The present dissertation proposes to study the role of the Department of Defence—both its civilian and military elements—in policy-making in regard to Vietnam. The role of the Defence Department in defence and foreign policy-making drew increased attention of the American public and scholars after President Eisenhower pointed out, in his farewell address, the dangers emanating from the "military-industrial complex." An effort will be made here to examine the validity of the two conflicting hypotheses: (1) that the military, as the most important component of the "power elite," controls foreign policy-making, and (2) that the military is just an instrument of the civilian elites for ensuring the reflection of their interests in foreign policy. The significance of the period covered in this study stems from the fact that the civilian who headed the Department of Defence was Robert McNamara, a dominant and highly capable individual with an innovative approach whose tenure in office was sometimes characterized as the era of the "McNamara revolution."

To start with, a conceptual scheme of American foreign policy-making will be attempted, to be followed by a discussion of the various hypotheses regarding the role of the military in decision-making on defence and foreign policy. In Chapter I, American involvement in Vietnam from the end of the Second World War to 1960 will be described. In Chapter II, the equation between the civilian and military elements of the Pentagon in policy-making with reference to Vietnam from 1961 to mid-1965 will be discussed. In Chapter III, the interaction between the
civilian and military elements of the Defence Department in policy-making on Vietnam from mid-1965 to February 1968 will be dealt with. Because of the importance of the escalation point -- mid-1965 -- in the context of the conflict between the civilian and military components of the Pentagon, mid-1965 will be taken as dividing line in the history of the interaction between the civilian and military components of the Pentagon on Vietnam. In Chapter IV, the competition of the Pentagon with other federal actors to influence policy-making on Vietnam will be studied. In Chapter V, the interaction between the Defence Department and Congress in regard to Vietnam policy-making will be dealt with. Some concluding observations will be made in the end.

After examining certain alternate models on foreign policy-making, an attempt will be made to suggest a theoretical framework for the purpose of studying the present problem.

The subject is extremely a complex one and the field itself is one with which non-American students are only beginning to be acquainted. The resources for such a work available in India are quite inadequate. The problem of sources was partially met because the present writer was able to spend a few months in the United States. While a feverish effort was made to consult as much materials as it was possible during that very limited time, the writer is acutely conscious of the disadvantageous position in which he is placed in comparison with American researchers who have a vast body of materials within easy reach
and who are also in a position to interview many of persons actually connected with policy-making. Despite these difficulties the writer ventured on the present task with a full awareness of his own limitations as well as the limitations referred to regarding sources and first hand discussions with informed persons.

The materials for the present study were collected from both primary and secondary sources. Besides the Pentagon Papers published by the House Armed Services Committee, its others versions -- one, edited by Sen. Mike Gravel and the other, published by the New York Times -- were primarily used. Government documents like Congressional Record, Congressional Hearings and Committee Reports were made use of. Moreover, memoirs, books and articles by knowledgeable persons having some experience in policy-making in regard to Vietnam were of great help. Interviews and discussions with scholars and ex-government officials in the United States made by the present scholar during his field-trip were of considerable help.

The author is greatly thankful to Prof. M. S. Venkataramani, Chairman of the Centre of American Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi from whose courses the writer initially developed his interest in the making of US foreign policy. Professor Venkataramani kindly made available to the author for consultation materials from his own research concerning some of the issues dealt with in the present
study. The scholar is deeply grateful to him for his guidance at every stage of the present work. He is grateful to Dr. B. K. Shrivastava, Associate Professor of American Studies, and Dr. R. Narayanan, Associate Professor and Head of the Division of Latin American Studies, S.I.S., J.N.U., for their kind help and assistance given from time to time. He owes his gratitude to Mohammed Ayoob, Associate Professor, South Asia, S.I.S., J.N.U., Manoranjan Mohanty, Associate Professor, Chinese Studies, Delhi University and Mrs. Veena Majumdar, Chief Editor, ICSSR, for their keen interest in his research.

The author remembers with pleasure the valuable assistance he received from his teachers in the School of International Affairs, Columbia University, New York during the academic session 1973-1974. The special mention may be made of Roger Hilsman whose course on the "Politics of Defense and Foreign Policy-Making" was of much help in building the theoretical framework for the present study. Moreover, he guided the present scholar in writing two research projects on American foreign policy-making in regard to Vietnam. The author is grateful to Professors W. T. R. Fox, Warner Schilling, Harold Lasswell, James Young, and Stanley Hegginbotham for their valuable suggestions and guidance. Thanks are due to A. Embree, the Associate Dean of the SIA, Columbia University, who was his friend, philosopher and guide.

The author is thankful to his friends L. N. Mishra, Basant Kumar Behera, Devee Chakravarti, Sivananda Pattanaik,
P. S. Ghosh, Adil Yasin, Christopher Samraj, Girijesh Pant, T. P. Bhatt, Indira Kaul, Sanjukta Banerjee and others for their help. He is obliged to the members of the Department of Political Science, Berhampur University, Berhampur, Orissa for their kind co-operation during his study leave. He is thankful to the authorities of the Berhampur University for having sanctioned him study leave for doing research on the present topic. He expresses his obligation to the University Grants Commission, New Delhi for having awarded a scholarship and to the United States Educational Foundation in India for having awarded a Fulbright scholarship which enabled the scholar to study for two semesters in the SIA, Columbia University, New York and collect research materials from various libraries there.

Finally, the author expresses his gratitude to the members of the staff of the Sapru House Library, New Delhi, JNU Library, New Delhi, the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., and the Butler Library, Columbia University, New York, for their kind co-operation.

9 September 1976
New Delhi-110057

Jaya Krishna Baral