CHAPTER VIII

THEORY OF PROTRACTED ARMED STRUGGLE A GRADUATED APPROACH

This Chapter has three sections. The first examines the origins of the left deviation in the APRCC's actions and their programmes; the second studies the APRCC in action and the three phases of the evolution of the movement during 1969-1976; and the third section examines how different interpretations and different perspectives developed upon the basis of this practice and ultimately resulted in the split of APRCC into two groups.

I

LEFT DEVIATION

The APRCC after being expelled from the AICCOR found it difficult to maintain its own line without deviating to the left on various issues, due to many pressures. viz. over all pressure of CPI(ML)'s extremism; and the apparent fervour among the followers of CPI(ML) which brought down the revolutionary credibility of the APRCC in front of its cadres;
the recognition of the CPI(ML) by China and its (China's) approval of the Naxalbari type of struggles as expressed in the Chinese press and the Peking Radio giving CPI(ML) additional prestige; the contacts which the Naxalbari Solidarity Committee (of Guntur) developed; and support to it by many leaders who had gained name as being the torch-bearers of revolution; the desertion of the Srikakulam district committee to the camp of CPI(ML); The militancy which people were showing in the separate telengana agitation, leading many Maoists to think that people were fully prepared to join and offer armed resistance to Government.

These general pressures seriously affected the Maoist cadre who in turn pressurised the leadership to take a more radical stand. As early as December 1968 the leadership started feeling the pressure. In a Central Committee meeting held at that time Kolla Venkiah a veteran popular party leader and a former member of Parliament from Ongole district put forward a resolution praising and unconditionally extending support to the movement in Srikakulam which by this time had taken armed form. It was defeated. Then he put forward another resolution demanding that all debates about tactics should be put in front of a state congress meeting and final decisions taken there. He felt that the general membership would be more in favour of a radical stance
than the leadership. T.N., D.V. etc. managed to defeat this
resolution also.

At that Kolla Venkiah resigned from the APRCC (to join the
Srikakulam group) and levelled several criticisms against APRCC's
formulations. He said that to think that the revolution requires
two stages, the first of which could be based on conducting
peoples' struggle based on partial issues, and building party
as well as mass organisations with the help of these
struggles, is wrong. "World Communist history makes it clear
that a party based on partial struggles can never become a
working class revolutionary party. Such mass movements and mass
organisations cannot be revolutionary. They will lead to economism".
He did not agree to the leadership's view that whether the struggles
were conducted with or without a revolutionary aim and objective
would make difference. "Opportunism whatever the aim will lead
to reformism. Like Parliamentary path of CPI(M) cannot lead to
the armed revolution which they are predicting, the partial
struggles of APRCC cannot develop into the armed struggle which
they are envisaging." He thought that searching for concrete
and limited demands on which to conduct struggles is to under-
estimate the people and neglect the much more important political
struggle and agitation. In his view there were already innumera-
rable class struggles and class conflicts taking place in the
country side. There was no need for any one to start class
struggles. What was needed is to give them a political orientation. Kolla Venkiah's exit was followed by several important desertions from the APRCC to the camp of CPI(ML) particularly in Krishna district.

In the same Central Committee meeting Bathula Venkateswara Rao the young advocate from Khammam also accused the party of not applying people's warpath in India. D.V. replied that it would not be practicable, to implement those ideas of Mao which he had developed in regard to the programmes in liberated areas, since Indian people were unarmed, while the counter-revolution was armed to the teeth. D.V. cautioned Bathula that it was not enough to arm a few conscious people but it was necessary to bring the broad sections of masses into anti-government movements.

Manthena Incident - Declaration of intention

These State-wide and general ideological and organisational pressures combined with some local problems, resulted in the "Manthena Incident" which started the debate that ultimately led to a major split within the APRCC.

In Manthena and Nugur the party programme was being carried out in full swing. The growing atrocities of landlords were resisted by the party. This resulted in severe police repression. It was becoming impossible for the party workers to remain in the open and work among people. The legal opportunities to work, were
lost. With this the party workers also could no longer function as individuals but had to form into squads and work on the basis of squad organisation in order to defend themselves from attacks of landlords and police. "There was an initial opposition to the formation of squads by Appanna. Ramnarasaayya also opposed it but however accepted it in practice. Soon it was felt that it became necessary to arm themselves for purposes of self-defence and thus armed squads had to be formed. In such a situation the local cadre appealed to the Mulug area committee for arms. This was placed before the Rashtra Committee for discussion by C.P. and Ramnarasaayya. The Rashtra Committee agreed to give arms to the squads there — one rifle and a STEN. But even before this was implemented the cadre in Manthena grew impatient and on their own initiative without consulting the higher Committees seized two weapons from an American hunter in March 1969. After seizing the weapons they conducted many public meetings explaining to the people why they seized the weapons. As a result of this incident both Manthena and Nugur Taluqs' Marxists had to face further intense police repression.

C.P. then suggested that this repression would not stop with Manthena and Nugur. Therefore he felt that the programme should be changed and they should start organising on the basis of squads in Mulug area also. Thus from the experience of Manthena the party was to be prepared organisationally for police
repression by forming squads and working in secret. Thus faced with the problem of self-defence of the cadre and the need of arms, the maoists in the field on their own initiative, without any ideological and organisational discussion took the step of seizing arms and organising themselves on squad basis. The forest area leaders meeting held on March 23 and 24 1969, at Narlapuram did not have very clear ideas about the issue.

While C.P. suggested that some more arms can be seized from policemen and hunters and used for the defence of the cadre, some others objected to it by saying that sporadic events only gave warning to the police and landlords and thus make it more difficult for the maoists to gather a large number of arms.

The Rashtra Committee was critical but did not outrightly condemn the developments in the forest area. Given the pressures, we had noted above, it could not afford to totally denounce the activity but gave a clear directive that all such activities should cease immediately and that no propaganda was to be conducted commending and explaining the armed seizure, but that the cadre was to concentrate on mobilising people for struggles on various issues like the wages paid for rolling beedi leaf etc. and developing contacts and support among the people.
The Conference - Concessions to the Maoists

In these circumstances the first State Conference of APRCC was held on April 10, 11 and 12, 1969, in a lime garden at Atlaprakada village near Vijayawada. It was held with the background of Srikakulam armed struggle which was hitting the headlines everyday and the pressure of forest area cadre who wanted arms and squads, base organisation for their self-defence. In this context the decisions of the First Conference represented several concessions by the leadership to the extremist pressure as well as general and over all reassertion of the line of protracted struggle and graduated approach to revolution.

The leadership succumbing to their leftward pressures could be seen in its changed attitudes on six issues. Some of these issues came up for discussion during the State Conference while some others cropped up earlier.

1) As already mentioned the Srikakulam Committee was determined to characterise the struggle as a liberation struggle which preceded the carrying out of the tasks of agrarian revolution. The APRCC on the other hand suggested inter-twinning agrarian struggles with liberation struggle and for the time being limiting of one self to mobilise people on various partial issues and preparing them to defend themselves against the police and landlords.
Yet when threatened with a situation in which the Srikakulam Committee seemed to be slipping out of their influence they made an opportunist offer and "inspite of these basic faults in the views of Srikakulam Committee the APRCC conceded to the demand of starting armed struggle". Inspite of these concessions Srikakulam Committee refused to function under the control of APRCC and thus probably saved APRCC from being caught in situation where there practice would have been opposite of their theory.

2) On the issue of election also the APRCC leadership conceded to the pressures of cadre and the general situation. They abandoned their previous view that boycotting elections was to be decided depending on the situation and cannot be ruled out prima facie. Now C.P. self criticised himself for his wrong views, and T.N. and already resigned from the Andhra Assembly, where he declared that it had become a talking shop incapable of solving any problem and though he had pleasant memories from his seventeen years of association with it, he was totally disillusioned about its usefulness.

3) On the issue of Kerala also T.N. etc. retracted from their earlier views while they had previously condemned it as Congress and C I I.A. plot, now they pleaded their not having listened to Peking radio broadcasts as the cause of the misunder-
standing. Still they refused to commend it and several members expressed the view that the leadership must be more forthright in their praise of Kerala incidents.

4) Another decision which indicates the leftward swing in the party's policy at that time is on the issue of participating in separate Telengana Agitation. In the Rashtra Committee meeting of July 6, 1969 D.V. proposed that though the movement was more in the nature of a factional rather than on anti-congress basis; though the problem of nationalities could not be solved under the present form of Government; and though only middle classes and students participated in it, it was still useful and necessary for the maoists to participate in it. Provided they gave correct slogans, they could take the movement away from its mistaken objectives and on the correct path and that it would also be organisationally and politically useful in developing contacts with the non-maoist participants in the movement. This resolution was defeated by a narrow margin in favour of C.P.'s proposal which was to deny any use of separatist agitation and to call for independent movements of the maoists.

5) Another sign of the left deviastion were the excessively optimistic opinions expressed in the conference. For e.g. C.P. stated "the general dissatisfaction among the people now has
turned into class hatred. The people have reached a stage where they want to get rid of the Government." He himself later on accepted that this was an overestimation.

6) However the most important manifestation of the left deviation was expressed in their "Immediate Programme" which was adopted at the State Conference. Theoretically their stand was that the armed struggle could start only when people come forward to directly participate in it after being steeled in the experiences of several partial struggles. This programme, while accepting this also made at several places statements to the effect that armed struggle was to start almost overnight. For e.g. 1) "The activities of the people should be taken to the higher levels (armed struggle) by the end of April 1969" 2) "Launch counter attacks on landlord class by May 1969" 3) "Be prepared for armed struggle in the coming rainy season - June 1969. That these deviations resulted from pressure was acceded later even by the leaders of the APRCC themselves.

Inspite of these leftward deviations the general programme outlined in the "Immediate Programme" was in consonance with the approach of graduated and protracted struggle.

The immediate programme - Tactics of Graduated Approach

The Immediate Programme gave the key role to land occupa-
tion programme which was seen as the crucial step in the progress towards armed struggle. They divided land into six types - (a) forest land, (b) cultivable government waste lands under occupation of landlords, (c) temple and endowment lands under occupation of landlords, (d) landlords pasture lands, (e) tenant cultivated lands, (f) lands which landlords themselves are cultivating with the help of agricultural servants and wage labour. These lands are called 'self-cultivated lands'. The communists were to give the slogan "land to the tiller" and mobilise people to occupy the first five types of lands. Given the general sentiments of people about these lands they can be easily mobilised to occupy them. In the course of resulting struggles they can be politically educated and convinced of the rightness and justice in redistributing the sixth type of lands. This would be the crucial step as the landlords and government will oppose with full force any attempt of people to occupy them. If people can be brought to occupy them then they can be prepared to conduct armed struggle against landlords in the defence of their justly occupied lands. This would be the starting point of armed struggle. However occupation of these lands was to be only a slogan and should not be implemented, until people are fully ready for the occupation and consequences. In the beginning only the big landlords lands should be occupied but later on even the small landlords lands also can be taken.
The maximum ceiling limit was to be a holding which does not require more than the personal labour of the owner-cultivator. Cattle and implements belonging to the landlords are also to be seized.

The main programme land of redistribution is to be supplemented by struggles against various feudal forms of exploitation like usurious rates of interest, forced labour, land alienation, corruption and harassment by officials, various forms of free personal labour offered by people to the landlords. The question of reasonable wages, the question of toddy tappers being allowed free access to palmyrah trees and letting the fishermen have access to tanks etc. are also to be taken up. In forest areas these are to be supplemented by taking up issues specific to those areas - problem of minor forest produce, of low rates and corruption in girijan corporation, low wages offered by forest contractors, etc. are to be taken up. But in the course of these struggles the non-tribal poor are not to be discriminated against. While concentrating on forest areas, 'Plains are not to be neglected. All the struggles are to be accompanied by political propaganda on the necessity of Armed Struggle.

Another proposal in the Immediate Programme was to boycott the Panchayat elections which were to be held in June 1969, and use the opportunity to propagate about the uselessness of Parliamen
tary system. The boycott was to expose corruption in Panchayats and offer a positive alternative by building village committees which would help solve the real problems of village people and their exploitation.

On the problem of defence of people from the attacks of landlords and police in the course of various struggles. Immediate Programme advised was the formation of "volunteer squads" consisting of all the youth in the villages. These squads using locally available weapons like sticks are to defend the people. As a slightly higher level "local squads" are to be formed to deal with situations requiring some training and skill in facing the enemy. The point emphasized about these defence activities was that they were to be actions of people themselves and not the work of a few hand picked party members. They must be mass actions and never be allowed to degenerate into elite, adventurist acts of a few people. The Immediate Programme kept silent on the controversy raised by Maithena incidents - about the self-defence problem of cadre as separate from the problem of peoples' defence. The problem was that even before people were mobilised, the cadre was being attacked by police and landlords etc. and how were they to defend themselves. No explicit answer was given on it.

The Immediate Programme also gave calls for extending
the movement to new areas; preparing for armed struggle; and converting the existing co-ordination committee type of organisation they were having into a party organisation with democratic centralism - and already this kind of organisational relations were established in several areas - particularly the forest regions.

I I

Organising for Struggle

The State Conference also held elections to AP
d Rashtra Committee. (also referred to in various documents
as provincial committee). T.N., D.V., C.P., Ramnarasayya,
Bathula Venkateshwar Rao, V. Ramlingachari (who had left the
company of Srikakulam maoists to join AP
d), Mandal Narayana
Susmy, A. Gopal Reddy and Nalla Narsimulu were elected unanimously.
The Committee was also given power to co-opt two more members.
It started by adding Vajravelu Chetty from Cuddapah who was
now made incharge of looking after the party publications.
(D. Krishnamurthy who belonged to the Garuda Bhadra village
and was a member of Srikakulam Committee had been looking after
this work previously but was arrested now.) They decided to have
a Centre with D.V. and T.N. to co-ordinate activities look after propaganda, develop all India contacts, and decide on theoretical issues. C.P. was deputed on his own request to be the on the spot leader of forest movement in Khammam district. The Centre also recruited several other members in plains area to send to the forests to develop the movement there. Several old party militants like Challapalli Srinivasa Rao, Sarpanch of village Koduru in Krishna Zilla, Sale Sundariah and Ravi Veera Venkiah and several other Telengana veterans, besides some young enthusiasts like Dr. Chenchuram Reddy from Warangal went to join the Khammam movement. The movement in East Godavari forests was joined by Ramalingachari, and several young student federation workers like Stalin Babu, Srinadri Subbareddy, Dr. Ankamma Choudhary and his wife Veena. One significant difference with the Srikakulam movement was that while recruits to the later were predominantly highly educated intellectuals or newly converted enthusiasts, most of the recruits to the APRCC had a long party history behind them.

The specificity of Telengana problem

The APRCC's problem in the Telengana region was different from the Srikakulam Committee's problem in regard to three different aspects. Firstly there were a vast range of dissimilarities in the
occupational structure, land distribution patterns and other economic problems. Secondly the strategy and tactics proposed in these two areas were different. Thirdly in Srikakulam, the Communists had a previous history of ten years during which they had led many mass struggles, developed trust and contacts among people and built a strong organisation. On the other hand, the Telengana Maoists started from scratch. They had neither contacts nor organisation. Fourthly while the Srikakulam Maoists had been relatively free of police harassment in the initial stages of building up the movement (during early 60's) because at that time they were working within the general legal framework even when they were crossing the bounds of law, they were still attending courts and as yet had not proclaimed their subversionary intent. On the other hand in Telengana the Maoists had started with their declaration of their aim of overthrowing the government and as such their activities were dealt by police with much more harshness, energy and determination than would have been the case if they were doing the same things with different or at least unknown objective. So because of these differences, the basic problematic within which the Telengana Maoists worked was different from that of Srikakulam. While the problem in front of Srikakulam was to maintain extend and find solution to an existing movement, the problem of Telengana Maoists was to create a movement while personally defending themselves from police and landlords. We have seen the answer given
to this in the Immediate Programme which was that of combining political propaganda with partial economic struggles depending upon peoples participation enthusiasm and initiative. While this answer covered the mobilisation aspect of the problem it made no reference to the problem of self-defence of the cadre, before mass mobilisation was achieved. The implication was that in the period the cadre was to depend on their wits for self-defence. They may play hide and seek with the police; constantly shifting their areas of operation, and probably even make temporary retreats from their place. This was the initial theoretical answer provided to the problem. We can now examine to what extent and in what manner and with what results the problem was tackled in the areas where AFRCC was active.

Roughly these areas can be divided into two regions -
(1) consisting of Khammam, Warangal and Karimnagar forest areas which took a particular attitude to the problem and the answer provided in the Immediate Programme (2) the Kondamodalu forest area in the East Godavari district (very much smaller than the former area) which took a different attitude.

In the movement in the Khammam, Warangal and Karimnagar forest areas we can see three phases which correspond to the three different answers given to the problem of simultaneous development of mass movement and defense of cadre. (None of the
three was the same as the answer in the Immediate Programme.

In the first phase squad actions independently and autonomously from mass participation was supposed to provide the answer for mass mobilisation, as well as present an organisational form (of armed squads) which would solve the problem of self-defence of the cadre. Squads would act on their own initiative setting up an example and precept which the masses were expected to follow and imitate. It was to be like the relation between teacher and student, between the Messiah and followers. This phase was a reflection of the leftward pressures and left deviations noted previously and resembled very closely the CPI(ML) line of total dependence on squad actions to the neglect of mass organisations, mass struggle etc. This phase hardly lasted for two months, before it was modified and moderated to some extent. In the second phase, squad organisations and squad actions were continued but were seen not as substituting or initiating mass movements and mass struggles but as working in alliance with and in protection of the mass struggles and mass movements. The relation between the squad and the masses could be compared to that of patron and protege or leader and led. The difference here is that while in a teacher student relation one was the active giver while the other was a passive imitator and follower, in the patron protege kind of relation, the latter also had to put in some active efforts and could expect help in gaining objectives not outright gifts. This
in this phase squads continued their role as protection of the cadre and also had an important role to play in the mobilisation of the masses by being their over-all protectors and guide. In the third phase there was further modification and moderation. The activity of squads here was limited to purely defensive actions. It was still a protector of the masses but only in the last instance and in a defensive way. The role of squad actions on mobilising masses was curtailed if not totally abandoned. This does not however mean that the role of squads in mobilising people ceased. What it means is that now the squads have taken on two roles one the role of defender of the cadre and punisher of police-agents, and on rare occasions, as a complement to the peoples defense of themselves and their gains from successfully conducted movements. In the second role the squads would function as propaganda units, which mobilised masses for partial-economic struggles etc. and gave them, political and revolutionary consciousness.

The First Phase: Left Deviation

The day following the State Conference D.V. met the leaders of the Khammam and Mulug area Committees, in which he gave them a moderate programme for mobilising the people on the issues of food problem, and wage increases for rolling beedi leaves. When the District level leaders raised the problem of finances
they were advised to conduct raids on rich persons in areas where the party had no mass base or support, and not in areas which the party was strong and enjoyed popular support. It was so advised because the ensuing repression by the police after the raids would alienate the party workers from the people nullifying all their earlier efforts. At the same meeting it was decided after discussions that to face the problem, the party should be reorganised on the basis of squads. This meant that the party members would no longer function or move about individually or alone. For the purpose of defence, they were organised into groups of 4-5 in each along with a commander, deputy commander and a political propagandist. This would enable them to jointly face the police and defend themselves when attacked.

The incidents in Pagideru where the party enjoyed popular support would give an example of how the squad acted. In this phase they fully succumbed to the left pressures. Initially they started with some efforts to mobilise masses on the problem of food scarcity and the demand of seizing landlords hoarded grains. The activities were given up as soon as they heard that the police were due to arrive in that area in a couple of days. On receipt of this information Bathula and several other local cadres pressed C.P. to grant permission for conducting raids
against landlords for arms before the police arrived. Though C.P. realised that such a decision would go against State Committee advice which was insistent that there should be no squad activities separate from mass activities he gave in to the pressure of the local cadre. (Later on he justified this decision saying that he did not want to disappoint the local cadre who were not only enthusiastic but also adamant. FCW e.g. several cadre like Manikya - a veteran of Telengana Armed struggle days were saying that unless they were given arms they could not trust the leadership's intentions. He felt that rigidity on his part might even have alienated the cadre and he also felt that the raids would also give the squad members, much needed experience.) As a result the Pagideru squad and others consisting nearly 20 members viz. C.P., Bathula, Radhakka, Mohan Rao, other local party workers raided the landlords and moneylenders houses in hamlets of Pagideru area from the 25 April 16 to 18, 1969. On the whole they had seized three shot-guns, one burmar, and some cash and articles. After the Pagideru incident up to May 1, 1969, fifteen raids on landlords and peoples' enemies like forest officials, money lenders, patels and patwars were conducted under Khammam Area Committee's leadership. Arms and ammunition were seized and property looted. In Kodavatancha area, Veeraman Appadu a well-known money lender was "annihilated". It was claimed by the party that Rs. one lakh
worth of promissory notes were seized and burnt.

Under the influence of the raids conducted by the Khamman area committee, the Kulug area committee under the leadership of Ramanarasayya, started to conduct raids in his area, on a competitive basis. It was also felt that it was not the moment to judge the pros and cons of starting the raids. As a result raids on moneylenders-cum-fisherman in Jagannadhapuram of Nugu Taluq and also Bode Boyina Bhimanna, a Sarpanch, and traditional tribal leader "but a collaborator with plainsmen from outside" were conducted on April 23, 1969. Promissory notes burnt and the party claimed to have seized cash of Rs. one lakh.

These raids were given a programmatic form when the three area committee leaders, (of Mulug and Khamman) i.e. C.P., Ramanarasayya and Bathula met at Katapuram on May 1, 1969. The discussions culminated in taking the most extreme decisions. It was stated that armed struggle had begun with the Pagidemu incident, and the following ten point programme was adopted:

"(1) Burn the records of patels and patanis and end their governing at the village level, (2) Distribute grains, live stock and agricultural implements of landlords among the people, (3) Land occupation of landlords, seizure of their property, drive them away from the villages and if necessary annihilate them. (4) Drive
forest officials from the forest areas (5) Refuse to repay loans and 'nagu' (usury in grain), (6) Occupy forest lands, (7) Refuse to pay loans given by instalment traders, (8) Take necessary actions on other enemies of the people, (9) Annihilation of police agents, (10) Raids on police stations and ambushing police. There was also an emphasis on collection of all kinds of arms, and along with the arms locally obtained it was decided to intensify arms collection either by buying them from the landlords or police or in the process of conducting raids.

With this, there was in practice, a total abandonment of building up of mass movements. The influence of Srikakulan movement could be seen from the fact that there were so many resemblances in both the programme, heavily loaded with guerilla type of actions, and even the acceptance of annihilation of landlords etc. (though with not the same theoretical importance as by CPI(ML)). Here annihilation was seen merely as sometimes inevitable event in the course of struggle, due to peoples feeling or tactical necessity). The raids were partially successful. The forest officials were forced to leave the interior forest villages. The "vetti" and collection of bribes by patels and patwaris fully stopped in these villages. There was a wage increase
in Kulug and Yellandu regions for folding beedi leaves after a strike by the workers.

However soon due to intensification of police activities it became difficult for the squads to even carry out raids on patels and patwaris etc. The police, according to the party sources, used every tactic to isolate the party and even threatened to burn the villages which had links with the communists; beat up party sympathisers in public; and carried out propaganda (along with the landlords) that C. Rajeswara Rao and Sundarayya were real communists while the maoists were dacoits. The landlords who were driven away returned, reassured of police protection. In places where party was weak many local men were recruited to homeguards with the lure of giving cash rewards for catching maoists.

In this situation the Khammam Area Committee suffered a loss which ultimately led them to rethink about the squad based raids without mass activities. This event at Gondigudem clearly exposed to the Maoist leadership their isolation from the masses and the resultant weakness. This village previously had been the scene of several indiscriminate raids by some members of the Khammam area squads who while taking shelter there (after having escaped from Pedideru where they lost all contacts with
people after their April 16th raids, due to intense police activity) had committed several hasty acts. Now when the Central Squad of Khammam Area consisting of C.P., Bathula and Radhakka besides nine others passed through this village on their way to Palawancha area they were attacked by a mob of local villagers who had been organised as homeguards by the government. In the ensuing fight C.P. and Radhakka and five others managed to escape with great difficulty. (After the 50 year old C.P. fought single handed against a group of stick yielding villagers. His courage and skill with sticks and the help of a colleague who managed to open fire with a sten-gun saved him.) But Bathula and two others were captured by the villagers and alleged to have been killed later by the police.

Inspite of these and other heavy losses the party was saved from total extinction due to two factors. Firstly, in 1969 the rainy season set in very early making it difficult for the police to comb the area and apprehend the left over members of the guerilla squads. Secondly the intensity of the Separate Telengana agitation at that time also prevented the Government from concentrating its attention here. These two favourable factors gave them an opportunity to rethink about their tactics, reorganise their squads and to re-establish their contacts with the people.

Soon after May 1, 1969 meeting the Hulug area committee reorganised their members on squad basis. Squads each with about
ten members were formed. One of these was led by Ramarsayya and was to function in the Katapuram area of Mulug Taluq, the second squad led by Bhaskar Reddy who was incharge of Gurrevula area in the Mulug Taluq, the third squad of Datla Venkata-Ram Raju and Panduranga Rao was to function in the Manthena area, and a fourth squad was to be active in Nugu Taluq of Khammam. All these were to function under the immediate supervision of Mulug area committee. During the beginning phase, their activities were almost undistinguishable from those of CPI(ML) in Srikakulam. Indeed they started by declaring that Armed struggle had started. Thus denying the Immediate Programme which said that the task was to organise, mobilise and prepare for armed struggle. But unlike Khammam Area Committee squads which lacked any mass base, the Mulug squads were acting in an area where they had been active in mass struggles for past ten years and had a good amount of mass support and sympathy.

They started their new activity with several raids for arms. At first they made a futile attempt to seize arms from a American hunter. This was just after the May 1st meeting. They followed this with a raid on village Sarvapuram where they managed to capture four burmarg.

After this they decided to finish off several well-known "local tyrants" who besides oppressing the people were also
active as police agents. Their first victim was Ahmed Khan. He was mistaken for his father Sheikh Mohammed, the Sarpanch of Kodai village, who was instrumental in disturbing many of their meetings in the previous period and also in handing over several party sympathisers to police. The Sarpanch of Gurrevula was annihilated on 27.5.1969. He was a moneylender turned into a big landlord, who had contacts with the Congress leaders. The maoists were against him for implicating many of their local sympathisers in cases and assisting the police by informing them regarding the maoists whereabouts and contacts. Many local people who had disputes about land against the Sarpanch had participated in the action led by the Squad of Bhasker Reddy. A week later Ramchandra Rao, another police informer was attacked (on June 3, 1969) and spared from death in view of his wife's and children's pleadings. The Central squad led by P. Ramanarasayya and Bhasker Reddy had also beaten to a pulp and killed Lakshmi Narasu, who was a close friend of P. Ramanarasayya, for having betrayed them. Immediately after this the Sarpanch of Peddapuram was attacked, and the records of Panchayati office was set fire to. A month later Raghunadha Rao, a big money-lender and police informer was killed by Ramanarasayya, Bhaskar Reddy and their squad. The maoists alleged that the victim had himself killed some tribals who had disputed his claims to certain lands which were their ancestral property. On the same day they attacked and killed
Subhan Sait, a local Congress leader and a big moneylender of the area. He was also a landlord of Pasara village and was reputed for 'owning' forty tribal families, as his slave labour.

These killings were followed by several raids on money lenders and contractors in which they burnt away the loan deeds and also warned the contractors to treat their labour justly. In the raid of 20th May on village Salipaka, they captured the local money-lenders who were small cloth merchants from Nellore, held a peoples court and left them after burning promissory notes worth Rs.20,000 and threatening them not to continue their usury. Three days later they burnt 70,000 rupees worth of promissory notes in a raid on Narlapuram. With these raids they claimed that the area was rid of all 'Nellore Bogams' who were fleecing the people.

Another target of their raids were police. They thrashed several local police patels and village chowkidars. They attacked several members of village defence voluntary squads on 14.9.1969, at Dharamaraopet and beat them up. These were being trained by Government to catch Maoists. Police patrols were fired upon in several instances. They also killed two police patels — Ayamkhan and another at Govindraopet. Several forest guards and officers were attacked and threatened with dire consequences unless they stopped harassing and asking for bribes from the tribals.

These incidents reached the highest stage in their raid in
Perur Police Station which was situated in the forest area. It had been built during the British times and was surrounded with a big compound wall. They planned to attack the police station from two sides, and take the policemen by surprise. The first group which approached could not even surprise the sentry, and failing to silence him started shooting wildly. The policemen shut themselves up and returned fire. The squads retreated hastily, and disorderly and only casualties on their side were suffered by one who fell in a ditch to dislocate his knee cap and another who had minor flesh wound from thorny bushes.

On the other hand a forest contractor who was visiting the police station to decide his terms with the station house officer, after having offered Rs.15,000 in the morning to the Maoist squads was caught in the wild cross fire and died instantly. The Maoists confidence in their ability to carry out attacks on police stations suffered badly and they desisted from any more attempts. The Station Officer also received a public dressing down next morning by his superior for his 'cowardly behaviour'. After this incident the Maoists left police stations alone.

The Maoists under Mulug area committee claimed to have made several gains by their programme of conducting raids etc. viz. (a) completely removing the influence of CPI and CPI(M) elements in the area, (b) secondly gaining support of the rich peasants and small landlords who even gave donations to the Maoists;
(c) thirdly stopping the landlords from seeking police help in order to "hunt" them. (d) finally it also claimed that "by effectively using united front tactics it could collect Rs.40,000 besides food supplies". The money was used for buying arms, medicines and also maintaining the squads and their families. The squad could collect Rs.20,000 in one stroke when Kamal Mohan Rao, a landlord cum beedi leaf contractor, Srinivasa Rao his partner and Panchayat Samiti President of Mahadevpur Block in Karimnagar district, Tulja Singh a timber merchant and other beedi contractors were held as hostages in the village Bayyakpet in Parkal Taluq. Their arms were seized and a payment of Rs.50,000 was demanded with in 48 hours for their safe return. They were released after a down payment of 20,000 rupees were given lengthy discourses and Maoist thought and made to promise that they would hereafter stop oppressing people. They also promised to pay rest of the ransom to T.N. or D.V. (This however was never realised).

On November 7, 1969 the whole area comprising Mahabubabad, Narsampet and Mulug taluqs were declared as disturbed areas and police reinforcements sent in. The Maoists suffered many losses. Twentytwo of their squad members were arrested by police in three encounters, and their contacts with the outside areas broken. After an attack on the party centre in Mulug area in
which police seized 15,000 rupees and all important papers and
documents, and in which Ramnarsayya and several other top leaders
escaped just by the breadth of hair, the squad activities princi-
cally seized and the maoists had to retreat away from the Mulug
area into interior forest regions.

Thus the first phase - of total dependence on squad action
irrespective of mass participation lasted actively from May to
November (and passively from November 1969 to July 1970), in
the area, under Mulug Committee. In the Khammam area however
this was replaced a slightly moderated programme between
June 1969 and July 1970. This second phase is absent from the
activities of Mulug squads. They directly moved off to the
third phase by July 1970.

The second phase: Disorganisation and disunity

The squads of Khammam Area Committee met in June 1969 and
decided upon six slogans with which the people were to be approa-
ched and mobilised. These were cut the forests contiguous to
forest areas and cultivate the land, occupy banjar lands; fight
forest contractors for higher wages; increase the wages
of agricultural labour; permit the free use of minor forest
produce. They also decided that the squad activities must take
note of the level of peoples consciousness. The squad activities
and economic struggles were to be accompanied by intense propaganda
on carrying out the peoples war path. They also decided to drive away from the forest areas all minor Government officials and revenue functionaries like patels and patwaris to make the life of tribals easier.

This programme (as given in June) was success fully implemented in many areas. In the Manukota and Yellandu taluq border area i.e. in the Barajipeta area there were thousands (10,000 acres according to party estimate) of acres of arable banjar land in a semi-forest area. Many people due to party's propaganda, had come forward to occupy the land. Three hundred acres of forest trees had been felled and seventy acres were cultivated. Inspite of arrests and threats the land occupation continued. The Government auctioned the area as a retaliatory measure, so that "atleast the wood may be used as fuel". The police concentration became intense, and all the squads members therefore could not concentrate in one area and work. The people were also mobilised not to pay for the use of banjar land for pastures which used to be regularly auctioned by the landlord Jana Reddy who claimed to be the owner of it. Meanwhile a contractor had bought the land which had to be cancelled, after the party had warned him. In this area people now came forward to use the land for the cattle to graze freely.

The programme of occupation of banjar lands was carried out even in Narasampet taluq at Gopalapuram village and also in Yellandu
taluk at Vantagudise village. In the latter people of the surrounding four to five villages also came forward and occupied the land. All these lands were immediately brought under cultivation. The Chowkidar who, opposed the people and got about fifty peasants arrested was beaten up by the squad. This had an impact on the surrounding villages. As in Manukota taluq, even in Yellandu and Narasampet taluq the programme of slashing the forests and cultivation was going on. Here the people were mobilised to use even the minor forest produce without fear.

The programme for increase in wages of the forest labour from the forest contractors was effectively implemented in Kunigiri area of Narasampet taluq. Here the forest contractors had increased the wage to Rs. 1/- for felling one tree from 75 paise. For a lot of fuel wood, wages had been increased from Rs.2.50 to Rs.3/-. The contractors according to the report were willing to be reasonable. The party had decided to further intensify their programmes on increase in wage rates from October 1969 onwards.

In Rayaram area, the demand of agricultural labours for increase in wages were acceded to in many villages. For one acre of land, the rice which was given as wages increased from 4-5½ measures to 6 full measures.

The records of the patels and patwaris were also burnt. Many of them were so beaten up that they left the forest areas
and had gone to neighbouring towns or were living in the police
camps for protection. Many patwaris and patels' houses were
raided and the documents pertaining to land ownership were burnt.
The forest Choukidars were also beaten up in many areas thus
stopping their harassment of tribals. The landlords in the
forest areas were also forced to come to a compromise.

By July the agricultural work was over. The agricultural
labourers and the tribals had faced the question of food scarcity.
There was one successful raid on the landlord in Satyanarayananapuram
village. About seventy people had participated. Earlier the
people could just listen but with this raid they began to move.
The landlord was a rabid anti-communist a usurer and immigrant
from Krishna district. Thirty bags of grains were seized and
Rs.40,000 worth promissory notes were burnt. Since the squad
had underestimated the amount of grains he had, there were not
enough men to carry away all of the grains. This raid was not
opposed even by the rich peasants.

The squad mobilised the people on the food issue and cited
the above raid as an example. This gave a lot of confidence
to the people, whose faith in the squads power also increased.
They had no longer doubted that the squads would leave them. Though
many people were willing to move on the issue of food there were
not many big landlords in the forests nor were there many hoarded
grains due to the famine the earlier year; therefore the opportunities
for seizure of hoarded grains were less. Most of the landlords in the forest areas compromised and paid levys to party, which were distributed among the people. The big landlords in villages bordering forest had police camps in their villages pre-empting both squad attacks and peoples movement on hoarded grain issue.

With these activities the movement which had its original areas of influence only in Yellandu and Mulug spread out to Bhoorgampadu in Khammam district, Narsannapet in Warangal and Hanukota taluq in Karimnagar district. The point to be noted here is that popularity was based on their squad actions, for e.g. beating up of corrupt 'patwaris', 'tyrannous chowkidars' and threatening forest contractors to increase wages.

In spite of these successes the Maoist movement was working under severe constraints. Firstly the general poverty and famine conditions made it difficult for them to get any financial help or food supplies from the local people. Still they managed to collect about Rs.22,000 in the first part of the year which was hardly sufficient for their needs of arms, ammunition (both of which had to be bought in black market) food, printing costs, contribution to party centre etc.

However a much more serious problem was that of increasing police activities. Police were setting up camps in all areas where
maoists activity was suspected. There were police camps at Gundala, Markodu, Avulapalli, Bayyaram, Kothakota. Besides the police camps there were regular Police Stations at Hanukonda, Narasempet, Yellandu, Kothagudem, Garla and Dornakhal. They were effectively functioning. Inspite of rains, and immobility due to roads being blocked and even jeeps not being able to go into the forests the Police moved in batches of 10-15 on the main roads and even entered the interior forest villages.

Most of the landlords had police camps in their homes. For e.g. the landlord Ramachandra Rao of Gundala (Kodavatanch area) who was leading Congressman of the area, had a police camp in his backyard. The torture and harassment of relatives of squad members, or anybody suspected to have even a remotest contact with the squad members was a common matter. There were several such instances, which forced these known sympathisers to leave their villages and join squads.

The Bayyaram area was also facing intense police activity. The Khammam area committee member Venkatramiah's family was harassed, his wife assaulted and his sons and servant beaten up forcing them to leave the village. In general the police harassment was limited to the squad members and their acquaintances.

It was not aimed at the general masses of people, who were participating in economic struggles, strikes etc. There were efforts
to employ CIDds in the villages to get information about maoists' camps at border areas made it difficult for the party to get its supplies of food etc. from outside.

The party at this time decided to continue up to September 15, 1969 the programme of mobilising people on the food and hoarded grains issue, and in November when the forest work would start they can organise on the wages issue and in December during harvest season agitate for higher wages to agricultural labour.

The party also felt it was necessary for the squads to be more careful while travelling. They were asked to abandon walking on roads and take to mule paths through the middle of the forests. At least this would avoid the squads in coming face to face directly with the police patrol. They had decided to look up for alternative supply routes and also take up dumping programme. It was decided that there should be a fixed, non-moving centre for the Area Committee to smoothen co-ordination work.

Since the movement had spread to wide areas, the squads could not cover the whole area. Therefore the party decided to give importance "to consolidation and not extension of the movement", and strengthen the party organisation at the village level by starting volunteer squads and village Committees or
at least groups of militants and sympathisers. However, the party was now faced with a dilemma on how it was to face the police. Though in its ten point programme given in May 1969, and in its June 1969 programme it had suggested that the police should be ambushed and attacked, it had so far not conducted a single raid on the police. The squad raids conducted earlier were on landlords, forest officials, patels and patwaris. The police were being avoided all the time. Since police were moving about freely on the roads, the question faced by the party was if it should ambush the police or postpone the programme. The crux of the problem as posed by the Maoists was - Police were intensifying their activities and people were not at the level of being willing to defend with arms, the movement and the Maoists from Police. People were willing to move only on economic demands and not for political struggles. Yet if the Maoists took to retreat and hiding, people may lose their confidence and trust and drop out even from economic struggles. So the solution they proposed was experimental attacks on the police to see the consequences and decide upon future programme.

Even organisationally the party felt the need for strengthening itself against repression which could be inevitable from October 1969 onwards and severe from February to June during the summer times. Due to police repression nearly twenty members had left the party. Most of them were those who
had joined when the movement was in the phase of carrying out raids with little or no political propaganda. But among those who had joined the movement in the earlier phase when the party was being reorganised on the basis of squad organisation except for one or two persons all the rest had continued. About twenty-five new recruits had joined the squads recently. On the whole there were 50-52 people working in six squads.

The squad members were given a four-day training in using weapons etc. Since the pressure of work was a lot, regular political classes were not possible for the squads. It was decided however to have a three day rest period once in every ten days to educate the squad members. Here the party lacked in members who could run political classes independently. Notes had been circulated on various subjects along with some literature.

During this phase the movement in plains also became subject to disorganisation. Their movement in plains areas hardly got off the ground, except in Jangaon taluq of Warangal, Nalgonda, Kurnool and Anantapur districts. In Jangaon the movement for food grains, and increased wages continued even after the State Conference in April. These were complemented by several localised struggles for restoration of alienated lands. In Nalgonda district Alugupalli Narsimha Reddy and Sankara Lakshmi Narasayya organised
several struggles for occupation of alienated lands and eviction of landlords from village commons, Government fallout etc. and also conducted several raids on money-lenders and traders. In each of these raids more than hundred persons participated, but they were not natives of the village in which the raids were conducted but were Maoist sympathisers collected from several neighbouring villages. However they enjoyed quite a bit of local support and the victims of their raids were hesitant initially, even to complain against them to the police. Sankara Lokahminarayana was a terror in his area, and he used to tour the villages brandishing a revolver and threatening local money-lenders and landlords. Local people were so scared of him that nobody came forward either to be a witness against him or register a case against him. The police were forced to book cases Suo Motu. However, the situation changed as soon as two special police camps were set up in the area, and they started patrolling the villages, and soon rounded up most of the local cadre sympathetic to the APRCC. The same was the case with Anantapur - T.N.'s home district. Here the APRCC quickly succeeded in making people occupy several disputed lands in the garladinne area and under the Tungabhadra river canal. But the movement fizzled out with the entry of police. In Kurnool also they had some response. In Nandyal, Koyulakuntla and Nandikokkur taluqs about one thousand acres of banjar land was forcibly occupied
by people led by APRCC. In one village even barricades were set up to prevent police from entering. But even here the movement fizzled out by July and large police camps were set up. Another plains area in which APRCC got some response was in West Godavari district where some lands belonging to an agricultural co-operative were forcibly occupied by the local peasant leader under the maoist influence. In all other plains districts the APRCC activity was limited to organising meetings and distributing, party literature. However they met with some response in Polavaram taluq, where a district Girijan Sangham was formed by Nekkalapudi Rama Rao - formerly West Godavari District Secretary of CPI(M) and struggles were led for abolition of Muttadari system. In the Nallamalai forest region several tribals led by Neelam Ramchandrayya a former communist legislator occupied reserve forest lands and started tilling them. In the forest region of Visakhapatnam district also Ramalingachari made some efforts which met with a little success in the forests near Sileru project and were on the whole abortive.

A significant fact to be noted here is that the left deviation was visible even in these plains area activities for e.g. The Kurnool Zilla Committee passed a resolution in December 1969 in which they recommended formation of squads, leaving of the plains areas temporarily to take shelter in the nearby Nallamalai hills. Similarly the Nalgonda Zilla Committee also
passed a resolution in July 1969 which recommended seizing of guns from landlords, and sent a provincial committee member to survey the terrain of nearly Amaravati hills with a view of forming squads and conducting armed activity from that base. Even the Guntur District Committee where there was hardly any movement requested the provincial committee to grant permission for conducting a raid in the town with a view of gathering money. All these resolutions show—(a) the willingness of party cadre to conduct armed struggle which was not connected to peoples demands or concerned with their participation. (b) Probably it also shows the dilemmas of the party which was neither able to proceed beyond the occupation of banjar lands nor even defend the occupied banjar lands against police.

By November 1969 the movement in Khammam, Caramgal and Karimnagar forest area came to a dead end for various reasons. These are (a) as noted earlier inspite of some gains in Khammam area they suffered severe losses in the Kulug area which had been their initial base. They were also thrown out from the Pagidem and Palawancha areas which had been their initial strongholds in Khammam. Because of these set backs several cadre left the movement and went back to their homes. These losses were compounded by personal differences and misunderstanding among the forest squads which became so serious that there was no single contact
between the squads of Khammam area with those of Halug area, between May 1969 and April 1970. The Halug Committee went so far as to write a letter to the Rashtra Committee in which it characterised C.P. as "degenerate betrayer" and narrated several alleged incidents which substantiated their charges on C.P. as being (i) arrogant; (ii) bureaucratic; (iii) anti-Chinese; (iv) factional and authoritarian; (v) immoral. The movements losses also led to severe criticisms by Rashtra Committee leadership which was quite unhappy with the local leadership's squad based activity (which were quite contrary to the understanding in the immediate programme). The State Secretary wrote a letter to C.P. castigating his activities as adventurist and irresponsible and demanded to know in what way his activities were different from those of CPI(ML) in Srikakulam. The movement further suffered from total organisational disruption when almost the entire Central Committee members were arrested in Madras, as a result of the information given out by one of the Central Committee members who was in fact a Police C.I.D. Their movement in East Godavari district had also suffered a total defeat following arrests of its leaders. The only positive factor (for APRCC) at the end of second phase was that the core of their forest area leadership and their squads were not only surviving but also had developed some influence among the tribals particularly in the Yellandu area.
Third phases: Moderation and reorganisation
(1970 July - 1975 June)

In these circumstances the squads under Khammam area Committee and Luluk area committee held a joint meeting at Katanagar in July 1970. Here they reviewed the situation and criticised themselves for their rash actions in the period April 1969 and April 1970. They decided that conducting raids on money-lenders, traders, landlords etc. for arms or money or to enthuse people was not only futile but also harmful. They declared that inspite of having formed themselves into squads the main task in front of them was not conducting armed struggle or armed actions but of mobilising and organising people. They declared their four basic tasks to be (a) propagating revolutionary politics, (b) mobilising people on immediate demands, (c) necessary action on agents of enemy and (d) self-defence against police. The Katanagar meet also contributed a good deal towards reorganising the party which had almost been demolished by the police in the December 1969, swoop. The meeting formed a regional committee to co-ordinate the activities of all squads, established a party centre to direct the movement throughout the State and made plans for publishing a paper and organising Committees in various districts.

This period saw the APRCP stabilising and extending its hold in the Godavari's forest region. Using the Yellandu Taluq
where they established some kind of hold during the second phase they slowly spread out to Bhoorgampadu taluq in Khammam (from where they had been thrown back during the first phase) and to some extent to the forest region of Kothagudem taluq, the Nugur taluq (both in Khammam), the Narsampet taluq (in Uarangal), the Poovaram taluq, Bhadrachalam taluq and the Rampachodavaram taluq (all on the Andhra side of Godavari, in Godavari taluq). They also managed to regain some hold in the Mulug and Manthena forest regions.

The modus operandi of APRCC completely changed during the third phase. Their squad completely gave up raids on money-lenders etc. Now they concentrated on propaganda for mobilising people. The squads were now asked by the party leadership to tour villages, conduct meetings, and after properly investigating the conditions in the village explain to the people, how their local problems were connected to national and international issues, and ask them to resist various local evils like vetti, negu, low wages etc. After gaining some sympathisers in the village they were to run night schools, conduct cultural shows, hold study circles and organise Praja Sangham (a mass organisation of villagers), and use these to propagate their views and exhort people to resist and rebel. As and when people were getting ready to participate in struggles against landlords and others,
militants groups and volunteer squads were to be organised. These would have traditional weapons and act as the front line of people whenever they went to seize landlords' crops or had to face attacks from landlords men or even police. They were also to be in charge of punishing police agents in villages. From these groups and squads, the more mature and committed are to be taken as party members and formed into party committees. Every effort was to be made to concentrate on a cluster of villages which should be turned into "Party Centres", with village committees which would function as local self-governing bodies, replacing the regular government institutions. These committees would look after various problems in the village like redistribution of lands, defence of village and so on. In such a situation liberated zones can be formed where the red army would be developed to aid in liberation of other areas.

While such was the theoretically advocated model for the functioning of APRCC in forest regions the practice seems to have been somewhat different. This difference can be seen in the functioning of their squads. While theoretically they were assigned only two distinct tasks — (a) to act as propaganda units (b) to provide defence for party members, in reality they took over a third task — that of acting as the 'Big Brother' or 'guardian angel' of the local tribals. It is this role of squads, that seems to have become the cornerstone on which APRCC movement was built in the forest region. In many instances the squads
effectively intervened to get the tribals' demands fulfilled. For e.g. they threatened money-lenders to lower rates of interest; they scared some landlords into vacating lands taken away from tribals on various occasions for various reasons; they thrashed forest guards to prevent their taking bribes or reporting to police or higher ups regarding reserve forest lands illegally occupied by the tribals; they pressurised various contractors to raise wages, and so on. This is however not to say that propaganda and mobilisation of masses and development of peoples initiative and participation were absent or given up. But only to emphasize the point that independent actions of APRCC squads was entwined with the whole process, some times substituting for peoples participation, some times initiating peoples participation and most of the time giving confidence and enthusiasm to people. However squad activities of the first two phases - raids on the houses of money lenders etc. and direct confrontation with police parties and even attacks on police stations were definitely given up in this period.

This phase saw APRCC giving comparatively much more importance to propaganda. Though there were not many public meetings in villages, due to police pressure squads constantly met groups of villagers to politicise them. Political classes were held in several areas for the more sympathetic and militant local people. And these were capped by a massive public meeting.
in Palvancha forest area which was attended by 15,000 people. They also held a campaign to boycott elections, and claimed that it was total success in interior forest areas and partial success in some regions bordering forest.

The activity of restoring alienated lands to the original owners was continued by APRCC during this period. But these activities were visible mostly not in their original strongholds of Hulug and Yellandu but in the newly extended areas – Narsampet, Palvancha, Yellavaram etc. One reason for this might be that they might have already exhausted the potentialities of mobilising people on this issue in those areas. In these new areas they succeeded in rousing peoples wrath against big landlords who were occupying large tracts of common or disputed lands. The APRCC also succeeded in mobilising people to recover or occupy some mortgaged lands, forest Patta lands etc. The common factor in all these cases seems to have been lack of legitimacy in the case of occupier. Most of these lands were under dispute or as in the cases of mortgaged lands, not really accepted by the people as belonging to landlords.

Another target of APRCC was the Government wastes, fallows, village commons, and reserved forest lands. They utilised the land hunger of tribals who pushed away from the fertile lands by the wily plainsmen and restricted from pursuing shifting
cultivation by Government laws, were extremely willing to
listen to any programme which promised land to them. They
started in early 1970 a programme of cutting reserve
forests to use for tilling purposes. In the beginning the
tribals seemed to have been quite hesitant, they cut a few trees
here and there and waited to see what would happen. The APRCC
squad beat up a few forest guards preventing any complaints
from being lodged against the few tribals who had cut the
trees. The Government also seemed to be somewhat lax about
the whole affair - they were at this time fully engaged in
coming elections and did not relish much the idea of cracking
down on tribals. In some places even the congress ministers
who toured the area seem to have promised the local tribals that
some forest lands would be given to them; slowly emboldened
in 1971 the tribals seemed to have cut forests in many areas.
Soon the movement caught up in the spontaneous initiative of
the tribals, and by 1974 the APRCC claimed the five lakh acres
were occupied and tilled under its programme during 1969-1974.

The APRCC also mobilised people on various issues like -
right of tribals to collect minor forest produce, illegal exac-
tions of forest guards, abnormally high interest rates, forced
labour, corruption of Revenue and village police officials, etc.
On these issues they seemed to have achieved total success in
many areas. They were able to force down interest rates (from
100 per cent to 25 per cent in several areas), see that local revenue official do not collect excess and the forest guard does not harass or prevent tribals from utilising minor forest produces. This they seem to have achieved by the simple expedient of uniting people thus raising their bargaining capacity and by simply thrashing up a forest guard or a small money lender here and there.

The APRCP also conducted several wage struggles both of agricultural labour and farm servants and forest labour. Most spectacular of these was against Birla Bamboo coupes in Palwancha area. Nearly 25,000 men participated in it and it lasted for three months. The Birlas had other sources of bamboo for their Sirpur paper mills and could afford to hold out. The strike was a total failure as far as its demands went but it gave an excellent opportunity for APRCP to conduct propaganda gain sympathy and enroll new sympathisers. They also conducted strikes among forest labour of Rajahmundry paper mills among road construction labour bamboo coupes, wood coupes etc. In Chodavaram taluq forests as well as in Yelleru and Narsampet taluqs. They organised farm labour and agricultural labour throughout the forest areas and succeeded in raising their wages. The squads of APRCP actively assisted these squads not only in organising and mobilising but also in some cases in helping, prevention of outside labour from coming to replace the strikers.
They also succeeded in preventing the corrupt practice of labour supervisors who were cheating in weighing the bamboo cut by labour (wages were paid according to the weight of bamboo cut) and refusing to give them proper wages or attendance if not given bribes. Some threats and a few beating up incidents stopped these activities.

These activities in the forest area during this phase were quite different from the previous phase. Firstly the demands were relatively modest. They now did not ask for total abrogation of loans but only for reasonable rates. The main reason for this seems to have been the realisation that the money lender was an essential element in tribal life, so long as there was no alternate source of credit. Theoretically the justification was that these money-lender-cum-trades, most of whom operated on quite small scale were potential allies in the united front against Imperialism and Feudalism. After having burnt their hands in the tuniki ahu (beedi leaf) affair and the Birla Coupe strike they seem to have moderated their wage demands also. The Government had fixed six paise as the rate for collection of hundred beedi leaves. The contractors were giving only three paise. Until 1969. After APRCP entrance into the field the wages rose to six paise in 1971. In 1972 they raised the demand that the rate should become six paise for fifty leaves. The contractors who could not resist APRCP
pressure acceded but started bidding very low to the Government. So the Government stopped giving the work to contractors and directly took it up and tried to enforce the lower wage. After lot of resistance the tribals acceded and in the process APRCP lost heavily in finances which it was getting as contributions from the contractors. They then moderated their demands and the next year the contractors came back again and old arrangement resumed - fair wages, contributions to APRCP and relatively low biddings by contractors, so that they can retain their profit margin. A significant aspect of their activities in all the three phases was that at no stage could they or did they occupy the so called "self cultivated lands" of the landlords, inspite of the repeated theoretical assertions of all their documents that armed struggle could really start only when such lands were occupied by the masses who would be willing to defend themselves and hold the possession of their occupied lands. The reason advanced for this by the APRCP was that in the tribal areas where they were really strong there were no big landlords possessing large tracts of lands, and in the border areas where there were big landlords the movement was not yet strong enough. In this situation the APRCP seemed to have settled into a semi-friendly relation with the local rich peasants in tribal areas, and in return for fair behaviour to people and regular contributions to party they would not be molested. The party seemed to have been collecting
levies from several landlords in the border areas also, as well as from forest contractors.

Another problem which the APRCP seemed to have solved with some amount of success, was that of self preservation from police attacks. They gave up the previous tactics of almost suicidal attacks on police. Such offensive activities were not only leading to increase police pressure but was also disrupting their movement by scaring common people who in many cases became the victims of police reprisals, and when people faced such reprisals before their loyalty and commitment to APRCP had been strengthened, the natural result was their alienation from the APRCP which would be identified as the cause of their plight. The new tactic of APRCP had two dimensions. The first was to take severe action on anybody who was supplying police information about their activities and the second was to avoid confrontations with police.

The reasons for their survival in spite of intensive police activities are two. One is that their 'big brother' role is found useful and appreciated by local people who now find a countervailing force to balance the power of landlords and money-lenders. So they are willing to help the APRCP squads in many ways - providing shelter, giving food and information about police and on the hand deny co-operation to police. The second
reason is that these squads have built a reputation for swift retribution on any police agent and informer. Short of mounting mass military operations, (which also has been done periodically) the police have to depend on information from local people to capture the squads and when such information is not forthcoming either due to sympathy for the Maoists or due to the terror created by them, the situation becomes very difficult for police. APRCP distinguished between class enemies and police agents, while former were to be dealt through mass mobilisation and class struggle the latter could be summarily dealt with by squads. Theoretically they advocated involving as many people as possible in the punishment of police informers. These are to be "watched, warned, bought to open trial and told to live in public with village". The punishment is to be matched to the crime of the informer. For e.g. to the loss caused by him, whether it is the first time or a regular offense. For first time offenders the punishment prescribed is open insult in the village centre or a march to his house by the villagers who heap abuse on him publicly, these may be supplemented by public humiliations like spitting on him and beating him with slippers. APRCP claimed that in one zone of their activity, the people caught fifteen informers in a period of one year and punished as prescribed. A form of punishment much praised by APRCP is seizing of crops and property of the offender,
faced with such penalties they reason that those people's inclination to supply information to the police would be minimised.

All these punishments are to be meted out by local people or volunteer squads. While such may be the case in a few areas when APRCP is very strong, the general pattern seems to be that squads directly and swiftly punish police informers. There are many cases in which whenever the squads have to face a loss as a result of information given to police they quickly retaliated by killing the informer. A typical case is that of Gopamun alias Timupathiah, a squad member who was invited by the landlords of Kommigudem and killed in December 1970. The squads hunted down the landlords nearly for a year before they took vengeance on them. In 1973, six such murders took place. In 1974 there were eight such murders including those of three village Sarpanches. In 1975 three incidents of this type have come to be known. The last one being on September 30, 1975. The party also made it quite unpragmatic and unprofitable for the local landlords and forest contractors to cooperate with police. For e.g. they burnt a forest contractor's property worth Rs.50,000 in January 1974, and as late as December 1975 they burnt Rs.30,000 worth property of a liquor contractor in Dharmapuram.

During this phase the APRCP squads tried to avoid any confrontation with police. Inspite of this hundred clashes with police took place in Farangal and fifty in Khammam upto
April 1974. In these fifty Maoists and four policemen had died. One significant point here is that only eight of these fifty had died between 1971 and 1974, i.e. after they had taken up their defensive tactics. The Maoists felt that their losses were a result of various technical defects viz. lack of training and discipline, carrying of huge weights which made it difficult to move fast or shoot fast, carelessness in sentrying, not shooting first when faced with the police etc. Once these were corrected they could avoid losses. They advised the people to defend themselves and their movement from police repression by showing unity and organisational strength. If police arrested anybody, people were to go in procession demanding release of the person. Though this may not "secure release of the comrade it would at least force the police into producing the person in court and prevent their being kept in police lockers where they would be tortured."

The manner in which police dealt with the problem of APRCP's activities differed from place to place and time to time. They were determined by the APRCP's tactics as well as external political constraints like the Separatist agitations, and elections. In general they seem to have maintained a low key in dealing with the APRCP during the third phase of their activities. They perceived the nature of Maoist tactics in this phase. The Chief Minister declared in the Assembly that
"the Extremists (these were to be differentiated from the naxalite, which was the official term used to describe the CPI(ML) group) were concentrating on gathering funds, conducting propaganda and killing or threatening police agents".

In these circumstances the Government adopted a three-fold tactic: (a) try to capture the Maoists depending on information and police patrolling and raids; (b) try to win over the people or at least keep them from going over totally into the Maoist camp; (c) prevent outbreak of Maoist activities and restore people's confidence by the constant presence of police. For this reason they set up police camps in all areas where the Maoists were suspected to be active or becoming active. For e.g. as soon as the APRCP squads entered East Godavari the police set up camps in various areas like Chodavaram, Maredummalli and Kondasodalulu so that instead of depending on reinforcements from outside they could immediately take action.

The successes of the police were limited in regard to the first objective because of the reasons already noted, and in the second objective also their success seems to have been only a limited one because of two reasons. (a) Though they provided some welfare services to the tribals and even freely distributed food, clothing, blankets, sheep, fowls etc., they could not solve the fundamental problems of the tribals viz.
their deficit economy and their dependent relation on landlords
money-lenders etc. (b) The police officers in general tried to
prevent the police from becoming unpopular with the people by
seeing that they behave fairly and decently with the people.
For e.g. when some local policemen tried to take sheep etc.
from the people at ridiculously low rates by threatening them,
the officers intruded and saw that fair prices were given,
when certain allegations of rape etc. were made on policemen they
were transferred from that place. Inspite of these, tensions
between police and people continued. Because of the basic
reason that the police wanted information which many of the
villagers were not willing to give and this resulted in
several allegations of beatings, taking bribes and tortures
against the police. Such allegations were voiced even in the
Assembly by a Congress member from Khammam viz. Chepuri Kasiah.
An incident which illustrates this tension took place in Gurjala
mote village of Khammam. In this village unprovoked and indis-
criminate firing of police killed a ten year old girl and the
villagers beat up policemen and went even to attack police camp.
Apologies of higher officials saved the situation.

Because the low key operations failed to eradicate
APRCP or even to inflict serious blows on them, the Government
took recourse to mounting operations almost on military scale.
Two such operations are definitely known. The first was in the summer of 1971 following the consolidation of Maoists and their massive programme of occupying reserve forests. Freed from the political constraints after the 1971 mid-term elections, the Government nearly set up 100 police camps with 15,000 policemen in the Khammam, Warangal forest area. Each camp was set up with gaps of two to eight miles in the all the areas of APRCP activity. All roads were carefully watched and all the major water sources of the forest area guarded. Section 144 was declared in the whole of forest area and partial curfew imposed preventing the villagers from leaving their houses between 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. Watch was kept on all shops and traders in the area, and villagers were banned from taking food or water into the forests. With these measures they expected to flush out their squads from their hideouts. Efforts were also made to utilise the services of the officials of forest department, malaria department and teachers to get information about the APRCP squads. These measures were supplemented by many welfare schemes. Loans ranging from Re. 500 to Rs. 1000 were given to some tribals, oil engines were distributed in some villages, agricultural implements were freely donated in yet some more villages, high breed chicken, sheep, milch animals, dry fish, milkpowder, clothes, slippers etc. were also distributed. Inspite of all this the success of the 1971 summer offensive seems to have
There were between 30 - 40 encounters in which about three guerrillas were killed and seven others were arrested and in retaliation the guerrillas killed four police agents.

Though the welfare activities ameliorated the tribals condition and gave him some relief they did not take full effect because of three reasons. Firstly they were neither consistent nor of a scale by which all tribals can be pleased and their problems solved. Secondly they were to some extent nullified by the tension created by the police activities. Thirdly they were offset to some extent by the effectiveness of the maoist propaganda that it was only because of them that the Government was being generous and once they were removed from the scene the tribals would be neglected and left to the exploitation of money-lenders etc. as before. An unauthenciated reason put forward by several people for the ability of the APRCP squads to get away from the Governments combing operations was that the more important leaders and squad members had simply left the area and retreated into the jungles of Madhya Pradesh or on the Andhra side of the Godavari forest, or simply took shelter in distant plains area like Hyderabad and Guntur city to come back again once the onset of monsoons made continuation of police activities on large scale impossible. All said and done the 1971 Government offensive's gains were limited and ephemeral. The
second large scale offensive of the Government started in 1974 summer and seems to be continuing even today (May 1976). In 1974 the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh said that he would revive the Nanjappa plan. Thirty platoons of Central Reserve Police which had been brought into curb the separatist agitation were now sent to the forest areas. But they also seem to have met with the same results as the 1971 offensive and for the same reasons. In 1974 summer 25 encounters took place in which only 3 guerrillas were killed, and several important squad leaders like Pullanna were arrested. The biggest success of Police in 1974 summer seems to have been the capture of APRCP's workshop in Allapalli hills in Khamman. Here they captured a press, several typewriters, tape recorders, maps, literature, ammunition, gun making implements etc. In 1975, and 1976 also the police seemed to have captured several important APRCP members. Three squad leaders were either captured or killed. For e.g. Pullanna killed on January 5, 1975, Dharmanna killed in July 6, 1975 and Sekhar captured on November 19, 1975. Another major catch by police was that of Kodavati Veera Raghaviah, Secretary of Palawancha area Committee on February 9, 1976. He was caught in the Guntur General Hospital where he had come for treatment. In spite of these losses the party does not seem to have been crippled and their underground journals Janasakti, Prajavudham and Tirugubatu have been regularly appearing as late
as May 1976 and carrying news of their activities in forest areas.

Having consolidated and somewhat extended their movement in the forest region the APCC turned its eye to extension of the movement in the plains. In August 1970 they formed the regional committee for plains. This committee consisting of Neelam Ramchandrayya as Secretary, Madala Narayanswamy and Nukalapudi Ramarao was given the tasks of building party organisation as well as mass movements and class struggles in the plains area. They were to build an underground party centre running a paper and distributing party literatures, establishing a courier system and helping the movement in forest areas.

This committee gave an immediate programme for conducting struggles on the demands of minimum wages for agricultural labour, fair salaries for 'Faleres', Banjar land distribution and abolition of old debts. The organisational methods were similar to those of forest areas viz. organise struggles on these issues and out of the struggles develop units of militants, volunteers squads, party members etc. The differences envisaged in plains area were that it would not be possible to have self defence of party members through squad formation since the protection offered by inaccessible terrain was missing here and as such before people were fully behind them squad formation would not be possible. So the party members were to function in utmost secrecy
conducting struggles from behind the scene rather than be at
the head of it. (b) Given the lower intensity and militancy
of the movement in plains areas, more use was to be made of
legal methods and opportunities. (c) The struggles were to
be organised mainly through mass organisations which were
however to be kept completely away from elections and fully
immersed in revolutionary struggles to keep them from becoming
revisionist. (d) Due to the necessity of bringing various
classes into struggle, more extensive use was to be made of
genral issues like "rising prices."

With this programme and tactical line the APRCC soon
succeeded in resurrecting "District Committees or District
organising committees in nine districts and strong contacts in
four districts." After forming of these committees the party
held District wide "Congresses" of its members. These were
meant to be "schools in our party's political struggle." In
fact they were used for explanations by the C.P. group's leader-
ship of their differences with T.N. group. The APRCC also held
eighteen party schools in different areas of the State to train
and recruit members. Nearly three hundred workers were covered
in these. These lasted fifteen to twenty days and consisted of
physical training including of making bombs, besides ideological
education.
The APRCP gave instructions that the emphasis was to be laid upon organising the basic classes—workers in towns, agricultural labour in village, and the poor peasants. Importance was also to be given to organising Youth who were seen as providing the militant active force to the party activity. They seen to have managed to organise trade unions and workers struggles in the districts of Warangal, Visakhapatnam, Nalgonda, Kurnool, Guntur, and Nizamabad. The unions were either among the old strongholds of maoists like the Road Transport Corporation. Union in Warangal and B.H.V.P. in Visakhapatnam or among various unorganised labour like the Nizamabad beedi workers and Nalgonda Toddy tappers or construction workers of Sileru. The explanation of their success in some areas and industries rather than other is explained not by nature of industry or area but by the human factor—the contacts and influence of leaders. For e.g. their unions in Kurnool and Guntur were the result of previous influence of Neelam Ramchandraiah and Madala Narayanasaamy.

They also organised agricultural labour unions in the districts of Guntur, Nizamabad, Kurnool and Nalgonda. The common factor again is human not any structural pattern. They were particularly successful in Nalgonda district, the old stronghold of Telengana armed struggle, where the concentrated work of Gurunatha Reddy and other APRCP sympathisers led to a militant agricultural labour movement. In every taluq the labour was
organised and several militant strikes conducted to achieve higher wages. All the strikes though conducted on basically economic demands, were combined with political slogan like, "release revolutionary writers", "Commutte the sentences on Bhoomaiah and Kistha goud" etc. One curious fact is that APRCP seems to have avoided organising the peasant classes as a whole either because they did not get a hold among middle and rich peasants or because they deliberately avoided such organisations since they felt that they would lead to undermining the interests of poor and landless to those of the rich. But their attitudes towards these (rich peasants) was generally friendly and their labour organisations passed such resolutions as the one demanding lowering of chemical fertiliser prices. Another thing to be noticed is that their activity on trade union and agricultural labour front is evident only after 1973. This may reflect a changing emphasis in their tactics, as well as increasing availability of cadre in the plains areas and better organisational strength and skills showed by APRCP leadership.

Besides these localised conflicts the APRCP ran a state wide solidarity campaign of plains people towards armed struggle in forest areas, and used this campaign to publicise their activities and gain new adherents. In the course of this
campaign thirty thousand pamphlets were distributed and innumerable local meetings held.

Even in the plains areas the main thrust of APRCP activity was directed to developing land occupation struggles, since theoretically this suits their anti-feudal definition of revolution and also since such struggle by their very nature tend to be militant and consisting of armed clashes between contending parties. Their aim seems to be to use land hunger of peasants and any previous quarrels over possession of land and develop struggles to an extent where people would come forward to occupy land. Obviously this would bring resistance and reprisal not only from the landlord but also the police. It is here that the understanding of APRCP from other Maoist groups seems to differ. While the CPI(ML) seemed to advocate seizure of lands and holding to them with the understanding that revolution was around the corner and people can and should hold to the lands occupied; the T.N. group seemed to advocate that lands must be occupied when people were prepared in the sense of being ready to defend their occupied land against all kinds of attack; the C.P. group seems to have a more limited aim viz. develop struggles, let the people become as militant as they want; police and landlords would obviously crack down on the people, it does not matter in such a situation if the people can not hold the land, or even if many back out from
the struggle for the positive results would outweigh these negative consequences. Firstly anger and hatred of people—even if temporarily suppressed by brutal force—would be aroused and sharpened, and prepare them for renewed and relentless struggles in the future. Secondly, each such struggles would produce many militants whose political consciousness is developed, to whom class nature of State becomes obvious and who being hounded and harassed by authorities would be willing to become full time activists in the party and could be used to foment agrarian discontent in other areas. The APCRCP group leadership denied that such struggles would demoralise the people and push them into apathy and acquiescence. They said such would be the case only if the struggles were conducted without paying proper heed to the level of consciousness of people. That is if people were prepared only for particular kinds of struggles and the party forces them into still higher forms of struggle (those needing more sacrifice and effort); then and only then would people react by being demoralised. They said such was the effect of struggles conducted by CPI(M), but that the struggles of APCRCP which would keep in view the peoples wishes and preparedness would not have any such bad effects.

With the perspective they conducted several struggles for land occupation in the plains areas. In Nizamabad they led
occupation of 300 acres of banjar by two hundred families and
also reclaimed some mortgaged land. Similar struggles were
conducted in several other districts - Warangal, Karimnagar,
Nalgonda and Kurnool.

They had wide response in Janagaon taluq during 1971. Here
taking advantage of a factional fight in Congress and utilising
the support of one of the sides, they quickly occupied several
lands - in the villages of Santapuram (600 acres), Bammera
(70 acres) Dadidapalli (30 acres) etc. They also utilised the
momentum to raise labour wages, reject repayment of Nagu etc.
There were several clashes with landlords and police arrested
fifty persons, but both the top leaders of the taluq Nalla Nar-
simlu and Ilayya managed to evade arrest, and kept on organising
the struggles. Militant peasant struggles (those which involved
physical conflict and required establishment of police camps
in the areas) were also seen in Devuruppala area of Warangal
(incidentally this is the birthplace of D.V. and was one of the
strongest centres of Communist activity in 1948-51, armed
struggle period). Atmakur area in Nalgonda, Divamdinne in Kurnool
and Nimmapalli and Koneraopela in Karimnagar. Out of these the
Nimmapalli struggle hit the Deadlines in all State newspapers
and it was given the colour of a struggle between harijan vs
upper caste landowner. The Chief Minister however declared that
"extremists cannot be allowed to take over as Harijan labour".
Massive police forces were sent to comb the area, nearly fifty men were arrested from the neighbouring villages, police claimed that arms were recovered from them.

Four interesting features arise from these Kisan struggles conducted by APRCP. Firstly all of these except for the one in Divamindine area in Kurnool were in the Telengana region. Secondly, most of these struggles were over banjars, government lands, mortgaged lands etc. and not over the "self cultivated lands". This probably explains the first feature. There are hardly any such lands or problem in the fertile cincar region. Thirdly, the struggles were conducted not in one village but always in a cluster of villages where the APRCP established its influence. Finally these struggles took place in areas where either some local fractional quarrels among landlords-cum-Congress politicians made it easy for them to start functioning initially (For e.g. they utilised the Rajeshwar Rao - Santosh Chakravarty quarrel in Mulug and Yati Raja Rao Madhava Reddy Quarrel in Janagaon taluq) or in areas where the local landlord was thoroughly villainous and disliked. For e.g. the Nimmappalli landlord was universally disliked and there were allegations that he had previously killed a local doctor in personal quarrel, had beaten up local traders who refused to give free service and collected
In this period APRCP became active in the field of students, Poets, Civil liberties associations, and separatist agitation. These also became quite useful for their organisational and political purposes. These would be examined in a later chapter.

THE MOVEMENT IN KON DAMODALU AREA

Just as C.P. had been sent to organise in Khammam district another State Committee Vasantada Ramalingachari was sent to East Godavari District. The APRCC enjoyed considerable amount of support here. Most of the erstwhile CPI(M) members in this district and all the student federation activists had been supporting it. Ramalingachari decided upon the Rampachodavaram and Yellawaram taluqs which had a good deal of forest areas as the ideal place to start their movement. He organised an area committee to which he became the Secretary and assigned several young enthusiasts to various areas in these taluqs, to mobilise people on various issues. For e.g. Dr. Ankamma Choudary and his wife Veena were assigned to organise in the Palem area, Somachari a seasoned kisan sabha activist was to mobilise people in Kota and Gujjimamidi Valasa areas. Shanti Raju - a local tribal militant was to be responsible for the Pullangi area and Simhadri Subba Reddi a student federation leader to the Kondamodalu area.
Several other enthusiasts like Paulus and Stalin Babu were also sent to help these. They were supposed to tour their area, encouraging, organising and mobilising the people, to resist various kinds of exploitation, and rebel against the unjust nature of the socio-economic system. They did not find the task difficult. At least as far the first part of the task was concerned. The people in this area (particularly in the Kondamodalu group of villages were seething with discontent. There were many standing issues of conflicts between tribals and those plainsmen who were money-lenders and landlords. The maoist intervention in this situation aggravated the conflict and acted as a catalyst to an out burst of the local people which came during August-September of 1969.

The APRCC activists started with propaganda on the unjust nature of several local affairs. The first demand that the party took up was to exhort the people not to pay taxes to the local revenue official - the "Karanam" and fines to the forest department for use of forest produce - while the former was corrupt and collected excess of revenue the latter collected bribes, for allowing the tribals to cultivate forest land. With the tribals refusal to pay taxes the Tehsildar arrived to settle the issue. The Tehsildar's asked the tribals to write a petition to the Collector for redressal of their grievances. These petitions were enthusiasm-
tically written along with their charges on the karansams and forest officials, they included their woes regarding their land being alienated to the rich landlords and some of them being taken away permanently by the landlords on 'tenancy'. Some members of panchayati board, and middle peasants, who had originally encouraged the tehsildar's solution later did not even sign on the petition sent to the Collector. The APCC members seized upon this opportunity. They 'exposed' them for "betraying and backing out". They held many meetings and carried out propaganda saying that forms of struggle like petioneering etc. would not bring about any solution to their problems. It was only by preparing themselves through armed struggle to defy the Government, and by setting up their own self-Governing institutions that there would be an end to oppression. For this purpose they had to organise themselves into Zilla Girijan Sangham. Soon, the girijan sanghams were formed attracting men, women and children, to their fold.

The Sangham was used in various ways to raise the level of peoples political consciousness. It conducted schools, which not only taught the three basic R's but also educated the tribal in regard to his rights. Efforts were made to develop revolutionary enthusiasm among them, by telling them about the struggles of oppressed people throughout the world; showing them pictures of
Vietnamese peasants and women carrying guns and fighting for their liberation; conducting cultural programmes, which propagated revolutionary ideas etc. These widespread organisational and propagandistic steps were followed by agitations on various local issues and problems. It was expected that in the process of these struggles a movement and an organisation could be built up to carry out armed struggle at later stages.

The first demand taken up was concerning indebtedness of the tribals. The APRCC members explained to the tribals how they wererepaying many times more than the actual capital taken as loan and asked them to stop repayment. In the initial stages, the tribals sought the help of party cadres while defying the money-lenders. However, they soon gained confidence and faced the money-lenders on their own. They even threatened the money-lenders that all the tribals even from the neighbouring villages could unite to fight them. The tribals were also explained how they were being cheated by the merchants etc. to whom they sold the forest produce.

The issue on which the movement really picked up support was that of mobilising the farm labourers for a rise in wages. During March 1969, they demanded a raise from Rs.200/- per annum to Rs.400/- per annum along with extra food, clothing and cancellation of all debts accumulated over years, and also freeing of
bonded labourers. The farm labours under the call of the Sangham went on strike. The landlords were caught unawares as they did not anticipate this step. The Sangham took advantage of this and gave a wider programme for struggle on increase in wages for other forest workers, and also of land occupation.

To this the Government reacted by setting up a police camp at Kondamodalu and after a month even brought the C.R.P. to this area. The sympathisers of the Sangham were harassed. As a result some of them began to express disaffection for the Maoists. The party also lost the opportunity for free political activity. After the situation became 'normal' the Collector himself arrived on the scene. He agreed that the grievances of the people were justified and promised to give them back their alienated lands, if they sent a petition. At the landlords' request the Collector intervened to tackle the problem of the growing resistance of the farm labours. He saw to it that the landlords give in to all the demands regarding the raise in wages. At this juncture, the landlords were willing to pay this amount, with the hope that the farm labours would come back to work regularly.

Now the party raised the slogan 'Land to the tiller!' and tried to link up the problem of farm servants with that of alienated lands and usury. Most of these servants were erstwhile independent tillers who had lost their lands and become servants
because of their inability to repay loans. The parties demands of cancellation of all standing debts, abolition of the "Farm servant system and return of the mortgaged or alienated land to the actual tillers; appealed to them and they participated with increased enthusiasm in the strike, inspite of landlords threats to use reserve police against them. The district Collector again visited the area and tried to bring about compromise settlement. The farm labourers refused to budge from their position and demanded that the land which rightfully belonged to them must be returned. The Collector asked the landlords to show revenue receipts and prove their ownership of lands. The Collector did not pursue the matter any further. But made the tribals vague promises and asked them to see him later at Devipatnam. The maoists widely propagated the idea that nothing would come out of this petitioneering and depending on the Government. However some of the tribals persisted with their efforts to get justice by legal means. But they made no progress and could not even get an audience with the Collector.

This strengthened the hands of maoists who gave a call for seizure of lands. The following categories of lands were to be seized. (a) Lands alienated from the tribals, (b) Lands mortgaged by the tribals and (c) Lands held by landlords under various types of tenancy, implying that the "Self-cultivated lands" of the landlords were not to be touched, because the people (as yet) felt it rightfully belonged to the landlords only.
The organisational method proposed was that tribals from several villages were to gather carrying ploughs and arms, go to each village and enforce seizure of the lands. This would show their unity, give them confidence and enthuse those who were vacillating. They were to be fully prepared for any kind of resistance by landlords. The maoists supplied some crude bombs to the tribals. They decided upon three principles in redistributing the seized lands. (a) It was to be seen that no tribal would be left without land and none would get too much. Thus the idea of egality was to be added to the idea of rightful ownership. (b) All quarrels arising within the tribals were to be settled by democratically formed village committees. (c) Those tribals who had not actively participated in the struggle were to be denied land even if it rightfully belonged to him before it was alienated.

The programme was implemented in the third week of June 1969. It elicited massive response. Big crowds of tribals gathered hoisting red flags on lands and symbolically ploughing them and declaring its occupation and seizure. The police in the area was hardly in a position or had the strength to deal with such a mass upsurge in which militant tribal groups of about a thousand members each were showing all signs of being willing to resist if attacked by police. The police made some formal attempts to arrest the leaders but backed out when faced with popular resistance.
This programme was carried out through the months of August, September and October. In this struggle they concentrated on occupying lands of big landlords like Malla Venkata Kameswara Rao and also on absentee landlords like Lanka Venkateswara Rao. In both these cases the tribals were led by Ramalingachari. They also singled out tyrannous landlords like Karre Somanna Patrudu, who had alienated vast stretches of land from the tribals, and taken them on 'tenancy' basis from them. His land was occupied at least about four times, in four different places. Similarly they occupied the lands of Kondamodalu Sarpanch Pothula Sayanna Pantulu who was a big landlord and owned big tobacco farms, and the land of the local Karanam.

One factor which had greatly helped the maoists was that, conflict over land was not a new phenomena in this area. Even previously the tribals were struggling for their rights and had even killed a landlord. Many of them had participated in violent confrontations and had served sentences in jail. The maoists found ready recruits among these people and after giving them a political perspective used them to lead occupations of land.

The outburst in Kondamodalu area helped them to expand to Nelakota area, where land was forcibly occupied and tilled. In this area, almost all the landlords whose lands were occupied were absentee landlords, being in possession of the land for over
sixty years. Their attempts to bring labours from the neighbouring villages were also foiled by the tribals by thrashing the landlord and threatening his supporters.

The party members in the Kondamodalu area organised the local village youth into village volunteer squads, and the women into Mahila Sanghams which were very active. Even in the formative state the village volunteer squads of Kondamodalu staged a demonstration in front of the police station protesting against the arrest of Paulus, the party's political organiser. These voluntary squads were also given training in use of sticks, making of bombs, hand grenades. They toured around their village and also the neighbouring villages to organise large number of tribals to conduct the programme of forcible land occupation. Due to the efforts of volunteer squads the party claimed that in the programme of forcible tilling and ploughing of occupied land, there were more number of people than required.

The party cadre also worked hard to remove the age-old prejudices and superstitions among the people. To unite all the tribals and peasants under one banner, they explained to them that it was in the interest of a few that, hierarchy among castes was still maintained and commensality was not allowed. With their efforts interdining was encouraged.
The popularity of the Girijan Sangham was growing. It distributed the collected paddy among the peasants with as little discrimination as possible. It was claimed that due to Sangham's influence, many peasants even from the plains area came to take part in the struggles. The Sangham also settled many local disputes. Even those against money lenders was brought to the Sangham for settlement. The Panchayati President from Manturu village who threatened his villagers of severe consequences if they joined the struggles or the Sangham was attacked under the leadership of maoists by more than hundred villagers who forced him even to feed all of them. In the same village the Sangham workers strived to unify the Reddi and Potters castes, who had always been warring with each other through generations. An example of the new found unity is to be seen in their joint action in 1969 September against the local Tehsildar, whose lands they occupied.

The success of their programme in Kondamodalu and Nelakota areas led them to make efforts for extending the movement and forming village volunteer squads in the neighbouring Manturu, Gonduru, Madipalli etc.

Before the above programme could be implemented, the police, Government and landlords retaliated. In Nelakota the party could hold the occupied lands only for two weeks. Very soon, the party
and its sympathisers were totally suppressed by intense police activities. The landlords reoccupied the forcibly acquired lands of the tribals. They also threatened to burn all the huts, and seized many palm leaves which were to be used by the tribals as roof tops. The landlords threatened that they would 'finish off' the Sangham workers, if they attempted to collect levies from them. The sangham was too weak to fight back and the party could not assure them of any support. Thus they had to yield to the landlords warnings.

The police made extensive use of informers to disrupt the maoist movement. As noted the modus operandi of the maoists was to tour the villages individually or in company of one or two colleague for the purpose of propagating their politics and exhorting the people to revolt. Police by using informers and highly mobile locally stationed units found it very easy to pick up the maoists and incarcerate them. The maoists were neither armed nor trained, nor programmatically and ideologically prepared to either physically resist the police squads or threaten the police agents. Their complete dependence on the "mass defense" tactics as propounded in the immediate programme made them particularly vulnerable to police arrests. This explains why even while the maoist movement was at its highest pitch many of the maoist political leaders and organisers had been arrested. Ramalinga Chari, Bhaskar Rao, Nakka Appa Rao etc. were picked off
with ridiculous ease by the police at a very early stage of the movement. Even in later stages when learning from their initial setbacks the Maoists tried to organise a guerrilla squad under the 18 year old Stalin Babu whose previous training in N.C.C. qualified him as the local guerrilla expert, they hardly succeeded. Though some initial training including making of crude bombs, was given to them they did not seriously implement the squad form of organisation as was done in Khammam and Warangal areas.

The landlords in the area could also pressurise the Government in many ways, so that they would be able to secure their lands, and with legal sanction. The party was left incapacitated, unable to provide an answer to the situation. Two such incidents would illustrate how this was done. (1) In Kondamodalu area the Sangham bought land on lease at a very low price of Rs.10/- an acre when it was auctioned by the Government. This was occupied by the people, and even tilled by them. The Panchayat President of Devipatnam, however, managed to pressurise the Government to reauction the same land. The party workers were helpless. Neither could they stop the Government from reauctioning nor did they have finances to buy it. The people on their own initiative armed themselves with sticks, and women came with chilli powder to oppose the landlord from buying the land. But they could succeed only in getting a compromise in which the land was bought not by the landlord with whom they had many fights but by another landlord
who was generally respected for his humane behaviour. But this left the people dissatisfied and disappointed as their crops in the land which were already showing signs of bearing fruit now were taken over by the landlords. The party, felt thoroughly demoralised. (2) The Government also came in a big way to survey and settle the land in the area. According to the party, the Government's intention was to stop further struggles for forcible land occupation, stop shifting cultivation, and to collect survey tasks. This would cancel all the gains made by them so far. The party therefore conducted propaganda and distributed pamphlets against survey. This did not stop the Government which gave rights over land to the 'owner' of the land before the forcible occupation of the tribals. To satisfy the tribals the Government announced that thirty four acres of land in Kondamodalu would be given to the tribals. These lands however were already considered as tribal lands and it was not much of a concession.

The landlords also boycotted the Sangham and the tribals on the economic front. They refused to give them seeds for ploughing. They refused to buy bamboos and other forest products from the tribals. Thus due to lack of money they had to leave their land barren without cultivating it. The landlords joined together and destroyed the crops of the tribals. They want only released cattle on the tribal land thus spoiling all their crops.
Organisationally the party was unable to face the situation. It had absolutely no finances. The party was unable to pay its cadre even Rs.10/- a month as allowance. Those tribals, who were willingly working as full-time workers also discontinued due to financial reasons. Families of persons who were arrested could not be supported. They did not even have money to buy food to sustain themselves somehow. The Provincial Committee at the State level had also expressed its helplessness regarding the matter. There was also an acute food problem which exacerbated the problems of maoist organised Sanghams. Since most of the farm labourers struck work, they had no means for sustaining themselves. The tribals who refused to pay back their grains to the money-lenders, and those who successfully carried out shifting cultivation, could pool in 200 bags of grains. But when this was equitably distributed by the sanghams, it did not leave anybody enough food to eat. Therefore the party cadre could not depend on the people for food.

With such difficult financial and food situation many left for the plains. There was a dearth of full time workers. In the party's own words "there were no squads, no squad training, no weapons, and the local giriJan squads became inactive due to lack of proper technical training. Though the people were willing to fight there was nobody to give them a lead or proper guidance."
In this situation the police shifted their activities to Kondamodalu. The landlords also started harassing the people. The people however did not lose their will to fight. They thrashed a landlords son in retaliation to the police-cum-landlord offensive. This triggered off direct confrontation between the people and landlords. The police activities were further intensified forcing the tribals to move into the interior forests. At dusk, when police cleared from the area about six hundred tribals met at the party centre. They expressed their anxiety and willingness to fight with bows and arrows, and resist the police. The party members at this stage advised the tribals that the problem could be solved only by conducting guerilla attacks on the police. For this purpose guerilla squads were to be formed and arms to be seized. The tribals on the other hand were ready to shoulder the family responsibilities of those members who joined the guerilla squads. This programme however was not be implemented due to organisational and financial difficulties. Once again during harvests the tribals in Kondamodalu came forward spontaneously to forcibly seize crops without party's direction. In the process many arrests followed. The people expressed their anger and were ready to kill the landlords and police. This was followed by the meeting of the remaining squads in Kondamodalu, they had decided to take squad actions against informers and also for finances. None of them were trained nor
sufficiently equipped for it. At this time they heard the news that most of the leaders of Provincial Committee had been arrested. This lowered their spirits and morale completely. These arrests led them to leave the area. Thus the movement fizzled out due to lack of effective leadership and inability to evade or resist the police.

However, since the basic causes of the response to Maoist movement—land quarrels and general dissatisfaction—remained, the ideas of Maoism were not rooted out. Several attempts were made by other Maoist groups during 1970-71 to make the tribals revolt but the movement again took an organised shape only during 1975, after the C.P. group's squads crossed Godavari river to enter Rampachodavaram taluq.

III

THE IDEOLOGICAL REPURCussions

The previous section has shown the practice of APRCC in various regions of Andhra Pradesh. We have seen that activities in areas other than in Kondamodalu area followed somewhat a different line than the one laid down in the Immediate Programme. Working under various national and local pressures these activities developed according to their own logic. Inspite of severe organi-
sational and personal differences among party members, nobody initially objected politically or even theoretically to theco developments. In fact even those who were (T.N. and D.V.) to later on emerge as relentless critics of this line were initially all praise and enthusiasm.

The 1971 general elections to parliament and the events leading to it seem to have decisively effected a small section of the party which consisted of such top leaders as T.N. and D.V. This section while broadly agreeing to the general Maoist assessment of the national and international situation as favourable to the movement, emphasized and described those aspects of the situation which would make the Maoists proceed with caution and moderation. They declared that "Any overestimation of the weakness of the ruling class and strength of the revolutionary organisation would lead to losses." In various documents they described various aspects of the situation which necessitated a cautious proceeding on the part of the Maoists. These are as follows:

1. Though there was an economic crisis in the country with stagnant industries, recession, inflation, unemployment etc. the Government was taking various steps to alleviate the problem. For e.g. it was nationalising banks, taking over those industries which were running at a loss and expanding the State sector.

2. Inspite of severe competition and several internal contradictions, the ruling classes in India
were united. There were several comprador sections in India for e.g., those which represented the interests of Soviet Imperialism and the public sector through which the Soviet Imperialism exploits India and those who represented U.S. imperialism and its ally the private sector in India. Though these interests were competing with each other for a bigger share of the cake, their interests in general were supplementary and complementary to each other. It was wrong to hold either the Congress split or the regional agitations as evidence for saying that the Indian ruling classes have broken out among themselves. The struggle between Indira Gandhi and Nijalingappa was a factional one, aimed at power and did not have any far reaching consequences. The split could not be held to indicate that the pro-Soviet and pro-American sections of the Indian compradors have irretrievably broken with each other. In fact Indira Gandhi represents the interests of both Soviet and U.S. imperialisms. Though she leans slightly to the Soviet side, she is not anti-U.S. and the statements of American leaders and news media supporting India Gandhi proved this. Similarly it would be wrong to derive from Separatist agitations like the one in Telengana that the contradictions within the ruling classes were reaching a breaking point. (3)

There was general political stability in the country and with the elections of 1971 "the instability of 1968 has turned into stability". The slogans of "garibi-hatao" etc. were creating
illusions among people and getting good response. (4) Instability of political situation was a temporary phenomenon and could be turned into a permanent one only if there was a revolutionary Communist party and a widespread revolutionary movement. They could have utilised the temporary political instability to deal crushing blows to the ruling classes and turn the instability into a permanent one. Since in India neither such a party nor a movement existed, the ruling classes could regain their stability at least for the time being. (5) The rule of the exploiters in India was still based on illusions of people and various welfare and other concessions. The situation was not one of simple brutal suppression. (6) Compared to the days of Telengana armed struggle (1947-51) the situation at present was more difficult for revolutionaries. Tactically Indian ruling classes were stronger; Parliamentary illusions had spread among people, the vocal sections of the people were corrupted; there was no single united revolutionary party and finally, India was of such a strategic importance to the imperialists that they would be prepared to take any steps to suppress revolutionary movements there. The intention of T.N. group in emphasizing these unfavourable conditions was not to deny the existence of a revolutionary situation but only to demand moderation.

The C.P. group on the other hand emphasised the more favourable aspects with a view to propose a slightly more active daring and dynamic tactical line. (1) In his view the strength of the ruling
classes in India was fragile. The country "is in the grip of serious economic and political crisis. People of various classes were fighting against the policies of exploitation of the ruling class." An excellent revolutionary situation was developing day by day and even a few armed squads could paralyse the general Government at machinery (in the Godavari forest area), given the correct political line and determination. (2) The Indian ruling classes "are split on policies to be followed and are beset with internal contradictions and as a result are getting weakened." (3) The split in Congress cannot be seen as a power or factional quarrel but is to be understood as a deep and clear division on basic policy matters between the group supporting U.S. imperialism and the one supporting Soviet imperialism. (4) The 1971 elections were not to be seen as bringing stability. The continuing President's rule in many States, the victory of Jana Sangh in Delhi Metropolitan elections etc. indicate otherwise. (5) On the whole compared to the situation in 1947 there were more favourable conditions for revolution at present. People had no illusions about Congress; the internal contradictions of bourgeoisie had matured; not only the communists but many others
were also conducting armed struggle for e.g. the Nagas, Mizos etc. the financial and monetary situation was relatively worse; and the country was beset with border problems which it did not have before.

The differential assessment of the situation reflected in (and was probably to some extent caused by) their differential perspectives of the tactical line to be followed. The main difference seemed to be centred around the relation of party's relation with masses. T.N. repeatedly stressed the mass line — the need to rally masses and completely to depend on their strength for otherwise the ruling classes were too strong to be faced. The C.P. group on the other hand for various reasons advocated a more positive role for the party.

There differences on various other tactical issues are as follows (1). The T.N. group held "armed struggle is a peoples struggle. Only when people participate in it directly can the armed struggle be started. Since we are in the stage of agrarian revolution, only when the revolutionary peasant movement had developed to a certain stage can the armed struggle be started." For the C.P. group on the other hand, armed struggle starts much earlier. "When the people launch struggles against feudal exploitation, the landlords and the reactionary Governments come down heavily upon them.
In such a case the people are prepared to resist, armed struggle can be started. Thus the C.P. group neither accepted the stipulation of direct participation, nor was willing to wait until the peasant movement had developed to a certain extent. For him the armed struggle began almost simultaneously with the launching of the movement, (at least in the forest areas). The T.N. group saw a symbiotic relation between land distribution and armed struggle. This was to him the lesson of 1948, the teaching of Mao Tse Tung and the experience of Kondamodalun struggle. He felt that unless people come forward to occupy lands, they would neither have the stake nor develop the consciousness necessary for conducting a protracted armed struggle against the state. This was particularly important in India because Indian revolutionaries did not start with a 40,000 men army as Mao did and had to totally depend upon the peoples support and strength. The C.F. group did not agree with this analysis. They thought that to prevent armed struggle until land distribution has taken place was to "bind our hands and legs and expose the people and the movement to the enemies repression and torture. It is to make us helpless in the face of enemy's actions." In C.P.'s view "Government would not wait until people get ready for land distribution. Long before that they would attempt to suppress the peoples movement with force. So armed struggle is to be started in the earlier stages of the movement based upon partial struggles. These can be slowly
developed into armed agrarian revolution. It is only when people
gain confidence in our squads ability to face Governments armed
forces, that they will be ready for land distribution but not
otherwise." They T.N. group disagreed with this view. They
thought that "partial struggles cannot provide the organisation
and mass consciousness necessary for guerilla struggle". He did
not oppose militant steps including armed resistance by people
during partial struggles. But "we oppose calling such militant
armed acts guerilla struggle. We oppose organising guerilla
struggle for conducting of partial struggles." (4) The C.P.
group laid great stress on self-defense of the cadre. In his
view if people were not prepared to directly resist repression
in the initial stages of the struggle "we must adopt necessary
tactics for self-defence of the cadre and mass movement. The form
of self defence would depend on the degree of preparedness of the
people and the terrain of the movement etc." They characterised
such struggle as the first step of armed struggle. It was on this
basis that they supported formation of squads and their activities
in the Godavari forest area. The T.N. group severely criticised
these conceptions. They said that if self-defence of the type propo-
sed and implemented by the C.P. group was taken up "people will
become spectators. Their consciousness will never rise. Their self-
confidence will suffer. They will fall into apathy and dependence".
Further "it is wrong to say cadres' self-defence is necessary for the defence of movement. You think of defending the people and the movement and because of the fear of you the landlords etc. may not exploit the people for sometime. But such victories are self-defeating. They will crumble like a house of cards as soon as the attack of enemy begins." T.N. thought that cadres' self-defence cannot become a substitute for peoples' self-defence. And in Khammam, the party lost all contacts with people because of armed acts which were not related to peoples participation. It was only by depending on the mass line and on volunteer squads raised from people and equipped with local weapons can mass participation be assured. He was not opposed to self-defence but to calling self-defence the first step of armed struggle.

He compared such statements to the CPI(ML)'s views of annihilation being the initial stage of guerilla struggle. The C.P. group rejected T.N's. advises of limited self-defence and self-defence without guns. They said that it would be capitulating to the enemy. (5) The T.N. group thought that squad activities were stultifying peoples' revolutionary consciousness and leading them to inactivity. Economic struggles combined with propagation of armed struggle cannot lead to revolutionary consciousness. Only mobilisation of masses in militant struggles which would give them practical and first hand experience can develop revolutionary
determination among people. The C.P. group first maintained that they were not substituting squad actions to mass initiative. They gave a detailed account of their activity in the forests showing that squads were participating only along side and in support of peoples movement and not in substitution of them. At the same time the C.P. group refused "to stop actions on peoples enemies by squads in the name of mass mobilisation being the key issue, and under the excuse of causing more repression."

(b) The T.N. group accused the C.P. group of taking to adventurism depending on squad actions, neglecting land occupations, not concentrating on an area but roaming aimlessly with the squads and thus weakening and destroying the movement in the forest area. They also blamed C.P. group's factional and bureaucratic methods, and disobedance of Rashtra Committee advises as being the cause for losses of the movement. They held the Kondamodalu movement as an example of what might have been achieved in regard to moving people for land occupation if proper methods were followed. They explained the failure of the movement in Kondamodalu to inept and immature leadership. The C.P. group replied to these charges. They said that their squads were not roaming but concentrated on a set of villages; they were not totally dependent on squad actions but made every efforts to form volunteer squads and people committees; the movement on the whole showed
striking progress by spreading to nine taluqs and increasing the squad membership by tenfold; they were not neglecting land occupation but were handicapped by lack of land concentration in the forest areas where they were acting; what losses there have been in the movement were a result neither of the conspiracy of a few persons (particularly C.P.), nor of the self-defence line, but because of the general overestimations of the movement, the left ward pressures and deviations in the beginning, lack of clarity in leadership (T.N., D.V. etc.) on tactics and the vacillations of the leaders; they also held that the Kondamodalu movement failed because the cadre continued to function in villages as individuals and did not take to squad form of organisations. On their side the C.P. group accused the T.N. group of capitulationism, of failing to build the party centre, or help the movement with various kinds of assistance which was their responsibility as the central leaders; as being personally weak and not going underground as required by the party rules; trying to encourage factionalism in the party; and satisfying themselves with passing resolutions like bureaucrats.

The differences naturally led to an organisational split. After having been arrested in December 1969, T.N. etc. said that the existing Rashtra Committee was dissolved since most of it was in jail and advised those still left outside to form a new Rashtra Committee. After this a three-member committee was formed outside
consisting of C.P., Ramanarasaayya and Neelam Ramachandriah, but when the differences between the jail leadership and the outsiders became severe in 1971. T.N. etc. asserted that they were still the official Rashtra Committee and refused to accept the legitimacy of the Three-man Committee outside. They also asked their followers in the State to form their own Committees and not obey any directives from the C.P. group. They could get only the Hyderabad and Guntur Committees on their side while all others opted for the C.P. group. In the forest area only a fraction of a squad consisting of five men opted for T.N. leadership but very soon retracted and went back to the C.P. group. The C.P. group put forward several proposals for unity in which they said that a fresh plenum should be held and a new Rashtra Committee elected to decide the basic cause of action. The T.N. group rejected such "formal democracies" and asserted that unity will be possible only on the basis of acceptance of the documents Immediate Programme and "Ma Moulika Pandha - Ikvata Samasaya" (our fundamental line - question of unity). With this it was clear that there was a separation of ways and that APRPC was organisationally dead. The C.P. group formally held their first statewide general conference in September 1973 and the C.P. groups rechristened themselves as the Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist Party (APRCP). Here they issued three documents.
"Party Programme", 'Rajakiya Tirmanam' (Political Resolution)

"Bharata Deshamlo Sayudha Praasatam Gamaninchya Valasina Konni-
vishayalu (some problems concerning peoples warpath in India).
The first document systematically summed up their analysis of
Indian social structures its contradictions and classes, and
presented an alternative system of institutions and policies
which they would bring after revolution. The second document
presented at one place, comprehensively their assessment of
national and international situation which had developed during
their debates with CPI(ML) and the T.N. group. The third docu-
ment summarised their views on the strategy and tactics to be
adopted. The only new thing in this was their emphasis on
overcoming the disunity in Indian maoists and establishing a
united party. This was specified as their first duty. The
T.N. group which hardly had enough strength in the State to
hold Statewide conferences etc. contended themselves by relea-
sing several documents under the name of Communist Party of India
(Revolutionsaries) (CPI(R)). They issued a Draft Programme
which was almost similar to that of APRCP, except for stressing
here and there on several hindrances to revolutionary movement
for e.g. they mention caste, communal and regional differences on
Indian working class which make it difficult for them to unite and
maintain that Indian army is of mercenary character while APRCP
saw Indian army as consisting of common people whose contradiction
with officers etc. may make some of them come to the people's side. In general the programme and analysis of CPI(R) avoided the over optimism of APRCP. The CPI(R) also published a draft path of Indian revolution which comprehensively presented the strategy and tactics of T.N. group as they developed in opposition both to the CPI(ML) and APRCP. While accepting like others that armed struggle would be the main form of struggles they added a rider "at an appropriate level of the movement". The T.N. group did not show any enthusiasm for uniting with other maoist groups. On the other hand it declared itself as an all India organisation - the CPI(R) and invited others to join it on the basis of its documents which would not be open to alteration as a condition to unity. They seem to have got some response in Kerala from the K.P.R. Gopalan group and in West Bengal from the Promod Das Gupta and Asit Sen groups with whom they even started publishing a common English paper The Proletarian Path. However their maximum strength cadre wise and movement wise seems to be in Punjab where both their students and kisan organisations have developed some following.
NOTES

1. Vide Chapter IV.


3. Ibid., p. 27.

4. Ibid., p. 23.

5. Document J-40 of H.C.C.


19. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p.11


25. Cr.No.20/69 to 25/69 P.S. Bayaram.


28. Ibid.

29. While the radio had announced that it was only Rs.15,000, Ibid.


31. Ibid.


33. Ibid.

34. Document Y-2 of H.C.C.


36. Ibid.


38. Cr.No.14/69 of P.S. Mulug.

39. It was stated that except for him all the rest in the village supported the Maoist. Document J-21, Op.cit.

41. Cr.No. 39/69 of P.S. Ghonpur.

42. Cr.No. 64/69 of P.S. Kulug, F.I.R. of 28.10.69 and also Document J-51 of HCC.

43. Cr.No. 65/69 of P.S. Kulug.

44. Ibid.


47. Document Y-4 of HCC, Kulug Area Committee letter to P.C. Comrades.

48. Cr.No. 22/69 of P.S. Ghonpur, FIR of 6-6-69.


50. See Cr.Nos. 41/69, 56/69 and 43/69 of P.S. Kulug.

51. Document J-12 of HCC.


54. Cr.Nos. 156/69 to 161/69 of P.S. Yellandu.

55. Cr.No. 56/69 of P.S. Garla.


57. Ibid.

58. See Cr.Nos. 53/69 and 54/69 of P.S. Suryapet Rural and Cr.No. 22/69 of P.S. Kanagal.

59. See Report of Special Branch Circle Inspector submitted in HCC.

60. See the section on T. Nagi Reddi in Chargesheet of HCC, and APC(R), Partvlo mtavada Avakasahyadram, December 1973, (Vijayawada), p.48.

61. Ibid.
62. Cr.No.34/69 of P.S. Elore and also Document C-25 of HCC.

63. See Chargesheet of HCC.


65. This was in June 1969. See Chargesheet of HCC.

66. See Cr.No.16/69, P.S. Sileen.


68. Document J-5 of H.C.C.

69. See Partylpo ativada .. eto., Op.cit., Pp.104-105, Immediate Programs, Op.cit. and also Cr.No.2451 to 2458/69 of P.S. Madras Central, F.I.R. of 18-19/12/69. Except for C.P. and Ramanarasayya all other Central Committee members were arrested. They had been unable to leave the forest area and sent Chalapathi Srinivasa Rao to represent them.


72. Ibid.

73. 'Nagu' is the rate of interest wherein the tribal has to repay the loan advanced in full along with interest by a specific time, and in case of default the interest accumulated on the principal, on which interest is taken which is 100% normally.


76. Janaaakti, April 1974, p.11. The APRCP seems to have taken advantage of a tribal mela to hold this meeting.

77. Ma_acharana, op.cit., p.40.

78. Ibid., Pp.35-36.
79. Ibid., Pp.23-24 and also Janasakti, May 1974, p.3.

80. See the case of Akula Srinivasa Rao in Narasampet or that of Palawancha retired military official.


83. Praja Yuddham, January 1974, Pp.15-16. Praja Yuddham is the APRCP's party organ from the forest regions.

84. Na acharana, Op.cit., p.35. Even if the figure is undeniably exaggerated, it cannot be disclaimed that widespread cutting of reserve forest lands took place in this area during this period. The local officials agree to it, though they cannot supply any precise figures.


88. Ibid.


93. Ibid.


95. Vismochana, December 1, 1974.


98. Indian Express, October 1, 1975.

100. Indian Herald, December 16, 1975.


108. General Nanjappa was instrumental in curbing Maoist activities in Telengana during 1948-51. He carried out large scale military operations to flush out the communists from forests.


111. The Hindu, January 12, 1975.


120. Ibid., p. 28.

122. *Janasakti*, April 1974. The State of Andhra Pradesh has 21 districts. The districts where they did not have any committee included Hyderabad and Guntur, where the previous committee sided with T.N. and refused to join the plains area committee formed by C.P. in Srikakulam, Visakhapatnam and Adilabad.


135. From an interview.


140. *Indian Herald*, August 17, 1974.
141. See Virochana, July 1, '74, p. 16.

142. See Prosecution Witness statement of Stalin Babu in HCG.


144. Ibid., p.5.

145. Ibid.

146. Ibid., p.7.


149. For details see Cr.Nos. 15/69 to 70/69 of P.S. Devipatnam and Cr.Nos. 40/69 to 90/69 of P.S. Nelakota.


151. Cr.No.21/69, F.I.R. of 27.8.69, Cr.No.44/69, F.I.R. of 3.10.69, Cr.No.49/69, F.I.R. of 8.10.69, Cr.No.86/69, F.I.R. of 18.11.69 all of P.S. Devipatnam. Each time 20-40 bags of paddy were also seized.

152. Cr.No.37/69 and 47/69 of P.S. Devipatnam.

153. Cr.No. 38/69 of P.S. Devipatnam.

154. Cr.No. 20/69 and 25/69 of P.S. Devipatnam.

155. For e.g. the lands of Kaltatu Satynarayana Rao, Venulapalli Pulla Rao, Kalagala Veeranna and his kith and kin who owned most of the land in the area. See Cr.No.50/69, 51/69 and 54/69 of P.S. Devipatnam.

156. F.I.R. of 20.10.69 of P.S. Devipatnam.


158. Ibid., p.11.

159. Ibid., p.14.

160. Ibid., p.16.
For example, see the stand taken by them in **Prothuta Parishthiti - Mana Kartavyalu** (mimeo, June 1970) as well as Khammam Area Committee **Bourkutumma Konni Sameavalu** (which is the Reply to the Khammam Area Committee Letter). Though both these documents contained harsh indictments and personal charges against C.P. and Khammam Area Committee, particularly in regard to their activities in the first two phases, there were no basic theoretical or political disagreements of a strategic level. In fact, their estimations in these documents were regarded as extremist and adventurist even by C.P.


*Ibid., p.26.*

*Ibid., p.16.*

*Ibid., p.28.*

**Defeat Party Splitting Activities and Capitulationist Policies of T.N. and D.V., APRCP, p.3.**


**Defeat .. etc., Op.cit., p.3.**

**Jailu Navakulu Fampaia Party lo ativada peddhorani and document tune tirackarinchandi, APRCP, (mimeo, 1973), Pp.7-8.**

**Parliamentary Ennikale Tadanantara Parishthiti - Mana Kartavyalu, APRCP.**
185. Ibid., p.13.
188. Ibid., p.41.
189. Ibid., p.73.
190. Ibid., p.46.
192. Ibid., p.34.
194. See Jailu Navakulu Pamphlet ... etc., Op. cit. and
195. Ibid., p.134 and Soravya Document (mimeo)
197. Bharata Neahamlo Sayudha Fornatam, Gamaninche Valasina
198. Draft Programme of CPI(R), (printed), p.11.
199. Draft path of Indian Revolution, CPI(R), (printed), p.17.