Chapter V

FRANCE, IVORY COAST AND PAN-AFRICANISM
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The Franco-Ivorian entente did not remain confined to the West African region. In response to the African unity movement led by Ghana, Guinea and others, Ivory Coast also mobilised African states in order to defend and consolidate its position. In the present chapter we shall examine how the interests of France and Ivory Coast were affected by the activities of Ghana and its supporters on the one hand, and how Ivory Coast tried to consolidate its position with the help of France on the other. This would involve an analysis of the various groupings in Africa during the early 1960s. We shall first give an account of the Pan-Africanist movement as championed by Ghana.

GHANA AND THE PAN-AFRICANIST MOVEMENT

After the independence of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, as Prime Minister, decided to support liberation struggles all over the continent. He declared "Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked with the total liberation of the African continent." With this objective in mind he convened the first conference of independent African states at Accra during 15-22 April 1958.

This conference was attended by the representatives of Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Soudan, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic. It also accorded a non-voting status to

the representatives of the Algerian National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) which was waging its armed struggle against French colonialism. The delegates discussed five main issues:

(a) The future of dependent territories, racial problem, and steps to be taken to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of independent African states.

(b) Examination of ways and means to promote economic co-operation among African states.

(c) Exchange of cultural missions among African states.

(d) Reaffirmation of the principles of the Bandung Asian-African Conference.

(e) Establishment of permanent machinery for consultation on foreign policy. 2

While concluding his opening address Nkrumah asserted: "Today we are one. If in the past Sahara divided us, now it unites us. And an injury to one is an injury to all of us. From this conference must go out a new message: 'Hands off Africa! Africa must be free'."

The Accra Conference was significant in a number of ways. First, it formally launched the Pan-Africanist movement on African soil. Vincent Thompson observed: "The goal of Pan-Africanism, namely, the crystallisation of a United States of Africa, became a more serious preoccupation than it had been in the first phase." By expressing solidarity with the Algerian


3 Ghana Daily Graphic (Accra), 16 April 1958.

people and the black population in South Africa, the Conference declared war on colonialism and racism. It also decided to set up a permanent machinery for co-ordinating the policies on all matters of common concern.

In December 1958 Ghana organized another Pan-African Conference at Accra, the All African Peoples Conference (A.A.P.C.). This time, Nkrumah invited the leaders of all African nationalist parties from Cape to Cairo. The parties of French Africa, excepting Guinea and Nigerian Northern Peoples' Party, did not attend the Conference. Declining the invitation to attend the Accra Conference, Houphouet Boigny stated in a Press conference that it was destined to produce only idle talk and demand 'illusory' independence. The Ivory Coast, he asserted, "must concentrate upon action, not words and must build prosperous republic made possible by the advantages of membership within the Franco-African community."

However, the Conference gave another opportunity to Nkrumah to condemn colonialism and imperialism. He said: "Fighters for African freedom, I appeal to you in the sacred name of Mother Africa to leave this Conference resolved to rededicate yourselves to the task of forming among political parties in your respective countries a broad united front, based upon common fundamental aim and object: the speedy liberation of your territories." The Accra Conference:

(a) endorsed Pan-Africanism and the desire for unity among African peoples;

(b) declared that its ultimate objective was the evolution of a Commonwealth of Free African states;

(c) called upon the Independent states of Africa to lead the peoples of Africa towards the attainment of this objective;

(d) expressed the hope that the day will dawn when the first loyalty of African states will be to an African Commonwealth. 7

The Conference recognized that certain territories could attain independence without violence. Nevertheless, it extended support to those who were obliged to use violent means in the circumstances of subjugation and exploitation. The French African states, on the other hand, did not join rest of the African states in condemning French policies in Algeria. Instead, Houphouet Boigny organized a meeting of these states to discuss and resolve the Algerian crisis without alienating France. 9

As a follow up step, Houphouet Boigny convened a conference at Abidjan in October 1960 to primarily discuss the Algerian problem. All the former French West African states were invited, while the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Algeria (G.P.R.A.) delegation also attended the conference. 10

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8 Ibid.


10 Guinea and Madagascar did not attend it. Along with Tunisia and Morocco Guinea had taken a definite stand on Algeria by recognizing its Provisional Revolutionary Government (G.P.R.A.).
The final communique issued by the Conference declared that the participating states would adopt common attitudes in international politics. According to Guy de Lusignan, "It recommended that the French-speaking countries could present a unanimous viewpoint at the UN (on Algeria) and should be represented by only few speakers - a course which was adopted at the 15th session of the United Nations in 1960."

Thus, by inviting G.P.R.A. to Abidjan Houphouet acknowledged the authenticity of the Liberation Front of Algeria. At the same time, he refrained from antagonizing France by not giving official recognition to G.P.R.A.

After the Abidjan Conference, Houphouet arranged a series of meeting among the African states from October till the beginning of December 1960. The purpose of these meetings, according to Houphouet, was not to create a political confederation which would infringe on national sovereignties but rather to establish strong economic ties, a common currency, a customs union and a common foreign policy in African and world affairs.


13 See Africa Report (Washington), vol. 5, no. 2, December 1960, p. 12. One can see also the contrast in the style of Nkrumah and Houphouet. Because of his ideology, Nkrumah was forced to take a formal public stand in various conferences. Houphouet on the other hand being mere interested in establishing workable ties was keen in avoiding public stand.
THE BRAZZAVILLE CONFERENCE

As a follow-up, another important meeting was organized at Brazzaville from 15 to 19 December 1960. The representatives of the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Dahomey, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Upper Volta, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Tchad and Madagascar assembled "with the aim of realising new progress on the road to their inter-African cooperation, founded on neighbourhood, culture and community of interests, and to work effectively towards the maintenance of peace in Africa and in the world." The Algerian crisis took a new turn at this time with the formation of a government-in-exile under Ferhat Abbas. To meet the situation, France launched a diplomatic campaign to strengthen its position in international affairs. Tunisia and Morocco were encouraged to share in the development of Saharan oil and gas as part of a movement toward greater French-Maghreb unity. The Franco-Tunisian pipeline agreement was reached in late 1958. France also wanted to reconsider its military position in both the states. Efforts were made to block UN discussion on the Algerian question. By 1960, the United Nations also refused to treat Algeria as an internal problem of France. Ultimately, on 5 September 1960 De Gaulle declared, "There is an Algeria, there is an Algerian entity, there is an

14 Brazzaville Declaration, Legum, n. 7, p. 179.
16 Ibid., pp. 458-9.
Algerian personality. It belongs to the Algerians, through suffrage, to decide their destiny."

Considering this background of the Algerian episode the final communiqué of the Brazzaville Conference stated "The undersigned states, attached to the principle of decolonization for which they have struggled so much; but aware of the danger for Africa which lies in prolonging the Algerian war, have taken the only attitude which by negotiations allows the honest and democratic application of the principle of self-determination solemnly proclaimed by General De Gaulle." Regarding UN efforts to resolve the Algerian issue, the resolution added, "They do not want to associate themselves with the hardly practicable and negative solution, consisting in an illusory resort to U.N.O., for the organization and control of referendum in a country which does not come under the guardianship of U.N.O." Further, the Brazzaville states preferred to solve the issue through negotiations between the concerned parties. During the discussions, they showed clearly their fear of communist interference in Algerian affairs.

The participants also discussed the Congo crisis. The

17 Quoted in ibid., p. 459.
18 Legum, n. 7, p. 179.
19 Ibid., p. 180.
20 Commenting on Movement National Congolais (M.N.C.) and Lumumba's leadership, Catherine Hoskyns observed: "The party was founded in October 1958 in Leopoldville by a group of young educated Congolese who came from a variety of tribes and regions. The President was Patrice Lumumba, who was already beginning to make name for himself as an orator, writer, leader...." Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence (London, 1965), p. 27.
origin of the crisis can be briefly sketched as follows: When Belgians departed from the Congo, Lumumba became the Premier and Joseph Kasavubu became the President. Immediately after independence, Lumumba's Government faced two major obstacles. First, the soldiers of Force Publique, dissatisfied with their low pay, long hours and unchanged status in contrast to that of the politicians, mutinied in Leopoldville and Thysville against the European officers. The new Government agreed to Africanize the army services and Lumumba flew all over the country to calm down the troops. However, even before the mutiny was suppressed, a secessionist movement broke out in Katanga under the leadership of Moïse Tshombe. The Katanga province was of vital importance to the Congo as it contributed nearly 75 per cent of the country's total revenues. Its giant corporation, the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (U.M.H.K.), produced annually $150 million worth of copper. There were also two N.A.T.O. military bases at Kamina and Kitona in Katanga. The 31,887 white settlers in Katanga supported the secessionist forces in connivance with

21 Force Publique was the army in Belgian Congo dominated by Belgian authorities.


24 U.M.H.K. was linked in turn with Societe Generale de Belge of Belgium whose various subsidies accounted for approximately 70 per cent of Congo's total output in 1959.

the Belgian Government. Finally, Lumumba and Kasavubu sent a joint-appeal to the United Nations against Belgian aggression. On 13 July 1960, the United Nations called on Belgium to withdraw its troops. A UN peace-keeping force, primarily composed of African troops, was sent to the Congo to maintain law and order.

Lumumba wanted to attain three objectives through the UN help: a) to put an end to the secessionist movement in Katanga; b) to expel the Belgians from the Congo; and c) to establish an effective Central Government exercising authority over the whole country. It is in this context that Lumumba organized a conference of independent African states in Leopoldville from 25 to 30 August 1960. Thirteen African states attended it. Although no positive solution came out of the conference, the participants wanted to keep cold war out of Africa; and insisted that all aid to the Congo be channelled through the United Nations.

The Congo crisis, especially UN involvement, posed new problems for France. Officially France stood for direct negotiations between concerned parties on the Congo issue and refuted UN intervention. This stand was consistent with its own attitude towards United Nations regarding the Algerian question. At the same time, however, certain elements in France were unofficially supporting the Katanga secession. According to Crawford Young "Disgruntled French army officers who now

26 They were Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Liberia, Morocco, Soudan, Togoland, Tanganyika, Tunisia, U.A.R. and Algerian Provisional Government.
fought the demoralizing, seven years war in Indo-China and Algeria, to maintain French sovereignty embraced a new cause in Katanga independence. Tshombe's mercenaries included many French soldiers. Nkrumah in his letter to UN Secretary General, Hammarskjold, complained that "Radio Brazzaville, which is controlled by France, a permanent member of the Security Council, is allowed to indulge in the most violent propaganda against the legitimate Lumumba government."

The stand of Brazzaville group was more or less similar to that of France. The Brazzaville Conference in its final communique held the view that the Congo question could be solved by inviting the concerned parties on the negotiating table. It stated: "The real independence of the Congo needs, without doubt, U.N.O. continuing to bring its technical assistance but U.N.O. is not required to substitute for the Congolese authorities. Above all, what is required in the Congo is that no other state intervenes in her domestic affairs through the intermediary of soldiers or diplomats." Thus, the French speaking states neither supported the Katanga secession nor did they oppose Lumumba whole-heartedly. They refrained from involving themselves on either side.

27 Young, n. 25, pp. 167-8.
28 Quoted in Thompson, n. 4, p. 148.
30 Brazzaville Declaration, Legum, n. 7, p. 181.
Ghana-Guinea and Mali could not remain indifferent to the Brazzaville meeting. In a declaration these states deplored the decision of the Brazzaville Conference. They held that it was "likely to jeopardize unity of Africa and strengthen neocolonialism". They condemned "all forms of African regroupment based on languages of the colonial powers". They also appealed to the heads of the states at the Brazzaville Conference "to follow a higher and more healthy conception of African unity."

Houphouet Boigny brushed aside such criticisms in two sentences. He asserted: "I am not afraid of the judgements of my contemporaries. I wait for the judgement of history."

EMERGENCE OF CASABLANCA GROUP

The phase of alliances and counter-alliances continued in the wake of the Algerian and the Congo crises. In January 1961, another Conference was held in Casablanca. It was attended by Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the U.A.R. These states came to be known as members of Casablanca group. The Conference was a sequel to Brazzaville Conference. According to Adekunle Ajala, "It acted as a rallying point for those African states whose leaders were strongly convinced that if the Congo crisis was to be contained and an acceptable solution found, the United Nations must be urged to change its


32 Quoted in Alan Rake, "Mr. Ivory Coast", Africa Report (Washington), vol. 7, no. 4, April 1962, p. 4.
by then ambiguous and unrealistic policy."

At Casablanca the heads of these states declared, "We, ... proclaim our determination to liberate the African territories still under foreign domination, by giving them aid and assistance, to liquidate colonialism and neo-colonialism in all their forms, to discourage the maintenance of foreign troops and the establishment of bases which endanger the liberation of Africa and to strive equally to rid the African continent of political and economic interventions."

On the Congo, they announced their "intention and determination of the respective Governments represented to withdraw their troops and other military personnel placed under United Nations Operations Command in the Congo." They reaffirmed their recognition of the elected Parliament and legally constituted Government of the Republic of the Congo which came into being on 30 June 1960 and urged the United Nations to eliminate from the Congo all Belgian and foreign military and para-military personnel not belonging to the UN Operational Command.

The Casablanca meeting also recognized the right of the Algerian people to Independence and Self-Determination on the basis of the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria. It offered de jure recognition to G.P.R.A. The resolution said that every assistance given to France in her war in Algeria

33 Ajala, n. 31, p. 30.
34 See the Charter, in ibid., p. 353.
35 Ibid., pp. 359-60.
constituted an act of hostility directed against Africa as a whole. It denounced the military assistance given by N.A.T.O. to France, advocated immediate withdrawal of French troops from Algeria, and called for the withdrawal of African troops serving under French command.

The meeting adopted a critical resolution on Mauritania. It held that in order to strengthen her domination over the Sahara, France had severed from Morocco the southern portion of her territory and set up a puppet state in Mauritania. It condemned the economic exploitation and the use for strategic purposes of the territory. It also denounced French nuclear testing in Sahara.

Thus, against the background of the struggle against colonialism, the Casablanca states adopted a very different attitude from that of the Brazzaville group. The Congolese crisis made them critical of the UN operations, but the French stand on Algeria provoked them to take an extremely anti-French stand. In fact the stand of the Casablanca states directly affected the interests of France and of African leaders in French West Africa. They attacked France on the one hand for its policies in Algeria, Mauritania and other places and condemned on the other hand the French African states for allowing France to station troops on their soil to fight the Algerian freedom fighters. As a result, the Franco-Ivorian model of co-operation came under severe criticism from the

36 Ibid., p. 358.
37 Ibid., p. 355.
To check the influence of the Casablanca states a conference was held in Monrovia during 8-12 May 1961. The Brazzaville powers and the uncommitted states such as Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Soudan, Togo and Tunisia attended it.

The delegates declared that "unity that is aimed to be achieved at the moment is not the political integration of sovereign states, but unity of aspirations and of action considered from the point of view of African social solidarity and political identity." The resolutions passed in the Conference can be classified into two categories. The first represented the urge of the Monrovia delegates to promote co-operation among the African states and the second expressed


39 To bridge the gulf between the so called Brazzaville group and Casablanca group, the six representatives belonging to the different shades of political ideologies were going to thrash out the major issues. The Ivory Coast and Cameroun were going to represent Brazzaville group, Guinea and Mali from Casablanca group and Liberia and Nigeria were going to represent the group of 'uncommitted states'. However, Guinea and Mali decided to back out after a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Casablanca states held in Ghana.

the norms of such co-operation. It laid down the following
norms of inter-state relations among the Afro-Malagasy states:

(1) Absolute equality of African and Malagasy states.

(2) Respect for the sovereignty of each state, and recognition of the inalienable right of
each state to exist and develop its own personality.

(3) Unqualified condemnation of outside subversive
action by neighbouring states.

(4) Non-interference in each other's affairs. 41

The inclusion of these principles became imperative in
view of the Ghana-Guinea union. Ghana had encouraged the
Sawaba Party of Niger which was trying to overthrow the Diori
regime. Also Dijbo Bakary, Nigerian opposition leader had
taken asylum in Ghana. Ghana was also encouraging secessionist
movements in the Ivory Coast. Guinea, on the other hand, was
supporting Parti Africain de l'Independence (P.A.I.) of Senegal.
The P.A.I. was influenced by Marxist ideology and it was

41 In consonance with the first category, the Conference
established an advisory organization to promote
cooperation. It decided to establish a technical
commission of experts that would be represented by
all states. The experts were supposed to meet in
Dakar within three months and discuss the ways and
means to promote economic, cultural, educational,
technical and scientific co-operation. Resolution

42 Gilbert Compte, "Triséannée d'histoire Nigerienne",
Revue Française d'Études Politiques Africaines (Paris),
no. 72, December 1971, pp. 24-25.
challenging Senghor's policies.

The Conference boosted up French position by adopting a resolution which welcomed "improvement of the situation in Algeria and the decision of the two parties to open negotiations on 20 May 1961, and appeals to the Government of France and the Provisional Government of Algerian Republic to conclude at the earliest moment an agreement putting an end to war." This stand was consistent with the line earlier adopted by the French-African states at Brazzaville.

FORMATION OF UNION AFRICAIN ET MALGACHE (U.A.M.)

With the establishment of Monrovia group, the Ivory Coast began to operate both within French-speaking Africa and


It also supported Comite Nationale pour la Liberation de la Cote d'Ivorie (C.N.L.C.I.) of the Ivory Coast and Union des populations Camerounaise (Cameroun) which were fighting the duly constituted government in the respective countries. Ibid., p. 2.


45 The Lagos Conference confirmed the decisions of Monrovia Conference. It decided to establish a General Secretariat to act as a central administrative organ. It also agreed upon setting up of a Council of Ministers to work out areas of co-operation in economic, technical, scientific and cultural matters. In substance, it was to become charter of African and Malagasy states. The charter stressed the equality of sovereign states. It also accepted the principle of non-interference by African states in one another's internal affairs. Thus, Houphouet's principles were further concretised. He got a wider platform in Monrovia group.
outside. It had already got the principle of non-interference approved by the Brazzaville states. Now it extended this principle for acceptance by other African states. In a word, the Ivory Coast began pursuing its own brand of Pan-Africanism.

It is in this context that the study of Union Africaine et Malgache (U.A.M.) becomes important. The U.A.M. came into being in September 1961. The Charter of the U.A.M. declared that its aim was "to organise, in all domains of foreign policy, co-operation between its members in order to strengthen their solidarity, ensure collective security, assist their development and maintain peace in Africa, Madagascar and in the world." Houphouet's ideas profoundly influenced the formation of the U.A.M. He had preferred functional approach to unity rather than the ideological one. Hence the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states became the core of the U.A.M. constitution.

Albert Tevoedjre, Secretary-General of the U.A.M. elaborated the concept of the U.A.M. in December 1962. He explained that it was not a racist syndicate against the white...
man. It was also not an agglomeration of beggars who refused to work. He said that it was primarily established to promote mutual economic interests by organizing the resources of the entire Community.

The structure of the U.A.M. included two main wings. The Assembly was composed of the heads of states and governments of the U.A.M. members. It held its session twice a week, but there was also a provision for holding extraordinary session if the request came from a majority of members. The general secretariat of the U.A.M. was at Dahomey. Its expenses were shared by the members according to their relative income. Besides, there was a union of economic co-operation with headquarters at Yaounde. All the U.A.M. states except the Upper Volta signed defence pacts with France.

The U.A.M. offered a new platform for the perpetuation of Franco-African co-operation. This can be illustrated by the instance of Air Afrique. 66 per cent of the capital of Air Afrique was advanced by the eleven African states (6 per cent each state), while 34 per cent was provided by the Société de développement des transports aériens en Afrique, a French


49 Ibid.

50 In Tananarive Conference of September 1961 defence pact was signed which supplemented the defence agreements that most of the U.A.M. members had signed with France. Cotonou became the administrative headquarters of the U.A.M. A headquarter was established at Quagadougou to look after the defence matters.
company which was created on 8 July 1960. The administrative headquarters of Air Afrique was located in Abidjan. Sodetraf (a French company) provided all the technical assistance.

The U.A.M. also became an instrument of political co-operation with France. Thus, it suggested that there should be co-operation between Algeria and France for the exploitation of the wealth of Sahara.

By the end of 1961 thus two rival groups had emerged in Africa each adhering strictly to its own version of Pan-Africanism. Writing on the event, William Zartman observed: "The paradox of the Casablanca-Brazzaville split was that both groups, originally created to discuss African issues, claimed to be representative of all Africa and attempted to define the content of African unity." This split, as we have noted, became more marked with the aggravation of the Algerian and Congolese crises. Ideologically, the Casablanca leaders


John Marcum has defined the Casablanca group's approach towards unity. According to him, "One approach to unity is associated with countries governed by monolithic regimes that feature highly disciplined, militant, and massively organized single party rule. These states have promoted union through mergers within centralised unitary states or through functional arrangements that stress ideological conformity. They are characteristically dynamic, expansionist and prepared to subvert that oppose their formula of unity." Marcum, n. 43, Africa Report (Washington), vol. 7, no. 1, January 1962, p. 2.
opposed all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism in Africa. They viewed, therefore, the association of African states with France as an attempt on the part of the French colonialists to divide the world into white bourgeoisie and coloured proletariat. In his book, *L'Afrique et la Révolution*, Sekou Toure denounced the negative characteristics of E.E.C. which was based on economic imperialism and accelerating pauperization of the non-industrialized nations. Nkrumah too described the association in his famous book, *Africa Must Unite*. According to him, "We are most decidedly and strongly opposed to any agreement which uses the unification of western Europe as a cloak for perpetuating colonial privileges in Africa."


Paradoxically, the Casablanca too did not break off their ties with the capitalist or 'ex' colonial or 'neo-colonial' powers even if they welcomed socialist co-operation. While analysing Nkrumah's attitudes during the initial phase of Ghanaian Independence, Ako Adjei asserted:

Toure was more nationalist, more left wing, more Pan-Africanist than Nkrumah ever was in those days. He wanted Nkrumah to break from Commonwealth, to nationalise the firms, to make Ghana a socialist state. These were not possible courses of action, so Nkrumah instead started taking love to the socialist countries as a substitute, and this gained momentum, all out of proportion to the actual amount of socialism practised in Ghana.


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As far as the Ivory Coast was concerned, Houphouet's fundamental principles in inter-state politics e.g. non-interference in each other's affairs and respect for national sovereignty were concretised in Brazzaville, U.A.M. and Monrovia group. In other words, his principles, instead of confining to the Ivory Coast, doubtlessly journeyed beyond the Ivorian borders.

**BIRTH OF THE O.A.U.**

Against this background, the Addis Ababa Conference of 1963 was historically one of the most important events in Africa. It gave birth to the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) which brought under its fold the rival groups advocating opposite approaches to African problems.

Similarly, Guinea did break away from France immediately after independence but it established cordial economic ties with the United States to pursue her economic development. One can conclude that even if the Casablanca states advocated socialist policies they were taking no positive steps to curb the capitalist expansion in their respective regions. Their brand of socialism encouraged them to establish cordial ties with socialist as well as capitalist countries.

From 1960-65, she received 20,000 million Francs from socialist countries as long term loans. At the same time it got American aid worth 19,000 million Francs during the same period. On 2 October 1962, an agreement related to Boke Scheme was signed with Harvey Aluminium (jointly owned by American and Canadian interests). For building three factories, one of bauxite, the other of aluminium and the third for alumina. Mining companies and foreign experts transferred 5 to 6 million Francs till 1965. Amin Samir, *Neo-Colonialism in West Africa* (Alesbury, Bucks, 1973), p. 240.
The Charter of the O.A.U. spelled out the principal objectives of the organization. Thus the preamble stated, "inspired by a common determination to promote understanding among our peoples and co-operation among our states in response to the aspirations of our peoples for brotherhood and solidarity, in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences." Further, it expressed determination "to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states, and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms."  

Houphouet Boigny's philosophy considerably influenced the charter of the O.A.U. In fact provisions in Article III of the charter embraced the principles which were dear to the Monrovia group. Article III(2) stood for "non-interference in the internal affairs of states". Article III(3) stood for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member state and for its inalienable right to independent existence. Houphouet Boigny himself expressed concern for the internal security of states being endangered by political assassination. In his address to the Conference, he warned, "The moment has come to condemn collectively and publicly political assassination as a means of coming to power. The conference must take a clear stand on this matter or else Africa will fall into so-called

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57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., p. 370.
59 Ibid.
revolutions." Houphouët’s warning caused the inclusion of Article III(5) which stood for unreserved condemnation of political assassination as well as subversive activities on the part of neighbouring states or any other state.

The charter also represented a compromise between Monrovia and Casablanca states. It championed the cause of anti-colonial and anti-racial struggle but accepted the principle of non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states. It also gave recognition to the national boundaries of the African states which were determined by the colonial powers. In this respect the O.A.U., to quote Philippe Decraene, chose to legalise the situation in Africa as inherited from the Congress of Berlin.

62 Immanuel Wallerstein explained the charter as “a compromise which is how large groups of states set up international organization.” Wallerstein, n. 60, p. 66. While Zartman wrote: “The really significant outcome of Addis Ababa summit was the temporary end of the alliance system in Africa.” Zartman, n. 52, pp. 37-38.
After the establishment of the O.A.U., it was hopefully expected that the various regional groups would voluntarily dissolve themselves. The expectation was not entirely baseless since the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union was dissolved in deference to the O.A.U. charter. The U.A.M. members also announced their intention to dissolve the organization, in March 1964, in deference to the O.A.U. Nevertheless, the U.A.M. was never totally dissolved. Instead, its members continued their co-operation on economic, technical and cultural matters through the Union Africaine et Malgache de Cooperation Economique (U.A.M.C.E.). A year later, the chiefs of the states of Francophone African states assembled at Nouakchott (10-12 February 1965) and announced that the U.A.M.C.E. needed to be transformed into a new organization, to be known as Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache (O.C.A.M.).

The final communique stated the objective of O.C.A.M. to be "in the context of O.A.U., to reinforce co-operation and

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64 It had its headquarters in Yaounde where the U.A.M.C.E. (Organisation Africaine et Malgache de Co-operation Economique) an organization dealing with economic co-operation, was already situated. The other U.A.M. specialized bodies namely Union Africaine et Malgache des Postes et Tele-communications and Air Afrique continued to exist. Union Africaine et Malgache de Défense (U.A.M.D.) was adopted to the new situation. The main organs of the U.A.M.C.E. were conference of heads of state, a council of ministers, a secretariat and seven technical committees.

Considering the closer association of France with the U.A.M. members and the transition of U.A.M. from to U.A.M.C.E. was advantageous to France because through U.A.M.C.E. the African states continued to co-operate with it economically, technically and culturally without destroying the essential characteristics of the U.A.M.

solidarity among the African and Malagasy states, in order to accelerate the development in the political, economic, social technical and cultural domains".

ROLE OF O.C.A.M.

The charter of the O.C.A.M. provided for three institutions e.g. the conference of heads of the State and Government, the Council of Ministers, and the Secretariat. The Conference was the supreme organ which convened its meeting once a year. The Council of Ministers, composed of Foreign Ministers of the fourteen member states, obeyed the directives of the conference of heads of State and Government. It also met once a year. The Secretariat, situated in Yaonde, was responsible for general administration. A Secretary General of the Secretariat was appointed for two years by the Conference of the heads of State and Government on the advice of the Council of Ministers.

As far as France was concerned, formation of the O.C.A.M. reassured the continuation of cordial rapport between France and the African members of O.C.A.M. According to Betrand Fassard de Foucault, an economist, the O.C.A.M. provided a framework as modelled by the U.A.M. for economic co-operation between France and Africans. For example, in order to run the Air Afrique efficiently, the O.C.A.M. countries signed bilateral accords with France. They held conferences at the ministerial level

alternatively in Paris and in the respective African capitals. Such conferences covered all the domains of multinational co-operation.

On the other hand, as Mirlande Hippolyte had remarked, the O.C.A.M. appeared to be an affirmation of the determination of the moderate African states not to allow the revolutionary African countries to outrun them. According to him the establishment of the O.C.A.M. represented a triumph of political motivations over the economic interests.

It is in this context that the clauses in the final communique of O.C.A.M. must be understood. It regarded that the respect of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs constituted the *sine qua non* for peace and development in Africa.

At Nouakchott Houphouet Boigny insisted that economically, politically and culturally the Francophone African countries were homogeneous, though manifestly different from other African states. He also wanted to close the doors for communist ideology by organizing a common defence of these countries.

Houphouet Boigny's preeminent position in the O.C.A.M. became evident when the members deliberated over two important

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67 Ibid.


69 Ibid., pp. 41-42.


71 Hippolyte, n. 68, p. 41.
issues of inter-state politics. First was the question of admission of Congo-Leopoldville to the O.C.A.M. Referring to the internal political developments in the Congo which gave rise to a fresh controversy in Africa, Houphouet asserted: "In Council of Entente we are all bound by one law: non-interference in the internal affairs of others. That is why, we were neither Lumumbist nor anti-Lumumbists. What is important to us is that Congo should not become Cuba of Africa -- for two blocs to continue their confrontation at our cost."

On 29 April 1965 Moise Tshombe applied for admission to O.C.A.M. To discuss the matter an extraordinary session of O.C.A.M. was convened at Abidjan in May 1965. After prolonged deliberations, the session unanimously agreed to "support the admission of the Democratic Republic of Congo and requested the president of the O.C.A.M. to enact Congo as a member in the next conference at Tananrîve". Thus the Congo was admitted to the O.C.A.M. Commenting on the event, Immanuel Wallerstein wrote: "Tshombe arrived for the closing session, thus climaxing

72 Gaston Scoumalot and Pierre Mulele rebelled against Moise Tshombe regime. The rebels were morally and materially supported by the radical African states. Moreover it was alleged that the People's Republic of China was supporting the anti-Tshombe movement. Houphouet condemned Chinese interference in Africa.


Diori Hamani of Niger and Maurice Yamego of Upper Volta shared Houphouet's views on the Congo. They went one step further and asserted that "Moise Tshombe is the only legal head of Congo Leopoldville". Ibid.

74 Ibid., p. 279.
his military victory in the Congo with a political blessing from at least a part of Africa."

Houphouet's attitude towards the Congo did not clash with the French interests in Africa. France had openly supported the admission of the Congo in O.C.A.M. Moise Tshombe visited Paris thrice within a year and entered a dialogue with De Gaulle, Pompidou, Triboulet and Habib De Loncle. On 2 December 1965 a French spokesman said that the French Government would give substantial aid to the Congo for reorganization of administrative structures. France also tried to woo the Congo by giving technical assistance.

The second event which bore out Houphouet's dominant influence was the decision of O.C.A.M. members not to participate in the Accra Conference of O.A.U. in October 1965. Prior to Accra Conference, Ghana was accused of encouraging subversive activities in neighbouring states. The final break came when it was alleged that the Ghanian Government had a hand in the attempted murder of Diori of Niger in April 1965. This prompted the O.C.A.M. states to issue a statement on 26 May which said, "In the light of the recent tragic events at Niamey we unanimously condemn Ghanian subversive activities and convey our refusal to participate in the Accra Conference".

75 Wallerstein, n. 60, p. 97.
76 Congo 1965, n. 73, p. 301.
77 Ibid., p. 279.
78 Ibid.
These two significant events bolstered the prestige of the Ivory Coast. They illustrated the success of Houphouet in keeping the group of like-minded African states intact even after the establishment of the O.A.U. By refusing to attend the Accra Conference, Houphouet proved that this group did not approve the Ghanian attitude. At the same time, O.C.A.M.'s continuing relations with France proved Houphouet's thesis that it was possible to maintain and consolidate a Pan-Africanist stance within a framework of interdependence between the metropole and ex-colonial countries. Whether or not this political stance ignored the economic realities shall be the theme of the next chapter.