3

FUNCTIONAL POLITICAL ARCHITECTURE: NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MAKERS, CIVIL – MILITARY INSTITUTIONS AND STRATEGIC PROCESS
In order to analyze the seminal status of national security and the related debates about India's posited rise, it is first imperative to offer some insight on India's foreign policy bureaucracy. Only then the question—Why India's foreign policy intentions do not always match implementation?-could be pertinently answered.

The Indian bureaucratic system is at once a relic of British Imperial rule and an example of India's sovereign evolution. Largely, based on the British Legacy, India's parliamentary system in somewhat of a hybrid approach that strongly incorporates a Cabinet style rule. Composed of a traditional democratic "checks and balances" system, which divides governmental power between an executive, legislative, and judicial branch, the Indian system of governance is both a familiar construct to western scholars and a complex, paradoxical adaptation of the imperial legacy.¹

India's executive branch is centered on the President, a largely symbolic figurehead and Prime Minister (PM), with whom most of the powers of decision-making reside. The PM is the head of the Parliament whose power is vested in the support of constituent parliamentarians. The Parliament forms the legislative branch comprised of the Lok Sabha (Lower House) and Rajya Sabha (Upper House). The PM and the minister of the major governmental departments are accountable to the democratically elected Lower House, whose confidence in turn empowers them to govern. The Indian system is an exception to the traditional Parliamentary system in that the Parliament does not formulate policy. The PM, his chosen Council of Ministers (the Cabinet) and his personal advisers largely formulate policy and then seek approval from the Parliament. Thus, although accountable to “the people”, the PM’s office
defines the agenda, suggests policy, and then the ministers actually implement the policy.²

**Ministerial Functions and Indian Bureaucracy :**

The basic determinants of domestic milieu are economic development and political traditions. India emerged as an independent nation with a broadly three-tiered ruling elite. The political leadership of the Congress, including the political executive, the permanent civil services, including the ICS, the police and foreign services, and the officers of the armed forces. Of these three broad categories of the ruling elite, the political leadership of the Congress alone was more or less Indian in outlook.

J. Bandhopadhya, an eminent political scientist believes that: "the ruling elite was therefore a mixture of different sociological categories, opposed to sharp polarization of national or international politics on the basis of doctrinaire ideologies or power groupings and wedded to the independent world outlook historically developed by the Congress."³

On the other hand, the upper echelons of the bureaucracy and the armed forces, however, were thinking in many ways opposite the pole. They had no particular ideological commitment, except perhaps wanted India to be a fourth carbon copy of Britain and to visit the latter country once in a while. It was this group of civil servants and army affairs which took charge of India’s internal administration, defence and diplomacy after Independence.⁴

In today’s time, the furious ruckus for the past fortnight over the confrontation between Army Chief General V.K. Singh and Defence Minister A.K. Antony and the newspaper report of “curious” troop
movements towards Delhi which allegedly “spooked” the government have shocked and confused the country. And while these supposedly subversive intentions have categorically been denied by both the Army and the Ministry of Defence (MoD), an apocalyptic atmosphere of mistrust and turbulence persists in the uppermost echelons of national security vitiated by suspicion and disbelief. Today we live in times where the majority of people believe and expect the worst from our leadership.\(^5\)

In a parliamentary system of government like India where the party or parties in power are to make the foreign policy decisions, the foreign policy outlook of the opposition parties is bound to affect such decision making, not only because of the role the latter play in the Parliament but also because of their prestige and influence over the Indian political system as a whole. Keeping in view the close proximity between the domestic political system and foreign policy, “a rational foreign policy must, therefore, be based on the broadest possible consensus of the political parties, especially in a multiparty system like India.\(^6\)

But all this seems to be theoretical since more than five and a half decades of day-to-day functioning of the Indian political system has shown that foreign policy making, under different governments has escaped the attention of the Cabinet which constitutionally is the real executive policy centre in Indian parliamentary democracy. The first and the foremost reason, perhaps, is the growing lack of interest in foreign affairs among political leaders who finally end up in the Cabinet. There is lack of any great intellectual interest in the knowledge of foreign affair.\(^7\)

Another reason is institutional. The decision making process as in most political systems has been shifted away from “unwieldy bodies to more informal and constricted groups”. Though the Indian Cabinet is not as unwieldy as the Indian Parliament, it is therefore, nonetheless, large
enough to slow down the process. Many of the decisions on defence and the foreign affairs have been therefore, shifted to more compact Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees that are generally composed of powerful cabinet ministers. This shift to a more informal decision making process has been further accentuated when all the different committees of the Cabinet have been replaced by an even more limited to the Prime Minister, Home Minister, Minister of External Affairs, Defence Minister and Finance Minister. But there is another viewpoint also. Breacher was of the view that ‘by the and large they did not shape policy.’

Privately, however, military planners concur that, above all, the prevailing ad hoc model of single-service operational readiness badly needs replacing with one in which the Ministry of Defence (MoD) takes upon itself the onus of integrated capacity building in connect with national security interests.

They maintain that it is time the MoD realised that India can ill-afford three separate service war-fighting doctrines. And that 65 years after Independence, the MoD must perforce assume responsibility by outlining cogent national defence policy guidelines that, in turn, accrue from a comprehensive national security doctrine.

H.M. Patel, a keen observer of the Indian Cabinet scene, wrote that “the Prime Minister himself has repeatedly taken decisions on his own in respect to matters relating to the External Affairs Ministry which is in his direct charge. A special committee, and the decisions taken by that committee have to be reported to the entire Cabinet. Time and again however, decisions of the greatest importance in the sphere of external affairs have been taken and announced to the public without the committee of the Cabinet for foreign affairs being aware of them. The Cabinet itself has been ignored frequently.”
The third reason seems to be the lack of political weightage of many members of the Cabinet. In the coalition and minority governments people with less and less experience and lower and lower status become members of the Cabinet. They “hardly had any clout to challenge decisions, thus pushing the whole process, at least in foreign and defence matters, to become more constricted and more informal.”

The fourth reason “was the changing constellation of political forces”. The Indian Cabinet has, through the years becomes less homogeneous. During Nehru era, when the Congress party was in full command, factionalism and groupism became more rampant, thus making collective decision making within the Cabinet more problematic. Under non-congress party Prime Minister and minority government (Morarji Desai, Charan Singh, Chandra Shekhar, V.P. Singh, Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Dr. Manmohan Singh, Deva Gauda, I.K. Gujral) things become more worse, since the governments have been headed either by minority or by coalition cabinets thus rendering the task of foreign policy making process more complex and difficult.

After fighting many wars and almost continuously deploying on anti-insurgency operations, India’s defence planning largely remains an MoD ‘book-keeping exercise of utilizing money and resources to meet service demands and those of innumerable and largely redundant associated departments. It has been optimistically presumed that over time these will magically get converted into derived military capability.

Logically, minority or coalition governments should keep in mind the ground realities and constraints, strengthen the powers and position of the Cabinet since the usually effectively Prime Minister needs to obtain the support of the Cabinet to effectively implement the defence and foreign policies. But if one has to see the ether side of the whole
picture, in all such types of governments the members of the Cabinet usually pay more attention to their ministries, their political aspirations, needs frankly speaking at the cost of seeking the cooperation of other ministries, their political aspirations needs frankly speaking at the cost of seeking the cooperation of other ministries.

But the changes in the configuration of forces in the Indian Parliament has increased the interest of the parliamentarian in the international affairs. For as along as, the executive had an absolute majority, it was possible for the government to manage foreign policy crisis within the parliamentary party. But since, the beginning of the trend of minority and coalition government in India, the executive became more vulnerable to criticism. There does not appear to be any doubt that there are more debates, questions and process and resolution on the subject than during the Nehru period. One can easily assume that through this involvement, Indian Parliament has improved his position in foreign policy making and that it is consulted and heard more than before.

There are a number of instances when at the intervention of Parliament, the government was compelled to change or amend its prime policy. During the Afghanistan crisis, when Mrs. Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minster the furore that was created because of India’s noncommittal position on Soviet Intervention finally resulted in a change into Indian attitude. Indian decision not to sign the N.P.T. and CTBT is considered to be because of the Parliamentary pressure.\textsuperscript{15} Same can be said about the role played by India during the East Pakistan crisis in 1971\textsuperscript{16} and the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) being adopted by the Indian Government to bring a rapprochement and thaw in Indo-Pak relations.
**Why deeds don’t always match policies:**

Conventionally, India’s governing process is concerned as bureaucratic behemoth; infamous for red-tape, a bloated civil service, and a paralyzing procedural practices. Upon deeper analysis, however, India’s bureaucracy is somewhat of a duality; while, the civil service including the state level civil servants, police and railway workers\(^\text{17}\) may fit the common stereotype, India’s foreign policy branches are in fact played not just by inefficiency but also a dearth of personnel. With only 300 civil servants and 600 Foreign Services Officers\(^\text{18}\) occupying the crucial spots within the MEA, each officer is tasked with a portfolio that is notably expansive. Yet, the diminutive staff that forms the nucleus of Indian foreign policy implementation is in fact expansive in comparison to those who actually formulate the policies themselves.

Although the Indian Government is designed to mirror the British Parliamentary system, most often the Indian PM’s Cabinet and special advisers are the true decision makers in the foreign policy realm. The MEA serves as a microcosmic example of the bureaucratic system that transcends all the ministries. Although clearly hierarchical in organization, the MEA is in fact paralyzed by a lack of delegation, because the head of each ministries directly accountable to the parliament, few tasks or decisions are effectively delegated. In most cases, information is slowly filtered up through the ministries until the minister makes the final decision or takes the matter to the Cabinet.

The inter-agency process is also obfuscated by the lack of clear guidelines, procedures or practices. The only formalised inter-agency meetings is carried out by the Cabinet and below this level there are some informal personal changes on matters that clearly cross ministerial lines or division lines within the MEA. Nevertheless, the MEA remains central to
the foreign policy making (embodied by the minister and his relationship with the PM) and implementation carried out by both the Civil and Foreign service branches. The MOD charged with the implementation of policies as dictated by the Cabinet, and other than influence through procurement or budgetary considerations, is not responsible for actual policy formulation. Because of this construct and India’s historical legacy of a professionalized but largely apolitical military, the Cabinet and the MEA are considered the primary sources for foreign policy formulations, not the MOD. Nevertheless, the MOD annual reports act as a crucial indicator for the implementation of foreign policy.

Due to the top down nature of the system, few actionable decisions are made within the middle or the lower echeleons of MEA (nor the MOD). The accountability of the ministers has created a system in which few are willing to take an action that has not been thoroughly vetted by the highest authorities. This has led to some extent, to stagnation of innovative policy and the reoccurrence of the bureaucratic inertia. Yet the analysis of the annual reports demonstrate that the foreign policy apparatus of India is undergoing changes, albeit in a manner that is unfamiliar to most western analysts.

The MEA’s annual report is arguably the central foreign policy document produced through an inter-agency/inter-division process. Where the MEA embodies the diplomatic arm of the foreign policy apparatus, the MOD acts as the military counterpart. Both ministries follow the guidance set forth by the PM and the Cabinet and act as the conveyers of policy to the implementers in their respective ministries.
National Security Council : Mechanism For Defence Preparedness :

The recent report that the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence (PSCD) has summoned the three defence service chiefs “to seek their views on the state of defence preparedness pointed out by Army Chief General V.K. Singh in his leaked letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh” as they “needed to examine the whole spectrum of defence preparedness.” It is a very heartening news, even though the concern was triggered by the leaked contents of General V.K. Singh’s letter. It is heartening because at last there is concern in the legislature regarding India’s defence preparedness. It is a moot question whether hearing the three defence service chiefs individually or together will provide the PSCD a realistic or holistic view of defence preparedness involving all three defence services operating together, as would be necessary for defence against external aggression. In any case, the PSCD is not immediately responsible for defence. The defence of the country is the government’s responsibility, and it is the Cabinet that needs to have a holistic view of defence preparedness. The real question is whether the Cabinet has or can have a holistic idea of defence preparedness.

Apart from actual manning, arming, provisioning and training of the three defence services for war, holistic defence preparedness involves :

- Assessing threat (intelligence inputs and strategic assessments);
- Taking diplomatic initiatives, without prejudice to India’s sovereignty or territorial integrity, to avoid armed conflict or limit its duration if unavoidable;
- Taking internal security measures so that defence measures can be wholly effective; and
• Planning for economic and fiscal measures to handle the huge, high-rate expenditures that are demanded by war.

Specifically defence preparedness is the direct responsibility of the prime minister and the National Security Council (NSC), which need to receive the right advice from the country’s military (hereinafter, “military” means the Army, Navy or Air Force) so as to take the right political, foreign policy, internal security and economic decisions to prosecute war or other military operations when required, in the best immediate and long-term interest of the country. But as of now, there is no mechanism in place for the government to receive essential single-point advice from the military, since summoning the three defence services Chiefs and seeking their views orally or in writing cannot give a holistic idea of defence preparedness. However, even with the best military advice, defence preparedness cannot be complete without a mature strategic vision.

**Strategic Vision:**

Pandit Nehru’s strategic outlook of foreign policy neutrality and sturdy political independence in the first two decades after independence, has gradually changed to its current US-predicated strategic dependence, even political subservience. It is regrettable that in the last four plus decades, India has not produced a single political leader with a strategic vision to enable India to adjust to and be on top of today’s rapidly changing geo-econo-political situations in a globalizing world. Notwithstanding lack of statesmanship at the apex, reputed Indian strategic think-tanks have recommended creation of a document defining strategic policy encompassing India’s international and regional political, economic (including energy) and military aims and objectives, depending upon its present and future needs. Realistic national security is only possible when strategic policy is explicitly understood by persons in government. But
none of the successive Union governments over six decades have produced a strategic document, thus effectively compromising national security by their ineffectiveness.

**The Defence Spectrum:**

Defence is a highly specialized area, and a military officer rises to the position of service Chief of the Army, Navy or Air Force with about 40 years of service experience in his own service. He acquires knowledge of the operational capability of the other two services by inter-services exposure in various courses, in joint exercise and also in the hard arena of active operations. He is responsible for and concerned with the operational capability of his own service and looks to the other two services to receive or provide operational support, depending upon the threat situation on type of operation. But in military conflicts-of-the-future, warfare, hitherto limited to operations concerning land, sea, under-the-sea and air, will include the dimensions of space and cyber space warfare. Thus, for the primary role of effective deployment and operations to protect India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, a service chief should be well-versed in the operational and logistic capabilities of his own service and adequately knowledgeable with respect to those of the other two also. It can safely be said that India has never had a service chief who has fallen short in this respect whatever his other shortcomings.

In a democratic republic like India in which the military is under the control of an elected government, defence preparedness requires mutual trust between the military and the government. Trust can only come out of direct official, institutionalized, periodic contact and discussions between the government and the military. The bureaucracy is a necessary link to assist in their communication, but cannot substitute for direct contact. However, as noted by Lt. Gen. Vijay Oberoi, “Our political
leadership is highly uncomfortable in dealing with the military directly and prefers to let the bureaucracy do so.”

Thus the bureaucracy is the de facto functional link between the defence services and the political executives of the union government, and has a stake in maintaining the distance between them.

Notwithstanding that a few select bureaucrats are assigned to study in the Defence Services Staff College, the College of Defence Management and the National Defence College for better understanding and coordination with defence services officers, they cannot be blamed for not knowing the details of the functioning of any of the three services, much less about the issues involved in their integrated functioning in war. At the same time, most politicians are ignorant of the functioning of the defence services and their capabilities, mainly because of their “distance” from the military, whatever the reasons.

**Reforms in Higher Defence Management:**

The National Security Council (NSC) with the Prime Minister at its head, formed in November 1998 by the BJP-Led NDA Union Government, is the apex agency for national security. It was formed to address the need to systematize higher defence management, particularly following India’s dramatic entry into the nuclear club with Pokhran –II six months earlier. The functions of the NSC were earlier being carried out by the Principal Secretary to the PM and, since the formation of the NSC, a senior bureaucrat is the National Security Advisor (NSA). Thus earlier and also currently, the advisor to the Prime Minister on national security is a bureaucrat. The decision making members of the NSC include the NSA, the Ministers of Defence, External Affairs, Home and Finance, and the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission. The three defence services Chiefs along with bureaucrats of secretary rank, are part of the Strategic
Policy Group (SPG), which advises the NSC members in decision-making and policy formulation. Thus, when the NSC is meant for higher defence management, excluding a military officer in the decision-making body and having the three defence service chiefs merely in the SPG, but on the other hand having a bureaucrat as the NSA, is clearly a bureaucratic machination. There can be no objection to having a bureaucrat in the decision-making body; rather, since bureaucrat is expert in secretarial work and functioning, it is essential to have a bureaucrat as the Member-Secretary of the NSC. But excluding a military officer from defence matters is detrimental to national security. The absence of a national security strategic document even after 62 years of Independence and 13 years of the NSC’s existence can perhaps be attributed to the absence of a military officer in the national security policy formulation.

Questions of Competence:

The question arises that if a military officer is to be inducted as a member of the NSC, who will that be: the Army Chief or Navy Chief or Air force Chief, or the senior most among them? Why not the Chairman of the existing Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC)? But this is unsatisfactory to say the least, because the incumbent always has the responsibilities, interest and functionality of his own service at the forefront. Thus the CSC Chairman cannot do justice to rendering single-point advice and assist in decision-making in matters that concern the other two services. The CSC mainly focusses on inter-service coordination issues and cannot have the NSC’s real-time perspective of geo-politics, economics (including energy), foreign affairs, home affairs, finance or development planning that influence national policy. It is a committee without powers, in its military ivory tower, though its isolation is not of its own making. Also in question is whether the other two service chief will abide by the advice that the CSC chairman may render, which can lead to decisions impinging on the
operational functioning or provisioning of their respective services. Importantly, such advice (even if its sincere) would be partisan because a service chief’s primary area of experience is in his own service and his primary responsibility is its effective operational functioning. Hence, a service Chief as a member of the NSC is not likely to be an asset to the NSC and worse, could be a spoiler of inter-service synergy. What then would be the solution for inducting a senior military officer into the NSC at the decision-making level?

Reverting to the need to examine “the whole spectrum of defence preparedness”, the previous question morphs to “who is competent to brief or advice on the whole spectrum of defence preparedness?” Clearly, this has to be a military officer and not a bureaucrat. Also as argued above, any of the three service chiefs cannot do justice to the job. Hence there has to be a military officer who represents all three services without being burdened with the direct responsibility of running any of them. He must also be senior to all three service chiefs, serving as the National Security Advisor to the PM just as the PM’s Scientific Advisor does on matters of science and technology. He would necessarily be a member in the NSC and, if he is to be superior to the three service chiefs, with five-star rank (though he may be of four star rank if he is the seniormost).

This brings the discussion directly to the decades-old demand of the military for appointing a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), as a measure of urgent necessity. This has also been supported post-Kargil 1999 by the Kargil Review Committee, headed by strategic affairs analyst K. Subrahmanyanam, and the 2001 Group of Ministers (GOM) led by parliamentarian L.K. Advani. The GOM report “Reforming the National Security System” underlined the need to have a CDS because it felt the functioning of the existing CSC comprising the three service heads, “revealed serious weakness in its ability to provide single-point military
advice to the government”. Further, in 2009, the PSCD, in its reports tabled in the Lok Sabha, said that India urgently needs a CDS as well as concrete long-term strategic planning, and lame excuses by the government or the Defence Ministry (MOD) in these critical matters will simply not do any longer.21 Notwithstanding these clean recommendations and dire requirements of CDS for single-point military advice to the government at the level of the NSC in the interest of national security, there are at least two reasons why the creation of a CDS post has not happened.

**Impediments to National Security:**

At present, the three service chiefs are just below the Cabinet Secretary in precedence. Appointment of a CDS of five-star rank would make him above the Cabinet Secretary and this is unacceptable to the bureaucracy, which exercises “civilian control over the military” that causes general resentment within the military. The reason for the traditional standoff between the bureaucracy and military is that while the military unreservedly accepts control by the elected executives in government and understands the role of the bureaucracy as the link between itself and the Defence Minister, it resents bureaucratic dominance. But this apart, the bureaucrat-NSA has a retired military man as his military advisor. This exposes bureaucratic hubris, the readiness of some senior military officers to acquiesce to blandishment, and the regrettable disinterest of the political hierarchy, especially at the highest levels. All these combine to adversely affect national security. Bureaucrats enjoy easy and direct access to the Defence Minister and PM because that access is institutionalised; whereas a service Chief would only get heard based on his professional reputation, or personal relationship or “equation” with the country’s executives, or when he is invited to render advice. Thus the bureaucracy resists creating the appointment of a CDS, since it would
effectively challenge the pre-eminence of the IAS and weaken it grip over the military. This is clearly an impediment to national security.

The second reason for no-CDS is internal to the three services and is a serious impediment to national security as the first. Even though the military recognizes the strategic need for a CDS, the three services are locked in an internecine struggle regarding which service should provide the CDS. The tacit (and less than honourable) assumption in this is that he would be partisan to his own service besides allowing one more promotion at the top level. This rivalry is based as much upon personal relations between service chief in-the-chair as upon traditional opinions of which service is pre-eminent among the three from a strategic or operational standpoint and because of fear that the importance of the other two services would be in some manner down-graded. It would be unrealistic not to recognize that this is connected with rivalry for financial and budgetary requirements for military procurement expenditures. Perhaps a scheme of rotational or cyclic appointment would solve this problem, but the inter-services rivalry is not in the best interest of national security, and even goes against the best interest of the defence services. This rivalry is kept simmering by a devious and scheming bureaucracy playing on senior military officers and the defence service chiefs so that a CDS does not become a reality.

As long ago as 2009, Rajat Pandit succinctly wrote : “Reforms have a way of coming in late. No wonder then that a decade after the Kargil conflict exposed deep fissures within the military top brass, some critical lessons, especially on the need for a single-point advice structure, and by extension a General Number 1 are yet to be learnt. It doesn’t help that the Army, Navy and IAF do not see eye-to-eye on this. Compounding matters is the smugness of a bureaucracy happy with the status quo even as it exercises a vice-like grip on the armed forces in the name of ‘civilian
control’. The political leadership, in turn, remain apathetic about genuine reforms in the country’s higher defense management”.

**Necessity for a CDS:**

There are some issues that demonstrate the necessity and urgency for creating the post of a CDS. The first and most important one is that, as discussed above, the PM and NSC cannot get a full and true picture of the military dimension of national security from the existing set-up. This is vital in the emerging regional scenario of Chinese military build-up on India’s northern border within easy missile-strike distance of Delhi, and India’s successful launch on April 19, 2012, of a 5500-km range missile that can target Beijing. Noting that there are arguments that nuclear deterrence cannot work at all, a nuclear deterrent can work only when it is backed by adequate conventional military force. The NSC strategizing with nuclear second strike capability (in view of India’s no-first-use policy) without a well-considered military advice is not merely dangerous; it could be disastrous. A CDS answerable to the PM and NSC will be the only competent person to manage India’s nuclear arsenal, which is currently being done by bureaucrats and technocrats who have little or no idea of military strategy and nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) warfare.

Secondly, a CDS will be able to advice the PM and NSC on the military aspects of border issues with neighbouring countries. For example, the advice of a CDS on how to handle Pakistani General Kayani’s very recent suggestion that both Indian and Pakistani troops should withdraw from the icy heights of the Siachen glacier at all, but have been kept well to its west by the Indian Army along the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), north of point NJ 9842. There is need for NSC and take a call on the history of territorial disputes and conflicts with Pakistan in the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, and particularly in the Ladakh region, by
consulting the CDS to get a holistic view of the past situations leading up to the AGPL and possible future scenarios.

It is doubtful whether General Kayani’s suggestion has the sanction of the Pakistani Government. Therefore, without involvement of the Indian Government, a detailed examination of General Kayani’s proposal and assessment of Pakistani’s hidden aims and agendas can be done most effectively by the CDS who would have on-the-ground knowledge of positions, operational and logistical problems, and the pros and cons.

Thirdly, to further strengthen the USA-India strategic ties, the US Pacific Unified Combatant Command (PACOM) chief, who commands combat forces of the US Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force interacts separately with India’s three service Chiefs. This does not allow India’s military to get a holistic view of interactions and plans, thus conceding strategic military advantage to the USA. A CDS who only can have a genuine tri-service perspective will be able to interact to India’s strategic and military advantage.

Finally, as a five-star rank military officer, the CDS will be in a position to advise and mentor the three service chiefs on the inter-service operational doctrine, encourage tri-service synergy and implement reforms in higher defence management. This will enable India to play a greater strategic role in international affairs and secure for India the necessary resources for its developmental growth.

**Policy Aims, Interests And Objectives : Content Analysis :**

The MEA and MOD reports offer the introductory insight into policy, aims, interest and objectives of national security. Providing an account of it, this section also analyses the consistencies and changes in
content of the MEA reports and the MOD reports from 1998-2010 from the perspective of national security.

**The Reports:**

The annual reports issued by the MEA and the MOD are an integral forum for the Parliament to ensure that the ministries are held accountable. The yearly report from the MEA serves to outline major themes of foreign policy in its introductory sections while the subsequent sections are summaries of each division’s activities from the year previous. The MOD similarly reviews the ‘current security environment’ on regional, internal and global levels and then given this assessment, proceeds to outline future procurement needs in the remainder of the text. In effect, both annual reports are formalized “proof” that they were implementing the policies agreed upon or outlined.

Both the MEA and MOD reports are retrospective. They review the events from the past year and offer insights into the future challenges given the security environment they have outlined. The MEA is characteristically focused on the diplomatic efforts of India’s foreign policy apparatus and the MOD is largely defense / military related. Both ministries’ documents across the twelve years observed, however, addressed the current security environment and the stated foreign policy considerations and objectives of the GoI. In comparing both sets of documents the uniformity of policy across both branches of government can be assessed. In order to best reflect the incremental changes in policy, this study does not seek to impose a false delineation of time-periods-many of the changes that are noted below did not happen in the time span of one year, on even two, rather broad changes or alterations to themes or priorities in policy were detected over the past many decades. The following analysis is nuanced and often the changes noted are arguably
intentionally obscured by the GoI, which, like most states seeks to portray a semblance of consistency or deliberateness in publications over time.

**MEA : Foreign Policy Objectives :**

Not unlike most states, India’s foreign policy is a laundry list of the greatest threats to its own national interest and the perceived policy solutions to those challenges. How the problems and solutions sets have changed over the past decades are a reflection of both a changing global, regional and local security environment and India’s perception of its own capabilities.

How then in the first years of the twenty-first century did India view its own security challenges and what were the prescribed solutions? Firstly, the MEA documents in the first half of the decade presented an itemized list of the key challenges and the principles behind the solutions to its national security. Beginning with the 1999-2000 annual MEA report, which reflects on the events of 1998-1999, major themes of Indian foreign policy are made clear. In the wake of major events like the Kargil incursion, the Asian financial crisis, and further consolidation of the Taliban’s control is Afghanistan, India’s stated primary concern was for its own domestic security and prosperity. In the 2000-2001 annual report, the MEA states : “Certain essential priorities and objectives that inform India’s foreign policy can broadly by encapsulated as follows : To safeguard India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, enhance India’s strategic space and preserve the autonomy of our decision making process”. How this goal is met is the subject of the subsequent 204 pages. In the case of the 2000-2001 report, the MEA describes the actions over the year and intentions going forward.

Secondly, the MEA establishes the theme of India playing a positive role in “Asia and in the world”, which arguably directly correlates
to its proceeding third goal: “To win international understanding and support for India’s national interest”. Despite the seemingly unremarkable nature of these priorities, these three key point are perhaps the most consistent concepts throughout the entire decade of MEA reports.

By the end of the 1990’s India’s economic liberalization had begun to transform both India’s standing in the world order and its own self-perceptions. Particularly, India sought to cultivate further economic growth through liberalization and integration of the economics in South and South East India. Perhaps most obviously captured in the “Look East” policy but also more subtly in the growing development of its “neighbourhood” policy.

Throughout the 1999-2010 time period Indian foreign policy remained consistent in its belief that economic strength would lend to independence in decision making and eventually influence on the world stage. As India’s economy has grown and as it has, for the most part, effectively navigated the overwhelming foreign policy challenges of the first decade of the twenty first century, it seems unsurprising that the language employed in foreign policy documents has become increasingly confident and self-assertive. For example, in the 2000-01 MEA report the National Security Objectives section claims, "The size and positive trends of India's economy give us the potential of playing a leading role in shaping the international economic order and pace of development."26 However by the 2008-09 annual report India sees itself as a "responsible power" whose participation in the international effort to find solutions to "major international issues…. will contribute to their success."27 The following section looks at the MEA annual reports and addresses some, although not all, of the key themes of foreign policy in each of India's three "circles."
Neighbors, Neighborhoods and Interests:

The use of "neighborhoods" to describe India's foreign policy initiatives was used before the first decade of the twenty-first century. The evolution of India's objectives in the neighborhoods during the decade, however, is telling. The annual report of 2010-2011 makes specific note of this terminology: "India has always regarded the concept of neighborhood as one of widening concentric circles, around a central axis of historical and cultural commonalities." The neighborhoods broadly correspond to how both Mohan and Indian policy documents outline the concentric circles that dictate India's interests.

The first circle, which encompasses Indians "immediate neighbors," also presents India's immediate concerns in the beginning half of the decade. The problem of security in the immediate neighborhood is solved according to the MEA by encouraging "mutually beneficial interdependence" so that India can "devote its resources and attention to developmental and infrastructural activities." The concern of neighborhood security remains notably constant throughout the annual reports. The logic of a secure and prosperous immediate neighborhood affording India the opportunity to focus on “rapid domestic economic growth and social development” is a fundamental equation in Indian foreign policy.

The extended neighborhood in contrast is less about India's immediate security concerns but more significantly about a reliance on mutually beneficial cooperation, particularly in the energy sphere and increasingly inclusive of defense cooperation.

Finally, the global arena has overlapping relevance for India's neighborhood construct. While transnational issues like multilateralism, terrorism, UN reform, nonproliferation and disarmament are consistent
throughout the years, India's increasing sense of responsibility and capability in effectively addressing transnational issues is the most pertinent development in the MEA annual reports.

**Economic Interdependence and the Immediate Neighborhood:**

Within the immediate neighborhood, India addressed concerns about the democratization of its neighbors, strengthening economic and cultural ties and ensuring mutual respect. By 2004-2005, the MEA sought to underscore India's unique economic success, particularly considering the insecurity of its immediate neighborhood. By poking the following question: "Countries across the globe are beginning to see India as an indispensable economic partner and seeking mutually rewarding economic and commercial links with its emerging economy. Should not India's neighbors also seek to share in the prospects for mutual prosperity India offers to them?"\(^{31}\) India portrays itself regularly in a benevolent context, but frustrated by the insecurity of its neighbors and their failure to see Indian policies as a model to emulate.

Although the MEA reports consistently highlight the potential for growth through mutual cooperation, by the middle of the decade under observation, India was beginning to show open dismay, India's stated vision was of a multipolar world, in which developing countries would be given a voice and the chance to progress through economic integration. Ideally through organizations like Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), South-South policies for trade or South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) India would be the leading example claiming, "India is prepared to make its neighbors full stakeholders in India's economic destiny."\(^{32}\) Despite a rapidly evolving “immediate neighborhood" the MEA documents have been consistent on insisting that
economic integration was essential for our success (and the immediate neighbors’ success).

The Extended Neighborhood and Energy Security:

India's foreign policy objectives for the extended neighborhood are primarily concerned with issues of regional integration on an economic level but increasingly this has focused on energy and resource security. Between 1999-2010 a few concerns have gained increasing prominence in the MEA annual reports. These include control over Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and naval modernization and resource security in light of India's rapidly growing economy A major tenet of India's national security objectives is the belief that economic security is integral to national security. Economic security is best pursued through integrative means given the interconnectedness of the globalizing economy. In large part, during the time period observed, Indian policy documents have clearly reflected an underlying acknowledgement that India's economy can only continue to grow if it's equally expanded resource needs are met.33

Growing resource demand has led to an expansion of the neighbourhood philosophy to more actively consider the "extended neighbourhood" broadly defined as East, South East, and Central Asia and the Middle East. The MEA annually reports growing bilateral trade figures, particularly with the ASEAN countries, figures were near $2.5 billion 1993-1994, $5.36 billion in 1998- 1999 and by 2009-2010 bilateral trade was reported at $44 billion.34 India has frequently cited 6-8 percent growth in gross domestic product in the MEA reports, calling particular attention to its resilience post the Asia financial crisis and the more recent global financial crisis : "Despite the global economic downturn resulting from the financial and economic crisis, India has fared better than most other countries, and remains one of the fastest growing among the major
economies, with a growth rate that is expected to reach 7% plus in 2009-10. \(^3\)

In order to maintain growth rate of this caliber, India has recognized that it must balance potentially hazardous bilateral relationships. While the MEA acknowledges that above and beyond the large Indian Diaspora in the Gulf States, the Kingdom supplies around three-quarters of India’s crude oil imports. \(^3\) Although the relationship with the Gulf is described as based on "close historical ties and cultural affinities" \(^3\) the regions increasing significance is not solely based on civilization bonds. This is also true for India's overtures toward various Central Asian Region states (CARs), whose vast potentials for resource procurement have been a keen focus of Indian foreign policy objectives for the entirety of the decade. Although, many of India's ambitions in the CARs have yet to come to fruition they have been an important axis of India's extended neighbourhood policy. \(^3\)

India has deftly manoeuvred between a longstanding reliance on Saudi and United Arab Emirate crude with its growing defense relationship with Israel. \(^3\) Equally as controversial and a central focus of later sections in this analysis, is India's balancing act between its resource relationship with Iran and the growing connection to the United States.

Of equal concern, are India's efforts toward naval modernization to ensure the free flow of trade in entire region. With an estimated 90 percent of India's resources imported via SLOC it is no wonder that a central focus of Indian foreign policy is in the security of the states that supply its resources or about the transportation routes.
International Arena: Terrorism, Multilateralism, and Pragmatism:

The distinct change in India's self-perception about its role in the immediate and extended neighbourhoods—from a member of a disenfranchised community, toward a shining exemplar of success against the international odds—was evident not just in the economic or energy spheres. Emphasis has been consistently placed on preventing "anti-Indian activity" and terrorism within the immediate neighbourhood up to the international arena from 1998 onward. After 9/11, however, India sought to capitalize on the global attention that was finally being accorded this critical threat: "The terrorist attack of September 11 changed the manner in which the world viewed the phenomenon of terrorism... There is now widespread awareness in the international community that the phenomenon of terrorism must be tackled globally, and in a non-selective manner, for which close international cooperation is a basic requirement."[^40]

Terrorism originating out of Afghanistan (under the Taliban) and Pakistan (as the Taliban's close ally) was a central and overarching concern for Indian foreign policy. Over time, India has adopted a more muted verbiage when describing this threat. For example, in the 1999 report when describing the Kargil Crisis the MEA stated: “The international community also concurred with our assertion that Kargil was a manifestation of the medieval malevolence spilling over from Afghanistan”.[^41] In addition, after the December 13 Parliament bombings the MEA reports the attack as "audacious" but even more telling was the justification for Pakistan's sponsorship of the attack: "that Pakistan- a product of the indefensible Two Nation Theory, a theocratic state with an extremely tenuous traditions (sic) of democracy- is unable to reconcile itself with the reality of a secular, democratic, self confident and steadily progressing India, whose standing in the international community is getting inexorably higher with the passage of time."[^42] This description is an unabashedly honest window into
India's deep seated distaste for its neighbour and the firm belief in Indian moral superiority. The statement, like others in regard to Pakistan, is highly emotionally-driven, particularly for a formal foreign policy document.

The previous description must therefore be compared to the description of terrorism post-Mumbai: "Pakistan's inability to implement her commitments as evidenced by the terrorist attacks from Pakistan on the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July 2008 and on Mumbai in November 2008 effectively suspended the dialogue process. The Mumbai attacks were universally condemned by the international community." 43 The reports have arguably begun to depict a more mature, less “shrill” 44 approach toward relations with its most pressing perceived threat. Indian documents seem to have registered that the single most critical challenge to its ascent is its visceral and hazardous relationship with Pakistan. By demonstrably restraining the inflammatory impulses of its foreign policy language, India seems to be reflecting an actual shift in policy toward Pakistan. While causally there is at best a tenuous link, the mild language in the reports has corresponded over the years with a warming of relations, the resumption of high level talks and confidence-building measures. 45

Over the decade India continuously asserted that relations with Pakistan over Kashmir must remain a bilateral issue even though there was a increasing bifurcation between the Kashmir issue and terrorism. 46 Where once the two issues were largely interrelated, today the documents reflect India's desire to have international recognition for the challenges of terrorism emanating out of Pakistan and Afghanistan, but separate out the settlement over the disputed Kashmir territory.

This is one example (of many) that points to a duality and seeming contradiction in Indian foreign policy. India seeks both bilateral
and multilateral fora to address overlapping issues. Just as India has signed a series of bilateral civil nuclear agreements with the United States, France, and Russia, New Delhi continues to pursue disarmament and nonproliferation policies in the UN. Yet these policies directly reflect another one of India's central foreign policy tenets; pragmatism and flexibility. The subsequent years' annual reports show a marked increase in the prevalence and prominence of transnational issues, particularly terrorism and "India's capability to shoulder regional and global responsibilities, and the consequent change in global expectations of India's role on the international stage." In large part, India points to its exceptional pragmatism and flexibility for its deft manoeuvring of these complex objectives.

India, consistently throughout the reports, relies on phrases like "the international community agrees with India" in order to lend credence to Indian policies and assertions. A central tenet to Indian foreign policy objectives is to retain sovereignty in decision making. India both wants the international recognition of the challenges it faces and its achievement in addressing them, while simultaneously seeking to maintain autonomy. Further confusion arises with India's dogged pursuit to prove that it is entitled to re-ordering the international community to better reflect reality: the rise of new powers, to include India.

Traditional and continuous focus on international organizations, institutions and causes has been a cornerstone of Indian foreign policy objectives. Whether through the nonproliferation and disarmament regimes, such as NAM and SAARC or through UN reform in general, India has sought to lead the developing nations into a position of power through unity. This has not been an easy path for Indian policymakers in recent years, particularly as India's foreign policy is first and foremost about protecting India's interests. Consistently the MEA reports claim
that India's own self-interest best served through a safe and prosperous external environment.

The MEA reports indicate that security and prosperity is best achieved through multilateral organizations, and co-operative efforts.\textsuperscript{50} India's role in the international arena, however, has changed. In 2001-02 India sought "high-level consultations" with major powers to ensure "that our views found echo in the councils of the world," \textsuperscript{51} by 2003, "the main thrust of India's foreign policy has been to establish its rightful place in the emerging world order."\textsuperscript{52} Equally, India sought non-permanent member status in the UN Security Council in 2006 but by 2007 was seeking permanent member status, culminating in the MEA's most recent and proud announcement of President Barack Obama's endorsement of the Indian bid for permanent member status in 2010.\textsuperscript{53}

In the above example, multilateralism was a way for India to have a voice in the international system. Where in the past India relied on “power in numbers” through economic, trade, diplomacy and policy institutions, increasingly the MEA reports reflect not only India's ability to stand independently, but also the desire to lead. In touting its 2011-2012 election as a non-permanent UNSC member, the annual report claims the vote " ...signaled an important endorsement by the international community of India's credentials in the global arena" and "would enhance its (the UN's) effectiveness and legitimacy."\textsuperscript{54} India's self-perception has undergone an important change which has been subtly reflected in its foreign policy; namely, that India's participation now lends institutions authority.

How then does India reconcile some of its long held principles (Panchsheel,\textsuperscript{55} nonproliferation, disarmament, etc.) with its burgeoning role in international affairs? Indians challenge of balancing its nuclear
weapons capability with its disarmament policy is instructive. As a nuclear weapons state India has actively attempted to portray this characteristic as both natural to its stated foreign policy objectives and inherently non-contradictory to its long held Nehruvian doctrine. This policy is exemplified by India's principled stand against signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which is considered discriminatory, while simultaneously upholding a belief in non-proliferation.

India's primary foreign policy objective is inherently self-interested. However, India believes that peaceful co-existence and mutual benefit are preconditions for India to meet its core national security objectives of economic growth and the betterment of its citizens. The path toward this goal in not a proscriptive policy (which may be evident in other states' foreign policy documents) rather, “foreign policy must be flexible enough to optimally respond to new challenges and opportunities.”\(^{56}\) India's foreign policy is intrinsically related to "building the nation's capabilities through economic development, strengthening social well-being and protecting India's sovereignty."\(^{57}\) In order to conduct effective international relations, India is aware that it must simultaneously protect its domestic interests.

Through "pragmatism and pursuit of national interests"\(^ {58}\) and "manifest ability to adjust to change"\(^ {59}\) "Indian foreign policy has combined firm commitment to our core national values with dynamic adaptation".\(^ {60}\) Built into all of the MEA reports is the freedom to readjust policies to meet whatever the pressing national interests are at the time. Although India seeks non-interference and maintenance of sovereignty, it interfered with Bangladesh in 1971, and has repeatedly been involved in Sri Lanka's insurgency because these were considered integral issues to India's national security.\(^ {61}\)
Despite years of attempting to lead a movement toward disarmament, India has pursued not only peaceful use of nuclear technology but weapons as well. While questioning the intentions of China's military modernization and rise, India has offered platitudes for the modernization of its own forces and reassurances that its rise will be peaceful. India has pursued a policy that follows similar practices to other democracies, in that it must balance the domestic whims of the voting polity with the foreign policy of a state hoping to increasingly project power to protect its national interests. This duality is not often satisfactorily reconciled for the careful observer as, attempts to balance both sets of demands are self-evident in the language of the annual reports.

**MOD: National Security Environment**

The MOD annual reports offer some clarity to Indian foreign policy objectives in that each report begins by outlining the "National security environment" and the National security objectives." On a macro level, the MOD reports have undergone changes in organizational structure that reflect some of the shifts in Indian foreign policy addressed above. Primarily the alteration in India's self-perception as an emerging power is encapsulated by the sub-titles articulated in the MOD reports over time.

alteration is only one symbol of Indians foreign policy changes, it does serve to highlight that there have been changes. A closer look at the broad themes within the text further underscores the contextual significance of the new sub-titles.

The MOD annual reports' definitions of the "National Security Environment" are the most instructive sections for understanding India's foreign policy as concentric circles. By observing how the priority of these circles have in some instances changed, but in others remained the same, the analysis of Indian foreign policy objectives is further demonstrated.

In the 1999-2000 MOD annual report the first issue for India was the intrusion of Pakistani forces in Kargil. Echoing the sentiments of the MEA report, the intrusion was described as "desperate" and a "betrayal of trust" while the MOD report points to a number of equipment and logistical "shortcomings" but that Indian security forces "remained vigilant" and that "the militancy was effectively checked."64 The second issue India was concerned with was the modernization of China's forces and their cooperation with Pakistan. While simultaneously concerned with the "militarization of fundamentalist forces" in the region, the report stresses India's policy of "peaceful coexistence."

This duality leads the MOD to claim that "the international and regional security environment warrants that we remain fully prepared to protect our legitimate security interests."65 India portrays itself largely as a peace-loving and cooperative state that is forced into a defensive posture as a result of external aggression. The 2004-2005 MOD report captures (his sentiment in describing India's nuclear tests: "Faced with an untenable nuclear environment, India was forced to resort to the nuclear option in 1980. As a nuclear state, India is even more conscious of its responsibility in regard to nuclear safety, nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament."66
Yet throughout the decade India has pursued foreign and military policies that would not be difficult to label as threatening to its neighbours. At least in rhetoric, these policies are couched in terms of defensive reactions.

Given the above portrait of a dangerous security environment the MOD reports are consistent in their attempts to portray India's military doctrine as subservient to the foreign policy practices of peaceful coexistence. The "National Security Objectives" outlined by the annual reports have changed subtly over time. They have remained consistent in efforts to balance growing capabilities with clear signals of peaceful intentions.

Much like the MEA reports, the MOD also believes that national security priorities are only met by ensuring a peaceful external environment. The MOD reports take pains to depict its security as inextricably linked with the prosperity and safety of its neighbours, “For its further growth and prosperity, India needs & secure and peaceful periphery. Working in that direction, India has striven to give us neighbours stakes in its own growth, through trade, investment and services/" Yet, "At the same time, India continues to take all measure for the security and safety of all its citizens." Essentially, India is signalling that while hoping for mutual peace and prosperity, "the country and our defence forces remain prepared to tackle the full spectrum of security challenge.”

What do these seemingly contradictory objectives mean for Indian foreign policy priorities and practices? To a large extent Indian MOD documents appear to be echoing the bravado of the MEA reports. It is largely unsurprising that the two major arms of foreign policy planning and implementation (the MEA and MOD) would undergo similar growth in confident rhetoric. The 2003-2004 annual report claims that "The nature
of new threats also reinforced the need for international cooperation to combat terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and underline the role that India could play in the global response against such forces." India sees its potential as an emerging partner of the international community to combat transnational threats with local dimensions. In the 2005-2006 annual report the MOD describes the national security environment as "multipolar" with India's transformation into one of those poles as "slow but steady." By the following year India saw its strategic role in the region as increasing, with 66 percent of the world's energy being transported "in close proximity to India, thereby placing a prime responsibility towards safely of this key energy flow. This can only be achieved by having visible and potent defense forces." Tellingly, the 2009 2010 report cites that "India stands as a bulwark against fundamentalism and extremism. It is a centre of economic dynamism in the region and as a plural democracy, a bastion of stability and peaceful coexistence." India's self-perception has clearly begun to indicate that it seeks major power responsibilities and status. If not yet in practice, this is certainly true in rhetoric.

**Revolution is Military Affairs:**

Sophisticated military equipment and technology backed by the military expenditure of the nation plays a critical role in strengthening national security and in deterrence against potential threats. (See Appendix III) Since they often cover high-tech areas, control of these technologies is guided by foreign policy considerations of the developed nations. For many decades, this has been a contributory factor is slowing down India’s military build-up. India lags behind world technology leaders by 10-15 years in various fields. Appendix V gives a comparative assessment of India’s technology maturity based on an assessment from broad technology domain knowledge.
Looking at specific security interests, one can easily see the growing importance of intellignece, surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies, autonomous systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles, missile and missile-defence technologies, space security technologies, micro-satellites and of course, was disruptive technologies like high power lasers or microwaves. The US Defence Science Board Report (March 2006) includes power sources, distributed and networked sensors, high performance computing, defence critical electronic components, persistent surveillance and technologies for advanced command environment in the list of critical technologies. The focus of critically thus seems to be shifting away from individual technology or equipment to integrated systems flexible adoptive performance and networked capabilities. Hence, while technological competence in key sectors of applicability continue to be critical in the context of self-reliance, the overall security readiness of a country, like India is going to depend more on integrated techno-military and techno-industrial maturity that support military strategies.\(^78\)

Clearly, identification of emerging technology targets and external follow-up is an important agenda for India’s external relations. Today, India has an unique opportunity to become a partner in development and utilization of military technology instead of being a target of technology denial regimes.\(^79\) India is trying to catch up with existing military technology through acquisition, incremental innovation and purposeful indigenization and, eventually, assimilation of new technologies through cooperative R & D. India has been negotiating with other countries from a position of confidence to intensify technology exchanges.

Relatively, India is in a better position in the aftermath of its civilian nuclear cooperation agreements in the recent past refurbished with international recognition of its effective control of sensitive technologies
through the special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials and Technologies regime and the WMD Act. But constant pressure has to be maintained on advanced countries to seek further dismantling of technology denial and export control regimes. The help of technology-owning foreign corporates can be solicited towards this end as, in contrast to the past, dual-use technologies reveals that they are now controlled more to limit competition for American companies rather than for foreign policy objectives. In fact, when foreign policies are now often revised to suit corporate priorities, diplomacy has become critical in dismantling the constraints to technology access and in resolving the cost and time problems that overshadow international exchanges.

While the post-Pokharan – II sanctions have been lifted almost fully, post-Pokharan-I sanctions, grounded in statutes or international technology control regimes, remain, as do procedural requirements across the bond, buttressed politically by commercial and non-proliferation lobbies.\(^{80}\) Given the political element in such transactions, diplomatic support plays an important role in modernizing India’s defence capabilities.\(^{81}\) Insofar as the US is concerned, Indian diplomacy has made sure that India-specific denial regimes are dismantled further and the general US Department of Commerce list drastically pruned. However, these issues need to be put on a fast track in the post-nuclear deal period, especially in the Indo-US High Technology Group where progress seems to have been rather limited.

The important strategic partners to tap for nuclear equipment sourcing and R & D collaborations are the US, UK, France, Russia, Israel, Brazil and South Africa. While India currently persist with competitive procurement procedures, more focus on greater participation by the US is needed since it is the global leader over a wide spectrum of conventional weaponry including smart bombs, maritime patrol, reconnaissance,
multirole aircraft, attack helicopters, amphibian ships, underwater warfare and antimines equipments. It also has an edge in non-conventional, high technology sectors such as missiles, ABMs, cyber war programmes, leasers and futuristic space-related weapons, as also in intelligence, communications and information systems, Removing bottlenecks in technology transfer from the US, including technology for civil-commercial applications, is therefore a priority for India. But India should also work towards inclusion in the Defence Trade Security Initiative so as to be able to take advantage of nuclear licensing and procurement procedures applicable to NATO. Similarly, in order to tap US counter-terrorism technologies, India needs to conclude a bilateral agreement for participation in the United States Technical Support Working Group. After finalizing the Generalized Security of Military Information Agreement and the End User Monitoring Agreement, the remaining issues need to be resolved. There are worries in India regarding possible US denial of military and ammunition supplies in crisis situations. It is unrealistic to expect assurances of uninterrupted supply as the US has no given such assurances to even its closet NATO allies. Also are the limits to which the US government will be willing to share frontier military technology. Synergy between US interests and indigenous R & D is necessary to achieve optimum solutions. Since India’s requirements over the next decades are huge, the commercial interests of the US should drive the process forward even though political considerations will continue to play a major role. An important task for the external policy is, thus, to promote R & D collaboration between the US and the Indian public and private sectors by clarifying the political framework and assisting in the negotiations.

Russia is the other major source of military hardware and technologies, even those which it provides to no other country. There is
reluctance in Russia to give the most advanced weaponry to its other large customer, China for intellectual property rights (IPR) reasons and the possibility of it being used one day against Russia itself. Such concerns are less relevant in the case of India, which can obtain from Russia sensitive technologies not available elsewhere. Russia overlooks some of its export control obligations to meet India’s needs. The decision to extend the military-technological cooperation programme upto 2020 and to jointly develop the multi-role transport aircraft and the fifth generation fighter aircraft is a clear signal that Russia will continue to be a major source of next generation military equipment and technology.

The futuristic RMA will mandatorily accommodate the criticality of space technologies in force enhancement and force support operations encompassing intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, navigation and communications, as also missile launches. During the next 15-20 years, space security is expected to become a significant concern with an increasing number of powers investing in space technology and positioning more military satellites. Protection of civilian and military space assets is also expected to become a major area of concern.

The international legal regime governing space is tenuous. The dominance of the US in the use of space for military purposes explains it lack of concern about weaponisation of space and reluctance to rush into a treaty that will legally prevent it from testing and evolving new capabilities. On the other hand, Russia and China are interested in getting a operational and globally acceptable space treaty. Ideally, it would be in India’s interest to see a global space regime involving not only a disarmament agenda but also a formulation of policy towards international technological collaboration in space. While being conscious of the unlikelihood of an effective overall regime being finalized in a foreseeable future, India must remain engaged in international initiatives in that
direction. It could propose a review conference on the Outer Space Treaty to build global perspective among participant countries on space-related issues under the provisions of Article 9 of the Treaty.

Hence, the need of the day is an articulation of an external policy based on a comprehensive military doctrine and a space programme. An opportunity which merits mention is the relaxation of regulations by the US for transfer of technology, components, and systems for the fabrication and launch of communication satellites (COMSAT) to NATO and major non-NATO allies. India’s inclusion in this dispensation is a goal worth pursuing.

**India’s Military Strategy:**

India’s military strategy of conventional defence encompasses a strong and viable defensive posture of dissuasion and a potent and credible counter offensive capability of deterrence. Dissuasion implies powerful defence (which extract a high price before the aggressor achieves the almost inevitable penetration) as also mob reserve that blunt and limit such intrusion without unacceptable loss of territory. On the other hand, deterrence is predicated to strong and credible counter-offensive capabilities that inflict unacceptable losses on the aggressor at a place of defender’s choice. The mere threat of a counter-offensive would deter the aggressor from embarking on changing the status-quo. Such a strategy, with varying force mixes is expected to shape force structures and weapon mixes as well. It applies both with regard to China and Pakistan, although the altitude-terrain compulsions imposed by the Himalayas place severe restrictions on major counter-offensive by both sides.

Conventional war, should it take place, would be constrained in time and place, scope and political objectives. The conflict would be characterized by high intensity, fast tempo, manoeuvre-oriented operations
and the duration is unlikely to exceed 2-3 weeks and if it does, the side with the greater sustainability and recuperability would have a clear and higher advantage. Success in the 21st century conventional war would lie in possessing strategic capabilities, higher technological levels, missiles, satellites, modern inter-service patched C412 system. For greater combat effectiveness potential, state-of-the-art-reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition capabilities and domination offered by technology-intensive force multipliers are considered mandatory paranephellia. Needless to emphasise, rate of induction of such system would follow an incremental pattern and be a function of resource availability, more vigorous time-quality credibility of indigenous R & D output and a balanced prioritization of force-weapon mix on an inter-service basis. Responsibilities and tasks would need to be clearly delineated in a futuristic time-frame so that turf battles on operational functions are eliminated altogether.

**Footnotes and References**

1. See Nair “*The Indian Bureaucratic System*” pg 1-4 and see Chapter II in Beener “*The Indian Foreign Policy Bureaucracy*” for discussions on the British Legacy on foreign policy bureaucracy in India.

2. See Benner, Nair and Mitra for good surveys of Indian bureaucracy.


4. Ibid.

5. Rahul Bedi, Senior journalist and defence analyst, *The Hindu*, Thursday April 5, 2012

6. Ibid.

8. Ibid. 159


10. Rahul Bedi, Ibid.


13. Ibid.

14. Rahul Bedi, Ibid.


17. Rigzin Samphel “India’s civil service: Battling the babu raj” *The Economist*, March 6, 2008.


The MOD reports actually use the term ‘current security environment’ as a subsection of the annual report.

25. MEA 2000-01 pg i
26. MEA 2000-01 pg ii
27. MEA 2008-09 pg iii
28. MEA 2010-2011 pg i
29. MEA 2000-01 pg ii
30. MEA 2001-2002 pg i
31. MEA 2004-2005 pg i
32. MEA 04-05 pg ii also see PM Vajpayee’s UN speech on multi-polarity.
33. MEA 2007-08, “India’s economic diplomacy has attached due importance to energy security that is vital for an assured high rate of growth for our economy”. pg i
34. MEA 1999-00 pg 15 and 10-11 pg vi
35. MEA 2009-10 pg iii
36. MEA 2009-10 pg ix
37. MEA 1999-00 pg 35
38. MEA 1999-00 pg 31
39. See for example, Fair “Indo-Iranian Ties: Thicker than oil” pg 52
40. MEA 2001-02 pg i
41. MEA 1999-01 pg 3 Also the MOD annual report of 2002-03 describes Pakistan in these terms”......the single greatest threat to peace and stability in the region is posed by the combination of terrorism nurtured in and by Pakistan for its
strategic objectives, and the ingrained adventurism of the Pakistani military motivated by its obsessive and compulsive hostility towards India”. Pg 3

42. MEA 2001-02 pg 9

43. MEA 2008-09 pg ii

44. Subrata K. Mitra, Politics in India, “On the Indian side, in the place of the shrill ideological rhetoric of the past, one now finds a more moderate, pragmatic and nuanced approach to the United States, as well as to Pakistan”, pg 180

45. This change it mostly likely the result of both the nature of domestic politics, constraints on India’s foreign policy behavior a result of other foreign policy relationships-like that with the U.S. and a genuine recognition that if India wants to be considered a responsible power it must ‘act and speak’ like one.

46. See MEA 1999-01 pg 4

47. MEA 2005-06 pg i

48. MEA 2006-07 pg i

49. Nearly every MEA report begins with India’s self-interest in ensuring a mutually beneficial security environment. For example “India’s foreign policy seeks to safeguard the country’s enlightened self-interest. The primary objective of India’s foreign policy is to promote and maintain a peaceful and stable external environment” (MEA 2008-09 pg i)

50. MEA 2005-06 “India has advocated the need to evolve a new paradigm of cooperation …. and multilateralism becomes the only effective tool for addressing global challenges.” Pg i

51. MEA 2001-02 pg i

52. MEA 2003 pg i

53. MEA 2010-11 pg 88

54. MEA 2010-11

55. For an introduction into the duality in doctrine and actions as regard Panchsheel see Mohan “How to intervene” The Indian Express, March 07, 2011 http://ww.indianexpress.com/news/how-to-intervene/758818/3
Consider naval modernization in order to better control its sea lines of communication (SLOC), the Chabahar port with Iran in order to bypass transporting goods and resources through Pakistan, the nuclear weapons tests of 1998, increased defense cooperation with Japan and other SE Asian Sates (as a counter albeit weak are, to China’s military), pursuit of energy resources in the CAS etc.

Consider the diminution in the prevalence of WMD proliferation as a major security concern, in the beginning of the decade this was a central concept that was afforded its own section, by the end of the decade it was only mentioned in 2 bullet points of 31.

For example the 2005-06 report says “India remains fully committed to the twin policies of (a) no-territorial ambition, and (b) no export of ideology”, pg 12

For example, the MoD 2006-07 annual report claims “India commitment of global, non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament, which would enhance its security and that of all states, remains unaltered”, pg 10

MoD 2008-09 pg 4

MoD 2009-10 pg 9
73. MoD 2003-04 pg 6
74. MoD 2005-06 pg 2
75. MoD 2006-07 pg 3
76. MoD 2009-10 pg 3