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THE EXTENDED NEIGHBOURHOOD AND THE GLOBAL ARENA
The extended neighbourhood and the global arena in contrast to immediate neighbourhood is less about India’s urgent security concerns but more about a reliance on mutually beneficial cooperation, particularly in the energy sphere and increasingly inclusive of defence cooperation. This includes regional integration on an economic level and control over the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), naval modernization and resource security in light of rapidly growing Indian economy. This “extended neighbourhood and the global arena” broadly implies East, South East, and Central Area, Middle East, Europe, America and rest of the world. This has overlapping relevance for India neighborhood construct and effective addressing of various transnational issues.

**Sino-Indian Relations:**

India and China are the trans Himalayan twins holding together roughly 1/3rd of the world humanity. Both the countries represent a unique example of having two ancient civilizations of the world across the Himalayan region. Although, after the initial phase both had followed the separate path of development and had created two different patterns of living and lifestyle, yet, the cultural interaction between the two continued down the ages and as K.M. Panikkar has rightly observed that cultural influence is always a two-way traffic for influencing and being influenced.\(^1\) Rabindranath Tagore after his great pilgrimage has, in his message to the Chinese friends appealed that it is our duty today to revive the heroic spirit of that pilgrimage following the ancient path which is not merely a geographical one but the great historical path that was built across the difficult barriers of race difference of language and tradition, reaching the spiritual home whose man is one in bonds of love and cooperation.\(^2\)
At the dawn of the new millennium, perhaps nothing has confused our intelligentsia more than India’s relations and responses to the outside world in general and to China in particular. The Cold War era and now the post cold war period has put litmus test to India’s foreign policy for protecting and promoting its national interest in the highly contradicting and complex global scenario. With the collapse of the Imperialist International System after the Second World War, India and China started the bilateral relations with the clean slate and forged a strong bond of friendship against imperialism, colonialism and for Third World Solidarity. Now it is the part of history that the two Asian giants – India and China, rose to the ‘Himalayan Heights’ in forging a bond of friendship and brotherhood (Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai) has committed the ‘Himalayan Blunder’ when fought a bloody war in 1962. Thereafter, the bilateral relations continued to be stressed and strained for almost next three decades resulting into deep suspicion, misperceptions and misunderstanding.

It is a strange fact that India’s advent for democracy in 1947 coincided with the emergence of cold war politics which overclouded the Afro-Asian states at a time when they were struggling to establish their independent identities in the comity of nations. Thus, India’s independence not only ushered a new era in Asia and the Third World but also coincided with a dawn of a new epoch in the world history. Inaugurating the Asian’s Relation Conference (ARC) in New Delhi on March 23 1947, Pandit Nehru, visualising the changes, called upon the delegates that there was a widespread urge and an awareness that the time had come for the people’s of Asia to meet together, hold together and advance together.³ It was not a vague desire but the compulsions of events which forced the newly independent states to think among these lines. The new emergent international system came to be dominated by the two rival hegemonistic
superpowers as “prime movers of the world”, equipped with the most deadly weapons of the time. The consequential formation of military blocs and political grouping in which the security was put to severe threats these newly independent states were forced to make undesirable compromises and alliances.

**Political Solutions to the Security Problems:**

Nearer the home, India’s security faced a new and altogether different difficult context. Notable among them were the emergence of a hostile state Pakistan in 1947 and the establishment of People’s Republic of China (PRC) after Communist Revolution in 1949. The formation of Pakistan as a separate sovereign state after the partition would not have had as grave consequences as emergence of Pakistan as a “hostile neighbour” did. Similarly any political changes across the Himalayas would not have mattered much to New Delhi as did China’s emergence as a communist giant more so at the time when the global environment was fully charged with politics of bi-polarisation in the bitterest form. The defence policy enunciated and very well implemented by the British government, was neither found functional and desirable in the changed circumstances and therefore, it was indeed a Herculean task to prepare and practice policy on the one hand to seek solutions for the security problems in the context of the deteriorating domestic conditions and on the other hand outside the uncomfortable regional milieu eclipsed with the cold war politics. It was in this background that independent India not only had to formulate its security strategy but also to recast and redefine its political perceptions and priorities accordingly.

It was in this global and regional milieu, the principle of non-alignment, above all was a political strategy to keep the cold war politics and military rivalries away from the Asia so as to ensure “Asia for
Asians”. Similarly Sino-Indian friendship established as “Sino-Indian axis” at Bandung was no less a collective endeavour to see political solutions of the security problems not only in the sub-continent but at Asia at large. The diplomatic efforts through ARC for forging Afro-Asian solidarity, the initiation of solving J & K problem through the good offices of the UN or resolving Tibetan issue through Panchsheel, irrespective of this final outcomes were enough to prove that in the initial phase, serious efforts were made by the New Delhi to diffuse and dissolve the security problems, but it appears that no well thoughtout defence policy based on sound military preparedness and strategic calculation was formulated. All the political arrangements made through ARC or through Panchsheel were found incapacitated and the strategies of non alignment also got exposed when Pakistan joined SEATO in 1954 and the cold war politics was dragged down to the doors of India.

**Sino-Indian Friendship :**

The military debacle in 1962 was the severest blow to India's foreign policy ever experienced. It rendered its defence policy and the defence installations totally exhausted and exposed. After this debacle, Nehru became 'a broken man' who had no longer the capacity to recast and redesigns a new defence policy for a humiliated nation and he passed away quietly in 1964. There is no dearth of literature on the causes and consequences of the 1962 military debacle by different scholars with different viewpoints. The ostensible reason for the 1962 crisis was border dispute between the two states, however, it appears that border dispute was not 'the real cause'; it was made 'a cause' to humiliate India for political reasons.

The establishment of communist regime in China under Mao Zedong in 1949 was not a welcome development for New Delhi. However,
the government of independent India led by Pandit Nehru was of the view that friendship with Communist China despite the different political systems is not only possible but it was imminent also in view of the emerging post-Second World War global scenario. He also believed that Sino-Indian collaboration might emerge as a 'strong bulwark' against imperialism and colonialism, and could become a rallying point for Asian solidarity. India could also emerge as a leader of the newly independent Afro-Asian bloc and get its 'due place' in the comity of nations. In view of the long -ange national interests, Pandit Nehru did not realize the problem of Tibet or the border dispute as damaging for forging an axis between New Delhi and Beijing in a world dominated by two superpowers.

The communist rule in China in 1949 also did not appreciate 'the bourgeoisie rule' headed by Pandit Nehru in New Delhi. However, during Mao's regime, foreign policy was not independent rather a part of Mao's holistic approach to the state and the emerging international setup. The basic postulations of Mao's holistic approach were 'anti-imperialism' and the objectives of making 'revolutions' within the states. In the world dominated by imperialist forces, Mao was well aware of the weakness of the revolutionary forces both within China and outside hence; he devised and demonstrated the strategy of 'united front'. In order to neutralize the challenges of imperialist Japan, the revolutionary forces in China under Mao forged a united front with the nationalists. After establishing People's Republic in China, Mao relentlessly made efforts to fight against the imperialist forces and evolved the strategy of joint front in which India occupied a pivotal place. India's unqualified stand against imperialism and colonialism carved out a significant place in Mao's strategy and acted as a cementing factor in Sino-Indian collaborations. As a part of the policy, PRC did not abrogate India's exercise of its erstwhile colonial rights in Tibet unilaterally as had been done in the case of rights of the other
imperialist powers in China. Not only this, Mao attended the national day celebrations at the Indian embassy in Beijing in 1951 in the most unusual and symbolic gesture and called for unity with India in the common cause of "working for peace".⁵

**The Triangular Relationship:**

It is noteworthy that in the later half of the fifties significant changes took place in the foreign policy perceptions of both India and China. In Chinese perception, the Soviet Union, the leader of the communist bloc, had started to lose its credentials as a champion of the 'communist revolution' as well as a leader against 'imperialism'. In Mao's perception, the Soviet Union under Khrushchev had abandoned the international agenda of fighting against the imperialism and was pursuing the new agenda of 'peaceful co-existence' and prevention of nuclear war in the international politics. This was not considered in consonance with the pursuits of 'communist revolution'. Any way, the net result was that the Sino-Soviet rift started to widen in the international politics, ultimately posing both the communist giants as the bitter enemies against each other. It was strange that the initial phase of Sino-Soviet rift coincided with the period of Indo-Soviet friendship. When Mao was developing serious doubts about Soviet Union under Khurshchev, the latter was pursuing serious plans to wean India away from China. It was a fact that Bandung was disliked by both the superpowers but Soviet Union, which was not allowed to participate on the ground that it's "mainland lies in Europe" resolved that Bandung be never repeated. The growing Sino-Indian friendship was considered detrimental to the Soviet Union's hegemonistic interests in the Third World particularly in Asia where India was emerging as a leader of the newly independent Afro-Asian bloc. This was the reason that in the end of same year i.e. 1955, the Soviet team comprising of its
President Bulganin and Prime Minister Khrushchev arrived at New Delhi and laid down the solid foundation of Indo-Soviet friendship.

At the time when Soviet leaders landed at New Delhi, India was facing a rough weather. Nehru's government was committed to the targets of 'quick economic and industrial development' of the state as its top national priority, but the absence of any meaningful technological support from the Western countries, prevented the establishment of the basic industrial setup. At the external level, the situation was more alarming and appealing. Pakistan, after joining SEATO in 1954, became a recipient of full American 'moral and material support' and consequently gained full political and diplomatic support on J&K issue from the Western bloc. On this most hypersensitive issue, India got isolated both within and outside the United Nations. Though India had carved out a place within the newly independent Afro-Asian bloc and also cultivated understanding and friendship with Beijing, but it was of no consequence because China herself was an 'out cast' in the comity of nations. At such a crucial juncture when India was all alone to face the Western onslaught particularly regarding J&K and full cooperation in establishing basic industrial structure, the strong foundation of Indo-Soviet friendship was laid down and it is remarkable that this foundation witnessed no visible cracks till the demise of the Soviet Union.

India valued its growing relationship with China and cautiously continued to venture on the path of friendship in order to fight against the imperialism and to forge the Asian solidarity but incidentally a new factor the Soviet Union, emerged which was too important for India to ignore. As already mentioned that it was the same period in which serious differences arose between Beijing and Moscow culminating ultimately into a rift and a serious rupture in the monolith communist bloc. It was under this background that China started doubting India's credentials as a champion
against imperialism and as 'a genuine non-aligned state' for the cause of Afro-Asian solidarity. In Chinese perception, India was playing politics and their worst fears were confirmed when Dalai Lama was granted political asylum in 1959. It is pitiable that for the reasons beyond their control, New Delhi could neither succeeded in reposing its faith and confidence in the Chinese leaders, nor could fully appreciate and acknowledge the growing sensitivities and accompanying circumstances across the Himalayas. It was under this background of emerging triangular relationship between Beijing-New Delhi-Moscow that misperceptions and misunderstandings were formed and unfortunately Sino-Indian friendship turned out to be a casualty.

**The Security Scenario:**

It is noteworthy that the military asymmetry between India and China in the sixties was the major "immediate cause' behind the 1962 debacle that ruptured their relationship completely. In October 1964, after the Chinese nuclear explosion at Lop Nor in the plateau of Shanghai the power-asymmetry further got aggravated and hence the PRC with 'nuclear teeth' started to threaten and encircle India beyond the Himalayas. It is beyond doubt that the initial momentum to China's foreign policy towards South Asian countries came from its hostility towards India. Beijing continuously played its 'anti-Indian card' fairly for a long period of time through India's neighbouring countries especially Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh in fomenting 'hate India campaign’ in the Indian sub-continent. In doing so, Beijing, naturally, found its greatest opportunity in Pakistan—a state with a population of over a hundred million, with a standing army ranking in the ten most advanced armies in the world and the state with the established anti-Indian credentials. China emerged as a major source of supply of arms and ammunitions for Pakistan over the years to the extent that it provided covertly, "the critical assistance" for nuclear and missile
technology to provide "nuclear teeth" to Islamabad. Apart from Sino-Pak collusion, China's bilateral relations with Nepal or with Bangladesh were mainly revolving around the axis of anti-Indianism. This has remained one of the most important reasons, which substantially deteriorated the security scenario in the sub-continent making it the 'grimmest' region in the world politics.

The nineties ushered not only a new era in the history of international system in the world but it also witnessed a new significant transformation in the security environment in the South Asia. Whatever may be the pros and the cons of the Pokharan II in the wider realms of international peace and security but this is true that it struck a "balance of terror" by imposing "the power-parity" between the two states for the first time, though this process was started with Pokharan I in 1974. This is one of the reason that in the new millennium both the countries have willingly pushed down 'the border dispute' which once caused a bloody war, under the carpet and are embarking, very confidently, upon the path of economic co-operation and technological collaboration. Hence, it appears that "power-parity" between the two Asian giants seems to be a pre-condition for "controlled peace", if not "complete peace" for the future co-operation. Being the established nuclear power with the latest killing capability, both seems to be quite conscious of the fact that the pattern and practice of their bilateral relationship will not only influence the socio-economic developments in their respective states, but will also influence, decisively, the regional and the global politics in the future in evolving 'polycentric system' in which India and China both will certainly be the 'centers of power' to reckon with. Hence, there seems to be a U-turn in their relationship, which deserves an in-depth study to analyse and estimate their future course of relations and responses.
The two 'Asian giants' have been back on the path of economic co-operation and technological collaboration with full vigour at the dawn of the 21st century which indeed was a welcome move. The fast growing mutual trade opened up new vistas of future co-operation and confidence between the two states. According to the Chinese Customs statistics the bilateral trade between India and China rose by 5.03 per cent in 1998. With New Delhi retaining the slot as Beijing's biggest trading partner in South Asia. In the post-Pokharan II phase, the security scenario substantially changed in the Himalayan region. India's successful explosion of the 'thermo nuclear device' struck a balance in the killing capabilities between the two Asian giants and significantly transformed the 'threat perceptions' and security-concerns' in the region. (See Appendix VIII) India's nuclear policy, which is aimed at maintaining "a minimum but credible difference", came out for parity in their future course of actions. The 'new low' experienced in their bilateral relations on account of Pokharan II in 1998 was successfully over come and at the dawn of the new millennium their bilateral relations seemed to be more matured and balanced. A significant hike in economic and trade collaborations, qualitative change in the security perceptions and an appreciable progress has been noticed in their political relations. Besides adopting a similar approach towards the many vexing international issues such as opposing unilateral interventionism, unipolarism, hegemonism etc. to advocate for polycentrism, environmental protection, NIEO in the international politics, both the states have taken resolute steps in improving their bilateral relations on many political issues. Both the states have successfully managed to keep the much troubled border-issues at 'low profile' and had maintained the complete 'peace and tranquility' at LAC to their credit. More recently, the Chinese pronouncements regarding Sikkim are highly encouraging not only for resolving one more old issue of yesteryears but a very positive move for giving way to strengthen and boost border trade.
Need for a New Paradigm:

The Chinese foreign policy has always remained 'Sino-centric' and hence proved to be the most 'prudent policy' in promoting and protecting its national interests in the comity of nations. They are the players of 'realpolitik' in which 'power-projections' and 'power-profiles' matter more than anything else in promoting and protecting their national interests may be at the cost of the other. Commenting on their foreign behaviour India's former National Security Advisor late Mr, J.N. Dixit had pointed out that “the Chinese do not believe in pulling other people's chestnuts out of the fire.”

India's relations with China in the past had proved that Chinese hardly hesitate in resorting to power mechanisms if their national interests so warranted. Therefore, India should evolve and implement a prudent foreign policy in relation to China to protect its national interests including the security and strategic interests. To keep their bilateral relationship 'balanced' and 'booming' they should resort to 'realities' rather than 'rhetoric'. On account of illusions neither the power parity nor the mutual interests be ignored.

Tibet had remained and continues to remain the most volatile cause of misperceptions, misunderstandings, suspicion and distrust. The issue has been internationalized in the past but now it appears that the new leadership in China under Hu Jintao is sincere enough to resolve it and in this pursuit India's willing co-operation is considered imminent in Beijing. As a matter of fact on the issue of Tibet, China's international image is much maligned and the world forces consider Tibet as a 'safe leverage' to pressurize China. China is also constrained due to its own limitations within Tibet and is conscious of the fact that the final resolution of the problem of Taiwan would also depend on the peaceful solution of the problem of Tibet. As China started preparing hard for organizing Olympics in 2008 to exploit it as an occasion to project its 'global image’ particularly
in the Western world, Beijing seemed to be serious in preparing a road-
map to stage a successful come back for Dalai Lama to finally resolve the
issue and herein lies the political importance of India for the success of this
diplomatic venture.

Keeping the pace of economic cooperation and technological
collaboration at full swing, New Delhi is to play its diplomatic cards very
carefully at least in this regard. The importance of Tibetan card should be
realistically reassessed in the context of the developments that had taken
place in the nineties and in view of the emerging attitudinal changes taking
place in the Chinese foreign policy towards India, particularly on Sikkim.
The time has come when India should stop looking at Tibet through the
eyes of the West and independently evaluates the issue in view of its own
national interests. In this regard, if at all an occasion arises when Tibetan
issue seems to be nearer to resolution, India should have little hesitation in
accommodating Chinese sensitivities and in offering its good offices. But
in such negotiations India should firmly stand for resolving the border
dispute also and a strategy should be prepared in which both the issues
could be resolved amicably. The territorial imperative had created a
deadlock in the Sino-Indian relations for almost more than four decades.
Now the time seems to be ripe for serious deliberations as Tang Jiaxum,
the Chinese State Councilor has said that Russia and China has recently
sorted out their border dispute once and for all. He made an optimistic
observation that "being personally involved in the settlement of this
question, I know very clearly that the boundary question between China
and Russia was far more complicated than between our two countries."\(^{10}\)
The territorial issue needs to be amicable resolved through political
dialogue and diplomacy within the ambit of national interests.

The emerging Sino-Indian relations ought to be understood under
the wider context of the triangular relationship emerging between India,
China and the United States. In the post-Pokharan II phase, Indo-US relations have improved considerably. Apart from the significant increase in the Indo-US trade, both the states have taken resolute steps in forging 'strategic partnership' through the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) since 2004. It appears that United States may not be directly involved in the bilateral issues of Sino-Indian relations, yet the US may also not appreciate any strategic alliance in the Asia-Pacific region particularly the Sino-Indian alliance with far reaching consequences. Hence, there is a need to pursue the national interests very carefully in the broader context of this triangular relationship between New Delhi, Beijing and Washington.

**Security Implication :**

- PLA has been pruned but is modernizing with a technological edge. With a booming economy the funds are available. (See Appendix-III & V)

- China already plans to have substantial naval presence in South China Sea by 2015 accordingly developing blue water navy.

- Military with neighbouring countries including Pakistan and Myanmar has been increased.

- Induction of modern fighter SU-27 and arms from Russia is a fact. Besides naval ships and military hardware in technical collaboration with other countries has been put in place.

- While Tibet is now on the back burner as far as international opinion is concerned, renewed threats to
Taiwan and show of force by way military exercises held in July 08 have reinforced her claims for unifications.

- Border talks and CBM between India and China have been instituted but basic issue of Arunachal Pradesh has not be accepted by China.

- China has now constructed two mains roads and a rail links to supply Tibet, while consolidating her presence in Tibet. Additional infrastructure, upgradation of roads, pipelines and airfields has been completed.

- Procurement plans for mid-an refueling air craft carriers and AWACS indicate her long term strategy.

- Support being provided by China to Bangladesh and Myanmar in developing military bases.

**Security Analysis :**

China aims to become a global power by 2015. Till then she will concentrate all her energies on economic and military development and consolidation. An all out war with China is not likely till 2025. However, she will want to ensure that similar analogy does not apply to India as it can then counter Chinese clout. She shall therefore continue to provide full support to Pakistan. She will also ensure her presence and support in Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar for future power-play with India.

**Indo-Us Relations :**

The history of Indo-US relations begins on the eve of America’s entry into World War II. Before then the United States has scant contact with India. In the late 1930s for example, US investment in India was less
than $50 million with half in the missionary schools, hospitals and other non-business activities. The end of Second World War and India becoming an independent entity did not automatically intensify the Indo-American connections, as there were very few areas of overlapping national interest and scarcely any business, intellectual and cultural contacts between the two countries. The U.S. was giving shape to the policy of containment of communism, which became the driving force of its foreign policy for the next four decades. With both India and the U.S. being the two largest democratic nations, there was never any lack of will or effort on both sides to put their relations on an even keel, but their postures on many bilateral and internationally issues were often conflicting. Giving India’s size, population, location and the greatness of its culture and civilization, Nehru wanted India to play a major and influential role in World Politics especially in Asia. Consequently, when the U.S., in pursuit of its policy of containment of communism was looking for allies to be part of its alliances, India adopted the policy of non-alignment. Not only this, Nehru even castigated the cold-war alliance system as anti-thetical to a healthy and stable world order. The US even found initiating Nehru’s style of sermonizing from the pulpit and teaching the World.

The Kashmir Imbroglio and Military Aid to Pakistan:

In the following months after the Independence, the Kashmir issue further strained their relation. Initially, the U.S. was reluctant to become uninvolved in the Kashmir problem and so on April 21, 1948, together with Britain adopted a resolution in the Security Council for the setting up of the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). But Nehru was angry and hurt as the UN had failed to condemn Pakistan as the aggressor and was treating both with parity. He was of the opinion that U.S. has not judged the issue on its merits and so speaking to Gordon
Walker, the British Commonwealth Officer Under Secretary said “the motives of the United State were to get military and economic concessions in Pakistan.” To India’s chagrin, Pakistan became the part of the U.S. alliance system, being inducted into SEATO in 1954 and CENTO in 1955 coupled with the U.S throwing its weight behind Pakistan’s incessant demand for plebiscite in Kashmir at all international forums. The U.S. armed the Pakistan to teeth in addition to huge and regular economic assistance. This Pakistan factor has all alone went on to become a crucial determinant in shaping Indo-U.S. Relations factored with the relations that unfolded between the two South-Asian neighbours made Pakistan an idée fixe in India’s foreign policy thinking and vice-versa. Pakistan’s armed adventures against India, starting from Kashmir in 1948 to Kargil in 1999 were possible because of U.S. Arms supplied to Pakistan and when in 1962 the Chinese attacked India, though the US did respond to India’s request for military help, but Nehru’s request for supply of modern supersonic jet fighters, available to Pakistan were turned down. His subsequent requests for military assistance to the U.S. were tied with strings like dialogue with Pakistan and Kashmir lowering its ceiling on rupee and foreign exchange for defence exchanges, delaying its decisions on purchase and manufacture of fighter aircrafts and acquiescing in the supervisory role of the US personnel. The U.S. gave up the idea of a joint air defence pack with could how achieved a major break through in relationships. And when war broke out in India and Pakistan in 1965, the U.S. declared itself to be neutral by suspending arms aid to both India the victim and Pakistan the aggressor- a partisan neutrality, obviously to the advantage of Pakistan. The ebb of Indo-US relations came about in 1971, during the Bangladesh War when president Nixon showed a complete tilt in favour of Pakistan in his foreign policy and the US 7th Fleet issued a nuclear threat to India.
Whatever justifications Kissinger adduced for this U.S. tilt as a counter to Soviet Union’s highly inflammatory role, were not convincing to India as the arms provided to Pakistan were never used against Soviet Union as promised by the U.S. This double-standard approach of the U.S. assured New Delhi to contain India-a growing regional power.\(^{16}\) India’s most persistent and important objection to America’s policy stemmed from its military relationship with Pakistan. It seemed to establish a strategic and moral equibalance between India and Pakistan which the Indians resented, just as many Americans resented that non-aligned India seemed to equate the U.S. and the Soviet Union.\(^{17}\) Furthermore by supporting Pakistan, the U.S. had forced India into an unnecessary arms programme. The Pakistani military also received extensive training and technical support include NATO briefings on nuclear war.\(^{18}\) By the end of 1959, in India’s opinion the Americans had made it more less likely than that Pakistan would agree for a settlement in Kashmir and more likely that they might pursue a military solution to the dispute or use force to pressurize India into dangerous concessions.\(^{19}\) Another major fall out of the US military program to Pakistan was that it distorted Pakistan’s politics and the Army became the country’s dominant political force.

**Other Issues :**

Among other issues that reflected differences could be found in the unfolding of the Korean War and the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. While the U.S.A after the Korean War conceded Soviet Union and the Communist China as countries with “aggressive intent of international communism.” India believed that this war not so.\(^{20}\) Similarly India’s position as regards U.S. involvement in Vietnam was not appreciated by the United States.
The Nuclear Issue:

The U.S.A. war reluctant to accept India’s argument that The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, 1968 was discriminatory as it legalised the status of the nuclear haves.\(^{21}\) Despite India’s assurance for harnessing the nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, President Reagan did not feel any compunction to renege on U.S. commitments on the supply of Uranium to India on the basis of 1963 agreement and to get the Symington Amendment waved in 1981 for another six years to provide military and economic aid to Pakistan without committing to non-proliferation, despite the reports of Pakistan having devised nuclear capability\(^{22}\) and attempted at achieving this before India thought of it.\(^{23}\) Pakistan, whenever faced with U.S. Congressional pressures regarding its clandestine nuclear programmes, urged on a regional approach to the issues on a clear-cut prompting and support from the US administrations. The usual argument from the Washington side used to be that such aid to Pakistan was meant to act as a restraining force to it, to prevent her from crossing the nuclear threshold. The sole motive behind ignoring Pakistan’s hunger for being nuclear through military and economic aid was to strike a nuclear deal between India and Pakistan, thereby bringing nuclear non-proliferation in the backdoor.\(^{24}\)

China Factor:

The oscillation in America’s policy towards China was also hardly comforting for India. After the communists came into power in 1949, the US warned India from the danger from the ‘Chicom’s’. And when India and China went to war in 1962, the New Delhi and Washington entered into a close intelligence and strategic relationship.\(^{25}\) Hence Kissinger’s secret mission to China via Pakistan in July 1971, came as a big surprise more so because it was followed by normalisation of relations
between the two. After encouraging India for years to stand upto Communist China the US was now using Beijing to balance the Soviet Union. Furthermore, China and Pakistan had begun a military relation also which helped Pakistan to become a nuclear states.\textsuperscript{26} In India’s opinion the United States had failed to act on its own principle’s and were supporting a Communist dictatorship that was a direct threat to the world’s largest democracy.

\textbf{The Positive Factors :}

Ever since 1951 the U.S. remained the principal source of food assistance to this country. During the acute food scarcity in India in 1960’s in India, the U.S. shipped 26 million tones of wheat nearly three-fourth of its entire average crop to India during 1963-69.\textsuperscript{27} Besides as long as U.S pursed the policy containment of China it was a source of political and military support to India against China. Then as President Nixon stated in his Foreign Policy report to the Congress, “India has been so far, the principal beneficiary of the U.S development assistance to the extent of approximately $10 billion since independence.”\textsuperscript{28} The U.S. investment in India by November 1992 accounted for the largest share of its foreign investment. Besides, since the early 1970s U.S.A. has been the main source of India import. Apart from this, the U.S. also provided technological aid to India. In 1963 the Indo-U.S. agreement on the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) was signed and in 1969 the TAPS was commissioned. Besides the collaboration with Ford Aerospace, the ISRO designed multipurpose commercial satellite in 1983. The U.S also collaborated with India in the field of defence and approved the sale of advance jet-fighter engine for India’s Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) in 1986. In September 1987 licences were issued to the supply of powerful IBM 3090 computers for use and design for aircrafts.\textsuperscript{29}
With the coming of Rajiv Gandhi into power in 1984 the processes of liberalizing the India economy was galvanized and consequently the western markets were targeted for non-traditional manufactured products in order to stave off the further slide in its balance of payment situation. With the transformation of Indian economy since 1991, corporate America has begun taking great interest in India. The U.S two-way trade to India rose from $5.30 billions in 1990 to $8.50 billion in 1995 and 12 billion dollar in 1999, with $9.1 billion in imports and $3.7 billion in exports. The Indian governments decision to open the energy sector to foreign investments led to the entry of American firms like Enron and Cogentrix to the Indian market though with mixed results. Then, the recent successes in high technology, especially software had attracted major American firms to India and also increased the Indian exports to the U.S : its software exports are going at the rate of 50% annually and could reach $70 billion by 2010, two-thirds of which would go to the US and Canada.

End of Cold War:

The end of Cold War created conceptual and actual vacuum for policy-makers as well as intellectuals regarding formation of foreign policy both in the US and India. This Post Cold War period has been marked with presentation of different alternative models high-lighted with Fukuyama’s talk of the End of History, Huntington talk of the coming Clash of Civilizations, Kennedy’s and Kaplan Thesis of Fault Line between developed and developing country’s, Thomas Friedmann’s Concept of New World Order with pro-globalisation versus anti-globalisation forces, Mearsheimer’s Notion of multi-polar Instability or Charles Kupchan’s feeling that all these maps of different world order are a product of a single feature of the world where the US happens to be the only pole of power preponderance. According to Kupchan all the models capture an element.
of international system but miss the mark when identifying the key fault line of the future.  

Broadly speaking, the US had two strategies open in the Post Cold-War period for the achievement of its goal (a) to act unilaterally (b) (i) to act in a genuine multilateral way with collective decision making or (ii) at least taking assistance of others. One wonders whether (b) (i) would be possible. The real option today is between (a) and (b) (ii). That has been the issue in Presidential election of 2003. It is difficult to have (b) (ii) without (b) (i).

End of Cold War changed many things and created many options for Indian policy makers as well in terms of foreign policy in a unipolar world. C. Raja Mohan refers to several options, which were reflected in Indian policy during 1990s. The options included bandwagoning with the US; active pursuit of multi-polar world; making NAM more relevant to new times and building a new partnership with the US as a part of multi-directional engagement of major powers. The last option was preferred with dominant emphasis on engagement with the US. This resulted even in talk of India and U.S. becoming ‘natural allies’. S.D. Muni gives credit for positive changes in Indo-US relations to India’s post-1998 nuclear status and compulsions of 9/11. He also raises the important issue of change at whose initiative? One can give the credit to the BJP elite for bringing about change. He suggests that dynamics of power was responsible. An important issue is that how much benefit and costs has India received in this new phase of Indo-US relation? How much of it could be attributed to the policy of ruling elite and how much to the structural constraints and opportunities is also a matter of debate.

Indian foreign policy has definitely become more pragmatic and old brand of anti-Americanism is no anvil. However, it has not been
possible to embrace US whole-heartedly and for the good. Infact preventing the world domination by a single-power has become one of the major themes of Indian foreign policy. On its own part India has always wanted a share in international governance. The 1990s has resulted in active efforts by India for a permanent membership of Security Council of UN. Negatively, India has resisted efforts from great powers to prevent it from acquiring components of great power. On the contrary even in the Post-Cold War period, a key feature of US grand strategy has remained ‘containment of second tier of major powers, existing or aspiration, unless they are willing to bandwagon to as US with subordinate allies’.  

Although strengthening of economic cooperation is a very important bond in Indo-US relation, it is also an area where progress has been least satisfactory. While the US is still India’s largest trading partner and source of foreign investment, two way trade between two countries still represent less than 1 percent of total US Commerce. Trade between India and US in 2002 totaled $14.40 billion, but that between China and US was $116.20 billion. Americans feel that pace of India’s economic reforms is slow. Accordingly to a widely noted 2001 Index of Economic Freedom, India ranks 133 in the list of 155 countries surveyed. US exports to India grew only by $1.2 billion in 1990s. Even a modest increase in economic cooperation could not become a catalytic agent for substantial relationship between India and US. Two countries have different views on issues lie North-South relationship and priorities of World Trade Organisation. US trade representative Robut Zoellick publicly stated that India was a “troublesome country in building a consensus for new international trade negotiations.”

Events of 9/11 seem to inject new substantial context in Indo-US relations. The euphoria that followed Bush’s declaration of global war on terrorism lost momentum. Even in the US there has been no agreement on
nature of threat and solution of problem. As far as India as concerned it believes that global war must be truly global and that US cannot have partnership with others only for protecting US interests. Both have complaints against each-other for not being enough about fighting terrorism. US feels that India’s main focus has become cross-border terrorism in Kashmir and that it is pressurizing Pakistan, though it cannot forsake Pakistan which is useful to it for its battle against terrorism. U.S also feels that India should appreciate that its war in Afghanistan has created bitter strategic environment for India. One wonders whether India would be interested in fighting a war against terrorism except in a limited way. Partly it is also because although terrorism poses a collective threat, terrorists target individual countries.

Thus relationship between the world largest and strongest democracies appears to grow in a mature relationship. It is obvious that as long as the world remains unipolar, New Delhi has much greater stake than Washington in a closer relationship. Though new areas of convergence have emerged, many issues of divergence still persist which can be briefly summed up as follows:

1. While economic ties between the India and the US are increasing, several issues are still disputed. Those include the American practice of linking Human Rights Issues with economic policies, the curbing of child labour, the disappearance of Indian brands with the growing of American MNCs on the Indian market.

2. Both the countries still have divergent views about a just international order. While the US sees no reason to change the “unipolar” structure of the world, India has always preferred a world of six or seven major powers, each
responsible for peace and stability in its own region.\textsuperscript{38} It is for this reason that both disagree greatly on whether India should be given a permanent seat in the Security Council. The Indian Government attaches great importance of Security Council seat since being empowered with veto power, India could quash any unwelcome move on the Kashmir Issue. The need for this has become even more important after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting differences between Russia and India thereafter.

3. But the real litmus test of the future Indo-US relationship will be manner in which both “accomodate” their relationship with Pakistan. In the past, Pakistan has been the most important factor that soured Indo-US relation. Will this relationship continue to remain a hostage of the past, or will it break new grounds? Although the US has emphatically asked Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism against India, but at times its stand appears to be ambivalent, which puts the US sincerity to test.

\textit{Impact on Indian Security :}

There has been some reconciliation over the last decade or so basically due to economic liberalization in India and India’s rise as a regional economic power. This marked by the shift of MNCs interests in India due to opening of Indian market, investor friendly policies including infrastructure sector, easy convertibility of rupee, cheap qualified labour as well as the availability of the middle class with adequate buying power. Besides declaration by India on ‘No first use’ of nuclear weapons and the restrain shown by her during ‘Operation Parakaram’ in Kargil; reverses suffered by US in Iraq and her perceived use of Pakistan and India troops
under the aegis of UN so that her own troops can be pulled out of this costly misadventure; growth in influence of NRIs in USA as a power block including their direct involvement in political; US policy shift in South Asia and her recent recognition of both India and Pakistan’s concerns independently and positive role played by USA in recognizing the growth of terrorism in Pakistan, illustrated by banning of a few terrorist organizations and ‘Operation Gerinimo’ in Abbotabad also played important role in this reconciliation.

USA strongly believes in primacy of her interests everywhere and anytime. Hence, her interests in this region shall grow due to growth of China and India as major economic powers. Also she views Kashmir issue as a global flashpoint in which nuclear exchange is possible. The Sea-routes to ASEAN and Japan are in proximity to Indian subcontinent and protection of these for her is a must. While countering of China through India is a must, not permitting over reach of India through Pakistan is also have future policy objective. While direct overland-air operations by USA in India are not envisaged, arm twisting and economic pressures through control of capital flow and technology-transfer shall continue.

**Indo- Russia Relations :**

Relations between India and Russia are built on a very strong foundation and it is advantageous to both sides. In fact there is a long history of time-tested relationship since the days of the former Soviet Union. Even though ideologically different, India and former Soviet Union had convergence of interests uncommon in the relationship between any other groups of countries. Geo-political considerations, power politics and pragmatism brought democratic-socialist India and communist Soviet Union closer. It is important to note that Soviet Union acted as a shield for
India in the Security Council on the issue of Kashmir. By virtue of its presence as a permanent member, it frustrated Pakistan's anti-India overtures. Soviet Union was also a major supplier of defense equipments and spare parts to India-at times even ignoring its close East European allies.³⁹

Contrary to the suspicious nature of Indo-US relationship, which was a necessary outcome of their divergent views on many crucial issues of global concern, Indo-Soviet relations were based on confidence and mutual trust. Soviet Union's disintegration was, therefore, bound to come as a shock for India, which was also reflected, to same extent, in New Delhi's confusion and delay in responding to the abortive coup in Moscow. Immediately after it's emergence as Soviet Union's successor, and inheriting a plethora of problems—socio-economic, ethnic, political, and strategic—which were a natural outcome of the disintegration, Russia found itself engulfed in finding ways to deal with its pressing problems. Moscow's unsuccessful attempts to seek financial assistance from the United States by toeing the American line on foreign policy issues, and its lacklustre and at time even indifferent attitude vis-a-vis its traditional: allies and a close friend like India, should be seen and interpreted in this perspective. The very fact that Russia very soon realised the significance of its relations with prominent Asian country like India, spoke of the continuing relevance of close Indo-Russian relationship. As an Indian scholar has observed "Russia, with its plus and minus points is there and so is India. Therefore, both these countries are bound in return towards a close partnership."⁴⁰ It was also argued that since the ground realities of world politics have not changed much ever since Soviet Union's collapse and with the emergence of new threats and challenges, there would be an even greater need for co-operation and co-ordination between countries like India and Russia.
Thus, when India and Russia resolved to open a new era in their bilateral relations, they took note of the new challenges both were facing and were likely to face in the years to come. The fall-outs of their economic liberalization programmes and the threats to their plural societies emanating from the extremist elements were common to both. When Russian President Boris Yeltsin came to India in January 1993, India and Russia not only resolved many of their bilateral issues, like settling the matter of rupee-ruble arrangement, supply of Russian defense spare parts as also the crucial Russian support on the Kashmir issue.

Apart from the existing traditional areas of co-operation like cultural, trade and defense, new areas like co-operation for the peace and stability of the region in and around the Central Asia, and to meet the most serious threat at present to global peace and security, i.e. international terrorism—all call for more intimate and fruitful interaction between the governments of India and Russia today and in the time to come. Their commonality of approach on 'new areas of tension and conflict in the post-cold war period' finds expression in every document signed between them, be it the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 28 January 1993, Moscow declaration on Protection of Interests of Pluralistic States of 30 June 1994, the Declaration on Strategic Partnership of 5 October 2000, the Moscow Declaration on International Terrorism of 6 November 2001, the Delhi Declaration on Further Consolidation of Strategic Partnership of 4 December 2002, the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism of 4 December 2002 and the Moscow Declaration on Global Challenges and Threats to World Security and Stability of 12 November 2003.
Joint Working Group on Global Challenges:

India and Russia are both victims of terrorism. India is facing the wounds of cross-border terrorism in the Jammu and Kashmir and Russia in the Caucasus where it has been fighting the Chechen rebels. Quite naturally, therefore, the fight against terrorism has been a cornerstone of their domestic policies and they have firmly expressed strong condemnation of all acts of terrorism wherever they may occur and whatever may be their motivation. They believe that terrorism is a crime against humanity and, therefore, the states that aid, abet or shelter terrorists are as guilty of committing gross violation of human rights as their perpetrators. Long before the issue of international terrorism acquired the centre stage in world politics, India and Russia had already taken note of the "new threats and challenges in the form of aggressive nationalism, religious and political extremism, terrorism and separatism, which strike at the unity of pluralistic states", in the post-cold war era. The sixteen page Moscow Declaration on the Protection of the Interests of Pluralistic States, 1994, had reaffirmed "the readiness of India and Russia to co-operate bilaterally and with all other states in combating terrorism and international crimes".

During his visit to Russia in November 11-13-2003, the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee highlighted this point in an interview to Russian newspaper *Izvestia*: "..those attacks (September 11, 2001) awakened the world to the reality of international terrorism, a scourge which both India and Russia had been suffering from, and were warning the world about, for many years..” India and Russia are also agreed on the definition of terrorism—that terrorism "constitutes a gross violation of human rights, particularly the most fundamental right - the right to life — and is a crime against humanity." They are, therefore, committed to "firmly condemn all acts of terrorism wherever they may occur and
whatever may be their motivation" and advocate that those who support terrorism or finance, train, harbour or support terrorists and states that aid, abet or shelter terrorists are as guilty of committing gross violation of human rights as their perpetrators."

This point was further reiterated firmly by the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee during his visit to Russia in November 2003 in an interview to Russian newspaper, *Nezvisimaya Gazeta*. To a question: "Which one of the two - terrorism and religious extremism - poses the biggest threat to your country?" his answer was "... India is a secular country where all religions of the world are represented. Secularism is an essential principle of life in India, which is also enshrined in our Constitution. We reject extremism of any kind. Both India and Russia are multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious pluralistic democracies, which are particularly vulnerable to terrorism. Terrorists have no religion, as no religion prescribes violence against innocent people. In fact, our battle is against those extremist elements, which misuse and misinterpret religion to justify terrorism and incite violence." \(^45\)

In response to a similar question posed by another Russian newspaper, Indian Prime Minister rejected any linkage between terrorism and religion: "We totally dismiss the proposition that any religion is a source of terrorism. Such arguments seek to discredit one of the great religions of the world. No religion prescribes violence against innocent people. Our battle is against extremist elements, which misuse and misinterpret religion to justify terrorism and incite violence." \(^46\) Since they are clear about the concept of terrorism, it follows that India and Russia favour a unified campaign to tackle the evil and express concern over the attempts to adopt a 'selective approach’ to terrorism, which is a global problem. \(^47\) "There can not be good and bad terrorists, our terrorists and others", warned Russian President Vladimir Putin adding, "all those who
have resorted to arms in order to resolve political disputes, all those organizations, all those structures and individuals who carry out those policies should not be tolerated". Similarly, the following remark of the former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee holds significance in this context: "... international terrorism is today a global monster, which knows no national boundaries or territorial limits of operation. It exploits the openness and freedoms of democratic societies. It uses modern technologies and unorthodox techniques to achieve its destructive objectives. It can only be countered by global, united and comprehensive effort. We cannot afford selective approaches, which sacrifice the long-term goal for short-term interests. Differing standards cannot be applied for judging terrorism…"\(^{48}\)

The co-operation and understanding between India and Russia on the issue of fight against terrorism, it may be noted, is not confined to the bilateral level alone but it is an international approach. It underlines the importance of joint efforts for establishing 'solid international legal basis for co-operation in combating international terrorism. The formation of a Joint Working Group on Combating International Terrorism for regular bilateral information exchanges and another Joint Working Group on Global Challenges are examples of bilateral initiatives. In addition to these mechanisms, the ongoing regular contacts and exchanges at all levels have helped India and Russia to constantly upgrade bilateral cooperation and to work closely together to meet the various regional and global challenges facing both as plural democracies.

At the global level, India and Russia have advanced the adoption by the United Nations Security Council's two conventions—the Indian Project on Universal Struggle against Terrorism and the Russian Project on Countering Nuclear Terrorism. They also achieved agreement on joint actions on the world scene to work out legal international documents
determining the common legal notion of terrorism and terrorists. "This is a very important issue for terrorists are moving from country to country and national laws are not common everywhere", said Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Oleg Chernov during his visit to India. In the fight against international terrorism the role of the United Nations is very crucial which represents the independent, sovereign countries of the world and is responsible for the maintenance of global peace and security. India, as a founder member of the UN and Russia as a permanent member of the UN Security Council are concerned about the challenges before the world body in the 21st century. They agree upon the need for a greater role for the UN to deal with the new threats and challenges effectively. Both favour reforms in the world body to make it more democratic and representative of the world community. Russia supports India's claim for a permanent seat in the Security Council. Earlier during Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to India in 2002, India and Russia, in their joint statement, "confirmed their determination to contribute to the establishment of a just, multipolar world based on the principles of respect for the UN Charter and international law in the interest of removing threats to international peace and security." In an indirect attack upon the Unites States for resorting to a policy of unilateral use of force to settle problems of worldwide ramifications, India and Russia, in their joint statement issued at the end of Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to India (December 3-5 2002) "strongly opposed unilateral use or threat of use of force in violation to the UN Charter, as well as interference in internal affairs of other states. It was stressed that a comprehensive settlement of the situation around Iraq is possible only through political and diplomatic efforts in strict conformity with the rules of international law and only under the aegis of the United Nations..." It was emphasized that "the counter measures against this
menace should be taken on a comprehensive and sustained basis. Such measures should be directed also against those states, entities and individuals who support, fund or abet terrorists or provide them shelter or asylum to engage in cross-border terrorism. There should be no double standards in the fight against terrorism. Both sides also reaffirmed the relevance of the Moscow Declaration on International Terrorism of 6 November 2001. They stressed the importance of strict implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions on the fight against terrorism, in particular Resolution 1373. They also advocated intensifying efforts to finalize in the United Nations the draft International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the draft Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism. Roots of terrorism, which lay in their common neighbourhood posed a threat to their security interests. Both sides would take preventive and deterrent measures in meeting these threats and cooperate in this regard. Both sides declared their determination to enhance collective and bilateral efforts to prevent and suppress terrorism.52

Both sides discussed in detail the current situation in South Asia. They stressed the importance of Islamabad implementing in full its obligations and promises to prevent the infiltration of terrorists across the Line of Control into the State of Jammu and Kashmir and at other points across the border, as well as to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan controlled territory as a prerequisite for the renewal of the peaceful dialogue between the two countries to resolve all outstanding issues in a bilateral framework as envisaged in Shimla Agreement of 1972 and the Lahore Declaration of 1998.53 The Declaration of the Russian Federation and the Republic of India on Global Challenges and Threats to World Security and Stability signed on 13 November 2003 paid more attention on how to tackle the problem of terrorism than
anything else. It reads like this: ‘The Russian Federation and India are united in their fight against the evil of international terrorism. They actively cooperate with each other and with other countries in anti-terrorist activities. Both countries resolutely declare that international terrorists, whatever are their stated objectives and the causes they espouse, will never succeed in bringing the world to its knees.’

Security Implications:

In last ten years or so Russia and India have reaffirmed their strategic partnership in a vibrant mode. Cooperation has not been limited to a buyer-seller relationship but includes joint research and development, training, service to service contact, including joint exercises. The coastal naval exercises took place in April 2007 in the Sea of Japan and joint airborne exercises was held in September 2007 in Russia.

An Inter-Governmental Commission on military-technical cooperation is being co-chaired by the Defence Ministers of the two countries. The seventh session of the commission was held in October 2007 in Moscow, in which an agreement on joint development and production of prospective multi-role fighters was signed. As development partners, both countries have joint ventures to develop and produce the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) and the Multi-role Transport Aircraft (MTA). India and Russia have several major joint military programmes including Brahmas cruise missile program; 5th generation fighter jet program; Sukhoi Su-30MKI program (230+to be built by HAL) and Ilyushin/HAL Tactical Transport Aircraft. Additionally, India has purchased / leased various military hardware from Russia.

The Eight Annual meeting of IRIGC-MTE held in September 2008 in Now Delhi cause with the agreement to extend to tenure of IRIGC-MTC by another 10 years, i.e. from 2010 to 2020. Today more than 200
projects are covered encompassing all the three service of the Indian Defence.

However, more recently the bilateral ties has been drifting and strained due to delays and frequent pricing changes for INS Vikramaditya, and repeated delays in delivery of several critical defence systems. In May 2011, Russia cancelled joint army and naval exercises with India allegedly in response to the elimination of Mikoyan Mig-35 from the Indian MRCA competition. An Indian Navy report to the Ministry of Defence referred to Russia as a fair-weather friend and recommended the review of Russia’s status as a strategic partner. The Indo-Russian Strategic Partnership has withstood both the test of times and the touchstone of enduring credibility. Hence the nurturing of this relationship is in the best national security interest of India.

**India and West Asia :**

Due to its geography and petroleum West Asia holds the strategic importance. Being the single most valuable commodity in the world commerce, petroleum is indispensable item in the time of peace and of critical strategic importance in the time of war. India has a big stake in the region as 70% of India’s imported energy needs are fulfilled from West Asia and this dependence will only increase if the Indian economy continues to grow at 8% or more. The proposed pipeline with Iran makes good economically strategic sense as does the Turkmenistan- Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline. India would certainly wish the Indian community to live in West Asia in conditions of dignity and self-respect for which efforts continue to be made and in which the governments of the region are being more and more cooperative. India’s non-economic relations in this region are also expanding to the mutual benefit. This is also true of Israel.
Thus India’s national interests are directly linked to peace and stability in West-Asia.

The dramatic unfolding of the situation in West-Asia in the past has posed challenge to India in terms of the political response. It called for a quick rethinking of our foreign policy, not just from a long term perspective, but also to address the challenges in a tactical manner. The challenges did not appear on the scene without warnings. We have been dealing with nuclear issues for about a decade. Moreover the post 9/11 scenario brought forth other issues that added to the dilemma and changed the situation in West Asia, like the rise of Shia influence, the Iranian nuclear issue, tensions between the Iranians and the other neighbours, the tensions between Iran is and Israelis and the Arab Spring. India’s interest are interspersed with all these developments. These have enthralled India’s policy so much so that responding and dealing with them within set parameters has become difficult. The interconnectedness of these issues makes it difficult for India to accept any side or position. With this background the following questions became relevant for India’s security.

(1) What are the dilemma’s facing India in dealing with the present crises in West Asia?

(2) How should India mitigate these dilemmas?

(3) How should India balance its foreign policy approach towards Iran vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia; Iran vis-à-vis Israel, Iran vis-à-vis the U.S?

According to an opinion, our foreign policy decisions in terms of West Asia, the West, etc is set, which is not the case when compared to West-Asian region. Amongst the three revolutions that has been witnessed within the region, the third revolution triggered by the self-immolation of
the fruit seller in Tunisia sent out a new message showcasing a rising expectation and demand for participatory democracy. However, India’s response to the crisis in the region has been confused.

A military solution to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear power bracketed with the Western solution of strangling the economy is not a feasible one. Within Iran there is fragmentation of the leadership elite is divided wherein Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmedinejad are at loggerheads. The West aim to use the International Atomic Energy (IAEA) and P 5+1 in order to pass a UN Security Council resolution against Iran. India should not get involved in this debate because the Irani interest will be taken care by China and Russia. It is not the principles, but the interests that should matter.

Iran is beneficial to India for three important reasons :-

(1) Oil and Gas (2) access to Afghanistan and (3) access to the Caspian Sea.

The Afghan advantage fits in to the large perspective for India, that is in order to break the two fronts that we face in term of conflict – Pakistan and China. Experts are of view that India should not be a partner to other powers in containing Iran; rather our role should be to double our relationship with the latter. India should develop a constructive relation with Iran and other Gulf Estates also who are not in favour of developing relations with Iran by citing our purpose as being to maintain relations with both sides.

According to Ambassador Ishrat Azziz all the problems that India is facing in the region are not bilateral in nature, be they with Israel, Iran and the Gulf cooperation council, etc. The roots of problems lies between the actors within the Gulf region and in this they want to drag
India into taking sides. The positive aspect is that India does not have a colonial relation or “cornering and controlling” relation with this region. All the countries in the West Asian Region have strategic problem with each-other, Shia—Sunni divide (led to strategic grins to outside powers) Iran-Israel tensions and Shia Iran’s problems with Sunni Saudi Arabia etc. However India has to give its region its due importance for meeting its energy needs besides the six million Indians working in the region forms an area of immediate concern to India.

Although the GCC led by the Saudi Arabia has expressed desire to establish to develop strategic relations with India, however, the problem is that this will put India in a bird vis-à-vis dealing with Iran and the tension between both will affect India relation with either of them. For India, two countries that matter above others among those who possess nuclear arsenals share common border with it and are beset with internal problems-are Pakistan and China. Hence Iran possessing nuclear weapons does not affect us directly, as it is our neighbour’s neighbour. However, neutrality in certain situation is not a option as our emerging power demands that take a strong positive stand and this is India’s dilemma.

Eventually there will be pressure on India but India should not be seen to be taking sides because of, for instance, the influence/interests of the U.S., Israel and the West India can justify Syrian voting because the Arab League is the conscious keeper of the Arab World.

**Security Implications:**

In recent times, Sandi Arabia and Pakistan are being pushed closer together by Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the Arab Spring creating new challenges for India. India’s foreign policy in the West-Asia lies at its most crucial juncture at its two decades and the recent debate had focused on India’s delicate balancing act between Iran and the United States. This
should not be taken lightly, American technology, weaponry and diplomatic backing will be important for India’s security and prosperity over the coming decades. At the same time, India is in a danger overlooking another balancing act, a sectarian, geo-political, strategic cold war is unfolding between Saudi Arabia, protector of Sunni Arab World and Iran, a Shia Persian power with intentions to subvert that status-quo. The battlefield of Syria and Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq for India holds stakes which are high. Saudi and Iranian rivalry has ebbed and flowed for decades but the two developments: the acceleration of Iran’s nuclear assimilation and the Arab Spring have sharpened the antagonism. In the coming years that will likely push Saudi Arabia closer to Pakistan and exacerbate threats to India.

**Footnotes and References**

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