CHAPTER X

COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS.
This dissertation had been developed essentially as a recreation of the political history of Maoist movement in Andhra Pradesh with the focus on showing the interaction of objective factors and theory to produce certain activity. In conclusion we can develop some insights and hypothesis which will enrich our understanding of the Maoists in India as well as point out the areas in which further research could be conducted. This Chapter examines the following six issues 1) Relations of Indian Maoists with CCP and other foreign elements. 2) The nature of Indian Maoist movement, 3) The position of Maoist theory in explaining their practice, 4) Some aspects of their tactics, 5) The Government's response and relations with other parties and 6) Their organisational structure and background.

C.C.P and Indian Maoists

There has been much speculation about foreign help to the Indian maoists. This can be divided into two types - a) material help and b) ideological guidance and control. As far as material help is concerned the following points are of interest. 1) Newspapers have reported that many pen shaped revolvers have been supplied by the Chinese to the Indian maoists. On the basis of these reports Madhu Mehta raised a question in the Parliament to which the Government replied that it was investigating. 2) Replying to a call attention motion Y.B. Chavan stated in March 1970
that small quantities of Chinese and Pakistani arms had been received by the naxalites. 3) Police reportedly seized Chinese made small arms and live cartridges from some Srikakulam maoists when they were arrested in Calcutta. 4) More than 100 naxalites reportedly went to Nepal and established contact with the Chinese ambassador there and asked for training facilities. 5) An M.L.A. alleged in the Assam Assembly that the Chinese were financing Indian maoists with fake Indian currency. 6) A letter purportedly written by one of T.N.'s relatives to D.V. has been published. It mentions that North Korean Embassy had given Rupees three lakhs. 7) North Koreans were also said to have financed and given publicity material to the Kunikkal group in Kerala. 8) Syed Hussain Shah an Assamese maoist leader was said to have connived with the Chinese and rebel Nagas to set up "Independent Assam". No concrete evidence exists as to any of these above charges. The Indian maoists are not known to have used sophisticated weapons in any action. In fact Charu Majumdar had made a theoretical fetish of using only local arms, and this had become an issue of contention between him and Ashim Chatterjee. However what looks quite probable is that a) The Indian maoists received some arms and ammunition of Chinese, Pakistani or even U.S. origin via Bangladesh maoists or Naga underground. However none of these were received or used by the maoists in Andhra. b) Some finances may have been received from sympathetic individuals abroad. The only concrete gifts of Chinese to Indian maoists seem to be a) receiving
visitors like Souren Bose and Kanu Sanyal. On his own admission the latter stayed at a Chinese Military Training camp for a month.

By an autographed copy of Māo's thought given to Charu Majumdar.

Several writers including Biblab das Gupta maintain that the Indian Maoist movement was inspired, started, guided and controlled by Chinese. The evidence presented is extremely flimsy and circumstantial. What is done is to show certain suggestions or comments made in the Chinese Press and link them to certain actions. Secondly statements of Maoist leaders themselves are presented as evidence of the proposition. Both these are highly selective.

There are as many instances of Indian Maoists not having taken Chinese advice as having taken it. In fact the policies of Charu Majumdar group (which was supposed to be blessed with Chinese recognition) were the farthest from Chinese indications as expressed in the articles in Peking Review. The C.C.P. letter contains scathing indictments of Charu Majumdar's policies on eleven counts. The statements made by Indian Maoist leaders proclaiming their loyalty to C.C.P. and concurrence with C.C.P. on many international issues can be interpreted as a mode of authenticating and legitimating their arguments or rationalising their policies. In fact almost every single step of Indian Maoists, and most of their theoretical formulations which sound as mere repetitions of the Chinese view can be easily explained in terms of the logic of their local needs and constraints. In fact the whole burden of this dissertation has been to show the above. A few comments of
some top Andhra maoists quoted below will show their mood.
A) T.N. - "By repeating Peking Radio like a Bible one can never become a Marxist". Here he was commenting on the reported support given by Peking Radio to the attacks on police stations in Wynad by Kerala Maoists. B) C.P. - "However big and mighty a Chinese fellow might be, he will come running to us if we prove success of our actions in practice". These comments were made in the context of Chinese support to Charu Majumdar group. C) Charu Majumdar himself did not even hesitate to disassociate himself from the Chinese stand on Bangladesh when it became necessary to satisfy his followers. However the Chinese influence is considerable on the Indian maoists in the following fields and areas. a) Most of the maoist leaders were neither theoretically equipped nor had the time and resources to conduct painstaking research and produce sophisticated analysis of the national and international situation. Instinctively and as a result of personal experiences they picked up armed struggle as the path of revolution and China as the high priest of armed struggle. So given the fact that while they had strong opinions about tactics, and immediate activities regarding local issues, they had no detailed opinions on long term issues. Thus they i) picked up CCP's formulations about international issues and owned them up. But this was also done selectively to suit their own requirements. For e.g. while Charu Majumdar depended on CCP statement that the Third World War has started with the U.S.
invasion of Cambodia to advocate radical policies. S.N. depended on CCP statement that "Revolution is the main trend in the world today", to advocate moderation. ii) They used the Chinese documents to model their own. For e.g. the Terai Report of Kanu Sanyal resembles closely Mao's Hunan Report not only in the form and presentation but even in language and some specific sentences. In the same way a hundred page document of T.N. group called the Sanskritika Viplavam - mana kartavyalu is almost a page to page translation of Mao's On New Democracy. However this is also done on selective basis. For e.g. Charu Majumdar never gave any publicity to Mao's writings like Why Red power can exist in China. The documents used are selectively picked up to suit their (Indian maoists) policies which have been already chosen depending upon the local circumstances and the leaders perspectives. iii) The CCP enjoys a favoured position in the thought of Indian maoists. It is viewed upon as the original and successful carrier of Revolution and as the present day centre of world revolution. This respect towards C.C.P. is expressed in several ways such as holding a ceremonial dinner of frogs meat (as the Srikakulam maoists did) or in the equally ceremonial explanation of radical actions in 1970 in Calcutta as steps to prevent world wide encirclement of China. Such an attitude probably might be explained in terms of the psychological necessity of a small group taking upon itself the task of moulding history and as such requiring an ally (however illusionary be might be). C.C.P. also stands as a living precedent and proof for the Indian
maoists that what they are attempting to do is not impossible. However it is doubtful whether the attachment to C.C.P. will be absolute and unvarying under all circumstances. For example the Vietnamese communists also had high prestige among Indian Maoists but once they (Vietnam) endorsed the Indian Governments action of declaring emergency, they were roundly condemned as revisionists. All in all the role of C.C.P. in the Indian maoist affairs can be summed up as one of being a catalyst, a symbol of legitimacy and authenticity.

Nature of maoist movement

The maoists had been compared and even characterised by some as Narodniki or Guevarites or urban terrorists of Marighella type or Trotskyites or West European student anarchists of late 1960's, or even the skin heads. The common contention of all these characterisations is that the Indian maoists have been too far away from the tenets of Chinese revolution to be called maoists. As far as the T.N., C.P. are concerned these charges are totally baseless. The Charu Majumdar group actions (particularly in West Bengal after 1970) do resemble some of the facets of above movements, but in their theory, understanding or perspective they have never accepted the underlying assumptions of above groups. For example they may have taken to urban terrorism like the Marighella group but they never expected urban terrorism to yield fruit on its own.
Urban terrorism was not conceived as a way of making but only as destroying the cultural superstructure, or recruiting cadre, or as first steps in forming the Red Army. It was seen as supplementary to rural struggles not as supplementing it. Thus the Charuistes never took to kidnapping and sabotage - the two main types of Marighellaist activity. Thus the above type of characterisations are useful only to malign or condemn but not to explain or predict the course of Maoist activity. However if the argument is that given the social background of the movement it inevitably takes such a form, it would be wrong on two counts. a) It misrepresents the social background of Indian Maoist movement. b) It exaggerates the role of social background to determine the nature of movements activity. Thus whatever the aberrations and deviations the Indian movements base is Maoist. However certain innovations have been done on this base by the Charu group. Their tendency to ignore mass organisations and economic struggles, their rejection of the graduatedness - the step by step approach to revolution, their refusal to take rich peasants as allies are all ways of putting a novel interpretation on Maoism. The other groups (T.N., C.P. etc.) have however stuck to the conventional model of Maoism.

The nature of Indian Maoist movement cannot be defined in simple terms. That is, it cannot be characterised as a student revolt, a tribal revolt or a form of peasant radicalism. It com-
bines all these elements. The only common factor is its maoist
bearings and the revolutionary perspective. It is this which gives
the tribal or peasant activity its specific shape. The tribal
problem on its own may manifest in several ways. But the parti-
cular shape they took was a result of the maoist perspective.
That their problems did not make the tribals take to a separatist
agitation or to religious revival or to vote for opposition parties,
but made them take to armed struggle was a result of the leaders
maoist perspective. Armed struggle was not inherent in the situation
of tribal problem. So the common unifying factor must be held to
be maoism.

Similarly no single set of ecological conditions can explain
eruption of the movement. It had taken place in the most backward
jungle areas as well as in the most modern metropolitan area of
Calcutta. However two generalisations can be made about the fre-
quency, intensity and response to the movement. A) The activities
of Charu Majumdar group which depends on annihilations and squad
actions gets most response from two kinds of areas 1) traditional
areas of communist support as identified by Donald Zagoria - irri-
gated wet crops lands with high percentage of landless labour.
For example the Mid-Pennar region of Andhra in which the Pro-Lin
faction was active falls into this category. 2) Economically
backward areas (low per capita income, tradition agricultural
techniques, social backwardness) in which a high degree of social
conflict and tension already exist. For example every single action of C.O.C. group of Maoists had been based on a previous quarrel between landlord or money-lender and people. The activities of other groups which depend on mass organisation, mass action, political education and economic struggles get most of their response from the relatively economically backward areas. For example all the areas in which C.P. group is active in Andhra Pradesh fall into this category. The same holds true for all areas in which the influence of S.N. group extends.

Maoist Theory

Theory is the raison d'être of all marxist actions. Indian maoists are no exception. They see reality through the prism of a theory which explains the historical process and defines their role in it. So the theoretical formulations of the maoists are extremely important in understanding and explaining their practice. There are several peculiarities of the Indian maoist theory which can be noted. (a) The theory can be divided into three kinds of statements. Firstly there are those which characterise the international situation and national power structure. Secondly there are those which define the long-term strategy to be adopted in view of the above characterisation and finally statements regarding the concrete tactics to be adopted. As far as the first two parts of these are concerned the Indian maoists adopted them
readymade from the experiences of the Chinese Revolution and the Statements of C.C.P. regarding the international situation. They were not the outcome of any detailed research of the Indian situation. As far as the tactical statements are concerned they represent the outcome of the amalgamation of two different sources. Firstly there is the tendency to derive the tactics from the analysis and strategy which have already been defined. Secondly there is the reality of practical experience which might require them to adopt certain kinds of tactics. All contents and debates among Indian maoists arose originally upon tactical questions. But were always later converted into more abstract theoretical questions. For e.g. the debate between C.P. and T.N. groups originally started on the question of the nature and scope for squad actions but the debates and the arguments to support each of their stand was conducted at an exotic plane where the questions were, whether the Arab-Israeli conflict represents the breaking out of U.S.-Soviet contradictions at world level and whether the 1967 split in the Congress Party represents the breaking up of Pro-Soviet and Pro-U.S. groups within the bourgeoisie. Given the amount of research undertaken and the facility with which generalisations are made without any evidence leads one to the strong suspicion that they are merely rationalisations used to support certain tactical steps which were taken under pressure of circumstances. All this is not however to reject the theoretical formulations of the maoists as mere rationalisations or some
external constraints because at the first instance their actions had been determined certain preconceived notions (theory) about reality. It is only at the second stage i.e. after the theoretically derived steps had interacted with reality - then come the theoretical changes rationalising the changes in practice.

The maoist understanding of the situation has been plagued by gross exaggerations and irresponsible formulations. For e.g. they said a) "Hundreds of militant struggles are taking place all over the country after declaration of Emergency", b) "India is a land of perpetual famine and millions are dying of starvation every year". c) "India supported United States actively in suppressing national liberation movements in Vietnam", d) "Radio Station Liberation has begun functioning though it is not yet making continuous broadcasts".

Some aspects of their tactics

Participation in election was not the major issue between CPI(M) and the maoists when they split with each other. In fact the maoists of all hues had denied that they were totally against electoral participation. But as events progressed boycott of elections became the hall mark of maoists, a proof of their revolutionary commitment and incorruptibility. It was transformed into a strategic and theoretical issue. The effect of their boycott
calls on electorate had been marginal. For example in the Anantapur Constituency where they had biggest success they could keep nearly 40% voters out of the polls in the 1969 by-elections following T.N's. resignation. But by the 1971 Parliamentary election voting figures came back to normal. However in the forest villages of Telengana the maoists claimed total success in keeping away people not only from Parliamentary and Assembly elections but even from elections to local bodies. But the lure of elections seemed strong for many maoists. Both in 1971 and 1972 some maoists contested elections but were disowned by their groups. Their sympathisers and some cadre showed even more vacillation in regard to local elections.

The participation maoists in mass movements led by non-communists had been guided by considerations of political expediency. Generally the groups which had maximum opportunity to benefit from such participation supported the movements, but when the question was purely academic for them (that is if the movement was taking place in an area where they had no following) they took an attitude of condemning such movements as bourgeois led and illusionary. For example while the Pro-Charu Majumdar groups supported movements like those of separate Andhra, separate Telengana or pro-Bangladesh movements, they opposed in very harsh terms the J.P. movement. The probable reason is that while in the former case the movements took place in areas where they had some following and were in a position
to gain advantage by participation, in the latter case the movement took place in areas where they had no following and the question of supporting or opposing it was purely academic. Conversely S.N. took a very theoretical position in regard to Bangladesh and issued warnings about being carried away by national chauvinism but when it came to the J.P. movement whose strongholds coincided with his areas of operation he had no hesitation in taking a pragmatic stand of offering limited support and even calling for establishment of a "Regime of patriotic and democratic unity", meaning a coalition Government. However the T.N. had group had consistently opposed all mass movements of this type as disruptive, but this may be explained by the fact that at no place did they have much organisational strength to take advantage of these and could afford to take such a stand.

Government Response

The Maoists pose a threat to Government in two ways. Firstly, they are a political problem in the sense that they represent existing grievances of certain sections of people. Secondly, and on a more immediately visible plane they represent a threat to the maintenance of law and order. The Government has recognised both these aspects. The Prime Minister reportedly stated that the naxalites must be fought and overcome politically. The Minister of State for Home Affairs K.C. Pant stated in the Parliament that "it is the
responsibility of all of us to carry out a dialogue (with the
\[ \text{maoists} \] and help the path of reason, and restore their belief
in democratic process". With this understanding Government has made
efforts with considerable vigour to destroy the basic causes of
\[ \text{Maoism} \]. This is evident particularly in the tribal areas of Andhra
Pradesh. Every effort was made to woo the tribals away from the
\[ \text{maoists} \]. In Srikakulam a special Corporation was set up to look
after the tribal welfare in that district alone. It started with
\[ \text{Rupees five crores} \]. Practically every family in the area was
cleared of its debts, by generous cash grants from the Government.
Many gifts of cattle and sheep were made. Efforts were also made
to provide regular employment to tribals. District administration
was instructed to take strict measures to restore the land to
\[ \text{tribals} \]. All these steps were taken in Khammam, Warangal, Karim-
nagar forest area also. However the police Department on the other
hand takes steps which nullify whatever political advantage that
could probably have been gained by the welfare measures. They
conduct searches for maoist squads, undertake combing operations
and question suspects and even common people for information. Most
of these are conducted in such a way as to alienate the people and
develop distrust among them about the intentions of the Government.
This lack of coordination between the sections of Government meeting
the political challenge of maoists with welfare measures and the
section of Government dealing with the problem as simply one of
restoring law and order, leads to collapse of the whole Government strategy. People in the area easily believe the Maoist propaganda that the welfare measures are a kind of bribe to catch the maoists and once they are caught the welfare measures would seize. People visualize continued existence of Maoist squads as necessary for continued assurance of benefits to them. This makes it difficult for police to get cooperation or information.

Realising the situation the I.G. of Andhra Police recently suggested that all welfare activity should be channeled through Police Department and several public relations officers be attached to the Police Department to conduct propaganda among the tribal people.

Relations with Other Parties

The attitude of the maoists towards the non-communist parties was one of non-recognition of their existence. Cooperation or conflict was thought in class terms but not envisaged as taking place with other organised political entities. Whenever they talked of United Front it was in terms of unity with social classes, not with political organisations. But all this changed for sometime after the emergency when they talked not of the United Front but an "United Council of Action" which can be interpreted to mean unity even with the Jan Sangh. But currently they seem to have withdrawn again into isolationist politics. The reason for this seems to be the fact that they have no stake in the field in
which traditional political parties operate and as such no need for truck with any of them. But whenever they entered the fields in which the other parties were also active for e.g. Trade Unions or other mass organisations, they had to confront the problem of relations with trade unions or other organisations. Those of the maoist groups which did enter these fields usually preferred to avoid avert conflict with other parties while at the same time trying to expose them to the people.

The attitude of the other parties towards the maoists was determined by political consideration. For e.g. the Jan Sangh which was outright in its condemnation in the earlier days suddenly started counting political merits and social justification for maoist activities during the J.P. agitation. In the same way the Congress leaders of Bengal who showed much understanding for the misled romantic idealists during the period when United Front was ruling, later became very tough and ruthless when they came into power.

The maoist attitude towards CPI had been one of contempt and denigration. However they did not hesitate to accept CPI's help in their campaign for Civil Liberties. CPI in its turn was equally critical of the petti-bourgeois adventurists, but "we would treat the revolutionaries and idealists among the naxalites as fellow revolutionaries who have gone off the track and ..."
do all in its power to save them from being murdered judicially or by the hoodlums of CPI(M) or by the police. The probable explanation for CPI's concern was their expectation that most of the Maoist cadre who were disillusioned with Maoist politics could be won over to their party. To some extent they seem to have succeeded in getting most of the deserters of the Maoist cause to join them. But in situations where CPI and Maoist cadres were working in the same area, trying to win over the same groups of people conflicts arose leading even to murderous attacks by one group on the other. Several other similar incidents took place in Vijayawada city and Khammam district.

With [CPI(M)] their relations started with a vicious ideological warfare in 1967-69 period when the Maoists were emerging. However unlike in Calcutta it did not erupt into a street war in Andhra Pradesh. Even in Andhra there were several clashes in rural areas when the interests of the two organisations contradicted, but the casualty figures did not reach anywhere near the figure they reached in Calcutta (nearly 700 on both sides). Maoists alleged several incidents of murder and handing over of their (Maoists) squads in Andhra to police by CPI(M). However after the declaration of emergency the Andhra Maoists particularly in student and trade union fronts seem to have developed cordial contacts with the CPI(M) cadre.
Relations between Maoist groups in Andhra did not reach the bitter level to which they went in Bihar and Bengal. Tu Tu Nagy, a close associate of Ashim Chatterjee was murdered by Charus followers. Liberation January-March '73. Sushital Roy Chowdhury mentions that M.L. cadre was killing fellow cadre calling them police agents etc. But even here there were some clashes. In Nalgonda T.N. followers beat up some of C.P. followers. Majumdar's followers in Medak also beat up C.P. followers there. C.P.'s squads prevented the Pro-Charu Majumdar squads functioning in the forest region of Khammam and East Godavari Districts.

Organisation

Secrecy is the basic principle of Maoist organisation. It imposes constraints on the entire organisational structure and decision making process. The Maoists maintain that while not shunning legal forms of activity or open types of mass organisations, the party itself will remain underground. Such a manner of functioning requires what the maoists call a technical apparatus. This involves a) An efficient couriering system. Since it is not possible for the leading party members to travel freely and frequently, and since public communication system is regarded both as risky and inadequate, the party requires an efficient and elaborate couriering system. This in fact provides the basic integrating factor in the maoist organisation. The courier not
only holds the key to most of the party secrets but also becomes an important factor in decision making by his close contacts with the party's top echelon and his role in conveying messages as well as interpreting them. Thus if any couriers fall into police hands it disrupts the entire organisation. b) Contacts – the inability of party members to function openly and publicly requires that they have reliable and committed frontmen to act as proxy. The actual conduct of agitation or mobilisation of people or organisation of meetings and other related work like distribution of party literature and dissemination of party ideas, is carried out by the contacts. They are the field workers, the visible part of the organisation. They are guided and controlled by party members who usually stay out of limelight. They constitute the hands, legs and voice of the party. Functioning openly they are in the most vulnerable position, but being acquainted very little with the inner party organisation, they are the most easily expendable elements as far as the party is concerned. c) A net work of sympathisers who contribute finances, provide shelters for party workers in hiding and do various other odd services. This entire technical apparatus forms a kind of buffer zone between party and police, and between party and people. Its members are carefully chosen. The couriers are usually those who could travel easily and pass off without being detected. They also must possess enough theoretical and organisational knowledge to carry messages. As such
they are usually quite well educated people. The main courier of Srikakulam District Committee was a Lecturer in an Engineering College, and a courier of A.P.R.C.C. who was recently caught was also an Engineer. The couriers are usually men who previously did not have much part in mass work and as such are unexposed. On the contrary the contacts are the ones who are what we may call natural leaders. The people who are chosen for field work are those with a capacity to attract, convince and lead people. At the same time they are not senior enough, experienced enough or valuable enough or committed enough to make to the inner circles of party. Sympathisers are those who are not committed enough to devote themselves full time for party work but are willing to contribute their mite.

The basic reason for Maoist emphasis on secrecy of party organisation is their belief that given their proclaimed revolutionary intentions, Government would not allow their (party) functionaries to indulge in any kind of activity at all. For example organising of a cultural association or physical club or a student union is not a crime when the organiser is a normal social worker or a politician. But if the organiser is known to be working for the Maoist party he would be harassed, arrested and the organisation suppressed. The Maoists also believe that the Government would pre-emptively eliminate all their cadre whether they had committed any crime or not. With the declaration of emergency and official
ban of their organisations what had previously been a matter of choice is now one of compulsion. Now the Maoists cannot but function secretly. Use of code names, transfer of exposed and known cadre to areas where they are not known, constant shift of hiding places, avoidance of public modes of transport, avoidance of appearance in public places are various ways the members try to keep underground. Even party meetings are held in far off places - that is the meeting of Srikakulam district of CPI(ML) would be conducted in Karimnagar, while the State Committee of A.P.R.C.P. meets in Madras. Secrecy is more difficult to maintain in rural areas. The Maoists usually resort to three steps in these areas. A) Shift the exposed cadre to distant areas; B) terrorise the known informers; C) withdraw cadre from villages and form them into squads living in forest areas and capable of depending themselves.

The axle around which the entire Maoist organisation revolves is its members. They are committed and tested people who already have put in quite a bit of service to Maoist organisation as its frontmen and field workers. Members are chosen on the basis of the recommendations of local party units and have to be approved by higher bodies of party. Each selected member is put in probation for a year (6 months only if he belongs to working class or is a landless labourer and two years if he comes from property owning classes). Normally membership is a prized possession and is not
given easily. In fact a majority of members in Maoist squads in Telengana forest area are not given party membership even after several years. It is normal for a squad to have only one or two members - its Commander and the Political Organiser. For some time the Charu Majumdar group of Maoists went by the principle that "only he who has dipped his hand in the blood of a class enemy can be a member." This is a temporary aberration and was not taken seriously for long. Membership of party is a full time work. Even the members' family life is subject to party control. The member has to seek party's permission for marriage. For example when such a senior party member as Dr. Mallikarjunudu wanted to get married to another party worker, the local Committee refused permission. Only after the intervention of Srikakulam district committee, could he get married. The party interferes even in the matter of members having children. The Khammam Area Committee issued a circular to all its members in squads to adopt family planning methods. When children are born by failure of precautions, party arranges for their being looked after by sympathisers at least in the beginning years. The constitution of CPI(ML) lists 17 duties of party members. These include not only his obligations to the organisation but also detailed instructions about the kind of attitudes and character which the members ought to develop. The constitution also lists the rights of party members. These include:

1) Right to elect and be elected to party organs.
2) To criticise freely party committees and functionaries at party meetings.
3) To make suggestions, etc.
Plaints, criticism and appeals to all higher Committees. (d) To make proposals regarding their own work in party, to get assigned to themselves in accordance with ability and requirements of party. Normally most of the members work as organisers. The recruits prospective supporters and through them set up organisations or conduct agitations and struggles.

A fundamental principle guiding the relations between various organs of party, between members and party bodies. It means that democracy and hierarchy should be combined in proper form to govern the organisation. To democratic aspects are:

(a) All party organs are elected, (b) All party committees will pay constant heed to opinion and criticism and of lower units and members, (c) All party committees must function strictly according to principles of collective decisions, (d) Higher committees must promptly communicate their decisions and directives to lower bodies, (e) Free and frank discussions are to be allowed in party units on all questions affecting the life of party, (f) Differences should be resolved through discussions and consultations, (g) Criticism and self-criticism is the method to be used for resolving all issues; (h) Sustained efforts must be made raise members ideological and political levels and make them participate in all aspects of party life, (i) Consistent struggles must be conducted against bureaucratic as well as anarchist and polycentric tendencies. The centralist aspects mentioned are:

(a) Individual is subordinate to
unit, minority to majority and lower to higher committee. 

All questions of international affairs, questions of all India nature or questions concerning more than one province or requiring uniform decisions for the whole country shall be decided upon by Central Committee. Lower Committees can send in opinions and suggestions. Factionalism in any manner is not to be permitted.

The tendency for centralisation has been strong for a very brief period during 1969-70, that too only in the Charu Majumdar group. At the Second Congress of CPI(ML) there was even a strongly supported move to declare Charu Majumdar as the authority - the only interpreter of Mao Tse Tung in India and the unquestioned originator and final arbiter on all theoretical matters. However the move was dropped when it faced strong opposition. But the Charu Majumdar faction itself ran the movement in a highly centralised manner. Charu advised abandoning on all general body meetings as these generate the most "dogmatically traditional ideas", when Charu used to preside over Committee meetings of his factional leaders there would no voting or majority let alone collective decisions. He would put forward proposals and brush aside any amendments simply by saying "I can not accept them". However it is to be noted that this was a strictly temporary phenomena limited to Charu Majumdar group that too only in theoretical matters. A rural guerilla movement or an urban terrorist movement depends a great deal on the willingness of members to follow voluntarily.
The leadership can guide, but cannot afford to be rigid because its discipline enforcing capacity is very limited. Besides given the secret nature of party work contacts between leadership and members cannot be constant. So the former can only given the broad guidelines and depend on members for implementation and interpretation. However theoretical centralisation is inevitable given the fact the Marxist and Maoist theory requires sophisticated capacity to handle and all such people who have the capacity are most probably already members of party's higher bodies. This theoretical centralisation combined with organisational decentralisation has repeatedly led to splits within the party. Whenever local units felt that implementing policy handed down from above is causing losses, they were faced with no alternative but split the party. This explains the pattern of splits within the Indian Maoist movement which have always taken place by horizontally splitting lower rungs of organisation from higher bodies. For example in one split the State leadership (TN etc.) split away from national leadership (Charu Majumdar etc.) and in the next split the forest area leadership (CP etc.) split away from State Leadership (TN etc.). These splits are followed by re-alignment of the diverse groups to provide new national level bodies.

The electoral principle is not strictly followed in Maoist organisations. Though there have been instances like the election of State Committee members of the A.P.R.C.C. in 1969, it has been an
exception rather than a rule, particularly since given the conditions it is very difficult for the Maoists to collect all their members for purposes of elections or holding conferences. The more normal procedure has been for the existing higher Committees to co-opt new members and get approval from general membership if at all possible. In none of the Committees of Andhra Maoist groups has there been any controversial appointment or glaring omission. Given the multiplicity of Maoist groups the leadership of each group is generally tight knit and in view of the difficult conditions and scarcity of good organisers, no group can afford personal prejudices keeping out otherwise qualified person.

One issue which had been continuously raised among Maoist circles is about whether they should function as a party or only as a coordination committee. It has been argued by some members (even S.K. Mishra, R.P. Sharaf and R.N. Upadhyay who had all been members of the central committee) that given the recent origin of Maoism and lack of clarity on many issues, and lack of any previous proved experience in applying Maoism. It is correct to function only as a coordination committee with right of all member groups to dissent from the majority decisions. This argument did not find much favour among the Maoists and even those who pleaded for it at national level practiced party like organisation with in their State or local area bodies.
The formal organisational structure of Maoists is complicated and the following chart can be used as an initial guide.

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<tr>
<th>All India Party Congress</th>
<th>Central Committee</th>
<th>Secretariat or Politbureau</th>
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<td>State Party Congress</td>
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<td>District Committee</td>
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<td>Intermediate Committees (village or area Committee)</td>
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<td>Forest Area Committee</td>
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<td>Village self governing organisations</td>
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<td>Party Unit</td>
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All India party congress is theoretically the supreme organ for the entire Maoist Organisation. It is composed of delegates elected by provincial party conferences. It has three functions.
a) to consider for approval reports and programmes submitted by Central Committee; b) to revise and amend party programme and constitution; c) to elect Central Committee by secret ballot. This is to meet once in four years. It is convened by Central Committee, which is also the deciding authority on the basis of representation and procedure of election. Because of organisational difficulties the Maoists found it difficult to convene these. The Charu Majumdar group had two conferences one in 1969 another in 1970. The Pro-Lin group held its conference in 1973 at village Kamalpur in Bengal. Both these conferences witnessed lot of debate, and jockeying for positions in Central Committee. In the 1970 conferences the Charu Majumdar group tried to use the conference to force upon the Central Committee certain decisions it was not willing to take. For example declare Charu Majumdar as the Authority. In 1973 conference of Pro-Lin group was so stormy that it ended in the resignation and walk out by party Secretary Mahadeb Mukherjee. This goes to prove that these congresses were by no means docile followers of Central Committee. In both cases they have been used to sort out the differences within the Central Committee. The other Maoist groups including T.N's. and C.P.-S.N's. have not yet held any all India level congress.

The actual body with in Maoist organisation which makes the policy decisions is the Central Committee. At every all India Congress meeting the existing Central Committee presents a panel of names which upon approval will become the new Central Committee.
Any member of Congress can object to a name in the panel or purpose a new name. When the All India Congress is not sitting it is the supreme functioning organ. The Central Committee usually consists of all top leaders of the movement. Its composition keeps changing by co-option according to the changing fortunes, of the movement. For example in 1969 the Central Committee of CPI(ML) consisted only of two members from Srikakulam. In 1970 they had five members. All policy decision are made by this body. Usually decision making is by consent, consultation and discussion. If there are differences of opinion they had shown preference to compromise rather than majority decisions. Since each member was a State leader forcing decisions upon minorities would mean alienating entire State Units. So compromises are preferred.

While in policy matters the Central Committee is the place where decisions are made, it is the Provincial Committees which really control the organisation and implementation. They are the ones which collect finances, publish papers and have day to day contact as well as control of field workers and cadre. Particularly, powerful provincial committees are also extremely influential in policy making as well as organisation. The West Bengal Committee was almost in control of CPI(ML) (Charu group) during 1970. The present Lin Piao faction of CPI(ML) is also controlled by the West Bengal Committee. The Andhra Committee has a great deal of
influence over the CPI(ML) S.N. faction, by virtue of the fact that it is the main financier of the party, and constitutes largest number of cadre. It is known to publish theoretical statements on its own, clarifying the Central Committee stand. The Andhra group of C.O.C. has gone further and taken stand on various issues which are openly opposed to their Central Committee views. Even the provincial Committee reaches its decisions by consensus and not majority. The members of this Committee are usually leaders of a particular areas movement in their own right and in a way indispensable without previous loss to the party. The Andhra unit of S.N.'s CPI(ML) says "our party methods are collective consultation, collective decision, and collective working". The Rashtra Committees functions include collecting finances to help local units, buying supplies of arms and ammunition required by forest squads, arrange for shelters and legal defence, publish party papers, give theoretical guidance to local units, co-ordinate the activities of various units supervising the cadre, allotting them work and area, providing them contacts and finances. Since it is difficult for provincial Committee members to be constantly in touch, normally a more permanent body is established to look after day to day affairs. For example the APRCC in 1968 appointed party Secretary D.V., T.N. and another provincial Committee member to carry out the committees affairs.

Between the provincial committee and local units there are some intermediate organs. These are the district committees,
Town Committees, Village Committees, area committees, Forest Area Committees. The functions of these units are essentially supervisory. They act as links with higher organisational units. They convey news and views of local units upwards in the party hierarchy, directions and documents downwards. In any activity that demands participation of more than one unit they also act as coordinators. The Town Committees are particularly active in organising cultural and educative activities, meant for general public. In this they have to use and coordinate the activities of many cells. Usually there are eight members in Zonal, Taluq and Zilla Committees. The very number rules out majority decisions. At this level, however, the units have a Secretary. His powers or functions are not specifically mentioned anywhere. So it can assumed that it largely depends on the person as to what he makes of the office. So far at least no elections have been held anywhere for membership in these organs. The membership usually consists of (a) Senior party organisers who were instrumental in building the local party units, (b) younger members who have been unanimously accepted by everybody as deserving place in higher committees, (c) those whom Ashtra Committee may send from outside for their special qualifications, i.e. trained intellectuals, find herth in higher committees easily even though they might not have much seniority. The Hyderabad Town Committee was known to have had three green hands - a doctor and two students out of its eight members.
One category of intermediate organs has however become quite powerful particularly in the case of the Andhra Unit of CPI(ML) S.N. group. This is the area Committee. The APRCC says "Where the movement has spread out, struck deep roots and is in the threshold of being guerilla struggle zone, we will have an area committee as incharge of the overall programme implementation". At present there are two area committees. One is the Khammam Area Committee to look after Yellandu, Palwancha and Madhira Taluqs. The second is the Mulug Area Committee to look after Mulug, Nugu and Bhadrachalam taluqs. Originally both these were regarded as supervisory committees. However, it did not turn out like that due to three reasons - (1) both these committees functioned from dense jungle areas which did not have been jeepable road. Communications had become a very difficult problem particularly since area committee members refused to come to plain areas for security reasons. If one wanted to send a message from the plains to the forest or vice-versa it took them one month. Under such conditions supervision by provincial committee became very difficult affair. (2) The Provincial Committee was supposed to supply jungle areas with money and cadre until the latter could become self-sufficient. In practice the Provincial Committee members spending their time either under constant police surveillance or in jail, with their contacts scattered and broken, their secrecy being only on paper, found it very difficult to fulfil organisational tasks. In fact,
the "area Committees did most of the recruiting and financing. In 1969 they gave Rs.18,000 to open a press and maintain itself. In 1970, they paid Rs.40,000 to maintain it. It has been the same since then. When the provincial committee members insisted on laying down a tactical line which was not palatable to the Area Committees, rupture became inevitable. The divorce between effective power and formal power could not be divorced for long and the previous balance of power in the Provincial Committee in favour of plain areas was reversed. The Provincial Committee had created the office of "Representative of Provincial Committee in the "area Committees" to be able to make effective use of their formal power. This person was supposed to see that the Area Committees faithfully implemented the central line. It did not turn out that way. C. Pulla Reddy who was sent to the field for supervision, himself led the revolt of the Area Committee against the tactical line of the centre. The function of the Area Committees had to be in accord with the general line of the party. The general line would be clarified and expanded by documents which would be sent by the Rashtra Committees. Decisions should be taken by applying these documents to specific local conditions.

The Area Committees often did this by notifying the Provincial Committee only after taking action. For example when at an early stage of the movement a major tactical problem that cropped up was whether to attack or treat against roving police
parties. This issue would have obvious repercussion on the general line of the party. The Khammam Area Committee decided to "conduct one or two attacks on police parties and according to results decide whether to continue or not."

The ground level organisational net work consists of village units, cells in towns and squads. The amount of initiative left in the hands of village units is very little. They are to take permission from higher bodies even for small actions like taking away two chickens from a rich peasants who was slandering Maoists or leading willing villagers to make forcible demands on local merchant to distribute freely Rs.200/- worth merchandise. The local members were criticised by higher bodies in these instances not for the acts themselves but for doing it without approval and prior consultation. However in propaganda and recruitment work local units are given full freedom. Only in questions of conflict and struggle are they to take instructions. Relatively the party cells in towns have more independence. The reason is better education, ability to assert and experience of town members. Unlike village units these are organised not on the territorial basis but according to the area in which they are working - students, petty Government officials, teachers, workers etc. Squad organisation is however different in the various Maoist groups. In the Andhra Unit of S.N. group squads have about 7 to 10 members, function in forest areas, have a leader who is elected freely by squad member and a
political organiser appointed by the area committee. For all their major activities squads have to get clearance from area Committee. While the leader is supreme in tactical decisions all policy decisions are taken by the Political Organiser. For example while the political organiser decides whom to attack the leader decides when and where. The squads of C.O.C. and Pro-Lin groups are much bigger have nearly 30 members. Their activities are in plains areas. After committing an action they either disperse to gather later or take to hiding in forests. They are autonomous without any party control or guidance.

Most of the Maoist activity is conducted not directly but by proxy through mass organisations, trade unions, students unions, agricultural labour and poor peasant associations, literary and cultural association, night schools etc. These are used for recruiting cadre, spreading propaganda, collecting finances, developing contacts, conducting agitations and struggles against Government. With the declaration of Emergency Maoists have given up overt activity in these fields and shifted their concentration to developing party organisation.

We may conclude by saying that though it was not mammoth in proportion or nation shaking in its effects - it was grand in conception, heroic in effort, and significant in its implications about social structure and tensions. It stands as an ever present possible recurrent phenomena unless drastic steps are taken to correct the social maladies which caused it.
NOTES

1. Since most of the comments and observations are based upon the data already presented not much further authentication has been provided here except where necessary.

2. The Hindu, March 5, 1970.


9. Ibid.

10. The Russian movement by which the students tried to bring revolution by depending on the peasants.

11. All this aside one gets the impression (based on informal talks) that in recent days there is a new trend among the maoists in India particularly among the younger cadre. Because of the circumstances most of this cadre are lying low in the sense of restricting political and mass activity. Having a lot of time on their hand and having realised the drawbacks of their theory most of them are undertaking serious studies into the nature of our country's socio-political history. Even fundamental assumptions made about India's class structure are not being spared from analysis.

12. On Emergency, C.C. of CPI(ML) 1975 (mimeo.)


15. Document No. N-1 of N.C.C.


23. See *Agenda and Notes* for the meeting of the Governing Body of Girijan Development Agency, Srikakulam on 26.2.75.

24. Based on interviews.


26. For e.g. See *Link*, June 6, 1971 and *Visalandhra*, August 13, 1972.

27. See *Visalandhra*, July 6, 1976.

28. The murder of Chalasani, City's CPI Secretary and the revenge killing of CPI workers of Radha are an instance of the tension in Vijayawada. *Visalandhra*, September 13, 1975 reports similar events in Khammam Taluq.


32. Ibid.

33. *Amee (Kriish) and Blitz*, September 21, 1975.

34. *Draft Constitution* of CPI(ML), Article I

35. Document J-21 of N.C.C.

36. *Draft Constitution* of CPI(ML), Article V.

38. Ibid.

39. Document N-4 of N.C.C.

40. Document S-32 of N.C.C.


42. Ibid, Article XI.

43. For e.g. See the debates in the 1970 conference of CPI(ML) and the resultant compromise political programme.


45. Document J-2 of H.C.C.

46. Document J-12 of H.C.C. They were so cautious that in one instance the Khammam Central Squad preferred to walk 100 miles across forest and mountains to hold the meeting with Warangal Area Committee, when a 1½ hour bus ride could have sufficed.


49. Document J-14 of H.C.C.

ANDHRA PRADESH
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
1971

BAY OF BENGAL

INITIAL STRONGHOLD OF APRCC IN MULUG-1969.
INTENSIVE ACTIVITIES IN ADJOINING YELLANDU AND HUGUR OF KHAMMAM DISTRICT, AND MANTHANI OF KARIMNAGAR DISTRICT-1969. IN THIS PERIOD THE MAOISTS WERE ACTIVE ON THE LEFT OF GODAVARI RIVER.

AFTER BEING SUPPRESSED FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN ONE YEAR DURING 1970-72 THE MAOISTS HAVE CONSOLIDATED THEIR POSITION & HAVE SPREAD TO THE OTHER BANK OF RIVER GODAVARI IN THE BANDRACHALAM TO OF KHAMMAM DISTRICT, YELLAVARAM & RAMPACHODAVARAM OF EAST GODAVARI DT.