Chapter - I

INTRODUCTION

South Asia consists of seven very diverse sovereign states of different sizes. It is the vast geographical space stretching from the Himalayan mountain ranges in the North to the Indian Ocean to the South and from the valley of the Indus in the west to the plains of the Brahmaputra River in the East.

South Asia is a sub region of Asia comprising the modern states of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, Bhutan, Nepal and it ranks among the world’s most densely populated regions in the world. South Asia is the land of great ethnic religious cultural and linguistic diversity. When the nations of South Asia won their independence from British almost 66 years ago they were at once united an divided by claims of identity. Soon after independence most South Asian states were faced with various kind of domestic conflicts.

South Asia is an international sub system which assumed importance soon after the British withdrawal from region and the emergence of a number of new states which ever either parts of the British Empire or were its protectorates. British withdrawal was necessitated by their shrinking economic and military capacity to pursue a super power role and growing local opposition to heir presence in the area this partial withdrawal by them is said to have created a vacuum in the
area and supporters of this pernicious imperialistic theory naturally justified the entry of the US aggressive forces in to the area. The countries of the third world have been manufactured into diverting their resources to the purchase of sophisticated weapons manufactured in US. In South Asia it plays an important role through Pakistan.

Having been in the strategic wilderness for more than a decade, the South Asian region is again becoming an area of geopolitical rivalry among world powers and regional states. The region was also an area of rivalry between Soviet and US forces during the period of the Cold War.

Defining the term ‘cold war’ with some care. Strictly speaking, a cold war may occur between any two entities who are at loggerheads but do not fight. The term owes its current usage to Walter Lippmann, who popularized it in 1947, but it is known to have been used much earlier by the Spanish writer Don Juan Manuel, who likened the conflict between Christendom and Islam to a cold war. I confine myself to treating as cold wars those conflicts that occur between nuclear-armed states. The point is vital. Pre-nuclear cold wars were a matter of choice for the participants. One or the other could have chosen to fight.¹

Nuclear cold war’s do not realistically offer the luxury of that choice. Because of their immense destructive power, nuclear weapons have a distinctive quality about them, and it is vital to observe and draw lessons from how nuclear rivals interact, for almost nothing worries us more than the prospect of a nuclear war. While much attention has understandably been paid to the problem of stability between nuclear rivals, it is time to go beyond the debate to grasp the wider influence of nuclear weapons on the dynamics of inter-state rivalry.

The short definition above – *that cold wars are tense but war-less confrontations between states with nuclear weapons – serves only as a starting point.*

Cold wars are produced by powerful ideational and material factors. Differences in the realm of thought – ideational differences encompassing ideology and identity – underpin the rivalries between nuclear-armed states, creating and sustaining mutual resentments, hostility and strong threat perceptions.

Nuclear weapons have complex modifying effects on this politics. Initially, the nuclearization of a hostile relationship generates intense antipathy, raising the temperature since nuclear weapons are central to cold wars, it is important to come to grips with the ways in which they shape the behavior of states. Most discussions on nuclear weapons are justifiably focused on the question of whether they have stabilizing or destabilizing effects. Optimists believe they have stabilizing effects because they inhibit fighting and engender caution. Pessimists believe they have destabilizing effects as their existence poses grave risks of losing control owing to failures of organization and control.²

Strategic theory relating to nuclear weapons provides the general principles of deterrence and war, including answers to basic questions such as: what are the requirements of deterrence; how much damage should one be able to do in order to deter an adversary? It reflects on key issues about relative balances of capability, issues of credibility, the

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prerequisites for stability, and the relationship between nuclear war and lower levels of armed conflict.3

United States and nuclear China were caught up in a bitter quarrel during the 1960s, while at about the same time and stretching well beyond, the Soviet Union and China also entered a phase of angry confrontation. The next cold war involved India, but was some time in coming. Though India became a nuclear-capable power in 1974, it made no effort to translate its wherewithal into actual weapons for another decade and a half. During this period, its relationship with China was extremely tense at times, but within the terms of our definition, this was not a cold war, because India never produced nuclear weapons. Had it done, we may have had a cold war between these two nations, for there were certainly many elements of rivalry and competition between them, including a border dispute, a history of war, and a prolonged border confrontation between their armed forces in 1986–87.

The last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of the fourth cold war, this time between India and Pakistan. The India–Pakistan relationship has had the characteristics of cold war from the time when both were incipient nuclear-armed states in the late 1980s, and remains mired in discord today.

By the turn of the twentieth century, yet another cold war emerged, between the United States and North Korea, again one which had a long gestation period while the North Koreans played hide and seek with respect to their nuclear capability. We have, then, a number of cold wars to compare. And to all appearances, there are more on the horizon. North

Korea’s nuclear test in 2006 raises the prospect of a cold war between North Korea and Japan.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, which stood face to face, with large conventional and nuclear arsenals in the middle of Europe. Across the globe, the two competed for influence in Asia, Africa, and to a lesser extent in Latin America. When things did not go their way, they intervened forcefully:

The United States in Latin America, Korea, and Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. The politics of the Cold War was intensely competitive and played out on a global scale. From time to time, the two sides came close to war and were involved in a series of crises, most notably in Berlin in 1961, Cuba in 1962, and the Middle East in 1973. In the first of these, President Kennedy actually discussed the possibility of war, including the feasibility of a nuclear first strike, but drew back because there was no certainty that it could be controlled and prevented from escalating to a nuclear exchange. The decision was taken not to risk nuclear war in spite of the knowledge that American forces were far greater in quantity and quality than those of the Soviet Union.

**India and Pakistan – the structural relationship**

The India–Pakistan relationship for the first five decades after independence displayed a typical strong versus weak state pattern. The material distribution of power at the close of the twentieth century, when both formally became nuclear powers, was clear-cut. Indeed, India’s

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sheer size dominated the South Asian region. Its share of the region’s land area was 73 per cent, of population 77 per cent, and of GNP 77 per cent. In military terms, India’s position vis-à-vis Pakistan was very strong. In 1985, India’s total military expenditure was US$ 8,921 million as against Pakistan’s US$ 2,957 million, the gap further increasing by 1998, when India spent US$ 13,780 million while Pakistan spent US$ 3,920 million. The strain on Pakistan’s economy was much greater. In the same years, India’s expenditure as a percentage of its GNP was 3.0 per cent (both years), while for Pakistan the figures were 6.9 per cent and 6.5 per cent respectively. The major indicators of military power were skewed in India’s favor. Its active armed forces numbered 1,173,000 as against Pakistan’s 587,000; and the difference was further reflected in relative capabilities with respect to main battle tanks (3,414 and 2,320), major naval combat ships (42 and 18), and combat aircraft (853 and 296). On the other hand, the popular conception that emerged in the late 1980s of India as a ‘regional superpower’ or even an emerging ‘great power on the world stage’ neglects the limitations on its actual exercise of power. For instance, India’s military capabilities were not enough to defeat the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka during the late 1980s.

None the less, the strategic behavior of the two countries displayed the strong/weak state patterns described above. *South Asia’s cold war* 49. The expectations of neorealist theory are borne out in the history of the strategic relationship between India and Pakistan. It is a history of territorial contest, distrust, arms competition, and war that need not be recounted in detail here. In 1947, the conflict began with a tribal revolt against the Maharaja of Kashmir, who was unwilling to join either India or Pakistan. The rebels, assisted by Pakistani forces, gained control over a
considerable swath of territory, whereupon the Maharaja acceded to India and the two countries went to war.  

The India–Pakistan nuclear relationship

India–Pakistan nuclear relationship, which has undergone three cycles of conflict and cooperation since their cold war commenced in the late 1980s. The alternation we find between crisis and collaboration is similar to that which occurred during the US–Soviet Cold War. However, there are some important differences. The Cold War was a much longer conflict, involving nuclear competition and antagonism over four decades, from 1949 (the year the Soviet Union obtained nuclear weapons) to about 1989, whereas in South Asia the comparable period (so far, to be fair) has been much shorter. If we date the nuclearization of the two countries to c. 1989, then it is about two decades old. Second, whereas the Cold War involved the active deployment on alert status of very large and technically sophisticated forces on both sides, India and Pakistan have thus far refrained from similar deployment of their relatively small and less developed forces even at the height of crisis. Given time, might they follow the same path? Third, because the large deployed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union posed serious risks in times of relative stability as well, there was a greater incentive to engage in strenuous efforts at arms control. In contrast, the Indian and Pakistani forces in their recessed postures do not produce such great anxieties. This means there is less pressure to engage in arms control and a greater focus on confidence building. This is less binding, because verification is not a vital component, yet in some ways more promising since it leans heavily on political understanding, which is the key to resolving disputes. As

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6 William R. Harris, ‘Chinese Nuclear Doctrine: The Decade Prior to Weapons Development (1945–1955)’, China Quarterly,
India and Pakistan developed their nuclear arsenals, the relationship became increasingly militarized, and the frequency and level of conflict increased.

The role of nuclear weapons during the crisis has been the subject of some debate. At the time, US officials were alarmed by intelligence reports that Pakistan was making preparations for a nuclear strike. One report stated that its F-16s were ‘pre-positioned and armed for delivery – on full alert, with pilots in the aircraft’.

During the crisis, while each tended to fear the worst, both sides displayed abundant restraint. Though their air forces were positioned to strike one another, a necessary posture given the vital advantage successful conventional air strikes could confer, the armored divisions of both countries remained in non offensive positions.

**The Kargil conflict, 1999**

In May 1999, Pakistani forces in civilian garb began occupying key positions along the Kargil heights on the Indian side of the LoC in Kashmir. Initially, India believed that it was a small incursion by Islamist *mujahideen*, but it soon became clear that the force was a professional one and was large in number.

Owing to the harsh climate and geography of the region, Indian forces had withdrawn, as was their custom, from their posts during the long winter. The intruders were thus able to penetrate deep into Indian territory, in places up to twelve kilometers, along a 150-kilometre front. The Indian Air Force was called in and the Army’s counter-attack reinforced with 155-mmhowitzers. The terrain made the process of ousting Pakistani forces a slow one. Fighting continued well into July,
when Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif called his troops back under American pressure.

The role of nuclear weapons in the Kargil conflict was indirect, yet central. By this time, both countries had conducted nuclear tests in mid-1998. However, while the tests strengthened deterrence by precluding conventional war, they did not prohibit fighting at a level below that of conventional war.\(^7\) There were two important differences between 1990 and Kargil. First, India and Pakistan were now declared nuclear powers, which removed all ambiguities about nuclear risk. Second, their forces engaged in combat for about two months, which raised the risk of war to a much higher degree than before. This meant caution came at a higher price as well, but we have seen that both were prepared to pay that price.

As with other cold-war confrontations, cooperation yielded some results by way of stabilization. It demonstrated the rapidly declining value of military force between nuclear powers. The empirical evidence from the India–Pakistan relationship, as well as from the other cold-war relationships discussed earlier, is clear. Nuclear weapons constrain their possessors from thinking in conventional ways when they are in situations of immediate deterrence, i.e. when war is near. Doctrines that emphasize types of forces and force balances are of little relevance in such circumstances. Hence, concepts that are built upon notions of credibility or resolve and the distribution of capabilities are inconsequential. Moreover, since nuclear rivals are careful to eschew conventional war as well, absolute and relative conventional military capabilities do not count for much, either, except to the extent that they

may be useful in marginal conflict or against other non-nuclear adversaries.

We have seen that nuclear powers are careful to avoid conventional war. This means that deterrence theory must consider whether the traditional approach to conventional weapons is meaningful in the nuclear context. Indian strategic thought does not generally do this. Most analysts either separate the two and say little about conventional weapons in their deliberations on nuclear doctrine; or make the argument, again drawn from American strategy, that strong conventional forces are necessary to keep the nuclear threshold high testing

Here too India and Pakistan are generally in agreement. After the 1998 tests, India announced a moratorium on further testing and Pakistan followed suit. The Indian atomic energy establishment declared that more nuclear tests were not necessary. In the domestic debate over the India–US nuclear agreement, though Indian scientists objected strongly to the US condition that the deal would be called off if India were to carry out a nuclear test, the objection was really to a permanent limitation being put in place by an outside power. There was no reference to the need for testing in order to obtain a better deterrent.

South Asia is characterized by low level of political integration, economic development and collective self reliance in defence. Activities of outside powers in indo Pakistan war of 1965 introduced a shift in US arms policy towards the subcontinent. America’s reticent, rather than neutral, attitude was clearly manifested when it imposed supply of military aid and equipment to both India and Pakistan.

During the Cold War, both United States (US) and Russia exerted political ideology and military might to gain the support of the nations of
the Indian Ocean region in order to gain supremacy in this littoral. This was due to the great importance of the Indian Ocean through which runs more than three quarters of the world’s trade. As of late both China and India are rising as potential superpowers and are making all efforts to gain control of the Indian Ocean.

India, because of its Indian Ocean littoral, seeks greater maritime presence in the region. China, as a Pacific Ocean Nation is increasingly interested in gaining a foothold in the Indian Ocean in its quest for global power. It has started funding its “Chain of Pearls” port facilities in southern Sri Lanka and Pakistan which is viewed as a possible first step in gaining control of the region.

In this context, the US, the sole superpower in the world is making diplomatic efforts to balance China South Asia is becoming increasingly important due to the shifting of the focus on Overseas Contingency Operations from Iraq to Afghanistan. With the developing relationship with India based on common concerns about international terrorism, religious extremism, and the rise of China.

India with its growing economy and powerful military position has become a global partner for the US and is shaping the future of Asia. There is a convergence of interests between India and the US on the issues vital to the two countries in the global arena.3 The naval power of India has made it one of the primary naval forces of the Indian Ocean,4 and it is now working with the US to maintain the security of the sea lanes running through the Indian Ocean. One of the major issues in protecting the sea lanes in the future is the harboring of large naval vessels and the security of such valuable weapon systems, which are lucrative targets to terrorists. The American global strategy to “balance of
power” in region exhausted its policy makers to make a reassessment of the strategic value of Pakistan. Unfortunately Pakistan calculations went wrong when neither the US nor china directly intervened in its strategic structure of the subcontinent. The united sates for the first time recognize India as a predominant power of South Asia.\(^8\)

The initial American involvement in Asia was primarily the product of its global policy of the containment of communism. In this team every player had his own set of reasons for closer association with America.

Another important interest of the US in South Asia is the socio-economic status of the nations in the region. A close look of the region shows that, with the exception of a few countries, all others are afflicted with one or more of the ailments of poverty, backwardness, fundamentalism, terrorism or internal insurgency. A number of territorial and maritime disputes remain alive. Confronted by this environment, States in the region believe that their security will be best guaranteed by gaining the support of the international community and the US believes that its relationship with India could enlarge India’s security perimeter to achieve a position of greater influence in the region.

The Ocean is also important in navigation and marine trade. Almost one fourth of the entire cargo in the world marine trade and two thirds of world oil are loaded and unloaded in the ports of this region. This is because of the commercial sea lanes that lie across the Indian Ocean. The sea lanes are the connecting link between Atlantic and Pacific

\(^8\) Peter Symonds,—U.S, China and the War in Sri Lanka,
Oceans. The routes passing through it connect Europe and East Africa with South and South East Asia.9

Therefore, almost all the powerful states in the world are concerned with controlling these sea lanes which are crucial to the protection of their interests. This is why major powers like the US and China are trying to expand their influence in the region, for no other powers in the world does the sea transit through this region play an important role as the US and China. Study of maritime history reveals that India was the first country to have dominated the Indian Ocean until the arrival of great powers starting with the Portuguese. The Portuguese conquered the Indian Ocean and controlled all its maritime routes to dominate the maritime and economic activities of the region. The Dutch, French and the English followed the Portuguese into the Indian Ocean. Such was the significance of the Indian Ocean; that the British controlled it until the end of the Second World War for its economic and strategic gains. During the Cold War the Soviet Union considered the Indian Ocean sea lanes as extremely important waterways to further its political military and ideological interests.

However, since the end of the cold war the US has been the dominant power in the region with no other nation to challenge its dominance in the Indian Ocean. But, emerging states like China and India are determined to gain the dominance of the region for the maintenance of their economic political and military interests. And yet, as the pirate activity off the coast of Somalia, the intense terrorist activities taking place in the region and the desires of emerging states suggest, the Indian Ocean, the world's third-largest body of water, already forms center stage.

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for the challenges of the twenty-first century. In the present context, the Indian Ocean region is important because of numerous reasons. One obvious reason is its economic potential and trading routes. Other important facts are the presence of a number of nuclear powered states and a number of states with nuclear ambitions. The region is also home to some of world’s most volatile failed and failing states. Terrorism, poaching and piracy are also grave issues of concern in the region. The involvement of major powers of the world in trade and security matters in the Indian Ocean and its littoral states makes the situation in the region increasingly complex. The focus of the world in this context is beamed on to the three powers India, China and the US.

The entrance of China to the maritime domain in the Indian Ocean is a key event that has increased the complexity of the situation. China’s enormous economic boom, coupled with superpower ambitions, has perplexed the United States and India. China is not only Pakistan’s major military ally, it has become one of India’s leading trading partners, and plays an important political role in Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, where a Chinese economic and cultural presence is welcomed as a way of balancing the dominant India.

According to a Defense concepts series article, the relationship between China and India is complex, and the developing relationship between India and US therefore is of great concern to China. China is the leading nation in the East Asian region and India is the leader in South Asia. However, China is trying to increase its leverage in South Asia due to the US support to India. This is where the smaller countries in the region come in to play. Though China is also concerned about good relations with India, it has maintained a much closer relationship with Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The Sino- Pak relationship is a
worry to India because of the Kashmir issue. China is also maintaining close links with Sri Lanka and has become a staunch ally of Sri Lanka in the recent past. There is concern in the US and Indian circles about the growing influence of China in the region. This influence might slowly result in a shift of leadership role in the region if China emerges above India in the region. Based on the facts on the importance of the Indian Ocean and the US relationship with South Asia, it is clear that the Indian Ocean is one of the busiest in terms of maritime, political and military activities. US involvement in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India coupled with Chinese influence in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka could make the region a hub of politico-military activities in the international system. It is also clear that almost all seven countries in South Asia have deep routed internal problems and economic and political turmoil of their own.10

As sense of insecurity and helplessness during Pakistan’s early years pushed that country into arms of America. Without giving much thought to its immediate geo political importance Pakistan joined SEATO & CENTO in order to balance the perceived Indian threat and to acquire much needed economic and military assistance.

Pakistan was benefited from its association with US in many ways. Indian reaction to this US-PAK military relationship was strong and angry. Nehru strongly accused US of introducing the cold war in the region. The US has adopted various techniques to ensure and adequate supply of strategic raw material at favorable prices. The advent of American powers in the Indian Ocean has been a major cause of concern

in India. Since the down of Indian independence, the US has perceived India as a possible obstacle to its interests.\textsuperscript{11}

As the countries of the region are undergoing positive political transformation, the region might be at the crossroads of a major change. There is a dominant view in the region in favour a cooperative security framework and in this regard India has to take initiative. The interests of the United States and South Asia have converged. The US and South Asia are at a unique place in time and history for building and cementing strong ties between the South Asian nations and its peoples, and these two blocks are determined to do so. The region is now, and will long remain, at the forefront of America’s foreign policy concerns. The United States is committed to help South Asia achieve the bright future that it deserves.

The American Chamber of Commerce is an important partner that is helping to strengthen ties between the United States and South Asia. In a globalised world, countries are facing. The regional security environment in South Asia reveals that intra-state non-traditional security threats have assumed serious proportions in the post-cold war period. However, mutual suspicion and mistrust continue to characterize bilateral relations among states and retard the process of regional cooperation and integration. In recent years, the countries in the region have made attempts to generate consensus on common NTS issues like terrorism, natural disasters and environmental change. As a regional organization, SAARC, has laid the foundation of a common platform which has enabled regular interaction at various levels on issues of critical importance, having their effect on regional security. It offers some

promise for the emergence of cooperative security architecture in South Asia terrorism has emerged as a perennial challenge to individual liberty and state authority. The entire region is affected by the virus of ideological extremism and terrorism. Due to a lack of coordination among South Asian countries, this problem remains unmanageable. Some rudimentary steps have been taken within the SAARC to work together on this issue the formation of SAARC.

**South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC):**

SAARC was institutionalized in 1985 and is being looked upon as a regional instrument for development cooperation. It has incorporated many of the human security concerns in its agenda, including counterterrorism, food and energy security, poverty alleviation, curbing of human trafficking, and mutual help against natural disasters such as floods, tsunami and earthquakes. But progress in these areas has been far below expectations.

The principle of unanimity in decision making in SAARC, which almost give a veto to all its members, ensures that neither the smaller countries of the region can be dominated by the larger ones nor the larger ones marginalized by the collectivity of the smaller ones. Every possible institution and arrangement envisaged under the South Asian strategic architecture will have to imbibe this principle. A number of South Asian countries such as—Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka—primarily driven by their desire to have a credible balance against India’s comparatively huge capabilities.

SAARC was envisioned initially as an organization that would facilitate peace, economic integration and prosperity in the region. In the past, any initiative within the framework of SAARC to discuss
cooperation on issues of traditional and non-traditional security threats was not possible since it was argued that discussion of such issues was outside the terms of reference of SAARC. However, in recent years, most notably at the last four SAARC summits, the subject of combating terrorism within South Asia has been given the highest priority. The need for joint action on food, water, environmental, human and energy security have also been highlighted in SAARC declarations, at both the summit and ministerial levels. Both traditional and non-traditional security issues are now being addressed by several SAARC member states within the framework of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and also within SAARC itself.

The South Asian region, comprising Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka has about 23 per cent of the world’s population and 15 per cent of the world’s arable land, but receives less than 1 per cent of global foreign investment and tourism revenues, and accounts for only per cent of global GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and 1.2 per cent of world trade. Furthermore, South Asia is still home to about 410 million of the 720 million poor living in the Asia-Pacific region despite the rapid economic growth in India and, to a lesser extent, other countries in the region.

Of the 1.4 billion people in South Asia, 42 per cent or 488 million live on less than a dollar a day. In addition, key indicators suggest that social development still remains relatively low when compared to other Asian regions. In terms of human development, all the above countries, with the exception of Sri Lanka, rank low. The United Nations Development Project’s (UNDP) Human Development Report of 2010 states that of the 169 countries for which the Human Development Index
(HDI) was calculated, the selected countries were ranked as follows: Bangladesh 129, India 119, Nepal 138, Pakistan 125 and Sri Lanka, 91.7.

Compounding the formidable economic and social challenges facing South Asia are numerous traditional and non-traditional security threats. Yet, while South Asian countries confront both military and human security dilemmas, national budgets tend to favour military spending. Excessive spending on defence continues to have an adverse impact on the capacity of the countries in the region to provide adequate resources to spend on human security and NTS programmes. South Asia’s ratio of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP is one of the highest in the world. The confluence of positive trends in regionalism and prevalence of NTS threats has resulted in the growing acceptance within the region of the need for a comprehensive security framework in South Asia. There is an urgent need for enormous and multifaceted challenges in South Asian countries. Only India has either direct land borders or maritime borders with its neighbours. There is an asymmetric relationship between India and its small neighbours. But India has never been considered as a common enemy in the region to bring other countries together in any security-cooperation framework.

The results of this irritating policy India moved closer to the soviets to balance the US pressure. At the same time Nehru announced NONALIGNMEN. Still US assured his friendship and relation to provide military assistance. Obviously the objective was to stop or slow down the Indian drift towards the soviets.

The economic aid continued to India on a much bigger scale in the comparison to Pakistan. This aid enabled India to allocate its own resources toward military requirements and to continue successfully
nonalignment, earning worldwide prestige as a truly independent country whereas Pakistan was dubbed as a subservient state

As India and Pakistan are two major regional powers which are capable of providing new directions to the desired level of regional cooperation. They have military, economic and political resources to help activate the process of détente among the countries of South Asia. Both are on the threshold of nuclear weapon capability program each views the other as a potential source of threat to its security. Peace, security and stability in one region is directly linked with the global security. Crisis in one region is likely to have a spillover on other regions.

Nuclear proliferation and arms aid are two issues that will continue to occupy the concerns of American foreign policy makers. With twenty percent of the world’s population, South Asia is responsible for about one percent of global military expenditure. Not only India and Pakistan but all countries of South Asia are facing internal conflicts and terrorism.

The ethnic and religious diversity in the state of J & K, Which is divided into three regions, has contributed to the complexity of the Kashmir problem. Which is no doubt a important factor effecting India’s security.

In Assam the united liberation front of Assam ULFA a revolutionary political organization was born on the lawns of the historic rang ghar of sibsagar on 7th April 1979. To liberate Assam, (a land of 78529 square K.M.) through armed national liberation struggle from the clutches of the illegal occupation of India and to establish a sovereign independent Assam.
In Bangladesh terrorism has become an important concern in recent years. Terrorism is less in Bangladesh compared to some other South Asian countries. According to India government sources, terrorist groups such as the united liberation from of Assam (ULFA) and all Tripura Tiger Forces (ATTF) and national liberation front of Tripura (NLFA) run several base camps in the Jungles of CHT areas and sylhet, which actually appears as a piece of discontent in the bilateral relationship between India and Bangladesh.

In Bhutan the united liberation front of Assam ULFA and the national democratic front of Bodoland (NDFB) had set up camps in Bhutan after they were driven into the Bhutanese foothills by a major Indian military offensive in 1990-91. With nowhere to go, they found the 266 K.M.s Bhutan border convenient because of its proximity with the northeast Indian state of Assam.

However, in recent times the royal government of Bhutan has been applying pressure on various Indian terrorist groups lime ULFA, the NDFB and the kamtapur liberation organization (KLO) to remove their camps from Bhutanise territory. Under an agreement between the ULFA and royal government on June 18, 2001, the former had agreed to shut down four of the nine camps they have been operating in that country, and to relocate their cadres to some other destination, by Dec 21, 2001.

When we talk about Shri Lankan terrorism it began in 1970 with the formation of a militant student body called the “Tamil students movement “to protest government plans to limit access of Tamil students to universities. Very soon this movement went underground and turned to overt terrorist activities. Violence escalate in Jaffna from 1972 onwards, beginning with the publication of a new constitution seen by the Tamil
united liberation front (TULF) as anti Tamil. The year 1972 saw the formation of two Tamil terrorist group the Tamil new tigers (TNT) and Tamil Eelam liberation organization (TELO), splinter group of the original students movement. The LTTE was formed on May 5 197 under the leadership of Valupillai Parbhakaran, and has emerged as perhaps the most lethal, well organized and disciplined terrorist force in the world.

Terrorism in the kingdom of Nepal is estimated that there are 10000 to 15000 fighters active across the country, with many parts completely under their control. The disillusionsionment of the Maoists with the Nepalese political system began after democracy was reintroduced in 1990. Maoist military strength has increased considerably in recent years in Nepal. These terrorist activities in South Asian region has an great impact on India’s security. As emerging a developed country.

As it is an open secret that South Asia has always remained an area of peripheral and derivative interest to united states. Ironically, no country has contributed, as America to the economic growth an military strength of South Asia.

American contribution towards the peace and stability of South Asia has not been as great as it should have been. American politics have not been able to prevent the soviet from making substantial roads. While Soviet influence has gradually increased in the area. American diplomacy in South Asian region appears inconsistent confused and reactive rather than calculate.

British withdrawal was necessitated by their shrinking economic and military capacity to pursue a super power role and growing local opposition to heir presence in the area this partial withdrawal by them is said to have created a vacuum in the area and supporters of this
pernicious imperialistic theory naturally justified the entry of the US aggressive forces in to the area. The countries of the third world have been manufactured into diverting their resources to the purchase of sophisticated weapons manufactured in US. In South Asia it plays an important role through Pakistan.

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The American global strategy to “balance of power” in region exhausted its policy makers to make a reassessment of the strategic value of Pakistan. Unfortunately Pakistan calculations went wrong when neither the US nor china directly intervened in its strategic structure of the subcontinent. The united states for the first time recognize India as a predominant power of South Asia.

The US is breaking from a policy of not giving nuclear aid in any form (weapons or otherwise) to any country by signing a nuclear agreement with India. It is especially noteworthy because as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States cannot spread nuclear technology much less provide material nuclear support countries that have not signed the NPT.

By giving nuclear weapons aid and technology to India, the United States is setting a dangerous precedent. India has never been a close, reliable, or a vital ally of the United States. History shows that during the Cold War that many times India aligned itself with the Soviet Union against the United States and really played both sides.

Yes, a positive economic relationship with India is in the interests of the United States, but a nuclear and military relationship is not. Though some speculate that forging a closer relationship with India will serve to buffer China, the agreement looks like another example of our
government exercising futile, shortsighted policies that have long-term consequences. We should be concerned as citizens because we are spreading Weapons of Mass Destruction. There is no limit on how much technology that can be shared. The problem is not that America is sharing secrets with one country over another; it is that the US is proliferating – period. It will spur the nuclear arms race in South Asia and could further destabilize a volatile region of the world. The nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan has accelerated sharply in the past year, with both countries increasing their weapons stockpile. Ten years later, the US lifted a three-decade moratorium on nuclear trade with India, agreeing to provide assistance to India's civilian nuclear energy program and expand bilateral co-operation in energy and satellite technology.

Since then, Islamabad has pressured the US for a similar deal, but Washington holds serious concerns over Pakistan's record in transferring nuclear technology to states such as Libya and North Korea, and fears for the stability of the country's nuclear arsenal.

Recent militant attacks on supposedly highly secured military facilities, including a 17-hour siege Karachi naval air base, have heightened concerns that the insurgents could gain access to Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik insisted this week the country's nuclear arsenal was "200 per cent safe" against an attack."The assets are well-protected and tightly monitored," he said. "The (International Atomic Energy Agency) agrees with us." The SIPRI report found that the world's nuclear-armed nations - the US, Russia, China, Britain, France, Israel, India and Pakistan - possessed more than 20,500 warheads, and that all eight countries were committed to improving or maintaining their nuclear weapons programs. "More than 5000 nuclear weapons are deployed and ready for use, including nearly 2000 that are kept in a high state of alert."
India has a stellar track record when it comes to non-proliferation, whereas Pakistan has an absolutely abysmal record, thanks to the work of its leading nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, who sold nuclear weapons technology to anyone who with a checkbook. So, yes, there is a danger of terrorists getting their hands on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

U.S. could be doing a lot more to persuade India and Pakistan to take measures that might lessen the chance of a nuclear exchange if the two countries do become involved in a conventional military conflict, as they have numerous times in the past. For instance, it would be very useful if they each articulated a clear nuclear defense doctrine. It would also be good if the two nations shared far more information with one another about their nuclear defenses so that signs would not be misinterpreted during a crisis. Getting Islamabad to agree to a “no first use” policy would be a huge step too (although Islamabad would be unlikely to agree to such a measure.) India is so busy defending the idea that South Asians are responsible nuclear caretakers, that it often underplays the very real danger of loose nukes on its doorstep.

The initial American involvement in Asia was primarily the product of its global policy of the containment of communism. In this team every player had his own set of reasons for closer association with America. As sense of insecurity and helplessness during Pakistan’s early years pushed that country into arms of America. Without giving much thought to its immediate geo political importance Pakistan joined SEATO & CENTO in order to balance the perceived Indian threat and to acquire much needed economic and military assistance. Pakistan was benefited from its association with US in many ways. Indian reaction to this US-PAK military relationship was strong and angry. Nehru strongly accused US of introducing the cold war in the region.