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INTRODUCTION: AN APPROACH TO NATIONAL SECURITY
This study delineates the national security of India as the principal component of increased national interest and utilizing that analytical framework, sets out to critically examine the dynamics of continuity and change within the broad contours of India’s foreign policy over last six decades. The endeavour, it is hoped, will prove as a more pragmatic benchmark for the conduct of external relations during this decade, and a basis for forging a stable national consensus on external relations in the contemporary era of coalition politics and rapid socio-economic transition.

The near past has been a witness to a perceptible ascendancy in India’s profile. A seat at a new ‘QUAD’ at the WTO and participation into the G-20, which has now clearly emerged as the major forum for global governance, has pitchforked India into playing a leading role in global affairs. The factors contributing to India’s rising profile include (a) maturing of its democratic institutions; (b) greater economic openness and integration with the global economy since 1991 reforms; (c) commendable economic performance since 2001 during which India’s economic growth was second only to China; (d) enhanced military capability; (e) marked shift in its international stance since the demise of the Cold War. During the financial crisis and the global meltdown of 2008-09, India was one of the few economies whose financial sectors remained unscattered and which still managed to achieve reasonable economic growth. This has further buttressed India’s position as leading global player. These developments necessitate greater security thinking and foresight, as also afford an unprecedented opportunity for India to pursue its national interest and achieve its medium to long term strategic objectives more effectively.
At the same time, increasing global economic interdependence has surmounted the risks in the case of failure to do so.

From the perspective of India’s principal fault-lines, it is obvious that demographic pressures, regional and income disparities, populist democracy, ethno-religious diversities and the deteriorating resource environment poses a dangerous mix for the near future, and will impact social cohesion and good governance, and thereby economic growth. While a great deal will depend untackling the constraints in the domestic economy and polity, maintaining a benign external environment will also play a crucial role in achieving India’s objective. India’s foreign policy must, therefore, have a sharply defined strategic objective which is strongly related to clearly articulated interest.

Objectives:

An important debate exists about the determination of India’s posited rise. There is a diverse spectrum of opinions from notable South-Asian Theorists; at one extreme authors like Raja C. Mohan or Stephen P. Cohen argue that India has been on a clear upward trajectory since the 1998 detonation of its nuclear weapon. In contrast Ramesh Thakur’s writing just before India’s explosion into the nuclear power club argued against the likelihood of a rising India. A vast majority of Indian focussed scholarship has emphasized a qualified analysis of a slowly rising India. For example, Harsh Pant’s analysis of a clumsy and unguaranteed rise of the South Asian democracy occupies a large swath of popular scholarship on India. Pant argues that India’s main challenge in the coming decades is its lack of a coherent national security strategy and culture of foreign policy debating. His conviction stems from a core assumption about India’s strategic vision: that it doesn’t have one.
In contrast Mohan posits that India does have a grand strategy and asset of observable national security objective and concludes this by looking at objectives and parliamentary debates and India’s behaviour with allies and enemies over many decades to demonstrate India’s clear strategic objective. Mohan concludes that New Delhi’s National Security Objectives are subdivided into “Three concentric Circles”, India’s immediate neighbourhood, its extended neighbourhood, and the global stage. (See Appendix II) While these three levels of analysis will be explored in-depth, the significance of Mohan’s assertion rests not only on the claim that India does have a clear strategic objectives although they have changed over a period of time as India increasingly began to conceptualize itself as a rising power.

Although few of the theories mentioned above do believe that India’s rise is assured, many recognize that India is beginning to play a more significant role in the international system. As India begins to acquire more influence in the international arena, the type of power it plans to be and how the new power is exercised is of considerable importance. If India does rise, what kind of power it will be, what are New Delhi’s strategic calculations and how does it define its current security environment? Finally, what do India’s strategic planning documents over the past decades tell us about India’s national security objectives? These questions are of critical importance to security scholars and scholars of international relations and are the central questions that underpin the analysis of this study.

Mohan’s thesis will be tested using previously underutilized primary sources. The current corpus of literature relies overwhelmingly on Indian military, economic and political actions but fails to utilise Indian primary sources, published foreign policy documents. By analysing the
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and Ministry of Defence (MOD) annual reports, it is hoped that new light will be shed on the utility of Indian planning documents as indicators of Indian foreign policy objectives.

**Methodology and the Analytic Approach:**

A portrayal of Indian foreign policy of more than six decades cannot be drawn only through theoretical paradigms. Political actors are quite complex, and cultures far too deep, to submit to a dry hypothesis without illuminating surmise with examples and inferences with anecdote. Economists can believe in universal constructs applicable to all societies, but those who study people in the context of their unique cultural habitat, mostly rely on what is called a ‘Thick description’ which flesh out the manner in which people actually react and respond and behave and conduct themselves in the affairs of foreign policy.

Nevertheless, the methodology of the proposed study is guided by the consequentialist view of neo-realism as has been expounded broadly in system theory and the political economy theories of international relations. This contrasts both with the view that the value of an action may derive from the value of the kind of character whose action it is, and the view that its value, belonging to it simply as an act of truth telling, promise-keeping etc. Implicating the neorealist principles consists of reasoned argument to justify a specific position taken of a particular line of inquiry.

Further, the framework of this work is influenced by cosmopolitan world view, instead of post-colonial, that is largely committed to the idea of complex interdependence and communicative
rationality. The mode of narration will combine both techniques of ‘stylized facts’ and ‘thick description’. The text will interweave facts and analysis. Special attention will be paid to issues of symbolic significance: Historical events and developments that are anchored or survived in the time frame of post-Independence India.

The research method employed was primary source document analysis with supplemental research on documentary sources, such as academic literature. While the central focus of the research is the text of the reports, events, actions will be considered to conceptualize the analysis. The methodology and the model of my approach is similar to that used by Walter Ladwig in his article “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine”. Ladwig uses a combination of speeches by Indian policy makers as well as Indian military actions to understand the origins, and challenges of the Cold Start Doctrine. Rather than rely solely on speeches to understand military doctrine as Ladwig does, published Annual Reports have been utilized in addition to the speeches and internal debates used by other authors as context to understand the National Security more broadly.

Raja Mohan’s analysis of India and grand strategy is the foundation of the inherent analysis. He uses the tones “Grand strategy, Strategic Vision, Strategic Goals, and Foreign Policy” interchangeably in his Analysis on “Three Concentric circles” of India’s strategic objectives. While the terms can be differentiated, for the purposes of this analysis, Mohan’s phraseology has been adopted for continuity.

Throughout the narrative of this thesis, “National Security” has been employed to denote India’s conceptualisation of its National Security Environment, while the challenges and the solution are encompassed in the
term ‘Security Objectives’. The goals and the policy prescription are understood in the context of Indian planning documents and are thus self-reflective. This definition is beneficial for the purposes of this study because it aims to derive how India understands its own security concerns, in contrast to relying solely on externally derived definitions. How the United States or how Pakistan understands Indian security issues will be inherently different from how India defines them. This thesis is primarily interested in Indian definitions of its own foreign policy.

The past decade has posed some key security challenges for Indian strategic considerations. This includes becoming a nuclear weapon states, the attacks on 9/11 and the increasing international attention on transnational terrorism.

Approaching the brink of war with Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, 2006 Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear deal and the Mumbai attacks in 2008. How these events have shaped the language used in Indian foreign policy documents will serve as an indication of how India will continue to balance the challenges of foreign policy with the security requisites of being a rising power.

Data:

Studying the process and systemic performance of the Indian Foreign Policy with reference to the National Security, data used in this research, the methods applied in the approach with caveats identified in data and methods have been utilized keeping in the mind following points:

1. Events/tendencies that have been already well documented but not analyzed yet.
(2) To prioritize those facts this could be verified with the help of other available facts.

(3) To look for the missing links as they could make the analysis much more balanced.

(4) Comparatively giving importance to those facts which are more extensive because miniscule facts would be easily distorted.

(5) Analyzing the main research topic in such a manner so that one could differentiate between conceptual myths and political-economic facts and could reconstruct an objective narrative.

The primary data used for the purposes of comprehending India’s national security objectives are the annual MEA and MOD reports. These reports are arguably the closest proximity of inter-agency documents that reflect India’s strategic concerns in the absence of a formalized strategic review process.

While India does not have a similar strategic review process to the United States, the annual MEA reports reflect and inter-agency process through which national security objectives are delineated. The MOD reports, not only outline the proverbial “wishlist” of India’s defence services but also clearly articulates the security environment in which New Delhi finds itself. Together these documents serve to elucidate how India conceptualizes of its central security concerns and how these perceptions have changed from time to time. Contrary to divining India’s concerns slowly from actions, incorporating an analysis of Indian primary sources will offer a greater understanding of India’s national security objective.
Since the time frame of this analysis starts right from the dawn of National Independence till 2010, the period encompasses more than six decades, but the availability of the primary data mainly covers the period from 1999-2010. Also, the reviews have been published online and English spanning 1999-2010. Although this period is based on availability, it is an acceptable period as it reflects India’s national security concerns directly after the first overt and successful nuclear tests of May 1998, the reciprocal tests of Pakistan a few weeks later, and but also before the critical Kargil War\(^1\). The subsequent reports also deals with post-Kargil, both pre and post-9/11, and pre and post Mumbai in 2008. Although these are not the only critical developments in recent Indian national security challenges, they do present a relevant time-frame for national security objectives.

It has been hypothesized that changes in Indian National Security Objectives are the most visible after these events which have had dramatic and lasting effect on Indian security concerns.

The period before 1999 has been proposed to serve as a backdrop for the aforementioned area. For this period library method has been utilised incorporating the references and analysis available in various books, periodicals and journals. Moreover, for the cross-verification of the issues advice from experts and period specialists have also been undertaken.

**Data Caveats:**

The analysis may be limited to the heavy reliance on official documents. Since the analysis is based on government documents, conclusions may be actually projecting what the Indian government wants to project with respect to its foreign policy considerations. Although Indian
actions have been considered and are reflected retrospectively in each report, the thesis focuses primarily on Indian intentions and calculations over and above their actions. In doing so, it has been assumed that India’s intentions are important both in the planning process and also in the eventual implementation of foreign policies. Nevertheless, the planning documents are one useful indicator (out of potentially many) for how India perceives and operates its national security environment within the matrix of its foreign policy framework.

**Foreign Policy and Existing Traditions of Inquiry:**

It is customary nowadays to divide the history of Independent India's foreign policy into the pre-1991 and post-1991 periods, but what one can say about the impact of LPG on Indian foreign policy? Disaggregating the observable changes that have occurred on the foreign policy front is especially difficult because 1991 produced two distinct ruptures-the old domestic order of dirigisme ended, but so did the ancient regime of international bipolarity. Indian foreign policy has had to adapt to this fundamental metamorphosis in both external and internal environments. Moreover, rising global tensions and regional unpredictability have gone to affect India's national security with the security managers having difficult choices to make. In the contemporary globalised, networked world security, in its all dimensions, is a more complicated business than it was earlier.

This international scenario has compelled India to redefine its national interests and major adjustments in the spheres of both foreign policy and international relation theory. These homogenous tasks, coupled with an attendant polarization of opinion on how to deal with them, have pitted India's policy-makers and experts against each-other in a battle of world-
views. This debate is far from its end. Neither new security identity nor coherent foreign policy strategy are found yet.

Current scholarship is replete with the works describing Indian domestic debates on foreign policy issues, and bearing in mind that reality is richer than the analytical schemes applied in describing it, it has tried all three criteria-theoretical principles, attitude to reforms and ideology in their study. Chronology is also given importance for such an analysis because some views succeeded one another, while others co-existed with their rivals.

Along with polarization of Indian foreign policy elites and public opinion, there was clear tendency towards consensus on foreign policy in 1994-1996. This development reflected relative economic and political stabilization in the country. In addition, the experiences of 1991-1993 resulted in defining some common principles. However, that consensus has been arrived mainly on the issues dealing with immediate India's security needs, creating a possibility for production of a number of governmental concepts and doctrine such as consolidation of South Asia as an integrated economic space (adopted in 1993), the Gujral doctrine (1995) as well as the draft of framework on national security (1995). But although the ruling elites have been able to identify threats to the national security but they are not ready to travel beyond negativism and sketch a positive security concept for the future.

The analysts of IFP continue to differ on many important theoretical and practical issues: meaning of India's national interests and security; correlation between 'hard' and ‘soft’ security; the role of International organizations in ensuring national and international security;
civilisational orientations; use of military force; functional and regional priorities; particular ethnic, religious and territorial conflicts etc.

In this context, since the nineties researchers have tended to play down the role of format institutions and to give prominence to the informal processes through which foreign policy is initiated and developed, highlighting the importance of policy networks, that is, communities of policy actors that crisscross the public and private domains. Moreover, greater interests have been tendered in evaluation through policy output studies, especially in the USA, since the late seventies. Empirical research is utilized to examine both what government does, in terms of security and economic development, and the consequences or impact of such policies. As Dye (1995) put this form of foreign policy analysis is concerned with 'who gets what'.

This poststructuralist approach that critically focuses on system performance has been missing in the IFP analysis. Henry A. Kissinger, former US Secretary of State feels that the rational actor analysis framed in structural approach is applicable only to stable periods, in the Indian context, with the recent changes in the political perspective of the Indian political parties and their leadership, the trend towards the growth of more complex polycentric political system has put stability factor in dire straits.

Theoretically, institutional decision-making process seems to have escaped the attention of foreign policy analysts. The role of the cabinet which is constitutionally the real executive policy centre in Indian parliamentary democracy holds no intellectual interest. Moreover, the shift away from unyielding bodies to more informal and constricted groups has been left unanalyzed. In today's trend of factionalism and groupism, collective decision-making within the Cabinet have become
more problematic and this has been rendered more difficult in governments headed either by minority or by coalition arrangements. Shifts in Indian defence and foreign policy at the macro-level cannot be ruled out,

The systemic performance of Indian foreign policy has been analyzed in both structural-functional and neo-Marxist traditions, but a focus on the interactions between state and society, unraveling an empirical puzzle, a post-structuralist synthetic paradigm has been missing. Social structures undergoing basic transitions are typically afflicted with disorderly processes with political variables making additional, autonomous contributions to the emergence of this empirical puzzle pertaining to Indian foreign policy orientation.

In the aforementioned backdrop the empirical analysis based on ‘mixed method’ in the research work proposed here begins with the assumption that political structures and processes enjoy a degree of autonomy from the social structure. Thus, Indian state can influence socio-economic change and foreign policy. Conversely, it would be absurd to underemphasize the significant impact that culture and class variables in the domestic milieu have on India's politics in general and Indian foreign policy in particular. The task of empirical analysis within a post-structuralist framework must be to assess how and in what proportions these competing variables mix.

For the authentic knowledge of the political and economic history and structural and in institutional framework. The studies of the following books have been important, M.S Rajan's famous book-Indian Foreign Policy that has adopted an integral approach instead of socio-political methodology. He has been able to present all the aspects of foreign Policy in a balanced way. Rajan have been able to portray the
divergent viewpoint not in an anti-thetical manner but he has also examined the different foundational aspects to forge a fruitful dialogue.

In this context Bruce Russett and Henrey Stan's book- *World Politics: The Menu for Choice* gives us an indepth sociological study of this subject. He has been of the view that liberal and Marxian outlook have been unable to understand the changing dynamics of the international politics. Presenting different configurations of different variables involved in the historical development of foreign policy events, this book has tried to put forward possible politics of conflict management and national security resolutions.

For analyzing the decision—making process involved in the foreign policy affairs, Joseph Frankel’s work has provided a lucid analysis of official actors, specified govt. channels and agencies and role of non-governmental organizations (NGO's). It also comes with the study of public opinion as input and output and related field of mass communications in this context.

Kluss Knorr's- *Power Capital of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations* gives a brief account of theoretical approaches and world views used in research and also give us a theory of systemic theory and performance of policy analysis which will be utilized in the proposed research work.
Key Theoretical Concepts and the Framework of the Arguments:

About Security:

Security... saturates the language of modern politics. Our political vocabularies reek of it and on political imaginative is confined by it. The hypocrisy of our rulers (whosoever ‘we’ are) consistently hides behind it.³

The term security is commonly defined as “freedom or protection from danger or worry; the safety or safeguarding of (the interest of) a state, organisation, person, etc. against danger, especially from attacks, espionage or theft;... and national security as “the defence of a country”.⁴

The *Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* visualises security as a core value and ultimate goal of state behaviour. Traditional analysis of security in a foreign policy content concentrated on the military dimension and policy-orientation having a large overlap with strategic studies. The post-cold war era has however changed the earlier notion of security and broadened its scope from what traditionalists would refer to as “high politics” to embrace so-called “low politics” of economics and environment.⁵

**Military Dimensions:**

The earlier studies on national security have exclusively stressed on military threats coming from cross-borders.⁶

As Walter Lippman says: ‘A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war’.⁷
It seems that a secured state is that one which can counter any outside attack triumphantly. Avoiding non-military threats and discussing only military fears / horrors could be even more harmful and dangerous to the nations security.\textsuperscript{8}

Thus, security lies in having both power and status in the world to dominate other nations by means of diplomacy, economic pressure, subversion, threat or use of armed forces for the purpose of political alignment, cessation of territory or gaining of special concession.\textsuperscript{9}

**Post Cold War Era:**

With the passage of time, the change constantly occurs particularly in International arena. The collapse of a militarily strong Soviet Union, the rise of Germany, Japan and China compelled a search for fresh paradigms and consequently led to the end of the Cold war confrontations. In the post-cold war scenario, the “state is being not only eroded but also fundamentally transformed with a wider structural context.”\textsuperscript{10}

**State : Source of Threat or Consent:**

The paradox is that the state may in some cases become a source of social threat against the individual. Thus, every angle of individual security is inseparably connected with that of the state.

Theoretically, the concept of state hinges on two different visions about individual security. C.A.W. Manning defines “Security as freedom from insecurity”\textsuperscript{11}. While John E. Mars explains it as “relative freedom from harmful threats”\textsuperscript{12}. 
**Human Security:**

Now-a-days the concept of human security is gaining increasing popularity. The individual is the central variable of human security. Mahbub-ul-Haq identified five, rather radical and necessary steps, to give life to the new conceptions of security:

A human development conception with emphasis on equality, sustainability, and grassroots participation; a peace dividend to underwrite the broader agenda of human security; a new partnership between North and South based on "justice, not charity" which emphasizes equitable access to global market opportunities and economic restructuring; a new framework of global governance built on reform of international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and United Nations; and finally, a growing role for global civil society.

**Third World Perspectives:**

The problem to define national security is far more difficult in developing nations of the Third World. Developing nations have not evolved their own conception of security but have borrowed ideas from the western security and strategic theorems. They borrow their security paradigm, caring little whether it suits their national needs. India too is not an exception.

In the third world context, it is even harder to differentiate the internal-external dimensions of security.
The content of security changes over time, depending on era and content. As far back as the 1930s, American national security thinking revolved very much around economic security, changing to an overriding concern with military security during the cold war era. Towards the late 1960s, the idea of security as being something ‘more’ than military security was put forward by Robert McNamara, the then president of the World Bank. During the 1970s and 1980s, the conceptualisation of security slowly broadened, both in the developed and developing worlds. In Europe, the Helsinki process and the idea of comprehensive security slowly gained ground. In Africa, the Front-Line States (FLS) increasingly came to include economic and social security as part of their security agenda which initially consisted of opposing apartheid and South African military destabilisation. The FLS founded the South African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC, now the Southern Development Community or the SADC) in 1980, the first example, it would seem, of a link between security and development. The essential meaning of security as freedom from threat has not changed.

Contemporary conceptualisation of security as being multidimensional and aimed at people as the main referent of security (human security) is, therefore, also not necessarily pointing to ‘the end of security’ to borrow from Fukuyama, but may change overtime as era and content change.
In the post cold war situation and with the increase in the number and complexity of conflicts throughout the world, it is important that post-conflict situation should have built-in measures to preserve human security ensuring safety and security of the individual being.

When human security is under threat anywhere, it can affect people everywhere. Threat to human security can no longer be confined within national borders and no nation can isolate itself from the rest of the world. Threats within countries could rapidly spill beyond national
frontiers posing global challenges to human security. The 1994 Human Development Report very appropriately emphasises that this invisibility and indivisibility of global human security extends to the consequences of both prosperity and poverty. If prosperity is becoming global, so is poverty. The real threat to humankind in the coming decade will arise more from actions affecting human security of millions of people than from aggression by a few nations. This demands new policy responses, both nationally and internationally. While global and national security in the traditional sense has attracted out attention over the years, one wonders whether we as individuals feel safe and secure in our day-to-day lives. As we embark on a new century, it is time that we focus on human security in all its dimensions and manifestations for all people of the world.

**About strategy:**

The term strategy in inevitably linked with the concept of national security both in theory and practice in the realm of international relations.

Strategy, per se is a complex political phenomenon, comprising as many definitions as its myriad forms ranging from the highest form of strategy, sometimes referred to as the grand strategy to pure or military strategy. These strategies are; limited war, guerilla or insurgent war, proxy war, limited and low intensity conflict. These strategies, in fact, tend to reverse the famous Clausewitzian dictum of war being a continuation of politics by other means to politics being the continuation of war by other means.

Strategy, like security has many definitions and as many interpretations. For a layman, this world evokes images of war and destruction. This popular imagery is reinforced by Von Clausewitz, who
defines it as “the employment of battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of war”.

**Types of Strategy:**

(i) **Higher or Grand Strategy:**

The role of grand strategy or higher strategy is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political objective of the war—the goal defined by the fundamental policy.\(^\text{16}\)

(ii) **Pure or Military Strategy:**

Strategy depends for success, first and most on a sound calculation and coordination of the end and the means.

(iii) **Strategy of Guerilla and Insurgent War:**

Guerilla warfare and Insurgent war like “Insurgency Operations”, “Irregular Warfare”, “Partisan Warfare”, “para-military operations”, “internal war”, “revolutionary warfare”, etc. To provide a basis for discussing “Guerilla Warfare” and “Insurgent War”, a look at different types of Warfare.

(a) General war is a struggle between two governments each with the aim of destroying the other by using all means at their disposal.

(b) Limited War is an armed conflict between governments where each is prepared to use only limited resources to secure a restricted or limited aim.

(c) Insurgent War is characterized by a struggle between an established government and an anti-governmental force.
(iv) **Strategy of Limited War**:

Ambassador Rober Mc Clintok said that “Limited war is a conflict short of general war to achieve specific political objectives, using limited forces. As between great nuclear powers, the maintenance of the global strategic nuclear balance of power would preclude the use of strategic nuclear weapons.”

(v) **Strategy of War by Proxy**:

Throughout history, there have been examples of states employing mercenaries or paying other countries to help them fight their enemies.

The Spanish Civil War introduced one of the other new elements in contemporary strategy, the practice of sending pseudo-volunteers to fight in foreign wars.

(vi) **Strategy of Low Intensity Conflict**:

A trend analysis of the conflict after 1945 indicates an increasing inclination of nations to resort to low intensity conflict (LIC), which may euphemistically be referred to as ‘the Warfare of the Future’.

LIC is combustion of racial, tribal, religious and regional struggles for political purposes which are manifested in insurgency, guerilla warfare, terrorism, trans-border raids and even peace keeping operations which may generate low-intensity conflicts.

(vii) **Diplomacy as a Strategic Tool**

John, G. Stoessinger defines diplomacy as “the conduct of international relations by negotiation. It is a process through which nations attempt to realize their national interests… When a nation has decided in favour of war, the instrument of diplomacy becomes superfluous. But so
long as the national interest dictates the avoidance of war, diplomacy works on behalf of peace and since most nations feel most of the time that their policies may be realized by means short of war, diplomacy has been, and remains or major highway to political order.  

Coercive diplomacy in its true definition is, therefore, a form of non-military strategy which may be tried before resorting to war.

Pakistan has long been resorting to coercive and pressure diplomacy in tandem with its military strategy as part of its two level strategy on Kashmir. The Pakistani’s believe their cause in Kashmir is just. Kashmir is disputed territory and has been so recognized by the international community.

In the above theoretical background, it can be stated that India’s national interest in relation to the external interface can be examined within three parameters:

(1) Security
(2) Economic Growth
(3) Global Public Goods

Out of these basic parameters national security constitutes the research subject of this thesis. The traditional concern has been security against military threats – conventional and non – conventional. More recently, external threats to internal security (including human security) has also gathered salience. Our analysis of external policy dimensions of security is sub-divided into conventional threats from Pakistan and China, Indian Ocean security, the need for a radical transformation in military affairs and internal security. The following figure illustrates the overarching interactive dimensions of national security in the overall framework of foreign policy portraying national interest.
Figure 1.2 : Security

Security

Security threats

International negative externalities

Alliance versus strategic autonomy

External threats

Internal threats

Fundamentalism

Terrorism

Arms running and drug trafficking

Importance of indigenous intelligence

External intelligence

Conventional

Non-Conventional

Space

Security geographics

Neighbourhood (Hormuz to Malacca, Kabul to Yangon)

Indian Ocean rim

Major Powers, (US, China, Russia, Japan, Europe)
Footnotes and References

1. The significance of the Kargil War is not only that it was the first military exchange between nuclear armed India and Pakistan but it was significant in retrospect given that India and Pakistan, while politically entering a ‘warming’ phase, Pakistan was tacitly supporting a militant incursion. The Indo-Pak relationship was ‘ahead of the curve’ in the decade of terrorism, Kargil was only one example of India’s accusations regarding militant activity in Pakistan pre 9/11.

2. By using the term “India” in the context of strategic planning, there is some inherent contradiction that the proportional role of elites in formulating policy is significant even though India is a democracy.


6. Berkowitz and Bock, n. 3, p. 41


14. Jain, n. 19, p. 2, Also see K. Subramanyam; p. 43


16. Hart, n. 34, p. 334
