CONCLUSION
In our time international conflict arises from the conflicting interests and policies of states. Samuel Huntington's view of differing cultural traditions as the source of international conflict and his representation of the contemporary international system as 'the West v. the Rest' falls partially in the thesis. Differing cultural traditions are surely among the sources of international conflict today, by themselves, however, they rarely lead to major conflicts between states. It is their interactions with scarcities of resources, rival claims of territory, conflicting agendas on trade and historic memories of ethnic or religious enmity that make cultural differences a source of war.

Likewise, environmental conflict is not an entity in itself however much threatened the eco-system is. It is very much part of a political conflict which when interacted with territorial dispute, cross border migration, conflicting views and interests on trade, differing security perception, ethnic and religious animosity transforms environmental issues into a source of conflict.

Six years after the Earth summit at Rio and one year after the second Earth summit in New York, the dilemmas surrounding international environmental policy-making still remains stark. The concept of power in which sovereign states live make demands on environmental issues such that it never seems to be fully compatible. The Rio summit in 1992 was a landmark in the sense that the leaders of the world gathered together, deliberated and eventually set up a framework for environmental policy, which would take account of the needs of the developing world. Since then nothing dramatic has happened that can be said to have changed the international system. On the contrary the

situation is alarming and funds to support the poorest nations have shrunk by 20% between 1992 and 1997. Quite a turnaround for the 1992 Earth Summit had laid down an outlay of $625 billion a year to tackle environmental problems ---- $125 billion from Developed countries and $500 billion from Developing countries. This worked out according to a popular environmental-security analyst, who loves to play with figures to a mere $100 or 1/9th and 1/180th of the annual incomes of Developed and Developing countries respectively. $625 billion became big money for states together to spend on tackling environmental problems while it did not matter that the world spent about $1 trillion on arms in the corresponding year or $3 billion a day or $2 million a minute. The figures prove that the states in the international system are very much stuck with the idea that security is best, and often only achieved through military activities.

All this makes it clear, that environmental policies cannot be realized without a sustained political effort at all levels of society and in all parts of the world. States are indeed a social construct and are not to quote C.A.W. Manning, "constituted for the purpose of withering away." States are not dysfunctional and are here to stay.

The Rio declaration especially the Agenda 21 exposed the tension between the principles of democratic constitutional on which global declarations are theoretically based and the respect for state sovereignty on which international cooperation rests in practice.

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Though environmental problems has the capacity to bring a new level of thinking, state level initiatives and plenty of hope of a better international system based on cooperation it, however, owing to the interests of the sovereign states failed to galvanise awareness of shared vulnerability. In fact on the contrary environmental issues has galvanised self-protective approach and inaction.

It is an apocalyptic belief that environmental degradation has the capacity in itself to initiate cooperation. One is reminded of the late Isaiah Berlin who was fond of quoting the American philosopher, C.I. Lewis: “There is no a priori reason for supposing that the truth, when it is discovered, will necessarily prove interesting.”

There is truth about the enormity of environmental degradation and its consequential impact but it has hardly aroused the interest at the state level to dilute the difficult choices and unpleasant trade-off that have always been a central feature in the relations of states.

Issues like state sovereignty, territoriality, nationalism and security continue to determine the evolution of the international system. Because of these issues it is difficult to proclaim the demise of the state. In fact, the many challenges to state sovereignty have given further impetus to a redirection of state activities which goes to suggest that current uncertainty like environmental degradation and resource scarcity is producing a renewal of state relevance. Although the decentralisation dynamics has forced the state to share some of its powers with suprastate, substate, and nonstate

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actors yet the complexities of today's international problems ---- environmental degradation as an important one ---- has resulted in the emergence of a new 'transgovernmental' order which harnesses the state's power to implement solutions to global problems. State's power and role in implementing solutions is, however, based on its interest and how it benefits from a particular issue.

Although states have responded to the consequences of many environmental problem by signing international agreements ---- more than one half of the 170 multilateral environment agreements now on the UN's list were added in the last 25 years ---- however, the good intention has not translated into effective action. In fact, as environmental problems intensify, commitments have become demanding and incentives to cheat or not to comply with the agreements grown.

It is fashionable to say that the government is on the decline and that civil society is on the rise. While indeed participation of civil society has grown and that most international environmental issues are on the agenda because public concerns put them there but it is the government that still negotiates, signs and ratifies agreements. Thus governmental decision making processes ultimately determine the context of international environmental agreements. It is in the decision making process that the outcome of political interests and struggles come out as Deutsch says, "the substance of politics.... Is inescapably implied in almost every ecosocial problem".5 Thus, politics and environment are everywhere thoroughly interconnected and in the interconnection

between politics and environment, it is the role of politics that is greater in shaping the environment. Since the development of environmental problem is linked to political processes, it is, therefore, through political means that a solution to environmental problems can be devised. While the thesis brings out the 'politics' in every examined situation, it also further explores the interests and actions of the actors involved in various conflict and brings out the differentiated concerns of the state and other actors.

At the highest level of politics, it is through nationalism that states vie with societal actors or with other state for control over a certain set of political objects. These objects can be the physical, human, cultural or environmental. Nationalism, hence is a set of political behaviour oriented towards certain objects in politics: the enclosure of the polity —- the drawing of its physical, human and cultural boundaries. 6

The objects including the environment are intrinsic qualities of the modern state. Nationalism emerged concomitantly with the rise of the modern state and the notions of popular sovereignty that materialised in opposition to the modern state’s growing appetite and ambitions. As Brubaker says, “The enclosure of the modern state is part of its mode of legitimation and operation”. The environmental boundary therefore is ambiguous and controversial. Interests are closely bound up with any given crystallisation of state boundaries and there is no objective answer to the question of what the proper bounds of the state should be. As Gellner recognised, “nationalism

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6 R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Massachusetts: MIT, 1992), p. 32
attempts to convert the intrinsically ambiguous and controversial into the conventional and seemingly natural".7

In an age when states claim to represent rather than rule, state institutions seek hence to promote ---- a hardening of boundaries within popular consciousness and among potential challengers by establishing a frame of discourse aimed at moulding attitudes to the ‘reality’ which these institution projects, turning boundaries, in Lustick’s words into “unquestioned features of .... public life”8 and “part of the natural order of things for the overwhelming majority of the population”.9 The boundedness of the state may be challenged both from above (through war) or from below (through resistance). The state therefore confronts challenges to its boundedness both domestically and internationally. In an age of mass politics all interstate wars are nationalist wars, conducted in the name of nations and purportedly in their interests.

For any state to sign a cooperative agreement on environment issues will depend upon the concerned states measurement of its interest---- territorial, sovereignty and security. However, the Arab-Israeli multilateral peace talks that was initiated in Madrid in 1991 did introduce ‘Water for Peace’ as a positive and viable proposition in order to break the conflicting deadlock that no water distribution can come about until a formal Arab-Israeli peace settlement is concluded. In February 1996, Israel, Jordan and PLO concluded for the first time a “regional water agreement”. Two explanations can be given. First, the glaring reality of the quantity and quality decrease in the region’s water resources that makes any short term rhetoric that exceeds the physical and economic

9 Ibid., p. 44
realities of the water base absolutely futile and second, the effectiveness of the “track two diplomatic” approach to bring negotiations on the water issue. The key feature of this negotiations, agreed and signed, is the emphasis on ‘cooperation on water’ and not on ‘sharing water’. In the former lies the departure line ---- the breakthrough in the water deadlock. For example, the ‘water declaration’ introduced the principle of water marketing, joint action in exploring new resources and joint mechanism in which the parties use their respective water networks to convey water under a specific water buying or selling. More importantly and from the political point of view, the declaration gave the impetus for reconciliation in the region by shifting dialogue from the bilateral to multilateral position. While kudos to the respective governments in signing the agreement is warranted but the real shepherd of the process was the mediating role of the epistemic community (scientists and academicians) in the framework of the ‘track two diplomacy’. By establishing factual basis, providing information and data for interest based negotiations and making the entire process transparent, the epistemic community created the perfect feeling of trust for the negotiations to succeed.

Politics it is said is about the distribution of power and the making of decisions. Environment----both in its unity and as a serious issue---- presents political problems that are complex. Two aspects come out: first is the politics of the 199 or so sovereign countries into which the world is divided each with its own interest to look and second is the interaction of these interest with the interest of other countries. This is further intensified with security concern and global economics. How does a state then balance its interest with its principal?
In 1972 at Stockholm the then prime minister of India, Indira Gandhi stressed upon poverty of the developing countries as the single greatest contributor to degrading the environment. “We do not wish to impoverish the environment any further and yet we cannot for a moment forget the grim poverty of large numbers of people”, she said. What she meant was that the developed world should address the poverty issue of the developing world in order to bring about effective means to tackle the environment. This heralded in the rise of bargaining and negotiations between the developed and the developing countries. In the pre-Stockholm period UN agencies were pushing environmental issues, but the attention was on industrial pollution in the developed countries. Even the NGOs and protest movements were west-centric and anti-industrial. Development of the developing world along with its poverty was ignored. The 1972 Stockholm conference and leaders like Indira Gandhi who effectively lent their voice not only gave legitimacy to environmental issues but linked environment and development, pointing out the inequity of the prevailing economic order. The result was that environment issue became holistic and transnational in nature bringing together both the ‘North’ and the ‘South’ countries. As it did aspects of flow of aid from the ‘North’ to the ‘South’ and transfer of technology became an important aspect of the environment issues. This resulted in power politics in environmental matters, which was the obvious consequence of state-centric structures seeking the best keeping in mind the national interest.

That Principle 2 of the Rio declaration admits that states are free to cause environmental damage within their own jurisdictions was a major boost to the
developing countries. This meant that the 'sovereignty' of the state allowed pursuit of any goal without intervention within territorial boundaries. While the developing states are free to do what is within their jurisdiction, they however do not have the financial resources to carry out development policies. It is in this arena that the developed countries use aid and transfer of technology as a lever of foreign policy. Like wise the developing countries use environmental issues as a bargaining tool in order to get funds. Environmental issues have thus become both a source and the consequence of the international system of resource production and use and an obvious victim of the liberalisation of world trade. The bottom line is that it is a bargaining chip that clearly affects South-North relations.

Immediately after the famous 'poverty linked environment' speech by India's prime minister, India in order to gain aid and technology flow quickly set the pace by establishing a National Committee on Environmental Planning and Coordination (NCEPC) in 1972 under the Department of Science and Technology. This was followed by the Wild Life (Protection) Act of 1972, the Water Act of 1974 and an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was set up.

The result of all this was that the World Bank, which is main source of multilateral lending to countries for individual capital projects, in 1973 distinguished between relative and absolute forms of poverty at personal and national levels and stressed investment in the poor. It carried its policies by funding projects concerned with small-scale production. Sensing the mood of the World Bank, developing countries jumped on the bandwagon that rapid economic growth would automatically result in the reduction
of poverty. Clearly protection of the environment was not the issue, money was. India in particular ventured on big dam construction binge and not surprisingly the World Bank has been repeatedly accused of supporting large-scale, technological 'solution' to the detriment of the environment. It can be said that India sold its poverty to gain maximum aid for what it thought was best for its development.

However, a contrary situation can be presented through the IMF (International Monetary Fund). This organisation has been an effective tool for the western industrialised countries to carry out its globalisation agenda. The ideology of the IMF favours orthodox economic explanations of the need for stabilisation. This organisation is concerned with the technicalities that underline globalisation. Consequently, if the developing countries want to borrow from the IMF, then certain conditionalities are to follow that as far as possible frees up world trade, regardless of the consequences for the developing countries and its environment. Some of the specific requirements are:

1. To reduce budget deficits through an immediate reduction in public expenditure.
2. To eliminate all forms of price and wage control, including the removal of subsidies on basic foodstuffs that often form an essential part of the bargain between developing countries and key interests.
3. To control money supply.
4. To devalue the currency in order to promote exports and reduce imports.
5. To remove tariffs and quotas that protects infant industries.

These requirements are commonly called Structural Adjustment Packages (SAPs). By placing emphasis on markets and exports the environment suffers for the developing
countries under the SAPs package have all the incentives to use intensive agriculture methods and exhaust their mineral resources in order to sell on the world market. If the greatest incentive is to pay back the debt then that has not come true, according to a figure developing countries are still 61% more indebted at the end of the period between 1982-1990. It is clear that SAPs favour the TNCs and the local business elite and by trimming government spending what has actually happened is that the environment has received very less attention and the mechanism for enforcement hardly exists. Trade and economics takes priority over environment issues. In a sense the economic potential of the developed world defines Robert Dahl’s definition of power in which “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”

Power, therefore, remains at the core of international relations. Whether it is the pursuit of markets through economic policies or security goals through nuclearisation or environmental issues, power politics determines it all. Power politics, power balances and power equations, therefore, remain essential to understanding the state of the environment.

Take for example India’s overt nuclearisation and stand on CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban treaty). India had long been queasy with issues of power. For four decades it preached principles as far as disarmament is concerned and pioneered the CTBT in 1954 as “a treaty with a nuclear disarmament context and direction, but by itself not a treaty for time-bound nuclear disarmament”. Four decades hence its priority now is

security based on its perception of threat. That India allowed its security interest to over ride its principles can be deduced logically. On January 25, 1996, India’s ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that was debating the signing of the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), Arundhati Ghose made a statement citing the indefinite extension of the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) as a main factor in legitimising the NWSs (Nuclear Weapon States) and in altering global circumstances. The ambassador insisted that it was imperative to link a CTBT with a specific time-bound procedure for carrying out disarmament ----- that is phasing out nuclear weapons. India raised the stake that was clearly endorsed by the G-21 and clearly not endorsed by the P-5. The ambassador’s statement read as follows: “If a CTBT was to be meaningful then it should be securely anchored in the global disarmament context and be linked through treaty language to the elimination of all nuclear weapons in a time bound framework.... So that the CTBT does not just become a flawed instrument aimed at curbing horizontal proliferation but a genuine disarmament step”. This was an intentional radical departure cleverly linked to the elimination weapons for the negotiators in Geneva knew that total time bound disarmament was unacceptable to the P-5 and hence unachievable. This therefore gave a certain legitimacy not to sign the CTBT. The Indian delegations took a lead role as the ‘linkage meisters’ and in the process displayed a complex interplay of the interests and intentions of a nation-state.

The Nuclear tests of May 1998 can be put in a global order where the national power of a state constitutes the basic measure and currency of international transactions for
legitimate needs of national interests. The explanation of India's nuclear tests falls into three categories:

1. A reaction to perceived security threats.
2. A logical culmination of the scientific-bureaucratic momentum.
3. Links to India's quest for status and prestige in the global order.

From these three general held beliefs two opinions can emerge:

One that since nuclear weapons is treated as the ultimate currency of national power then why not claim that status. For long India's approach towards the world was to be liked rather than respected. To be a "liked" state in global politics only attracts short-term fair weather friends. However, it is power that makes the world listen to even if it does not want to. India's nuclear tests demonstrated that principles of disarmament have to be universal and that if preached and practiced by one should like wise be preached and practiced by the rest. The tests were a major break with the past. The world has learnt to live with India's acquired status of a nuclear power and in the process has become respected rather than just liked. Power begets respect and this runs smoothly with the principles of power in international relations. That power is still the currency that sells in the market of global politics can be deduced from the next opinion.

The second opinion is the bargaining nature of the CTBT. It took India just 10 days to officially announce to the world that it was putting a moratorium to further nuclear testing and that it would adhere to the no-first use doctrine. India felt that since it had demonstrated its nuclear capability and having been assured by the scientific

11 Times of India, New Delhi, 26 January, 1996

299
community that the tests yielded sufficient data to carry out in the laboratories, hence reconsidering to sign the CTBT was on the agenda but only after a national consensus. Hence CTBT could be used a bargaining chip to extract economic returns.

In this context an intense dialogue and better bargaining position is being played between India and Washington. John Holum, top US adviser to President on non-proliferation stated that the US administration plans to “strip” India of its nuclear weapons and ability to make them. The three modes are:

1. Oppose any recognition of India as a nuclear power under NPT.
2. To make India join the NPT as a non-Nuclear Weapon Power
3. To pressurise India to sign the CTBT but allowing Delhi to retain a nuclear deterrent, i.e. right to test anew would be taken away and use sanctions along with economic leverage to put pressure to that effect.

India instead of succumbing to these pressures is on the contrary using it to good effect.

A flurry of activities has taken place in the economic arena with the US in particular showing great interest. This can be highlighted by US president’s last State of the Union address on 30.1.2000, “..... Next month, America will achieve the longest period of economic growth in our history. To realise the full possibilities of this economy, we must reach beyond our own borders, to shape the revolution that is tearing down barriers and building new networks among nations and individuals, and economies and cultures: globalisation. It’s the central reality of our time.....”

Obviously India is a big player in the picture of globalisation and however critical US has been on India’s nuclear tests it cannot ignore this fact. Importantly India senses this and is therefore

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keen to consider “being an adherent to some of the undertakings” in the CTBT. In
return the US has recently removed 51 government organisations, research institutes,
PSUs and private corporation from the banned list of entities that it had imposed after
the nuclear tests. India is further interested in lifting the sanctions on lending by
financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF. The CTBT bargaining chip is being
used by India to make its relation with the US a realistic one based upon nuclear
accommodation and intensive economic cooperation.

India has shrewdly split the Republicans and the Democrats on the CTBT issue keeping
in mind that the US Congress (Republicans in majority) had recently rejected the
ratification of the CTBT. That India is sending the CTBT signals without any
commitment is a strategy that India is playing well. This can be noticed from a remark
by a US Senator Sam Brownback who indicated that US would waive all sanctions
against India. To this effect a Congressional waiver has already been passed but the
US administration is still holding certain sanctions subjected to India’s finally agreeing
to sign the CTBT. Meanwhile India is playing tough. Recently when the DG of World
trade Organisation (WTO), Mike Moore came to India, he took consideration of India’s
“extremely strong views” opposing linkage of trade to the social clause. Other issues
like trade barriers and dumping measures were meted strongly. On Jan 22, 2000 the
Commerce and Industry minister, Murasoli Maran announced removal of the remaining
Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) on imports and an accelerated phase-out of all import

13 Shab, Pralash and Ghose Arundhati; Signing the CTBT, Times of India, New Delhi, 25 January, 2000
14 Hindu, New Delhi, 15 January, 2000
controls by the year 2001. A significant decision this for India is through the Indo-US talks centering on non-proliferation and security is churning out economic benefits. Likewise India is through its diplomacy pushing the terrorism agenda on the list with the US and diluting the proliferation issue. At the 10th round of parleys between Jaswant Singh, the External affairs minister and Strobe Talbott, the US deputy secretary of State in London, a Joint Working Group (JWG) was established between the two countries to tackle terrorism.

The US secretary of Treasury, Lawrence Summers in his visit to India announced that US will consider granting MFN (Most Favoured Nation) status to India but with a condition that companies adhere to the International Property Rights (IPR) regime. On top of this the Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee while inaugurating the World Congress on “Sustainable development”, at Calcutta urged the international community to evolve mechanism to ensure transfer of sound environmental technology to developed countries.

It is quite understandable that India is selling the CTBT issue to the industrialised world that is paranoid about nuclear proliferation after all the Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) to the Indian market by USA, NRIs, Japan, Germany, Australia and UK is worth 305.6, 54.5, 48.4, 41.6, 30.6 and 78.5 billion dollars respectively and is important to the development of India. Apart this is the 985 million dollars loan by the

15 *Hindi*, New Delhi, 23 January, 2000
16 *Hindi*, New Delhi, 20 January, 2000
17 *Hindi*, New Delhi, 21 January, 2000
World Bank for different infrastructure projects in the power, energy, roads and agriculture sectors, which India is keen to garner.

In conclusion, therefore, the environmental issues follow the bargaining route and fuse with the international state-system where power, strategic and economic imperatives dictate the proceeding and where principles are conveniently sacrificed at the altar of interest. This is the classical terrain of power politics and interest-oriented international system hard and harsh to dismiss. It is in the end, the politico strategic interests of states that determine the types of conflicts, be it territorial, be it human rights, be it trade or environment.