DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL MILIEU
Competing National Debate:

The nexus of this debate can be represented by two alternate extremes of opinion: C. Raja Mohan who argues that India has a robust and identifiable and strategic vision and Harsh Pant who argues that India’s lack of a coherent strategic structure is what stunts the otherwise possible rise. Mohan asserts that how India projects its strategic culture is in essence, culturally Indian as well. Theorists must not fall into the trap of projecting their own expectations based largely on their own strategy formulation processes onto Indian expressions of strategy. Whereas in the United States one can turn to speeches, policy documents, the numerous forms of strategic defense reviews in order to derive U.S. strategic policy, India’s policy may be harder to identify.

However this is not the sufficient condition on which to base total lack of strategic culture. For this reason, the MOD and MEA reports have been employed in the analysis to demonstrate that, indeed India does have a clearly articulated objectives. Where Mohan argues that India can hold diverse and complex set up partially contradictory national objectives, Pant believes that India’s pursuit of multiple and at times contradictory analysis is inadvisable but also the policy serves as evidence that New Delhi lacks coherent national security objectives. This question is central to the analysis of India’s foreign policy objectives and considerations.

Pant seems to conceptualize strategic calculations from a realpolitik position, whereby structural concerns dictate the strategic environment in which decisions are made. He argues that India has failed to hold meaningful debates in order to determine the challenges of or solutions to, the current security environment. The absence of these debates and decisions are, thus evidence of a lack of coherent foreign
policy. Pant expounds his view by first describing some of the key challenges of India’s security in the coming decade. These include but are not limited to the changing structure of International system, China’s rise, nuclear posturing and arms reforms, the myriad challenges of alliance building in the Middle East (Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran to be specific), and energy security.

Pant explicitly argues that there is an “appreciation in Indian Policy making circles of India’s rising capabilities. But all this is happening in an intellectual vacuum with the result that the micro issues dominate the foreign policy discourse in the absence of in an overarching framework.” Pant believes that divisions among the decisions making elites is equal to an overall division on foreign policy.

In quoting Walter Lippman, Pant supports the claim that this division will result in the inability to “prepare adequately for war or to safeguard successfully its peace.” Perhaps the principle is true, if the state is indecisive and fails to follow a coherent policy it may at the end be counterproductive to achieving its goals. However, Pant fails to convincingly demonstrate that India is failing to engage in these debates.

Contradicting his own assertion Pant writes, “…Indian foreign policy strategist increasingly see their country as a great power in the making and are more ambitious than ever in defining Indian interests …” He later describes a level of surprising continuity in the foreign policy decisions in the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) and the newly elected Congress Party. Despite two very different groups of elites coming to some form of consensus on foreign policy, Pant continues to assert that “Indian policy stands divided on fundamental foreign policy choices”. Whether or not this can be explained by the nature of democracies in general, which are inherently and vocally competitive or if indeed, this is a uniquely Indian
feature, will underpin the entirety of this thesis. The second assumption behind Pant’s reasoning can be explained through his personal belief that India’s current foreign policy is untenable in the future. Stated simply, “India cannot continue with its multi-dimensional foreign policy for long without incurring significant costs.” Pant creates a false binary for Indian strategic thinking when he claims that India’s failure to choose between an alliance with Israel or Iran and whether to cooperate or hedge against rising China is evidence of an absence in foreign policy. Disaster for a policy, however, is not equal to an absence policy. In contrast, India’s belief in its ability to maintain successful and independent and multilateral alliances with various other states is arguably evidence of a strategic culture or doctrine, however ill-advised it may be.

Indeed, Mohan mobilizes similar examples of Indian foreign policy practice and rhetoric to highlight a robust and strategic culture. Mohan points to the Indian behaviour towards China as in fact “mimicking the US in focusing on bilateral trade as a means to prolong any conflict with rising China.” Even the burgeoning Indo-US relationship is evidence of a shift in India’s strategic calculations. Mohan highlights the domestic debate around the prudence of a warming US relationship. He points out that the Congress party risked political survival to enact a foreign policy that at the height of the cold war was abhorrent. Congress’s base was couched in the rhetoric (and actions) of non-alignment and anti-western sentiments. In the light of both the internal and external shifts of the new security environment, Mohan believes that there has been a shift in strategic objectives, which he calls a “shifting from the emphasis on autonomy to an emphasis on responsibility”.

To be sure, this evolution is still underway and not without deep ideological challenges. What began in Mohan’s view after the nuclear tests as a growing self-confidence is now the first signs of evolving national security perspective.
This evolution is important for two reasons. Firstly, India like the United State has a “sense of a larger national destiny, and uncontrollable attraction to idealism… and is therefore a difficult partner to engage”.\textsuperscript{11} India’s role in the international system is changing, whether or not it is rising boldly or clumsily maybe better understood if India’s strategic vision is clarified. In large part, India’s strategic culture may shed much needed light on the continued debate about India’s rise and future relevance. Secondly, given that India’s strategic objectives may aid in an understanding of its intentions and presumably strategic behaviour, the process of identifying clear strategic policy is paramount. Yet, India’s strategic culture is hard to determine. In part because Western theorists are trapped within their own culture prisms, they expect other states to present their intentions in the same way as they would, calculate decisions the same way and carry out policy in their fashion. The reality is much more complex. The existing body of literature on strategic culture point out that a great deal of US understanding about the Soviet Union was because we were unable to operate outside ever cultural prism and thus evaluate the Soviet strategic culture. Therefore an analysis of India’s evolving national security will have a value added relevance both to theoretical debates about India’s rise and also for the policy makers who seek to better understand something such as a burgeoning Indo-US alliance.

The implications of these assumptions will be addressed in detail in the latter part of the thesis. The evidence employed from speeches, MEA and MOD reports and parliamentary debates underlay the subsequent rejection of Pant’s claim in favour of Mohan’s contrary argument that India does have a clearly delineated strategic goals.
The International Variables and Linkages:

The world politics in the post-Cold War period has moved apace, but with markings of uncertainty and instability. The uncertainty of the emerging international security system characterised by conceptions of both confrontation and co-operation has imparted increased significance to the management India's national security system. Strategic policies are influenced a great deal by the nature of the international security system. Policy-makers take decisions after assessing the external threats, challenges and opportunities. These change with time and environment, and hence the need for the policy-making structures to have the capacity to remain flexible and responsive to change. Threats always require immediate addressing; challenges can be dealt with over a period of time. Opportunities for furthering national interests and affecting transformation of relations in international politics do not come often; therefore, they require immediate attention of the policy-makers.

The international security system during the Cold War was based on bipolarity and was predictable. During this period, the world survived without major wars in a highly competitive security regime between the United States and the Soviet Union. Most of the Third World aligned with either the US or the Soviet Union camp. But many of the Third World countries could not secure themselves from the threats of intra-regional rivalry as in South Asia, West Asia and the Korean peninsula. For these countries, management of national security became a highly challenging task. However, India managed its national security in a satisfactory manner during this period. Its policy of non-alignment and strategic understanding with the Soviet Union paid-off.

Due to the predictability of the strategic patterns during the Cold War, India was in a position to objectively assess the intensity as well as
the direction of threats to its security. That helped India in exercising proper policy postures and responses. The end of the Cold War has brought about major consequences for the international security system, and hence new policy problems for various states in the developing world. Now the predictability of the Cold War has given way to uncertainty and complexity. Many of the strategic assumptions of the past have changed.

The end of the Cold War coincided with the emergence of globalisation of economies. New economic policies (NEP) also became a consideration in redefining and reorienting foreign and security policies. The US and other developed countries and the countries of the Third World wanted to use this economic factor for rebuilding bilateral strategic relations. Many believed it was the beginning of a new era in which economics will precede geo-politics in determining inter-state relations. However, this model did not take roots in South Asia. Both India and Pakistan have looked towards the US and other developed nations for helping them in realising the objectives of NEP. At the level of bilateral Indo-Pak relations, competitive security and geo-politics have continued to have precedence over economic factors in the formulation of their foreign and security policies.

For India, disintegration of the Soviet Union has meant uncertainty on several aspects viz., supply of weapons systems, supply of spare parts, diplomatic support on Kashmir and other politico-strategic issues in and outside the United Nations, and as a counterweight to the US in South Asia. However, this has also provided India with an opportunity to reorient its defence and foreign policies.

There have emerged three broad perceptions of international security:

- In the nuclear age, security is mutual and dependent on accommodation, and not confrontation. The former Soviet
Union and the US and its European allies activated this perception in 1987 with the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) treaty and later the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). This trend has continued till date. Both the US and Russia have broad understanding that arms control, particularly in the nuclear field, is in the interest of enhancing their mutual security.

- The post-Cold War period international system is also confrontationist and anarchic in nature. Certain states are aiming to maximize their relative power positions over other states. At the same time there are states that are striving for survival. The US has unilaterally decided for National Missile Defence (NMD) and the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) systems. The ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) treaty signed between Russia and the US in 1972 came to an end with the US unilaterally withdrawing from the treaty on June 13, 2002. This is seen as a case of ‘offensive realism’ or maximising power to which others will respond with ‘defensive realism’ or increasing power for survival.\textsuperscript{12} The US adoption of pre-emptive strike as a legitimate method of self-defence against rogue states or enemies has already motivated other countries including India, to adopt similar postures against their perceived threats.\textsuperscript{13}

- In the post-Cold War period, the concept of balance-of-power has become more prominent at the regional level. During the Cold War period, the US had a direct role in balancing the Russian power. Now in the post-Cold War period it has been suggested that Soviet power can be balanced at the regional level without direct US involvement.\textsuperscript{14} Similarly, in other
regions too, hostile powers can be checkmated through the balance-of-power logic. Two Asian powers, China and India, have attracted the attention of the US policy-makers. The US is in a position to exploit the situation of adversarial interstate relations in South Asia through its regional version of balance-of-power. China can be counter-balanced by Russia and also India. Pakistan and also China can be used to balance India. India is placed in this difficult geo-strategic environment, hence there are limitations for its policy-making in the post-Cold War period. India has however, so far played its cards well. It has tried to make best use of whatever opportunities are there for it to further its security interests.

**The US Pre-eminence and Unilateralism:**

Just when the Cold War was beginning to end, middle-level countries aspired for enhanced manoeuvering power and strategic autonomy in world politics. But the US-led Operations ‘Desert Storm’ and ‘Desert Shield’ against Iraq in 1990-91 in the Gulf War demonstrated the rise of the US as a sole Superpower. The entire Third World felt insecure due to the end of bipolarity and emergence of unilateralism in US foreign and security policies. Robert Jervis predicted that the end of Cold War and bipolarity would lead to increased conflict in areas having politico-strategic rivalry and disputes.¹⁵

The early 1990s was a period of dilemma for India. It felt threatened by the US preponderance and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's capacity to project and use power in Third World countries even after the end of ideological conflict with the Soviet Union. India’s difficulties increased further due to the uncertainty of Russian military and diplomatic support. The US pressure on India for signing the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT) started increasing. It is significant to note that India acquired nuclear weapons during the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{16} and Sino-Pak nuclear collaboration was a motivating factor in India's nuclear effort. But it is very difficult to substantiate whether the 1991 Gulf War and the threats of US preponderance had anything to do with the Indian nuclearisation.\textsuperscript{17}

In the post-Pokhran II period, India as a state with nuclear weapons is more assured of itself while dealing with the US. Even the US has somewhat changed its perceptions towards India’s legitimate role in the regional and global strategic environment. India is seeking a new cooperative and even strategic relationship with the US. The Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security has observed: "US pre-eminence in the global strategic architecture is unlikely to diminish in the foreseeable future. Meaningful, broad-based engagement with the United States, spanning political, economic and technological interests and commonalities, will have a positive impact on our external security concerns with a resultant albeit less visible impact on our internal security environment. Conversely, an adversarial relationship with that state can have significant negative repercussions across the same broad range of issues and concerns".\textsuperscript{18}

This perception has guided India on the issues of the NMD and the TMD and more recently on the war against terrorism in Afghanistan and the war against Iraq. India's policy-makers have taken these developments as an opportunity to build strategic relations with the US. However, a futuristic approach on defence and security requires a deeper scrutiny of these issues and their impact on the arms race and nuclear proliferation and also on regional or Indian security.
India's policy on the Iraq war has a mix of both principles and pragmatism. India wanted that use of force for disarming Iraq must be backed by the UN. But it has not gone overhand on the US war considering the growing relationship between the two countries. The idea behind this flexibility was “to remain firm on the side of peace but not to let differences with the US come in the way of strengthening the 'strategic partnership' with it.”

The 21st century is termed as the century of ascendance of Asian power. This view is based on the assumption of the relative decline in the US and Russian power and increase in Asian power, particularly that of China, Japan and India. According to one perception, this provides an incentive for a realignment of interests and allegiances, with the United States and Russia coming together to contain the new Asian centres of world power. The US has politico-military wherewithal to balance on its own the growing power of Japan and India. But it will need strategic partners to regionally balance China. Here, India's, and also Russia's, importance as strategic partners of the US increases. But the situation is far from final.

Some political analysts foresee a strategic storm surfacing in Asia. There are fears of renewal of Cold War in Asia and 'at the core of the Cold War in Asia is the US strategy to contain Asian centres of power and influence.' The US containment strategy or unilateralism faces a serious challenge from China's increasing power and influence in Asia and beyond. Such a scenario of conflict and new power equations in Asia creates policy dilemmas for India.

The strategy or best option for India to maximise its interests according to Professor S.D. Muni,“a strategy of forging differential and issue- based coalitions; with the major concerned players in Asia is the
best option for India to deal with the unfolding strategic reality in Asia at present." According to Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, “India’s strategic interests would be served better through sustaining a non-hegemonic polycentric world order which leaves it with greater flexibility to pursue its national interests.”

**Role of Nuclear Weapons:**

The Report of the Group of Ministers observes: "Despite the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons continue to be legitimised by treaties like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The US, European, Russian etc., doctrines stress the value of nuclear weapons in national and collective defence strategies." India cannot afford to be blind to the nuclear realities. One, there has been proliferation of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War period. India and Pakistan have declared themselves as nuclear weapon states. Apart from that, North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Libya are believed to be vigorously carrying on nuclear weapons programme. Two, the US has unilaterally decided to abandon ABM treaty, and go ahead with NMD and TMD. More importantly, it has also formulated a nuclear doctrine that envisages use of nuclear weapons against states. Three, during the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, it has been highlighted that even non-state actors plan to have nuclear devices to use them against states. In fact, US President George W. Bush in his speech on June 1, 2002 highlighted the danger of terrorists having Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capability and the US strategy to strike pre-emptively against such dangers. In a curious development just ten days after his speech, on June 10 the US officials arrested an Al Qaida suspect at Chicago airport with plans to detonate a 'dirty bomb’. The challenge for states is to control these WMD with terrorists.
In January 2003, the Indian government formalised the country's nuclear doctrine and command and control structure.²⁷ Now, the no-first-use (NFU) policy stands qualified. India will not adhere to NFU against non-nuclear states if they attack India or its forces anywhere, in the world with biological or chemical weapons.²⁸ By this qualification India has not only extended the scope of nuclear strikes, but in a way has conferred on itself the option of pre-emption in certain circumstances.²⁹ The unrestrained Pakistani behaviour during Operation Parakram and the menace of non-state actors must have been the major considerations while qualifying the NFU.³⁰

In India's threat perception, major threats to its security come from the continuous proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles in its neighborhood.³¹ Apart from the strategic role of nuclear weapons, policymakers in India face a challenge of maintaining a psychological advantage of military superiority over Pakistan-an advantage somewhat distorted by Pakistan's nuclear capability. Broadly, India sees a two-fold role for nuclear weapons. One, nuclear weapons are not for war fighting, but for deterrence. Two, nuclear weapons are also a political instrument. The US, Russia, China and Pakistan emphasise 'blackmail' and even 'hegemony' in the political role of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, India emphasises 'counter-blackmail' and 'counter-hegemonism'. Backed with nuclear power, India seeks to play a more influential role as a democratic balancer and stabiliser in Asia.

At present India's nuclear strategy and posture are largely influenced by the policies of Pakistan and China. The combined threat of China and Pakistan has to be met both on the defence and diplomatic fronts.
Alliance against Terrorism:

Transnational terrorism is being perceived as a major threat to international peace and security after September 11. The Security Council Resolution 1373 highlights the nature of the threat and means to tackle it. It says that, there is "a close connection between international terrorism and transnational crime, illicit drugs, money laundering and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other deadly materials." It reaffirms "the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter." All means include: (a) the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence and (b) the need to enhance the coordination of national, sub-regional, regional and international efforts to strengthen a global response to the threats to international security from non-state actors.

The US-led war in Afghanistan and the emergence of an alliance against terrorism has introduced a new feature in the international security system. The US war against terrorism in Afghanistan has thrown up new possibilities of challenges and opportunities for India's policy-makers that must be comprehended keeping in view the larger US geo-strategic goals in Asia, particularly for containing Iran and Iraq and also possibly Russia and China. India should also examine the possibility of prolonged US presence in Afghanistan and its fallout on Indo-Pak relations. The increasing importance of Pakistan in the US security calculus after September 11 is a matter of concern for India. India believes that the US will not help Pakistan on the Kashmir issue as well as its (Pakistan's) desperate quest for strategic parity with India. In any case, September 11 has "provided India with a rare chance to work with the US in changing Pakistan's national course towards political moderation, economic modernisation and regional harmony."
**Rapid Technological Developments:**

Technological developments are acquiring increasing importance in security policy due to their scope of penetration and utility as means of offence and defence. The rapid technological developments underway will not only facilitate threats by reducing a country's time but also add new dimensions to threats and challenges, such as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and offensive /defensive information warfare. The RMA is a military concept linked to the fusion of technology and military force for the purpose of a swift and decisive victory. They essentially reflect the (incomparability of) abilities of the US and NATO to conclude a war with minimal collateral damage and casualties.

The concepts of the RMA and asymmetric warfare also reflect the revolution in strategic affairs having not only the military dimension, but political too. Lawrence Freedman has explained the importance of the political dimension of the revolution in strategic affairs. According to him, the end of the Cold War has heralded a revolution in political affairs, reflecting a situation where in major powers appears less likely to go to war with one another, but they are more likely to intervene in conflicts involving weak states, militia groups, drug cartels and terrorists. The cumulative effect of these two revolutions (in military and political affairs) has resulted in a more broad-based revolution in strategic affairs rather than just military affairs.

India's perception of threat from the rapid technological developments can be summed up thus: "The revolution in Information Technology (IT) which is sweeping the world has deepened the process of globalisation. The role of media in creating, shaping and changing perception will continue to expand. In the military sector, the technology-driven Information Warfare (IW) and the RMA will have a dramatic
impact in the coming decades. Developments in communication and space
technologies are shaping everyday life and economy in a far more
fundamental fashion than is ordinarily realized."\textsuperscript{37}

The field of military-related IT has witnessed good progress in
India. India has established two major space systems—the Indian National
Satellite (INSAT) system and the Indian Remote Sensing Satellites (IRS)
system—that form important elements of national infrastructure.\textsuperscript{38}
According to this policy, "India is developing high-resolution imaging
satellites which will have strategic value and take care of the national
security interests."\textsuperscript{39} The space communication systems can have
significant battlefield applications in planning, deployment of forces, and
offensive and defensive operations.\textsuperscript{40}

After the Kargil conflict, there have been extensive deliberations
among the Indian Air Force, the Defence Research and Development
Organisation and the Indian Space Research Organisation on space-based
electronic intelligence.\textsuperscript{41} India might soon develop a dedicated satellite
exclusively, military missions.\textsuperscript{42} Incorp. India has done well in the
development of space systems compared to its main military rivals-
Pakistan and China and its capabilities to build supercomputers and a vast
information technology infrastructure further provide India's policy-makers
several leverages over its immediate challengers.

\textbf{Regional Security in South Asia :}

The South Asian sub-system in the international security system
has provided main challenges and threats to India's national security and
defence. The region, despite several commonalities, has witnessed
"interdependence of shared rivalry rather than the interdependence of
shared interests."\textsuperscript{43} India's defence policy has been influenced by a number
of regional factors such as: Chinese and Pakistani aggressions; politico-
military doctrines of both Pakistan and China; elements of political dissonance between India and her neighbours; Pakistani pursuit of acquiring nuclear weapons, latest weapon technologies and equipment; and arms sales policies of great powers. India's threat perception has also been influenced by the link that has existed between the global power and local (India-Pakistan) rivalries. This linkage has been an important factor in determining the course of political and strategic issues, such as the Kashmir issues, arms race and nuclear proliferation in South Asia. The US and China have played a significant intrusive role in South Asian security environment. India has faced challenges of the US and China supporting Pakistan's military programmes. In the recent times, India has been more concerned at Pakistan-China military collaboration.

China has played an intrusive role in South-Asian politico-strategic issues with the objective of keeping India under constant strategic pressure. The process of normalisation of Sino-Indian relations, which began with Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988, and the end of Cold War have not diminished Pakistan's value in China's strategic calculations. China is believed to be working towards not only creating Pakistan as a viable counterweight to India's power in South Asia, but to tilt the nuclear balance in Pakistan's favour.\textsuperscript{44} India fears that Pakistan's capabilities in nuclear warheads and missile delivery systems are being beefed up with Chinese and also North Korean help.\textsuperscript{45} It believes that "the asymmetry in terms of nuclear forces is strongly in favour of China which additionally has helped Pakistan to build missile and nuclear capability. Some reports have speculated over the Pakistani ballistic missile superiority, which may have left India militarily vulnerable."\textsuperscript{46}

India has been concerned over China's support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue also. China's Kashmir policy has been drifting slowly to a position of evenhandedness since the mid-1970s. Before Pokhran-II,
particularly after Rajiv Gandhi's visit, China's policy was hardly distinguishable from neutrality as it was no more willing to side with Pakistan on the issue. It adopted a policy of 'careful neutralism' on Kashmir.47 Its emphasis now is on the resolution of the problem bilaterally through negotiations. Samina Yasmeen finds inconsistency in China's Kashmir policy. She argues that China’s South-Asian policy has been part of its broad anti-Soviet counter-encirclement strategy. As the threats from Russia in the post-Cold War period have diminished, China's South, Asia and Kashmir policies have also witnessed change.48 China's position now accepts that Kashmir is a bilateral problem between India and Pakistan and it needs to be resolved through dialogue. However, there is no reason to believe that Beijing has surrendered its options vis-a-vis the Kashmir issue. In the overall framework of India's security, Beijing's posture on the Kashmir issue—though a low profile one at present—is of considerable significance for regional stability.

India has viewed China as a long-term security challenge. In fact, India has challenged Chinese nuclear hegemony in South-Asia by declaring itself a nuclear weapon state after the Pokhran II Shakti nuclear tests. According to Barry Buzan, India's transformation to a pre-eminent or great power status "does not depend on all-out rivalry with China; it can also achieve this status while cooperating with China."49 However, India's desire to play a role, on its own or with others, for strategic balance in Asia is in direct conflict with China's ambition of making Asia as its area of influence. Both India and China have become more suspicious of each other's long-term security agenda. India suspects that "China's policy vis-à-vis India will be not necessarily to resolve, but keep differences within manageable limits."50 Similarly, India cannot be oblivious to China "rapidly modernising its Armed Forces and building political and military bridges with a large number of countries in our neighbourhood."51
India's defence and security policies seek to deal with the Chinese and Pakistani threats and challenges on both military and diplomatic fronts. Often, Indo-Pak conflict formation is de-escalated or managed through diplomatic means, mainly through the US' good offices. India has military superiority over Pakistan and is capable of winning a war on its own. But India's success against the Chinese threats both on the diplomatic and the military fronts is suspect. India sees an opportunity in the intensifying rivalry between the US and China. The Sino-US rivalry has further, intensified after China's vehement opposition to the US attack on Iraq in March 2003 without UN Security Council approval. Pakistan has also sided with the Chinese on the Iraq War issue. As a result, India and US are likely to come closer on issues of strategic cooperation. It is believed that the US strategic partnership with India can countervail the Chinese threat. But the Indian policy-makers will have to weigh the, pros and cons of such strategies.

It has been suggested that India must dovetail military capabilities with long-term political objectives. These views have led to speculation whether India has an ambition for creating an area of influence. Speculations about India having an objective of creating asymmetrical power relations have also led to the concept of India's 'extended power posture' that includes South-East Asia, the West-Asia and the Indian Ocean. Notwithstanding the various views about the raison d'être of India's military programme, security from external threats has so far been the single most important reason for its defence preparedness.

As India's power status is increasing, it is inevitable that it would like to use the influence of its military capabilities to further other political objectives in its foreign and security policies. These political objectives are: autonomy of decision-making; enhancing its manoeuvrability in international politics; to be admitted into the management of various
multilateral nuclear, missiles and arms control issues; and influential role as a democratic balancer and stabilizer in Asia.

At a conceptual level, India’s area of influence is not confined to South Asia. A number of Indians today envisage an extended South-Asia as India's strategic frontier or area of influence. This area would include the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran, China, South-Asian countries, Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar and northern Indian Ocean. In future, India's policies will be formulated, keeping in view the threats and challenges, to its security in this larger area of influence.

Footnotes and References

2. Ibid, pg 16
3. Walter Lippman as quoted by Pant, pg 16
4. Ibid, pg 11
5. Ibid, pg 12-3
6. Ibid, pg 16
7. Ibid, pg 12
8. Ibid, pg 15
10. Ibid, pg 151-2
11. Ibid, pg 152
12. Morgenthau maintains that states have an innate will to power and are inherently offensive in their outlook. While Kenneth Waltz maintains that states merely want to survive and are driven to maximize security for defensive purposes. Both Realists emphasize the role of power in an anarchic world order. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and


16. For details see, Raj Chengappa, Weapons for Peace. 2000, HarperCollins; New Delhi. The book reveals that India completed weaponisation in May 1994. Former Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and Dr Abdul Kalam confirmed to the Kargil Review panel that weaponisation was completed in 1992-94, quoted by K. Subrahmanyam in ‘From Indira to Gowda: It was Bomb All the Way,’ The Times of India, New Delhi, April 17, 2000.

17. Eliot Cohen has observed that the American show of military power during the Gulf War created an incentive for nuclear proliferation. He also says that increased instability in certain conflict-prone areas of the world in the coming years may see the use of an atomic bomb as a weapon of war. Quoted in Robert J. Lieber, ‘American Hegemony, Regional Security and Proliferation in the Post-Cold War International System’, Contemporary Security Policy, April 1996, 16 (1) 1, 4.


20. George Liska visualized the US strategy along these lines just when President Gorbachev was drawing the curtain on the Cold War. See his ‘From Containment to Concert,’ Foreign Policy, Spring 986, (62) 3-23.


(64)


27. As for command and control structure, a National Command Authority (NCA) and Strategic Forces Command (SFC) have been established. NCA has two bodies-political council and 'executive council. The Prime Minister will head the former and he will authorise the use of nuclear strike after taking advice from the executive council. The SFC will be the custodian of all nuclear weapons and delivery systems.


29. In fact, striking a parallel with the US strikes against Iraq, India's External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha, observed that India too had a case for a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan for the letter's sponsorship of terrorism against India. See, ‘Striking a parallel with Iraq,’ *Hindustan Times*, New Delhi. April 8, 2003.

30. In fact, due to these developments there was an increasing pressure on the government from official and non-official constituencies to scrap the doctrine of NFU. The third NSAB too suggested for scrapping NFU and resuming nuclear testing.


33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

36. ‘Reforming the National Security System’, no. 8, p.6, para 2.3.


38. Reforming the National Security System, no. 8, p. 7, para 2.8.


42. Spy satellite project takes shape, no.30. Ibid.

43. Ibid.


45. According to an assessment of the U.S. intelligence officials, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is bigger than India's and also it has more accurate and effective delivery systems. For details see, "Pakistan's N-might bigger than India's, says US," The Times of India. New Delhi. June 8, 2000. This assessment may be motivated and inaccurate. However, this shows that how critical can be the Chinese help to Pakistan's nuclear and missile capabilities vis-a-vis India and tilting the balance against India.

46. Reforming the National Security System, no. 8, p. 10, para 2.21.


52. Ministry of Defence, no.37, para 1.12.

53. Ibid, para 1.11.

54. Pakistan Prime Minister, Mir Zafarrula Khan Jamali visited China on March 24-26, 2003 and during the visit the leadership of the two countries opposed the US military action against Iraq and called for its immediate end. "Pakistan-China Agree to Have Close Contact on Iraq Crisis" at http://paknews.com/top.phd?id=1&date1=2003-03-25.