CHAPTER-1
INTRODUCTION

Jammu and Kashmir even after signing the Instrument of Accession 66-years ago in 1947 in favour of India is still crying to be ‘integrated’ with the country. Speaking at the country’s 67th Independence Day celebrations Chief Minister of the State Omar Abdullah said: “The differential treatment meted out to Jammu and Kashmir is fueling its alienation and as long as it continues, the state cannot be integrated into India. We are treated differently, like we are not part of the mainstream. You want to scrap the Article 370 of the constitution to integrate Jammu and Kashmir fully with the rest of the country, but you treat us separately. As long as you do, integration will not happen by changing the clauses of the constitution. It will happen when you change your attitude” (Hindustan Times 2013:11). The Kashmir problem has become of utmost significance in cementing the unity and integrity of India.

Seeking a lasting solution to this problem assumes importance as it remains one of the oldest causes of tension between India and Pakistan. In South Asia, Kashmir is also an issue of concern for powers like The United States of America who believes that if not resolved it might spark a nuclear confrontation and would like to see an end to the terrorist activity that Kashmir’s disputed status inspire, warning that “tension between the India and Pakistan has made Indian sub-continent (Kashmir) the most dangerous place in the world.” The people as well as governments of the two countries are keen to develop good relations and settle the issues that divide them by peaceful means as all the parties involved in the conflict\textsuperscript{1} – India, Pakistan and Kashmiris – have not been able to change the status quo through military means or otherwise in their favour (Zeb & Chandran 2005). Needless to say, all the parties advance a rhetorical claim to the entire territory of Jammu and Kashmir as it existed prior to its accession to India.

\textsuperscript{1}Sumantra Bose argues that those wielding gun or supporting its use as a political weapon have to been recognized and validated as bona fide participants in legitimate, institutionalized politics. Demonization of entire sectors of political opinion as practitioners or apologists of terrorism and fundamentalism - and their exclusion from political and diplomatic processes on the basis of such characterization - will guarantee a continuation of violent, polarized conflict. See Bose (1999).
in 1947 – though New Delhi actually has long wanted the line of control to be made into the permanent international boundary, which Pakistan as well as most pro-independence Kashmiris does not want to accept (Bose 1999). Among the key reasons that peace initiative between these two neighbours have historically failed is the vexing problem of Kashmir. Whereas Pakistan has repeatedly termed this the ‘core issue’ in its contentious relationship with India, New Delhi has maintained that this matter was settled with Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to India. The United States of America also believes that the Kashmir issue remains central to and at the heart of India-Pak relations (Puri: 2001). Many intellectuals from India also hold the similar point of view as far Kashmir issue is concerned (Thapar 2013). Both New Delhi and Islamabad hold different views regarding their conflict. As far as India has been concerned the only issue for discussion between the two countries has been what India regards as Pakistan’s continuing illegal occupation of part of Jammu and Kashmir (Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir or POK), an occupation that began in 1947-48, during the war between the two nations. Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee in February 1999 during his visit to Lahore agreed to put Kashmir on the agenda in a bid to reopen dialogue with Pakistan. However, this glimmer of promise was extinguished later that year by Pakistan’s adventure in the Kargil district of Jammu and Kashmir. This move precipitated a clash that had developed into a full scale war – what became known as the Kargil war – by May 1999. Why has the conflict over the Kashmir persisted for so long? Writing way back in 1954, Joseph Korbel (1954), chairman of the United Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) until 1949, argued in his book Danger in Kashmir that “the real cause of all the bitterness and bloodshed, all the venom speech, recalcitrance and the suspicion that have characterised the Kashmir dispute is the uncompromising and perhaps uncompromising struggles of two way of life, two concepts of political organisation, two scales of values, two spiritual attitudes, that find themselves locked in deadly conflict, a conflict in which Kashmir has become both symbol and battleground”

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2This statement was made by U. S. Secretary of State Collin Powell in Pakistan. See Puri (2001).
3India calls it Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) whereas Pakistan terms it Azad Kashmir.
4Way back in 1964, Leader of National Conference and former Prime Minister of the state Sheikh Abdullah on the request of then Prime Minister Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru went to Pakistan in search of a solution of the Kashmir dispute which could accommodate the interests of Kashmir as also of Pakistan.
The ruler of former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, regarded by many as the paradise on the earth for its natural beauty and also considered very precious strategically, signed the instrument of accession on October 26, 1947. India’s argument for the legitimacy of its claim to Kashmir has been grounded in that accession. Pakistan, however, has always questioned the legality of the accession arguing that districts with Muslim majorities should have been assigned to the new State of Pakistan as partition took place on the basis of religion. For India, this argument militates against the concept on which Indian nationhood is founded, namely, India as a multi-ethnic, secular nation-state. These opposing views have set the tone for the adversial relationship between the two countries ever since (Habibullah 2004).

However, it goes without saying that the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir have suffered immensely from the ongoing conflict between the two hostile neighbours. While the compulsions of Islamabad’s domestic politics ensure that Kashmir and its integration with Pakistan will perennially remain on Islamabad’s political agenda, India is committed to its territorial integrity and will not accept any solution which changes its territorial borders. Truth is also that no political party or coalitions worth its salt in India can afford to change the existing status quo in Kashmir without risking to be electorally marginalised. For Pakistani military establishments, Kashmir could give them a chance to settle the score with India which they had suffered in 1971 Bangladesh War. Moreover, the Kashmir issue legitimises the dominance of armed forces in the power structure of Pakistan as it claims to safeguard the interest of the nation. In addition to these, there are the regional complexities of the Jammu and Kashmir state. While the Kashmir Valley’s population is more or less committed to the option of ‘independence’, the people of the other two regions of the state – Jammu and Ladakh – consider themselves as an integral part of India. Writing on “Social Reform and Political Future of Kashmir” in 1953, Michael Brecher (1953) was of the opinion that the Kashmiris were essentially pro-Kashmir.

\(^{5}\)Jammu and Kashmir was integrated into complex structure of colonial empire due to the British trade interest in the central Asia and concern over Russian expansion. See Tremblay (1997).

\(^{6}\)British historian Alastair Lamb in his book entitled Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1884 - 1990 has argued that the Instrument of Accession was not signed by the Maharaja Hari Singh on 26th October 1947 and hence India’s claim to the state of Jammu and Kashmir was fraudulent. See Lamb (1992).
and not pro-India or pro-Pakistan, and that this feeling was tied up with the universal admiration for their leader Sheikh Abdullah (grand father of the present Chief Minister) and his programme of social and economic reforms. According to Brecher (1953), a relatively small group in the Valley which had suffered as a result of the unsettled conditions in the Kashmir since 1947, particularly the tourist-dependent community, was inclined to favour Pakistan, and that the overwhelming majority, who benefited from the social and economic reforms especially the land reforms instituted by the ruling National Conference government, favoured the continuation of Sheikh Abdullah government, which meant accession to India. The plight of the people garnered international attention in the closing decades of the 20th century, although, unfortunately, only because they had revolted and resorted to political violence. Throughout the 1980’s as the people of Kashmir suffered from the stagnant economy and high level of unemployment, the government of Jammu and Kashmir was scarred by corruption, riddled with nepotism, and prone to blunders. After a series of missteps by the governments in Srinagar and New Delhi culminated in 1987 in what appeared to the Kashmiris to be a rigged election. The newly formed but unpopular coalition between the Indian National Congress and the State’s ruling National Conference made mockery of the State Assembly elections and deprived the dissident groups of representation in the new Assembly by rigging the election results in their favour. This was not something that happened for the first time in the state. The Kashmiris’ anger boiled over. Violence increasingly marked the expression of their political demands. Finally in 1990’s a revolt broke out. Who, then, are the Kashmiris, what are their demands?

The state of Jammu and Kashmir can been seen as the microcosm of India given its diversity of ethnicity, language, culture and religion. Majority of the Kashmiri population living within India resides in the Kashmir valley. Those who live in the Valley and the surrounding area speak Kashmiri. Other two major components of the state are the regions of Jammu and Ladakh. The people of Jammu speak various forms of Dogri, which is different from Kashmiri. Ladakh, the largest of the three components in the terms of area, has predominantly Muslim and Buddhist population (Habibullah 2004). Jammu and Kashmir in 1989 became involved in a mass-based nationalist movement which was accompanied by a wide scale insurgency. The civil administration of the state was brought down by two agitating groups: the secessionist
group headed by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), established in POK in 1976 which gradually extended its influence into Indian Jammu and Kashmir, demanding independence and union of the Indian and Pakistan sides of Kashmir; and the irredentists groups headed by Islamic Hizbul Mujahideen (party of Holy warriors), a militant wing of the radical Jamaat-i-Islami, seeking unification with Pakistan. All of the insurgents were the residents of the Kashmir valley. They were financed, supplied and trained by Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), which was still relishing its success in assisting the Afghans in their resistance against soviet occupation. Home grown Insurgents declared objective was and continues to be ‘azadi’ (freedom) for Jammu and Kashmir, thus restoring to the Kashmiris the dignity that they feel has been compromised by India’s rule over their land (Habibullah 2004). The insurgency quickly dissipated into a struggle for domination among different insurgent groups and what had begun as an ethnic conflict was given a religious colour by the ISI, which promoted religiously oriented outfits. The Hizbul Mujahideen sought to marginalise the JKLF. The principal targets of Hizbul Mujahideen violence were the Pandits of the Kashmir valley, who began to emigrate from the area. The Sufi tradition of the valley based on syncretic culture came under severe threat. By 1993, most separatist leaders, however, had realised that violence had brought only sufferings. Many separatist elements thus joined together under the banner of All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) seeking to harness popular discontent and channel it into peaceful political action” (Habibullah 2004: 5). The APHC was set up on September 9, 1993, in the wake of disillusionment with gun, precisely to serve as a political interlocutor with New Delhi, as ones who enjoyed the confidence of militants. “While overall objective of the APHC has remained ‘azadi’, the exact nature of freedom has remained undefined and because both India and Pakistan have recoiled to at the very concept of independence for the region, which is not an option under the UN resolutions, the ramifications remained undiscussed. Even after the creation of the APHC, some parties were still convinced that violence was their only recourse. Besides, they were interested in sustaining the insurgency in order to damage India’s international standing and dash its pride. … As the revolt flagged, these rebel groups proceeded, with the encouragement of Pakistan’s ISI, to bring in terrorists who had been engaged in Afghanistan to bolster the cause” (Habibullah 2004: 5). This resulted in the rise of murder and rapine within the State by the terrorist groups such as Harkat-Ansar (Movement of the Medinite Friends of the Prophet) and
currently active Jiash-i-Muhammed (Muhammed’s Troops) and Lashkar-i-Toiba (Army of the Pure) (Habibullah 2004). The political upheaval in the recent decades has exacted a heavy toll on the state’s economy and the richest source of income has become the threat and use of violence by the secessionist forces. India’s policy of aggressively pursuing the elimination of militants and at the same time trying to engage them in dialogue has resulted in not only of increased violence by the imported Islamic groups but also extraordinary presence of Indian armed forces in the state. The presence in large number by the armed forces has made state’s local administration irrelevant and de facto institutionalisation of the Indian armed forces in the Valley (Tremblay 2002). “The Indian security forces, which have no confidence in the state’s civilian government’s ability to control militancy, have been successful in establishing themselves as a dominant and quasi-permanent institution (Tremblay 2002:571). Commenting on the state of Jammu and Kashmir’s economy, Gautam Navlakha (2007) writes that thousands of acres of orchards and agricultural land have been acquired in the state particularly in Kashmir Valley, districts of Rojouri, Poonch and Doda by armed forces. Apart from occupation of productive land by the security forces, many institutional buildings including hospitals and schools have been occupied by the armed forces. With more than six lakh security forces present in the state, their demands for more land for camps, training fields, shooting range are substantial. Even otherwise, large deployment has had an impact on economic activities as all movement to and from villages to fields, markets and towns are affected. Were this land to be freed of occupation, which is accompanied by encumbrances placed on the mobility, it would contribute immensely to increasing agricultural/fruit production and generation of revenue and reduce net outflow from the state (Navlakha 2007). Caught up in poverty and politically alienated and swayed by the slogan of ‘azadi’, Habibullah writes that young people are easily being recruited into predatory terrorist organisations, some of which are financed and trained by ISI. “The principal reason why organisations such as Ikhwanul Muslimoon, the Hizbul Mujahadeen, Lashkar-i-Toiba, and Jaish-i-Mohammed have been able to recruit large numbers of terrorists despite popular disillusioned with violence is that they offer the best opportunity to make money. (A similar situation obtains in Afghanistan.) For those taking this course, life may be short, but it is sweet. Recruits have access to luxuries unavailable to common people, such as staying in houseboats and five star hotels and consorting with young women, themselves often orphans with
no prospects for marriage and fed up with commonplace, increasingly burdensome lives. Since 1996, there has been an increase in activity by foreign terrorist infiltrating across international borders and line of control. However, Kashmiri youth also continue to participate substantially in terrorist activities, a fact that is rarely highlighted. At this point, their participation is motivated more by economic considerations than by ideology” (Habibullah 2004: 6).

The Argument

To a large extent, the study of the ‘Kashmir problem’ has been undertaken in a political context with reference to such factors as the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, the influence of Pakistan, and supply of arms from Afghanistan. But the root cause of the Kashmir problem, according to the researcher, is somewhere else. The researcher, in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of the genesis of the Kashmir problem, wishes to study it from a political economy perspective. To the researcher, the Kashmir problem is not merely a ‘political’ problem but has an economic dimension too. One of the key objectives of the research would, therefore, be to systematically bring out as to how the economic and political realms have mutually interacted and contributed in the developments leading to the Kashmir problem. Such an approach needs to be distinguished from the political sociological approach which gives primacy to ‘political’ while analysing it by referring to the political and social institutions as well as the processes.

Our Central argument is that the root cause of the Kashmir problem lies as much in the dominant skewed nature of the political economy of the state as in the dynamics of political autonomy as has been argued in most of the literature on Jammu and Kashmir.

The researcher further wishes to argue that:

1) The problem of Kashmir might have arisen in a particular political context in the wake of the partition of the country but its perpetuation for such a long period of time cannot be explained without rooting the problem in the political economy of the State as it has evolved over the years.

2) The distorted nature of economic development that has catered to the interests of the dominant segments of the society along with the denial of political
democracy has been major factors in creating political alienation among the classes and masses in the Kashmir.

3) Any plausible solution to the Kashmir problem needs to be conceptualised in the context of addressing the issues emanating out of the complex political economy of the state which have been unduly exploited by the insurgent elements in the state to carry forward their agenda in the state.

The present study with the political economy approach drawing on unconventional understanding of autonomy politics has been undertaken with the knowledge that such an approach would throw a better light into understanding the issues related to development, deprivation and alienation in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The researcher through this study has made an attempt to show as to how the incentives available to the private investors have not been as attractive as in other states of the country which have meant that the State of Jammu and Kashmir remains unable to generate sufficient capital from the private sector in the era of new economic liberalisation. The research will also aim to show as to how India’s Kashmir policy of massive aid as a part of autonomy package has not helped the economy of the state as it has resulted into highcost economy. Moreover, because of the excessive and unnecessary intervention by the Central Government over the years in Jammu and Kashmir, most of the investments have been into unproductive sectors. Along with this, high level of economic mismanagement and political nepotism by a particular political party since 1947 helped to isolate the youth of the state from the mainstream. For many, separatism or what they call ‘azadi’ proved to be a way towards achieving their social, political, economic and cultural freedoms which for many have been denied by the Indian state and accuse the New Delhi of treating Kashmir as its ‘colony’.

The researcher in the present study has tried to answer the following research questions:

**Research Questions**

1. What does the term political economy mean and how useful this framework could be in studying the Kashmir problem? To what extent economy has impacted upon the politics of autonomy for Kashmir?
2. To what extend the economic agenda of National Conference as enshrined in the ‘New Kashmir Document’ has been carried out? Special emphasis has to be given to the politics of land reforms.

3. Why there has been relative neglect of fiscal autonomy in analysing the politics of autonomy in the state of Jammu and Kashmir?

4. Has there been a consistent ‘Kashmir Policy’ of the Indian state? If yes, then how has it affected the nature of political economy of Kashmir?

5. How has the economic policy of successive governments in Jammu and Kashmir led to regional imbalances? To what extent, it has been responsible for the counterdemand for regional autonomy and trifurcation of the state emerging from the regions of Jammu and Ladakh?

6. Has the ‘policy of economic populism and appeasement’ adversely affected the state in mobilising its own resources for economic growth?

7. To what extent the lack of infrastructure, lopsided economy, unemployment, financial hardship and corrupt administration created an army of unemployed/unemployable youths, who have been instrumental in the ongoing movement for self-determination.

**Theoretical Framework**

The researcher has examined the various theories of political economy to understand the Kashmir problem specially the rise of secessionist movement in the Valley in late 1980’s and to what extent it could be applicable to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. John Toye (1988) and Siddhartha Prakash (2000) have observed that there are fairly large numbers of scholars who have used the concept of political economy to understand the development process in India. The prominent among the scholars who have used political economy as their analytical framework include – Jagdish Natwarlal Bhagwati and Padma Desai (1970), J. N. Bhagwati and T. N Srinivasan (1975), A. O. Krueger (1974), Michael Lipton (1977), Francine R. Frankel (1978), P. S. Jha (1980), B. R. Rubin (1982), Subroto Roy (1984), Pranab K. Bardhan (1984), Srinavasan (1985), Deepak Lal (1988) and S. Chakravarty (1988). There are three competing paradigms of political economy of India – neo-classical paradigm,
classical political economy and political economy of class opposition – as far as analysis of India’s development is concerned. “Each of these paradigms has been fueled by empirical research by the economists on the different aspects of the Indian economy” (Toye 1988: 98). For Toye, the neo-classical paradigm (represented by Krueger, Roy and Jha) – represents the contribution of the current counter-revolution in the development thinking of India – it has been based on empirical studies of government intervention in trade and industry and the varied effects that such policy actions have had. The classical political economy (represented by Lipton) has focused on rural-urban and agricultural-non-agricultural distribution of assets and investments. The Marxian political economy or political economy of class opposition (represented by Bardhan) has focused around the problem of industrial stagnation and the dynamics of state expenditures (Toye 1988: 99). Political economy is commonly defined as the study of the interaction of politics and economics. Political economy thus can be considered a mode of inquiry which enables a researcher to theorize different types of politico-economic linkages, depending on the specific problem being studied. Thus political economy may be viewed as an attempt to explore as to what kind of relationship exists between economic behaviour and political behaviour. “At the same time economic and political relationship could be understood in a variety of contrasting ways: “on one hand political change can be explained in entirely economic terms – ‘economics of politics’ offered by neo-classical economists, or the determination of the superstructure by the economic base in vulgar Marxism. On the other hand there are theories which focus on the role of political power in shaping economic life. Thus political economy embraces radically opposed intellectual strategies which range from extreme forms of ‘economism’ to equally extreme forms of ‘politicism’” (Toye 1988:98).

**Political Economy of India as a Rent Seeking Society**

Neo-classical paradigm scholars have developed an approach called New Political Economy (NPE) of India from which a theory of rent-seeking emerged leading to a debate amongst the scholars on what has been called ‘dirigisme’ syndrome or ‘interventionism’ by the Indian State. This approach as we would argue seems quite applicable in the case of Jammu and Kashmir. Neo-classical scholars argue that the cause of economic distortion, bias and corruption in developing countries is primarily because of the government intervention and control under a command economy.
According to Toye, the new political economy of rent-seeking in India has grown out of the empirical findings of Bhagwati and Desai and later work by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1973) where they had focused on how political influences inhibit economic liberalisation programmes. According to NPE scholars because of the government interventions and political influences, there is a change as far as the nature of the state is concerned. The interests of the ruling elite become the priority for the government at the cost of the interests of the citizens. The state is seen as nothing but a group of individuals interacting in such a fashion where their self-interest is articulated and promoted in the best possible manner. The welfare state assumes the role of a predatory one where the interest of its ruling elite is paramount over the welfare of its citizens.

In his empirical study of the nature of India’s development, Krueger (1974) developed a theory of competition for ‘rents’. “In many market-oriented economies, government restrictions upon economic activity are pervasive fact of life. These restrictions give rise to rents of a variety of forms, and people often compete for rents. Sometimes, such competition is perfectly legal. In other instances, rent seeking takes other forms such as bribery, corruption, smuggling, and black markets” (Krueger 1974: 291). The allocation of government licences to import was presented as a typical governmental control that creates windfall gains, or ‘rents’. Such rents are the rewards of the partial monopoly power which licences confer and which in a control system the state can give selectively. Krueger argues that his model has particular applicability for developing countries, where government interventions are frequently all-embracing. A theory of how people can compete in order to acquire these gains vide ‘rent-seeking’ was then developed, embracing both legal and illegal means. In 1980’s Krueger’s theory of competition for rents moved a step further where scholars labeled India as a rent-seeking society. According to Toye, “it would have been more exact to label India as a society with rent-creating government, since on neo-classical assumptions about economic motivation all individuals will be rent-seekers” (Toye 1988:103).

For Prakash (2000), an interest group approach to politics is the basis of rent seeking models. Rents are defined as the excess returns over social opportunity costs and rent seeking is the attempt to redistribute the rights of such returns through political actions. According to Toye, “the misguided adoption of certain economic policies,
especially import quotas, itself creates a society with certain kinds of economic irrationalities, a corrupt administration and a political structure dominated by interests fed financially by windfall gains. This later feature is important because it rules out the possibility of achieving the reform which neo-classical are seeking at any rate in India” (Toye 1988: 104). Classifying the Roy’s (1984) version of political economy as highly ‘economistic’, Toye argues that “the crucial determinants in Roy’s model are seen as economic – the system of incentives which, when once distorted, produces a political system which then defends and protects the distorted incentives that have created it. In this, it displays an analytical similarity to the equally economistic theory of the state in vulgar Marxism. Here the bourgeois class controls the power of the state, using it to entrench the class interests of capital and to maintain the exploitation and misery of the working class” (Toye 1988:104).

Another scholar who has used the concept of political economy of rent-seeking to understand the more comprehensive political economy of Indian development is Jha (1980). He refers to the rise of an intermediate class – market-oriented peasant proprietors, small manufacturers, traders and other self-employed groups – to political dominance through their rent-seeking activity. “The relation of this intermediate class to rent-seeking is that it was the beneficiary of rents from the Indian economic controls (Jha quoted in Toye 1988). Since this class had benefitted from the economic controls it tried to perpetuate and even strengthen the regime of shortages. In turn, the strengthening of government economic controls during the Second Plan and after is given as the reason for the onset of economic stagnation in 1966” (Jha quoted in Toye 1988: 106).

**Political Economy of Rural-Urban Divide in India**

Lipton’s (1977) political economy of rural-urban divide attributes urban bias as the moving force behind needlessly slow and inequitable growth in contemporary developing countries. Unlike Bhagwati and Desai (1970) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975) who merely provided the Indian empirical analysis on which rent-seeking theory was built, Lipton provided both empirical evidence on rural-urban divide in India and constructed a socio-political theorisation of it. In the opening paragraph of the introduction of his book ‘Why Poor People Stay Poor’ Lipton writes that “the most important class conflict in poor countries of the world is not between
labour and capital. Nor is it between foreign and national interests. It is between the rural classes and the urban classes.” According to Lipton, “the villages contain most of the poverty, and most of the low-cost sources of potential advance; but the cities have the articulateness, power and organisation. So the urban classes have been able to win most of the rounds of the struggle with the countryside; but in so doing they have made the development process needlessly slow and unfair. Scarce land, which might grow millets and bean sprouts for hungry villagers, instead produces a trickle of costly calories from meat and milk, which few except the urban rich (who have ample protein anyway) can afford. Scarce investment, instead of going into water pumps to grow rice, is wasted on urban motorways. Scarce human skills design and administer, and not clean village wells and agricultural extension services, but world boxing championships in showpiece stadia. Resource allocations, within the city and villages as well as between them, reflect urban priorities rather than equity or efficiency. The damage has been increased by misguided ideological imports, liberal and Marxian, and by the town’s success in buying off part of the rural elite, thus transferring most of the costs of the process to the rural poor” (Lipton 1977: 13).

In his assessment of Lipton’s urban bias theory, Ashutosh Varshney (1993) argues that this theory is essentially pointing towards two things – “one that the development process in the third world is systematically biased against the countryside; and two, that this bias is deeply embedded in the political structure of these countries, dominated as they are by the urban groups. In another words, the countryside is economically poor because it is politically powerless” (Varshney 1993: 04).

There were two other development economist scholars – Mitra (1977) and Mamalakis (1969) – who along with Lipton had put forward the theory which claimed to explain slow economic progress in the third world by prevailing rural-urban relationships. According to Mick Moors (1984), “Mitra described a class analysis approach to the rural-urban relations as ‘one of the grandest problems classical political economy has dealt with’. For the first time since the debates on the British Corn Laws, the rural-urban relationships...”

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7The two classical economists – Thomas R. Malthus and David Ricardo – held different views on ‘the terms of trade’ debate on the British Corn Laws (1360-1846). The question was whether laws limiting wheat and cereals imports into Britain should be repealed. If imports are permitted, inflation will come down; if restriction continued, prices of food would remain high. How would all this affect industrialization in Britain? Malthus was in favour of the continuation Corn Law on the ground that if wheat and other cereals imports were increased, terms of trade would turn against agriculture which in
urban issue was back as a major item on the agenda of political economy” (Moore 1984: 14). “There are a range of differences between Lipton, Mamalakis and Mitra in focus and approach. For example, Mamalakis attempts to explain low growth in Latin America since 1930’s; Mitra tries to explain the falling-off of the rate of economic growth in India in the 1960’s, and Lipton tries to explain both low growth and the persistence of mass rural poverty in most of the third world since the second world War. Lipton argues that ‘urban bias’ – the diversion of resources to urban areas – the cause of low growth and poverty” (Moore 1984: 14). Much before Lipton’s theory of urban bias was established, in 1970’s another scholar R. Schickele (1968) wrote about empirical evidence of urban bias in economic policy of a kind pointed out by classical scholars like Adam Smith. According to Schickele, “the state tended consistently to divert resources from rural agricultural to urban industrial sectors by depressing agricultural produce prices, taxing agricultural exports, taxing agriculture more heavily than industry, and obliging the rural sector to meet the reproduction costs of the industrial work force. Like the classical scholars, Schickele also added a class dimension to the sectoral divide: the surplus extracted from agricultural producers by landlords to moneylenders was diverted to urban sector, not reinvented in agriculture to generate rural livelihood” (Moore 1984: 14). But unlike Smith, Schickele was able to draw attention to the harmful effects of state welfare expenditures on agricultural development and rural living standards. He pointed out the ways in which the state’s welfare expenditures, especially education and health programmes, and its administrative efforts to promote development, were consistently biased against rural areas. “The central focus of the concern was the way in which human capital development failed to benefit rural areas: formal education was simultaneously fitting rural youth for urban jobs and alienating them from agricultural and rural life; salaries and living conditions of public servants were tending to concentrate most of the public service, but especially the more able public servants, in urban areas and in departments catering to urban needs and concerns. There was simultaneously a general feeling that public investment of all kinds was unduly concentrated on urban and industrial facilities” (Moore 1984: 14).

turn retard industrial growth as the agriculture accounted for a major part of the demand for industrial goods. Ricardo, who disagreed with Malthus, argued in favour of repealing the Corn Law. For Ricardo the repeal of Corn Laws would in fact facilitate help industrial growth. Opposition to Corn Laws was led by the Anti-Corn Law League and in 1846 Sir Robert Peel’s government repealed them. A nominal duty continued to be levied until 1869. For details see Varshney (1993).
According to Prakash (2000), “agricultural savings contribute most to the development process, yet the rural economy has often been drained to finance industrial development. Most of the rural surpluses are diverted towards urban centres. The state also works against the small farmer by supplying cheap food to the urban population and paying low prices to farmers by levying heavy subsidies on food. The price disincentive induces farmers to reduce their level of food output, resulting in agricultural stagnation” (Prakash 200: 317-318). Lipton has rightly concluded, writes Prakash, that state intervention has often ‘urbanised the benefits and ruralised the cost of development’ (Prakash 2000). In Jammu and Kashmir, for example, the state government, in the name of streamlining supplies and ensuring the procurement of food grains (read: to provide cheap food to the people of cities) introduced the *Khus-kharid* (procurement of surplus food grain) and made some changes in age-old *Mujawaza* system (revenue paid in kind)\(^8\). However, these methods instead of helping the peasantry turned into oppressive tools in the hands of the officials responsible for collecting revenue. These officials misused their power and position to procure crops from the poor peasants and became the biggest beneficiaries as they extracted large amounts of money (Thorner 1953).

**Political Economy of Dominant Proprietary Classes in India**

The political economy of dominant proprietary classes propounded by Bardhan (1984) is a ‘story’ of three main classes of India namely – industrial capitalist class, the rich farmers and the professionals in the public sector – who, according to him, despite being roughly two deciles of the population, have come to dominate Indian society. Bardhan, according to Prakash (2000), rather than using the Lipton’s political economy of urban bias (Lipton 1977) and Neo-classical political economy of rent seeking (Krueger 1974) separately, has integrated the two paradigms into a wider framework where the post-mortem of the conflicts between these three classes is done and their relationship with the Indian state is analysed. “The first thing that strikes one in this respect in the Indian scene is the plurality and heterogeneity of these classes, and the conflicts in their interests are sufficiently important …” (Bardhan 1984: 40). Describing India’s public economy as nothing but an elaborate network of patronage

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\(^8\)A *Mujawaza* Committee was set up by the Government to formulate a system of procurement on monopoly purchase basis as also to suggest improvement in the realization of *Mujawaza*. See Ministry of Revenue (undated).
and subsidies, Bardhan writes that these proprietary classes fight and bargain for their share in the spoils of the system and strike compromises in the form of ‘log-rolling’ in the usual fashion of pressure-group politics (Bardhan 1984: 66). The heterogeneous elements of the dominant coalition along with the intermediate groups all contribute to the mounting non-development expenditure in the budget and leave for the state a dwindling share of revenue to be reinvested in public capital formation (Bardhan 1984: 67). Exploring the nature of the Indian state and its relationship with society since 1947, Bardhan has tried to trace the impact of these forces on the functioning of the economy, especially its growth process, and on the functioning of the polity. For Bardhan, all the three dominant proprietary classes have significant conflicts of interest among them and these conflicts have serious repercussions on the fortunes of economic growth and of the democratic polity (Bardhan 1984). According to Bardhan, “in recent years the conflict that has become particularly sharp and open in public discussion and agitations is that between the urban industrial and professional classes on the one hand and the rural hegemonic class of rich farmers on the other. The principal cleavage in Indian politics is seen as that of Bharat vs. India, the countryside vs. the city and even borrowing from the rhetoric of the international dependency literature, has pointed attention to what is being called the problem of unequal exchange between India’s metropolitan capitalist industrial economy and the vast agricultural periphery of primary producers (Bardhan 1984: 54-55). However, all the three classes accuse the Indian state of favouring the other two. Finding problem with the conflicts among the proprietary classes which unlike most advanced capitalist countries are not homogeneous, Bardhan argues that the ‘dominant coalition’ is not only marked by plurality and heterogeneity but also has important implications for the pace and pattern of India’s economic growth.

The industrial capitalist class, Bardhan’s first category of India’s proprietary classes, was quite strong at the time independence. It was this class, mainly under the leadership of some of the top business families from western India, which supported the government’s policy of encouraging import-substituting industrialisation, quantitative trade restrictions providing automatically protected domestic markets, and of running a large public sector providing capital goods, intermediate products and infrastructural facilities for private industry (Bardhan 1984: 40). “Since fifties, the government created several public lending institutions, loans from which form the
predominant source of private industrial finance. Even the ostensibly adverse government policy of an elaborate scheme of industrial and import licences has been allowed to be turned to the advantage of the industrial and commercial interests they were designed to control: the richer industrialists, having better ‘connections’ and better access, got away with the lion’s share in the bureaucratic allocations of the licences, thus pre-empting capacity creation and sheltering oligopolistic profits” (Bardhan 1984: 41). According to Bardhan, there were also instances when industrial houses challenged the might of the state by not only openly violating licensing regulations but also by creating unlicensed capacities and produced far in excess of the quantity permitted. It is worth noticing that the successive governments also failed to prosecute the violating industrial houses; on the contrary the governments *ex post* regularised their unauthorised capacity creation (Bardhan 1984: 41). Comparing India to Latin American countries where, according to Bardhan, a major focus of analysis of the capitalist structure is on the role of international capital and its interaction with a relatively weak local bourgeoisie, a remarkable feature of Indian development is the relative unimportance of foreign capital and foreign firms (Bardhan 1984: 44).

For Bardhan, rich farmers constitute the second category of proprietary classes in India who, according to him, are also numerically the most important proprietary class. The land reforms in India after 1947, according to Bardhan, helped the transfer of land from the non-cultivating, absentee, often upper-caste landlords to enterprising rich farmers often belonging to the middle castes and in some cases erstwhile landlords now found it profitable to convert themselves into big farmers with the use of hired laborers and sharecroppers (Bardhan 1984: 46). Under the 1949 Constitution, states were granted powers to enact and implement land reforms. This autonomy led to significant variations across states and time in terms of the number and types of land reforms that were enacted (Besley & Burgess 2000). “The governments has assured for these rich farmers substantial price support for farm products and liberal provision of subsidised inputs (water, power, fertilizers, diesel and tractors) and institutional credit. Agriculture being a state subject but with power of the rich farmers being more of a direct constraint on them than on the central government, there has been hardly any significant taxation of agricultural income and wealth” (Bardhan 1984:46). According to Bardhan, the influence of rich farmers in India is so strong that poor peasants and agricultural wage labourers have remained not only
highly unorganised but also locked into dyadic and clientelist relationship with them. More often than not the poor peasants are used by their rich brothers to demonstrate their numbers and strength whenever agitations for higher prices, subsidies and other state sponsored concessions are launched which by and large serve the interests of the latters. The rich farmers in India not only exploit the poor peasantry in the name of being ‘kisan’ (someone who is engaged in the agricultural activities/ who works in the field) but they also make use of the intermediate class of primarily family farmers. This class of family farmers is also lured into joining hands with rich farmers as some of the concessions gained from the government also help these farmers i. e. – lower irrigation and power rates, higher prices for farm products and subsidised credit and inputs like fertilisers. But, according to Bardhan, again the real beneficiaries of these state concessions are the rich farmers (big landlords).

The third major proprietary class in India is the class of professionals – both in the public and private sectors. For Bardhan, India has a fairly long tradition of powerful bureaucratic functionaries and this was even continued by colonial rulers. During the British rule there was expansion in the numbers of the civil servants and most of the offers came largely from the educated groups in the population. According to Bardhan, the expansion in the size of the professional class in colonial regime was linked more towards educational, judicial and administrative developments than to technological or industrial progress (Bardhan 1984: 52). “This dominant tradition of an independent civil service, particularly in its upper echelons, with social origins that do not have much of a direct stake in the fortunes of private capital, has continued to this day, even though the proportion of professionals coming from business, farmer or trader families has increased significantly” (Bardhan 1984: 52). In India, a very small section of the society that is educated enjoys a very high scarcity value for their education and profession. “By managing to direct educational investment away from the masses, this small group has been able to protect their scarcity rent, and by acquiring license-giving powers at various levels of bureaucracy some of them have increased their capacity to multiply this rental income. It seems the old rentier class in Indian society, deriving its income from the absentee landlordism, has now been replaced by the new rentier elements in the privileged bureaucracy, and not infrequently they both belong to similar social status and castes. Brahmins and other upper castes are disproportionately represented among the administrators, engineers,
doctors, educators, and so forth as they in the old rentier class (Bardhan 1984: 52). No wonder that the issue of reservations in government jobs and in professional colleges and universities creates so much of bitterness amongst the different sections of the society (which also includes underprivileged i.e. S.C./S.T./O.B.C.)\(^9\) as these are the places from majority of the professionals emerge to dominate the society.

When diverse elements of the loose and uneasy coalition of the dominant proprietary classes pulls in different directions and when none of them is individually strong enough to dominate the process of resource allocation, result, according to Bardhan, is the proliferation of subsidies and grants to all the proprietary classes. This action of the modern ‘welfare state’ – giving grants and subsidies – creates reduction in available surplus for public capital formation. The government diverts resources from productive investments to unproductive sectors (subsidising the public sectors) thereby incurring huge loss to state exchequer. “Huge subsidies from the budget are required every year to maintain high support prices for farm products, while the vocal urban consumers have to be pacified with lower issue prices of grains at the public distribution points; to maintain low prices of fertilizers, irrigation water, power diesel and so forth, for rich farmers; to supply all kinds of underpriced public-sector-produced material and services for rich industrialists; and to provide substantial subsidies to export interests. The government is also obliged to supply subsidised credit through public lending for private agricultural and industrial finance. What is disturbing is the fact that many of the subsidies disbursed to the rent-seeking proprietary classes did not always help the cause of accumulation and technical change” (Bardhan 1984: 61). When distribution of patronage and subsidies is unproductive both for the economy and also for the proprietary classes who have much to gain from economic growth of the country, then why these proprietary classes do not come together to dismantle the patronage structure? Bardhan quoting Mancur Olson (1982) argues that solution for greater efficiency through collective action does not work in countries with such large heterogeneous groups because the risks and sacrifices involved for the individuals to reform the patronage structures

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\(^9\) S.C. stands for Scheduled Castes, S.T. for Scheduled Tribes whereas O.B.C. stands for Other Backward Classes. The people from these groups are seen as economically poor and socially backwards and hence require State protection in the form of positive discrimination. The successive Governments have from time to time made amendments in the Constitution to provide them with certain State benefits like reservations in education and government jobs.
cultivated over the years are quite high. Many times, as scholars point out, patronage system are quite true of those countries facing legitimacy crisis (leadership/institutions) and this is where the politicisation of the state’s economy becomes imminent and Jammu and Kashmir fits the bill.

**Political Background**

When India was fighting to liberate itself from the British rule, the people of Jammu and Kashmir led by Sheikh Abdullah were also fighting to liberate themselves against the ‘misrule’ of Dogra regime, a princely state under the Paramountcy of British government. The state which has three historical-cultural regions – Jammu, Kashmir Valley, and Ladakh – was ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh when it acceded to India in 1947. At the time of signing of the Instrument of Accession, the territories of the state apart from present Jammu, Kashmir Valley and Ladakh, also included Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir (POK) territories.\(^{10}\) The POK consists of the so called Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and ‘Gilgit-Baltistan’ (referred to as the Northern Areas). When the state was attacked in the month of October 1947 by the Azad Kashmir Forces with the support of Pakistan’s regular army, Maharaja Hari Singh appealed to India for help and subsequently signed the Instrument of Accession with India. With the signing of instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947, the Jammu and Kashmir became a territory of India and Pakistan an aggressor in the state. By the time New Delhi approached to United Nations for its intervention, and a ceasefire agreement was signed in January 1949\(^{11}\), Indian armed forces could free only two-third of Kashmir from the tribal control while the other one-third remained under the control of Pakistan (Tremblay 2002:571; Jha 1998). It is this territory of the state which Islamabad has refused to vacate and referred to as POK. However, according to Constitution of India, the territory of Jammu and Kashmir comprise all the territories, which, on August 15, 1947, were under the sovereignty or suzerainty of the ruler of the state i.e. including the POK areas of Jammu and Kashmir (Basu 2000: 253). Even today out of 100 seats of legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir, 24 seats are

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\(^{10}\)While India always refers to the part of the state under Pakistani administration as Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir (POK), Pakistan refers to it as Azad Kashmir. Officially the name used by Pakistan is ‘the Azad government of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.’ See Schofield (2004).

\(^{11}\)The ceasefire was signed on 1\(^{st}\) January 1949 by General Gracey on the behalf of Pakistan and General Roy Bucher on the behalf of India.
kept vacant to be filled by the representatives of people living in Pakistan-occupied areas of the State (Basu 2000).

At the time of partition of the sub-continent, both – India and Pakistan – made their claim to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan’s claim on the state was on the basis of its two-nation theory and of the fact that Muslims constituted the majority in state. India’s claim on Jammu and Kashmir was based on Nehru’s ideas of secularism and rejection of Jinnah’s two-nation theory and also the fact that ruler of state Maharaja Hari Singh opted for India and not Pakistan. The state from 1947 onwards – initially because of indecision on the part of the ruler, then an Act of aggression by Pakistan, then acceptance of Instrument of Accession by Viceroy Lord Mountbatten on the condition that as soon as law and order had been restored, the question of the accession of the state would be decided by a reference to the people, then New Delhi approaching United Nations for a third party mediation and then the ‘partisan’ role played by the two veto power holders of the United Nations Security Council – U. S. A. and Great Britain – made Jammu and Kashmir a ‘disputed territory’ between the two neighbours. Initially it was ‘indecision’ on the part of Maharaja Hari Singh who instead of joining India or Pakistan was keen on declaring independence of the state and later popular leader Sheikh Abdullah complicated the Kashmir issue by first supporting India’s position on Kashmir and later contemplating ‘independence’ for the state. When Sheikh Abdulllah took the charge of the administration of the state, he not only defended accession of the state into India but also saw compatibility between Kashmiriyat and India’s idea of secularism and opposed Jinnah’s two-nation theory (Puri 1973: 1992). By 1953, Sheikh Abdulllah had become disillusioned with India’s secularism and had started thinking in terms of independence for the state. According to Victoria Schofield (2004), Sheikh Abdulllah’s speech in Jammu in 1952 pointed to specific areas of dissatisfaction: “I have told my people that their interests were safe in India, but educated unemployed Muslims look towards Pakistan, because, while their Hindu compatriots find avenues in India open for them, the Muslims are debarred from getting government service” (Schofield 2004:91). Sheikh Abdulllah also objected to discrimination against Muslims in the central governed departments as well. Muslims were almost entirely debarred from working in postal services. Instead of striving for secularism, the officers of this department did just the opposite.
“Despite Sheikh Abdullah’s earlier statement that Pakistan was the aggressor against the state in 1947, he began to talk about India and Pakistan in the same terms” (Schofield 2004: 92). From a blue-eye boy of Nehru to someone who could turn the tide in favour of India’s secularism, soon Sheikh Abdullah became an irritant for leaders in New Delhi. Sheikh Abdullah's implementations of land reform in state in a manner not followed in the rest of the country i.e. confiscation of land without paying any compensation to the former landlords (and hence becoming a communal issue as most of the landlords were Hindus of Jammu region and beneficiaries were Muslims of Kashmir Valley) and discrepancies in its implementations gave enough opportunity to Sheikh Abdullah’s opponents to criticize him.

**Sheikh Abdullah and his Politics of Autonomy**

Sheikh Abdullah was also disliked for his dislike of any kind of political opposition and the distinction between the party and the state disappeared from Jammu and Kashmir. In fact, ruling National Conference’s slogan was ‘One Leader (Sheikh Abdullah), One Party (National Conference) and One Programme (*Naya Kashmir* Manifesto) (Bose 1997). The matter got further complicated when Sheikh Abdullah reportedly met American statesman Adlai Stevenson in May 1953 in Srinagar who in an interview to *Manchester Guardian* said that independence could be the best status for Kashmir and this new development was seen by the New Delhi with alarm (Puri 1993; Schofield 2004). When India was arguing its case with United Nations’ Security Council accusing Pakistan of being an aggressor in its territory, Sheikh Abdullah was there in New York as India’s representative where he spoke openly in favour of Kashmir’s accession to India but privately he lobbied for independence for Kashmir with U. S. Representative at United Nations Warren Austin. Sheikh Abdullah reportedly discussed a third option for Kashmir i.e. independence … as he was against his people being torn by dissensions between India and Pakistan. Sheikh Abdullah argues that it would be much better if Kashmir were to become independent and could seek American and British aid for development of the country (Schofield 2004). However, the American official policy at that point was not to allow

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12 In 1951, Sheikh Abdullah organized elections to form Constituent Assembly for the state. His ruling National Conference party ‘won’ all 75 seats uncontested. Even no contest was allowed in Jammu, where Praja Parishad was fighting elections.
‘balkanisation’ of the Indian sub-continent which might destabilise the area and work against the U. S. interest (Schofield 2004). And it was not a coincidence that Sheikh Abdullah while in New York also met some prominent members of the Pakistani delegation there including Taseer who was acting as advisor to the President of POK. When Pakistani delegation asked Sheikh Abdullah about the probable solution to the Kashmir problem, he reportedly replied, “Only this, that Kashmir should be an independent state, free from both India and Pakistan. This should be a solution which should be acceptable to all, a face saving solution. Afterwards, if Kashmir has become an independent state, it will naturally be closer to Pakistan, firstly because of a common religion and secondly, because Lahore is near and Delhi is far off. Such a solution cannot be harmful to Pakistan” (Schofield 2004: 78). Despite mutual dislike and hatred for each other, Sheikh Abdullah and Maharaja Hari Singh were of the same opinion that India had no right to extend its jurisdiction in Kashmir beyond the three areas agreed in the Instrument of Accession – Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications. The Maharaja’s motive was to preserve his dynasty; Sheikh Abdullah's to protect his people.

Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India on the same terms of the Instrument of Accession as were applicable to other princely states that joined India. This Instrument was defined earlier in Section 6 of the Government of India Act, 1935, while the Indian independence Act 1947 provided that the Governor General could adopt it under the Indian provisional Constitution Order, 1947. The Instrument limited the accession of the states to India to three subjects – Defence, Communications, and External Affairs, conceding a residual sovereignty to the states. Despite Jammu and Kashmir's accession, its relationship with India was in the initial stages, according to Puri (1993), was unstable. Fluid situation in the state was caused by situations such as Maharaja Hari Singh threatening India with cancellation of accession, the presence of Pakistani forces, India’s commitment to plebiscite as well as endless debates in the Security Council. At the time of the formulation of the Indian Constitution Sheikh Abdullah demanded a special status for the his state while a number of Congress leaders and members of the Constituent Assembly insisted that Jammu and Kashmir should be given the same status as accorded to other states who had signed the Instrument of Accession (Jagmohan 2011). The National Conference was treating the terms of the Instrument of Accession literally whereas India was of the opinion that
Instrument was a provisional formality with expectations that Jammu and Kashmir too like other princely states would follow the uniform pattern. Sir N. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar, a member of the Drafting Committee, told members of the Constituent Assembly on October 6, 1949 that the Constitutions of all other states except that of Jammu and Kashmir have been embodied in the Constitution of India and “it is the hope of everybody here that in due course even Jammu and Kashmir will become ripe for the same sort of integration as has taken in the case of other states” (Puri 1993: 24). According to Puri, after India’s action in Hyderabad and Junagarh, any special considerations for the aspirations of the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir, therefore, lost its pragmatic compulsion. There was also pressure on Sheikh Abdullah government to cede more powers to the central government. In May 1949, a meeting of the leaders of two governments was held where it was decided that the Constituent Assembly of the state would decide upon the transfer of powers to the government of India and accordingly, a ‘transitional and provisional’ Article 370 was incorporated in the Indian Constitution with the idea, to quote Ayyangar: “When the Constituent Assembly of the state had met and taken its decision on the constitution of the state and the range of federal jurisdiction over the state, the President may, on the recommendations of the Constituent Assembly, issue an order that Article 370 shall either cease to be operative or shall be operative only subjects to such exceptions and modifications as may be specified by him” (Puri 1993: 25).

Speaking in Parliament on July 24, 1952, Nehru had said: “We all wanted to leave it in a fluid condition because of the various factors and gradually to develop the relation – legal and constitutional relations. As a result of this, a rather unusual provision was made in our Constitution. That provision is now Article 370, in part XXI, Temporary and Transitional provisions. On August 7, 1952 he once again made it clear that Article 370 was not final and it merely prescribed the manner in which additions could be made to the subjects” (Jagmohan 2011: 103). According to Jagmohan, the sum and substance of Article 370 is that in addition to Defence, Communications and Foreign Affairs, Parliament can make laws with regard to the items in the Union and Concurrent Lists, but only with the concurrence of the state government and such laws can be extended to the state by an order of the President under this Article. Later, Gulzari Lal Nanda argued that Article 370 was ‘nor a wall but a tunnel’ whose gate was manned by the state government; whenever the gate was
opened by the keeper, by giving concurrence, Union laws and provisions of the Indian Constitution could be moved to the state (Jagmohan 2011). The special constitutional status to Jammu and Kashmir was thus not granted by the Government of India but was sanctioned by the relevant provisions of Government of India Act 1935, Indian Independence Act of 1947, the Indian (Provisional) Constitution Order 1947 and the Instrument of Accession. Neither the Maharaja, nor Sheikh Abdullah was ready to give up that power (Puri 1993). The first order of the President under Article 370 was issued as the Constitution (Application to Jammu & Kashmir) Order 1950. It applied to the state those provisions of the Indian Constitution that pertained to the subjects stipulated in the Instrument of Accession. In order to develop a better working relationship between the two governments, a number of meetings were held between the representatives of both the governments where New Delhi was of the opinion that Jammu and Kashmir should accept more provisions of the Indian Constitution. After the negotiations, Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah signed an agreement which is known as the Delhi Agreement. In November, 1951, Jammu and Kashmir's Constituent Assembly was elected and the purpose of this was, inter alia, to debate and settle the question of accession and ratify the land reform program announced by the government earlier, and make a Constitution for the state. Meanwhile, by the middle of the 1952, an agitation started in Jammu led by Praja Parishad. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, a Member of Parliament and President of Jan Sangh lend his support to the agitation and demanded that Jammu and Kashmir be fully integrated with India. When he went to Jammu to join the protest, he was not only arrested but also died while in the police custody. Both Praja Parishad and Jan Sangh were against giving any special treatment to Jammu and Kashmir. Their slogan was: *ek Pradhan, ek Nishan, and ek Vidhan* (one Prime Minister, one Flag, and one Constitution). Soon situation deteriorated in the state leading to dissent against Sheikh Abdullah within National Conference and Cabinet. Sheikh Abdullah was opposed by his own Cabinet colleagues and finally he was dismissed from office and arrested.

**The Politics of Integration**

After Sheikh Abdullah's removal from power, he was replaced by his own cabinet colleague and Deputy Prime Minister of the state Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed who was seen as an advocate of a closer relationship with India. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed period (1953-1963) was marked by greater integration of Jammu and...
Kashmir with India and to soothe any possible sense of injury in the Valley, New Delhi gave developmental funds to the state to build roads, hospitals, schools and generate electricity (Varshney 1991). Sheikh Abdullah's dismissal and arrest was marked by protest not only in Valley but also in Pakistan. “The Pakistani, however, reacted angrily at Abdullah's dismissal, despite their earlier criticism of the Sheikh’s pro-India stance. Karachi went on strike and the Government of Pakistan announced the cancellation of their August independence day celebrations” (Schofield 2004: 94).

It was during Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed’s tenure that in 1954 Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India was ratified by the state Constituent Assembly. In 1957, the state adopted its own Constitution which declared that “the State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the union of India” (Article 3, Noorani 1964: 73). With the ratification of the accession, all discussion on the issue of reference to people came to an end. According to Bose (2003), Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed term in office as the Prime Minister of the state was more of a contractual relationship between Srinagar and New Delhi, whereby Bakshi would be allowed to run an unrepresentative, unaccountable government in return for facilitating states’ ‘integration’ with India on New Delhi’s terms. This unequal relationship resulted in – crippling of rule of law and democratic institutions; and erosion of states’ autonomy, achieved (as required by Article 370) with the concurrence of the state government (Bose 2003). “Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed’s government and legislature eagerly consented, in February 1954, to the proposed roster of integrative measures, as was legally and constitutionally necessary for their validation. Bakshi informed the Constituent Assembly … that Kashmir had ‘irrevocably acceded to India more than six years ago and today we are fulfilling the formalities of our unbreakable bonds with India’. On the floor of India’s Parliament, Prime Minister Nehru ‘welcomed the decision of the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir as representing the wishes of the people of Kashmir’” (Bose 2003: 69). Bose continues that the developments of 1954 were the beginning of the end for Article 370, which has effectively been dead in letter and in spirit since that time. Even Bhartiya Janata party (BJP), a pro-Hindu nationalist party, when it came to power in 1990’s, like Congress party, did not abrogate Article 370 and allowed the autonomy clause to remain in the Constitution. According to Bose (2003), “this is understandable from the view point of practical politics. Article 370 has been cipher for decades and its formal retention is an irrelevance.”
On the popularity of the Bakshi regime, Schofield (2004) writes that Bakshi’s government was not popular. Although he allowed the nominal existence of other political parties, their leaders were arrested indiscriminately and public meetings were banned. Even foreign journalists were not allowed; they were harassed by the ruling party activists and asked to leave Kashmir. According to Prem Nath Bazaz, “So far as the economic and social life of the Kashmiris is concerned, I have no doubt that they are grateful to India for the little progress they have made … but political persecution and suppression of free opinion coupled with harassment by the goonda element is, besides making them sullen and resentful, neutralising the good effects of the benevolent attitude of the Union government” (Schofield 2004: 96). Bazaz also believed that the accession issue had not gone away. “To make Kashmir's accession to India everlasting, it is essential that the Kashmiris should feel convinced that economically as well as politically they will enjoy freedom by remaining as part of the great Indian nation” (Schofield 2004: 96). Sheikh Abdullah, according to Bazaz, was known for guarding Kashmir's autonomy, whereas Bakshi for diluted that. “The ten-year period of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed rule is noted for the steady erosion of the special status with which Kashmir had begun its relationship with India. Some of the changes appeared to be cosmetic, but they increased suspicions amongst Kashmiris that the state of Jammu and Kashmir was being made to conform to the other states in India” (Schofield 2004: 97). Sheikh Abdullah remained incarcerated for 22 years, until 1975, barring briefs out of jail in 1958, 1964-65, and 1968. According to Bose (2003), after the change of guard in Jammu and Kashmir in 1953, there emerged a decisive turning point in the basis and nature of the relationship between Kashmir and India. “The old National Conference conception had viewed that relationship as an honourable partnership of equals. After 1953 this conception became history. From August 1953 onwards, any defiance of New Delhi’s absolute supremacy in the relationship guaranteed not only a swift passage to political oblivion but criminalisation as an enemy of the state” (Bose 2003: 67). Fall of Sheikh Abdullah from power and rise of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed in the state was, according to Bose, a clear message that only those who will follow the dictates of New Delhi could aspire for office in Jammu and Kashmir. Comparing the two regimes in Kashmir – Pre-1953 phase ruled by Sheikh Abdullah and post-1953 phase ruled by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and G. M. Sadiq – Bose (2003) writes that there was no doubt that Sheikh Abdullah's period was marked by authoritarianism and his
policies somewhat divisive but some of his decisions like land reforms, resisting the New Delhi’s interventionist approach in the state and his ‘Kashmir first’ approach made Sheikh Abdullah very popular leader especially in the Valley. The post-1953 regime backed by New Delhi, on the other hand, was not only authoritarian but noticeably more corrupt. The visible difference between the two regimes was more in the terms of the popular base. Sheikh Abdullah a charismatic leader despite all his flaws enjoyed popularity to the extent of saintly status in the eyes of ordinary people whereas his successors lacked that charisma. Another stark difference between the two regimes was that the post-1953 period was marked by ‘contractual’ relationship between Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and the government of India whereby former would be allowed to continue in power in return for helping Jammu and Kashmir's integration with India on New Delhi’s terms. Puri (1981a) notes though many reasons were given for the resignation of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed in October 1963 under Kamraj plan, his championship of the autonomy of the state must have been a major reason. Later on, he was also arrested under the Defence of India Rules in 1964 for opposing the G. M. Sadiq government.

In 1954, President of India promulgated a Constitutional order (applicable to Jammu and Kashmir) which gave powers to central government to legislate on all matters on the Union List and not just those mentioned in the Instrument of Accession with the concurrence of the state government. For Bose (1997), with the promulgation of this Constitutional order began the end of Article 370. This Order practically annulled the 1952 Delhi Agreement which had agreed to give a special status to Kashmir. Puri (1981a) writes that though Presidential Order of 1954 did not radically changed centre-state relation as given the in the Delhi Agreement but it did start a process through which further constitutional integration of Jammu and Kashmir with India was made, off course with the concurrence of the state governments. From 1954 till 1977, a total of 28 Constitution orders (applicable to Jammu and Kashmir) were issued and each order extended more provisions of the Indian Constitution to the state. Parliament also extended 262 central laws to the state up to 1973. All these measures for application of the Indian constitution and Central laws to the state were seen by both the governments as steps towards further integration of the state with India (Puri 1981a). Commenting on the constitutional changes made during Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed tenure as the Prime Minister of the state, Behera (200) writes that among
other things substance of Article 370 was diluted considerably. “New Delhi appropriated the authority of the state through two key mechanisms: first was the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution (Amendment) Act of 1954 which deleted section 75 of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution Act of 1939 under which the council of ministers was the final interpreter of the Constitution. Under the new provisions, the Sadar-i-Riyasat (Governor) acquired the power. The other was the Constitution Order of 1954 extending the central government’s power from original three subjects to all under the Union list and the residuary powers. These two laws practically annulled the Delhi Agreement under which it was agreed that ‘sovereignty in all matters other than those mentioned in the Instrument of Accession shall reside in the state’” (Behera 2000: 112). In the meantime, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed was replaced with former Speaker of the Constituent Assembly G. M. Sadiq as the new Prime Minister of the state. Under Sadiq’s regime, Article 356 (power of central government to dismiss state governments) and Article 357 (to assume legislative powers of the state governments) of the Indian Constitution were extended to the state. Article 249, which empowers the central government to legislate even on subjects on the state list, was also made applicable to the state. Sheikh Abdullah, who was now leading the movement of the Plebiscite Front, repeatedly declared that he was basically opposed to the manner of imposition of these measures rather than their contents. Condemning the move as encroachment on the autonomy of the state, Sheikh Abdullah criticised the state government, on whose concurrence it was being extended to the state, as not being truly a representative government of the people. Sheikh Abdullah and his supporters between 1953 and 1975 remained in confrontation with central as well as state governments. But situation in the state changed drastically after the India-Pakistan War of 1971. “It was only after India’s victory over Pakistan and latter’s split in December 1971 that negotiations with Kashmiri dissident leaders were resumed. Though it immediately created favourable objective situation for a settlement between popular Kashmiri leadership and Centre, some subjective factors delayed the phenomenon till 1975” (Puri 1981a: 175). According to Puri, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi agreed that engagement with Sheikh Abdullah was important to de-internationalise the Kashmir issue but at the same time she was not ready to accept Sheikh Abdullah’s demand of restoring the constitutional status of Kashmir to

\[^{13}\text{All Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front was formed on August 9, 1955 by Mirza Afzal Beg.}\]
its pre-1953 period. Puri (1981a) was able to persuade both Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Abdullah that latter should accept the finality of the accession and Prime Minister should let the Kashmir leader participate in the state Assembly elections and return to power (Puri 1981a). Responding to the initiatives, Sheikh Abdullah and his team had started responding to persuasions. A major change in Sheikh Abdullah’s position on Kashmir came when he in an interview to the Times, London in 1972 said that: “Our quarrel with the Government of India is not about accession but it is about the quantum of autonomy” (Puri 1981a:176). Explaining the background of the 1975 Accord, Sheikh Abdullah writes (quoted in Punjabi 1995): “I told my Indian friends that there is no difference of opinions as far as Kashmir’s accession to India is concerned. However, I have differences on the limits of accession. We have defined limits of accession through mutual agreements and it had resulted in the shape of Article 370. The Indian leaders distorted this article forcibly and unconstitutionally, which separated us (from the Indian mainstream). If the situation is retrieved, and the status quo ante is restored, our differences would be resolved” (Punjabi 1995). The prolonged battle for self-determination came to an end in 1974 when Sheikh Abdullah was persuaded by Indira Gandhi’s emissaries to ‘cast away his pro-plebiscite robe and don the pro-accession attire’ (Verma 1994).

All this development led to the start of negotiations between G. Parthasarathy (representative of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi) and Mirza Afzal Beg (representative of Sheikh Abdullah) extending up to almost three years and both sides ended up signing a six-point Accord on November 13, 1974 in New Delhi. “The negotiations culminated with Beg making most of the concessions. To begin with, Abdullah and Beg had to concede that the Instrument of Accession as ratified by the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly under Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed was no longer subject to challenge” (Ganguly 1997: 67). This negotiation saw some important issues being discussed between the two sides: First was outright rejection of plebiscite to determine the future of Kashmir, second Article 370 to continue to guide the relationship between New Delhi and Kashmir, third, agreement on giving the President of India power to review certain legislative acts of the State Assembly before they become law, fourth the residuary powers of legislation shall remain with the state but in case there is a threat to the sovereignty of India or territorial integrity,
Parliament will have power to make laws, and fifth, giving power to the state government to review a number of legislative Acts passed by New Delhi since 1953 (Ganguly 1997). The signing of the Accord paved the way for resumption of power by Sheikh Abdullah on February 25, 1975. Commenting on the Accord, Bose writes: “This was not a settlement Abdullah would have accepted – or even considered – twenty, ten or even five years earlier. His politics and popularity since 1953 had been based on defiance of New Delhi’s authoritarianism” (Bose 2003: 88). One reason could be that, according to Ganguly, Sheikh Abdullah probably calculated that after Pakistan’s defeat in 1971 war and East Pakistan becoming Bangladesh, the regional balance of power was definitely in favour of India, leaving him with little choice but to accept terms dictated by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Commenting on the 1974 Accord, Puri (1981a) writes that: “with the signing of the Accord, the gulf which was created between popular leadership of Kashmir and the national leadership in August 1953 regarding finality of the state’s accession to India was bridged” (Puri 1981a: 176). With Sheikh Abdullah returning to power of course with the concurrence of New Delhi, the new arrangement worked out between the two governments was more towards postponing the real problem of Kashmir rather than finding a substantive solution to it. It seems, from the very beginning, India’s Kashmir policy revolved around the personalities. In the initial years, after independence it was around Sheikh Abdullah and after him Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and after him G. M. Sadiq. Puri had on many occasions requested Nehru to give some political space to disgruntled National Conference leaders in the form of democratic opposition but it was repeatedly turn down on the ground that India’s Kashmir policy revolved around Sheikh Abdullah and nothing can be done to weaken his position (Bose 1997). After Sheikh Abdullah fell from grace in the eyes of New Delhi and his subsequent arrest, Puri again made the same appeal when Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed became the new Prime Minister of the state. Nehru agreed that Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed was a thoroughly unsavoury character, but ‘argued that India’s case … now revolves around him, and that despite all shortcomings, his (state) government had to be strengthened. For Nehru, Kashmir politics ‘revolved around personalities’ and ‘there was no material for democracy there’ (Bose 1997).
Rise of Farooq Abdullah and his ‘Deal’ with Rajiv Gandhi

The post-1953 period was marked by the absence of Sheikh Abdullah from the active politics of the state and the constitutional integration of Jammu and Kashmir with India. Although Sheikh Abdullah was in and out of jail all these years but his former colleague Mirza Afzal Beg and supporters were very much active through the Plebiscite Front, launched in 1955. It was through the Plebiscite Front that Sheikh Abdullah kept his ‘self-determination’ demand for Kashmir alive all these years. According to Navnita Chadha Behera (2000), although in the post 1953-period central government ruled by Congress party enjoyed an upper hand, but Prime Minister Indira Gandhi felt that mere constitutional integration of the state would not be enough; active participation of Sheikh Abdullah would still be required for the emotional integration of the people of the state with India. “New Delhi’s protégés, Ghulam Mohammed Bakshi, Ghulam Sadiq and Mir Qasim, together had failed to purge the idea of plebiscite from the Kashmir psyche. Mrs Gandhi recognised the ‘desirability and necessity’ of negotiating with Sheikh Abdullah because he alone can bring about its political and emotional integration with the Indian national mainstream” (Behera 2000: 134). Although both Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Abdullah signed an Accord in 1975 to bring New Delhi and Kashmir closer but the political situation in 1975 had drastically changed from 1952-53 when Nehru was the Prime Minister. According to Behera (2000), Nehru in 1952 was willing to concede political autonomy to Kashmir, but Sheikh Abdullah aspired for a sovereign and independent state. When Sheikh Abdullah became willing to accept Kashmir's special status in 1975, Indira Gandhi wanted its complete subordination. So, according to Mrs Gandhi ‘the Accord provided scope for further application of the Indian Constitution to the state’, while Sheikh Abdullah considered the Accord as ‘the first step towards restoration of [the] pre-1953 constitutional position of the state’” (Behera 2000: 138). With the signing of the accord, Sheikh Abdullah was back into the power and with the new mandate received in the 1977 State Assembly elections, he remained in office till his death in 1982. After his passing away, he was succeeded by his son Farooq Abdullah. As long as Sheikh Abdullah was the chief minister, there was tremendous support for him and his National Conference and Congress’s support base declined in the Valley. National Conference won 47 seats out of 75 it contested in 1977 state Assembly election, of which 39 were in the Valley (Schofield 2004). In order to
strengthen its hold in the state, Congress party was keen to have an alliance with the Farooq Abdullah and his party but fearing wrath of the people, National Conference leadership rejected the offer of alliance. The decision of not aligning with Congress party paid dividend to National Conference in 1983 Assembly election. Victory of National Conference in 1983 elections (it won 46 out of 75 seats) gave confidence to Farooq Abdullah, who was seen not as charismatic as his legendary father, to venture outside the state territory and challenge the centralising power and authority of Indira Gandhi in the post Nehruan period. “Farooq's decision to join hands with the national opposition parties and hold an opposition Conclave in Srinagar in October 1983 proved to be the last nail in the coffin. Mrs Gandhi was not prepared to tolerate rival centres of power in the states. This could have been welcomed as bringing Kashmir into mainstream Indian politics but that was not the kind of integration she wanted. It had to be a relationship of subservience, with her party in command. The centre gave a clear signal to the state Congress-I unit that Farooq would have to go, no matter how it was done” (Behera 2000: 152). Commenting on the centre-state relations during Indira Gandhi’s period, Sumit Ganguly (1997) writes that: “The central government under Indira Gandhi insisted on characterising every demand for local autonomy as potentially secessionist and virtually every indigenous leader as treasonous. In response, the Prime Minister frequently resorted to a variety of dubious measures, including the dismissal of legitimately elected governments. With political activity effectively undermined, the disaffection within various states simply took on more radical hues” (Ganguly 1997: 85). Most of the scholars writing on the Kashmir were unanimous in view that the government of Farooq Abdullah was arbitrarily dismissed by Governor Jagmohan on July 02, 1984 on the directions of the central government. In the place of Farooq Abdullah, his own brother-in-law Ghulam Muhammad Shah was installed as the new Chief Minister of the state. Within two years of his dismissal, Farooq Abdullah in 1986 made peace with Congress party now under the command of Rajiv Gandhi and one possible reason for this volte face of Farooq Abdullah, according to Ganguly, was his realisation that unless he made peace with Congress party, there was little prospect of his returning to power in near future (Ganguly 1997). For P. S. Verma, “This Accord was the product of mutual expediency for political gains which motivated both Farooq Abdullah and Rajiv Gandhi to make a complete turn about and join hands together” (Verma 1994: 135). Farooq Abdullah also believed that the accord would help in getting money for the development of Jammu and Kashmir from
the central government, especially removal of poverty, disease and unemployment (Verma 1994). Commenting on the alliance, Behera writes that: “Farooq had never faltered in his commitment to Indian secularism as opposed to Pakistan’s Islamic identity, but he blundered on home ground in compromising the Kashmiris by signing an accord with the Congress in 1986. He justified the decision in terms of a ‘hard political reality’. He had come to accept that ‘if I want to implement programmes to fight poverty … and run a government, I have to stay on the right side of the centre’” (Behera 2000: 155). This arrangement provided an opportunity to opposition leaders in Valley to criticise Farooq Abdullah and accuse him of selling the state to the central government. For Varshney (1991), this deal defied the basic logic of Kashmiri politics. Kashmiri politics has always been characterised by its resistance to any kind of control or subjugation by outsiders. Sheikh Abdullah was seen as the best representative of that brand of Kashmiri politics. So what if central government headed by Nehru, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi were also Kashmiris. Sheikh Abdullah throughout his life fought for autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir and challenged the central government whereas his son Farooq Abdullah ended up signing a deal with Congress. Commenting on this, Verma (1994) writes: “The accord started with two unavoidable political handicaps. First, it robbed Dr. Abdullah of his father’s role, so popular with some Kashmiris, as a Kashmiri leader standing up to New Delhi. Instead he became an ally of New Delhi in the eyes of his friends and a stooge in the eyes of his enemies, though most unfairly. Second, with both the major secular parties becoming allies, the indispensable role of an opposition as the channel of popular discontent passed into the hands of Muslim fundamentalists, which helped them loom larger than life size” (Verma 1994: 136). The view expressed by Verma found an echo in Ganguly (1997). “Despite the euphoria surrounding the accord, it reduced Abdullah’s stature in Kashmir’s internal politics. No longer was he seen as a Kashmiri standing up for the state’s interests. Furthermore, since the one secular party in the state had become the political ally of the Congress (I), the only other avenues of opposition, particularly in the Kashmir Valley, were the religiously oriented and fundamentalist political parties, such as the Jammat-i-Islami, the Ummat-e-Islam, and the Mahaz-i-Azadi. Before long these parties would join to form the Muslim United Front (MUF) to contest the fateful 1987 elections” (Ganguly 1997: 97). For Puri, “Aside from the reestablishing that the state of Jammu and Kashmir was less equal than the other states of India, the accord once again pushed Jammu and Kashmir
outside the framework of federal democracy in India. More importantly, it also blocked secular outlets of protests against governments both at both the centre and the state” (Puri 1993: 51-52). Before the deal, the National Conference fought for Kashmir’s autonomy and opposed the abrogation of their autonomy by the central government. At the state level, Congress provided an outlet to the people against the corrupt and authoritarian government of National Conference. “The accord destroyed the raison d’être of both the parties and forced all types of discontent to seek fundamentalist or secessionist outlets, which consolidated in the form of the MUF” (Puri 1993: 52). This situation provided an opportunity to a coalition of Islamic groups, known as MUF to mobilise people in the name of Kashmiri Muslim identity. According to Varshney (1991) Kashmiriyat in Valley was always represented by secular parties and not by Islamic groups like MUF but in the post-1986 scenario, Kashmiriyat was mobilised by MUF. “This development was as unexpected as Farooq’s alliance with Congress” (Varshney 1991:1015). Before the deal, these groups were never preferred by the voters i. e. Jamaat-i-Islami had won a mere five seats in the 1972 state Assembly elections and one in 1977 and zero in 1983 elections. But this alliance between Congress and National Conference gave enough space to Islamic parties to grow but, according to Varshney (1991), this was not enough to dislodge Farooq Abdullah. This surge in MUF support made both the Congress and the National Conference panicky and they resorted to the same old strategy which they had been practicing since 1950’s – rigging of elections.¹⁴ Thus a charismatic leader like Sheikh Abdullah with larger than life image in Kashmir being supported by another tall national leader Nehru and who was seen as someone who could win plebiscite for India had to ironically resort undemocratic means to win seats for state Constituent Assembly. “The manner in which this election was conducted made a mockery of any pretence of a democratic process, and set a grim precedent for future ‘free and fair elections in Jammu and Kashmir” (Bose 2003: 54). No wonder, National Conference’s slogan was: “One Leader, One Party, and One Programme. A ‘tradition’ which began its journey in 1951 in Jammu and Kashmir was repeated every time there was an election in the state in the name of safeguarding secular ethos of the country with full and open support of the central government. The rigging of

¹⁴According to Verma (1994), of all the Assembly election held in Jammu and Kashmir, the election held in 1977 was ‘relatively free from vices and other related irregularities’.
1987 state elections produced a very different result. Although Assembly results in terms of number of seats came on the expected lines i.e. in favour of Congress-National Conference alliance but those who lost election because of riggings or were declared invalid to contest elections did not take this humiliation lying down. Despite the manipulation of election results, MUF received 32 per cent of voted as against 6.42 per cent in 1983 elections. The National Conference – Congress alliance percentage of votes slipped from 78.43 to 53 per cent. This election produced an alternative to National Conference which was non-secular in the form of MUF. National Conference – Congress managed to get the majority but did not get the legitimacy to rule. The sanctity of the electoral process and Kashmiri trust in Farooq Abdullah collapsed after the 1987 elections (Varshney 1991). “If the accord had blocked secular and nationalist outlets of discontents, the elections blocked constitutional and democratic ones as well” (Puri 1993: 52). Blaming India’s Kashmir policy for the rise of secessionist movement in the state, Puri writes that: “There has been a persistent policy of denying Kashmir a right to democracy: one-party rule has been imposed on the state through manipulation of elections, opposition parties have been prevented from growing and elementary civil liberties and human rights have been refused to the people. This refusal to integrate Kashmir within the framework of Indian democracy has proved to be the single greatest block to the process of Kashmir's emotional and political integration with the rest of India” (Puri 1993: 52).

Review of literature

Fairly large amount of academic literature has emerged in the post-1989 period trying to explain the origin of the Kashmir problem. The categorisation of the available literature on the subject has been done differently by different scholars. For example, Reeta Chowdhary Tremblay (2002) writes about availability of three sets of works on the Kashmir conflict. First, deals with the historical accounts of Kashmir problem, second, with the lack of political institutions, and the third, with the problem of (minority) identity in modern nation state. Navnita Chadha Behera (2000) also divides literature present on the Kashmir dispute into three categories. In the first category, she includes, “books written in an international relations framework, examining the India-Pakistan conflict on Kashmir, and, as fallout, the secessionist movement of Kashmir is explained” (Behera 2000:14). In the second category comes, books presenting historical accounts and narratives of political developments in the Kashmir
Valley. In the third category are those scholarly works which have tried to provide a theoretical explanation of the secessionist movement in Kashmir and some publications in recent times especially those of Summit Ganguly (1990&1997) and Sumantra Bose (1997, 1999 & 2003) are an attempt towards that. Like Tremblay and Behera, Ganguly (1997) also divides the work done towards understanding the Kashmir problem into four broad categories. First, Pakistan’s not-so-hidden hand: Pro-India supporters accuse Pakistan for the crisis in Kashmir arguing that since late 1970’s, Islamabad has engaged in a systematic strategy of infusing Islamic fundamentalist ideology into Kashmir Valley with all types of help. The growth of large numbers of Islamic schools throughout the Valley is also because of the help provided by the Pakistan. In these schools, students were indoctrinated in the precepts of fundamentalist Islamic thought and encouraged to challenge the sovereignty of the Indian state (Ganguly 1997). Second, India’s denial of self-determination: For Pakistan, the secessionist movement in Kashmir is because of many factors. These include historical betrayals, constitutional discrimination, economic deprivation and state repression, besides long years of misrule and manipulation from Delhi (Ganguly 1997). Third, Ethno-national feelings: For social scientists, birth of insurgency in Kashmir is because of the emergence of ethnic sub-nationalism in Kashmir and its challenge to the Indian state. For example, Riyaz Punjabi (1992) refers to the breakdown of the ethos of Kashmiriyat. Ashutosh Varshney (1991&1992) traces the origin of insurgency in the competing claims of three variants of nationalism: religious, secular, and ethnic and all three versions of nationalism were compromised (Ganguly 1997: 19). Fourth, Literature giving historical and narrative accounts of the insurgency: Some of the scholars who have written on Kashmir problem from historical perspective include: Ajit Bhattacharjea (1994), Rajesh Kadian (1993), Tavleen Singh (1995) and Vernon Hewitt (1995).

Giving an alternative argument for the crisis in the Kashmir, Ganguly (1997) writes that: “the insurgency in Kashmir is the result of a fundamental paradox of Indian democracy: Kashmir represents both the mobilisational success and, simultaneously, the institutional failure of Indian democracy” (Ganguly 1997: 20). In exploring the roots of secessionist movement in Kashmir, Ganguly takes the clue from Samuel Huntington’s (1968) thesis of a negative and conflictual relationship between modernisation and development to explain the problem in Kashmir.
Sumit Ganguly (1997) in his book ‘The Crisis in Kashmir’ has argued that national policies and programmes produced political mobilisation on a historically unprecedented scale across India and in Kashmir particularly. Yet at the same time, successive governments did little to promote the strengthening of institutional politics in Jammu and Kashmir. And it is this dichotomy – the increase in the political mobilisation against a background of institutional decay – that explains the origins of the secessionist insurgency in Kashmir Valley (Ganguly 1997). For Ganguly, Huntington’s thesis – that social mobilisation and a consequently increased level of political participation, unless accompanied by robust political institutions, breeds political instability – clearly suggests that in Kashmir’s case, “it can be argued that given dramatic expansion in literacy and media exposure, a generation of Kashmiris has now emerged that is far more conscious of its political rights and privileges. This generation is also most likely aware of political developments well beyond the Valley of Kashmir and is far more politically sophisticated and knowledgeable than previous generations of Kashmiris – those who had been loyal to Sheikh Abdullah and his family.” (Ganguly 1997:37; Tremblay 2002:573). The new generation of Kashmiris has been most unwilling to tolerate the skullduggery that has long characterised Kashmiri politics and this has been evident in terms of the wider participation of the youth whether it is in the form of militancy or in the form of non-violent street level protests. The traditional leaders have also been challenged by the Valley youth making many of the marginal in terms of their influence. Ganguly’s thesis of increased participation and the absence of solid political institutions resulting in political decay holds true as far as the Valley is concerned. Huntington had argued that economic development may well lead to widespread political instability, especially in the absence of robust political institutions and such institutions are critical for maintaining political order in societies undergoing rapid economic modernisations (Ganguly 1997). Huntington believed that India had considerable promise because of its political institutions. But these robust institutions – bureaucracy, electoral system, and a political party (Congress Party) – started declining since the days of Indira Gandhi (Ganguly 1997). In Jammu and Kashmir the process of institutional decay started even before Indira Gandhi. The singular political tragedy of Kashmir’s politics was the failure of the state and national political leaderships to permit the development of an honest political opposition. From the time of independence to his dismissal from office in 1953, Sheikh Abdullah dominated the
politics of the state and when Nehru was asked to intervene to allow political space to opposition, it was refused on the ground that India’s Kashmir policy revolved around Sheikh Abdullah and nothing could be done to weaken his position (Ganguly 1997; Bose 1997). Even successive governments in the state did not allow the growth of a meaningful opposition with the connivance of the central government. New Delhi’s tolerance of such malfeasance seemed a paradox. Over the years, any opposition to the ruling National Conference was steadily driven out of the institutional arena (Ganguly 1997). “The lack of solid political institutions, capable of providing outlets to the dissident population, has to a large degree been responsible for the rise of political militancy, supported by the masses of the Valley, towards the cause of secession of Jammu and Kashmir from the Indian state” (Tremblay 2002: 573).

One of the first political initiatives of Sheikh Abdullah when he took over the office was to abolish exploitative age-old landlordism. Because of his some of the bold initiatives in area of agrarian reforms while implementing New Kashmir manifesto, even though his successors proved to be inept and corrupt, his personal standing in Kashmir remained largely undiminished. “The socio economic transformation that was begun in Kashmir under Sheikh Abdullah was continued by his successors and, increasingly, by the national government in New Delhi. The electorate changed from a politically passive to an increasingly politically aware and assertive population” (Ganguly 1997: 31). As they acquired more and more educational institutions in ten years from 1971 to 1981, the overall literacy rates in Jammu and Kashmir grew by more than 43 per cent, the third fastest growth rate in the country. Jammu and Kashmir remains only state where education is free up to graduation level. Growth of literacy meant that people became exposed to mass media. Owing to its location, Kashmir was one of the earliest states in India to have access to television. In 1972 Kashmir capital Srinagar was the third television center to be commissioned in India after Delhi and Bombay (Mumbai). After acquiring a modicum of social and physical mobility, Kashmiris became aware that the free exercise of adult franchise existed in virtually all other parts of India. It was only in the Kashmir Valley that elections routinely being compromised. This discrepancy, in large measure, caused the pang of political discontent. After years of frustrated attempts at meaningful political participation, and in the absence of institutional means of expressing dissent, resort to more violent methods became all but inevitable (Ganguly 1997:31).
While answering the question why did the mobilisation take place along ethno-religious lines, Ganguly lists four factors: First, the Jammu and Kashmir is divided into districts that produce a religious division as well: The Valley of Kashmir is predominantly Muslim. The districts of Leh and Kargil have Buddhist and Muslim populations, respectively. Jammu is largely Hindu. The secular politics of the ruling party National Conference had little appeal among the Hindus of Jammu. Buddhist-dominated Leh was also outside the ambit of National Conference politics. Second, the geographic isolation of the valley separated Kashmiri Islam from the larger currents of Muslim politics in India. Except on particular occasion, Muslims elsewhere in India rarely joined in common cause with their fellows in the Valley. In turn, the Muslims of the Valley never developed extensive ties with Muslim communities in the rest of India. As a consequence, they did not air their grievances as part of the national community but as a regional sub-community, with parochial concerns. Third, notably in Iran and Egypt, when secular politics fails to offer adequate channels for the expression of discontent, the only viable means that remains is the pursuit of political mobilisation along ethno-religious lines. This pathway of protest had a long history in Kashmir. On occasion, Sheikh Abdullah had even encouraged his followers to generate a degree of fear in New Delhi. Sheikh Abdullah’s strategy was simple and effective: He threatened to unleash the forces of the Jammat unless New Delhi supported him unequivocally. A fourth and final factor contributed to the ethno-religious direction of the movement: Pakistan, sensing an opportunity to weaken India’s hold on Kashmir, funded, trained and organised a loose, unstructured movement into a coherent, organised enterprise directed toward challenging the writ of Indian state in Kashmir (Ganguly 1997). “In transforming the socio-economic landscape of Kashmir and producing a generation of politically aware Kashmiris, while also allowing the political institutions in Kashmir to be stunted and corroded, the national and state level governments left open few institutional channels for the expression of political discontent and dissent. Demands for political autonomy were inappropriately construed as incipient moves towards secession. Inevitably, this contradictory set of policies drove emerging generations of Kashmiris toward more extreme forms of political expression. Furthermore, as secular and institutional pathways of expressing political dissent were curbed, political mobilisation and activism increasingly proceed along an ethno-religious dimension” (Ganguly 1997: 42).
British historian Alastair Lamb (1992) challenges the claim of India on Kashmir stating that Instrument of Accession was not signed by the Maharaja Hari Singh on the 26th October 1947, a day before the Indian troops arrived in the Valley to free it from the control of the tribes from the north-west province of Pakistan. India has always claimed that its troops arrived in the Kashmir Valley only after the Maharaja Hari Singh had signed Instrument of accession to formally join India. Consequently, Indian army was able to free two-thirds of Kashmir from tribal control, while the other one-third remains still under the control of Pakistan (Tremblay 2002). Lamb argues that not only was India’s legal claim to the state of Jammu and Kashmir false but that the territory’s accession was the outcome of a planned conspiracy between Congress leaders, the Kashmir government and the British (Tremblay 2002). Lamb claims that the Britain conspired with India to prevent Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan for geo-strategic reasons as it needed a ‘vantage point’ from which to watch Central Asia. This vantage point was needed principally to counter Soviet intrigue in Central Asia and the best place for doing this was from northernmost part of Kashmir i.e. Hunza, adjoining Gilgit (Lamb 1992: 74; Jha 2003: 5). Lamb based his conclusion that the British had conspired with India over Kashmir almost entirely on Mountbatten’s decision to retrocede Gilgit and Hunza to the Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir in 1947, instead of transferring the 60-year lease of the area signed with Maharaja Hari Singh to Pakistan, which, he believes, would have been in accordance with the principles of partition laid down in the Indian Independence Act (Jha 2003: 95). Vindicating the contention of the Pakistan in entirety, Lamb claims that Indian troops entered Kashmir well before the signing of the Instrument of Accession (Lamb 1992: 153; Jha 2003: 5). In another book Lamb (1994) goes a step further and hints that the instrument of Accession was perhaps never signed (Jha 2003:5). Prior to writing of the above-mentioned books (Jha 1992 & 1994), Lamb (1966) had argued that after the partition of the Indian sub-continent into two dominion, Kashmir should not have been with India as it was never a part of Dogra dynasty. “There was absolutely no traditional link between the Dogra dynasty and the Kashmir valley. The union of Jammu and Kashmir was the product of sale in 1846 to Gulab Singh by the British who had previously taken it over from the Sikhs,” writes lamb adding, “It is not really a unit geographically, demographically or economically. It is an agglomeration of territories brought under the political power of one Maharaja” (Lamb 1966:146). For him, if there is to be peace in the Indian sub-continent, New
Delhi and Islamabad must recognise each other’s right to existence. “Once it is admitted that later has a right to exist at all, then it cannot really denied that she has every reason to be interested in the future of Jammu and Kashmir. On the grounds of geography and economics as well as religion, this region is closely bound with Pakistan” (Lamb 1966: 145). According to Lamb, the problem exists in Kashmir because Paramountcy and not the principle of partition were applied in this princely state. As then Maharaja Hari Singh opted for India, it became the keystone of New Delhi’s claim of possession of Jammu and Kashmir. For the author, had India in 1947-48 accepted the existence of Pakistan and ready to share the sub-continent with it, then the Kashmir story would have had a very different outcome. Jammu and Kashmir State is in many important respects rather different from other princely states of British India. Lamb’s work is an important contribution to the literature on Kashmir crisis as it presents an entirely different version of the history of Kashmir.

Prem Shankar Jha’s two books (1998 & 2003) examine Alastair Lamb’s (1992 & 1994) version of history of accession of Kashmir to India to find out how closely it confirms to the known facts. According to Jha (1998 & 2003), Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to India in 1947 is being contested by two rival groups of militants. “Every insurrection, every revolt, creates its own justification. More often than not it seeks justification in history, which is re-examined and re-written to fit the revolutionaries’ needs. It is not, therefore, surprising that the history of Kashmir’s accession and its subsequent integration into Indian Union is being challenged, and not one, but two parallel histories are being created by the rival groups of militants” (Jha 1998 & 2003). Those who favour independence for Kashmir, writes Jha, are reinterpreting the history in such a way to claim that since Mughal times Kashmir has been engaged in an unending struggle for its independence. Then there are those who want merger of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan and it is they who are challenging the legitimacy of its accession to India. Among the many who have rewritten the history of Kashmir to fit the latter’s needs, according to Jha, Lamb (1992 &1994) is the most determined one. Of the two versions of history, Jha’s books rejects Lamb’s recounting of the events by providing counter historical material and testimonies, such as that of Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, Lieutenant Colonel in 1947 and serving in the Directorate of Military Planning, to prove that the Instrument of Accession was indeed signed by Maharaja Hari Singh well before Indian troops landed in Kashmir on October 27,
1947 (Tremblay 2002). Field Marshal Manekshaw’s statement was crucial because it was he who had accompanied V. P. Menon (Secretary of the Ministry of States headed by Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel) to Srinagar to get the precise military situation in Kashmir and give a report of the same to Governor General Lord Mountbatten. According to Manekshaw the Instrument of Accession was signed by the Maharaja in Srinagar on the night of October 25, 1947 itself and he (Manekshaw) is sure of this (signing of Instrument of Accession) because he remembers Menon (V. P. Menon) coming out of Maharaja’s rooms to telling him, ‘Sam (Manekshaw), we have got it’ (Jha 2003: 71). Manekshaw was also present next day (October 26, 1947) at the Defence Committee meeting presided over by the Governor General when the Instrument of Accession was handed over to Lord Mountbatten by Menon (Jha 2003: 71). However, according to Menon, the Instrument of Accession was signed by the Maharaja in Jammu on October 26, 1947, a day before Indian military help reached Srinagar. According to Menon, after reaching Delhi from Kashmir, he went straight to a meeting of Defence Committee and soon after the meeting along with Mehr Chand Mahajan, the then Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, flew to Jammu. Menon writes, he informed Maharaja Hari Singh of what had taken place at the Defence Committee meeting and the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir was ready to accede to India at once. The Maharaja, according to Menon, composed a letter in which he made a request to the Governor-General for military help, informed of his intention to set up an interim government headed by Sheikh Abdullah to carry out responsibilities of the state in this emergency. He also signed the Instrument of Accession (Menon 1956: 399-400). To strengthen his case, Jha also provides details of Congress Politics, Nehru’s disagreement with Sardar Patel, Cabinet colleague and the man responsible for integration of more than 600 princely states into the Indian Union and Nehru’s insistence that the instrument of accession had to include arrangements for the inclusion of Sheikh Abdullah in the interim government (Tremblay 2002).

Navnita Chadha Behera (2000) in her book ‘State, Identity and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh’ have tried to trace the roots of the insurgency and separatist demands in Jammu and Kashmir. To understand the discontent in the state, she has focused on the understanding of the social formations in the state – ethnic, religious, regional, cultural and linguistic identities – its politicisation and their changing
relationship with the state (Behera 2000). Knowing the importance of identity in
democratic plural societies, she has examined the relationship of the Kashmiri identity
with the Indian state; the regional identities of Jammu and Ladakh with the State of
Jammu and Kashmir and sub-regional identities with the regional centres (Behera
2000). For Behera, the Kashmir conflict, in all its manifestations, can be
contextualised within a number of discourses such as the ‘Indian nationalist
discourse’, ‘the Pakistani nationalist discourse’, and the ‘self-determination and
autonomy discourse’. Stating that each of these articulate a specific range of issues, a
particular way of raising questions, a particular set of questions, as well as a particular
kind of and a set of solutions, Behera writes that the root cause of the alienation and
suffering among the ethnic communities lies essentially in applying the logic of the
modern state to a pluralistic society like India (Behera 2000: 277). For her, the
Kashmir has become a ‘problem’ because our ways of thinking about the notion of
identity and state is influenced by modernist school and according to this thinking, a
nation state is created by certain causal factors which bind together the diverse
communities living within their territorial boundaries (Behera 2000: 11). “The logic
of the modern nation state allows recognition of only a single determinate,
demographically numerable form of nation within its jurisdiction” (Behera 2000: 24).
This principle when applied to a society like ours endowed with diverse identities,
India’s identification with only one identity would create problems as political space
is denied to other identities. “With state being the sole repository of political power,
which is exercised by the ‘majority’, the minority communities tend to feel alienated
and marginalised. Then these ‘minority’ who are left out, try to create sovereign
spaces as a means of articulating their respective identities and create alternative
spaces within or without the state boundaries” (Behera 2000: 278). Rejecting the
modernist concept of nation state, Behera supports for an alternative institutional
mechanisms which will give a voice to the plural social realities of a polyethnic and
multicultural society like India. To her, “a dominant identity seeking subjugation,
assimilation or submergence of other identities, and self-assertion of a non-dominant
identity seeking a share in the state power controlled by the former, is inherently
imbued with the risk of violence.” “When the state takes on a majoritarian or sectarian
character, the relationship between the state and non-dominant identities turns violent.
Much of this violence consists of the use of visible physical force. On the other hand,
an identity may resort to violence when political and constitutional means to achieve its objective are either exhausted or perceived to be ineffective” (Behera 2000: 25).

A feeling among the alienated segments, that ‘only violence pays’ abets it further as violence is perceived to be the only way of ensuring a hearing by the state (Behera 2000). Commenting on Behera’s book, Tremblay (2002) writes that it seems the initial relationship between India and Kashmir was aimed to avoid this kind of situation. Though Article 370 of Indian Constitution and Delhi Agreement of 1952, India simultaneously embraced and denied its differences from the Kashmiri society. While it recognised the cultural and political identity of the Kashmiri people, it also asserted that similarities between Kashmir and India were based on the secular, socialist and democratic agendas of Kashmir on one hand and of India on the other. Kashmiriyat defined Kashmiris as distinct from others and yet it was this secular identity which formed the basis for binding the two communities and two nations together (Tremblay 2000: 575). By promulgating differences and similarities, India was able to unify formal and informal nationalism. Thus, the articulation of the Kashmiri identity through the reconciliation of the formal and informal nationalisms became the basis by which the secular Indian elite, historians, intellectuals and the ‘nationalist group’ the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation front have come to define the Kashmir nation. Soon there was a breakdown of this framework when New Delhi started legislating also on those subjects not mentioned in the Instrument of Accession that the movement for autonomy began to surface in the Valley. And over the years, this demand for autonomy became a demand for azadi (Tremblay 2002: 576). “The arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953; the installation of successive centrally-approved state governments; and the incremental integration of the state into the Indian federation which, by extending Indian constitutional provisions to the state, altered the special status of the state; these were the most notable developments in the state which were responsible for generating contradictions between the meanings and structures associated with the formal and informal nationalisms” (Tremblay 2002: 576).

Balraj Puri (1981a, 1983, 1999 & 2008) is another scholar who has done extensive work on Jammu and Kashmir. He has not only written on the problem of the state but also actively participated in all the endeavors of the state. Puri through his regular writings on the Kashmir issue has been supporting the cause of autonomy for the state
and feels strongly against abrogating Article 370 of the Indian constitution which provides for special status to Jammu and Kashmir. He has also contributed by advocating regional autonomy within the state on the same basis on which Kashmiri leaders were demanding autonomy for the state (Puri 1993: 28). He is for creation of a federal state of Jammu and Kashmir within an Indian federation. Unlike many scholars on the subject who blame Pakistan for conflict-like situation in Kashmir, his main focus has been on the problem of regional inequality/imbalance of the state. For him, the problem of the state is internal and is likely to continue unless the issue of regional inequality is not addressed. In other words, the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir granted by the Constitution of India ought to be accompanied by the internal autonomy of its regions. Puri goes further by advocating devolution of power within each region to the locally elected panchayati institutions at the district, block and panchayat levels. In 1952, Puri wrote to Prime Minister Nehru to extend the logic of Article 370 to state – region relations within the state to allay the apprehensions of Jammu and also of Ladakh. “In a joint statement on July 24, 1952 Prime Minister Nehru and then state Prime Minister Sheikh Abdullah declared that the Constitution of the Jammu and Kashmir would provide for the regional autonomy” (Puri 1990: 191 & Puri 1993: 28). This arrangement, according to Puri, might have worked towards reconciling regional urges within state and the state’s status with India but this was not acceptable to the Bhartiya Jana Sangh which along with Jammu Praja Parishad launched an agitation for the abrogation of Article 370, which, more than anything else, shook the faith of the Kashmiri Muslims about the security of their identity within India (Puri 1990: 191). Listing some of the factors responsible for alienation of people in Kashmir, he points out that alienation has been the result of a cumulative process. He writes that although Kashmir had the choice of acceding to Pakistan but ‘preferred’ India. Again the state under Article 370 and Delhi Agreement of 1952 was constitutionally and politically entitled to retain its autonomy within India but was forced to integrate – mainly under the pressure from Jammu which was denied its rightful status within the state – against the wishes of its majority (Puri 1990: 192). Again, it is the only part of India where regional identities has not been recognised. Its unitary constitution forces people to align on communal lines (Puri 1990). “One vital but less known clue to the understanding of Kashmir politics is the fact that almost half of its population is non-Kashmiri speaking. In fact Kashmiris comprise just one-third of the total population of the undivided state, including the area occupied by
Pakistan. Further they inhibit only the Indian part of the state, in the fabled Valley of Kashmir. Yet it is the Valley around which politics of the state revolves. The landlocked region has a compact and homogeneous people. History, geography and politics have helped them to develop a deep consciousness of a distinct identity” (Puri 1967: 149). Kashmir politics is always viewed and understood from the Hindu-Muslim angle and in terms of triumphs and failures of Indian secularism but in reality, superimposed on, and cutting across, this division of Kashmir politics is the regional, cultural and linguistic distribution of people, suggesting an altogether different approach to the solution of the Kashmir problem (Puri 1967:150). Puri suggests that it is still not too late to fix things in the state. “What is needed is recognition of and respect for the three distinct personalities of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh. Constitutional and political means have to be devised to ensure a relationship of equality and amity between them” (Puri 1967: 150). In trying to understand insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, a state which has been Puri’s field of activity and study since 1942 says that Kashmir is much more than a dispute over real estate, a matter of national prestige or a threat to Indian secularism. His argument revolves around two main points – autonomy and democracy. Arguing for the need to recognise the legitimacy of regional identities, Puri says the bonds between a region and the nation can be built on stronger grounds within a political culture which is sensitive to democratic aspirations of people of different regions (Puri 1993). In the early years after independence, the nationalist leadership was committed to a certain notion of regional autonomy within the framework of the nation state but in subsequent decades this idea was gradually thrown overboard leading to a growing feeling of alienation and anger in Kashmir who felt cheated. The question of autonomy is linked to the issue of democracy. Puri believes that democratic institutions were never allowed to acquire roots in Kashmir. Democracy in the state was projected as an impossible option and demand for democracy were censored as anti-national. This denial of democratic rights, according to Puri, deepened the alienation of the Kashmiri people and terrorist and secessionist forces played on this sense of alienation. For Puri, the problem in the Kashmir is because of the failure of Indian nationalism, federalism, democracy and above all secularism to accommodate the aspirations of the Kashmiri Muslims and not because of administrative or economic reasons alone (Puri 1993: 82). Administrative excesses and lapses cause individual grievances which rarely lead to political terrorism. Similarly, poverty and
unemployment may cause class discontent but not community discontent. Economic misery and victimisation by the administration can cause discontent in a community only if it perceives them as part of a policy of discrimination. It is the deprivation of political power that in turn is at the root of this perception, due to which the community believes that its dignity and identity are threatened (Puri 1993: 81). Puri is also highly critical of the India’s Kashmir policy. “New Delhi’s policy on Kashmir has been vacillating from one extreme to another; from complete trust of its people to complete distrust, from treating them as a special category to treating them as colonial subjects” (Puri 1986: 245). At the time of partition of the country, writes Puri, Mahatma Gandhi’s belief in the wisdom of the popular sovereignty of the state paid the dividend as the popular leadership of the State responded to the gesture and decided to accede to India. The people of the state were also unilaterally offered by New Delhi to get the decision of accession to India ratified through a reference to the people. “But when the Kashmiri leaders took the offer seriously and started thinking aloud about alternative options for the future affiliations of the state, the idealist pendulum swung to the extreme of realpolitik. The popular government was dismissed, its leaders were imprisoned and a regime of repression and corruption was imposed on the state” (Puri 1986: 245). India’s Kashmir policy was at its ‘best’ again when Nehru in 1964 not only secured the release of Sheikh Abdullah and other leaders of National Conference from jail (arrested for their anti-national activities) but also persuaded Sheikh Abdullah to go to Pakistan for negotiation in search of an ideal solution to the Kashmir dispute (Puri 1986: 245). Instead of using the services of Sheikh Abdullah for finding viable solution to the Kashmir problem as Nehru had initiated the peace talks through Sheikh Abdullah, Prime Ministers after Nehru were more interested in doing what was called ‘integration of Jammu and Kashmir with India’ (Puri 1986). In the name of ‘integration’, amendments after amendments in the form of President Orders were carried out to empower the central government to appoint the head of the state, who was earlier elected by its Assembly, and to declare emergency there. All these steps eroded the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir. And if this was not enough, National Conference was forced to merge with the Congress party in the state (Puri 1986). Commenting on the crisis created in state by integrationist attitude of the central government, Puri writes that: “The Kashmir policy of India has been based – implicitly and explicitly – on the theory that all secular and what are called pro-India forces should unite under one party to fight
communal and anti-India forces. The policy has been supported by the national press and by the political commentators” (Puri 1990: 192). But empirical evidence points to the contrary. “Whenever there was a secular opposition party in the state, it provided a nationalist outlet to popular discontent, in the absence of which such discontent was forced to seek secessionist outlet.” “Before the Rajiv Gandhi – Farooq Abdullah Accord in 1996, Congress Party was the principal channel of discontent against the state government, while the National Conference channelised discontent against the central government. As the two parties formed a coalition government, both type of discontent were diverted to communal and secessionist outlet. The lack of democratic tradition, civil liberties and free and fair elections, further forced the popular discontent to seek outlets outside the Indian system” (Puri 1986: 192).

Sumantra Bose (2003) explains how the Kashmir conflict has come to present such a grave threat to peace in South-Asia and to global security and what can be done about the situation (Bose 2003: 6). To him, the strife has much to do with the events that unfolded in the decades since 1947 than those of 1947, itself. Explaining the problem, Bose (2003) in his book ‘Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace’ writes that firstly, the roots of the problem lie in the continuous denial of democratic institutions and rights to the people of the Kashmir since its accession with India in 1947. The agenda of institutionalising ‘responsible government’ which was raised during 1931 agitations by Sheikh Abdullah has still not been realised even today and people of Kashmir have yet not made transition from subject to being citizens. The only way to enable them to make this transition is to make up the democratic deficit (Bose 2003).

Secondly, both India and Pakistan have made possession of Kashmir as the cornerstone of their respective identities as states. India from the very beginning has been rejecting Jinnah’s two-nation theory and saying that Muslim-majority Kashmir is the living example of their believe in secularism and in case Kashmir leaves India, its secular credentials will be grievously damaged (Bose 2003: 8). To this Bose asks why retention of Kashmir should be indispensible to the validation of New Delhi’s secular credential is not very clear. There are already more than 150 million Muslims in India outside Kashmir and their status and treatment could equally serve to validate India’s secular credentials. Why Kashmir only (Bose 2003)? Similarly, Pakistan has been claiming since 1947 that their country is incomplete without Kashmir because as a Muslim-majority state, Kashmir's natural home is Pakistan and not India. Like India’s
argument for retention of Kashmir, Bose finds Pakistan’s argument also equally
dubious. Pakistan claim as a homeland for all Muslims of the sub-continent was
rejected by people of East Pakistan in 1971 when Bangladesh became a nation. To
make his point Bose, quotes Prem Nath Bazaz (1967): “that the conflict between India
and Pakistan over Kashmir is primarily … an ideological War,” in which the elites of
both the countries have perceived foundational, non-negotiable principles of statehood
to be at stake” (Bazaz 1967: 128). According to Bose, Kashmir which constitute just
one per cent of both India and Pakistan’s total population has become the cornerstone
of the nationhood of both the countries (Bose 2003).

Pinpointing the essential features of the conflict, Bose says that Kashmir problem has
both exogenous sources in the form of conflict between India and Pakistan, and
endogenous sources in the form of the existence of several fundamentally different
political allegiances and preferences among the socially heterogeneous population of
Kashmir (Bose 1999). According to Bose, Kashmir is not the cause of the conflict
between India and Pakistan as these deeper roots and is much more than just Kashmir.
“However, it is correct to regard the real estate dispute over Kashmir as the single
most important symptom of that deep rooted animosity as both the countries have
chosen to make possession of Kashmir central to the raison d’être of their respective
national existences” (Bose 1999: 762). Then there are also endogenous sources of
conflict. The state of Jammu and Kashmir consists of not only several distinct
geographical regions but its population is also divided into a bewildering multiplicity
of religions, ethnic, linguistic and caste groups. Along with this social diversity there
are several distinct political identities and orientations in Kashmir – pro-India, pro-
independence and pro-Pakistan. The difficulty is that these different political
orientations are fundamentally irreconcilable with each other (Bose 1999: 762). For
Bose, the internal social and political context of Jammu and Kashmir makes plebiscite
or partition as a solution impractical and requires a more sophisticated approach to the
Kashmir problem. Unlike other scholars on the subject who always keep harping on
Nehru’s promise of holding plebiscite in Kashmiri, Bose’s focus has been on the
understanding of the roots of the present conflict and finding a workable solution to the
crisis involving all the three parties - India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris. Inspired
by the ongoing peace process in Northern Ireland, Bose argues that recourse to the
plebiscitary-majoritarian method in Kashmir is simply a non-option as it has inherent
risks and problems. “Combine exogenous and endogenous factors, and the Kashmir conflict looks almost impossibly intractable. There is obviously no space whatsoever for finding any resolution to the Kashmir conundrum within the present framework of three zero-sum, competing and mutually incompatible nationalist claims to its population and territory. The framework itself needs to be radically modified if there is to be any prospect of progress towards building a viable peace in Kashmir especially so because each of the three maximalist positions of Kashmir suffers from crippling deficiencies” (Bose 1999:763).

Blaming India for the present conflict like situation in Jammu and Kashmir and in his attempt to understand what he calls ‘the challenge in Kashmir’ Bose (1997) believes that Indian as a federal country has failed to fulfill the aspirations of people of Kashmir (Bose 1997). Sheikh Abdullah’s decision to have an association with India in 1947 was because it was felt that their political aspiration of democracy and self-determination seemed consistent with the idea of a democratic and federal Indian republic. “Today, however, Kashmiris stand sadly disillusioned, and it was the false promises and broken hopes that explain the rage of younger generation that has risen in armed revolt against the Indian state” (Bose 1997:20). Bose says that the mass base and dogged determination of the ‘secessionist’ urge in Kashmir today is because of Indian state’s consistent policy of denying democracy even in the minimalistic sense of what Robert Dahl calls ‘polyarchy’ to the people of state.15 Democracy was denied to the people by making mockery of the representative system, creating fraud and manipulation of multi-party electoral processes; and denial of the federal autonomy (Article 370) which was a condition of Jammu and Kashmir’s accession in 1947 to the Indian union (Bose 1997: 19). Ruling out economic reasons for the secessionist urge, Bose says that poverty, corruption and unemployment in the sub-continent are not unique to Kashmir, though these problems have assumed some significance when taken in conjunction with denial of democracy and autonomy, which are unique to Jammu and Kashmir.

The question that Reeta Chowdhary Tremblay has posed in her seminal paper is: “why do certain ethnic groups clamour for political autonomy in certain states and not

15Polyarchy means free, competitive elections of public officials through popular balloting. This, together with such associated norms as rule of law and civil rights, constitutes the minimal basis for any functioning democracy. See: Bose (1997).
in others? Why in some pluralistic societies are cultural and political autonomy not an issue and why is the national homogeneous identity readily accepted? What causes shifts in national consciousness such that certain groups feel that their cultural identity is incompatible with mainstream culture and can only be maintained in a separate territorial state” (Tremblay 1997: 476). There are three ways, according to Tremblay, of answering these questions regarding the content of nationalism. “First, the states’ own actions in sponsoring formal nationalism and in politically constructing an identity through its legal and constitutional structures set up a framework which determines and constrains the future actions of the state and the civil society. In this process of political construction of an identity for its ethnic groups, the state selectively propagates certain historical references and symbols which satisfy its own need for cultural homogeneity and its own version of nationalism” (Tremblay 1997: 476). With regard to Kashmir, India affirmed the nature and boundaries of Kashmir nation supported by Sheikh Abdullah whose notion of Kashmiriyat and New Kashmir Manifesto gave New Delhi with linkages and raison-d’être for inclusion of Jammu and Kashmir in Indian Union (Tremblay 1997). Second, the failure of state to reconcile popular or informal nationalism may result in ‘inaudible sub-state sphere of representation’ i.e. the capacity and strategies of the state to accommodate or satisfy informal nationalism (Tremblay 1997). In post-1953 Kashmir, writes Tremblay that India was not able to reconcile the informal Kashmir and official Indian nationalism. However, the sub-state structures of representation which emerged as a result remained inaudible for over four decades because of pursuance of patronage politics and suppression of political opposition. Third, according to Tremblay, the selection of state strategies to suppress popular nationalism is the function of the structure of the state itself and given that in overpoliticised third world countries competition among the social actors largely pertains to the control of state structures and political power, the major preoccupation of state actors, who use state apparatus for accumulation purposes, becomes survival. Tremblay has argued in her paper that it was the failure of the India to accommodate the state-sponsored nationalism with the informal Kashmiri nationalism that has led to the rise of anti-state structures. “Had the Indian state consistently pursued its attempts at reconciling state-sponsored nationalism with informal nationalism of the majority Muslim population, the Hindu nationalist groups would have remained marginalised and the Indian state would have most probably
achieved its goal of maintaining the dual identity of Kashmiri populace” (Tremblay 1997: 489).

With arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953, India, with help from new leaders in the state altered its policy towards Kashmir i.e. – moved towards more and more integration of state into the Union; two developments were noticed in the state – alienation of Kashmiri Muslims and rise of a symbiotic relationship between Jammu’s Hindu and the Valley’s Muslims. When Muslims of Valley demanded autonomy, the Hindu’s of Jammu reacted with demand for its merger with India, leading to further alienation of Muslims and stronger claim for autonomy (Tremblay 1997). According to her, the move by New Delhi to integrate the state with Union created tensions and contradictions between the meaning and structures associated with the state-sponsored and popular nationalism and at the same time it made formal nationalism very weak and ineffective in the state in terms of relating itself to the daily experiences of Kashmiri Muslim population. Muslims of Valley displayed their anger in the form of demonstrations against New Delhi, demand for plebiscite, submitting petitions to United Nations office in Srinagar, giving call for boycott of Republic Day and Independence celebrations and raising pro-Pakistan slogans. All this was in a way to disassociate the Kashmir population from the state-sponsored symbolism. On the other hand, when many laws of the central government were being extended to the state with the approval of the state Legislative Assembly, Hindus of Jammu were satisfied that Kashmir is being integrated with the rest of the country (Tremblay 1997). But when Sheikh Abdullah resurfaced at the centre of politics in the state and his insistence on granting of autonomy to the state which it enjoyed before his arrest in 1953, again a polarisation between the two regions of the state – Jammu and Kashmir – emerged. New Delhi from 1953 onwards in order quench informal nationalism in the state relied on two strategies – encouragement to one-party regime and repression of democratic opposition, and pursuance of politics of patronage (Tremblay 1997). According to Tremblay, the repression of the forces of democratic opposition by the ruling party in the state as well as at the centre resulted in the rise and strengthening of inaudible anti-state structures “in which an autonomous and largely ideational culture is produced and reproduced across generational lines” (Tremblay 1997:495). In Kashmir, writes Tremblay, the state strategy of maintaining a monolithic political structure along with liberal use of patronage may have in the
short run quenched the informal nationalism but in the long run it has been responsible for the emergence of anti-state structures. Tremblay writes that the use of patronage politics by the state government was responsible for two consequences for its civil society: “First there emerged a privileged administrative class whose rising expectations were increasingly frustrated by negligible economic development and the limited ability of the state sectors to absorb its members into the public administration. Second, the beneficiaries of the state’s social and health policies were primarily the upper and middle classes, largely concentrated in the urban centres, which served to increase the gap between rich and poor” (Tremblay 1997: 495). For Tremblay, while the prime motivators for secessionist movement were shrinking career opportunities for the urban middle classes combined with closed avenues for the expression of their political voice. The rural masses were also mobilised as there was no trickling down of the benefits of patronage politics (Tremblay 1997; Prakash 2000). “In short, the myopic state strategies of repression of opposition politics and institutionalisation of patronage politics combined with both the economic and geographical isolation of the Kashmir Valley have resulted in the full activation of the sub-state structures of representation which had remained inaudible till 1989” (Tremblay 1997: 496).

Explaining separatism in Jammu and Kashmir in his book ‘Kashmir in Comparative Perspective: Democracy and Violent separatism in India’ Sten Widmalm (1997&2002) notes that it was neither the historical background nor the cultural identity nor the socio-economic conditions nor outside (Pakistan) intervention that explains the discontent in the Valley. Rather, for him, it was political factors specifically the breakdown of institutions and the struggle for power among the elites in Srinagar and New Delhi that caused the crisis in the state (Widmalm 2002). Among the many approaches to the study of the causes of separatism in Jammu and Kashmir, to Widmalm, only the cultural, socio-economic and political theories provide most of the perspectives and even amongst these it was political factors that led to violent separatism (Widmalm 2002). Dismissing the argument put forth by the nationalists that the Kashmir problem was a result of merger of incompatible identities; for Widmalm, the emergence of incompatible identities was an outcome of a distinctly political conflict in the state and not its cause. Similarly, he finds no merit in the views of the West for describing the problem in Kashmir as a part of Islamisation of
Asia or the spread of global ethnic conflict. For Widmalm, even the respective positions of India and Pakistan – New Delhi accusing Islamabad as the orchestrator of insurgency in the Valley and Pakistan terming the violence in the Valley as ‘uprising’ and a result of economic deprivation – on the possible causes of conflict situation in the Kashmir is nothing but a mistake. To Widmalm, one should look beyond ethnicity to understand the problem and focus more on the development of political institutions and decisions made by the political elites in Jammu and Kashmir and New Delhi from 1975 to 1989. Reiterating that separatism was not determined by ethnic factors, the historical background or even the Pakistani intervention, Widmalm argues that the discontent that finally ignited the valley in the late 1980s and took the expression of violent separatism was mainly caused by an internal process. For the author late 1980s was the period when violence replaced democratic means of protests in Jammu and Kashmir as other peaceful means were exhausted.

Widmalm writes that this point becomes clearer if we make use of Albert Hirschman’s (1970) contribution to the field of organisational theory where later argues how loyalty is related to the availability of avenues of exit and voice. Widmalm finds exit and voice quite relevant while studying the stability of political system. In a democratic system, when a citizen is dissatisfied or wants to express disapproval, he can simply criticise political leaders within the party. This is one example of voice option. If that is not effective enough the exit option can be chosen i. e. changing party preference. Institutions such as police, judiciary and election commission provided by the state which take complaints from citizens can be seen as options for voice. When these state institutions are not effective or unavailable to the citizens, one may expect a more radical expression of discontent. The citizen may then attempt to protest against the central government using means that are not allowed by the law – a person may decide to exit from the democratic dialogue (Widmalm 2002).

"From 1977 onwards, for almost ten years, it seemed possible to refute Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s two-nation theory by pointing to the democratic state of Jammu and Kashmir, integrated with India after free elections. The prevalent mood of the electorate was one of moderation, with extremist parties such as the secessionist Jamaat-e-Islami and the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) being shunned by the voters, and with attempts by the separatists force to launch a movement proving unsuccessful.
The channels for both exit and voice were definitely present, but the political parties and other democratic institutions upholding these avenues of political expression were deteriorating (Widmalm 2002:99). After the 1977 debacle, the Congress was looking for an opportunity to bounce back to power and this came in 1980 when Indira Gandhi was voted back to power. In the meantime, when Sheikh Abdullah died in 1982, his son Farooq Abdullah took over as Chief Minister of the state. Again when elections for the state Assembly were held in 1983, Farooq Abdullah again became the Chief Minister. But very soon the relationship between Farooq Abdullah and Indira Gandhi deteriorated leading to his dismissal on the ground that he had lost majority support in the Assembly. With the dismissal of the state government, there was restlessness in Jammu and Kashmir and particular in the Kashmir Valley. Loyalty of the people of the state to the government in New Delhi decreased although the channels for voice were still the main means of expressing criticism. Farooq Abdullah remained the legitimate leader since he had not gone against the will of the electorate. Media criticised the central government and the dismissal of Farooq Abdullah was challenged in the court (Widmalm 2002). But very soon Farooq Abdullah came back to power with the help of the Congress party. This volte face by the Farooq Abdullah was something people of the state were not ready to swallow. This move of Farooq Abdullah defied the basic logic of Kashmiri politics - defying the domination by the centre and assertion of Kashmir's autonomy. Farooq Abdullah became a traitor to the Kashmiri cause. The very party (Congress) which had got him dismissed and installed his own brother-in-law Ghulam Mohammed Shah as the Chief Minister; Farooq Abdullah entered into an alliance with, what Widmalm calls ‘creation of cartel’, the Congress party. “When the National Conference and the Congress passed the J&K Special Powers (Press) Bill in the State Legislative Assembly, bringing almost total press censorship to the state, the political opposition that had stayed loyal to Union and the democratic system in spite of the electoral malpractice of 1987 said they had enough. But now there was few legal channels left for the expression of political discontent. This is when the status of the Jammu and Kashmir as a part of the Indian Union began to be more seriously challenged” (Widmalm (2002: 100). This was when all the routes for exit and voice were closed and the system become unstable in Jammu and Kashmir.
As democratic institutions in the state were undermined – dominance of one party, Sheikh Abdullah promoting his family members as his successors in the party (son Farooq Abdullah and son-in-law G. M. Shah), unceremonious removal of Mirza Afzal Beg from the party, appointment of Jagmohan Malhotra as the Governor, engineering defection in the National Conference, dismissal of Farooq Abdullah and installation of G. M. Shah as Chief Minister – tensions increased and large scale violence was finally triggered by the kidnapping of Rubaya Sayeed, daughter of then India’s home minister in 1989 (Widmalm 2002). From here, notes Widmalm, violence escalated in the state, moderate voices were given less room for free expression, and finally violence became self-perpetuating. It was in this context that the most serious polarisation of Hindus and Muslim occurred. Therefore, the political conflict between elites of the state and the central government over power should be regarded as the cause of the conflict in the Valley and not the polarisation on ethnic lines. Polarisation of people on ethnic lines is not the cause rather it is a consequence of that political conflict, writes Widmalm. And one of the more important factors that led to the escalation of violence, according to Widmalm, was the weak party organisations of both the National Conference and Indian National Congress. Because of their internal weaknesses, the Congress Party and National Conference resorted to semi repressive policies and democratic legitimacy was lost and violence escalated. To prove his point that political factors, and not competing nationalisms, as argued by political scientist Ashutosh Varshney, was a crucial factor in producing violent separatism in Jammu and Kashmir, Widmalm compares Jammu and Kashmir with Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. He says that the competition between nationalisms may be considered a necessary factor in the explanation of separatist violence, but according to him, it is not a sufficient one. “Although it is true that the competition between nationalisms to which Varshney refers may be considered a necessary factor in the explanation of separatist violence, it is not a sufficient one. All the three states have had competing forms of nationalism, or the cultural preconditions that can lend themselves to separatism. In Jammu and Kashmir, the cultural prerequisite is represented by Kashmiriyat, in Tamil Nadu by the demand for Dravida Nadu, and in West Bengal by a strong Bengali esprit. But Tamil Nadu never produced separatist violence on the scale of Jammu and Kashmir, and the Bengali identity has not yet led to a separatist movement in West Bengal, so something more is needed if we are to explain the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir” (Widmalm 2002: 123). Therefore, according to
Widmalm, culture and identity *per se* are neutral, and act as a vehicle rather than a cause of political conflict (Widmalm 2002). In order for polarisation to occur effectively and on a large scale between groups in society, political elite pursuing certain policies is needed. Whether the elite are aware of the fact that it is creating polarisation is irrelevant. For strong polarisation to take place there has to be real discontent among the citizens. Otherwise mobilisation on ethnic lines may fall flat.

For Ashutosh Varshney (1991&1992), “the Kashmir problem is a result of three forces: religious nationalism represented by Pakistan, secular nationalism epitomised by India, and ethnic nationalism embodied in what Kashmiris call *Kashmiriyat* (being a Kashmiri). Each side accuses the other of duplicity; however internal inconsistencies, contradictions and paradoxes mark all the three” (Varshney 1991). In order to understand the Kashmir problem, Varshney has divided the entire period – from 1947 to 1991 – into three phases to know what went wrong where and when. According to Varshney, the first phase was from 1947 to 1953 and marked by ambiguity. This uncertainty was characterised by invasion of Kashmir by Pathan tribesman supported by Pakistan army, the special circumstances under which the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir signed the Instrument of Accession, New Delhi taking up the issue of invasion with the United Nations and the world body instead of taking any firm decision on the issue, termed Kashmir as a disputed territory to be decided by a referendum. India also became a party to this uncertainty by putting a clause (Article 370) in the Constitution which accorded a special status (a temporary measure till accession is confirmed by a reference to the people) to Jammu and Kashmir among all other states of the Union. Sheikh Abdullah also contributed by taking some of the decisions which later became controversial i.e. ignoring the views and aspirations of people of Jammu, land reforms being viewed communal and hobnobbing with western powers for their support for an independent Kashmir as one of the possible solution to the Kashmir problem (Varshney 1991). What was good about this phase was that all the above-mentioned nationalisms – marked by inconsistencies, contradictions and paradoxes – have not yet surfaced in the Kashmir. The second phase was from 1953 to 1983. According to Varshney, this period saw rise and triumph of secular nationalism. A number of developments contributed to this. The first and decisive was approval of the Kashmir's merger with India by state’s Constituent Assembly and India helping the state in its economic development
process. Second, it became clear by 1965 that not only Kashmir but even Kashmiris are indeed an integral part of India when they supported India when it was attacked by Pakistan in 1965. Pakistan was under the impression that Kashmiris in India are not happy and in case a support is provided to them, they would rise in revolt against India. Contrary to Pakistan’s expectations, the Kashmiris supported India and not Pakistan. Third, Pakistan’s two-nation theory collapsed with the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971. The 1971 War not only demolished Pakistan militarily but also psychologically when it could not stop East Pakistan from becoming Bangladesh. At the same time India emerged stronger and a message was given – to both Islamabad and Plebiscite Front in Kashmir – that there cannot be any negotiation which threatens its sovereignty in any form. This phase also witnessed the return of Sheikh Abdullah back into the politics of Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah not only on the request of Nehru went to Pakistan to negotiate a deal on Kashmir but also signed an accord in 1975 with Indira Gandhi in which Article 370 was kept alive and Sheikh Abdullah accepting Kashmir as a constituent unit of the Union of India (Varshney 1991).

Third phase, starting from 1983 was the turning point for the Kashmir as it was seen as the beginning of a new phase of alienation in the valley. For Varshney, this period was marked by secular nationalism becoming abusive, resurgence of Islamic nationalism and a rekindling of Kashmiri nationalism. With the demise of Sheikh Abdullah and his son Farooq Abdullah at the helms of affairs in Kashmir, there was major change as far as centre-state relations were concerned. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s centralising political drive undermined the powers of the non-Congress governments in the states. Some of the methods used by central government in total defiance of well established federal principles were – use of defections to dislodge the governments in states, dismissal of state governments by the appointments of controversial Governors and appointments of Chief Ministers who were loyal to the central government. In 1984, Farooq Abdullah was dismissed from office and in his place a new Chief Minister was imposed in Kashmir (Varshney 1991). Farooq Abdullah in a surprising volt face and defying the basic logic of Kashmiri politics ended up signing a deal with Congress. According to Varshney, in 1987 State Assembly election, people were mobilised in the name of Kashmiriyat by a coalition of Islamic groups, known as the Muslim United Front (MUF). This was something which was unexpected in Kashmir. Despite very poor performance of orthodox Islamic parties in previous Kashmir elections, the Congress-Conference alliance
became jittery of MUF and rigged the 1987 State Assembly elections. According to reports, not only the vote was rigged, several candidates of MUF party were beaten up. Frustrated with system, these people crossed the border and joined extremists groups and according to Varshney, the leadership of the insurgency two years later (1989) came from some of these candidates (Varshney 1991).

Explaining Religious Nationalism, Varshney, argues that Pakistan always believed that the Jammu and Kashmir being a Muslim-majority state should have come to it in 1947 because the sub-continent was divided into two dominions – India and Pakistan – on the basis of two-nation theory. But this did not happen because neither Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir Hari Singh nor National Conference led by Sheikh Abdullah opted for Pakistan. Even Kashmiris fought Pakistan vigorously when they were attacked in October 1947. Not only India but even Sheikh Abdullah and his party National conference rejected Jinnah’s two-nation theory unequivocally. “I and my organisation never believed in the formula that Muslims and Hindus form separate nations. We did not believe in two-nation theory, not in communalism… we believed that religion had no place in politics” (Varshney 1991: 1000). Jinnah was able to create Pakistan on the basis of his two-nation theory in which about 65 million Muslims joined Pakistan in 1947, but 35 million were still left behind in India and now, according to Varshney, this number is more than 100 millions, whereas the number of Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir is a mere four million. Varshney argues that Pakistan’s continued search for Kashmir, thus, runs into contradiction: if Islamabad tried to ‘liberate’ Kashmir or if Kashmir breaks away with its help, Pakistan runs the risk of endangering the welfare of the remaining Muslims in India. An inevitable nationalist cry, however, is: how many times India will be partitioned because of so-called Muslim Question? In a memorandum submitted to United Nations representative in Kashmir in 1951, many non-Kashmiri Indian Muslims including Dr. Zakir Hussain made arguments about the implications of Pakistan’s actions in Kashmir. They argued that Pakistan has made their position weaker by driving out Hindus from the western Pakistan in utter disregard of the consequences of such a policy to us (Muslims in India) and our welfare. It is a strange that in its eagerness to rescue the three million Muslims from Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan is prepared to sacrifice the interests of 40 million Muslims in India. Pakistan does not realise that if Muslims there can wage a war against Hindus in Kashmir, why should
not Hindus, sooner or later, retaliate against Muslims in India (Varshney 1991: 1000)? Like Varshney, even Bose (2003) finds Islamabad’s claim of Pakistan being the homeland of Muslims as dubious when their East Pakistan became Bangladesh in 1971. It is not surprising that Indian Muslims outside Kashmir have not supported the insurgency in Kashmir. For Pakistan, Kashmir continues to represent the unfinished business of partition (Varshney 1991).

Even India’s secular nationalism is also marked by contradictions. The Congress leadership especially Nehru rejected Jinnah’s two-nation theory. Dismissing the two-nation theory, Nehru argued that Hindus and Muslims had separate religions but they were not distinct nations. Both Hindus and Muslims are citizens of India. The secular nationalism of the Congress not only faced an ideological adversary in Muslim nationalism but also an intraparty rival in Hindu nationalism. Hindu nationalists had no objection to Muslim living in India but at the same time they (Muslims) have to show their loyalty to India and also accept that India was primarily a Hindu civilisation. The decision of Jammu and Kashmir ruler along with the consent of the National Conference party to join India gave high moral ground to the Congress’s secular argument. Once part of India, however, Kashmir's decision to break away, if taken or successful, threatens to empower Hindu nationalism for it legitimates its main argument that Muslims are essentially disloyal to the country. Thus, the battle between secular and Hindu nationalism after independence came to be embodied in Kashmir, which led to serious contradiction in the position taken by Nehru and his followers. Nehru argued that in order to maintain secularism in India and to keep Hindu nationalism at bay, Kashmir must stay in India – if necessary, by force (Varshney 1991). Nehru in his speech to Parliament in 1953 said that: "we have always regarded the Kashmir problem as symbolic for us, as it has far reaching consequences in India. Kashmir is symbolic as it illustrates that we are a secular state… Kashmir has consequences both in India and Pakistan…” (Varshney 1991: 1002) Despite Sheikh Abdullah’s statement within India and at United Nations that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India and his total disagreement with Jinnah’s two-nation theory, Hindu nationalists under the leadership of Shyama Prasad Mookerjee led a popular movement in Jammu against Kashmir's vacillations on full integration with India. Nurtured by a widespread feeling among the Hindu middle classes that India’s secular state has gone too far in appeasing minorities, Hindu
nationalism has gained remarkably in recent years. “Kashmiri nationalism may not entirely account for the rise of Hindu nationalism but, because of its history and context, substantially contributes to it and makes it difficult for India to deal with it generously. If Kashmir withdraws from Indian Union and second partition of India takes place, the main beneficiary will be Hindu nationalists” (Varshney 1991:1002). Keeping Kashmir in India, thus may have led to a tragedy, but letting Kashmir go, however, means a tragedy of greater magnitude – a possible Hindu-Muslim bloodbath and an invigorated attack on secularism. Bose (2003) also finds New Delhi’s position on secularism not very convincing saying why India requires only Kashmir to prove its secular credentials. There are Muslims in other parts of India also who can equally vouch for India’s secularism. The population of Muslims in India (176,190,000) is second to Indonesia (209,120,000) but definitely more than that of Pakistan (167,410,000).

Varshney also finds Kashmiri Nationalism very problematic and full of contradictions. On one hand, majority of Kashmiris share their religion with Pakistan but when the opportunity came in 1947 to live with their co-religious brothers by joining Pakistan, they decided against it and instead supported India’s democracy and secularism. This suggests that Kashmiri nationalism is closer to Indian nationalism and it is nothing but part of Indian nationalism. If this is true, then why Kashmiris are demanding for an independent Kashmir (Varshney 1991)? If Kashmiris did not feel themselves as part of Indian nationalism then why did they fight against Pakistan in 1947 and 1965 war? Again, If Kashmiri nationalism is not subset of Indian nationalism, then how Jammu and Ladakh can go with Kashmir? If Kashmiri nationalism is not based on religion but on Kashmiriyat, then it has to be realised that ethnically the Buddhists are Tibetans, the Hindus in Jammu are Dogras, and the Muslims of Jammu are Punjabis. An ethnic notion of independent Kashmir cannot carry the entire state without being internally inconsistent, particularly if non-Kashmiri groups do not wish to join such a state. Sheikh Abdullah from 1947 till his death in 1982 fluctuated between Kashmir's accession to India and independence. This was strange when he himself had on many occasions not only openly rejected the two-nation theory but also had recognised the link between Kashmir's accession to India and India’s secularism (Varshney 1991). Hindu nationalists questioned Sheikh Abdullah's motives. According to them: “if Sheikh Abdullah hated the two-nation
theory and his principles were the same as those of Indian polity then where was the ground for not accepting a full accession” (Varshney 1991: 1009)? For Varshney, as long as the Kashmiri leaders had not threatened with secession, New Delhi respected Article 370 of the Constitution and when Pakistan has been militarily weak, there was no problem in Kashmir. In order to restore peace in Kashmir, writes Varshney, both India and Pakistan need to compromise. The shape of compromise cannot be predicted but lack of a compromise will only definitely prolong the problem.

Raju G. C. Thomas (1992) in his introduction to the edited volume argues that Kashmir remains one of the major roots of conflict between the two neighbours – India and Pakistan. Although both countries have laid claim to the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, but it is the Vale of Kashmir that constitute the main bone of contention. Thomas writes that Kashmir problem could be understood from five different dimensions: (i) Territorial Partitions and the Nationalities Question, (ii) The politics of Secularism and Theocracy, (iii) Interpretations and Implementations of partition Plan,(iv) Strategic and Military considerations, and (v) Alternatives Scenarios of Conflict Resolution.

Territorial Partitions and the Nationalities Question: In the introduction this section, Thomas has questioned the very idea of resorting to territorial partition as a solution to the nationality questions. Division of India into two parts was actually a consequence of British policy of ‘divide and rule’. According to him, it was a bad idea to divide British India into two Dominions to resolve the Hindu-Muslim enmity which in reality threw up problem of Kashmir and continuing India-Pakistan conflict in South Asia. For him, it is very difficult to divide a country into two or more parts on the basis of religion or ethnicity alone because people are not only spread over the entire country but they have multiple identities too. “Indeed, it is debatable whether such partitions (or secessions) are appropriate solutions when various ethnic populations and religious communities are dispersed in the territories to be partitioned. For example, one of the problems associated with Croatian demands for secession and independence from Yugoslavia, is the large Serbian minority – almost 12 percent – that would be left behind in the pockets in Croatia” (Thomas 1992:06). According to Raju, like Kashmir problem, the legacy of partition and conflict arising from British withdrawal from territories that it once controlled may also be found in the case of Northern Ireland and in the British mandate of Palestine. At the same time,
he points out that one should not put all the blame on the religious differences as the cause for conflicts in these areas. “The sources of such conflicts relationships in all three cases arise essentially over disputed territory, socio-economic grievances often unrelated to religion, and leadership and power rivalries. Thus, conflicts over the status of Northern Ireland, Kashmir and Palestine are not fundamentally different from other conflicts that occur among peoples and states of the same religion, as among Arabs and Persians, Kurds and Arabs, Iraqis and Kuwaitis, or Muslim Bengalis and Punjabis” (Thomas 1992: 06). Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), one of the separatist outfits demanding independence for Kashmir, has claimed that the Kashmir question is not a Hindu-Muslim dispute but an effort to assert the political rights of the ethnic Kashmiris (Thomas 1992).

The Politics of Secularism and Theocracy: Here, Thomas while introducing the theme has argued that the root causes of Kashmir are to be found in the events leading to the partition of India and the opposing ideological perspectives of Congress and the Muslim League. According to Muslim League, Kashmir's natural home was Pakistan and not India because Kashmir is a Muslim-majority state whereas Congress held the view that religion is no ground for dividing people into two or more nations. Muslim League wanted creation of a Muslim homeland whereas Congress stood for unity and the secular basis of the new independent state (Thomas 1992). Muslim League leader Jinnah demanded the partition of India on the ground that the two communities constitute two different nations as their respective beliefs and customs are incompatible with each other and hence difficult to coexist peacefully as a single state. He said in a post independent India, the ‘British Raj’ would be replaced with ‘Hindu Raj’ (Thomas 1992). Jinnah, therefore, demanded the creation of ‘Pakistan’, an independent homeland for the Muslims of India. On the other hand, “Nehru had claimed that the people of India despite a variety of religions, languages, castes and races, shared an overarching historical and cultural experience, and had common racial roots in different regions, that made them all uniquely Indian. Where religion may separate them, language, race and culture also united them. Moreover, Hindus and Muslims elites had interacted with each other for centuries, especially under British rule, setting the basis for a common social and political ruling culture” (Thomas 1992: 12).
Leaders of Muslim League claimed that the Congress was essentially a Hindu organisation where most of its leaders outwardly appeared secular but were Hindu chauvinists in reality. By extension, Pakistan has continued to claim that India is really a Hindu state with no moral or political rights to the Muslim majority state of Kashmir. Abdul Kalam Azad’s support for a secular India arose not so much from a belief in the compatibility of Islam and secularism, as from the pragmatic belief that the partition of India would cause more harm to the Indian Muslims as a whole (Thomas 1992). “If a united India implied the domination of the Muslim minority by the Hindu majority, this would occur mainly in the regions where the Muslims were in actual minority – regions that would be left behind in India after partition anyway to face an even greater and more hostile Hindu majority. If there was need for a separate state, it was the Muslim minority areas which remained part of India that needed a ‘Pakistan’ the most; not those Muslim majority areas which would become part of Pakistan. To Azad, the creation of Pakistan, therefore, made no political sense. Accordingly, it is not surprising that Muslim separatism was much stronger in those Muslim majority areas that remained part of India, than in those provinces that eventually became part of Pakistan” (Thomas 1992: 15).

Interpretations and implementations of the Partition Plan: while introducing the theme, Thomas argues that Kashmir problem was also a result of rivalry between the Congress and the Muslim League who not only interpreted Indian history differently but also applied different principles for making partition. For Congress, the partition of the country was a direct result of ‘divide and rule policy’ of British whereas Muslim League supported the British policy. When it was decided to create Pakistan, partition was to be carried out only in the Muslim majority areas of the northwest and northeast. For Jinnah, this kind of partition was not the ideal solution (Jinnah calling it ‘moth-eaten’ Pakistan), but it was the only practical translation of the two-nation theory of Hindus and Muslims in India into a practical reality. For Nehru, the acceptance of Pakistan was merely an expression of pragmatism – an acceptance of their failure to resist the demands for Pakistan by the Muslim League, and an effort to avoid civil war in India. For them, there had been no acceptance of Jinnah’s two-nation theory (Thomas 1992).

Congress and Muslim League also took contradictory position on the question of whether the principles of partition applied only to British India ‘proper’, or also to the
600 princely states. Indian princes were persuaded by the British to opt for either of the two dominions and the two essential criteria to be followed by them for acceding would be: (a) states with Muslim majority populations should accede to Pakistan, and those with Hindu majority to India; (b) accession to Pakistan by the rulers of the Muslim majority states should occur only if these states were geographically contiguous to one of the two wings of Pakistan created out of British India in the northwest and northeast. Both Congress and Muslim League accepted these principles of partition but there were inherent contradictions in their actions on specific cases (Thomas 1992). In particular, complications arose over three princely states: Hyderabad, Junagarh and Jammu and Kashmir. At a broader level, India claimed that while the partition of India had been accepted but not Jinnah's two-nation theory. Muslims of the sub-continent were as much a part of India as Pakistan, and the fact that the majority of Kashmiris were Muslims did not give an automatic claim on it. Thus the accession of Kashmir to India was considered legal, final and irrevocable. The Pakistan’s claim over Kashmir was that state had a Muslim majority population and was contiguous to Pakistan, the two basic criteria to determine the accession of the princely states to India and Pakistan. This argument of Pakistan was reinforced by the fact that Hindu-majority Hyderabad and Junagarh had been absorbed by India. India could not have it both ways (Thomas 1992).

Strategic and Military Considerations: In his introduction to this part, Thomas argues that irrespective of the claims made by India and Pakistan that Kashmir belongs to them, the present status of Kashmir (Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh with India and POK with Pakistan) was obtained on the result of first India-Pakistan War of 1947-49, retained during the next War of 1965, and then firmly established under Indian control during the Bangladesh War of 1971. The status of Kashmir since1947, writes Thomas, reflects the ‘balance of military power’ in South Asia, although varying legal, moral and political arguments continue to be advanced by the antagonists at home and abroad. “India had sought to retain Kashmir on the basis of both power and persuasion; that is, by maintaining the military edge against Pakistan to prevent the seizure of Kashmir, and while proclaiming its legal, moral and political rights in Kashmir. Similarly, Pakistan has sought to change the status quo in Kashmir through the conduct of war against India while also proclaiming the same rights in Kashmir” (Thomas 1992: 22-23). After the victory of India in 1971 War and the signing of
Shimla Agreement, the Kashmir issue was supposedly ‘dead’ with the Kashmiris showing no major outwardly sign of discontent with the status quo, and Pakistan showing no further sign of seeking to annex the state, either through military power or through political or diplomatic means (Thomas 1992). According to Thomas, this status quo on Kashmir prevailed until the rigging of the state Assembly elections in 1987 by Congress party along with National Conference. In turn this led to the armed Kashmiri uprising in 1989 which has continued since.

To summarize the view of Thomas, he while exploring the arguments of the various sides on the Kashmir issue and the options for conflict resolution proposed at various times, says that Kashmir remains one of the major roots of conflict between the two neighbours. Ruling out war as an option for the resolution of conflict, Thomas lists following potential alternative solutions for consideration: 1) Maintaining the territorial status quo in Kashmir; 2) Secure Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan; 3) Create an Independent Kashmir; 4) Secure a ‘Trieste’ solution through the territorial transfer of Vale of Kashmir to Pakistan; 5) Manipulate a ‘Tibetan’ solution by transferring the demographics in Kashmir; 6) Generate an exodus of Kashmiri Muslims into Pakistan; 7) Achieve joint Indo-Pakistani control over Kashmir; 8) Foster a sub-continent of several independent states.

The book, which includes contributions from scholars such as A. G. Noorani, Ashutosh Varshney and former Minister with Central government and also Minister for Kashmir Affairs George Fernandes among others, is considered as very valuable for policy makers and researchers. For Fernandes (1992), the root of present problem is neither Hindu-Muslim divide nor foreign hand. The reasons why the youths got disillusioned, according to Fernandes, was because of following three reasons: a) the all pervasive corruption, b) the failure of the government to alleviate the economic problems, particularly jobs; and c) the kind of election that people experienced there. Noorani (1992) added two more reasons to the above list for the alienation of the people – Failure to respect state’s autonomy and human rights. Mushahid Hussain (1992), a Pakistani scholar, says that the uprising in Kashmir presents the first serious possibility of altering the political status quo in South Asia since the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971. Drawing a parallel with then East Pakistan, Hussain writes that the situation in Kashmir today is actually ‘India’s Bangladesh’ (Hussain 1992).
To sum up the experts writing on Kashmir issue have invariably narrated the political history of the State as historical context remains very important for contextualising the ongoing agitation in Kashmir. The Kashmiri identity has been very much based on their sense of history as to how they were persecuted in the past by the forces from outside the Valley and how even now they have been victim of breach of trust as Indian State has been unable to fulfill its promises like ensuring full democratic rights, special constitutional status as well as bringing about radical reforms that would have paved way for development in an overarching sense.

Sifting through the available literature, the economic dimension of the Kashmir issue also becomes relevant as the economy has remained lopsided and a form of crony capitalism in the sense that the economic decisions have always been taken on the basis of narrow/parochial political consideration. Indian State has adopted the politics of adhocism in the sense that there has not been any coherent long-term Kashmir policy and also the politics of cooption in the sense that discredited and corrupted leaders have been imposed on the masses by the Central Government State through rigged elections thereby deny even the minimal democratic rights to the people. In economic terms the politics of appeasement has been in the form of direct transfer of the resources that have given birth to unbridled corruption crippling the State’s economy and hardly contributing to long term infrastructural growth.

Relevance of the Study:

It would be pertinent to argue that understanding Kashmir problem from political economy perspective as we attempt in the present study is relevant in many ways. There is dearth of detailed fully worked out studies of the Kashmir issue from the vantage point of political economy. Much of the analysis of the Kashmir problem has been undertaken in a political context with reference to such factors as the political leadership, influence of Pakistan, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and supply of arms from Afghanistan. Arguably, the Kashmir ‘problem’ as commonly projected is not merely a ‘political’ problem but has an economic dimension too. One of the key objectives of the research would, therefore, is to systematically bring out as to how the economic and political realms have mutually interacted and contributed in the developments leading to the Kashmir problem related to the wide scale lack of development, deprivation and discrimination.
The researcher through his focus on the ‘economic’ along with ‘political’ has made a modest attempt to show as to how the incentives available to the private investors have not been as attractive as in other states of the country which have meant that the State of Jammu and Kashmir remains unable to generate sufficient capital from the private sector in the era of new economic liberalisation as the development planning model has been gradually discarded. The research work shows how India’s Kashmir policy of direct massive transfer of money as a part of autonomy package has not helped the economy of the state as it has resulted into high cost economy devoid of internal dynamism. Kashmir economy has remained a classic example of ‘peripheral/dependent’ economy as formulated in the dependency/underdevelopment theory literature. Excessive and unnecessary intervention often by the New Delhi since independence in the State, most of the investments have been into unproductive sectors rather than in the primary productive sectors. Along with this, high level of economic mismanagement and political nepotism by the political class right since 1947 has completely alienated the disgruntled youth of the Valley.

Methodology:

As no single methodology would have been most appropriate to conduct study on such a nature so for the purpose of the present research which is analytical in nature, an attempt has been made to use both inductive as well as deductive method.

It adheres to deductive method as the study focuses on the arguments presented in the scholarly literature on the subject. It also adopts inductive method as the subject required projections into the future. The researcher has also used comparative method of research in which an intra-State comparison has been made between three regions of the state i.e. Jammu, Kashmir Valley and Ladakh while discussing their respective concerns.

The researcher has used data wherever it was required. The data used in the thesis are from both the sources – official reports and also from published academic books and journals. The researcher has collected information from primary as well as secondary sources. The primary sources include reports, official documents and other publications from the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. The secondary sources include published books, autobiography, articles, journals, newspapers, and documentary.
An overview of the relevant literature on India written from the political economy perspective has also been attempted by the researcher for drawing on the theoretical framework in this library based research.