CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

Two important factors dictated President Suharto's "New Order" regime's domestic and regional policies, first, political stability and economic development and secondly, ASEAN's as the cornerstone of Indonesia's regional policy. These two main priorities determined the government's policy not only in dealing with domestic politics but also in carrying out its regional policy and in coping with the involvement of major powers in the affairs of Southeast Asian region. The main criterion that the government used in connection with these aspects was whether it could help Indonesia to achieve its domestic goals and create a congenial environment in Southeast Asia which could help the regime to achieve its goals. The essence of these goals was formulated in the government's concept of national and regional resilience which emphasized the importance of social, political and economic development and closer cooperation with its neighbouring countries in the region.

The preoccupation with bringing about political stability and bitter experiences in fighting against Islamic insurgents in the past had influenced the attitudes of many security elite within the ruling New Order government in
their dealing with Islamic social and political groups. The Islamic ideology of the Islamic groups was seen as a source of political and security threats. Therefore from the very beginning of its coming to power, President Suharto's government had launched a plan to force the Islamic social and political groups to abandon their Islamic ideology and Islamic insignias that they carried with them, and replace them with state ideology of Pancasila. The forceful and manipulative ways that the government carried out to achieve its goal caused not only resentment but also a sense of alienation among large section of devout Muslims who could not accept the abandonment of Islamic ideology.

The sense of resentment and alienation was further aggravated by social and economic factors that large sections of Muslim community suffered under the allegedly pro-rich policies of the New Order government. The political structure that had evolved under the regime had made it difficult for them to express their social and political grievances through legal and legitimate channels. This led some militant section within the Muslim community to express their frustration violently. The violent expression was also triggered by close collaboration between the Chinese entrepreneur class with the ruling regime which
according to the militant Muslim benefited the Chinese at the expense of the Muslim/indigenous community. The militancy among some section of the Muslim community could not be regarded as distinct and separate from the world wide phenomenon of Islamic resurgence. It was therefore understandable that the fall out of this Islamic militancy had not only affected Indonesia, but also its neighboring countries in Southeast Asia.

Resentment against the government was also felt among the native Irianese in Irian Jaya, but it had grown from different causes. Here again the government policy to bring about economic development compelled it to implement a policy of transmigrating large number of landless Javanese farmers in an attempt not only to reduce population pressures in Java island, but also to rectify population imbalance and filled other islands with Javanese settlers. However, more important than that was to create a cordon sanitaire to the areas that the government regarded as of vital importance for Indonesia's security. Indeed, the presence of Javanese settlers in Irian Jaya had helped to promote economic climate for development and enable the government to divert large amount of development fund to build the province. This eventually attracted not only
large number of foreign companies which came to exploit the natural resources of Irian Jaya, but concurrently drew Indonesian from other parts of the country. The combination of these factors forced the native Irianese into the corner and engendered resentment directed against the government in Irian Jaya.

The anger among the native Irianese was rooted in the belief that they were culturally and ethnically distinct from the mainstream Indonesians. An important additional factor was the existing Papua New Guinea as an independent state with whom the native Irianese shared close ethnic and cultural sense of identity. This finally helped to trigger political opposition from the native Irianese under the banner and leadership of Free Papua Organization (OPM). Although the Free Papua Organization never seriously threatened Irian Jaya's integration with the Republic of Indonesia, yet its existence caused serious embarrassment to the government in Jakarta and forced it to pay more attention to its almost one million citizens of ethnic Melanesians. It also compelled the Suharto government to develop closer relations with its neighbour in the South Pacific region.

Indonesia's main regional preoccupation continued to be in Southeast Asia. The New Order government's first priority
when it came to power was to rectify President Sukarno's policy of confrontation with Malaysia and develop closer relations with its neighbouring countries. Indonesia became an enthusiastic supporter of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. The government regarded Southeast Asia as of paramount importance to Indonesia's political and strategic interests. Its will to do so manifested itself when it helped to establish the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN served Indonesia's political and strategic purposes. Politically, Indonesia used ASEAN as a vehicle to restore its credibility in the eyes of its neighbours. Through ASEAN Indonesia could regain trust and confidence from its partners. Strategically, ASEAN could play as a sort of shield from external threat. Indonesia's domestic and regional policy demanded a stable regional environment to prevent conflicts which could divert the government attention from its development programmes. Indonesia's experience with the separatist movements in Central Sumatra and North Sulawesi which was allegedly supported by Malaysia and the Philippines convinced the Suharto government of the need to forge friendly and constructive relations with its neighbours. In addition, by joining ASEAN, it enabled Indonesia to deal with the major
powers in a much stronger position. Indonesian government realised that Indonesia had to adopt a low profile because it was aware that had it tried to force its view on regional issues, it would have led to hostility towards Indonesia which in the long run could jeopardize the unity of ASEAN. In return, the Suharto government did expect that its ASEAN partners were sensitive to Indonesia's wishes and avoided openly and unnecessarily antagonizing it. Like his predecessor, President Suharto also felt that Indonesia should be consulted in any major issue affecting the region and that it should play a role as a spokesman for the region vis-a-vis outside powers. It was this sense of regional entitlement which finally caused serious dilemma in dealing with regional issues. Indonesia's dilemma could be seen in its attempt to find a peaceful political solution to the Kampuchean problem.

Indonesia had long regarded Kampuchea as the weak underbelly of Southeast Asian region. It had taken keen interest in the Kampuchean problem. The convening of International Conference on Cambodia in April 1970 in Jakarta was one clear example of this interest. The realization that the conflict in Kampuchea was essentially an extension of a larger conflict between the two major
powers, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China had necessitated Indonesia to take diplomatic initiatives to find a peaceful political solution to the problem. Indonesia and its ASEAN partners considered that the involvement of major powers in regional affairs of Southeast Asia was an anathema to regional order that they wanted to establish based on the concept of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). However, even here Indonesia's limited military capability and underdeveloped economy forced the Suharto government to develop closer relations with the United States and Japan. Indonesia's security perception in which China was regarded as its main long term threat dictated its attitude towards the problem. Thus, the government in Jakarta could not afford to see Vietnam isolated which in its perception was the only country in the region that in the long run could play a meaningful role as a sort of buffer between China's hegemonic ambition and the rest of Southeast Asia.

Indonesia's commitment with ASEAN demanded that it should adhere to ASEAN's consensus which allowed Thailand to play a key role in dealing with the Kampuchean problem. Its readiness to accept Thai's leading role in regional issue caused criticism from within the country. The critics
demanded that being the largest country in ASEAN, Indonesia should play a more assertive role instead of meekly towing the ASEAN line even when it was not in its own national interest. The Suharto government ignored the criticism and continued to adhere to the ASEAN line in order to maintain ASEAN unity which it considered to have served its domestic and regional goals. Therefore, Indonesia could not sacrifice ASEAN unity for the sake of appeasing Vietnam. What emerged out of this highly complex problem was a dual track policy. By pursuing it, Indonesia could continue to maintain dialogue with Vietnam without jeopardizing consensus within ASEAN. Indonesia's appointment by other ASEAN members as ASEAN interlocutor with Vietnam justified this dual track policy. Despite the fact that throughout the period under study (1976-1987) Indonesia's attempt to find a peaceful political solution in Kampuchea did not achieve a significant result, it showed remarkable persistence in playing an influential role which the Indonesian government felt it was entitled to.

The Suharto government refusal to wreck ASEAN unity forced it to find other forum wherein Indonesia could play an important role in international affairs and thus silenced its critics. This eventually led to its courtship of the
non-aligned countries by hosting the Conference of the Ministers of Information of the Non-Aligned Countries in 1984 and through the celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the Bandung Conference in April 1985.

The Suharto government's determination to bring about economic development prevented it from strengthening its military strength since it could take away large amount of government budget from its main development priority. It also stemmed from the belief that spending a large amount of national budget for defence purposes was in contradiction with its concept of national/regional resilience, which stressed the importance of economic development and regional cooperation as essential ingredients in establishing domestic and regional stability. In addition, the nature of security threat that mainly came from within the country in the form of ethnic diversity, separatist tendencies and religious fundamentalism convinced the ruling elite of the need to concentrate more on development priority. The limited military capability that Indonesia had in terms of its military industries as well as the level of sophistication of its weaponry did not lead its security establishment to consider joining military alliance with any major power since it was fundamentally against the basic
tenet of Indonesia's foreign policy which demanded its strict adherence to an independent and active foreign policy.

While endeavouring to overcome its military weakness and refusing to be part of larger military alliance with any major power, Indonesia decided to embark on the policy of security/military cooperation with its ASEAN partners. This came about in the form of joint military exercises, joint military operation and intelligence cooperation. Though Indonesia had developed close cooperation with all its ASEAN partners, it was with Malaysia that Indonesia forged a strong and close relationship. Cultural and strategic factors played a significant role in this process. Despite this, Indonesia refused to depend on its smaller ASEAN partners for its military needs and continued to depend on Western military industries. Attempt had been made to reduce its heavy dependent on major western powers for its military equipments by establishing and expanding its military industry although it was still in initial stage.

Indonesia's interaction with the major powers, namely the United States, the Soviet Union, The People's Republic of China and Japan were primarily dictated by its domestic and regional goals. One could therefore, analytically divide its relations with the major powers into two parts, with the
United States and Japan on the one hand and the Soviet Union and China on the other. The nature of its economic development which necessitated large amount of foreign investment and external market for its industries, forced Indonesia and its ASEAN partners to forge strong and friendly relationship with these two countries. One could therefore understand that the Suharto government considered these two countries as regional partners in creating politically stable and economically vibrant Southeast Asia. This strong relationship with both the United States and Japan enabled Indonesia to gain diplomatic supports in dealing with regional problem such as the Kampuchean problem.

Indonesia, nevertheless began to assert itself particularly on issue which it regarded not to be in its interests. Indonesia's refusal to accept less outstanding candidate for the post of the United States Ambassador in Jakarta was clear example of this new assertiveness. The other issue was the growing relationship that the United States and Japan had been seeking to have with the People's Republic of China. It made it clear that this relationship with China should not be developed at the expense of the ASEAN member countries. Meanwhile, in its relationship with
Japan, Indonesia expressed its strong disapproval of Japan's growing military strength. Events in the recent past played an important role in this matter. Indonesia tended to believe that it was not on its own as well as regional interest to see Japanese growing military capability. It arose from its fear that it could bring back militarism in Japan. Instead of strengthening its military capability, Indonesia expected that Japan could provide technological assistance to the ASEAN countries to improve their military capabilities. In general, however, Indonesia continued to rely on the United States and Japan for political, military and economic supports.

Indonesia's relations with the Soviet Union had gradually develop from suspicion to a more friendly one. Two important factors played significant role in this regard. First, it related to the collapse of oil prices in the world market that hit Indonesian economy badly and force the New Order government to find a new market for its industrial products. This eventually led to a reassessment of Indonesia's relations with the Soviet Union. Secondly, the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev as the Secretary General of Soviet Communist Party brought about a new dimension in Soviet relations not only with Indonesia but also with the Asia-
Pacific region as a whole. These two factors were primarily responsible for the first ever visit in a decade by Indonesia's Foreign Minister to the Soviet Union.

However, the Soviet continued support for the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, its relatively underdeveloped economy and deep-seated suspicion towards communist ideology stood in the way of Indonesia's developing closer relations with the Soviet Union. Indonesia nevertheless refused to accept its ASEAN partners security perception that the Soviet Union posed a security threat to the region. It began to cultivate friendlier relations with the Soviet Union after Mikhail Gorbachev's speech at Vladivostok in July 1986. Indonesia regarded the speech as a positive development which could eventually lead to a solution to the longstanding problem in Kampuchea in particular and a more stable and peaceful regional environment in general.

Indonesia's attempt to normalize its diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China continued to be frustrated by various factors operating within the country as also from China itself. There was still strong lingering suspicion within the Indonesian security establishment about Chinese hegemonic ambitions in Southeast
Asia. The presence of economically dominant Chinese minority and frequent outburst of anti-Chinese feelings made it all the more difficult for the Suharto government to normalize diplomatic relations with China soon. This was further complicated by strong opposition both from the Muslim political parties and the old nationalist leaders. China's refusal to publicly give up its support for the communist insurgents in Southeast Asia put another formidable stumbling block.

The demand that Indonesia should normalize its diplomatic relations with China mostly came from two sources, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the business groups. Foreign Minister Adam Malik and his successor Mochtar Kusumaatmadja had been keen supporters for the cause of the normalization of diplomatic relations. Both realised that China was a geo-political reality that could not simply be ignored. They were well aware that Indonesia's attempt to find a peaceful political solution to the conflict in Kampuchea continued to be handicapped by the fact that Indonesia had no normal diplomatic relations with Beijing. Meanwhile, the business group's call for normalization of diplomatic relations came from their fear of losing competitive edge vis-a-vis other ASEAN's business groups.
which had benefited from their commercial link with China. These two factors finally paved the way for the signing of Memorandum of Understanding between Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry with its Chinese counter part in Singapore in July 1985. It was a new beginning in an attempt which ultimately could lead to a normalization of Indonesia's troubled relations with China. Concurrent with Chinese growing economic and political importance, there was an apparent reassessment in Indonesia that it could no longer ignore China's growing role in Southeast Asia in particular and the Asia-Pacific region general and hence it had to soon change its attitude towards China.

In brief, one could highlight some important aspect with regard to Indonesia's regional security policy: (1) development priority and the need to maintain political stability within the country continued to dictate Indonesia's regional policy; (ii) ASEAN continued to be the cornerstone in Indonesia's regional policy in Southeast Asia and adhere to its consensus in dealing with regional issues despite the growing criticism from section of the elite in the country that it should play a more assertive role; (iii) The demand that Indonesia should play an active role in international affairs compelled the Suharto government to
play a more active role within the Non-Aligned Movement and thus it could respond to its critics that Indonesia was still an important actor in the world stage; (iv) domestic and regional priorities also dictated Indonesia's interactions with the major powers which resulted in closer relations with the United States and Japan; (v) an emerging trend began to appear in the middle of 1980s that Indonesia actively pursued closer relations with the Soviet Union and China; (vi) Indonesia's new urgency to develop closer relations with both the Soviet Union and China could not be detached from the new political and strategic developments in regional and international environment.