6

INDIAN DEFENCE
DOCTRINE, CONFLICT
COMPLEXES AND
ISSUE OF
DISARMAMENT
India is located in an unstable neighbourhood in which historically the political conditions have been volatile and instable and are more likely to worsen before the improve in future. The Failed State Index of 2007, brought out by Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace, lists 60 failed and failing states in the world, of which 23 are located in Asia. Significantly, except China, every country that borders India is on that Index. In the background of such unstable regional environment, India’s military strength and preparedness necessarily gets factored in at the core of the national security construct. However, since the complexity emerges from the limited role of military power in strategic superiority, the need to focus on composite power comes in highlight of which military strength is but one factor, though quite clearly a significant one. Moreover, the emergence of ‘new ways of warfare’-specially terrorism and sub-conventional wars and their adoption by both non-state actors and by a number of state entities has aggravated the defence situation. This is becoming further complicated by the proliferation of technological force multipliers, sophisticated weapons, and explosives among rouge non-state actors. So, involving a shift away from traditional military hardware towards integrating and even embedding information and communication technology, India’s defence and security systems today is facing challenge of directly linking the national defence to scientific and strategic technological capability and its ‘smart’ innovative dynamism.

(i) Indian Doctrine of Risk Balance and Security strategy

*Strategic Goals*:

Indian’s strategic objectives are to deter armed aggression, protect its decision-making autonomy and vital national interests. Effective conventional and nuclear deterrent forces are an essential part of India’s
strategic posture. To safeguard vital national interests, our conventional forces must have the technological edge to perform their core tasks of fighting and defeating any aggressor. India cannot fully concentrate on achieving economic modernization and social justice without defending peace. Missiles have become a central instrument in modern warfare, our conventional and nuclear deterrence requires advanced ballistic and cruise missiles deliverable from land air and sea.

In order to be a ‘global player’, one requires to have long-term coherent thinking and planning to overcome the challenges ahead, which are the following:

- Ensure coordinated application of political, diplomatic, military and technological resources to protect and promote national security objectives.
- Evolve a comprehensive strategy to tackle ‘proxy wars’, an effective intelligence agency and a higher defence control set-up.
- Project our credible nuclear deterrence, backed by delivery systems, command and control structure, as also a visible dissuasive conventional capability.
- In addition, to existing dependencies, we need to pursue alternative energy sources of ‘nuclear’ and solar energy.

**Strategic Doctrine:**

Close interdependence between the economic power of a nation and its military prowess has far greater relevance today than before the breakup of the former Soviet Union. India’s vital national interests and objectives of territorial integrity, internal cohesiveness, safeguarding of the
democratic system and equitable social economic growth of its massive population largely shapes the contours of its national strategic doctrine.

Economic prosperity is a crucial determinant not only for national security, but its military component as well, as faster economic growth would also generate larger capital for developing military capabilities. Necessity to have ever expanding areas of peace around the country is an essential pre-requisite to unhindered growth and development. In essence, there is a fundamental need to move from ‘the classic paradigm of competitive security’ towards a ‘cooperative inter-state model.’

Instrumentalities and mechanism in the form of security and confidence building measures to achieve peace in the region assume increasing importance and must be pursued relentlessly.

In sum, the strategy doctrine would need to be configured to:

• Defence of India through adoption of appropriate military strategies.

• Prevention of war, and if that fails, prosecute it to attain main benefits to achieve national objectives fastest and with least damaging cost.

• Strategic Defensive Posture.

(ii) India’s Military Strategy:

As poisted clearly in a 1997 study, India’s military strategy of conventional defence would encompass a strong and a viable defensive posture of a dissuasion and a potent and credible counter offensive capability of deterrence. Dissuasion implies powerful defence as also mob reserve that blunt and limit such intrusion without acceptable loss of
territory. On the other hand, deterrence is predicated to strong and credible counter-offensive capabilities that inflict unacceptable losses on the aggressor at a place of defender’s choice. The mere threat of a counter-offensive would deter the aggressor from embarking on changing the status quo.

Conventional war, if takes place, would be constrained in time and place, scope and political objectives. The conflict would be characterized by high intensity, fast tempo, manoeuvre–oriented ops and the duration is unlikely to exceed 2-3 weeks, the side with a higher sustainability and recuperability would have a clear advantage.

Success in the 21st century conventional war would lie in possessing strategic capabilities, higher technological levels, missiles, satellites, modern inter-service patched C4I2 systems. For greater comb effectiveness potential, state of the art reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition capabilities and domination offered by technology-intensive force multipliers are considered mandatory needs.

**Nuclear Threat:**

Pokhran II was truly historic for India and the nuclear option that had been kept uneasily open for 24 years was finally closed in favour of acquiring overt nuclear weapon expability.¹

As per Gen. K. Sundarji, the nuclear threats are as under²:

- **From Large Nuclear Power (LNP)**

  USA is a LNP with which a clash is only likely if there is a future divergence between India’s interests in our region and those of the USA.
• From Medium Nuclear Powers (MNP)

China with increasing clout, both economically and military is willing to flew her nuclear muscle or go in for nuclear black mail to suit her global/regional interests. India is perceived as a challenge due to the regional interests.

• Small nuclear powers (SNP)

Pakistan poses a considerable threat due to the exaggerated expectations in that country and due to her covert support to terrorism and insurgency.

Conventional External Threats:

Since last one decade conventional external threats are more visible. They relate to territorial integrity, sovereignty, security from external trans border terrorism, illegal arms supply, trade wars, information warfare, technology control and denial and threat of nuclear weapons and missiles.

Pakistan or other like minded countries are the main threat. US threat, through land operations is unlikely, but arm twisting will be there. Naval threat or air exclusion zone is possible in the eventuality of clash of interests rather than a direct invasion using land air operations. Indo-China border dispute could only lead to large scale war due to miscalculation.

(iii) Emerging Conflict Scenario and Management:

Nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998 enhanced the possibility and indeed probability of a nuclear conflict in South Asia. The aim of nuclear programmes of both the countries have been different. India points towards the security threats from China and the
nuclear monopoly of the Big Five, while Pakistan points fingers to India itself. The shared perception between India and Pakistan, the two nuclear weapon states, are that nuclear weapons would guarantee national security and provide an element of stability in bilateral relations.

India and Pakistan relations have never been harmonious right from the day the two got independence. The major problem has been obviously the Kashmir Problem, Pakistan’s involvement in encouraging terrorism in Kashmir, the Siachin Glacier etc, which still remains unresolved. The problem of Kashmir can be solved through internal mediation.

Nuclear issues in South Asia concentrates on the policies of India and Pakistan. India exploded its first nuclear device at Pokharn on May 1974. Whereas Pakistan’s decision to make nuclear weapons was decided in Jan 1972 well before India’s ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ of 1974. Pakistan’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons was after the humiliating defeat in the Bangladesh conflict of December 1971. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto decided to acquire nuclear weapons to safeguard its security and territorial integrity seeing India’s size and conventional superiority.

Both India and Pakistan maintain active nuclear and missile programmes. Both countries have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The security dynamics of the region are complicated by India’s perception of China as a threat, and Pakistan’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons and missile system are intended primarily to counter India’s substantial conventional military advantage and its perception of India’s nuclear threat.

Pakistan test fired its first ever cruise missile. The missile, named Babur (Hatf VII) is capable of flying parallel to the surface of the ground, can hit the target with ‘pinpoint accuracy’ and can be fired from warships,
submarines and can be fired from warships, submarines and fighter jets. The range of the missile is 310 mile (approximately 500 km). Babur missile does not have a supersonic range like ‘Brah Mos’, despite having a longer range than Brah Mos. This crucial difference between the two missile systems leaves the power balance to tilt more towards India.

Pakistan used its nuclear deterrent capability to conduct cross border terrorism first in Punjab and then in Jammu & Kashmir. In reality, it is the Pakistani military that has crossed the Line of Control (LoC) in the past to provoke Indian defence. Pakistan insists on Kashmir being the ‘core’ issue of stability/instability between India and Pakistan.

**India and Pakistan : Status of WMD Programmes :**

**Nuclear Weapons :** Both possess fissile material.

**Chemical Weapons :** India, with its large industrial base, can produce precursors for chemical warfare agents. Pakistan must obtain precursors for chemical agent productions.

**Biological Weapons :** Pakistan is conducting research and development with potential biological warfare application India’s efforts are geared towards defence.

**Delivery System :** Both have aircraft capable of delivering nuclear and chemical weapons. Both are developing missiles.
Figure 6.1

Missile Programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prithivi (150-250 Km)</td>
<td>Hatf – I (100-150 Km)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni – I (1000-1500 Km)</td>
<td>Hatf – II (300-450 Km)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni – II (1500-2500 Km)</td>
<td>Haif – III (600-800 Km)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trishul (Space to Air Missile)</td>
<td>Ghauri (Hatf) 1200-1500 Km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akash (Space to Air Missile)</td>
<td>Ghauri – II (2000-2300 Km)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nag (Anti Tank Missile)</td>
<td>Shahin – I (500-750 Km)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhanush (UUM)</td>
<td>Shahin – II (1500-2000 Km)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sagarika (Sea Launched Missile)</td>
<td>Ghajnavi (M-II) (Supersonic Cruise Missile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahmos (Supersonic Cruise Missile)</td>
<td>Abdali (1000-1500 Km)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashtra Missile (Air to Air Missile)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni A- I (Space to Space Missile)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

India, whose nuclear weapons program is mostly plutonium – based, is scouring the world for technologies to enhance its modest uranium enrichment program.

Albright cautioned that these were merely estimates and there was reason to believe that at least in the case of Pakistan, the numbers may be greater : Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme is mostly uranium based.

According to Institute for Science and International Studies (ISIS), Pakistan is believed to have 1.1 tons of highly-enriched uranium. It
placed Russia, Pakistan, Indian and China among the list of vulnerable countries is terms of nuclear safety. The history of the development of nuclear weapons is linked with Mutual assured destruction (MAD), a concept involved during the Cold War. According to the MAD concept, the use of nuclear weapons by one against the other is apprehended in final destruction of both the attacker and the defender.

Ten pillars required for nuclear CBMs:

- Improving bilateral relationship
- Both parties should not be any use of coercion.
- Critically evaluate the methods adopted to resolve conflicts.
- Sharing knowledge of decision-making processes.
- Agreement on advance notification of missile testing and movements.
- Flight test missiles only from designated test ranges.
- Provision of advance notifications of the movement of missiles for training purposes.
- Review of policy decisions related to tactical nuclear weapons (including development, productions, or use).
- Establishment of multi-layered, reliable, secure, accurate and authenticated communication mechanism.
- Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre (NRRC)s.

Pakistan insists on Kashmir being the ‘core’ issue of stability/instability between India and Pakistan. The India-Pakistan peace process got a fresh push with the much awaited launch of the Amristar-Lahore bus service in Nov, 2005. If it is possible to have buses playing on the Delhi-Lahore and Srinagar-Muzaffarabad routes, there is no reason
why there should be no such link between Amritsar and Nankana Sahib (the birthplace of Guru Nanak Dev) which would be another lane on the widening highway of people-to-people connection.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had pointed out to President Bush that General Musharaf (the former President of Pakistan) still controls the flow of terrorist into India. The terrorist infrastructure is still intact on the Pakistan side.

In the 21st century nuclear weapons and missiles are not likely to be the currency of power as there is little probability of war between the major powers, while wars between a major power and medium or small power cannot be ruled out, conflicts in the future will be over intellectual assets. Indian should tend its own relationship with Pakistan with care, patience and perseverance.

India’s response to many multiple threats and challenges have always been restrained, measured and moderate, consistent with its peaceful outlook and reputation as a peace-loving country. India’s strategic and security interests require a mix of land-based, maritime and air capabilities. India remains fully committed to maintaining peace with its neighbours and stability in the region through a combination of defence-preparedness, unilateral restrain, confidence building and dialogue.

India’s long term objective is to develop progressive and peaceful environment and friendly relation with all. India’s endeavor has to develop economically and militarily through promoting cooperation and understanding with neighbouring countries, strengthening confidence building measures (CBMs), engaging in cooperative and collective security initiatives, and pursuing security and strategic dialogues with major powers and other key operation. India and Pakistan would have to realize
their vital national interests and rise above these pressures to initiate a dialogue.

As taking a major step toward confidence building, India and Pakistan on 3 Oct, 2005 signed accords on pre-notification of ballistic missile tests and setting up a communication link between Indian Coast Guard and Pakistan Maritime Security Agency.

(iv) Growing Nuclear Danger is South Asia : Prospects for Cooperative Denuclearization?

*Nuclear Dilemmas in Indo-Pakistan Relations : Level One :*

India and Pakistan count as Nuclear-Weapons States (NWS) since May 1998. In 2001, the Indian armed forces even conducted a military exercise dubbed ‘Operation Poorna Vijay’ (‘complete victory’) in a simulated nuclear war environment. Terrorism has introduced a fresh dimension to the nuclear question.

The low-yield nukes carry the unmistakable stamp of being tactical, a counterforce weapons. Even low yield nukes create massive collateral damage in the densely populated Kashmir-Punjab sector on both sides of the border.

The second dilemma relates to the reliability of the nuclear warheads and their delivery systems. Hot tests by each side including Pokhran I of 1974 are grossly inadequate to ensure the reliability of the nukes at critical times.

The nuclear veteran nations, tested theirs for ever four decades (China since 1964) before halting hot tests. Even then they have retained the option of continuing with cold tests via computer simulation. So, weaponisation needs more tests.

(204)
The third dilemma relates to India’s No-First Use (NFU) declaration. Time and space are against the two South Asian neighbours. In the US-Soviet/Russian case, each side would have half-an-hour of early warning. Further, to maintain a credible record strike capability our retaliatory assets must be hardened with mobile, easy to hide missiles, nuclear blast-proof, super-concrete and widely dispersed underground silos and command centres, secure communications, SLBM-submarines, etc.

Fourth, early warning sensors of both countries are sub-optimal. Both heavily depend on radars, but their reliability is an open question. US-style hi-tech satellite early warning is hardly in place.

Fifthly, both sides have reportedly kept their nukes dispersed and in unassembled form. This is supposed to reassure each other and put up a good face to the ‘international community’. This status has been called ‘recessed deterrence’ by Jasjit Singh and ‘force-in-being’ by Ashley Tellis of RAND. It is a state of relaxed deterrence in normal times. Will these components be assembled, deployed and launched in 3-6 minutes? The anxiety to launch will be all the more if there is no way of knowing whether the incoming first strike, capability. The alternative postures are even more disastrous.³

Despite an Indo-Pakistan agreement reached in December 1998 on sparing attacks on each other’s nuclear facilities, desperation in crisis, unauthorized launch by hotheads, launch by miscalculation or by accident are real dangers, especially so in South Asia not known for efficiency.

A sixth question related to the status of the chain of nuclear command. Media reports have suggested that Pakistan’s National Command Authority is streamlined and ready to face a nuclear emergency decision-making better than India’s less organized command chain.
It was incredible that Premier Vajpayee’s Boeing 737-200 aircraft, flying a three-nation tour in late 2001, reportedly did not even have a telephone for the nation’s leader to communicate with the ground, a basic amenity which commercial airlines routinely offer to their passengers!

**International Terrorism and the Nuclear Threat : Level Two :**

A brand new dilemma has burst upon the international scene with sudden urgency since 11 September 2001. The Al Qaeda terrorist network easily conquered world headlines. A surprise terrorist seizure of nuclear materials in South Asia, especially in Pakistan immediately neighbouring troubled Afghanistan, Al Qaeda is known to have sympathizers and contacts among segments of nuclear scientists in several countries including Pakistan. Hence, the nuclear weapons problem in South Asia – has become a dual one. The conventional level is that of inter-state nuclear balance between India and Pakistan, our level one. But the second level, which needs the most urgent attention and even surpasses the threat posed by the first, is the one introduced by non-state actors, or terrorist organizations. Nuclear deterrence is as useful against them as an eight-inch battleship artillery piece.

**The Obstacles :**

The past nuclear agreement between the US and the U.S.S.R. did not control nuclear warheads directly but focused on delivery systems. An effective way to nuclear weapons reduction can be direct control over the warheads and the materials needed to manufacture them. Besides ‘national technical means’-euphemism for espionage-there is undoubtedly need for cooperative verification measures. These would include : declarations of the location and status of all nuclear warheads and fissile material stockpiles, verification of these declarations via on-site inspections and
exchanges of data on the design and operating history of the production facilities, verification for the dismantling of nukes and of the storage and disposition of the fissile materials contained in them.

Inspecting fissile materials would pose greater difficulties than nukes. The latter can be counted but not fissile material. Ways have to be found to overcome this problem with fissile materials.

**Level One : The Nuclear Weapons Problem in South Asia :**

The declared yields in Kt of TNT of the nuclear devices which India tested on 11 and 13 May 1998 – Pokhran –II were 43, 12, 0.3 on the first day, and 0.5 and 0.3 on the second. Pokhran I, way back on 18 May 1974 had 15 Kt yield. Pakistan’s tests in Ras Koh in the Chagai Hills on 28 and 30 May 1998 yielded 12, 25, 3 sub-Kt on the first day, followed by 12 Kt on the second. While India insisted that it had successfully tested a thermonuclear device, controversy surrounded its claim.6

**Indo-Pakistani CBMs and CSBMs**

The Indo-Pakistani scenario has not been all hostility. Indian and Pakistani scholars have been visiting each others countries on academic missions. In 1996-97 interaction took place between the two sides along with Asia Society and the Japan Institute of International Affairs. The discussions included nuclear issues. At a conference in September 2001 sponsored by the Indian Council for Social Science Research experts from the two countries agreed on the need to develop contacts between civil society groups, easing of media reporting on each other, and of visa rules to boost exchanges and contacts. Pakistani delegates quite openly criticized their own legislators for their “scant regard for the democratic process”. *The Times of India* reported on 27th April that even in the middle of the Indo-Pakistani border tension, an Indo-Pakistani non-governmental
A seminar was held in Islamabad in March 2002; the Indian delegation also talked to Musharraf.⁷

Pakistani leader, former General Musharraf matched the Indian offer with his own at the UN General Assembly in November that year. His country was ready to discuss “nuclear and missile restraints as well as nuclear risk reduction measures with India in a structured, comprehensive and integrated dialogue”. He further stated that he probably wanted to include the Kashmir question too, he was ready to formalize a bilateral treaty” to create regime of “mutual test ban”, confidence-building measures and non use of force.⁸

Vajpayee the former PM had offered a no-first use of nukes agreement to former Pakistan Premier Nawaz Sharif during the Colombo SAARC Summit of 1998. One reason why India found similar Pakistani offers unacceptable in the past was that these would define security strictly within the geographical confines of South Asia. “The aim is to score points. The two have gone round this mulberry bush many times since the 1980s while cynically proliferating atomic weaponry.”⁹

The conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) represents another way of enhancing CBMs. In June 2004 officials of the newly elected Congress-led government in India and their Pakistani counterparts held nuclear risk-reduction talks, possibly focusing on the hotline and other measures to cut chances of accidentally nuking each-other.

As of April 2002 Islamabad continued to refuse to hand over the twenty terrorists demanded by India. However, its Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar sweetened the pill by saying that while there was no extradition treaty between the two countries, the 1987 SAARC Document on Extradition might serve as a framework for the purpose.¹⁰
However, continued cross-border terrorism in Kashmir and Islamabad’s crocodile tears over the plight of Kashmiris in India continues to mar any efforts at reconciliation.

South Asia: Need for Unambiguous Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy:

India’s bomb is not Pakistan specific but takes the growing Chinese nuclear potential into account too. China in recent years has upgraded its ballistic missiles based in Tibet to the so-called CSS-5s. A significant percentage of its missiles are based there. This is of strategic concern to India’s defence planners. In Pakistan where the military dominates the nuclear debate, the nuke is a tool of war to get even with the numerically superior conventional Indian military. In an interview with the German news magazine Der Spiegel in Spring 2002, Musharraf reiterated that view openly. He reportedly observed that if India’s pressure on Pakistan was stepped up, it might reach a point where Islamabad would press the nuclear button.11

Islamabad seems to believe that its nukes will deter India from launching conventional strikes while Pakistan could go ahead with waging its proxy war in Kashmir. Kargil in mid-1999 epitomized its line of thinking. Terrorist attacks over the past decade but particularly the ones against the Kashmir Assembly in October and Parliament on 13 December 2001 to galvanise India into unabashed military mobilisation along the Pakistani border. There were reports that India tested a second time its long-range missile Agni II on 17th Jan 2001, was going to weaponise it to make it “ready for battle status”. USA, arm-twisted Musharraf to stop bothering India and crack down against terrorists operating from Pakistan.12

India remained skeptical and spurned several Pakistani offer of ‘talks’. New Delhi insisted upon effective Pakistani measures against the
export of cross-border terrorism and handing over of twenty terrorists wanted for various atrocities committed against India. For instance, the leader of Jamait-e-Mohammad (JeM), which had for long been on New Delhi’s counter-terrorism crosshairs, Masood Azhar, had to be set free from captivity in India when an Indian civilian passenger aircraft was hijacked to Kandhar. He found refuge in Pakistan. Following Musharraf’s ban on his JeM, he simply changed its nomenclature to Jamait-ul-Furkan and re-emerged in Kashmir. Hence, the Indian armed forces remained poised on alert on the border.

If a conventional war breaks out between India and Pakistan, will it cross the nuclear threshold? But following 13 December 2001 India determinedly mobilized and deployed troops on the Pakistani border. The accompanying talk of even ‘hot pursuit’ of the intruders in Kashmir back to their bases in Pakistan.

**Level Two : Nuclear Terror in Russia and South Asia :**

After 9/11 the danger of hostile states and especially terrorist outfits gaining access to loosely guarded nuclear arsenals, primarily in Russia but now also in South Asia, is real. The possibility of terrorists gaining access to nuclear materials in South Asia, especially in Pakistan, has loomed large in US calculations. International Terrorism since 9/11 immediately raised the question how secure the nuclear arsenals and stockpiles of India and Pakistan were and whether terrorists could seize them and use against the USA. India’s nuclear programme grew “too quickly”, without observing proper safeguards. It further alleges that lack of accountability and wide dispersal of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities pose a potential hazard. Of India’s 14 nuclear plants, only four are safeguarded. Moreover, uranium mining remains potentially hazardous. Lack of adequate safety measures for the population living around these
mines, largely ‘dalits’ or some of the poorest strata of Indian society. Financial rewards from sale of illicit nuclear expertise, the study alleges, have become a serious threat for India’s scientific community. Existing international conventions on nuclear safety do not deal much with question of nuclear reactor design, safety features governing the mining of radioactive materials, nuclear theft and so on. Hence, India needs to tone up its nuclear administration, whether civilian or military.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal :}

The Washington Post reported that Musharraf had quickly moved his nukes to six secret sites within 48 hours of the 11\textsuperscript{th} September attacks. A few days later, on 19 September, Musharraf laid down his cards in a major speech to the nation that was startling in its anti-jehadi tone.

\textbf{A Cooperative Denuclearization Agenda for South Asia :}

Denuclearisation agenda for NWS States several years ago that is applicable to the present Indo-Pakistani Scenario.\textsuperscript{14}

1. De-targeting and de-alerting nuclear missiles.
2. Establishing a UN register of nuclear arms for greater transparency.
3. Separating nukes from missiles.
4. Placing excess weapons-grade fissile materials from retired nukes and production facilities under international control.
5. Making a firm commitment in multinational for a to the goal of nuclear disarmament and ultimate elimination of nukes.
6. Assuring non-NWS states of banning use of nukes against them.
Implications for India:

In India, nuclear weapons are taken as political weapons. Consequently, India's nuclear doctrine is one of deterrence and not for war-fighting. It posits infliction of 'unacceptable damage' on the enemy in retaliation for nuclear use. The doctrine favours 'massive' punitive action in case of the enemy 'first strike'. This is understandable in terms of reinforcing the uninviting consequences of nuclear war for the sake of deterrence. Due to India's 'No First Use' (NFU) pledge in its doctrine, the nuclear initiative would be with the adversary. In case of an India-Pakistan conflict, the nuclear initiative would be with Pakistan. Therefore, possible contours of Pakistani nuclear 'first use' need to be visualised. Implications of such use on India's nuclear and conventional doctrines would then emerge. At present, the dimensions of limitation in conventional doctrine are not explicit. Nor does the formulation of 'massive' punitive retaliation in nuclear doctrine indicate limitation. Further movement, if necessary, in India's conventional and nuclear doctrines can emerge from discussing the likelihood and consequence of Pakistani nuclear use.

Thinking along lines of 'Limited War' has often been debated and discussed in India, particularly, since the Kargil War Operation Parakram furthered this trend in thinking. The consequent change has been towards a more proactive and offensive Indian military doctrine. The implications of military operation in a nuclearised environment, particularly the aspect of Pakistani nuclear thresholds have received adequate attention. The theorising of 'Limited War' in India must be translated into an explicit 'Limited War' doctrine; secondly, nuclear war termination needs to be undertaken at the lowest possible escalatory level; and lastly, institution of a strategic dialogue mechanism to bring about the latter may be advisable.
Here the distinction on this scale is made between ‘higher order’ and "lower order' nuclear strikes. The understanding is that there would be required some correspondence between the strike and response. A 'higher order' nuclear strike would legitimise a higher retaliatory response Thinking along this line has given rise to Pakistan's 'option enhancing strategy' in which the likely introduction of nuclear weapons in a conflict is done at the lowest opprobrium level to minimise the retaliatory strike. This echoes General Sundarji's conceptualising of first strike contingencies that included: minimal demonstrative first strike; first strike only on tactical battlefield target: first strike on tactical battlefield and counter force larger, disarming first strike; and decapitating first strike (please refer to Figure 6.2).

**Figure 6.2**

**Nuclear Use Preferences Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Higher Order</th>
<th>More damaging;</th>
<th>More damaging;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less likely</td>
<td>Less likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opprobrium Quotient</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Order</td>
<td>Less damaging;</td>
<td>Less damaging;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More likely</td>
<td>Less likely</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Time dimension

Low threshold  High threshold

Quite obviously, nuclear non-use would be the preferred option for Pakistan. However, it is evident that this is not the only option it has. In other words, nuclear first use is not impossible to visualise in certain circum-
stances. While the risk is generally accepted, the finding here is that even a low threshold in which early nuclear use is resorted to cannot be ruled out. Of consequence in the foregoing discussion is that late nuclear use options, being less controllable, could prove more dangerous and damaging. Finally, middle order nuclear use has much to recommend it, and may be the more likely. From an Indian limitation standpoint, while nuclear non-use is most preferable, nuclear use by Pakistan of a low 'opprobrium quotient' may be more preferable for India since that would be less damaging and less compelling for India to escalate. The 'opprobrium quotient' is likely to increase over the duration of conflict, particularly in the case of Pakistan appearing to lose progressively. Therefore, a low nuclear threshold is not necessarily adverse for India since the nuclear strike would have a higher probability of a lower opprobrium quotient.

Strategic rationality seems to indicate a higher probability that Pakistan would keep its resort to nuclear weapons at the lowest level of provocation. This could equally likely be at the early stage so as to preserve as much of its military power as possible and when it is possible to operate its nuclear capability with a higher degree of efficiency. The likelihood appears to peak at the state of middle order nuclear use. The aim of 'limiting damage' for an attacker can best be brought about by an attack that does not provoke a 'massive' nuclear retaliation. Minimising India's retaliation and influencing the reaction of the international community would only be possible at the lower end of the scale of nuclear first use options. Added to this, Pakistan may go through the 'tests' and 'green field' options, prior to nuclear resort in keeping with its 'options enhancing strategy'.\textsuperscript{21} This could strengthen its case for nuclear use to a limited extent, in that it would be a call that India would ignore at its own risk. Administering a warning before delivering the nuclear strike would be an added measure to strengthen its otherwise weak hand. A not unreasonable political aim of employing nuclear weapons would be for
signalling war termination at any stage. This would be better from a Pakistani point of view earlier in the conflict, when it still has conventional resilience. Doing so makes greater sense before the destruction conflict inevitably entails has been incurred and at a stage when conflict dynamics and passions are not inordinately out of hand. Therefore, middle order nuclear use may be preferred by it (please refer to Figure 6.3).

**Figure 6.3**

**Nuclear Threat Assessment**

India is likely to be proactive and offensive on the conventional plane in future. The expectation appears to be of a high Pakistani nuclear threshold that would enable application of a proportion of India's
conventional might. The foregoing discussion questions this assumption. It brings out that early and lower order nuclear use has advantages for Pakistan that cannot be discounted. Therefore, India needs to arm itself with a conventional doctrine that is cognisant of the nuclear dimension of conflict. Such a Limited War doctrine could include, in addition to limited aims and limitation in means employed, communication of this to the enemy: early, unambiguously and through multiple channels.\textsuperscript{23} This has the advantage of enabling the early initiation of bargaining. While there may be hesitation in conveying exact aims to the enemy, at a minimum these would require to be communicated. This should also be evident on the ground by an appropriate war-waging strategy. Avoidance of over-zealous and over-aggressive military operations, such as the dash for Dacca in December 1971,\textsuperscript{24} is necessary.

There ran no longer be a pursuit of 'decisive victory' or the proverbial 'decisive battle'.\textsuperscript{25} "Even the war aim of degrading the Pakistani military to levels where it ceases to be an effective force would not qualify as a limited aim in a Limited War scenario."\textsuperscript{26} Presently, the Army Doctrine states:

Conflict is either resolved or terminated; military force contributes by the defeat of an opposing force. Defeat is defined as 'diminishing the effectiveness of the enemy to the extent that he is either unable to participate in combat or, at least, not being able to fulfil his intention'.\textsuperscript{27}

Pakistan would be prompted to use its nuclear capability prior to such a situation being reached. Therefore, neither is pursuit of 'victory' possible, nor is 'defeat' of the enemy desirable. It is possible that reticence in Limited War articulation owes to the understanding that in case it is communicated to Pakistan that India countenances Limited War, then Pakistan's conventional counter would be more violent under a heightened degree of security. Capitalising on insecurity could result in military advantages, but is neglectful of the nuclear context of the war. The latter, being
more consequential, requires India to move towards articulating a joint Limited War doctrine, alongside the doctrines of the services.

On the nuclear plane, the implication of Pakistani nuclear use is that follow through on the promise of 'massive' punitive retaliation against any kind of nuclear first use against India or its forces may prove incommensurate, and thereby escalatory. India's declaratory nuclear doctrine presently projects the prospect of 'one step' escalation for deterring Pakistani first use. But, as has been seen, deterrence has its limitations, particularly in warding off lower levels of nuclear provocation. Limitation entails consideration of quid pro quo or quid pro quo plus options, as referred to by General Sundarji. This may well be the nuclear strategy implemented in the event of lower order Pakistani nuclear first use. In such a case congruence between declaratory and actual doctrine could be arrived at. Doing so does not detract from deterrence.

A criticism would be that such doctrinal innovation increases the incentive for nuclear first use for Pakistan. It allows Pakistan to get away without maximum punishment for breaching the nuclear taboo. Letting Pakistan think it can get away by movement towards 'flexible' punitive retaliation would increase its propensity towards nuclear first use. The nuclear overhang would increase in salience with the possibility of early nuclear use. However, the paradox is that such nuclear use, as has been seen, would be less damaging and, therefore, preferable to more destructive late nuclear use. In such a case, resorting to commensurate retaliation would not be any less deterring since it is equally damaging. Besides, it would permit continuing of in-conflict deterrence and escalation control to the extent possible in a nuclear circumstance. A restrained nuclear exchange would have greater probability of paving the way for an easier negotiated end to the conflict. This would facilitate war termination, despite it having gone nuclear.
While limitation may have received attention, de-escalation and terminating nuclear war have not. Gumeet Kanwal writes that, ‘escalation control will be difficult to manage. There would be near certainty of nuclear exchanges graduating to massive strikes’. But he concludes that, 'there is only one viable response to a Pakistani nuclear strike, whether on Indian cities or military forces, whether inside Pakistan or not, and that is massive punitive retaliation with the full force of India's nuclear capability.' The thinking on this aspect is limited to stating that while India would be able to survive a nuclear attack, Pakistan would be 'finished'. The importance of consideration of nuclear conflict termination is further accentuated in light of scepticism on the possibility of limitation in nuclear war. According to McNamara, 'It is inconceivable to me, as it has been to others who have studied the matter, that "Limited" nuclear wars would remain limited - any decision to use nuclear weapons would imply a higher probability of the same cataclysmic consequences as a total nuclear exchange.' Therefore, approaches to breakdown of deterrence should not be restricted to the manner of response, but should also cover how to terminate nuclear exchanges. Kahn writes, 'De-escalation is even more sensitive to accurate communication and shared understanding than escalation is.'

The writings of late General Sundarji provide one option. The first stipulation governing targeting philosophy—in his words—should be, 'The desire to terminate the nuclear exchange at the lowest level with a view to negotiating the best peace that is politically acceptable.' In a conflict, national interest is in keening the nuclear threat and escalation prospects at the lowest possible threshold. Materialising such a bargain in the midst of war requires an institutional interface to be created prior, since, to quote Schelling, 'the strategy of retaliation is affected by the need to communicate or coordinate or limits'. This is especially so because, while 'tacit bargaining is possible ... there is no assurance that it will
succeed in any particular case or that when it succeeds, it will yield to either party a particularly favourable outcome compared with alternatives that might have been available if full communication had been allowed.\textsuperscript{45} awards this end, a mm-e beyond mere nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs) is required.\textsuperscript{46} Instead, a standing strategic-dialogue mechanism requires setting up\textsuperscript{47} and a doctrinal exchange undertaken in order to withstand the ultimate test of conflict.\textsuperscript{48}

The possibility and manner of Pakistani nuclear use has not received adequate attention in India. This perhaps owes to the belief in the viability of deterrence—that 'nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons'. However, since India's nuclear deterrence is based on inflicting 'unacceptable damage', it may not hold for lower order nuclear use having least opprobrium quotient directed at nuclear signalling rather than gaining military advantage. Infliction of unacceptable damage in retaliation to such first use may open India to like retaliation. While the promise of ‘Assured Retaliation' is kept, the ‘unacceptable damage' promised may in the event be considered.

Pakistan may be emboldened to resort to lower order nuclear first use, particularly if proactive Indian conventional offensives breach their nuclear thresholds. This restricts space for India's offensive conventional force application. Therefore, the Limited War concept requires fleshing out in the Indian context. The air and naval military instruments, being flexible, lend themselves more easily to limitation.\textsuperscript{49} However, this is not the case with the army. It needs to explicitly reflect on Limited War, even if the concept can be inferred from its discussion of various issues it covers.\textsuperscript{50} Limited Nuclear War thinking requires being energised, particularly in light of the potential proactive offensives of the Cold Start doctrine setting off the nuclear tripwire inadvertently. It follows that conventional war doctrine must veer towards Limited War in its reportedly ongoing-iteration.\textsuperscript{51} The
necessity has been acknowledged by the army chief, General Deepak Kapoor, who stated, 'a limited war under a nuclear overhang is still very much a reality in the Indian subcontinent'.

In the case of Pakistani nuclear first use that does not exact 'unacceptable damage' on India, there is a case for non-escalatory Indian nuclear retaliation. To accommodate this possibility, India's nuclear doctrine needs to move to flexible nuclear retaliation. In order to ensure nuclear escalation is restricted to the minimum possible level for the sake of damage limitation, a standing strategic dialogue mechanism with Pakistan may be considered.

**Chinese Perception of India's Growing Military Power:**

Almost all Chinese analyses of India's rise argue that India is attempting to become a major military power. 'India has always aspired to be a big powder, and has paid due attention to realizing this dream through military upgrade'.

According to Zheng Ruixiang, India aspires to become 'a world military power by 2015'. Both Ma Jiali and Cheng Ruisheng note that India is building its military power in tandem with its growing, economic power in order to raise its international status and strategic profile.

Chinese analysts are particularly concerned about the fact that India is steadily increasing its annual military budget and that it has emerged as the world's largest arms buyer in recent years. Furthermore, there are concerns about India's military and high technology partnership with Western powers, particularly the US. also believed that the US is promoting an Indo-Israeli relationship because Israel's emergence as a supplier of high technology weapons to India will leave the US 'much room for manoeuvre in its India policy'.

However, besides general concerns about India's military modernisation programme, the reasons for Chinese concerns are not
entirely clear, especially because it has been consistently spending a larger percentage of its much larger economy on defence. There are also concerns that the growing Indo-US military partnership may lead India into playing a military role to share some of the latter’s defence burdens given that it now finds itself overstretched in two wars. These Chinese concerns are not necessarily unfounded as the 2005 framework for defence collaboration between India and the US allows for collaboration on multinational operations when it is in their common interest. This 2005 agreement has been noted by Chinese analysts with some alarm, as it led one prominent India-watcher in China to refer to India as America's 'quasi-ally'.

Chinese analysts are also seriously concerned about India's growing missile and missile defence capabilities. Chinese analysts have been following the slow, but steady, progress in its indigenous cruise and ballistic missile capabilities as they are believed to be able to carry conventional and nuclear warheads. They are also concerned about India's partnership with Russia and Israel in the field of missile defence. Also, Indo-US cooperation on missile defence is a major cause of worry in Chinese assessments. In this context, it has been noted that the 2005 defence agreement between the US and India makes provisions for collaboration related to missile defence. It was also observed with some unease that the Israeli Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), a platform which has some components of US origin and can be used in a missile defence system, was sold to India but not China. Chinese analysts are also concerned about the military potential of India's spare capabilities. In this context, Chinese analysts have not only taken a note of India's growing ballistic missile capabilities, but also its potential for Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV). India's successful launch of a cluster of 10 satellites into orbit in 2008 led to this
In fact, India's growing missile capabilities over the past decade have called for 'a reappraisal of India ... within a broader perspective beyond the borders of China'\textsuperscript{65}

Finally, Chinese analysts are concerned about India's growing naval power and its ambitions in the Indian Ocean region. According to Chinese analysts, soon after the withdrawal of the British navy from the east of Suez, India developed a strategy to control the Indian Ocean region.\textsuperscript{66} While the Chinese realise that India has not yet been able to dominate the Indian Ocean, it is argued that 'India has never given up' this ambition.\textsuperscript{67} Given that the bulk of China's energy resources from the Middle East and trade with the countries of South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe pass through the Indian Ocean, the Chinese do not wish to give in to what they perceive as India's ambitions. As early as 1993, a senior officer of the PLA remarked that 'We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as an ocean only for the Indians.'\textsuperscript{68} However, there is a realisation that India has a prominent 'geographical advantage' in the region, stretching from the Persian Gulf in the west to the Straits of Malacca in the east.\textsuperscript{69} Consequently, the Chinese have responded by seeking naval access facilities (and perhaps even bases) along this entire oceanic stretch. However, there is a concern that the so-called 'quadrilateral alliance' is seeking to balance China.\textsuperscript{70} Finally there is a concern that India has a lead over China in the naval realm,\textsuperscript{71} and that it is seeking to project its power even into the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{72}

**Issue of Disarmament:**

The groundswell of opinion in favour of a nuclear weapon free world blends well with India's position on the issue, both traditional and current. India has always been a staunch advocate of the elimination of nuclear weapons. Over two decades ago, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
proposed an Action Plan (Appendix IX) to the Third Special Session on Disarmament for a nuclear weapon free world to be achieved by 2010. India's position on this issue remains the same. Thus, India's Nuclear Doctrine, as enunciated in January 2003 (Appendix X), pledges India's "continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament." This approach has since been reiterated on several occasions.

Most recently, India's approach has been comprehensively articulated in the statement made in the UNGA First Committee by its Permanent Representative to the CD on 10 October 2008 (Appendix XI). In the aforesaid statement India, inter alia, called upon the nuclear weapon states to negotiate a no-first-use agreement, an agreement for non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines, and to adopt nuclear risk reduction measures. Most important of all, India urged the negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention "leading to the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified timeframe". In these circumstances, it is not surprising that George Perkovich and James M. Acton have suggested, in the backdrop of this history that India is "the most willing of all nuclear-armed states to participate in the global elimination of nuclear arsenals."73

There is sound logic in India's commitment to a nuclear weapon free world. India's security would be much better served in an environment where there are only conventional weapons. It would not only obviate the possibility of a global nuclear holocaust, a regional nuclear exchange, or a terrorist attack with nuclear weapons or materials, but would also deprive Pakistan of a nuclear shield behind which to engage in terrorist actions against India. Some have argued that nuclear weapons provide India an equalizer against China. This argument may have been valid if India had
hostile intentions vis-a-vis China, much as Pakistan has vis-a-vis India. Since this is not the case, India will not need nuclear weapons if all nuclear armed countries, including China, do not have them. For India, its conventional forces are sufficient to keep China's possible hostile intentions in check. India's need for nuclear weapons has arisen only because China and Pakistan had them. India's use for nuclear weapons, as reiterated in its nuclear doctrine, is purely for deterrence and not for first use.

Therefore, it makes sense for India, even as a nuclear armed state, to lead the current movement for the elimination of nuclear weapons. India's traditional advocacy of nuclear disarmament, its security interests, and the international acclaim that is there to be garnered, demand that India plays a proactive role in promoting the cause of nuclear disarmament and takes a leadership role in this regard.

Since the surest route to the elimination of nuclear weapons is through an NWC, as detailed in the previous chapter, India should continue to press for the immediate commencement of negotiations on it in the CD, which it has for long been urging. In so doing, India should emphasize that such a direct approach is far superior to the incremental approach being commonly touted by most other advocates of a nuclear weapon free world. Not only will any forward movement achieved under an incremental approach be susceptible to reversal but, above all, the slow progress implicit in such an approach will expose the international community for many more decades to the nuclear menace.

India should suggest that simultaneously with the negotiation of the NWC aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework and setting in place a robust verification and control system to supplant the NPT regime, a number of other steps be taken, as detailed in
the previous chapter. These steps are essential to minimize the danger of use of nuclear weapons pending their elimination, which will take at least another five to ten years in a best-case scenario, following the commencement of the proposed NWC negotiations.

India does not appear to have a problem with any of the measures detailed in the previous chapter barring, perhaps, signing and ratifying the CTBT. India's hesitancy on this issue was signaled by former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran in an address at the Brookings Institution in March 2009, where he reportedly stated that India would not sign the CTBT unless the world moved "categorically towards nuclear disarmament in a credible timeframe".

It may be pointed out that the CTBT has been signed by 180 countries, of whom 148 have ratified it, including three nuclear weapon states, notably France, Russia and the UK. In order to come into force the treaty requires that the 44 states having nuclear technological capabilities, prevailing at the time of the finalization of the treaty, must sign and ratify it. Of these, North Korea, India and Pakistan are yet to sign the treaty. China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel and the USA, having signed it, have yet to ratify it. The US, though the major player, has so far been unable to get Senate approval for ratification. But President Obama, putting his full weight behind ratification, may succeed. In the event, India's opposition to the CTBT could become a stumbling-block to operationalizing it, as most of the other hold-outs are likely to fall in line with the US.

It may be recalled that India's reservations on the CTBT began to be expressed from the autumn of 1995 and peaked in the period leading up to Pokhran II in May 1998. The sharp change in the Indian position was attributed at the time to the loosening link between the process of nuclear disarmament and the CTBT. Shyam Saran's assertion, cited above, merely
echoes this thought process. The basic flaw in this line of argument is that
India had not, ab initio/ firmly predicated its support to the CTBT on any
definitive progress on nuclear disarmament. Thus the UNGA resolution of
December 1993 calling for negotiations on the CTBT in the CD, which
was co-sponsored by India, makes no such definitive linkage. Moreover,
right up till the autumn of 1995 India remained an active and constructive
participant in the negotiations on the CTBT in the CD. It is possible
therefore, that the real reason that led to the change in its position was that
India wished to retain its testing option. This is corroborated by Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's assertion at the 1998 UNGA session that
"The treaty, as it emerged, was not accepted by India on grounds of
national security."74

In any case, post-Pokhran II there has been a sharp diminution in
India's visceral opposition to the CTBT. Indeed, Prime Minister Vajpayee
stated categorically at the 1998 UNGA session that India was prepared to
bring the discussions that it was having with key interlocutors on, inter alia
the CTBT, "to a successful conclusion, so that the entry into force of the
CTBT is not delayed beyond September 1999". He added: "We expect that
other countries, as indicated in Article XIV of the CTBT, will adhere to
this Treaty without conditions".75 Moreover, since Pokhran II India has not
shown signs of wanting to test. This is borne out by its repeated
commitments to a moratorium on testing and its signing the nuclear deal
rules out testing.

In these circumstances, it would not seem logical for India to
stand in the way of the finalization of CTBT. Indeed, since it cannot itself
test, it should welcome a Treaty which forecloses the testing option for
other countries as well. Moreover, by continuing to oppose the CTBT or
being seen as lukewarm in its support, India would needlessly sully its
disarmament credentials. It has sometimes been argued that India must
keep open its testing option. To ensure that its deterrence remains credible, India may need more tests. In response, two points may be made. First, because of Indo-US civilian nuclear deal, testing may not be a desirable proposition. Second, while a few questions have been raised about India's hydrogen bomb capability, the government has refuted this view. In any case, it must be emphasised that India's atomic bomb capability has at no stage been questioned. In other words, India's deterrent capabilities are in place and testing is no longer critical for the country for this purpose. India will, of course, be constrained by not being able to bring about improvements in its design, etc. of its warheads as it cannot test. This approach however would not be consistent with a policy of nuclear disarmament.

As regards the FMCT, India should have no objection to working along with other like-minded countries on the issue. India first proposed the FMCT in 1954 and cosponsored the resolution in its support in December 1993. India is also committed by the nuclear deal to work in support of it. India must, of course, ensure that the FMCT should be strictly as per the mandate accorded to the CD in this regard. Specifically, the treaty should exclude "past production", which is being insisted upon by countries belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement, led by Pakistan, and that it should be "internationally and effectively verifiable". The treaty should also not debar production of fissile material for the propulsion of India's nuclear submarines.

India also needs to note that the United States' adherence to the mandate under which the FMCT is to be negotiated has been suspect for some time. The draft FMCT tabled by the US in the CD does not include any verification provisions: this is because the US lacks confidence in the possibility of monitoring compliance. This goes against the considered view that verification, though it would be challenging, is technically
feasible. The situation was muddied further by the assertion of the US Acting Assistant Secretary on 18 May 2006, while tabling the text of the FMCT, indicating that verification would rest on national technical means. To quote:

Consistent with our conclusions regarding the verifiability of an FMCT, which Ambassador Jackie Sanders announced to the Conference in July 2004, our text includes no provisions designed to provide verification. This does not mean that compliance with the treaty would be unverified, but rather that the primary responsibility for verification would rest with the parties using their own national means and methods ~ or, said another way, through the exercise of the sovereign responsibilities of the states parties to monitor compliance. 76

Fortunately, the Obama Administration has begun to talk of a verifiable FMCT. It is the hope of the international community that this means an internationally and effectively verifiable treaty as with a treaty verifiable through national technical means the USA would call all the shots on verification by virtue of having the most advanced national technical means. Moreover, it would rob the FMCT of all transparency and reduce it to a US-operated enterprise. India must, therefore, insist that the FMCT to be negotiated should be strictly as per the originally approved mandate of 1993.

The case for adopting a direct route to a nuclear weapon free world through the initiation of early negotiations for a NWC towards this end may not be acceptable to the nuclear weapon states, but India has nothing to lose by championing it. Indeed, in so doing it will have the diplomatic advantage of seizing the moral high ground and getting the support of the majority of the international community. In this context, it is germane to recall that in December 2006 at the UNGA 125 governments - including those of China, India and Pakistan - called upon states to immediately fulfil their nuclear disarmament obligations "by commencing
multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination” (Resolution 61/83) (Appendix XII). Indeed, a draft NWC was already Grafted way back in 1997 in response to the ICJ Advisory Opinion and was updated in 2007 by an international consortium of lawyers, scientists and physicians with inputs from many disarmament experts. Significantly, the ICNND has acknowledged that it enjoys considerable support from civil society groups around the world as well as many non-nuclear weapon states.

The nuclear weapon states will, in all probability, settle for the more tardy step-by-step approach. In keeping with such an approach one is likely to witness, amidst some bilaterally negotiated US and Russian reductions in their nuclear arsenals, calls for doctrinal changes designed to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons, efforts to address political hot spots around the world, adoption of arms control measures like the CTBT, FMCT, etc., a plethora of measures designed to tighten the NPT regime with a view to making horizontal proliferation more difficult and steps aimed at preventing non-state actors acquiring access to nuclear weapons.

While remaining critical of this piecemeal approach on the grounds that it would not lead to a nuclear weapon free world, India should react to each move on a case by case basis so that India is not viewed as being obstructionist. The litmus test for supporting any move should depend on whether it is in India's interest. Accordingly, it would need to be ensured that the moves proposed do not in any way differentiate between India and the nuclear weapon states.

India should, thus, flatly resist calls for the universalization of the NPT as it is an unequal treaty and will perpetuate the possession of nuclear
weapons with the nuclear weapon states, with all the attendant dangers of this phenomenon. Under the current non-proliferation regime, India is not likely to be formally acknowledged as a nuclear weapon state. It should be India's endeavour to promote an alternative and more equitable non-proliferation regime so that it is not treated in a manner inferior to other nuclear weapon states. India may, similarly, oppose efforts at the multilateral ization of the nuclear fuel cycle unless it is embedded in an NWC or equally applicable to all. India may also resist all moves urging it to observe a moratorium on fissile material production.

On the other hand, India should have no hesitation in signing the CTBT provided all others required to come on board for its operationalisation do so. It should also be ready to participate in the FMCT negotiations on the lines detailed above. Such moves should be made irrespective of whether or not these arms control arrangements are part of a comprehensive programme of nuclear disarmament. India should also, in principle, have no difficulty in supporting measures aimed at preventing non-state actors securing access to nuclear weapons and materials and at curbing the trafficking in them. Thus, it should readily cooperate in the US-sponsored CSI, as it would not only prevent movement of such materials from and through India to the US, but, by upgrading its own capabilities, would help in preventing the illicit ingress of all manner of prohibited materials into India.

Footnotes and References


12. Within less than a fortnight after the attack on India’s Parliament, US state Secretary Powell declared on 26 Dec. 2001 the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) as “foreign terrorist organizations” much to New Delhi’s satisfaction. Two days later, Bush observed at his Texas ranch that Musharraf had already caused to arrest of 50 terrorist and expressed the hope that India noted it. TOI, 14, 27, 29 Dec. 2001. The fresh US look at India as an important power is argued in Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power, Oxford University Press, 2001; Ajaz Ahmed, “Back from the brink?” Frontline Online, Vol. 19.


20. See, for instance, Gurmeet Manwal, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Thresholds and India's Options', Airpower Journal, 1(1), 2004; Bharat Kamad. "Sialkot Grab" and Capturing the "Corridor": Objectives and Tactics in a Nuclear Battlefield, War College Journal,

21. Sardar Lodhi writes: 'This would entail a stage-by-stage approach in which the nuclear threat is increased at each step to deter India from attack. The first step could be a public or private warning, the second a demonstration explosion of a small nuclear weapon on its own soil, the third step would be the use of a few nuclear weapons on its own soil against Indian attacking forces. The fourth stage would be used against critical but purely military targets in India across the border from Pakistan. Probably in thinly populated areas in the desert or semi-desert, causing least collateral damage (sic). This may prevent Indian retaliation against cities in Pakistan. Some weapon systems would be in reserve for the counter value role. Sardar F.S. Lodhi, no. 19.


24. Dacca did not figure in the initial objectives of the attack on East Pakistan in December 1971. The manner in which the war unfolded led to political approval by 'the third or fourth day' (O.K. Palit, 'Strategy of Force: A Historical Survey and Future Concepts', *Combat Journal*, 5(1), 1980, p. 14) of what the military made possible by its multipronged attack. However, this would be a dangerous manoeuvre in a battlefield having a nuclear backdrop.


26. Pertinent in this regard is room for 'face saving', especially important in Eastern cultures. Schelling (*The Strategy' of Conflict*, no. 37, p. 6) writes: 'We have recognized that the efficacy of the threat may depend on what alternatives are available to the potential enemy, who, if he is not to react like a trapped lion, must be left some tolerable recourse'.


29. On doctrinal development in India, see Ali Ahmed, 'The Interface of Strategic and
War Fighting Doctrines in the India-Pakistan Context', *Strategic Analysis*, 33(5),
2009, pp. 701-715.


31. K. Sundarji, *Vision 2100*, no. 11, p. 148. Herman Kahn uses the term 'controlled
reprisal' for such attacks in his discussion in *On Thermonuclear War*, no. 24, p.
174. Kahn's view is that the defender's first objective must be to 'Punish the enemy'.
The third objective on his list is 'Limit Damage'. However, his discussion is in the
context of a strike of massive proportions. Even he concedes that in case this is not
so and, 'quite a large force survives that attacker's strike, we can afford to shift the
priorities and put the Stalemate War and Limit Damage first, probably without
losing much in the quality of our deterrent since we would then have plenty of force
available to punish the enemy later if this becomes necessary' (*On Thermonuclear
War*, no. 24, p. 180).

32. Those in NATO in favour of nuclear first use during the Cold War argued that
increase in risk of nuclear war also served to deter conventional attack by the
Soviet Union. Robert McNamara, 'The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: The
Perceptions and Misperceptions', *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1983, p. 75.

33. Gurmeet Kanwal. *Indian Army*. no. 21, p. 82

34. While this received attention in the Cold War, there is a gap in thinking on this in
South Asia. The Cold War sources include: Stephen J. Cimbala, *Nuclear War
Termination: Concepts, Controversies and Conclusions*, Strategic and Defence
Studies Center. Canberra. 1989; James L. Foster and Gary D. Brewer, 'And the
Clocks Were Striking Thirteen: The Termination of War' (RAND), at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2008/P5559.pdf; Herman Kahn, 'Issues of
Thermonuclear War Termination,' *The ANNALS of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science*, 392(1), 1970, pp. 133-172; Klaus Knorr, 'Controlling
to thank an anonymous referee for the input.

35. Gurmeet Kanwal, *Indian Army*, no. 21, p. 82.

Requirements'. G.D. Bakshi writes that while one per cent of India's population
would be killed, Pakistan would lose six per cent of its population. G.D. Bakshi. The Paradox of Pakistan: Collapse or Caliphate, Manas. New Delhi, 2009.


38. Campbell Craig writes that, 'Strategists had tried, and failed, to show how a nuclear war could reliably be limited', in 'The Illogic of Henry Kissinger's Nuclear Strategy'. Armed Forces and Society, 29(4), 2003, pp. 547-568, at p. 565.


40. Herman Kahn, 'Escalation as a Strategy', no. 28, p. 31.

41. Further directions of thinking include nuclear war termination, in-conflict nuclear deterrence, bargaining, communication, conflict management and war strategies including calibrated nuclear attacks to bring about damage limitation. The author is grateful to an anonymous referee for insight on this dimension.

42. 'Nuclear Targeting Philosophy', in K. Sundarji, Vision 2100, no. 11, p. 146.


44. Thomas Schelling, no. 37, p. 76.

45. Ibid., p. 77.

46. The Lahore MOU envisages a discussion on doctrine. For text, see http://www.indianembassy.org/South_Asia/Pakistan/mou(lahore01211999).html. Five rounds of discussions have taken place since 2004, the last in 2007.

47. Shireen Mazari recommends a 'permanent framework for a strategic stability dialogue' in her article 'India's Nuclear Doctrine in Perspective and Pakistan's Options', Defence Journal, 3(8), 1999, p. 19.


49. Jasjit Singh, no. 4, pp. 1205-20; Swaran Singh, no. 42 pp. 2179-83.

50. The term is mentioned only once in the Spectrum of Conflict diagram on page 19 of the Indian Army Doctrine.
Bharat Karnad, no. 6, p. 5. The army doctrine is under review with a seminar having been conducted in United Services Institution of India in late 2009 in which the remarks of the army chief on preparedness of 'Two Front War' attracted attention. Rajat Pandit, 'Army Reworks War Doctrine for Pakistan, China', The Times of India, December 30, 2009.


In fact, it seems like India's military relationship with the United States is becoming a serious cause of concern even for ordinary Chinese citizens. In a recent anonymous poll conducted by huanqiu.com. 92.5 per cent of the 3,111 web surfers believed that US-India military cooperation will threaten China. This poll was conducted in the aftermath of the signing of the US-India end-user monitoring pact on July 10, 2009. See 'Chinese Web Users Voice Concern over US-India Defense Pact', Global Times (China), July 24, 2009, at http://world.globaltimes.cn/asia-pacific/2009-07/450897.html (Accessed July 25, 2009).

Tang Zhichao, 'India-Israel', no. 52, p. 52.


Ma Jiali, 'The Posture of India's Rise', no. 52, p. 19.

Ibid., p. 17

Ibid., p. 19


Zhang Ying, 'Watch This Space', no. 54.

Han Hua, no. 82, p. 291.
66. Shao Zhiyong, no. 55, p. 10.


68. Quoted in Robert D. Kaplan, 'Center Stage for the Twenty-First Century', Foreign Affairs, 88(2), 2009, p. 16-32.


71. Michael Pillsbury, no. 34.

72. Han Hua, no. 82, pp. 293-294.


75. Ibid.