CHAPTER VII

THEORY OF PROTRACTED STRUGGLE - I

IN PREPARATION

This Chapter consists of two sections. The first gives a brief introduction to the problems and features of the area in which the Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist Committee (APRCC) established the base for its activities. The second examines how the movement developed here and how APRCC differentiated itself from CPI(ML) on various theoretical and programmatic issues.

I

Area and indicators of Maoist Activity

The Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist Committee claims to be active in most of the districts of Andhra Pradesh. It claims to have a guerrilla area in the forest area of Urankaral, Khammam, Karimnagar and East Godavari districts. All this area is contiguous to the Godavari river and the forest runs not only through the above four districts. This area is also
contiguous to Bastar district of Madhya Pradesh and is separated by the Godavari river. The area of activity of the A.P.R.C.C. in the plains of Telangana cannot be pin-pointed because (a) it is a secret party believing in secret organisation, (b) at the present stage it is not going in for any drastic activity like annihilation, and (c) its claims cannot be verified by any other independent source. Only Janagaon Taluq of Warangal district, can be definitely said to be having some of the A.P.R.C.C. activists and activities. Here various strikes and food grain looting activities took place as claimed by the police, press and the party itself. After 1972, some pockets in Malgonda and Karimnagar districts also, showed pro-C. Pulla Reddy group's maoist activities. As far as the guerilla area is concerned the figures given by the party organ were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Taluq</th>
<th>Guerilla Area</th>
<th>Pop. in Guerilla Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warangal</td>
<td>Malug</td>
<td>600 Sq. Mls.</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karimnagar</td>
<td>Manthena</td>
<td>200 Sq. Mls.</td>
<td>28,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khammam</td>
<td>Nugur</td>
<td>75 Sq. Mls.</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khammam</td>
<td>Burgampahad</td>
<td>300 Sq. Mls.</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khammam</td>
<td>Illenda</td>
<td>800 Sq. Mls.</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khammam</td>
<td>Palvancha</td>
<td>900 Sq. Mls.</td>
<td>1,10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,875 Sq. Mls.</td>
<td>2,96,475</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The same paper in a review of three years' work in September-October issue of 1972 gave the following figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Taluq</th>
<th>Guerilla Area</th>
<th>Population in Guerilla Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uarangal</td>
<td>Mulug</td>
<td>1,200 Sq. Mls</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uarangal</td>
<td>Parkal</td>
<td>200 Sq. Mls</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uarangal</td>
<td>Narasampet</td>
<td>300 Sq. Mls</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karimnagar</td>
<td>Manthena</td>
<td>200 Sq. Mls</td>
<td>20,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khammam</td>
<td>Nurgur</td>
<td>175 Sq. Mls</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khammam</td>
<td>Burgampahad</td>
<td>300 Sq. Mls</td>
<td>62,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khammam</td>
<td>Illendu</td>
<td>850 Sq. Mls</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khammam</td>
<td>Palavancha</td>
<td>900 Sq Mls</td>
<td>1,10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>\sqrt{4,125} Sq. Mls</strong></td>
<td><strong>\sqrt{4,24,475}</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The party claims a spread to a new area of 1,200 miles consisting of 1,50,000 people in three years, that too in a sparsely populated area where density is around 100 per square mile compared to the average density of Andhra Pradesh, which is 359 per square mile. However, the party organ says: "Purely in mathematical numbers our progress may seem negligible... The movement has been greatly intensified... Today if we want we can turn this area from a Guerilla area to a Guerilla base... but in view of existing national and international conditions..."
such a step would be left adventurist." What it means is that but for a policy decision the party could unleash in this area a struggle more intense than Srikakulam or Naxalbari.

There are three indicators to substantiate the party's claim of intensifications: (1) the increase in number of police deployed in the area; (2) the increase in the number of 'crimes' committed in the area; and (3) the increase in the number of party cadre and membership in the area.

The police activity more or less seems to uphold the claim. It is not known how many police were employed in this area in 1967 and 1968. It is also not known how many new police stations were opened in this area in the normal course of affairs. However, about one hundred and eighty five special police camps were opened. Each such camp has between fifty to hundred personnel. Taking an average of 75 police personnel, it would mean 15,000 new policemen. The Home Minister, without giving exact details, has also mentioned the deployment of some C.R.P. forces in this area. A military camp of a regular cantonment type was opened at Khammam city - District headquarters of Khammam district. Even though no specific mention is made of the reason for this, the connection is too obvious to be missed.

The APRCC has published a booklet Telangana Amara Veerulu
(Telangann's heroes) which claimed twenty martyrs to police shootings in 1972. Their biographies and addresses having been given their claim cannot be dismissed as fictitious. In a year when they were lying low and the party's policy was to avoid armed encounters, twenty deaths in the course of ordinary activities is a big toll and indicates either a heavy police repression or intense activities of the party.

The party claims, in their *Review of past three years*, published in 1972, to be having two hundred whole-time party members. It claims to have eight sten guns, besides seven hundred other fire arms. (Most of them are probably muzzle-loaders as police recoveries and police records describing their raids indicate).

The Government of Andhra Pradesh had issued an order which declared the whole area in Harasampet and Kukug taluq in Warangal district and Yellandu taluq in Khammam district as disturbed areas. This Government Order has not been withdrawn to this day.

Based on these evidences we could conclude that the movement was alive and accordingly to a press report "the Marx-lite Movement in Warangal district has been intensified from June this year". They same can be said of other districts also,


during 1974 and 1975 as our narrative would make it clear.

The Tribal question in contrast with Srikakulam

The general nature of tribal problem in the areas in which APCC is active is more or less the same as that of Srikakulam — penetration of Government, plainsmen, monetisation and commercialisation into the tribal economy, society and general life; resultant cultural, and economic disturbances in tribal life; specifically land alienation, forcing tribal men into 'vetti' through usury; and general misery caused by official corruption and greed of merchants etc. But these similarities are also accompanied by certain dissimilarities in the tribal problem of Godavari forest area. Since these differences have consequences to the political programmes and prospects of the tribals they are enumerated below.

The Mulugu and Narasampet Taluqs of Warangal, Yellandu, Bhadrachalam, Boorgampadu, Nagur and Kothagudem taluqs of Khamman, Manthana of Karimnagar, and Yellavaram and Rampoorodaparam Taluqs of East Godavari are forest and hilly areas. It is in these areas that the APCC is very active.

In both Warangal and Khamman districts, the forest area is almost double that of Srikakulam. In Warangal the forest is distributed over 3914.43 sq. kms. and in Khamman 3033.43 kms.,
while in Srikakulam it is 1550.2 sq. kms. This gave more place for the maoists to manoeuvre, and avoid police. It also made it difficult for the police to successfully comb the area and flush the maoists out. The density of population is very less in Warangal and Khammam districts, when compared to Srikakulam. So the number of persons available for the maoists to mobilise for active, militant politics is less.

Compared to the Srikakulam area, in the forest regions of Khammam and East Godavari there has been more commercialisation in the economy. The Khammam area is rich and abundant in forest produce like bamboo, beedi leaf, teak wood, which are very valuable i.e. while the value of bamboo was Rs.1,74,746 (during the years 1967-68) and that of beedi Rs.6,98,777 (during the same year) in Bhadrachalam taluq alone, in the whole of Srikakulam district the value of bamboo was only Rs.49,229 and of beedi leaves Rs.11,200 in the same year. In the Khammam area not only are the forest products more valuable but the area under both food (including fruits and vegetables) and non-food and non-food crops is more than that in Srikakulam area. So also the net sown area which in Bhadrachalam and Konavaram tribal blocks of Khammam district is double that of Bhadragiri and Sitampet tribal blocks of Srikakulam District. While in Khammam area it is 11,952 hectares and and 10032 hectares respectively in Srikakulam.
area it is 5,776 hectares, and 5,715 hectares respectively.

This greater commercialisation of the economy meant an increase in the number of confrontations of tribals with number of timber merchants and forest contractors. These men from the rich Circar districts and Madras utilised the permanent deficit situation of the tribal economy to give loans at highly usurious rates, and slowly use these to evict them from their lands. This problem was particularly severe in the fertile regions by the side of river Godavari. (The tribals were evicted from their own lands and further converted into bonded labour. The tribals were treated as personal property and mere things which can be exchanged between merchants as parts of their agreements. In fact it would not be an exaggeration to say that a form of slavery existed in a widespread area and with varying degrees of intensity from the days of Nizam to much later periods. The increased commercialisation not only intensified various feudal form of exploitation like the vetti but also created many opportunities for wage struggles.) They also increased the antagonisms between the tribals and various functionaries of the Government from forest guards to patel, patwar and other higher officials. These officials found an opportunity (and fully utilised it) to ally with the merchants and others and get a share
from their exploitation of tribals. They helped in the underhand dealings involved in alienation of tribal land, converting them into slave labour infringement of minimum wage laws, helping the merchants exceed their contracts and take undue advantage of all kinds of forest produce, preventing the tribals from access to any forest type of produce like tamarind honey etc. and harassing them by involving them in any cases if they refused to pay bribes.

The land concentration in this area was not very high, particularly in the interior regions of the forests they had no big holdings. Firstly lack of irrigation facilities and difficult living conditions made it an unattractive proposition and secondly it was much easier to make money by trade, money lending and forest contracts. The few landlords that were there existed mostly in the fertile regions of Godavari bank and the plains area bordering the forests. However even in the interior regions there were several Halguzarn and Mahalvans (corresponding to the Muttodhars in Srikakulam) in several areas of Khammam who had several tenural rights over village lands besides having proprietoral rights over village lands, porambokes, pastures, tanks and tank lands, fisheries etc. This system was however abolished. (atleast from the statute book in 1969). For this reason the messi
did not find much opportunity to conduct struggles against monopolist landlords but had to concentrate their fire on moneylenders, forest contractors etc. This meant that they had to concentrate on wage struggles rather than land occupation programmes. This had very serious implications for their political programme of developing guerilla struggles etc. based on land occupation of landlords personal lands.

Another difference with Srikakulam was that shifting cultivation was less significant in the Khammam area. While the Bhadragiri Tribal Development Block in Srikakulam had under shifting cultivation 47.46 per cent of the total cultivated area, all the blocks of Khammam together had accounted only 9.9 per cent of the total area cultivated under shifting cultivation. This shows the relative pressure of land in the Srikakulam area and also the vast numbers of unemployed men who had to resort to such primitive forms of cultivation.

Another peculiarity of this area as compared to Srikakulam, was that there were many non-tribal poor people here. So there could be no clear tribal non-tribal correlation in these parts.

An Illustration

A more detailed picture of some of the taluqas in which APROC was active would give a more clear picture of the arena
in which they functioned. Mulug, Yellendu, Hugur, are some of the strongholds of APECC.

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Mulug

This area has a total population of 93,408 and the density is only 76 per square mile. There is no village having a population of more than five thousand. Railways are not known to this taluq. Thirty five per cent of the area consists of forests. The whole taluq is dotted with hills and hillocks. A major portion of the Taluq is covered by thick reserve forests.

It is an "Overall deficit taluq as far as foodgrains production is concerned. Fifty per cent are rice eaters, and fifty per cent millet eaters."

Daily wages as in December 1960 are as follows: Men Rs.1.00; women Rs.0.50; children Rs.0.25; herders Rs.1.25; colliers Rs.2.00; carpenters Rs.3.00; and blacksmiths Rs.3.00.

In Mulug 12.24 per cent of the population are literate and 19.57 per cent of them are male and 4.56 per cent of them are female.

In Mulug, there is no village with more than 5,000 population. The taluq headquarters in Mulug village has a popu-
lation of 4,750. There are thirty villages with more than one thousand people, and sixty seven villages have less than two hundred people.

Malug has a hospital with ten beds and Chalag village has a primary health centre. The other one hundred and sixteen villages depend for their medical requirements probably on magicians and quacks.

Two 'Macadam' surfaced roads pass through the taluq. The first one is the Warangal-Eturangaram road, touching thirteen villages in the Malug. The second is the Parkal-Mahadevpur road touching three villages only.

There is a high school at Malug and a middle school at Ghanapuram besides twelve primary schools.

Irrigation by pump is unknown because there is no electricity in any village other than Malug. The Kakatiya Kings of good old days seem to have done more for this area than the present rulers. The former kings built three big tanks Ramappa, Laknavaram and Ghanapuram in the 18th century. Tap water is still foreign to them. Often in summer water is sold at more than Re.0.50 per bucket in Malug.

There are thirty one post offices and the nearest telegraph office is in Warangal – some eighty miles away.
The proportion of scheduled castes to the total population is 15.7 per cent and of scheduled tribes is 17.1 per cent.

There is not even a cinema hall or veterinary hospital.

There are five police stations.

There is one Community Development Block covering fifty four villages. It has passed pre-extension, extension-I periods and is supposed to be extension-2 period. The census table on C.D. Blocks notes "Information not ascertainable." There is a Panchayat Samiti in Mulug Taluq. In sharp contrast to the State Government budget, which always runs into deficit, the income of the Samiti is Rs.2,91,000 and its expenditure is only Rs.1,18,000.

In Mulug Taluq there are no banks. There are no markets also - not even a weekly shandy market. The nearest shandy market for cattle is at Parkal where foodgrains and vegetables are also available. The nearest all-week market is in Warangal.

Most of the scheduled castes and tribes households own land less than two acres. Seventy to eighty per cent of the cultivators also work as agricultural labourers most of the time.
44.5 per cent of the total area of Yellandu consists of forests. Density of population here is 139 per square mile. There are seven villages with more than 5,000 population. Yellandu itself has 10,951 people.

In the whole taluq there are seven pump wells. There is no electricity.

There is one irrigation canal called Singabhipalem Canal irrigating 1800 acres.

The State Highway from Suryapet to Chintalpudi passes through Yellandu Taluq. There are two covered roads one from Yellandu to Boorgambadi another from Yellandu to Kadhira. There are three railway stations in the taluq. The Kanzipet-Vijayawada main line passes through the district. Besides a narrow gauge line connects Yellandu with the coal town Kothagudem.

There are two hospitals - one at Yellandu (eight beds) and another at Barla (four beds). There is no primary health centre or veterinary hospital but there are two veterinary dispensaries at Yellandu and Garla. There are five police stations. There is no market, not even a shandry. There is one bank - a branch of State Bank of Hyderabad at Yellandu. There is a Community Development Block - the Sudimalla Block. The census report about this block also states "Information not ascertainable".
The foregoing statistics show that Yelamndu is somewhat better but not very much when compared to other APCCG strongholds Mulug. An interesting detail about Nugur - another fast developing centre of the movement would not be much out of place. This taluq has no village with a population even of 4,000 people. There is no electricity and no railways. The Census report also tells that "Buses ply on the highway road only during summer. The unbridged vagus (hillstreams) receive large waters during the rainy season and disrupt the road communication facilities." In this taluq census could not even record wages.

II

INITIAL EFFORTS

Leadership

The majority of the Andhra maoists did not agree with the assessment of national situation and the tactical line derived from it by the Bengali leadership of the APCCG. They proposed as an alternative, a graduated approach and a theory of protracted struggle which would take into consideration the level of people's consciousness and the differences in situation in various areas of the country. The Andhra maoists were led by (among others) T. Nagi Reddy (TE), C. Pulla Reddy (GP) and Devulapalli Venka-
teswara Rao (DV). TN was the scion of a feudal family from Anantapur. One of his brothers-in-law was the erstwhile Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh and President of the Congress Party, another of his brothers-in-law was the General Secretary of the CPI, and his brother was the Chief of Anantapur Panchayati Samiti. TN was extremely popular in Anantapur and when his brother-in-law (later Chief Minister) contested against him the latter could not even get back his security deposit. While TN was the mass leader, fund raiser and the general popular symbol of Andhra Maoists, C.P. was the typical organisation man of the Communist Party.

This lanky and tough organizer from Kurnool district was extremely popular among party militants. He had been in forefront of many peasant and other struggles led by Communist Party in Andhra and had been prosecuted many times for his activities. He even faced a murder trial in which he was defended by K.V. Raghu-
natha Reddy. While both T.N. and C.P. came from Rayalaseema district, D.V. was from Telangana. He was a Brahmin and primarily a theoretician and ideologue of the party. He had been a member of the five-man Committee which had led the Telangana Armed Struggle of 1948-1951. All the three T.N., D.V. and C.P. had been members of Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly and served on the higher bodies of Communist Party organisation. They were all members of the Secretariat of the CPI(M) in Andhra Pradesh and also of the Central Committee of the CPI(M). All the three
were in their early 50's (in 1968) when the movement started. Another prominent leader of their party was Madala Narayana Swami, of rich landlord origin and an ex-Member of Parliament from Ongole district.

In 1968 March, these leaders formed a coordination Committee for Communist revolutionaries within the CPI(M) and in June 30, after the Burdwan meet they formed the APOCCR as an independent and autonomous organisation. Following this they issued a circular asking the movement to be directed towards armed struggle. This circular divided the Andhra Pradesh State into three areas and proposed separate tactics for each of these three areas.

Coastal and Rayalaseema districts - No Response

In the coastal regions they had a sizable following. Five members of the district committee of CPI(M) in Krishna (out of a total of 9) and 1150 cadres of the CPI(M) in the district (out of a total of 1500) went over to the Maoists. In Nellore 15 (out of the 17) District Committee members of the previous CPI(M) came over to the Maoists. In Guntur and Godavari also they managed to wean away at least 40% of the cadre and leadership of CPI(M). In all these areas new committees were formed to carry out the Maoists work. T.N. and other leaders extensively toured these areas propagating the efficacy of people's warpath,
and the necessity of leading all struggles towards armed struggle. However, inspite of having a strong organization of experienced Communist Cadre they were unable to start any militant mass movement in this area. The party in this area remained as the financial backbone and the ground for recruiting activists but could not in its own area lead struggles.

The reason for this probably is that the disparities in land-holding in these areas were not very glaring. With its past of ryotwari tenancy systems and particularly after the destruction of few zamindari holdings like those of Chalapalli, Nuzvid and Venkatagiri - there were hardly any large holdings left,

Secondly this area has been a traditional stronghold of Communists and the labour was receiving fairly high wages. Given the organisational strength of the agricultural labour and the general amiable relations with the landed section the Green Revolution increased the general standard of living all around rather than intensifying the conflicts. The Rayalaseema area inspite of its poverty, misery and general drought conditions, was never a stronghold of the Communists. Most of the CPI(M) members in this area followed T.N. and C.P. both of whom were from Rayalaseema, but at least for the time being there was no movement amont the peasants here.

However the APRCC succeeded in launching a mass movement in the Telengana region, particularly in the contiguous forest
zones in the Khammam, Karimnagar and Warangal areas, and on
the other side of the Godavari bank - the Kondamodall forest area.

Success in Mulug

Their initial stronghold was the Mulug area in Warangal
District. Here a militant mass movement of tribals and peasants
had been organised even before 1967 under the leadership of
Ramanarasayya. This 44 year old (in 1969) self-educated kisan
worker was active in the Communist movement from the Telengana
days. He was the Secretary of Mulug Taluq CPI(H) and was also
in the position of Vice-President of Mulug Panchayati Samiti.
He resigned from both these posts to join the APRCC and take up
the maoist line. The 1967 general elections was to a great extent
instrumental for his decision to take up the maoist path. Inspite
of having conducted several mass struggles in this area, resulting
in the stopping of vetti, bribes and other forms of local evils,
and also having a strong organisation of a dedicated band of
militant cadres, the Mulug CPI(H) not only failed in capturing
any seats to the assembly but did not even make a creditable
performance as far as the percentage of votes was concerned.
This might have caused dissatisfaction and rethinking among
the party cadres about the efficacy of electioneering. The Warangal
District Committee which met soon after the fourth General Elec-
tions felt that militant mass movements could not be carried
forward, unless the Parliamentary path was abandoned. In future it decided to concentrate its activities in the forest areas and mobilise the people for militant mass struggles.

With this understanding, they continued their struggles in the forest areas against forest officials, contractors, patels and patwaris and moneylenders. The party claimed that by June 1968, it was entrenched in the whole of Kukug area.

At this time the newly formed APRCC sent a circular to the various units of the CPI(M) asking them to direct the peoples movements to the path of armed struggle. The maoists in Warangal District Committee separated themselves from the CPI(M) fold and held a meeting at Vadalakonda. This meeting was addressed by D.V. and Nalla Narasimulu of Nalgonda another old hand from the Telengana days, an efficient sniper whose courage and dare devilry, in those times had earned him an enviable reputation. Both of them explained the stand of maoists on various national and international situation and the proposed path of revolution for India. Ramanarasayya was made the area Secretary and he was to be assisted by Appanna a 48 year old (in 1969) veteran CPI(M) organiser, who was at that time working in Warangal town, Bhaskar Reddy a youthful (25 years in 1969) right hand man of Ramanarasayya and Anti Reddy (28 year old in 1969) a militant from the neighbouring Nalgonda district. The meeting decided upon mobilising people to occupy banjar and poramboke lands, and conduct
the struggle in such a way as to take it to more militant forms, and combine it with propagation of Maoist revolutionary politics. It was also decided to simultaneously carry out propaganda campaign regarding armed struggle in Telengana during 1948-51.

Efforts to implement the above decisions met with success. The Telengana armed struggle with emphasis on its "uncompromising nature" was hailed. Many local youth were attracted to the party. There was an increase in party strength. Many village committees were established. In about 30-40 villages area committees were organised. The Secretaries of these village area Committees formed themselves into the area Committee to coordinate the movement. During the task of reorganisation the party took time to completely break away from the CPI(M) past. The politics of CPI(M) were attacked and those remaining in CPI(M) were consti-gated as 'cowards'.

With increase in party strength the programme for occupation of benjar lands was implemented. In Malug taluq at Boyyuru, Rampuram and Ramenagar villages the land of some merchant came landlords like Tappa Ramaswamy, Tungaturthi Venkata Sastri and Vaddo Rajeswara Rao was forcibly tilled. In Veeranna peto two hundred acres of lease land was occupied. The programme of land occupation was carried in Eturu, Katapuram, Chintagudem, Lakshmipuram, Tupukulagudem etc. On the whole in about 10 villages the
people have occupied 2500 acres of landlord's. Other struggles by agricultural labourers for increase in wages, struggles against forest guards who took ‘mandi’ frequently for allowing the cattle to graze in the forest areas were led. The landlords retaliated. Many party workers and sympathisers were implicated in cases especially in villages of Dupalagudem, Pasra and Venkatapuram. Professional goondas were employed, and many attempts were made on Ramnarasayya's life.

The impact of the movement in Mulug area was soon felt in Nuggur Taluq adjoining Mulug across the river Godavari, in Yellanda Taluq, South of Mulug, (also in Bhogampadu, Bhadrachalam and Palavancha taluqs of Khammam district), and also in Mantena Taluq of Karimnagar district situated north of Mulug and West of Nuggur. In other areas in Telengana region, for e.g. Jangoan taluq, Urangal town and Nalgonda district also the APRCC was active.

**Khammam — Starting from a Scratch**

On July 1, 1968, important maoists of Khammam area formed a District Coordination Committee. The APRCC Secretariat, sent C.P. to guide the movement in the area based upon the new party line. In the meeting the Khammam district coordination committee was formed. It was decided to take up the following tasks—
1) Concentrate on the mobilising people around issues arising in the forests, like wages, against usury etc. 2) Mobilise people for occupation of banjar lands in forests. 3) Mobilise people for occupation of alienated land and forcibly till it. 4) Conduct propaganda for the boycott of Panchayati elections by carrying out processions, public meetings and propaganda. 5) Give a call for the people to collect locally available arms to resist police and landlords. 6) Give political and military training to young militants in the village volunteer squads.

In Boorgampadu, Palawancha and Yellandu taluq of Khammam district Bathula Venkateswarrao organised the movement. Bathula Venkateswara Rao, was originally from Madhira taluq in Khammam district. He was a law graduate. He became the President of the Student Federation of India and during the time of split with the CPI(M) he took active part in organizing the political schools, against the CPI(M) line. He later became the Secretary of the Khammam District Committee under APCRCC and under his dynamic and youthful leadership mobilised the people into various struggles in the Boorgampadu, Yellandu and Palawancha taluq.

In Aswarapur block of Khammam, Bathula Venkateswara Rao led the tribals to occupy thousands of acres of alienated land.

It was decided to distribute the land not on individual but on collective basis. Some amount of confusion and dissension between the tribals and non-tribals crept in, when the party
gave slogans like "Land to the tribals". The non-tribal poor peasant feared that their lands would also be occupied. According to their review in the Khammam Zilla leaders meeting (on November 23, 1966) "this was due to our inability to differentiate classes in our slogans". The landlords took advantage of the situation and posed as protectors to the non-tribal peasants and even collected bribes from them to enable the establishment of a police camp in that village. On the other hand, in the same village both the tribals and non-tribals willingly joined hands on the issue of occupation of four hundred acres of Government land.

Nugur

The Nugur area adjoining the Godavari river is a very fertile area. Here the tribals were evicted from their lands and converted into bond labour by the rich landlords who had immigrated to this area from Godavari, Krishna and Guntur districts. The Venkatapuram Zamindar, was the biggest land owner of the area and all the land in a majority of the villages was registered as his personal land. As a result most of the people did not have pattas for the lands they cultivated. Besides the Venkatapuram Zamindar, there were the Vajedu Rajas from East-Godavari who came in as small merchants and finally settled down as big landlords. They transferred to themselves lands
worth thousands of rupees from the tribals for non-payment of paltry loans, and registered it in their own name by bribing the patward (the revenue official). The tribals were supposed to get wages of fifty paisa per day. But even this was not paid regularly. For nearly eight months work they were paid only Rs.50/- or Rs.60/-. The food which the farm laboukers were given was paltry. The tribals were also forced to render free service to the forest officials and contractors. Any protest resulted in their being implicated in police cases and going to the courts which was a costly and difficult affair.

The APRCC workers toured these areas conducting meetings, establishing contacts and explaining to them now liberation could be achieved by the organised strength and relentless conduct of class struggles for just rights of the people. Their propaganda was helped by the Charismatic presence of Nirmala alias Radhakka a 30 year old female maoist leader. She belonged to a family of party sympathisers and had taken leave of her family of husband and two children to work in the party's Central office in Vijayawada. From there, on her own initiative she was sent to work in the forest areas. Her presence helped mobilisation of tribal and peasant women in large numbers.

The movement started with a strike by about four thousand people against vetti and corruption of forest officials. This was
followed by a strike of agricultural labourers in the Dharmavaram group of villages demanding increased wages for their work in the Chillie farms.

These struggles resulted in several people including some women, being involved in cases under section 307 (attempt to murder). Despite this, and harassment and threats from landlords and the police, people continued giving shelter and support to Maoist cadre. Many local youth came forward to participate and organise the agitations proposed by the Maoists.

In Yellandu, Boorgampadu and Palavancha areas, the movement was built up under the personal guidance of C.P. who had been sent there as the representative of the State Committee of APROC. C.P. extensively toured the area and particularly the interior forest regions. His energy, enthusiasm and fervour created a great impression on the local people many of whom were drawn to the movement because of his personal influence. These areas were previously (in 1948-51) centres of Telengana armed struggle and people still cherished the experiences, gains and legends of that movement. So to some extent it was easy for the APROC to mobilise people.

**Yellandu**

In the Yellandu Taluq forest area struggles were organised
on the issues of higher wages and vetti. These had good response and took to militant agitational forms particularly in Bayyaram and Kodavatancha. Both the demands were successfully enforced, but there was severe repression by police and landlords on the party cadre. Several cases were registered in which many party cadre and sympathisers were involved.

The landlords also harassed peoples families in many ways. In these circumstance the movement came to a standstill for the time being. This brought C.P. and Gaddam Venkatramayya - a respected old Communist leader of Khammam district, to this area. Both toured the area extensively enthusing people and encouraging them to agitate again on other demands. Several struggles were organised against contractors, patels, patvaris and forest officials. A campaign for non-payment of Revenues and a programme of land occupation was taken up. As a result in Alligudem seventy acres, in Pandalu eighty acres, in Merralpet fifty acres, in Lakshmipuram forty acres, Kantapalli sixty acres and in Ramagundem ninety acres of land was occupied.

The party claimed that militant struggles spread in seventy-eight villages all over the forest areas.

**Bhoorgampadu**

The impact of the movement in Malug was used to organise a movement in Bhoorgampadu under the direction of Balthala Venka-
Several young party enthusiasts like Mohan Rao, a student Federation Worker from Kothagudem (incidentally he is the brother of Radhakka), and Yadagiri, an 18-year-old school student from Bhongir, who left his studies initially to participate in the Separate Telengana agitation, were brought to these areas and sent to tour the villages, organise and mobilise the people. Assisted by several old CPI(M) Kisan organisers like Nellipaka Madhav Rao and Kondayya. They succeeded in forming Committees in about forty-two villages.

They had put forward six immediate tasks to be carried out by the Committee workers, viz. occupation of banjar lands, struggle for increase in wages for beedi-leaf workers, increase in wages of wage earners, collection of famine tax on grains hoarded by landlords, enhancement of rates for workers in forest coops, and finally reduction in rent of vehicles (carts etc.) hired by the peasants. As a result in many villages like Venkatapuram, Gondigudem, Jaggaram, Hallela Madugu etc., the tribals came forward to occupy thousands of acres of forest lands and about eight hundred families were organised to clear the forests, fell wood and occupy it. Struggles against the patwaris for increase in wages, against collection of bribes, against forest contractors for abolition of vetti and against forest officials were conducted. The people participated in
processions in many villages against the forest officials. Vetti and bribes were totally stopped. In Pagidoru area the people could successfully conduct struggles against money-lenders forcing them to phase out repayment schedules without charging extra interest. They even demanded that the locally produced grains were to be sold locally and not to be transported outside. They effectively obstructed and retaliated against a landlord transporting grains outside. With this the landlords were forced to sell grains in the area at low prices. The party claimed that the movement covered seventy villages and had support of two-thirds of the total population.

Palvancha

The Palvancha Taluq earlier had an active CPI(M) unit. After the split the majority went over to the APRCC. As in Bhoorgampadu, even here, the landlords were forced to sell their grains to the local people. (The food situation was bad in these areas). The party workers were implicated in many cases. This did not deter them in carrying out their task of organising struggles. Programme of occupying landlords' land was taken up. In Sattupalli thirty acres of wet land near the canal were occupied, and in Tottipampa village, 120 acres of land under landlords control were occupied by the tribals. The resistance of the local girijan women
against the police in this area, had an impact on neighbouring villages. These struggles met with police suppression as well as conciliatory steps. Seelam Sidda Reddi (Minister in Andhra Pradesh Government) organised a Girijan Maha Sabha. He accused the party-workers for bringing in police, involving the people in a number of cases, and promised that lands would be made available to the tribals if they took a more conciliatory approach towards the landlords. To counter this propaganda, the party decided to organise its own special Girijan Maha Sabha to expose the illusions created by the Minister, and gave the slogan of land occupation, and further intensification of the movement. The party claimed that it established cells in twenty villages and about one half of the total population was with them. In Bhadrachalam, in 120 villages, propaganda against forest officials were conducted by the APROC. More than three thousand agricultural labourers, from neighbouring eighty villages took out a procession popularising their demands.

**M o n t h e n a**

The Monthena area in Karimnagar district adjoining the Nalg Taluq was also a stronghold of the APROC, during the days of Telangana armed struggle (1948-51) in which
movement had spread to this area in the last days (during 1950). After that the communists lost contact with the people here. After the formation of APRCC several communist organisers were sent to this area again to organise the people. Pandu Ranga Reddy, a 35 year old lecturer from Tenali College, his wife Jhanji (incidentally the sister of Radhakka) and Datla Venkata Rama Raju (better known as Peddanna) a factory worker from Samarlakota (East Godavari district) and his younger brother Datla Krishna Raju came to this place under the instructions of APRCC and formed two propaganda squads.

The party organisers had to initially face stiff opposition from the landlords who portrayed the Communists as murderers, looters and rapists. As a result the people had a lot of misgivings about them. To overcome this the party held many meetings, and carried out propaganda, setting before the people their true aims and objectives. These meetings were disturbed by the landlords and their gang of ruffians. In spite of these hindrances, the party managed to organise a procession of two hundred people to the District Forest Officers, with allegations against the forest officials, forest guards and contractors. This had met with some success. The practice of using forced labour was stopped and wage labour established. The notorious patel of Neelampalli was brought before the people and made to
apologise for his activities. With this collection of bribes
was also stopped. The rowdies, who were used by the landlords
to disrupt the meetings of the party were thrashed up and
made to promise to desist from their activities.

A decisive turn for the movement in Mantena took place
when the party lead the people against Government's collection
of four years of revenue arrears. The party gave a call that
only one year's land revenue should be paid and the rest cance-
led. (It became difficult for the people to pay these
arrears, in view of the crop failure that year). The people
resigned to pay arrears, effected the extra illegal incomes
of the forest officers, patels and patwaris (along with the
loss of bribes and loss of use of forced labour). They sent
reports to the authorities regarding the situation. Three
vans of special police, arrived and police camps were establi-
shed in three villages. The people stood by the party
organisers and gave them shelter. The police however had to
leave the place due to the Separate Telangana agitation. This
gave the organisers a breathing space to re-establish their
contacts with the people and organise the movement. According
to the party it claimed that within three months the movement
had spread to forty villages in an area of four hundred square
miles.
Jangaon

In Jangaon, plains area of Warangal district the Taluq Committee of the APRCC led many struggles. It attracted wide support among local people who joined the organisation in large numbers. The whole taluq was organised under various area Committees. The Jangaon taluq committee was formed with eight members, seven of these were whole timers. They were from middle and rich peasant background. Nalla Narasimhulu was the Secretary who became a State level leader after joining APRCC. The Committee was working openly for the time being. Several struggles were led to occupy banjar lands under the landlords occupation in Veerannapet, Gumidalli, Kootikalli, Nallampalli, Vadakonda and many other villages. On the whole about three hundred acres of banjar lands had been occupied by four hundred harijan families. There were also strikes by agricultural labourers for increase in wages. The programme of seizure of food grains which was taken up by the APRCC throughout the State, due to the drought and famine conditions met with success in Jangaon taluq. The grains hoarded by the landlords were seized, and distributed among the people and many hunger marches and processions were being organised. However, with the coming of rains the struggle for food grains lost its momentum.
Nalgonda

The Nalgonda district always supported the Communist party. During 1967 general elections, the CPI(H) party workers and sympathisers had to face severe suppression by the police. Many surrendered or left the movement. Leaders like Nalla Narasimhulu and D. Malla Reddy who had joined the APRCC made efforts to revive the support to them. They led struggles against usury, for increase in wages and also against forest contractors in Nalgonda, Ramannapet and Alemu area with their demands being conceded to. In Suryapet, Hazurnagar and Nalgonda areas, however, they could not make much headway as the whole area was flushed with police and police camp, completely immobilising the activities of APRCC there.

Warangal Town

In the Warangal town, the APRCC organised the rickshaw workers, cart pullers, agricultural labourers, construction workers, Road Transport Corporation workers, private teachers and workers in Azamzahi Mills. It started regular political classes for the Kuzipet Railway Workers. It could also win over a very active section of the students in the medical college, engineering college and the arts college. It set up committees in places surrounding Warangal (in Somadi, Madikonda, Palem,
Paidipalli, Mogali cherla etc.). The copies of party organ Janasakti, literature regarding Telengana armed struggle (1948-51) Lin-Piao's works and even the Liberation were circulated widely. The cultural troupe 'Praja Natya Mandal' was activated.

Training Guerillas

At this time the party also organised a guerilla training camp in Khammam district at the Dilapuram streambed in batches, in the use of sticks, daggers, firearms, and the nature of operations in the jungles. The training was taken among others by C.P., Pandu Ranga Rao, Bama Narasayya, Bathula Venkatesvara Rao etc. Several top leaders from Srikakulam district like Choudary Tejesvara Rao, Pyla Vasudeva Rao etc. also said to have attended the camp.

\[An Assessment\]

Thus, the militant mass struggles which were confined only to the Mulug area until June 1968, were soon extended to other adjoining areas of N Gus in Khammam District and Manthana in Karimnagar district. With persistent work the party developed roots also in Boorgampadu, Yellandu and Palavancha taluqs of Khammam district, and in Jangaon of warangal district) and in Hazurabad and Aleru of Nalgonda district.
In sum, "The people were mobilised on their immediate issues to fight against the exploitation and the injustices of the forest officials, and the village patels and patwaris. In addition, the people in these areas began by organising themselves to occupy government forest lands which had been forcibly taken by the landlords from them long ago". There were also struggles in certain areas for increase in wages to collect 'beedi' leaves, for increasing wages to fell and log wood in forest coupes.

The above struggles were combined with propaganda. Public meetings were held in both big and small village. The "glorious past" of the Telengana armed struggle days was propagated to instil among the people "the necessity of People's War path and to create an atmosphere of struggle among the people... to reenliven the Telengana movement, its victories, the revisionists and neo-revisionists betrayal and the fallacy of parliamentary path." The party claimed that the anniversary of Telengana Armed Struggle, during October 1968, was held in nearly five thousand villages, with the message reaching even the remotest village. A campaign of wall writing was carried, and booklets on Telengana were published. Many processions were organised. In a meeting at Kothagudem seven thousand had attended while in Warangal ten thousand had attended "which
enthusied all of them."

Soon after the anniversary of Telengana armed struggle, the Panchayat elections came. To avoid side-tracking of the struggles towards elections, the APRCC gave a call to boycott panchayati elections and at the same time propagated for elections to the party's village committees, and their self-Governments. However, in many areas, the party's forum was used by the sympathisers to get into the Panchayats.

So during this period, the APRCC concentrated its efforts on setting up organisational units and branches, and activating them; establishing contacts with people, organising and mobilising them, starting struggles which were mostly of legal and open nature based upon economic demands of the people, combining these movements with propaganda of their revolutionary political line, its aims and objectives. This kind of programme and activities were severely criticised by the Bengal leadership of AICCPCR and their followers in Srikakulam and other districts of Andhra Pradesh. The AICCPCR leadership had developed a tactical line calling for immediate unleashing for guerilla armed struggles all over the country. In this situation particularly after their expulsion from AICCPCR in February 1969, the T.N. - C.P. leadership released several documents which were totally critical about the tactical
line of the AICCCR's leadership. The criticisms levelled by APRCC and the alternative proposals put forward by them give a clear picture of their views of Indian revolution's path.

The thread underlying the various differences between CPI(ML) and APRCC is their differential assessment of the situation in the country and its implications for revolution.

**Differences with CPI(ML)**

**Differential Assessment of the Situation**

The APRCC agreed with the CPI(ML) that there was a revolutionary situation in India but refused to accept that it was in the form of a "nation-wide upsurge which had reached the stage of armed struggle everywhere. To the APRCC the revolutionary situation was an objective fact. Firstly in the sense that the productive forces in India had reached an impasse and could not develop any further without a social revolution taking place. Secondly the people were in a miserable position having to bear the burden of not only an exploitative but stagnant and even decreasing economy. This situation required a revolution which could be carried out only through armed struggle directed against the state, but not through the existing electoral mechanisms. However the subjective situation
had not matured to the extent that the objective forces had. This meant two things. Firstly though the people required revolution, they were not conscious of its necessity and its possibility only through the armed struggle. They also had illusions about bettering their situation through existing political structures. In sum, the peoples need was not yet the peoples demand. Secondly, there was no revolutionary working class party in India which was strong enough to be an effective medium and institutional channel through which requirements of history would fulfil themselves. So, instead of the formulation of a nationwide upsurge APRCC put forward the concept of uneven development. This meant that India with its continental size and innumerable socio-economic cultural diversities presented several levels of development of a revolutionary situation. While in some places people had reached the stage of actively defying the state with arms, in other places people were not even agitating in pursuance of their legitimate and trivial economic demands.

In this situation the APRCC, envisaged five tasks which had to be fulfilled to make revolution a reality. (a) formulating a policy and demands on the basis of which the vast majority of the Indian people would be mobilised to overthrow the existing system — in other words building a united front; (b) giving this political alliance an institutional form to channelise their
energies and utilise their mobilised strength. This was to be done through building of mass organisations and conducting mass struggles; (c) leading people to armed struggle by raising their political consciousness through conduct of several partial struggles based on economic demands; (d) utilising all forms and types of tactics in order to direct the people towards armed struggle; (e) and finally concretely, carefully and realistically operationalising and planning the whole course of revolution.

The Political line of United Front

The primary task of the APRCC was to create a mass base which would isolate and weaken the enemy. This was to be done by building united front of the working class, students, middle classes and the large masses of the peasantry. Within the peasantry the APRCC felt that the large sections of the peasantry were to be united initially against the "big landlords and the big usurious merchants". The small landlords and the small merchants, were to be neutralised, which would isolate the landlords. Each one of the sections in the united front was to be mobilised on the basis of its own daily demands and immediate problems. For e.g. the worker had to be led into struggles on issues like wages, better working conditions and participation in management as well as struggles which had a clear political content like, solidarity campaigns with peasant movements and
protests against Government and imperialism. With this perspective APRCC disputed the CPI(ML)'s formulation of the principal contradiction as being between landlords and peasants. This they felt would lead to abandoning work among workers students and other classes and giving them idealistic and impractical slogans like asking them to abandon their present mode of life and go to the villages and integrate with the peasants. The APRCC instead put forward a broader characterisation of the Indian situation, as one in which several contradictions existed for e.g. between the workers and the bourgeoisie, between the middle classes and the system in general and within the capitalists and imperialists themselves. This enabled them not only to justify and pursue their United front line but also advocate mobilising of various classes of people by appealing to their specific, problems.

Institutional Mechanisms for the United Front

They saw that the United Front to be effective has to be given an organisational shape. Many types of mass organisations become necessary to conduct mass movements and struggles. Mass organisations can be divided roughly into two types. In the first category there would be organisation of students, workers, agricultural labourers, girijan sanghams, civil liberties and cultural associations. These would be utilised to mobilise
and educate the masses. The second category of organisations would consist of **gram sanghams**, village militia etc. which would provide alternate institutions for people, government and defence.

The mass organisations were not to be abandoned even during repression. Only their form was to be changed to adapt to the new situation.

**From Partial to Armed struggles**

Various sections of the people were to be led into struggles, which though starting on partial and economic demands, could be developed into political struggles. This would be possible because in the course of the struggle, workers, peasants, students etc. would be exposed to the real character of the state and whom it supports. So if the struggles were to be combined with propagation of revolutionary politics, they could be made to realise the need to overthrow the State through armed struggle. The APrCC disagreed with CPI(ML)'s criticism that "economic struggles are economic inducements".

It replied that the "political and revolutionary consciousness of the workers is raised only through a process of economic and partial struggles" and when conducted with proper understanding, perspective and objective the workers come to accept "that only through the overthrow of rulers by armed struggle that the real freedom can be achieved". The misuse of partial struggle
in the past, by the revisionists to lead the party and the people into the morass of economism should not be used as an argument for abandoning them. The partial struggles are the instruments and medium through which the revolutionary potentialities of the underdeveloped subjective conditions could be realized.

According to the APNIC the question of struggle for occupying land CC the landlords was the keystone of Agrarian Revolution. It was not to be regarded as merely another economic struggle. In their view the question of land cannot be separated from that of seizing political power and armed struggle. Land occupation was the first step towards armed struggle. It was only in the process of defending the occupied land that the broad masses of the people could be mobilised to carry out armed struggle for seizure of political power. Only by occupying land can they realise the necessity to overthrow the state, which being the defender of the landlords would try to wrest land from them. Indeed land occupation could be seen as seizure of power, since feudal relations and feudal power are dependent on the pattern of land distribution. For these reasons they disagreed with CPI(ML)'s view that "agrarian revolution must await the smashing of state power. To attempt an agrarian revolution without first smashing the State machinery
in straight forward revisionism". They rejected CPI(ML)'s view that the agrarian programme exposed the revolutionary workers, invited police attacks, bogged down the peasant masses in the mire of economism, and that the setbacks suffered during the conduct of the struggle would only lead to demoralisation of peasant masses. The APRCC's reply to these was that (1) in a protracted struggle setbacks are common. The masses would therefore be prepared to overcome these setbacks, and this can be done by increasing the consciousness and awareness of the people regarding the "relation between the struggle for land and struggle for political power" (2).

The question of land is so vital to the peasants, that "if the enemy would be able to seize the land by employing overwhelming force, the peasant masses would be fully prepared to recover the land no matter how many times they have to do it". Another criticism levelled by the CPI(ML) on this issue is that by taking up the land distribution programmes, quarrels among the "land-hungry peasants would arise, leading to "blood letting fratricidal strife". To this the APRCC replied, that if the agrarian programme was implemented properly and if the contradictions which develop are handled correctly, "the poor and landless peasants will be united ever more firmly". The APRCC also ridiculed the CPI(ML) idea that given the possession
of land the peasant "changes his class character, becomes a middle peasant, and within one year drops out of peasant struggles, since the demands of the poor and landless peasants are no longer his demands."

**Tactical Flexibility**

About the process of carrying out armed struggle, the APJCC disagreed with CPI(ML)'s view that guerilla struggle was the only tactic to be adopted. According to the APJCC, though guerilla struggle was the main form of struggle, any other form of struggle whether it be legal or illegal, open or secret, should be taken up if it is useful for mobilising the people and leading them towards armed struggle. Meetings, demonstrations, agitations, ghoraos, dharnas, strikes, in fact anything can be used in so far as they are helpful. This does not mean "that every form of struggle must be followed, but that every necessary form of struggle had to be followed."

Guerilla struggle was seen as a tactic which appeared at a particular stage in the revolutionary process which starts with guerilla struggle and ends with mobile and positional warfare.

**Operationalising of the Concept**

For the successful conduct of the armed struggle the APJCC
prescribed traditional Maoist tactics regarding the operationalisation of its strategy of mass line like united front.

The task was to utilise partial economic struggles to educate, organise and mobilise the people and lead them into struggles; utilise these struggles to build and train guerilla squads; establish zones in which the guerilla squads would be active; slowly build a regular army out of the guerilla squads, and depending and taking advantage of the national situation slowly develop these bases of guerilla activities into liberated zones which would be devoid of enemy's presence and have the establishment of revolutionary authority; after building several such liberated areas throughout the country side of India finally encircle the torns and destroy the enemy authority there.

In choosing the areas in which guerilla bases were to be created preference was given to the mountainous and forest regions. These areas have poor transport and communications facilities making it difficult for the police forces to capture and crush the guerillas, and in general are economically self-sufficient and can hold out inspite of a prolonged blockade from outside. So "if we could mobilize the people of the forest areas on the basis of a concrete political and
military line, we could develop the area soon into a guerilla zone and then a liberated area. Specifically they pointed out to the forest area around the Godavari river which spread over the four states of Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh as a good starting point.

This however did not mean that the APRCC had ignored or abandoned the need for developing struggles in the plains area, as alleged by CPI(ML). The APRCC felt that in the plains areas adjoining the forests, efforts to intensify class struggles and limited guerilla resistance at the present stage was possible. In case of severe repression the party cadre and militants could seek refuge in the forests, and return when conditions improve. By following a policy of advance and retreat, the movement in the plains and forests could be coordinated and taken to higher forms of struggle. In case of those areas, where the movement had already reached a higher stage of struggle temporary base areas could be established and as "armed struggle advances wherever necessary conditions develops we must try to establish stable base areas in the plains area also." The CPI(ML) criticised the APRCC's line of limited guerilla resistance in the plains and sending the cadre to the forests as resulting in isolation from the people and called it a jungle theory. The APRCC felt that the CPI(ML) critique did not take the APRCC's
total perspective of developing the movement, which was 

viz. "It is incorrect to think that plains areas are not useful 

for resistance, though they are less favourable than forests 

and other mountaineous areas in terms of armed resistance".

In sum the APRCC strategy for victorious conduct of revo-

lution was to implement a programme of economic demands inclu-

ding land occupation and once this programme was started, they 

felt that severe police and landlord repression is likely to 

begin. The people would resist and come forward to defend 

their gains. An open confrontation between Governments' armed 

forces and people will take place. At this stage, peasants 

will be armed and the APRCC will organise its cadre and mili-

tants into regular guerilla squads and will go underground. 

The area will be made a guerilla area of constant activity and 

raids. If the area has natural advantages like mountains, 

and the movement grows it will be turned into a guerilla base 

area. But if it is a plains area and the movement at this 

stage is unable to face upto the repression the cadre will go 

to the nearest forests and join the guerilla area there or 

if there is none, they will create one. Out of this guerilla war, 

according to their analysis, a regular red army will arise which 

will have the capacity to deal hard and ultimately decisive 

blows to the armed forces of the ruling classes."
With this process taking place in many areas, guerilla bases are created throughout the nation and revolutionary bases cover the whole map. The APRCC visualises setting in of the second stage viz. the stage of liberation.

With all the guerilla areas engaging and bogging down armed forces of the ruling classes, one or two liberated areas will be created. The liberated areas will be enough to be self-sufficient and have enough population. In their stronghold the existing Government machinery would be smashed... a red area and parallel Government would be formed. With such a step, they believe, a qualitative change will come in the national scene. After this, guerilla warfare will be supplemented with positional warfare and slowly towns would be surrounded and soon the whole country would be liberated.

Thus we see that the APRCC does not visualise any quick victory. They see ahead of them a long period of struggle involving many ups and downs. "We should not clamour for immediate victory.... This is a protracted struggle.... Victory is certain. But, we should remember the cruel truth that it would depend not merely on our efforts and wishes but on many national and international conditions." However they are confident of victory and believe in their historical destiny.
They take comfort from the Kuoist saying that "All reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance they are terrifying but in reality they are not so powerful. From a long term point of it is not the reactionaries but the people who are really powerful".

One fundamental idea to be kept in view throughout the process, is that the whole struggle has to be conducted with a "defensive perspective". The struggle was defense of people's rights and to develop in defense of peoples gains. People were to understand that they were defending their just rights against exploitation and oppression. The enemy was to be branded and made to look like the aggressor.

The above described strategy and tactics were obviously quite distinct from the proposals of the CPI(ML). The APRCC was conscious of it and directed its critical wrath against the programme of CPI(ML). As already noted they dismissed as wishful thinking the assessment of nationwide upsurge and the call of unleashing Naxalbari type of struggles which was based upon that. They also rejected CPI(ML)'s formulation about the principal contradiction which constricted the chances of building of united front. They had no sympathy at all to the idea that united front could be built only after some areas were liberated. They vehemently criticised the CPI(ML) for abandoning mass
struggles, mass organisations and partial struggles based on economic demands in favour of guerilla actions alone combined with revolutionary political propaganda. The APRCC stated that such a line resulted from the fact that the CPI(ML) had no patience to build the movement by utilising all forms of struggle, and so they took for granted the existing political consciousness among the people. When they found this was lacking among the majority of the people, it forced the CPI(ML) to fall back on a few revolutionaries who were in fact isolated from the masses. This led to guerilla squads operating without mass contacts. Such a situation led them to formulate that "the peasant wage war against the state through the guerillas which was only a rationalisation of their isolation."

**Criticism of CPI(ML)**

The APRCC criticised CPI(ML) for proceeding to destroy the feudal classes by annihilating them physically and calling this "the highest form of class struggle and first stage of guerilla struggle". According to the APRCC, it was not by annihilating the class enemies in large numbers but by destroying the State machinery that seizure of power is possible. The "annihilation of class enemy does not annihilate the system nor the forms of exploitation". Nor would annihilation disperse the enemy's
armed forces. It would only lead to increase in their armed
concentration and repression and results in demoralising the
people. It would certainly not lead to the creation of libe-
rated areas as the CPI(ML) claimed. It might be conceded
that through annihilation, people in that particular area
get some relief temporarily. But this does not help the pro-
gress of the movement, and in fact it does not even help to
start a revolutionary movement, as the people are not organised
and made conscious, to effectively resist the opposition.
Thus annihilation only invited repression and abused the people,
and all the opportunity to organise the people for armed
struggle is lost. It created illusions among them, that
without their own efforts and just with a handful of indivi-
duals working, they would be liberated from the present system
of exploitation. CPI(ML)'s claim that repression lead to
increase in political consciousness of the people was also
denied by the APRCC. It stated that "it was only through
repression which was an outcome of the necessity to suppress
the united and militant political and economic struggles, that
created political consciousness, and not the repression which
was the result of annihilation campaigns". They also thought
that annihilation usually degenerates into indiscriminate
killings, disrupting the united front and alienating the party
from people.
They also criticised the CPI(ML) for its wrong understanding about creation of base areas, which was a result of its wrong estimation of national upsurge all over the country. It (ML) made no distinction between different types of terrain and stated that base areas could be created anywhere and everywhere — simply by armed raids of the guerilla. It also criticised the CPI(ML) for saying that liberated areas could be created "when the guerilla units begin to act in this manner (meaning annihilation) in any area the class enemies will be forced to flee from the countryside and villages will be liberated". It was also wrong to equate the movements of the guerilla squads from one area to another with mobile warfare, because mobile warfare developed only at a higher stage when the guerilla army increased in number of recruits, in arms, training and form into regular armed forces.

Answering the Revisionists — Doubtists

While criticising the extremist stand point of the CPI(ML) the APRCC also refuted the arguments of those who said that Indian conditions as compared to China in 1930's or Telengana in 1946-51, were different and much less suitable to conduct of a guerilla armed struggle. The APRCC declared that the Chinese line was applicable to India but that it should
be creatively applied, taking the specific characteristics of India into consideration. "We should never apply Chinese experience word to word in that way we can never develop peoples war ... we should closely examine the differences between India and China ... Then only can we benefit from Chinese experience." At the same time it rejects the contention that the differences between China in 1927 and India in 1972 are so different as to make the Chinese path entirely unsuitable to India. In their documents Bharata Desham - Praja Yuddha Pandha (India and people's war path) and "the tactical line" they have made a detailed comparison between the Chinese and Indian conditions.

According to this analysis, compared to China in 1927, India is an industrially advanced nation. The APRCC does not agree that this makes much difference for two reasons viz. (a) the growth has not been in the direction of national capitalism. Indian industries are appendages to foreign bourgeoisie, and Indian bourgeoisie is comprador bourgeoisie. So industrial advancement need not make any differences in the analysis of the Indian conditions and the resultant strategy. India like China in 1927 is a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country; (b) this industrial growth may mean a stronger
bourgeoisie as an opponent, but it also means a bigger proletariat as a revolutionary ally of the peasants.

Besides, due to the irrigation projects capitalist agriculture has developed in certain parts of India. This development of a rich peasant in the rural sector gives a new social base to big bourgeoisie. The APRCC accepts this difference of the Indian situation with that of China but maintains that such areas constitute only a very limited part in India and even in such areas where such a development has taken place, a crisis has set in motion due to the pauperisation of the peasants and the plight of the agricultural labourers, both of whom were potential participants in the militant struggles.

In China the contradiction between big bourgeoisie and big landlords had led to a violent clash in the form of armed struggle. This made the establishment of liberated areas easily. But in India the contradiction between the ruling classes are confined to parliamentary struggle. The APRCC accepts this fundamental difference. However, they are of the opinion that as the political and economic crisis deepens, as peoples' movement spreads and as the contradictions between the various big bourgeoisie and the big landlord groups, the situation will become explosive and result in permanent social and political
instability including armed conflicts.

In China there were private warlord's armies. Indian revolutionaries have to face only one army (in China this made procurement of arms easier, but the Indian revolutionaries have no such facility). China was helped by the Soviet Union while in India no such support is foreseen. Our borders with China are not easily traversable besides as the border area do not have strong peoples' movement. The AFRCC does not give much importance to this fact. Instead, they point out to the cases of Albania and Cuba where successful revolutions occurred without any help from neighbouring countries.

India has a parliamentary system such as Chinese never had. Lenin had pointed out the necessity of participating in parliament until the people disillusioned. Even Che Guevara had expressed similar opinion. However, the AFRCC feels that Lenin, while supporting parliamentary activities by the revolutionaries, had in view western capitalist countries where workers had fought for and gained parliamentary systems and as such had illusions about them. This formulation, according to them, does not apply to India, where parliamentary system is an imposition from above.

The AFRCC accepts that India's transport and communication system is much stronger, making our army quite mobile
and effective. This, they say "may delay establishment of liberated areas but it would not be a hindrance to the starting of armed struggle, since our struggle starts on agrarian issues and only the local people form the guerilla squads. . . . It may be an obstacle to our spreading; however, ours is a protracted struggle and in the long run it does not make such difference. Besides, we have vast areas inhabited by millions of people without any transport or communication network... people are oppressed and dissatisfied here. We can start here and later on spread when national and international conditions favour."

Chinese toilers had a united leadership under one Communist Party. The Indian workers are under the influence of many parties. The Chinese Party had a nationalist reputation, due to its participation in national liberation movements from the inception. The Indian Communist movement could not become an effective leader of the anti-British imperialist struggles. The bulk of the Chinese belong to the Han nationality and one language is understood throughout the country. The problem of nationality and language restricts the scope of spreading to different Indian revolutionary groups. A movement even if very strong in an area and capable of sparing cadre cannot take advantage of the situation due to these barriers. The Chinese Army had participated in the national liberation struggle and in the days
of Sun-Yat-Sen, it had some political consciousness. The Indian Army on the other hand had been recruited by the British and is purely mercenary. Above all the Chinese Communists had started with an army of 40,000.

All these drawbacks in the Indian situation compared to the situation in China were accepted by the APRCC. They stated that problems like lack of army could be overcome in the revolutionary process. Besides, they said that Indian revolutionary situation had some advantages which the Chinese did not have. First of all, the Chinese revolution took place at a time when capitalist system was stable but today we are supposed to be in an era of eruption of national liberation armed struggles, an age of world wide socialist victory. Another big advantage is Mao's thoughts and existence of Chinese peoples' republic as world revolutionary centre. As for internal conditions a deepening permanent economic crisis and the resultant permanent political instability have created an excellent objectively ripe revolutionary conditions. Acting under these historically favourable circumstances the APRCC believed that victory was inevitable.

Asserting the correctness of the peoples' armed path, the APRCC rejected the arguments that conditions for an armed struggle were less favourable today as compared to 1946 when the first Telangana struggle took place. Their argument
was based on (a) in those days the majority of the people were under the impression that the Congress Party had brought about national independence and that the Congress in those days had a mass political base to face peoples' struggles. Today, people have no illusions left, and the Government is forced to depend exclusively on the armed forces to face the people; (b) in those days the bourgeoisie largely was united and the national bourgeoisie had high hopes of benefitting from the industrial progress. Today the contradictions between various bourgeoisie groups have become deep and conditions have become permanently unstable; (c) in those days only the Communist party was fighting. Today there are armed struggles by hill-tribes like Nagas and Mizos. The middle classes and workers are constantly struggling. Though at present they are under "revisionist" parties' influence and fight only limited battles for limited demands soon they will join the liberation struggle, (d) in 1948 the Government had £1000 million sterling reserves. Borders were calm. "Today Government is bankrupt and in loans". Borders are alive and engage much of the army. "Ruling classes can increase the army, but this will lead to more economic burden on common man and he will become more willing to fight the oppressors on the otherhand, Ruling classes can take foreign help, but this will expose their comprador nature and arouse national liberation consciousness of people - either way we stand to gain" and (e) lastly
Telangana struggle 1946-51 had to learn everything from experience whereas now one can draw from experiences of Giap and others.

The APRCC rejected two other arguments against the path of armed struggle. One being that India has no tradition of violence. Secondly that "as long as there is bourgeois parliamentary democracy armed struggle against the Congress rule is not feasible." They point to the terrorist movement in India and peasant revolts of Worli in Maharashtra, Noplah revolt and Punnapra and Valayar peasant struggles of Kerala, Azamgarh peasant upsurge in U.P., Tebhaga peasant revolt in Bengal and the famous Alluri Satyanarayana Raju Tribal revolt of Andhra as disproving the point about the absence of tradition of violent revolt. The Telangana armed struggle, Tripura revolt of 1950, Naxalbari, Srikakulam and the general violence of post-independence period are cited by them as examples to disprove the view that armed struggle against the Congress rule was not feasible.
NOTES

1. *Janasakti*, April 1969. *Janasakti* is the AFECC's party organ. At present there are two *Janasaktis*. A weekly which represents the view of T. Nagi Reddy's group, and a monthly which represents C. Pulla Reddy's views.

2. Ibid.


8. Whereas density of population is 600 per square mile in Srikakulam District, it is only 76 per sq. mile in Mulug and 188 per sq. mile in Narasampet Taluq and 110 per sq. mile in Yellandu.


10. Ibid., Table 6.3.

11. Ibid., Table 6.1.


15. Mulug is a taluq in Warangal district, where the movement was intense.

17. Ibid., p. xxiii.
18. Ibid., p. iv.
20. Ibid., p. 74.
21. Ibid., p. xxiii.
22. Ibid., p. 72.
23. Ibid., Map on p. 69.
25. Ibid., p. 46.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 50.
29. Ibid., p. 50.
30. Ibid., p. 56.
31. Ibid., Table Part A and Part B, p. 152.
32. Ibid., Pp.72-91.
34. Ibid., p. A 39.
35. Ibid., p. A 87.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p. D 130.
38. Ibid., p. D 129.
40. Ibid., p. B 51.
41. Ibid., p. B 47.
42. Ibid., p. B 49.
43. Ibid., p. A 90.
44. Ibid.
45. Probably nobody was being paid in cash.
46. Vide., pp. 142-146
47. This five-man committee had only two members from Telengana region - D.V. and Bhim Reddy Narasimha Reddy.
48. Vide., Chapter III, p. 112
50. Vide., Chapter IV, p. 145
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Banjar lands are village fallows, and other common lands, not yet occupied and brought under cultivation.
56. Manuls are bribes which are collected by the Government officials as a matter of course.
58. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. See Ibid.
66. Ibid.
71. Ibid., p. 49.
72. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Viz. Jangaon Area Committee in charge of 13 villages had 78 members and 285 active sympathisers; Ippagudem Area Committee had hold over 12 villages with 197 members and 620 militants; Cheryal Area Committees organised in 23 villages with 129 members and 640 militants, Document W2. Minutes of Jangaon Taluq Committee, 29.11.68.
79. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
83. See Prosecution Witness statements of Nune Samiah, Macherla Gopiah, Chamarti Robiah etc. There are also references to it in various minutes of party meetings and personal letters of members from Srikakulam and Telengana area. Vyavasaya Viplavam...etc., Op. cit., also makes mention of it. The police however stated that "the reports of naxalites being given training in guerilla warfare (in Khammam) was in correct", Deccan Chronicle, December 12, 1968. The police was obviously misinformed at this stage.

86. Ibid.
87. Ibid., p. 32.
88. Vide, p. 137
89. Some problems concerning the Path of People's War in India, APRCC (printed, probably 1970), p. 45.
91. Ibid., p. 60.
92. Ibid., p. 19.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Some Problems of People's War, APRCC, (mimeographed), p. 2.
98. Some problems...etc., (mimeo.), Op. cit., p. 3.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
103. Ibid., p. 37.
105. Ibid., p. 11.
108. *Bharata Deshamu Prajayuddha Pandha, APRCC*, (mimeo, 14.3.72).
110. Ibid., p. 59.
113. Ibid., p. 43.
116. Ibid., p. 48.
117. Ibid., p. 47.
118. *Some Problems*...etc., (Mimeo.), p. 5.
120. Concretely the APRCC is of the opinion that the weakening of the system due to inevitable historical pressures that lead capitalism and imperialism to downfall, the conflicts between the State and Centre, the States themselves may take an armed form with groups and factions of the army actively participating.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid., p. 5.
124. Ibid., p. 8.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid., p. 8.
127. Ibid., p. 16.