Chapter I

INTRODUCTION: THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
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China's Historical Experience

Before the advent of the Europeans, China had very limited contact with the outside world. Its culture and polity were both fashioned in conformity with Confucian ideals. While the West had undergone an industrial revolution and was far advanced, the Chinese scene was characterized by a peasant society and feudalist institutions. It is, therefore, no wonder that China should have failed to withstand the military might of the West based on technological superiority. It tasted its first defeat at the hands of the West in the Opium War and signed the humiliating treaty of Nanking in 1842. For a full century thereafter, i.e. up to 1943, it remained subject to a system of international relations characterized by "unequal treaties". Throughout this century it came into closer and closer contact with the dominant and ever-expanding West. Its old social, economic, and political order was challenged by the alien Western culture.

Defeat and debacle continued in the battlefields. With each defeat China felt more and more demoralized and gave in to the dictates of the West. When it agreed under duress to accord the most favoured nation treatment to Britain after the Opium War, America, Belgium, France, Norway, and Sweden too demanded the same kind of treatment. Its sovereignty was further eroded with the Anglo-French joint expedition of 1858. The West
gradually escalated its demands to cover trade concessions, right of access to its ships to new treaty ports, right of travel, etc. China also yielded diplomatic equality to the Western Powers.

China's humiliation and subjugation was facilitated by the weakness of the government in Peking. The Manchu dynasty was totally corrupt. The court was a hotbed of intrigue. Besides, the administrative and political institutions of Manchu rule were hopelessly outdated. The army was by no means a modernized one. Nor was it an active, disciplined force capable of giving a fight to the West. The misery of the country was compounded by the economic condition, which deteriorated day by day. The size of the population was constantly on the increase; the prices rose steeply; the people groaned under heavy taxation. As the foreigners sought more and more indemnities, the Government had no alternative but to enhance the taxes. There was inefficiency in the collection of revenue, and the Central Government received a much smaller sum than was actually collected. Trade too suffered, and the country was virtually bled white. Thus the Manchus were called upon to deal with the mercantile and rapidly industrializing countries of the Western world when they were least equipped to meet their challenge.

Not only were the Manchus not properly equipped to meet the Western challenge, but they also failed to learn from their successive military defeats up to 1860. They employed the
traditional tactic of "controlling barbarians through barbarians". Unlike Japan, China took its own time to open itself to western ideas and institutions. Indeed it took two decades after its first debacle in the opium war to acknowledge the necessity of studying the west.

The event which occasioned this change was China's defeat in 1860 at the hands of the British and French forces. China had to give in to several crushing demands, including the demand that it open a new Foreign Affairs Office contrary to its tradition. The Chinese at last realized that if they really wished to stand up to the West, they should also learn to produce the western type of arms and weapons, study the Western sciences and acquire Western skills.

China's efforts to modernize in order to meet foreign aggression, however, suffered a setback in 1894, when it lost the Sino-Japanese War. The defeat it suffered at the hands of Japan was too heavy a blow for China. It realized how feeble it had grown; its weaknesses stood revealed to all the world. "The eagles gathered to the prey. The 'spheres of interest' period arrived. Russia claimed Manchuria as its 'sphere of influence', which irritated Japan; Germany, the province of Shantung, with an eye to all northern China; France, the southern borders and Yunnan; Japan, the province of Fukien; Great Britain, the Yang-tze Valley".

The defeat showed the utter bankruptcy of the "self-strengtheners". It also gave a fillip to the efforts of those who wanted their country to imbibe Western learning and study Western institutions. This culminated in the Reform Movement of 1898. The Reform Movement called for a change in the examination system and for a reorganization of the Government on modern lines. The Empress Dowager, however, saw in it a challenge to her power. She, therefore, put it down with the help of the scholar-official class.

The Reform Movement was no doubt put down, but the trend as such was irreversible; for, after the Boxer Uprising of 1900, even the Empress Dowager found it necessary to take some steps towards Westernization. In 1905-6 she gave orders for a review of the administrative system and the education and examination system. She also disbanded the Manchu garrison, and directed that the army and the navy be reorganized. In 1906 she sent influential missions abroad to study systems of constitutional government. She also decided to set up local and provincial parliaments with a view to convening a national parliament in 1915. These steps were no doubt progressive and modern-looking, but they came too late; for the battering blows of sixty years had aroused the sleeping Chinese nation. It was too late for the dynasty to win a new lease of life.

Nationalism thus emerged as the dominant force in China.

2 Ibid., p. 186.
All politically conscious people felt the humiliation implicit in the provisions of the Boxer protocol. The Manchus had proved themselves incapable of safeguarding China's interests. It was against this background that Sun Yat-sen and his followers overthrew the Manchu dynasty and established a Republic in 1911.

The Revolution of 1911 did not mark the end of China's sorrows. Yuan Shih-kai, the provisional President of the Republic, strangled the infant Republic and seized all power. He even sought to proclaim himself Emperor in 1915. Sun Yat-sen, the architect of the Republican revolution, became a fugitive fleeing from place to place. The country was plagued by warlordism, political chaos, and confusion. Taking advantage of the political instability in China, Japan presented its twenty-one demands. If these had been conceded, it would have reduced China virtually to the status of a protectorate of Japan. China failed also to secure justice at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919 though it had hoped to get back the German concessions in Shantung.

China's failure to secure justice at Versailles was the immediate cause of the May Fourth Movement of 1919. Angry and humiliated, the intellectuals sought to organize the forces of nationalism. Two major forces emerged on the Chinese political scene—the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communists.

The KMT was the dominant force in the twenties. Its objectives were the unification of the country, political modernization, and economic development. Though the vestiges of the unequal treaties remained, the KMT succeeded by and large in
unifying the country by 1927, when the capital of China was shifted to Nanking. The Communists - the other political force of the country - were also anti-imperialist, and they also sought to unify the country. Side by side with political unification, they aimed at securing socio-economic justice for the people of China.

There were differences between the KMT and the Communists right from the start, but they were overshadowed by the immediate need to wipe out the vestiges of colonialism from China. The anti-imperialist orientation of the two facilitated the formation of a united front. This front, however, lasted only up to 1927; for the KMT then turned against the Communist movement.

When Japan invaded China in the early thirties, the two major political forces once again came together. In 1932-33 Japan occupied Manchuria and established a puppet regime there. It steadily extended its penetration of China. Then, in 1937, it unleashed a full-scale undeclared war in China. Initially, Japan occupied vast areas of China without much resistance. The Japanese army not only burnt down entire villages but also disrupted the social order in wide areas by displacing the inhabitants. The Second World War intensified the Japanese terror.

With the end of the Second World War not only did Japan's

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aggression cease but the political situation inside China also underwent a change. In the process of fighting the Japanese, the Nationalists had shown their incapability and ineptitude. The Communists, with a better political organization and a more appealing socio-economic programme, had emerged as the stronger force. Indeed the Communists gained in strength during the Second World War. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had at the close of the war some 1,210,000 members, a regular army of 910,000 men, and a militia serving locally of 2,200,000 men.

After the Second World War the country was plunged into a civil war. The United States played a role in this war. It is important to understand this role, for it made the Chinese Communists and the US Administration hostile antagonists.

Prior to the civil war, the United States enjoyed a lot of good will in China as the champion of the policy of Open Door. The principle underlying this policy was incorporated in a number

5 In the view of Fitzgerald, the Japanese campaign to burn, loot, and kill drove "thousands of refugee peasants into the arms of the communists and those men who had seen their villages destroyed, and their kin slain, who had lost everything, were the best possible and the most ardent recruits the communists could enlist". C.P. Fitzgerald, *Communism Takes China* (London, 1971), p. 107.

6 Ibid.

7 The policy of Open Door meant equality of opportunity for trade and maintenance of the territorial integrity of China. The United States argued accordingly that the domination of China by any one Power or group of Powers was contrary to the interests of the United States and China. See US Department of State, *The United States Relations with China* (Washington, D.C., 1949), p. 1.
of nineteenth-century treaties. It was first incorporated in the Treaty of Whanghia signed on 3 July 1844. Subsequently, it was reiterated in the Treaty of Tientsin of 1858 and the Berlingame Treaty of 1868. When the working of this principle was threatened in the 1990s, the then US Secretary of State, John Hay, sent Open Door notes to Britain, Germany, and Russia.

After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the US Secretary of State requested the two belligerent Powers to limit their military operations and respect the neutrality and administrative integrity of China. At the outbreak of the First World War China requested the United States to help in preventing hostilities from erupting on its soil. The United States acceded to the request. It also protested to Japan against its twenty-one demands. At the Washington Conference (1921-22) it played a key role in restoring the Shantung Province to China.

Again, when Japan started carrying out its expansionist designs on China after 1931, the United States reiterated the policy of Open Door. When Japan embarked on its policy of forcible occupation of Manchuria, the United States announced that it would not recognize "any situation, treaty or agreement" affecting the rights of the Government and people of China. It also urged Japan to act with restraint during its undeclared war.

8 The Powers participating in the conference signed a Nine-Power Treaty on 6 February 1922 and agreed to respect "the sovereignty, independence, territorial and administrative integrity of China and to uphold the principle of open door". See The United States Relations with China, n. 7, Annex. 14, p. 437.
with China. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, it joined up with China and fought against Japan. All these friendly gestures towards the people of China, however, came to nothing when it practically sided with the Nationalists during China's civil war.

In the early stages of the civil war, the United States tried to mediate between the KMT and the Communists. According to the then US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, the US objective was to bring peace to China "under conditions of stable government and progress along democratic lines". General George C. Marshall was sent to mediate. Marshall spent several months in China working out a settlement. He also prepared a series of proposals and counter-proposals. All went in vain. He found that the civil war had created a good deal of bitterness between the two sides. He also felt that the Nationalists were more to blame for the rift. John Leighton Stuart, who went to China in July 1946 in the place of Marshall, fared equally badly. Finally conflict erupted, and it reached its climax in the victory of the Communists in 1949.

The role of the United States in the Chinese civil war was not impartial as between the two sides. The United States not only made efforts to secure a compromise settlement but also actively helped the Nationalists in reasserting their authority in as large an area of China as possible. From 1945 onwards it

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9 Ibid., p. xi.
vigorously pursued the objective of helping the KMT. This vitiated its impartiality. The KMT eventually lost to the Communists. It failed to meet the crisis confronting it: its troops had lost the will to fight and the Government had lost popular support.

Not only was the United States committed to the Nationalists but the outbreak of the Cold War meanwhile had added to the complexity of the situation. Hostility rapidly developed between Red China and the United States with each passing day. American actions in the civil war left no alternative to the Communists but to side with the Soviet bloc. They too became emotionally worked up in the process, and Sino-American hostility increased further.

Sino-American Relations, 1949-1962

By 1949 the international situation was characterized by the dominance of the Cold War. The Cold War was projected as a conflict between two mutually hostile ideologies and political systems. For China, there was "no middle road" at that time. Indeed Mao declared clearly in *On People's Democratic Dictatorship* that China was bound to "lean to one side", i.e. towards the Socialist bloc. In the context of a polarized world it

10 Ibid., p. xiv.

was not possible for China to "sit on the fence" or to build a third road. Although Mao thus expressed himself exclusively in ideological terms, he was fully conscious of the practical necessity of such an alliance "to attain victory and consolidate it".

The US attitude towards China, and especially the policy of containing communism that the United States pursued after the Korean War, made it even more difficult for China to think of any alternative to tightening its links with the USSR. The American attitude to China was expressed in a White Paper which explicitly stated that, China being a part of the Soviet Communist system, the only practicable policy for the United States to adopt was the policy of containment. The US attitude virtually came to be that every anti-Communist element or group should be regarded as a friend, regardless of its nature.

The next significant event during the decade was the Korean War, which provided the United States with a pretext for not recognizing Communist China by portraying it as an expansionist Power. After the outbreak of the war, the United States neutralized the Taiwan Straits and made it its defensive perimeter.

12 Ibid.

13 Acheson said: The Chinese leaders had "fore-sworn their Chinese heritage and have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia, which during the last fifty years under Czars and Communists alike, has been most assiduous in its efforts to extend its control in the Far East". See United States Relations with China, n. 7, p. xvi.

in the Far East. It now stood committed to "defend" Taiwan. Refusing to recognize Peking, Dean Rusk, the then US Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, said: "The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government - a Slavic Manchukuo on a large scale. It is not the Government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese...." China's reaction to the neutralization of the Taiwan Straits was inevitably very sharp. After this, any reconciliation with China became virtually impossible. China felt that "Washington had followed a policy of active hostility toward the new regime in this country" and that without further doubt or debate it should adhere to a definite policy - "one of flat opposition".

After 1954, in order to gain time for the work of national reconstruction at home, China needed a peaceful international environment. Hence it geared its policy "to avoid war, reduce tension, and limit by peaceful means the ability of the United States to deploy its forces -- in short a strategy of denial". The Prime Minister of China, Chou En-lai, made a historic pronouncement at Bandung, and said that the Chinese people were not

15 Ibid., p. 83.
16 Prime Minister Chou En-lai's statement, Ibid., pp. 83-84.
17 China Weekly Review (Shanghai), vol. 4:16, "no. 2"; 10 December 1949, p. 20.
hostile to the American people and wanted to settle disputes through negotiation. This expression of a desire for peace by China, together with the normalization of the situation in the Far East, facilitated Ambassadorial talks at Geneva, but soon these talks were deadlocked over the question of Taiwan. China refused to accept the US demand that it renounce the option to use force as regards the question of Taiwan. Thus, the major point of difference between the United States and China at this time was Taiwan. Vice-Premier Chen Yi's report to the CCP's Eighth Congress in 1956 shows the importance that China attached to Taiwan.

The Chinese attitude towards the United States gradually hardened. Obviously this was due to a feeling in Peking that the Taiwan question was incapable of being solved through negotiation. In reply to a question on negotiation with the United States, Chou En-lai said that the United States only wanted other parties to make concessions although it was itself very rigid. He added that "in the case of US, even when we extended our hand, they refused to take it". It was obvious that

19 Chou En-lai's speech, 23 April 1955. This was reiterated by Chou En-lai in his report to the National People's Congress, China and the Afro-Asian Conference (Peking, 1955), p. 35.

20 Chen Yi, in his report, said: "The possibility of bringing about a peaceful liberation of Taiwan is increasing too. Nevertheless, whatever form the liberation of Taiwan will take, Taiwan is sure to return to the bosom of the motherland. Nothing can stop the Chinese people from liberating Taiwan". MacFarquhar, n. 14, p. 133.

21 Chou En-lai's speech, 29 January 1957. See People's China (Shanghai), no. 5, 1 March 1957, p. 43.
China's increasing hard-line policy from 1958 onwards was due partly to the failure to get any concession from the United States on Taiwan and other related issues.

Besides its strong reaction to the US policy of implacable opposition, there was the failure of the Hundred Flowers Campaign. Not only did China take a sharp leftward swing in the domestic field, but it adopted a more uncompromising line in dealing with the international situation. It was buoyed up by the Russian success in the ICBM test. It looked upon it as signifying a notable increase in the power of the Socialist bloc. It, therefore, felt that a policy of confrontation with the United States would yield quick success. Chairman Mao Tse-tung propounded a new thesis: "Imperialists and all reactionaries are paper-tigers". He maintained that capitalism had reached a stage of decay and that communism was gaining momentum. He called the atom bomb a paper tiger. The "reactionaries", he said, only looked strong; they were really paper tigers. He, therefore, decided to "strategically slight all enemies and tactically take full account of them". This hardline policy was summed up in the slogans "The East Wind Prevails over the West Wind" and "The Strength of Socialism Exceeds the Strength of Imperialism". Meanwhile a major crisis erupted in the Taiwan Straits in 1958,

22 Mao Tse-tung, "Imperialists and all Reactionaries are Paper Tigers", *Peking Review*, vol. 1, no. 37, 11 November 1958, p. 9.

23 Ibid.
a crisis which exacerbated Sino-US hostility. Also, around 1960, a new element, viz. China’s relations with Russia, started dominating Chinese thinking.

It gradually became evident that Sino-American hostility would increase further. Sino-Soviet relations had started deteriorating some years earlier, though this fact came to be fully known to the West only later. China was now convinced that the liberation of Taiwan had become exceedingly difficult. It increasingly criticized the United States for trying a "two Chinas" solution. On the question of China’s representation in the United Nations, the United States had moved a resolution to make it an "important question", the purpose being to exclude China from the United Nations for an indefinite period of time. Thus, on the various major issues affecting China intimately, China continued to be confronted with US opposition and obstruction. Accordingly, the mutual hostility between China and the United States was further aggravated.

The Changing International Situation

The year 1962 saw two major developments on the world scene - the replacement of the environment of the Cold War by a developing understanding in Soviet-American relations and a point of virtual rift in Sino-Soviet relations. These developments were related to each other and affected each other. Sino-

American relations further deteriorated in the new international context.

Thanks to three major crises in their relations - the Berlin crisis, the Cuban missiles crisis, and the crisis in Laos - the United States and the Soviet Union realized the need for some understanding between them. The Cuban missiles crisis especially revealed the danger of a thermonuclear war being unleashed between them without either of them wanting such a war. They saw that the continuance of misunderstanding between them or even a slight miscalculation on the part of either of them might lead to the use of nuclear force and bring about incalculable devastation. They, therefore, reached an understanding between themselves on the need to consult with each other to avoid such a danger. This understanding gradually changed the perceptions of the two world Powers, and they thought of following a policy of peaceful co-existence towards each other.

The other major development on the world scene was the Sino-Soviet conflict. In several ways it contributed to a deepening of Sino-American hostility. An important difference between China and the USSR was the policy to be pursued by the countries of the Socialist bloc towards the United States. China wanted to follow a tough policy towards the United States, whereas the Soviet Union advocated a "soft" line. The United States also took a tough line towards China partly because of China's hostile stance towards it. The United States saw in China a major challenge to its policies and interests in various parts of the world.
The actual course of the two developments would show that Sino-American relations became more hostile in the wake of the new international developments. This chapter is an attempt to present an outline of these developments.

(a) Soviet-American Relations

Three major issues, as mentioned above, led to a new course in Soviet-American relations. In different ways, each contributed to a lessening of the hostility characteristic of the Cold War. They also underlined the importance of better communication of each other's perceptions to avoid the danger of war.

The Berlin Question

The Berlin issue created a tense situation for a long period. Though the solution of the issue seemed far off in both Soviet and American circles, the long duration of the crisis helped transform the perspectives of the Cold War into a limited understanding in Soviet-American relations. Since 1958 Russia had issued threats repeatedly to the West on the Berlin issue, but it had never followed them up with serious action. The United States on its part had never allowed itself to be provoked by Soviet threats. The Berlin issue had no irretrievable shock effect. Slowly and gradually it helped in the reduction of the tensions of the Cold War. About the year 1962 it also helped in the transition to a new era of co-operation in some areas in Soviet-American relations.
Since 1958 Khrushchev had been putting pressure on the West for a quick solution. He, however, never carried out his threats. The West also learnt to be restrained in its actions. In spite of the Soviet threat to sign a peace treaty with East Germany unilaterally, both sides continued to exchange notes with a view to find a solution of the issue. On 13 August 1961 the East Germans started building the Berlin Wall. The West lodged a protest but refrained from taking any further action. President John F. Kennedy kept up his quest for a satisfactory solution through negotiations in view of the difficulty of obtaining a clear-cut victory by any other means.

In spite of Russian harassment in the Berlin corridors early in 1962, the negotiations continued. The West adopted an uncompromising posture on three aspects of the question, viz. the freedom of West Berlin, the question of access routes, and continued Allied presence in Berlin. The result was a tantalizing deadlock. Nevertheless, both sides persevered in their efforts in the direction of evolving an acceptance formula. Khrushchev in a statement published in Pravda agreed to continue the preliminary talks.


the West to withdraw its forces from Berlin. The threat rendered the situation even more complicated. The US Administration, however, did not give up hope in view of the Soviet inclination to continue the probing operations.

Again, in October of the same year, the Soviet Premier threatened to raise the Berlin question in the United Nations in the event of the talks breaking down. However, he still expressed his desire to "continue the dialogue" in order to work out a solution acceptable to both parties.

Thus, in the whole period of the crisis, in spite of both parties taking rigid postures and the danger inherent in the situation, there was appreciation of the need to continue the negotiations. The prolonged dialogue enabled the two sides to gain a fair understanding of each other's positions. Gradually the intense hostility of the era of the Cold War melted away.

In October 1962 the Berlin question was overshadowed by the Cuban missiles crisis. In spite of pressures from various quarters, including China, Khrushchev took care to avoid direct confrontation with the United States. Kennedy also wanted to avoid any dangerous situation in which either side might be tempted or forced to take excessive action to advance its own interests. Thus a new understanding was born which gradually

27 Ibid., 17 November 1961.
29 The Times (London), 26 July 1962.
diffused world tensions. China, however, felt that this new situation impinged on its vital national interests. In its anxiety to achieve its major foreign policy objectives it looked with suspicion upon the growing understanding between Moscow and Washington.

The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962

The Cuban missile crisis made both the United States and the Soviet Union realize the calamitous consequences of a possible use of nuclear weapons on their part to realize their objectives. As Roger Hilsman says, the danger of the use of nuclear weapons is not yet eliminated altogether. Nor is there a complete reconciliation between the East and the West. However, "if either of these objectives is ever attained, historians may well mark the Cuban missiles crisis of 1962 as the beginning".

The crisis is remarkable for the manner in which the danger of war was averted and the two Super Powers showed their anxiety to achieve understanding in their relations.

On the eve of the crisis the US Administration was under constant pressure to invade Cuba militarily. In justification of such an invasion it was argued that a successful Soviet nuclearization of Cuba would double the Soviet striking capacity against American targets, that the political consequences of the Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba were even more crucial, and that

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credibility in the US ability to protect other countries would be lost irretrievably if an audacious Soviet action ninety miles from the US mainland succeeded.

In spite of pressures at home, President Kennedy wanted to avoid an action which would drive the Russians to the wall. Even while it was getting ready to impose a naval blockade on Cuba, the US Administration was busy looking for a way which would "avoid war, preserve flexibility, and offer Khrushchev time to reconsider his actions". This showed a realization of the need to take due note of the other party's difficulties in any grave crisis.

On 22 October 1962, after receiving confirmation of the intelligence reports from Cuba about the presence of Soviet missiles there capable of carrying a payload up to 2,000 miles, Kennedy announced his decision to impose a naval "quarantine" on Cuba. He also asked Khrushchev to withdraw the missiles and "move the world back from the abyss of destruction". Adlai Stevenson, the US representative at the United Nations, requested an emergency meeting of the Security Council. During the debate he forcefully voiced the danger inherent in the situation and

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33 Ibid., p. 685.
requested the USSR to avoid a worsening of the situation.

In his reply on 26 October 1962 Khrushchev apparently offered to remove the missiles in return for an American pledge not to invade Cuba. Next day he demanded that the United States dismantle its bases in Turkey. On 28 October the United States replied to the first letter. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev reached agreement on a formula to end the crisis and ease tensions in other areas. Khrushchev agreed to dismantle the weapons in Cuba and agreed to take them back under UN supervision. Kennedy on his part consented to lift the blockade and refrain from military action against Cuba.

The way in which the crisis was resolved shows that the two Powers were reluctant to use nuclear weapons for achieving their objectives. The Americans realized that they might use military force only if the vital national interests were threatened. For "progressively lesser objectives" at a certain point the "political cost" might be higher than the gain. At such a point, they felt, the wiser course would be to avoid the use of military force and depend on other instrumentalities.

Thus, the Cuban missiles crisis underlined the importance of avoiding crisis situations capable of bringing the two major nuclear Powers face to face militarily. It highlighted the need

35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., pp. 392-404.
37 Hidaman, n. 31, pp. 227-8.
to use negotiations as a means of reaching agreement on political issues. Thus the perspectives of the era of the Cold War began to change, facilitating the emergence of a new power configuration in the international arena. China, however, saw in this development a grave danger to the realization of its vital national interests. It was an anti-status quo Power. Its national objectives had not yet been realized. It criticized the Soviet Union for giving in to US "blackmail". China's relations with the United States became increasingly bitter, for the United States was the principal architect of the new balance of power, a balance of power which was totally unacceptable to China.

Laos

The Laotian crisis of 1962 strengthened the prospects for detente. At the same time, China's influence in Laos also declined. The US objective was to prevent China from gaining a major foothold in Laos. Russia's interest too was to ensure that China did not extend its influence any further in the region in the wake of a Communist victory in Laos.

The capture of Nam Tha affords another illustration of Soviet-American understanding. During the crisis in Laos President Kennedy moved the American air, land, and naval forces, including a group of 1,800 marines, towards the Indo-Chinese peninsula. According to Arthur M. Schlesinger, the idea was to make use of both military and diplomatic means. The Soviet

Schlesinger, n. 32, p. 303.
interest, according to the Americans, was to keep China out of Laos. Although it warned the United States against its war-like manoeuvres in Laos, the Soviet Union was found to be remarkably moderate both in diplomatic conversations and in its public propaganda.

After the Nham Tha take-over, both the USA and the USSR supported the formation of a coalition Government in Laos. The United States had two major purposes in wanting such a Government. It not only regarded military intervention as risky in Laos but also wanted to deny China any political advantage there. After an agreement was reached between the various parties in Laos on the formation of a coalition Government, the New York Times said that it saw the "benign hand" of the Soviet Union in the resolution of the crisis. The Russians, in its view, wanted to keep China several paces behind in a place where Peking was logically expected to be the predominant Power. On 23 July 1962 fifteen nations guaranteed Laotian neutrality, and the United States was naturally happy at the development. The developments in Laos thus not only helped in promoting Soviet-American detente but also highlighted the common interest of the

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39 Ibid., p. 301.
40 Ibid., p. 303.
42 Ibid., editorial, 14 June 1962. Also see the President's news conference, Chase and Lerman, n. 30, p. 240.
two Super Powers in denying China influence in several areas.

(b) **Jino-Soviet Dispute and the United States**

Another important aspect of the changing international situation which had a profound bearing on Sino-U.S relations was the dispute between China and the USSR. The question of peaceful co-existence with the United States was a major point of dispute between the two Communist Powers. By criticizing the USSR for its alleged "soft" line towards the United States, China indicated its own determination to follow a stiff policy towards the United States. And by supporting the Soviet stand as against the Chinese, the United States too indicated its intention of opposing China. However, it avoided making public statements on the Sino-Soviet disputes.

As regards the origin of the dispute there is no agreement among scholars. Some trace its origin to the conference of the world Communist leaders held in Moscow in November 1967. At this conference China pressed for a more aggressive assault on the West than the Soviet Union was prepared for. It gravitated to the extreme Left in the international Communist movement and rejected the possibility of the use of peaceful means to achieve Communist goals. It insisted that war was inevitable as long as capitalism existed. It sought to dissuade Khrushchev from

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implementing his doctrine of "peaceful co-existence". According to another view, the dispute began at the Congress of the Romanian Communist Party held in June 1960. The Soviet open letter of 14 July 1963 gives another version. According to it, the conflict began with the publication by the CCP of an article entitled "Long Live Leninism" on 16 April 1960. The article criticized the policy of peaceful co-existence, the policy of avoidance of world war while capitalism lasted and the possibility of a peaceful path to communism. Thus from the very beginning of the dispute, the issue of peaceful co-existence with the United States figured prominently.

In the beginning China and Russia maintained a facade of unity. On the occasion of the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship the two countries stressed their unity. Observers in the United States, however,

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noted a difference in the way the two countries expressed their views. The Soviet Union, they observed, stressed the necessity of friendship and co-operation 'among peoples of all countries', while China criticized the 'intrigues of imperialist bellicose groups' and expressed reservations on the desire of the West for world peace. Gradually a certain coldness in Sino-Soviet relations became discernible. China returned certain Soviet goods, saying that they were of an inferior quality. The Soviet Union withdrew its technicians working in Chinese plants.

The Moscow conference of the world Communist parties held in November-December 1960 witnessed a bitter exchange between China and the Soviet Union. This transpired to the outside world only in February 1961. According to a report carried by the New York Times on 12 February 1961, Khrushchev branded Mao a "megalomaniac war-monger" at this conference. The Chinese on their part called Khrushchev a "revisionist". They also accused him of bartering their country's interests away for a "deal" with the United States. The Soviets retorted that the Chinese had no idea of the nature of modern war. Thus, as many as eighteen months before the news reached the West, the Sino-Soviet conflict had reached a bitter and violent stage. For the first time in the history of the international Communist movement a


conference of Communist leaders ended, not with the usual "unanimous agreement", but with a less-than-silent agreement to disagree.

The dispute erupted anew during the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in October 1961. Khrushchev denounced Albania and the "anti-party group" in Albania and implicitly criticized its policies. The most unexpected feature of the conference was that the disagreement between Khrushchev and the Chinese leadership was publicly recorded.

By the end of 1961 the West came to know some of the changes in the Communist bloc. The US Government, however, refrained from explicitly supporting the Soviet side at this stage. In answer to a question, President Kennedy refused to make "a judgment" on the dispute. He only indicated his Government's desire to conclude more agreements with the Soviet Government in order to achieve a general relaxation of world tensions.

In January-February 1962, the Sino-Soviet dispute became

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51 Tzibigniew Brzezinski, "The Challenge of Change in the Soviet Bloc", *Foreign Affairs* (New York), vol. 39, no. 3, April 1961, p. 437. It has also been argued that the conference was more "remarkable for what it left unsaid rather than what it said". See Charles B. McLane, "China's Role in the Communist Bloc", *Current History*, vol. 43, no. 253, September 1962, p. 133.


53 For Kennedy's Press conference of 1 March 1961 see Chase and Lerman, n. 30, p. 36.
more intense. China and the USSR accused each other of playing into the hands of the Western camp and of wrecking the international Communist movement. According to one view, the escalation of the Sino-Soviet polemics proceeded on three levels during this period (January-February 1962): intensified but veiled attacks; more outspoken but "surrogate" polemics (i.e. the Soviets attacking the Albanians, and the Chinese attacking the Yugoslavs); and a direct ideological controversy in the various international Communist front organizations.

From March onwards there appeared some signs of a detente in Sino-Soviet relations. On 12 April the New York Times reported that there were indications of China and the USSR patching up their quarrel to some extent. Important among these indications were, according to it, China's confession of its ideological errors in the Great Leap Forward movement and the talk in both countries of unbreakable unity between the countries. An editorial in the New York Times referred to these indications of a patch-up, and observed that Sino-Soviet relations were nevertheless different from what they had been before. For the first time in Sino-Soviet relations the two countries were finding it difficult to agree on anything except the right to disagree.

57 Ibid., editorial, 7 August 1962.
The seeming rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union was short-lived. The dispute intensified during the Sino-Indian border war in October 1962 and the Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba the same month.

Peking regarded the Soviet offer to supply weapons to India at a time when the Sino-Indian border situation was tense as an act of betrayal. The U.S. State Department, it is reported, felt happy about the Soviet supply of MiGs to India. From the U.S. point of view, it served two purposes: it enhanced India's efficiency in defending its borders; and it widened the gulf between China and the Soviet Union.

The Chinese attack on India in October complicated the Soviet position. It undoubtedly called into question Khrushchev's policy towards the "zone of peace". Beginning 1955, the Soviet Union had given considerable aid to India, the most powerful state in this zone. Initially it took an apparently pro-Chinese stance, but the course of events in the aftermath of the Cuban crisis and the Sino-Indian border war showed that it strongly disapproved of the Chinese conduct. The Soviets alleged that China was pushing India into the camp of the "reactionaries". China on its part sharply criticized Soviet policy towards the Sino-Indian confrontation.


59 Times of India (New Delhi), 9 October 1962.
China vigorously criticized the Soviet decision to withdraw missiles from Cuba. A Jen-min Jih-pao editorial on 31 October 1962 argued that it was folly to believe "the empty promises" of the United States. On 15 November another Jen-min Jih-pao editorial inferentially accused the Soviet Union of betraying Marxist-Leninist principles by accepting President Kennedy's assurances in regard to Cuba's security. Without naming the Soviet Union explicitly but leaving no doubt as to its meaning, it added that if one retreated, bowed down, or begged for peace "at the expense of the revolutionary principles", the only result would be encouragement of "policies of aggression and war". On 15 November an article in Hung ch'i openly denounced the Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba. It argued that if the Communists failed to recognize the outwardly strong but inwardly brittle nature of the imperialists and the reactionaries of the various countries in their struggle, they would not dare "to win the victory" that it was historically their destiny to win.

On 18 November 1962 the CPJU defended the policy of Premier Khrushchev against what it termed "the unbridled slander".


by the Albanian leadership (really meaning Chinese leadership). It accused them of "pushing mankind toward thermonuclear war".

The Cuban missiles crisis thus sharpened the Sino-Soviet conflict. At the Italian Party Congress held in November 1962, Signor Togliatti supported the Soviet position on war and peace and criticized the Chinese stand as "irrational and absurd".

At the same time Frol R. Kozlov, a CPSU Secretary, criticized Peking's "adventurist position" in the Sino-Indian border dispute. He added that even a local conflict had the potentiality to develop into a nuclear war and that it was, therefore, dangerous to take an adventurist position. He also defended the Soviet action in Cuba, and said that those having faith in their historic future "had no need to play with the thermonuclear fire".

The Chinese delegate rebutted the Soviet charge. He declared that the nature of imperialism would never change. He also argued that war could be avoided only through struggle.

On 15 December 1962, in a long statement, China demanded a meeting of the world Communist parties to resolve the Sino-Soviet dispute. It also defended what it had done in the course of its border conflict with India. It openly criticized the Soviets and accused them of creating dissensions in the Communist

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64 The Guardian, 3 December 1962.
66 Ibid.
On 29 December 1962, for the first time, Pravda included the Chinese among those opposed to Moscow's policy.

On 31 December 1962 a Jan-min Jih-pao editorial reiterated the "paper tiger" thesis. It also gave a call for a meeting of the world Communist parties. It indirectly criticized Khrushchev for making no distinction between "just" and "unjust" wars and for refusing to support "just" wars. It declared that the course of history could not be determined by nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it said, mankind would "definitely destroy nuclear weapons".

On 7 January 1963 Pravda replied to China's charges. It described the Chinese view as "nothing but renunciation of the policy of peaceful co-existence". It rejected China's ridicule of the manner in which the Soviet Union had handled the Cuban missiles crisis. It rejected China's "paper tiger" thesis, saying that it demobilized the masses and conditioned them to the thought that imperialism was a myth not to be seriously taken into account.

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During the period from November 1962 to early January 1963 there appeared a number of comments in the United States indicating U.S. thinking on the developing Sino-Soviet dispute. Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Averell Harriman is said to have described China as more dangerous to the world than the Soviet Union. A *New York Times* editorial sharply criticized the Chinese stand on nuclear weapons. It said that if China succeeded in making nuclear weapons, the future of the world would be bleak.

The East German Communist Party Congress, which opened on 5 January 1963, exacerbated the conflict. Ulbricht, a leader of the East German Communist Party, directly criticized China for not adopting the policy of peaceful co-existence in its relations with India and for going to war with India without consulting the CPSU. Next day Khrushchev defended the Soviet policy of settling differences through negotiation rather than war. He disagreed with the Chinese on the usefulness of an early meeting of the world Communist parties. The Chinese delegate rose to defend his country's position but had to face an unpleasant situation at the meeting.

71 *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 23 December 1962.
74 *Indian Express* (New Delhi), 17 January 1963.
US officials were conspicuously cautious in commenting on the Sino-Soviet dispute. President Kennedy stated in his State of the Union Message that there was no room for rejoicing so far as the West was concerned.

In contrast, news media in the United States were quite vocal. Commenting on the East German Communist Party Congress, the New York Times said that there were certain "basic" and "enduring" factors in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Sino-Soviet polemics continued even after the East German Communist Party Congress. A Jen-min Jih-pao editorial on 27 January 1963 warned the Soviet Premier "in all seriousness" to note that the world Communist movement was at a critical juncture. It called for unity and stressed the need for all good Communists to follow the Moscow Declaration of 1957.

A Pravda editorial on 10 February 1963 announced that the Soviet Union was ready for bilateral talks with China on the ideological differences between them "at any time and at any level" but disapproved of the idea of multilateral talks with all the Communist parties of the world participating in them. It openly accused the Chinese of making "unsubstantiated and sharp criticism" of the other Communist parties and of offering

one-sided interpretations of the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and the statement issued by eighty-one Communist parties in 1960. It also cried for a halt to the polemics.

On 27 February 1963 China accused the Soviet Union of tearing up perfidiously and unilaterally, and in violation of proletarian internationalism, hundreds of agreements that the two countries had signed. On 8 March 1963, in reply to the Soviet taunt that China had not gone to war to recover Formosa, China warned the Soviet Union that it might "at some suitable time" claim the vast Chinese territories in Siberia that Tsarist Russia had annexed.

On 14 March 1963 the New China News Agency (NCNA) released the texts of the letters exchanged on the possibility of talks between the two countries. China accepted the Soviet proposal for talks. It invited Khrushchev to Peking for talks, and said that if he was not able to accept the invitation, talks should be held at lower levels. On 2 April, Khrushchev declined the invitation, and suggested that Mao should come to Moscow instead.


On 10 May, China agreed to send a high-level delegation to Moscow in the following month for talks.

Eventually it was announced that talks would be held in Moscow from 5 July onwards to discuss the ideological differences between the two countries. However, before the talks could actually begin, China sent twenty-five questions to Moscow. The questions it wanted to raise included "combating revisionism, the main danger in the international communist movement". In a letter the CCP stated that it would not allow the general line of the Communist movement to be reduced one-sidedly to peaceful coexistence, peaceful competition, and peaceful transition. It also warned against collaboration with imperialism. It, further, protested against the tendency to entrust the fate of the people to the imperialists.

The letter wrecked what little chance there was of Left unity. Where previously the Chinese views were vague, now they were unmistakably clear; where they were implicit, they were now reiterated with careful precision.

There was widespread discussion in the United States on the Sino-Soviet talks scheduled to be held in Moscow. US news media were unanimous in characterizing them as carrying lasting

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83 The Times (London), 17 June 1962.
85 Griffith, n. 55, p. 143.
significance for the West. They spoke of the need for accommodation with a segment of the Communist bloc - an obvious reference to the Soviet Union - for they considered China as adhering to the orthodox Marxist line of "violent revolution" and demanding uncompromising political opposition towards the United States.

US Government circles too began to express their views in the aftermath of the East German Communist Party Congress. Roger Hilsman, Director of Intelligence and Research, doubted the possibility of a restoration of unity in the Sino-Soviet bloc. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, was even more explicit in his comment. He said that "the monolithic structure of international communism" had been "publicly shattered".

By the middle of 1963, the scope and extent of the Sino-Soviet dispute was clear to observers everywhere. In spite of its cautious statements on the dispute, the United States improved its relations with the USSR and thus clearly demonstrated its preference for the Russian side in the dispute at this stage. China on its part started taking an even more militant anti-American posture than before.

88 Ibid., p. 275.
Change in the Chinese Attitude towards US as a Result of the Changes on the World Scene

China's differences with the Soviet Union, both ideologically and otherwise, hinged on the question of relations with the United States. Though it framed this question in an ideological idiom, its concern for its basic national interest was explicit. The new balance of power brought about by the limited detente in Soviet-American relations deprived China of some of its status and leverage. In view of the rift in its relations with the Soviet Union it could no longer remain assured of Soviet military power being available for the protection of its security and integrity. There also seemed no possibility of the Taiwan question being solved in the near future. Admission into the United Nations, too, looked more problematic than before. These questions had made China an anti-status quo Power.

No wonder, then, if, in such a situation, China turned increasingly hostile towards the United States. There was indeed no alternative as she saw it. The only question before China was now how to fight the United States. Its economic and military power was undeniably small in comparison with that of the Soviet Union or the United States, and it was, therefore, anxious to find a way of making up for its shortcomings. It chose the ideological weapon with which to fight in spite of all its economic and military weaknesses and make a bid for success in its "struggle" against the United States. It felt that it could mobilize a large number of independent states under "a broad United Front" against the US "policies of aggression and
While we can perhaps debate endlessly as to how far ideology played a major part in China's pursuit of its foreign-policy objectives, the really significant point for us is that China proclaimed its commitment to ideology and that many observers accepted its proclaimed commitment without much reservation.

Quite often China found the ideological weapon ideally suited to the pursuit of its major national objectives. Changes in national objectives at times led China to reformulate or at least moderate its ideological standpoint. The "hard line" and the "soft line" it advocated at different times in dealing with the United States and the Soviet Union were closely related to its national priorities. For instance, in the mid-fifties it followed the policy of peaceful co-existence in its relations with the United States. In 1962 it argued that instead of peaceful co-existence, "struggle" should be employed as the main weapon for fighting US imperialism.

Now one thing was certain: China opted for a tough policy towards the United States in 1962. As in earlier years, it continued to oppose US policies in Taiwan and in the countries on its periphery. It also denounced the United States for blocking its admission into the United Nations. As regards the strategy of dealing with the United States, it took a much tougher line than it had ever done before: it declared its uncompromising opposition to the United States in all matters.

Taiwan

Taiwan was an important issue in Sino-US relations. After the Korean War, as we have already noted, the Taiwan Straits were neutralized. In 1953 President Dwight D. Eisenhower of the United States declared that he would not restrain Taiwanese forces from invading the mainland. He added that US "responsibility" not to allow Taiwan to attack the mainland had permitted China to kill US soldiers and those of the UN allies in Korea with impunity. Significantly, Taiwan signed a Mutual Defence Treaty with the United States during that year.

Sino-US relations were affected in a major way by the US commitment to defend Taiwan. China reacted sharply to the US decision to underwrite Taiwan. All the same, Premier Chou En-lai, as noted before, agreed to enter into negotiations with the United States. China and the United States even commenced formal talks in Geneva. The United States demanded that China should renounce the use of force in the "liberation of Taiwan". The uncompromising line taken by the United States in the matter hardened China's attitude in the Taiwan Straits, but it was somehow resolved later. As the United States took a determined line about resisting China's attempt to take over Taiwan by force, China quietly gave up the idea of using force and "turned to a political and long-term strategy".

90 MacFarquhar, n. 14, p. 107.
91 Ibid., p. 147.
In 1960-61 there was much talk in the United States about a proposal for a "two Chinas" solution. A Jen-min Jih-pao editorial on 8 September 1960 strongly criticized the "two Chinas" proposal. Reiterating its position on Taiwan, China said that Taiwan was its affair and that it would decide for itself whether it should "liberate" Taiwan by peaceful means or by force. It criticized the United States for confusing "the international dispute between China and the United States with the internal affairs of China".

In March 1962 there was a report that Chiang Kai-shek had appealed to President Kennedy for "advance" permission to attack the Chinese mainland in the event of any large-scale uprising in China against the Communist regime. However, at a new conference President Kennedy sought to discourage the belief that the United States would support any such adventure on the part of Taiwan. China took Chiang Kai-shek's reported plans seriously. A correspondent of the AGNA even reported military preparations in Taiwan. The Chinese Vice-Premier, Chen Yi, declared that China was paying serious attention to Chiang Kai-shek's preparations for a war with US support and encouragement. He added that

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92 Ibid., Doc. no. 70, p. 302.
94 Ibid.
the United States would bear full responsibility for the grave consequences of such a war.

In August 1962 China further criticized the United States for its alleged attempt to follow the "two Chinas" policy at the Fourth Asian Games in Indonesia. Ti-vu Pan, a sports newspaper, charged that the United States was still not reconciled to the emergence of Communist China.

On 9 September 1962 a U-2 reconnaissance plane belonging to the US Air Force was shot down over Chinese territory. China promptly denounced the US espionage activities. A Ta-kung Pao editorial accused the United States of aggravating tension and preparing for war in the Far East. It argued that the incident of 9 September 1962 was not an isolated incident. A Jen-min Jih-pao editorial held that there was evidence to show that the United States was "the mortal enemy of Chinese people and world peace".

The following conclusions can be set down as regards the Taiwan issue as a factor in Sino-American relations about the year 1962. First, while still keen on liberating Taiwan, China decided to stay its hand till the situation became sufficiently favourable. Second, while it still regarded Taiwan as a major

96 Ibid., no. 2769, 29 June 1962, p. 3.
97 Ibid., no. 2729, 3 August 1962, p. 25.
98 Ibid., no. 2820, 18 September 1962, p. 4.
99 Ibid., no. 2822, 20 September 1962, pp. 9-10.
issue, it became increasingly preoccupied in the sixties with other developments. For some time, thus, it was constrained to accord lower priority to Taiwan without prejudice to its long-range importance. Third, though convinced of Taiwan's preparations to invade the mainland, it accepted official US statements denying encouragement to Chiang Kai-shek's plans of invasion. Last, it was still not quite clear as to how it would liberate Taiwan. The problem was obviously difficult. By 1962 the Chinese leaders seem to have decided to leave it for time to sort out the problem.

As for US policy on the question of according representation to Communist China in the United Nations, the United States succeeded in 1961 in making it an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority. It thus blocked China's entry to the United Nations for a long time. On 26 October 1962, when the question came up for discussion, the United States opposed China's admission. China resented the fact that it had been deprived of its representation in the United Nations because of the manipulation of the United States.

US Policy in the Countries on China's Periphery

US policy as regards the countries on China's periphery was another factor in Sino-US hostility. The United States sought to keep those countries under its own sphere of influence.

It held that the main danger to those countries was the monolithic Communist bloc, especially China. China, therefore, looked upon every US action in Southeast Asia as directed against itself. It condemned every US move in the region.

China regarded the resolution of the Laotian conflict as a victory of the people. A *Jen-min Jih-pao* editorial on 24 July argued that the victory showed the tremendous influence of the Socialist countries and also that it constituted a vindication of the national liberation movement as a historical trend. It viewed the agreement as representing a failure for the "obstructionist" policy of the Western countries.

The situation in Laos deteriorated after the murder of Quinim Pholsena. Describing it as a "grave incident", a *Jen-min Jih-pao* editorial alleged that the murder had been carefully planned. China criticized US "conspiratorial activities" in Laos after the conclusion of the Geneva Agreements. A Chinese Government statement on 16 April 1962 held that the United States had incited "the reactionaries to engineer a series of political and armed conflicts in Laos". US actions, it charged, were in "flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreements". The United States, it alleged, had created splits and provoked armed

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102 Ibid., no. 2788, 30 July 1962, p. 28.
104 *Peking Review*, vol. 6, no. 16, 19 April 1963, p. 13.
conflicts within the neutralist group in Xieng Khouang and the plain of Jars. It warned against the danger of subversion of the coalition government and an expansion of the civil war. It called upon the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference to hold consultations with a view to checking U.S. intervention and aggression in Laos. A Jen-min Jih-pao editorial held the United States responsible for the grave situation in Laos. A Foreign Ministry statement issued on 20 May 1963 openly declared that the United States had intervened in Laos and created an atmosphere of terror in Laos. It added that the United States had introduced a large quantity of weapons in Xieng Khouang and the Plain of Jars.

The Chinese felt very much concerned about the development in Laos, particularly in the context of the changing international situation. In Vietnam also they became concerned more than before.

Vietnam was strategically important for China. Success in Vietnam would have been a political boost to China in its "struggle" against the United States. For the United States also the area was important. It took special steps to frustrate China's success in Vietnam.

China felt especially anxious when on 8 February 1962, the United States established a Military Assistance Command in Vietnam. A Chinese Foreign Ministry statement issued on 24 February 1962 described the US action as marking the beginning of a new phase of US involvement. Expressing the view that China's security was affected, it added: "...while the spearhead of US imperialist aggression points directly to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, it points indirectly to China". It then asked the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference to take prompt action.

China also criticized the "special warfare" of the United States. A Jen-min Jih-pao editorial criticized the United States for alleged violation of its territorial waters by US warships. It charged that the US Military Assistance Command exercised direct control over the US troops and the South Vietnamese army engaged in "mopping-up operations" and in wholesale burning and looting in Vietnam. In March 1962, when the United States carried out a strategy called "Operation Sunrise", China intensified its criticism. A Jen-min Jih-pao editorial on 22 June 1962 described the US action as an "undeclared war" which aggravated the situation in Southeast Asia. It stressed that US activities

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109 Ibid., p. 32.
110 Ibid.
were a "serious threat to peace in Asia".

China condemned US actions in other countries also. It described as a "serious step" the dispatch of US troops to Thailand on 15 May 1962 in the context of the critical situation in Laos. A Jen-min Jih-pao editorial on 13 May 1962 warned the United States that it would not tolerate the establishment of "new military bridgeheads" directed against its territories. General Maxwell Taylor's tour of a number of Asian countries in September 1962 also provoked China to launch attacks on US activities. A Ta-kung Pao editorial on 20 September 1962 held that Taylor's purpose was to press ahead with the policy of aggression.

Conclusion

The changing international situation led China and the United States to see each other as antagonists. In the perception of the United States its basic foreign-policy stance at that time - viz. detente in its relations with the USSR - was endangered by China's hostility. Also, by championing violence and armed revolutions China, in US eyes, posed a major danger in Southeast Asia, an area in which the United States felt that it had a major stake.

In the Chinese perception the United States constituted

113 Ibid., vol. 65, no. 21, 25 May 1962, pp. 11
114 Ibid.
a great danger both to it and to the region. The US policy of detente with the USSR isolated China. China became an anti-status quo Power and opposed the United States. Besides, China had fundamental disagreements with the United States on the question of Taiwan. The United States was also opposing representation in the United Nations. China saw no possibility of these issues being solved except by forcing the United States to yield through an anti-US united front all over the world.

China and the United States sought to pursue policies calculated to frustrate each other's objectives. The changing situation inevitably led them to adopt such a course. No improvement seemed possible in their mutual relations for a long time in the situation then obtaining.