APPENDICIES
APPENDIX – I

Map of Asia
APPENDIX – II

Immediate and Extended Neighborhoods
# APPENDIX – III

Military Expenditure of Selected Countries, 2000-08 (in constant 2005 $ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>12,910</td>
<td>14,879</td>
<td>14,998</td>
<td>12,089</td>
<td>12,392</td>
<td>13,381</td>
<td>12,720</td>
<td>14,737</td>
<td>15,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China*</td>
<td>[23,767]</td>
<td>[28,515]</td>
<td>[33,436]</td>
<td>[36,405]</td>
<td>[40,631]</td>
<td>[44,911]</td>
<td>[52,199]</td>
<td>[57,861]</td>
<td>[63,643]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>17,697</td>
<td>18,313</td>
<td>18,256</td>
<td>18,664</td>
<td>21,660</td>
<td>22,891</td>
<td>23,029</td>
<td>23,535</td>
<td>24,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia*</td>
<td>[19,138]</td>
<td>[21,242]</td>
<td>[23,601]</td>
<td>[25,107]</td>
<td>[26,120]</td>
<td>[28,488]</td>
<td>[31,176]</td>
<td>[33,821]</td>
<td>[38,238]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>43,803</td>
<td>44,276</td>
<td>44,725</td>
<td>44,818</td>
<td>44,476</td>
<td>44,165</td>
<td>43,666</td>
<td>43,460</td>
<td>42,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>41,147</td>
<td>40,474</td>
<td>40,604</td>
<td>40,044</td>
<td>38,816</td>
<td>38,060</td>
<td>37,133</td>
<td>37,233</td>
<td>37,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>342,167</td>
<td>344,927</td>
<td>387,297</td>
<td>440,806</td>
<td>480,444</td>
<td>503,353</td>
<td>511,171</td>
<td>524,591</td>
<td>548,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>47,778</td>
<td>49,417</td>
<td>52,423</td>
<td>55,347</td>
<td>55,112</td>
<td>55,152</td>
<td>55,043</td>
<td>55,746</td>
<td>57,392</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Database.*

**Note:** Figures in brackets indicate SIPRI estimates.
APPENDIX – IV

Share of Intra – Regional Trade in Total SAARC Trade (1991-2008)

Source: Asia Regional Integration Center (ARIC), Integration Indicators Database.
## APPENDIX – V

Critical Security Technologies and the Comparative Position of Selected Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Technologies</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>US, EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Semiconductor materials, sensors, and microelectronic circuits</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Software engineering</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High performance computing</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine intelligence and robotics</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulation and modelling</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photonics</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensitive radar</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive sensors</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal and image processing</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encryption and signature control</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon system environment</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data fusion</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computational fluid dynamics</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air breathing propulsion</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulsed power</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypervelocity projectiles and propulsion</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High energy density materials</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite materials</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superconductivity</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biotechnology</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanotechnology</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexible manufacturing</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High power lasers and microwaves</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Y S Rajan, Amitav Mallik, Santosh Kumar, B Bowonder and S Chandrasekhar, 2009. 'National Interest and Technology', Background Paper, ICRIER.

**Note:** The asterisks indicate level of advancement in ascending order.
## APPENDIX – VI

### Agri – Imports of Selected South Asian Countries

(Units = $'000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Nepal</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Sri Lanka</th>
<th>Total Imports from Selected South Asian countries in Global Imports (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2,473,302.21</td>
<td>6,734.92</td>
<td>316,658.78</td>
<td>31.09</td>
<td>38,057.06</td>
<td>1,682.78</td>
<td>14.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3,515,500.22</td>
<td>11,702.23</td>
<td>677,452.77</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>35,793.65</td>
<td>1,993.26</td>
<td>20.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5,063,437.82</td>
<td>13,265.47</td>
<td>965,210.37</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>45,374.06</td>
<td>1,975.44</td>
<td>20.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5,656,905.63</td>
<td>52,864.84</td>
<td>9,341.38</td>
<td>121,119.00</td>
<td>114,407.93</td>
<td>185,338.58</td>
<td>8.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5,829,292.14</td>
<td>45,774.71</td>
<td>19,324.54</td>
<td>91,197.66</td>
<td>82,640.94</td>
<td>155,806.34</td>
<td>6.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7,870,893.71</td>
<td>75,369.57</td>
<td>15,615.19</td>
<td>11,9174.76</td>
<td>91,541.94</td>
<td>200,208.60</td>
<td>6.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>8,742,898.56</td>
<td>132,209.53</td>
<td>20,074.48</td>
<td>140,771.90</td>
<td>57,353.21</td>
<td>142,754.80</td>
<td>5.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3,206,011.01</td>
<td>21,839.70</td>
<td>11,387.93</td>
<td>155,219.87</td>
<td>2,807.70</td>
<td>33,982.77</td>
<td>7.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3,581,287.81</td>
<td>47,282.16</td>
<td>6,950.98</td>
<td>587,212.49</td>
<td>3,594.22</td>
<td>37,699.94</td>
<td>19.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3,935,531.74</td>
<td>53,606.50</td>
<td>11,321.61</td>
<td>460,010.49</td>
<td>1,254.27</td>
<td>31,805.71</td>
<td>14.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6,349,034.27</td>
<td>45,516.87</td>
<td>16,968.11</td>
<td>738,860.84</td>
<td>997.41</td>
<td>30,658.95</td>
<td>13.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>989,811.82</td>
<td>10.11</td>
<td>44.92</td>
<td>178,909.77</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>13,177.19</td>
<td>19.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,154,668.63</td>
<td>132.81</td>
<td>121.48</td>
<td>191,986.65</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>19,927.63</td>
<td>18.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,300,587.15</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>138.90</td>
<td>339,276.69</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>40,334.18</td>
<td>29.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,795,624.51</td>
<td>72.88</td>
<td>339.65</td>
<td>450,601.14</td>
<td>3191.91</td>
<td>45,179.06</td>
<td>27.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Commtrade.

**Note:** Rows represent importing countries while columns represent exporting countries.
APPENDIX – VII

Major Conflicts and Terrorist Groups Operating in India

State: Jammu & Kashmir

Lashkar-e-Toiba (Army of the Pure)

Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of the Prophet)

Hizb-ul-Mujahiddeen (Party of Holy Warriors)

Hark at-u l-Muiahlddeen (Movement of Holy Warriors)

Al Badr (The Full Moon)

Harkat-ul-Jehad Islami (Movement of the Islamic Jehad)

Northeast India

State: Assam

ULFA: United Liberation Front of Asom

NDFB: National Democratic Front of Boroland

UPDF: United Peoples Democratic Front

BLT: Bodo Liberation Tigers

State: Nagaland

NSCN-IM: National Socialist Council of Nagalim - Isak-Muivah

NSCM-K: National Socialist Council of Nagalim - Khaplang

State: Manipur

UNLF: United National Liberation Front

PLA: People's Liberation Army

PREPAK: People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak

NSCN-IM: National Socialist Council of Nagalim - tsak-Muivah

State: Tripura

(370)
NLFT: National Liberation Front of Tripura
ATTF: All Tripura Tiger Force
State: Meghalaya
HNLC: Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council
ANVC: Achik National Volunteer Council

**Left Wing Extremism**

**State: Bihar**

People's War Group [Communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist (People's War)]

Maoist Communist Centre

Ranyir Sena (Anti-Left Wing caste army of landlords)

**State: Jharkhand**

People's War Group [Communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist (People's War)]

Maoist Communist Centre

**State: Orissa**

People's War Group [Communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist (People's War)]

**State: Chattisgarh**

People's War Group [Communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist (People's War)]

Maoist Communist Centre

**Andhra Pradesh**

People’s War Group (PWG)

Communist Party of India — Marxist Lennist (*Janasakhti*)

[Janasakhti: People's Power]


## APPENDIX – VIII

### Status of World Nuclear Forces 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>STRATEGIC</th>
<th>NON-STRATEGIC</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
<th>TOTAL INVENTORY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2790</td>
<td>2050&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4840</td>
<td>13,000&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>500&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2700&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>9400&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>~300</td>
<td>300&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>~180</td>
<td>240&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>&lt;160</td>
<td>185&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>80&lt;sup&gt;i&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>60&lt;sup&gt;j&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>60&lt;sup&gt;j&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>&lt;10</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>&lt;10&lt;sup&gt;j&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>5850</td>
<td>2550</td>
<td>8190</td>
<td>23,335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Russia's total inventory of non-strategic warheads is approximately 5390 warheads, down, from 15,000 in 1991.

<sup>b</sup> The estimate for the size and composition of the total Russian inventory comes with considerable uncertainty but is based on Cold War levels, subsequent dismantlement rates, and official Russian statements. Perhaps as many as a quarter (~3000) of the weapons listed may be awaiting dismantlement.

<sup>c</sup> Approximately 200, probably including some inactive warheads, are deployed in Europe.

<sup>d</sup> An additional 2500 warheads are spares and in reserve to increase the operational force if necessary but are not counted as operational.
e. In addition to the 5200 warheads in the DOD stockpile, approximately 4200 retired warheads are awaiting dismantlement. In addition, more than 12,000 plutonium cores (pits) and some 5000 Canned Assemblies (secondaries) are in storage.

f. France is thought to have a small inventory of spare warheads but no reserve like the United States and Russia. An additional reduction announced by President Sarkozy in March 2008 will reduce the inventory to slightly less than 300 warheads in 2009.

g. Many "strategic" warheads are for regional use. The status of a Chinese non-strategic nuclear arsenal is uncertain. Some deployed warheads may not be fully operational. Additional warheads are in storage, for a total stockpile of approximately 240 warheads.

h. Only 50 missiles are left, for a maximum of 150 warheads. "Less than 160" warheads are said to be "operationally available," but a small number of spares probably exist too. Forty-eight missiles are needed to arm three SSBNs with a maximum of 144 warheads. One submarine with "up to 48 warheads" is on patrol at any given time. In addition to the operationally available warheads, Britain probably has a small inactive reserve.

i. All warheads of the four lesser nuclear powers are considered strategic. Only some of these may be operational.

j. On October 8, 2006, North Korea announced it had conducted a nuclear test. There is no publicly available evidence that North Korea has operationalized its nuclear weapons capability.

k. Numbers may not add up due to rounding and uncertainty about the operational status of the four lesser nuclear weapons states and the uncertainty about the size of the total inventories of three of the five initial nuclear powers.

Source: <http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html>
APPENDIX – IX


1. Humanity stands at a crossroads of history. The world has lived too long under the sentence of extinction. Nuclear weapons threaten to annihilate human civilization and all that humankind has built through millennia of labour and toil. Nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States alike are threatened by such a holocaust. It is imperative that nuclear weapons be eliminated. The recently signed INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union is a first major step in this direction. This process must be taken to its logical conclusion by ridding the world of nuclear weapons. The time has also come to consider seriously the changes in doctrines, in policies, in attitudes, and in the institutions required to usher in and manage a nuclear weapon-free and non-violent world. Peace must be predicated on a basis other than the assurance of global destruction. We need a world order based on non-violence and peaceful coexistence. We need international institutions that will nurture such a world order.

2. We call upon the international community to urgently negotiate a binding commitment to an action plan for ushering in a non-violent world free of nuclear weapons. We suggest the following action plan as a basis for such negotiations.

3.1 STAGE 1 (Duration: 6 years, from 1988-1994)

3.1.1 Nuclear Disarmament:

3.1.1.1 Elimination of all Soviet and United States land-based medium and shorter-range missiles (500-5,500 kms) in accordance with the INF Treaty

3.1.1.2 Agreement on a 50 per cent cut in Soviet and United States strategic arsenals (with ranges above 5,500 kms)
3.1.3 Agreement on a phased elimination by the year 2000 AD of United States and Soviet short range battlefield and air-launched nuclear weapons

3.1.4 Cessation of the production of nuclear weapons by all nuclear weapon States

3.1.5 Cessation of the production of weapon-grade fissionable material by all nuclear weapon States

3.1.6 Moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons

3.1.7 Commencement and conclusion of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty

3.1.2 **Measures Collateral to Nuclear Disarmament:**

3.1.2.1 Conclusion of a convention to outlaw the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons pending their elimination.

3.1.2.2 Declaration by the United States and the Soviet Union that the fissile material released under the INF Treaty would be utilized for peaceful purposes only and accordingly be subjected to supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

3.1.2.3 Declaration by all nuclear weapon States of their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapon-grade fissionable material

3.1.2.4 Cessation of direct or indirect transfer to other States of nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and weapon-grade fissionable material

3.1.2.5 Non-nuclear weapon powers to undertake not to cross the threshold into the acquisition of nuclear weapons

3.1.2.6 Initiation of multi-lateral negotiations to be concluded by 195, for weapons by the year 2010. This treaty would replace the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which ends in 1995
3.1.2.7 Non-nuclear weapon powers to undertake not to cross the threshold into the acquisition of nuclear weapons

3.1.2.8 Initiation of multi-lateral negotiations to be concluded by 1995, for a new treaty eliminating all nuclear weapons by the year 2010. This treaty would replace the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which ends in 1995.

3.1.3 **Other Weapons of Mass Destruction:**

3.1.3.1 Conclusion of a treaty banning chemical weapons

3.1.3.2 Conclusion of a treaty banning radiological weapons

3.1.4 **Conventional Force:**

3.1.4.1 Substantial reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces, especially offensive forces, and weapon systems in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals

3.1.4.2 Multilateral discussions in the Conference on Disarmament or in the United Nations on military doctrines with a view to working towards the goal of a purely defensive orientation for the armed forces of the world. The discussion would include measures to prevent surprise attacks.

3.1.5 **Space weapon systems:**

3.1.5.1 A moratorium on the testing and deployment of all space weapon systems

3.1.5.2 Expansion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space

3.1.6 **Control and management of the arms race based on new technologies:**

3.1.6.1 Arrangements for monitoring and assessing new technologies which have military applications as well as forecasting their implications for international security
3.1.6.2 For research in frontier areas of technology where there are potential military applications, new technology projects and technological missions should be undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations in order to direct them exclusively to civilian sectors

3.1.6.3 Commencement of work, under the aegis of the Untied Nations, for the formulation of guidelines to be observed by governments in respect of new technologies with potential military applications

3.1.6.4 Commencement of negotiations for banning technological missions designed to develop new weapon systems and means of warfare

3.1.7 Verification:

3.1.7.1 Acceptance in principle of the need to establish an integrated multilateral verification system under the aegis of the United Nations as an integral part of a strengthened multilateral framework required to ensure peace and security during the process of disarmament as well as in a nuclear-weapon free world

3.2 STAGE 11 (Duration: 6 years, from 1995-2000)

3.2.1 Nuclear Disarmament:

3.2.1.1 Completion of Stage I reductions by the United States and the Soviet Union and the induction of all other nuclear weapon States into the process of nuclear disarmament

3.2.1.2 Elimination of all medium-and short-range, sea-based, land-based and air-launched nuclear missiles by all nuclear weapon States;

3.2.1.3 Elimination of all tactical battlefield nuclear weapons (land, sea and air) by all nuclear weapon States

3.2.1.4 Entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

3.2.2 Measures Collateral to Nuclear Disarmament:
3.2.2.1 Negotiations on the withdrawal of strategic nuclear weapons deployed beyond national boundaries

3.2.2.2 Completion of the ratification and entry into force of the convention prohibiting the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons

3.2.2.3 Conclusion of the new treaty eliminating all nuclear weapons by the year 2010 to replace the Non-Proliferation Treaty

3.2.3 **Space Weapons:**

3.2.3.1 Agreement within a multilateral framework on banning the testing, development, deployment and storage of all space weapons

3.2.4 **Conventional Forces:**

3.2.4.1 Further reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces to minimum defensive levels

3.2.4.2 Negotiations under the Conference on Disarmament on global conventional arms reduction

3.2.4.3 Removal of all military force and bases from foreign territories

3.2.5 **New and Emerging Technologies:**

3.2.5.1 Completion of negotiations on banning technological missions aimed at the development of new weapon systems.

3.2.5.2 Completion of the negotiations on guidelines in respect of new technologies with potential military applications

3.2.6 **Comprehensive Global Security System:**

3.2.6.1 Negotiations on the establishment of a comprehensive global security system to sustain a world without nuclear weapons. This would include institutional steps to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the non-use
of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the right of every State to pursue its own path of development.

3.2.6.2 Arrangements for the release of resources through disarmament for development purposes

3.2.6.3 Elimination on non-military threats to security by such measures as the establishment of a just and equitable international economic order

3.2.6.4 The strengthening of United Nations system and related multilateral forums

3.2.6.5 The commencement of negotiations for the establishment of an integrated multi-lateral verification system under the United Nations.

3.3 STAGE III (Duration: 10 years, from 2000-2010)

3.3.1 Elimination of all nuclear weapons from the world

3.3.2 Establishment of a single, integrated, multilateral comprehensive verification system which inter alia ensures that no nuclear weapons are produced. Reduction of all conventional forces to minimum defensive levels

3.3.4 Effective implementation of arrangement to preclude the emergence of a new arms race

3.3.5 Universal adherence to the comprehensive global security system

4.1 There has been a historically unprecedented militarization of international relations during the last four decades. This has not only enhanced the danger of nuclear war but also militated against the emergence of the structure of peace, progress, and stability envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations

4.2 To end this dangerous militarization of international relations, we must build a structure firmly based on non-violence. It is only in a non-violent democratic world that the sovereignty of nations and the dignity of the individual can be ensured. It is only in a non-violent world that the intellectual and spiritual potential of human kind can be realized.
4.3 The prospect of a world free of nuclear weapons should spur us to start building a structure of international security in keeping with the fundamental changes that are taking place in the world political, economic and security environment.

4.4 In a shrinking and interdependent world, such a structure has to be comprehensive, its components supportive of each other, and participation in it universal.

4.5 A world order crafted out of outmoded concepts of the balance of power, of dominance by power blocs, of spheres of influence, and of special rights and privileges for a select group of nations is an unacceptable anachronism. It is out of tune with the democratic temper of our age.

4.6 The new structure of international relations has to be based on scrupulous adherence to the principles of peaceful coexistence and the Charter of the United Nations. It is necessary to evolve stronger and more binding mechanisms for the settlement of disputes, regional and international. The diversity among nations must be recognized and respected. The right of each nation to choose its own socio-economic system must be assured.

4.7 Concomitant changes will be called for in the international economics order. The interdependence of all the economies of the world makes for a symbiotic relationship between development in the South and stability and growth in the North. In a just and equitable order, access to technology and resources, on fair and reasonable terms will be assured. The gap between the rich and the poor nations will be bridged.


1. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) met today to review the progress in operationalising of India's nuclear doctrine. The Committee decided that the following information, regarding the nuclear doctrine and operational arrangements governing India's nuclear assets, should be shared with the public.

2. India's nuclear doctrine can be summarized as follows:

   a. Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent;

   b. A posture of "No First Use": nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere;

   c. Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.

   d. Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority.

   e. Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states;

   f. However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons;

   g. A continuation of strict controls on export of nuclear and missile related materials and technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations, and continued observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests.
h. Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.

3. The Nuclear Command Authority comprises a Political Council and an Executive Council. The Political Council is chaired by the Prime Minister. It is the sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons.

4. The Executive Council is chaired by the National Security Advisor. It provides inputs for decision making by the Nuclear Command Authority and executes the directives given to it by the Political Council.

5. The CCS reviewed the existing command and control structures, the state of readiness, the targeting strategy for a retaliatory attack, and operating procedures for various stages of alert and launch. The Committee expressed satisfaction with the overall preparedness. The CCS approved the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Forces Command, to manage and administer all Strategic Forces.

6. The CCS also reviewed and approved the arrangements for alternate chains of command for retaliatory nuclear strikes in all eventualities.

Source: The High Commission of India in Ottawa,

APPENDIX – XI

Statement By Mr. Hamid Ali Rao, Permanent Representative of India to The Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, At The General Debate of The First Committee of The 63rd Session of The United Nations General Assembly on 10 October 2008

Mr. Chairman,

The Indian Delegation congratulates you on your election to the Chairmanship of the First Committee. We would like to assure you of our full cooperation in the discharge of your responsibilities. India associates itself with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. The reference in that statement to universality of the NPT pertains to views of NAM states parties to the NPT and does not reflect India's position.

Mr. Chairman,

The United Nations is the embodiment of our faith in the benefits of collective action and of multilateral approaches in resolving global issues concerning global peace, stability and development. India's approach to addressing issues relating to disarmament and international security - the mandate of the First Committee, is underlined by our conviction that global contemporary challenges are best addressed through collective efforts imbibed by a spirit of genuine multilateralism. We must work together, in cooperation and partnership to address threats to international security, both old and new, and to show a new spirit of unity of purpose and vision to advance global disarmament and non-proliferation goals and objectives.

Mr. Chairman,

India attaches the highest priority to the goal of nuclear disarmament, enshrined in the Final Document of SSOD I. This year we mark the 20th Anniversary of the "Action Plan for Ushering in a Nuclear-weapon free and Non-Violent World Order" proposed by Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, to the Third Special Session on Disarmament of the General Assembly. India's commitment to universal, non-
discriminatory nuclear disarmament leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons was reiterated by our Prime Minister on June 9, 2008 as well as by our External Affairs Minister on September 5, 2008. Speaking at the 63rd session of the General Assembly on 26th September, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh reiterated India's proposal for a Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and providing for their complete elimination within a specified time frame.

While the end of the Cold War created new space for action on global disarmament with notable results such as the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention eliminating, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, the goal of nuclear disarmament has remained a distant one. We call upon the First Committee to reinforce the message, now being echoed even by prominent statesmen and experts in the field, in favor of generating a new momentum to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. No effort must be spared in building consensus to this end.

India has put forward both at the General Assembly and in the Conference on Disarmament a set of practical measures to stimulate debate and promote consensus on the way forward. The measures we suggest include:

- Reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of all nuclear-weapon States to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
- Reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines.
- Taking into account the global reach and menace of nuclear weapons, adoption of measures by nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear danger, including the risks of accidental nuclear war, de-alerting of nuclear weapons to prevent unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons.
- Negotiation of a global agreement among nuclear-weapon States on 'no-first-use' of nuclear-weapons.
- Negotiation of a universal and legally-binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States.
- Negotiations of a convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
• Negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame.

Mr. Chairman,

It is clear that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes and require concerted and cooperative international efforts. India supports such efforts aimed at realizing global non-proliferation objectives. Expansion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by increasing the share of nuclear energy as a non-polluting energy source, in a manner that is safe, secure and consistent with non-proliferation objectives, will have a positive impact on global energy security and international efforts to combat climate change. We attach importance to carrying forward this process through dialogue and mutually beneficial cooperation with our international partners.

India supports the negotiation in the CD of an FMCT that is universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable. India joined the consensus, as reflected in the UNGA Resolution 48/75 L which envisaged FMCT as a significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects. We support efforts towards building the necessary international consensus so as to enable the CD to move forward on this important issue. India has continued to observe a moratorium on nuclear explosive tests.

India supports negotiation with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. As part of its credible minimum nuclear deterrent, India has espoused a policy of „no first use and non-use against non-nuclear weapon states and is prepared to convert these undertakings into multilateral legal arrangements.

We support international efforts to strengthen the present international legal framework to ensure the safety and security of space assets and to prevent the placement of weapons in the outer-space. While noting that there is no legal regime governing the possession and use of missiles, we believe that any initiative to address these concerns in a sustainable and comprehensive manner should be through an inclusive process based on the principle of equal and legitimate security.
India has contributed actively to UN efforts to strengthen regulation of small arms and light weapons as we believe that it is necessary to break the nexus between small arms proliferation and terrorism and organized crime. We remain strongly committed to the CCW process which offers the only forum of a universal character that brings together all the main producers and users of major conventional weapons, thus ensuring that the instruments that emerge have a greater prospect of making a meaningful impact on the ground.

Mr. Chairman,

As in the previous year, India seeks the support of the First Committee for the following three resolutions:

i. Convention on the Prohibition of use of nuclear weapons.

ii. Reducing nuclear danger.

iii. Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Chairman,

In order to save time during the plenary debate we will make our detailed presentation on these resolutions during the time allocated for that purpose.

In conclusion, let me assure you of India's strong commitment of working together to ensure a successful outcome to this Committee's deliberations.

Thank you.

Follow-Up to The Advisory Opinion Of The International Court of Justice on The Legality of The Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons', Un General Assembly Resolution 61/83, 18 December 2006

The General Assembly,


Convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all life on Earth, and recognizing that the only defence against a nuclear catastrophe is the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the certainty that they will never be produced again,

Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free world,

Mindful of the solemn obligations of States parties, undertaken in article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,\(^1\) particularly to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,

Recalling the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,\(^2\)

Emphasizing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear
disarmament, adopted at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 3

Recalling the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in its
resolution 50/245 of 10 September 1996, and expressing its satisfaction at the
increasing number of States that have signed and ratified the Treaty,

Recognizing with satisfaction that the Antarctic Treaty 4 and the treaties of
Tlatelolco, 5 Rarotonga, 6 Bangkok, 7 Pelindaba 8 and Semipalatinsk, 9 as well as
Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, are gradually freeing the entire southern
hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons,

Stressing the importance of strengthening all existing nuclear-related
disarmament and arms control and reduction measures,

Recognizing the need for a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding
instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear
weapons,

Reaffirming the central role of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole
multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, and regretting the lack of progress in
disarmament negotiations, particularly nuclear disarmament, in the Conference during
its 2006 session,

Emphasizing the need for the Conference on Disarmament to commence
negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons
with a specified framework of time,

Expressing its regret over the failure of the 2005 Review Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to reach agreement
on any substantive issues,

Expressing its deep concern at the lack of progress in the implementation of
the thirteen steps to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty, 10
Desiring to achieve the objective of a legally binding prohibition of the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, threat or use of nuclear weapons and their destruction under effective international control,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on 8 July 1996,¹¹

Taking note of the relevant portions of the report of the Secretary-General relating to the implementation of resolution 60/76,¹²

1. Underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control;

2. Calls once again upon all States immediately to fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination;

3. Requests all states to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the present resolution and nuclear disarmament, and requests the Secretary-General to apprise the General Assembly of that information at its sixty-second session;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-second session the item entitled “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the international Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons”.

Source: [http://disarmament2.un.org/vote.nsf/511260f3bf6ae9c005256705006e0a5b/ $FILE/A%20RES%2061%20%2083.pdf](http://disarmament2.un.org/vote.nsf/511260f3bf6ae9c005256705006e0a5b/ $FILE/A%20RES%2061%20%2083.pdf).


5. Ibid., vol. 634, No. 9068.


8. A/50/426, annex


