.....a dream that everyone agreed to dream.

And now I think there actually is a country called India.

- *Midnight’s Children, Salman Rushdie*

The narrator of ‘Midnights Children’ describes India as a collective fantasy, supposedly implying that never had been a political entity called India until 1947. What came into being as an idea of nation-state, was an unique invention of a nationalist movement against the British Colonialism, and a very successful invention, indeed. But this ‘tryst with destiny’, after more than six decades of Independence, unfolds a different story of India that can be told with an unceasing invocation of one word- *If* – the shorthand for a saga of missed opportunities. On face-value, its achievements – a vibrant democracy, a large reservoir of skilled manpower, a self-confident middle class at the cutting edge of new technology, and above all, a huge and growing domestic market-do not commensurate with India’s acknowledged potential and the country today faces an unacceptable performance – potential gap, and leadership deficit. India as a nation is standing on the ‘threshold of greatness’, but that superlative still proving to be chimerically a distance post, according to some observers.

In this holistic context, the discussion in the preceding chapters brought in focus a range of historical conjectures and variables which have impinged on Indian national security and strategic considerations with reference to its foreign policy in preceding six decades or so. Apparently, there have been indications that India lacked a cohesive vision of a viable global and regional policy and more often than not resorted to a reactive response instead of a proactive one, especially in the context of the moves made by its regional adversary – Pakistan. The formative phase of Indian
foreign policy saw its high statured leadership focusing more on over-
arching global issues and did not bother to articulate a distinct policy to
deal with regional geopolitical security concerns in South Asia. However,
with growing impulse in favour of regionalism in near past decades, there
emerged a realization to delineate contours of India’s national security
accommodating the management of both cooperation as well as conflict of
late.

To gauge critically the performance of Indian foreign policy on
the parameters of national security, first a better understanding of how
India’s foreign policy language has evolved, becomes mandatory. For this
MEA and MoD documents of the Government of India as primary sources
have been analysed. This analysis provided a ring-side view about India’s
security perceptions and intrinsic ideological coordinates offered a proper
comprehension of India’s foreign policy behaviour and action. The thesis
endeavoured to discuss the issue of national security from more than one
perspective and explored inherent themes such as domestic and
international milieu; political architecture of foreign policy making;
neighbourhoods and rival interests, the extended neighbours and energy
security; defence doctrine, nuclear deterrence and conflict complexes and
even multilateralism and diplomatic pragmatism.

The context holds a timely relevance. In today’s world, it is not
military might alone that shapes national security. The future is determined
by economics. But that in turn is moulded by institutional, procedural and
diplomatic creative environment we create for ourselves. The West, despite
having entered a ‘brave new world’ centred on post-modernist and post-
industrial grand narrative of intellectual property rights and knowledge-
society, is in the throes of a dramatic downturn, a downturn that has
followed the longest boom in recorded human history. Fears have been
lurking that the developed market economies may be poised for a
prolonged spell of stagnation. Hence, in the contemporary uncertainties of the post-Cold-War-era, the increasing role of economics and growing concerns for forging new strategic equations are two grounds along with other systemic changes, now compelling India’s national security policy to redesign and encourage mutual trust–building and multilayered-development on these functional modules.

Traditionally, security meant collective security, i.e., state security. Now, the trend has shifted towards the individuals. The created paradox is that the individuals and states provide both threats as well as security is an interactive manner. In this regard, security is a relative concept. Till the Cold War era, the nature of national security was identified within militarized parameters. But current discourse on the perspectives of national security has encompassed the human dimensions coupled with the military priorities.

The present study has hypothesized that the MEA and MOD official documents, serving as a conceptual backgrounder, are to a great extent, indicative of the Government of India’s national security objectives and how their national security environment is understood. This study sought to offer analytical clarity on the applicability of C. Raja Mohan’s argument that India’s foreign policy considerations were best understood through the prism of three spheres of influence. The above analysis has made clear that there has been an evolution in how India defines its national security concerns, but also that they continue to adhere to Mohan’s description.

Given this assessment, the study tried to answer significant questions such as, how then will India’s current and future security concerns manifest in foreign policy decision making? If India continues to pursue a compartmentalized policy, whereby the objective outcomes in
each security circle are weighed based on pragmatic merit, will India be forced to make strategic trade-off in its relations with other states, as Paul Kapur claims? Or alternatively, can India continue to deftly balance seemingly contradictory relationships, at least for the near future?

The major inferences drawn from the study, in this context, are given in the following section. This begins by addressing India’s foreign policy concerns, followed by a discussion of the potential tradeoffs that India will face if it continues to pursue the foreign policy objectives as outlined in the annual reports. Finally, the study will seek to make some broad hypotheses about the future of Indian foreign policy from the viewpoint of the national security.

**Foreign Policy Concerns and Tradeoffs:**

In the early decades of post-independent era, the formative phase of Indian foreign policy saw its high statured leaders focusing more on over-arching global issues such anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, Afro-Asian solidarity, non-alignment, disarmament, New International Economic Order etc. and did not bother to articulate a distinctive policy to deal with regional actors in South Asia. However, with the growing impulse in favour of regional cooperation, in the beginning of the 1990s, there is realization to delineate the regional contours. Reflecting this concern, Indian foreign policy planning documents were first and foremost concerned with developing security and economic interdependence in its closest neighbourhood. These goals were to be pursued, as spelt out in annual reports, through active participation and leadership in international and regional organizations. Emphasis on the NAM, the UN, ASEAN and SAARC were given significant attention both in the introductory sections of the MEA reports but were also expanded on in great depth throughout the sub-sections of the documents.
Throughout the last twenty years or so, there has been an erosion of the multilateralism that once epitomized India’s foreign policy. The annual reports called attention to India’s participation and leadership in cooperative organizations, yet increasing amount of pages were occupied by India’s primary and unilateral security threat: terrorism emanating out of Pakistan. The official position indicated a sense that India felt as though its fight against terrorism was unappreciated by the international community and therefore, it was India’s burden to bear, even if it was alone.

Faced with the demise of its primary ally-the Soviet Union, although India argued that they were not bounded by their ‘mutual cooperation’, India’s foreign policy concerns underwent a natural and necessary shift during the 1990s. India’s focus on multilateralism and economic cooperation as the forefront of its rise slowly gave way to a focus on countering terrorism in order to securitize the region. Economic growth remained paramount; however now as a means to an end, not an end in itself, New Delhi began to adopt and act on the belief that it could no longer count on economic strength alone to cement its rise, but instead with power came the responsibility to protect itself against ever more complex national security threats.

Two crises serve to clarify the shift. The first was the Kargil crisis in 1999 followed shortly thereafter by the 2001 Parliament attack. At the turn of the 21st century, not only did India fear a conventional Sino-Pakistan encirclement, but the nuclearization of South Asia added a new level of uncertainty and insecurity in India’s immediate neighbourhood. The consequences of the nuclear tests, in addition to the heightened tensions between India and Pakistan were the supreme national security concerns in the beginning half of the decade.
As a result of the conflicting states nuclear parity, Pakistan began to adopt a more aggressive military and military-proxy policy under the assumption that India’s foreign policy was newly constrained. Demonstrably, the Pakistani military had developed a plan to infiltrate Kashmir using military personnel and Kashmiri militants (who knew the terrain), in order to shift the Line of Control (LoC) and thereby, after the status quo of the conflict with India. Under the direction of General (and later President) Pervez Musharraf, Pakistani force infiltrated Indian held Kashmir prompting the Kargil War. The involvement of Pakistan’s conventional forces in the infiltration triggered a massive conventional military buildup along the LoC, bringing India and Pakistan to the brink of the nuclear exchange.¹

Pakistani leasership,² in the light of the nuclear tests, believed that India would not allow any crisis to deteriorate into a full-scale conventional war, thereby increasing the probability of a nuclear exchange. To their chagrin, neither the BJP government, led by PM Vajpayee, nor the Indian polity, was willing to tolerate such a brazen act of warfare without any response. The Kargil War, thus, served as an essential lesson to future Pakistani governments, namely, anything, but proxy war, which afforded a high degree of ‘plausible deniability’ for Islamabad, could be used against India. India on the other hand learned a very different kind of lesson form Kargil episode; although Pakistani aggression was obvious, the international community was now more interested in preventing a nuclear exchange then punishing an ‘aggressor’.

Pakistan’s freedom to rely on a proxy-war increased the value of domestic militant groups who, if willing to take direction from the Pakistani military and intelligence establishments, would be considered to be at the forefront of the conflict with India. For India, these militants were
also at the forefront their national security policies and epitomized India’s foreign policy concerns.

This policy shift was further exemplified by the 2001 attack on Indian Parliament. On December 13, five LeT/JeM militants\(^3\) entered the Parliament building only moments after the assembly had departed. The attack caused outrage in India and alarm for the international community. For the second time in as many years India and Pakistan were at the brink of war. The repercussions of India’s conventional mobilization and Pakistan’s reciprocal mobilization again heightened the risk of a nuclear exchange. The reorientation of the Pakistani forces from the western to eastern border adversely affected the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and again prompted active mediation. Again India was forced to recognize that U.S. interest in the region was not solely the evidence of a warming Indo-US rapport, but rather signaled that stability in South Asia was paramount for U.S. Interests.

The lesson for Pakistan is the post 9/11 world was twofold, firstly, the U.S. now had vital stakes in preventing a heightening of the Indo-Pak conflict. The U.S.’s reliance on Pakistan as a strategic partner in its ‘War on Terror’ meant that their mediation in any conflict was a given. Secondly, it became clear that the use of militants to wage a proxy-war was inflammatory for New Delhi, but due to U.S. mediation, on effective policy. These lessons were surely not lost on India, who at the same time began to capitalize on the international attention to terrorism in order to highlight the insecurity of Pakistan.

While the national security policy-makers began emphasizing India’s leadership role in fighting extremism and insecurity in the region, relations with another sponsor of terrorism were warming. The Indo-Iranian relationship throughout the 1999-2010 seemed to contradict India’s
increasing focus on countering extremism in its neighbourhoods. The Indo-Iranian relationship, which is indicative of both India’s interests in its extended neighbourhood and the challenges it faces therein, appears to serve two critical functions for Indian foreign policy objectives. In the first instance, Iran and India share concerns for energy and resource security. On another level, India’s expanding interests in Iran are correlated to increasing India’s strategic options in the larger Asian region. Iran serves as a counter weight to Pakistan, affording India strategic depth particularly in Afghanistan.

Growing ties between India and Iran may at first seem inconsequential; a stalled LNG pipeline, growing but still diminutive trade ties and limited defense exchanges, yet what their relationship lacks in tangible outcomes it makes up for in strategic importance. Over the decade both the MEA and the MoD reports maintained a consistent description of India’s relationship with Iran. Described as “cordial and multi-faceted” with “congruent views on a range of regional and international issues”, Indo-Iranian ties have been termed increasingly over the years, as a strategic relationship. Both India and Iran would accrue benefit from increased bilateral cooperation in the energy sector, particularly to meet India’s growing resource needs and to meet Iran’s current inability to produce the LNG. India and Iran have similar energy stakes in the CASs which after the potential for resource extraction but also offer a prospective trade route to Russia. Perhaps more tacitly, India and Iran share similar goals in their pursuit of greater regional power, and the reordering of the international system to make space for their perceived growing influence and security concerns. The Indo-Iranian relationship, however, epitomizes one potential tradeoff in the future.

Although India has managed to utilize its tenuous security situation in the immediate neighbourhood to bolster its credibility and
image of responsibility, the extended neighbour may pose a much greater challenge for India’s future foreign policies. Iran serves as the most salient example given the dramatic increase of international, specifically U.S., criticism of Iran’s nuclear policies. This presents an important consideration for India, which espouses both an unflinching faith in non-discriminatory nuclear cooperation and disarmament. Most pragmatically pertinent for Indian security policy in the future is that over the past decade it has proved to become surmounting arduous to compartmentalize its extended neighbourhood policies and its international policies. The ascending Indo-U.S. relationship juxtaposed to the Indo-Iranian relationship has presented one interesting instance of India’s pragmatic alliance balancing. India’s future ability to continue the contradictory policies may not only be inadvisable, but perhaps impossible.

India’s deference to Iran despite international proscription was expressed in the MEA and MoD reports by its notable absence. As tensions over Iran’s nuclear program began to brew in the middle of the decade, Indian strategic documents gave very scant hint that these significant events were even underway. The 2003-04 MEA report uses a text box to call attention to the fact that, “The Iranian side also briefed the Indian side on the peace approaches of its nuclear programme.”\textsuperscript{11} But in 2004-05 MoD report a subtle shift in the Indian rhetoric can be noted, “Strains over Iran’s nuclear intentions and the reactions of the international community to it, could have a destabilizing impact on the region.”\textsuperscript{12}

Similarly is the MEA report Iran quietly shifted from the immediate neighbourhood section into the extended neighborhood section.\textsuperscript{13} India was unwilling to openly criticize Iran’s tenuous ‘peaceful’ program, but regularly insisted that Iran, under the provisions of the NPT, was entitled to civil nuclear technologies. This was further reiterated in PM Dr. Manmohan Singh’s speech in the Indian Parliament in 2007,
“Indian while upholding Iran’s sovereign rights to develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses, called upon Iran to cooperate with the IAEA in honouring safeguards which it had undertaken as a signatory to the NPT….”\textsuperscript{14} Indian objective were threefold; firstly, to reinforce its long standing belief in the sovereign rights of states to pursue their national interest. Secondly, India sought to balance its growing ties with the U.S. vis-à-vis the civil nuclear deal. Finally, India has to maintain its commitments at least in rhetoric, to non-proliferation. In so doing, India was attempting to disentangle and thereby justify the competing and contradictory nuclear policies that it has espoused. India was signaling that not all nuclear technologies are the same; differentiation between peaceful nuclear programs and weapon technologies is possible.\textsuperscript{15}

Yet, India’s support for Iran did in fact cause some challenges for the Indo-US civil nuclear deal.\textsuperscript{16} Firstly, Congress members in the U.S. did express some reticence to trust India given its relationship with Iran, “In January 2006, the US Ambassador to India explicitly linked progress on proposed U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation with India’s upcoming vote, saying if India chose not to side with the United States, he believed the U.S.-India initiation would fail in the Congress:”\textsuperscript{17} This attempt by Washington to constrain New Delhi’s behaviour was met with opprobrium in Indian Parliament. Aside from a string of serious debates which expressed heated opposition to the deal, Indian policymakers were still voicing their policy of autonomy in decision making in 2010. For example, the External Affairs Minister (EAM) was asked by one Parliamentarian “whether the U.S. President Barak Obama during his recent visit, made some remarks about India’s relation with Iran…. Whether the Government (of India) proposes to change its foreign policy in regard to… US President’s remarks?” His response, “Iran is a major source of India’s
imports of energy resources…. India’s bilateral relations… stand on their own and are not influenced by India’s relations with third countries”.18

Even after voting with the U.S. for adopting UNSC Resolution 1929 which placed further sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program, the EAM assured Parliament, “Government remains committed to maintaining and further strengthening bilateral relations with Iran including economic and trade ties and in the energy sector. There have been regular high level exchanges including consultations at ministerial level between India and Iran to discuss bilateral relations and important regional and global issues.”19

In voting affirmatively for the sanctions against Iran, Indian policy may at first glance seem as though it were being dictated by the whims of Washington. However, in light of India’s pragmatic national security policies, it would be more accurate to put the vote in the context of greater considerations. India’s slow rise has led to the challenging feat of balancing a historical legacy of peaceful, multilateral, non-aligned doctrines with its emergence. In order to meet the exigencies enmeshed in security interests of its expanding influence, India has sought to appear consistent and true to the time honored doctrines both its appease the overwhelming domestic support for these policies, but also to assure all those who may be fearful of its rise, that its intentions are benign.

The Future :

A grand external strategy would require that interactions between different strategic objectives be examined to arrive at the right balance. There is clearly a possibility of a tradeoff between some interactive objectives, and even between components of an objective.
Amongst the more significant interactions of such type, security and growth can be seen as a dyad, with primacy to security objectives sometimes negatively affecting growth. An exaggerated perception of threats to security, either external or internal, can result in neglect of measures required for achieving the necessary economic growth and raising overall the welfare levels. The erstwhile Soviet Union is an apt example of this distorted prioritization of policies. India’s attempt in the past to adopt leadership and vanguard positions on a range of global issues are an example of a trade-off between perceived returns from an enhanced role on global public goods issues, and a focus of measures more directly affecting its national interests. The former, it can be reasonably argued, often distracted attention away from more immediate and important aspects of national security.

The analysis in this study indicates that India will enjoy a window of relative external security during this decade. The probability of a major armed conflict or violation of sovereignty through territorial incursion or remote aggression is quite weak because of the global balance, India’s changing relationship with the U.S., multipolarity, nuclear deterrence, and preoccupations elsewhere of China and Pakistan. Although the military build-up for contingencies beyond 2020 must continue, the situation does leave room to concentrate on economic prosperity as the driver of external policy during this decade. An inability to achieve the potential rate of economic growth of 8-10% will not only generate unmanageable levels of socio-political stress internally, but also severely compromise India’s capacity to acquire the required strategic capability. This is best understood from the fact that while both India and China currently spend around 3% of their GDP on defence, this translates in absolute terms to a threefold advantage for China, given the differential in the two countries total GDP. There is no other option to catching up with
China, which has emerged as the most important ‘swing economy and strategic power’ in the current global transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world. Thus, it would be important for the Ministry of External Affairs to focus principally on foreign policy’s role in achieving the high and consistent growth targets. The rest can, and will, follow. India’s de-linking of strategic and economic interests in Myanmar from democracy and human rights in a useful precedent in this regard.

Insofar as the security paradigm is concerned, internal security threats that emanate from ethnic strife, ideologically driven armed campaign against the Indian state, or religious fundamentalism will pose a greater danger to the country than external conventional and non-conventional threats. Security and foreign policy should, therefore, pay greater attention to the not insignificant external aspects of these internal security threats.

Despite the heightened expectation of the global community, the implications of India’s enhanced role in global issues and governance needs to be looked at within the parameters of its growth and security objectives. In case of contradictions, the former should be given lower priority in the conduct of the country’s foreign policy. This does not in any sense imply an abdication of global responsibilities, but rather that India cannot afford to let them pose a trade-off on the more important aspects of its national security. For example, it would have been an unnecessary distraction had India let its potential leadership role in global disarmament come in the way of finalizing the nuclear deal. Similarly, making efforts to become a member of either the UN Security Council or other leading groups in global for a should not be at the cost of primary national security objectives.
While the long-term security threat from China remains, neither government seems to be in position to make the compromises necessary for a settlement of the border dispute during this decade. And yet, neither is interested in exacerbating the military stand often the ground. This gives India breathing space to consolidate its military dispositions and connectivities on its side of the LAC. It also gives it the opportunity to engage China in exploring long term possibilities of building economic interdependence between the two countries through hydro-power projects along the Yarlong-Zangbo-Brahmaputra. Sino-India cooperation on the latter issue is of course time-sensitive to the situation in Tibet. In the event of a resurgent militant Tibetan pro-independence movement, possibly after the demise of the present Dalai Lama, Beijing’s attitude towards India and border question could harden. An early resolution of the Tibet issue on the basis of substantial autonomy, therefore, is in India’s security interest. Failing this, India will have to walk tightrope between China, Tibetan expatriates and western countries.

The security-economy dyad also runs through the overarching India-US-China triangle. The US has adopted a ‘coordination’ policy towards China but has, at the sometime, become progressively more dependent in the trade, investment, and financial sectors on that country. It is simultaneously seeking closer strategic ties with India in order to ‘hedge’ against the prospect of a more assertive China. India on its part will have to rely on critical inputs from the US in terms of markets, investments, technology, military build-up, and strategic synergies. Together with this, it needs to contain its border dispute with China and benefit from China’s economic rise, especially its trade and energy potential. The main challenge for the Indian diplomacy during this decade and beyond will be how to judiciously play the triangular relationship to India’s best advantage. This will essentially be a balancing act in which a military alliance with the
US or involvement in anti-China postures can be as counterproductive as a less than robust strategic partnership with the United States.

This is no easy task and will likely not be any easier in the future. India, like any other representative liberal democracy, must continually address the concerns of its voting masses, the elite constituencies who frame policy and make strategic decisions, while also balancing the same security priorities of a large nation in a complex matrix of global security environment. In a time-period of Post-Independent history of India where the only real consistency has been the ‘change’, the chequered profile of the national security within the gambit of the country’s foreign policy depicts India’s admirable struggle to come to grips with balancing an intrinsic faith in peaceful co-existence with a desire to increasingly project power. PM Singh captured the nature of Indian foreign policy best when in a speech to Parliament he explained.

“…..interaction among sovereign countries is essentially a matching of sovereign but competing interests. It involves living with contradictions. No written document of any nature can spell out everything on earth in black and white. There are grey areas which are left vague and unexplained. Reconciling those calls for ingenuity of the highest order. It is the outcome of this interaction that constitutes international relations called diplomacy. Great nations have diverse interests and contradictory challenges to meet. There cannot be a strait jacket or a single approach to them.”

No state is expected to successfully navigate all its unique national security challenges in its foreign policy. Indian foreign policy will certainly continue to confound and generate debate.

The above exposition not only highlighted some of India’s major national security concerns over past decades, but also some of the
challenges faced in negotiating conflicting priorities. India’s future national security challenges will likely raise same equally complex questions of prioritization and management of foreign policy objectives. India’s immediate neighborhood has remained a fairly constant balance between pursuing integrating economic policies and a defensive security posture. The extended and international spheres have begun to require an increasingly complex calculus which has left many scholars like Harsh Pant to argue that India has hitherto not managed to successfully balance its national security objectives. This study argued in the line with C. Raja Mohan that India’s national security in the framework of the country’s foreign policy is beginning to take a clearer shape and the India’s success at balancing competing priorities while still a contentious issue, is in fact possible.

Indicators point out that India’s influence in the Asian region is appreciated by New Delhi, which is beginning to not only project a sense of security, power, and benign intentions but also continuity. New Delhi is consistently addressing the importance of sending non-threatening signals to its neighbours and the international community. Policy makers in New Delhi seem to also believe that their rising status as a ‘responsible power’ should afford them greater international influence. Should New Delhi continue to pursue a positive role in stabilizing the immediate and extended neighbourhoods, then India may yet prove to be a responsible rising power in the global arena.

Today standing on the crossroads of global highways of the international politics and relations it is India’s moment of millennial opportunity. The challenge is to convert the national hope into reality. To make a leap—a great leap in congruence to our collective Vision of 2020, that simply means to redefine India as a nation; to redefine us—WE, THE PEOPLE of the Republic of India, that is, Bharat.
Footnotes and References

1. It remains contested as to how close the two countries came to an exchange, or high tensions were running, suffice it to say however, that most analysts agree that without U.S. intervention in the crisis, the situation would have deteriorated rapidly.

2. Again, P.M. Nawaz Sharif has had claimed that he was unaware of his military’s involvement, although many analysts are skeptical of his denial.

3. LeT’s involvement is contested in this attack, the group has denied any involvement and when four men were caught they were all said to be a part of JeM. However, it is important to note that often these groups have overlapping membership. While the plan may not have come from LeT leadership, they would have surely supported the cause and plausibly allowed their members to be involved.

4. K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman, “India-Iran Relations and U.S. Interest”, CRS August 2, 2006, “There are signs that, in the wake of the July 2005 launch of a U.S.-India “global partnership” and plans for bilateral civil nuclear cooperation, India is bringing its Iran policy into closer alignment with that of the United States.” pg. 2

5. Both India and Iran have sought to counter the Taliban and diminish Pakistan’s influence over Afghanistan.

6. Indian Iran trade relations where reported in 2010-11 MEA report as just over $13 billion, in comparison to $69.9 billion US-Indian trade in 2008 reported in the MEA 1999-10 document.

7. For detailed listing of Indo-Iranian defense cooperation, see C. Christine Fair “Indo-Iranian ties : thicker than oil,” pg. 49-50

8. MEA 2000-01 pg. iv

9. MEA 2003-04 pg. 22

10. See for examples, C. Christine Fair “Indo-Iranian ties : thicker than oil” pg. 47-46 and MEA 2000-01 pg. iv

11. MEA 2003-04 pg 27
12. MEA 2004-05 pg 8
13. MEA 2004-05 pg 47
14. MEA Foreign Relations Report 2006 pg. 22-23
15. MOD 2006-07, “India has made clear that it does not support the emergence of new nuclear weapon states” pg. 10 and see MOD 2009-10 “Iran has underlined the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities. India and Iran share historical and cultural ties and India continued to support a peaceful resolution of the issue which would be in the interest of peace and stability in West Asia” pg 4.
17. Krondstat, “Indian – Iran Relations,” pg 3
19. MEA STARRED QUESTION NO. 248, August 11, 2010
20. MEA, Foreign Relation Report, 2007 pg 16
21. See for example MoD 2005-06 pg 4