American foreign policy in Southeast Asia during the Cold War period. Since that time, American policy goal has been to deter any power or a combination of powers hostile to its national interests from dominating the region. The Reagan Administration viewed the Soviet Union's access to the bases (Cam Ranh and Da Nang) in Vietnam dangerous to its interests.

President Reagan's determination to guard the interests of the United States in Southeast Asia heightened the importance of the bases in the

Philippines. These facilities were considered in Washington as the projection of American power in Southeast Asia. Emphasising the vitality of the Philippines to the United States, Casper Weinberger, the Secretary of Defence said at Clark Air Base on 2 April, 1982 "the defence of the Philippines, the defence of the free world, is a very big job".  

While the Reagan administration could well realise the defence of the Philippines as a sine qua non to the defence of Asia Pacific, it lost no time in adopting a policy that would protect the Philippines from communist subversions. It perceived the government of Ferdinand E. Marcos, the age-old friend of the preceding four administrations (Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter) as the best alternative to communists. It prompted the President to give unequivocal moral, political and economic supports to the Marcos regime to deal with communist insurgency that had been fed on the abject poverty of Filipinos. But with the passage of time, the wholehearted support of the Reagan administration had been exploited by Marcos and his coterie to gain their own self-interests which in turn paved the way for the crisis -- the harbinger of historic democratic revolution of the Philippines. The revolution was initiated indigenously by the people of Philippines which subsequently embraced its supreme ally United States, to play an important role.