Chapter III

THE TUSSLE INSIDE THE PENTAGON
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Problems posed by the growing military requirements of the war in Vietnam inevitably had their repercussions on the issue of troop levels in Europe. Not only did they spark additional points of criticism in Congress but they also led to some disagreements within the Executive branch itself. These disagreements were not of a major or fundamental nature. There were no differences of any significance between the President and the major concerned agencies of the Executive branch concerning the objectives of the United States in regard to Western Europe and NATO. Among the concerned agencies too, more particularly the State and Defence Departments, there were no basic divergences concerning the fulfilment of the US commitment to NATO, the maintenance of the existing military presence in that region, and the avoidance of any action that might erode the credibility of the United States in the minds of the Allies. The disagreements that came to the fore related to relatively modest adjustments in the size of US forces in Western Europe to meet Vietnam-related issues. The question of bringing back from Europe some experienced "specialists" for training or strengthening Vietnam bound units was one such issue. Bringing back a few thousand troops from Europe as an alternative to further call up of reserves was another issue with domestic political implications that needed to be weighed by the President. The issues were such that the agency in the Executive branch most directly concerned was the Department of Defence (DoD).
The principle of civilian control over the military is firmly established in the United States. The President's role as a Chief Executive and the authority of the Secretary of Defence as a civilian head of the Department of Defence remained intact during the period under review. The President has to take an overall view of the domestic political implication of a course of action as well as its diplomatic and military implications. While the DoD would be inclined to take positions reflecting its specific concerns, the possibility of disagreement exist between the military and civilian components of the Department. The civilians come and go with each passing Administrations while the uniformed military is a continuing entity whose leaders might be disposed to weigh the implications of a course for the military establishment, and its present and future role. No Secretary of Defence can be comfortable in a situation representing a serious disagreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS have direct access to the President and have significant capabilities for mobilizing public opinion. While a shooting war is in progress the influence of the JCS grows and it may begin to vail only if the Administration moves in the direction of a diplomatic rather than a military solution to the problem concerned.

In his years as the Secretary of Defence, Robert S. McNamara, had established a tight reign on the military component by means of various innovations in decision-making based on systems analysis and the concept of cost-effectiveness. He had even barged into cherished preserves of the military like
selection of new weapon systems, budgetary requirements and manpower allocations. The proposals or recommendations of the Service Chiefs were subjected to critical examination by teams of civilian "whiz kids" who had been inducted into the Department by McNamara, and whose activities were by no means wholly palatable to the military leadership. It is against this background that the evolution of opinion within the Executive branch since 1966 on the troop levels issue needs to be discussed.

DoD Undertaken Reassessment

On 15 December 1965, Secretary of Defence McNamara pledged in the North Atlantic Council meeting in Paris that the mounting effort in the South Vietnam war would not require the withdrawal of any "major combat units" from US forces in Western Europe. The phrase "major combat units" soon contributed to the anxiety of the Allies when sources ranging from Cabinet members down to Assistant Press Attaches declined to state whether a "major combat unit" meant a platoon or a division. Besides, a small-scale "number game" soon followed. The DoD spokesman began saying that there would be no reduction in the "240,000" US troops stationed in Germany, whereas for months earlier the total figure of such troops had been given as 250,000.

A further source of concern was a comprehensive survey of the readiness of US Armed Forces by military correspondent

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Hanson W. Baldwin in the *New York Times* on 21 February 1966. He asserted that four of the six divisions in the continental United States supposedly ready for combat were not in fact combat ready. Two of the four divisions, the First and Second Armoured Divisions at Fort Hood, Texas, were earmarked primarily to reinforce the Seventh Army in Germany in the event of any emergency caused by Soviet action. He also cited growing shortage of ammunition and clothing. Baldwin contended that there was a continuous drain of specialists, particularly Army aviation pilots, maintenance and electronic specialists and certain types of materials from Europe. Overall, both numerically and qualitatively, the United States forces in Europe were at a lower level of strength than at any time since before the Berlin crisis in 1961, Baldwin declared.

Baldwin's report was assailed by McNamara in a specially called news conference on 2 March 1966. He asserted that the total strength of United States Army units in Europe was "almost identical" to what it was in 1961 before the Berlin crisis. He also upbraided a West German correspondent, Joaquim Schwlien of the *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, for questioning the readiness of US forces in Europe in the context of the growing needs of Vietnam War. "I am sick and tired of having implication made that we have drawn down the forces in Western Europe when we haven't. The Seventh Army has been, is today, and in the future will be,

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the most combat ready Army in the world," McNamara said.

In spite of McNamara's firm denial, the Baltimore Sun reported on 19 March that the DoD was carrying out a reassessment which would permit, among other results, some "thinning" of American forces in Europe. Such thinning of American forces would take place side by side with airlift replacement capability on short notice. The officials, the report continued, expressed the opinion that the reduction would be a small portion of 320,000 American servicemen stationed in Western Europe. They reiterated that the United States would retain the force structure equivalent of six divisions in Germany, although not necessarily at full strength, the report added.

Shortly thereafter the Secretary of Defence made a more specific reference to the issue at a news conference in the Pentagon. He said:

I stated to NATO--to the North Atlantic Council in December of last year--that I believe we could meet our South Vietnamese requirements without diversion of any major units from Europe. I still believe we can accomplish that objective. It doesn't mean that there may not be shipment of some personnel, individuals with peculiar military occupational specialties, from Western Europe to South Vietnam, or to other parts of our organization. But any such transfer of individual personnel would not degrade the total military effectiveness of our forces there and would not be significant in percentage term. (6)

McNamara also conceded that the combat readiness of four divisions in the continental United States had been reduced because they

4 News Conference, Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara, 2 March 1966, at the Pentagon, Text.

5 Baltimore Sun, 19 March 1966.

6 News Conference, Secretary of Defence McNamara, 31 March 1966, at the Pentagon, Text.
were being used to train draftees and recruits.

On 7 April 1966, some DoD officials leaked information to the press that the United States would withdraw 15,000 specialists from the Army's forces in West Germany to meet the mounting needs connected with the Vietnam war. (The possible source of the leak is discussed in the next section.) Among the specialists being recalled were artillery, armour and infantry units commanders, signal and engineer officers, light weapons infantrymen, field artillery crewmen, combat engineers, military intelligence specialists and supply and ordnance specialists. These specialists would "go to units in the Continental United States that are being readied for duty in Vietnam, or, if they're qualified, they might go as instructors to any of the Army's 11 training centers across the country," it was reported.

DoD officials asserted that the withdrawals would not affect the overall-strength of US ground forces in Europe, the bulk of which were stationed with the Seventh Army in Germany. But they acknowledged that the experience level of the Seventh Army would be reduced by the transfers. They also disclosed that the Seventh Army, which remained the principal United States combat forces in Europe, would be reduced from 225,000 men to around 210,000 by 30 June 1966.

The DoD disclosures were confirmed by McNamara first on 14 April in a news conference and later in detail on 20 April 1966, during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearings

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7 New York Herald Tribune, 8 April 1966.
on Foreign Assistance. He said: "We had 225,000 men in the Army in Western Europe, including men in logistical support units. . . . We are drawing that down from 225,000 to 210,000 at the end of June, and we will be back to the previous level on 225,000 by the end of the year." The announced withdrawals, McNamara pointed out, were support troops over and above the United States commitment to NATO. They would not be immediately involved in the event of combat, but were to be available on the soil of Europe in the event of need at some point after the initiation of combat. The Secretary affirmed that US forces in Europe could operate effectively without them. It was more desirable to withdraw such elements from Western Europe than calling up a similar number of men from the Reserves. Senator Eugene J. McCarthy (Democrat, Minnesota) asked the Secretary whether he would have withdrawn such troops from Europe but for South Vietnam. McNamara replied: "probably not."

An analysis of the Pentagon's "numbers game" is relevant at this point. The US troop levels in Europe on 30 June 1965, according to the DoD's own documents, was 365,419. Out of this total the US Army personnel accounted for 252,150. The US troop levels by the end of December 1965 did not significantly change. Nevertheless, there was a reduction of a little

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over two thousand military personnel, which brought the overall total down to about 363,000. Assuming that these reductions were made in the US Army, it could be held that the total of US Army personnel would have stood around 250,000 on 31 December 1965.

In April 1966, DoD officials and McNamara disclosed that the total US Army strength in Western Europe was 225,000. That meant a reduction of 25,000 US Army personnel was carried out between January and April 1966, which was not announced or notified. On top of it, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was informed by McNamara that there would be a reduction of 16,000 US Army personnel from the total of 225,000 by 30 June 1966. The obvious inference from the official statement would be that since the reductions were to take place between April and June it would have meant a further reduction. Actually there would have been a reduction of 40,000 personnel by June 1966. In fact the newspapers reported that the United States had withdrawn 123,000 to 40,000 troops from Western Europe. John J. McCloy, former US High Commissioner in Germany and a Special Envoy of President Johnson on NATO Affairs, also disclosed to a Senate

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12 "Pullout in Europe Tops DoD Figure," Navy Times (Washington, D.C.), 18 June 1966; and Baltimore Sun, 4 August 1966.
Subcommittee members that the reduction involved more than 30,000 troops in Western Europe.

By 30 June 1966, the US Army personnel strength in Europe, according to the newspaper reports, was about 211,000, but it was 216,496 according to the DoD document. The Administration by December 1966 had to restore both the US Army personnel strength and the overall troop levels in Europe. Again it had to decide whether to restore US Army strength to 250,000 or 225,000. The Administration after June 1966 certainly moved in the direction of restoring the overall US troop levels in Europe because by December 1966, the overall US troop levels increased to 363,000 according to a Congressional Research Service document prepared in the Library of Congress. But the increase was greater if the DoD's December 1966 troop levels figure of 366,000 was taken into account. Nevertheless, both the sources are in agreement that the Administration had restored the troop reductions made in the first half of 1966 by the end of 1966 so as to equal the overall US troop level figure of December 1965. The US Army


14 Baltimore Sun, 4 August 1966; and US Department of Defense, "Confidential", "Deployment of Military Personnel By Country As of 30 June 1966."

personnel strength would have been also restored to 225,000 if not to 250,000.

**Systems Analysis Office vs. JCS**

The Pentagon's decision to withdraw some troops from Western Europe was not a sudden development. The process leading to the decision apparently had its beginning in early part of January 1966, when the requirements of the South Vietnam war build-up were evaluated by the DoD's Systems Analysis Office. The sequence of development is revealed at least in part in some of the documents of the Pentagon Papers released in 1971 by the Senate Committee on Armed Services. On 14 January 1966, Assistant Secretary of Defence Alain C. Enthoven, who was in charge of the Office of Systems Analysis, presented a memorandum to the Secretary of Defence summarizing requirements set forth by the 16 Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC). In his memorandum, Enthoven listed four sets of "cases" or options proposed by the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) for meeting the CINCPAC requirements. He made an important point that the JCS estimated that the President was more reluctant to "call up reserve units and extension of terms of service than he was to take forces out of Europe." This was the signal to McNamara which culminated in

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his programme of withdrawal of some "specialists" from Europe.

On 9 February 1966, a tentative decision on Enhoven's memorandum was taken by McNamara after his return from the Honolulu Conference—where he had meetings with top South Vietnamese leaders. He favoured some elements of the JCS's "Case 1" option for the South Vietnam build-up. That option envisaged "providing forces from CONUS [continental United States] force structure including activation, plus feasible draw-downs from overseas area, call-up of selected reserve units and individuals, and extending terms of services." However, McNamara did not take a final decision on "Case 1." In fact, he issued further directives for a series of studies to identify and evaluate the options which appeared to be open. The scope of these studies was indicated—by partial listing of projects compiled—by Assistant Secretary for Manpower Thomas D. Morris in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defence on 16 February 1966. Among other things the studies included appraisal of an "acceptable draw-down on Europe."

On 17 February 1966, in a memorandum to the JCS, the Secretary of Defence directed that in meeting the requirements of CINCPAC no reserves or extension of terms of services were to be utilized as envisaged in the "Case 1." On the other hand, he specifically instructed that planning should be undertaken "under the assumption that only cadres are taken from Europe."

17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 37.
19 Ibid., p. 38.
The JCS, however, in their memorandum to the Secretary of Defence—JCSM-130-66—recommended against the exclusion of reserve call-up and extension of terms of service because they were reluctant to be left with the lone option of meeting South Vietnam requirements through withdrawal of "cadres" from Europe. Such a plan, the JCS felt, would severely affect the combat effectiveness in Europe. If the reserves were not to be called or terms of services extended, the JCS recommended that the deployment to South Vietnam be extended to 1967 rather than attempting to complete them by the end of 1966.

McNamara did not accept the JCS recommendations. On 10 March he ruled:

I have reviewed JCSM-130-66 and related memorandums from the Secretaries of the Military Departments. All of these require more study and review. However, until such studies are completed, you should plan to deploy forces to SVN / South Vietnam/ in accordance with—Case 1—all necessary actions are to be taken to meet these deployment dates without call-up of reserve or extension of terms of service. Troop movements from Europe will be made only by written approval of Mr. Vance or myself. (21)

These were highly secret developments in the top echelons of the Pentagon. Possibly through a leak the Baltimore Sun was able to report on 18 March that the DoD was carrying out assessment which would permit some withdrawal from Europe, as has been mentioned earlier, McNamara too was constrained to acknowledge it in cautious term.

On 4 April the JCS submitted to the Secretary of Defence a fresh memorandum—JCSM-218-66—containing a US troop deployment

20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
plan for South Vietnam. While details are not available, it is possible that the JCS document did not indicate complete acceptance of withdrawals from Europe.

The JCS memorandum was reviewed by the DoD's Systems Analysis Office whose approach to the question of "acceptable withdrawal" of troops from Europe differed from those of the JCS. The JCS laboured under the anxiety that NATO forces might be weaker than the Warsaw Pact forces. But through various analyses, the Systems Analysis Office had concluded by 1965 that "NATO and the Warsaw Pact [had] approximate equality on the ground." The Systems Analysis Office, the present writer infers, was unlikely to have attached the same importance to the calling up of reserves and extension of duration of service for the US troops in South Vietnam as the JCS. They might have argued the case for some troop withdrawal from Europe. That perhaps might have led to some degree of bureaucratic politics entering the scene. It is possible that some elements in the Pentagon favouring the JCS view leaked to the press the decision concerning the withdrawal of some troops from Europe.

There could be another possible source of the leak. The Systems Analysis Office itself might have leaked the information to the Press to strengthen its case, to evoke Allied reaction, and speed a final decision on its troop reduction recommendation. If that were the intention, the move brought good dividends.

Except for the German news media which strongly criticized the proposal, the West German Government voiced no particular concern over the news from Washington that 15,000 US troops were being recalled from Europe, especially from Germany. The West German officials, in fact, had known for sometime that American Army technicians might be withdrawn and later replaced by other men. But they probably did not know when exactly they would be withdrawn and how many. According to US press reports, the Erhard Administration protested against the manner in which McNamara's move had been made public. It was annoyed at not having been informed in advance of Washington's decision. It was reported that West German Defence and Foreign Office officials had learned about the Pentagon's decision from newspapers. American reports said in their despatches from Bonn that German officials accused McNamara of failing to appreciate the importance of observing the diplomatic proprieties.

The fact that the Erhard Administration showed no particular public concern over troop reductions, probably encouraged the Systems Analysis Office to put forth its recommendations firmly. On 9 April 1966, Enthoven submitted his memorandum to the Secretary of Defence containing a review of the JCS' 4 April memorandum. On 11 April the Secretary of Defence approved Enthoven's memorandum. Most probably it contained a recommendation for withdrawing 15,000 troops from Europe, for on 14 April in a news conference, and on 2 April in testimony before the

The President's approval must have been obtained earlier by McNamara.

On 14 April itself, John J. McCloy, the Special Envoy of President Johnson on NATO affairs, was sent to Germany to explain the Administration's position. From subsequent testimony by McCloy before a Senate Subcommittee on 25 May, it could be inferred that he not only informed the Erhard Administration about the Johnson Administration's decision to withdraw 15,000 troops but also presented a justification for such an action. McCloy told the Senate Subcommittee: "I do feel the withdrawal of those 15,000 men was justified and necessary by reason of the Vietnam situation."

Johnson Weighs Implications of French Withdrawal From NATO

On 7 April 1966, President Charles De Gaulle of France in a hand-written letter to President Johnson wrote:

...France intends to recover, in her territory, the full exercise of her sovereignty, now impaired by the permanent presence of Allied military elements or by the habitual use being

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made of its air space, to terminate her participation in the "integrated" commands, and no longer to place forces at the disposal of NATO. (26)

The announcement of the French withdrawal from the integrated command was not a sudden development. Differences between France and the United States on various NATO issues could be traced from 1959 onwards. Basically, the French position had been that the integration of NATO forces involved an element of "subordination", and that it would be "totally illusory" to think that there could be any real equality between the United States and other member of the Alliance if integration continued. The United States, France contended, had dominated the NATO Alliance since it was formed. The integration of the military forces was a myth as the American atomic bombs remained under strict American control. There was no certainty that an American President would fire its nuclear weapons at the Soviet Union in the event of an attack on an European ally because it would invite a retaliatory Soviet missile attack against the United States. Further since the Soviet threat itself had abated, it was time for France to take the lead in opening a useful dialogue between Western and Eastern Europe. Such, in brief, was the French contention.


The United States rejected the French position. American objections to the emerging French posture had been discreetly stated by officials even earlier. For instance, on 21 January 1965, David H. Popper, Director, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, the Department of State, had made a significant address at the University of Utah on "The United States, France, and NATO." It is noteworthy that detailed excerpts from the speech were featured in a Department of Defense newsletter, *For Commanders*, on 1 March 1966. Popper and other argued that the joint military planning and integrated command were the outcome of the experience and the lessons of the First and Second World Wars. Their adoption in the NATO framework seemed the vital purpose of safeguarding the security of Europe. A crisis could be deterred or effectively dealt with only if the members of the Alliance planned in advance their command structure, strategy, force levels, tactics and committed their troops to NATO in advance of any crisis. Such planning, cooperation and participation in the collective defence involved no compromise of any Ally's own sovereignty, US officials declared. US officials warned that if collective effort "should falter"—common determination eroded—the foundation of the Atlantic's stability would be shaken. The continuance of the NATO Alliance had

diminished the Soviet threat. Dismantling NATO would, however, jeopardize the security of Europe and invite disaster. The way to genuine peace would be through Western solidarity and strength which would enable the Alliance to bargain with the Soviet Union effectively. US officials also emphasized that although the American President would retain final control on nuclear weapons, the European Allies would have a greater share in planning and coordinating Western nuclear defence.

On 16 March 1966, President Johnson summoned his senior foreign policy advisers to the White House to discuss the implications of the French withdrawal. Among the advisers were former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who was serving as a Senior Consultant to the State Department; Under Secretary of State George W. Ball; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John M. Leedy; Deputy Defence Secretary Cyrus R. Vance; and US Ambassador to France Charles E. Bohlen. After the meeting,

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the White House Press Secretary, Bill D. Moyers, told newsmen that the talks centered on General De Gaulle's stated intentions and the intensive consultation that the US was holding with its Allies. While no conclusions were reached at the meeting, there was agreement that it was imperative for the United States to present a common front with the Allies and not let the crisis deteriorate into a dispute between France and the United States. Such confrontation, it was suggested by officials, would serve De Gaulle's interest by rallying French opinion behind him. It might induce the smaller countries in the NATO to hover on the side-lines awaiting the outcome. However, the officials strongly believed that De Gaulle did not enjoy the support of the Allies in challenging the NATO military structure.

Johnson had a second meeting with his advisers the following day. Although little was said in public, the Washington Post reported that there was within the Administration a growing belief that NATO was overdue for modernization. The President, in addition to examining the problems of De Gaulle's action, reportedly was being urged to consider structural reforms for NATO, and more importantly a redefinition of long-range American concepts for the Atlantic Alliance. However, Under Secretary of State Ball, the New York Times reported, espoused a "punitive" policy. But the President wanted no open attack on France. Eventually, a strategy composed of three types of actions was

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adopted to counter the challenges to NATO posed by De Gaulle.

Firstly, the President and his advisers favoured an Allied declaration supporting principle of integration. Secondly, the President was to dispatch a personal letter to De Gaulle.

Thirdly, the President was to make a public statement indicating the US reaction to French withdrawal from the NATO integrated command.

On 18 March, the first objective was realized. The United States and 13 other NATO nations declared:

...the Atlantic Alliance has insured its efficacy as an instrument of defense and deterrence by the maintenance in peace time of an integrated and independent military organization in which, as in no previous alliance in history, the efforts and resources of each are combined for the common security of all. We are convinced that this organization is essential and will continue. No system of bilateral arrangements can be a substitute. (31)

On 22 March, the President wrote a personal letter to De Gaulle. Johnson reviewed the successes of the NATO Alliance as well as the need for its continued existence. Referring to De Gaulle's message of 7 March, Johnson wrote:

I am puzzled by your view that the presence of allied military force on French soil impairs the sovereignty of France. Those forces have been there at French invitation pursuant to a common plan to help insure the security of France and her allies. I have always viewed their presence as a wise and far-seeing exercise of French sovereignty. For our part we continue to


believe that if the Treaty is to have force and reality members of the Alliance should prepare the common structures, the strategic and tactical plans, the force in being, and their designation to NATO in advance of any crisis and for use in time of crisis. . . . I do not consider that such participation and cooperation involve any impairment of our own sovereignty—or that of any of our Allies. (32)

The following day in an address to the audience of Foreign Service Officers at the State Department, President Johnson rejected De Gaulle's contention that the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in 1949, and the NATO military organization built upon it in later years were different and separate. He asserted that the Treaty was "more than a legal document." At stake in the maintenance of the 15-nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization, said the President, "is the design of collective security protecting the entire world..." that "...is woven through the history of the past 20 years." This objective "transcends the personalities and issues of the moment," said Johnson.

Johnson indirectly hit out at De Gaulle by asserting that withdrawal by one country from the integrated command would mean replacing a pattern of "unity" with a course of "isolation" which would be a return to "those national rivalries which so often led to the useless squandering of lives and treasure in war." That would deny the hope "for the reconciliation of Western Europe with the people of Eastern Europe," and would shake the "political integrity" and the physical security that

represented Atlantic area's stability. The lesson of two World Wars had been that aggressors tended to feed on divided foes. "It is our firm conviction that collective action through NATO is the best assurance that war will be deterred in the Atlantic world," Johnson declared.

Johnson warned that a nation that sought its security by trying "to prepare and plan alone, could still imperil her own security by creating a situation in which response would be too late and too diluted." He thus put France on notice that its absence from a combined defence command could prejudice its allies' ability to come to its defence. Throughout Johnson's remarks there was an implied recognition that De Gaulle was unlikely to be deflected from the course he had set for France. However, the President held a door open for a change of policy. He said that he was hopeful that no West European nation could "long remain withdrawn from the mutual affairs and obligations of the Atlantic," and promised that "a place of respect and responsibility" would await "any ally who decides to return to the common task."

Relocation of US Troops Based in France

De Gaulle proceeded with the programme he had set for France. On 29 March 1966 through an Aide-Mémoire to the United States, De Gaulle gave NATO, including US forces in France, an one year eviction notice. The Aide-Mémoire read: "...April 1, 1967, would be appropriate for completing the necessary

34 Ibid.
operations, such as the transfer of the headquarters of the American forces in Europe (camp Des Loges) and of several United States Army and Air Force installations."

The immediate reaction of the United States Government was a formal expression of displeasure and disagreement over the eviction notice. In its reply to the French Aide-Memoire, it stated:

The U.S. Government cannot agree with the suggestion of the French Government that April 1, 1967, "would be appropriate for completing the necessary operations" with regard to the transfer of personnel and installations involved in these agreements, but, on the contrary, believes that such precipitate action could jeopardize the security interests of all members of the alliance. (36)

However, the US Government did not totally reject the French request for vacating its territory. It indicated that it would remove its facilities from France as promptly as possible.

On 15 June, McNamara announced that virtually all American combat units in France would be evacuated within the "next few months." No specific time limit was set for the over-all removal plan. McNamara said that altogether about 84,300 people would be affected—30,000 military personnel, 37,000 dependents and 17,300 French nationals. Initially two squadrons of C-130


transport aircraft—32 planes—would be transferred from Evreux in France to Mildenhall in the United Kingdom. In addition, "combat-essential stocks of ground and air munitions and equipment will be moved out of France to other NATO countries, largely to Germany," McNamara said.

The initial withdrawal, McNamara stated, would be about 7,500 defence personnel and 10,700 dependents. At an unspecified later time, six squadrons—about 90 aircraft—would be transferred, if possible to "European bases outside of France." "If this proves impractical for all squadrons, consideration will be given to basing some of the aircraft in the United States under a dual-basing concept."

Prior to McNamara's announcement consultations with North Atlantic Allies at the Brussels Ministerial Council meeting were held on 7 and 8 June. All the US troop relocations and reorganizations were approved by the Ministerial Council. The Allies also agreed on several concrete changes: removal of the military headquarters from Paris to Brussels; location of political and military headquarters within close proximity of each other; and an invitation to Italy to provide a new site for the NATO Defence college.

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38 Department of Defence, Office of Public Affairs, News Release no. 6-17-66-386.

39 For details see, Testimony of the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, US Senate, Congress 89, session 2, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations.
The whole relocation and reorganization process was accelerated soon after McNamara's announcement. By 3 April 1967, McNamara was able to declare that "for all practical purposes, the relocation has been completed." He said that relocation had permitted the United States to save 16,000 military personnel billets in France. Accompanying dependents accounted for 19,000 additional people returning to the United States from France. Some troops and dependents from Germany were also withdrawn. On the whole, McNamara stated that 18,000 military personnel plus 21,000 dependents were withdrawn—a total of 39,000 personnel moving from Europe to the United States.

Testifying before a Combined Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees of the Senate, McNamara sought to convince the members that the relocation that had been carried out would have no major adverse effect on NATO's capabilities. He said:

There has been a definite foreign exchange savings.... But it is true that the movement of the lines of communication from France to the low countries has somewhat increased the vulnerability of those lines of communication.

There has been some advantages, however. The rail and road communication net in the low countries is a far more efficient one and a far more responsive one than the rail and road conditions that we would be depending on in France. So there have been both gains and losses as the result of this move.

The net effect, in my opinion, on the military strength of the West has been small. (41)

It is noteworthy that all the US troops withdrawn from France were not relocated in the United States in spite of Congressional pressure for troop withdrawal from Europe that had developed in the Senate, as described in the following chapter. The Secretary of Defence appears to have shared the view of the JCS that the major part of US troops withdrawn from France should be relocated elsewhere in Europe, especially in Germany, Britain and the Benelux countries. They held the opinion that the relocation of US forces elsewhere in Europe was essential to retain military capability the United States previously had in France. The JCS was by no means happy at the prospect of withdrawal of troops from France for military reasons. Nevertheless, the Administration decided to withdraw troops from France because of De Gaulle's attitude and his eviction notice. It was a political decision. Since some troops, mainly Air Force personnel and aircraft were relocated in the United States also, the overall US troop strength was slightly affected. However, those troops were committed to NATO, and were to be flown to Europe in times of crisis.


McNamara and JCS Memorandum 46-67

There was continuing pressure from the certain section in Congress for a substantial reduction of US troops in Europe, as will be described in the next chapter. The Administration was constrained to find ways and means by which its position could be substantially safeguarded even if it were to involve some minor concession. In October 1966, the Pentagon took the lead by re-examining every angle of NATO strategy. The Generals had to acknowledge that twenty years had passed since the Second World War ended, and that the requirements of the Alliance should be updated. The JCS, according to the Christian Science Monitor examined such complex questions as: How many troops in Western Europe would be called an appropriate "American presence"?; What would be the breaking point between strength and weakness?; What would be the cheapest way to maintain American power close to Western Europe if some troops were withdrawn?; What about the use of the C-141 jet transport fleet?; How many American troops could be flown across the Atlantic within five days?; Can enough Air Force fighters fly to Europe overnight to beef up the NATO strength? The JCS also examined the possibility of adopting a "dual-basing system"--that is, a redeployment of two of the three brigades in a US division stationed in Germany to some base in the United States, while retaining the third brigade at the German base. Such redeployment was considered within the purview of the entire division being ready for combat and committed to NATO.

On 23 January 1967, the JCS completed their study. They submitted a memorandum—JCSM-46-67, Subject: Redeployment of U.S. Forces Withdrawn from Europe (U)—to the Secretary of Defence for consideration. Some idea of the contents of the memorandum could be gleaned from testimony given in March by JCS Chairman General Earle G. Wheeler before a House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations and a Senate Combined Subcommittee of Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. General Wheeler said:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken a very careful look at these proposals—a substantial withdrawal of American forces from Europe and dual-base concept—and have analyzed the military aspects of the problem. Our conclusion is this: There is no military justification for any reduction of military force in central Europe. (45)

Wheeler justified the JCS view by comparing the relative military strength of Warsaw Pact and NATO. He was of the view that the military forces of the Warsaw Pact had improved substantially over the years. The military posture of the Warsaw Pact was stronger in 1966 than it was in 1950 when NATO was first formed. However, Wheeler said: "the relative strength of the Warsaw Pact forces and the NATO forces are such that today they are in reasonable balance...a balance which has been established over the years and which I believe has proved to be

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44 DoD Documents, n. 16, 5, Section IV, c.b.(b), p. 52.

deterrent to the Soviets in the past." The Chairman was averse to being guided by "peoples talk in terms of a detente in Europe." Attitudes in people and government could change quickly, almost overnight. A military planner should plan military posture according to the adversaries' military capabilities and not intentions, Wheeler declared.

Wheeler warned that a withdrawal of US forces would be "serious" because that action of the United States as leader of NATO would probably have a serious effect on the future actions of the other members of NATO. It was possible, to mitigate the military detriment by withdrawing forces to United States and maintain the forces there being committed to NATO and return them speedily in time of crisis. But "such plans, such earmarking and such actions," cannot in the full sense take the place of troops in ground in Europe, Wheeler asserted. He could not agree that the concept of dual-basing was a complete answer to the problem. Wheeler said:

...it might well be that at a time of crisis, when you would like to reinforce your forces in place in Europe, you would find it politically undesirable to do so because to take action at a time of tension or time of crisis might trigger the very event you are seeking to avoid or to deter.

As I shall repeat, the Joint Chiefs can find no military justification for a cutback of military forces in Europe. (47)

However, Wheeler recognized that economic and political consideration also had to be taken into account by any government in deciding "what its military posture will be." As mentioned

46 Ibid., p. 220.
47 Ibid., p. 221.
earlier, the present writer tends to believe that the General Wheeler's testimony probably approximated the JCS position as set forth in JCSM-46-67.

Secretary of Defence McNamara did not approve the JCS recommendations against any redeployment of US troops from Europe to the United States. From his own subsequent testimony before a Senate Subcommittee it could be inferred that McNamara strongly believed that the dual-basing concept was a feasible proposition. McNamara also believed that there would be a period of political and military warning prior to a serious crisis, and that with the US capability to reinforce speedily, the Pentagon should find it possible to return the redeployed troops to Europe well in time.

The Secretary was constrained to acknowledge that his view was sharply at variance with the appraisal of the JCS. That the JCS had taken a particular position and the Secretary had found himself unable to go along with them was indicated when he said:

The Joint Chiefs state that the period of warning may not exceed [deleted] days. I think that statement is subject to question because although the period of military warning may be only [deleted] days, almost surely there will be political tension over an extended period in excess of [deleted] days, and this constitutes warning as well. So from my point of view, I think we can deploy the forces within a period of political and military warning. (49)

Once again the decision appear to have been a case of the


49 Testimony of Secretary of Defence McNamara, before the

(Contd. on next page)
Secretary weighing the recommendations of the JCS against the findings of the Systems Analysis Office and Office of the International Security Affairs. McNamara was not willing, like most of his predecessors, to place implicit trust in the "military judgement" of the Service Chiefs in a complex matter involving varied considerations. If the JCS kept on repeating old chants, the Secretary was ready to confront them with the elaborate studies of his "whiz kids."

**Systems Analysis Office Rebuts JCS Arguments**

A fairly comprehensive picture of the method of analysis made by the Systems Analysis group and the conclusions that they presented to the Secretary of Defense is to be found in the volume by Alain C. Entenov and K. Wayne Smith entitled *How Much Is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969*. These men firmly believed that they "worked for the Secretary of Defense" and that career military officers too often tended to attach undue importance to their "parochial interest." They were also convinced that while the military officers were independent and objective, civilian analysts had "more career and intellectual independence than career military officers."

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According to Enthoven and Smith, the standard military briefings given at the NATO headquarters and by the JCS, in the 1950's and the early 1960's, was a comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces solely in terms of divisions. The Warsaw Pact was usually described as possessing 175 well-equipped, well-trained, fully ready Soviet divisions. Its counterpart NATO was usually depicted as having about 25 ill-equipped, ill-trained unready divisions in the central region. The conclusion of the briefings was always the same: "NATO could hold for only a few days before it would be forced to use nuclear weapons."

The "fact" of these 175 Soviet divisions became the target of the Systems Analysis Office and Office of the International Security Affairs (ISA) after McNamara's advent. They made a complete review of aggregate population data, gross-national-product data, technical skills, and composition of the economies of the NATO Allies and the Warsaw Pact countries. The review led to the conclusion on the basis of economic criteria that it would be more difficult for the Soviet Union than for NATO to maintain a large army.

The Systems Analysis Office and ISA made a comparison of the total number of men under arms in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. On the basis of intelligence estimate, they argued that NATO countries had over six-million men on active duty compared with about four and one-half-million for the Warsaw Pact. They asked how NATO could be outnumbered in the battlefield

51 Ibid., p. 133.
52 Ibid., p. 134.
while it had one-third more men under arms.

The Systems Analysis Office and ISA also found a discrepancy in the contention of 175 Soviet divisions facing 25 NATO divisions when they compared the expenditure relating to equipping the US Army and the Soviet Army. They took the planned average expenditure of £2.2 billion a year to equip the US Army's 22 division forces (16 active divisions and 6 priority National Guard divisions) to estimate the possible expenditure to equip 175 Soviet divisions. They estimated the expenditure to equip 175 Soviet divisions at anything like US standards would be at least £17.5 billion. That expenditure, the Systems Analysis Office and ISA contended, was highly improbable in view of the fact that £17.5 billion was more than the United States was spending at that time for all military procurement, not only for the Army but for the Air Force, the Navy and the Marine Corps. That expenditure would be hardly compatible with the other equally important demands of the Soviet economy on the Soviet budget. However, the Systems Analysis Office and ISA indicated that the estimated expenditure did not prove that "the Soviets couldn't be doing it but it made the 175 division figure highly suspect." This accounting puzzle became known in the Office of Secretary of Defence as the "PEMA Paradox" (Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army).

A similar paradox emerged when the Systems Analysis Office and ISA analysed the personnel strength, Enthoven and

53 Ibid., p. 135.
Smith point out. They took the 1961 US overall Army strength figure for analysis. At that time the United States had nearly one million men on active duty in the Army, organized into 16 combat divisions plus support. The Soviet Army, they pointed out, numbered roughly two million, which would be enough to support an army of 40 divisions if organized on US standards. So they concluded that the claim of 175 divisions maintained by the Soviets appeared doubtful. This disparity, the Systems Analysis and ISA christened the "People Paradox."

After analysing aggregate economic data, and the "PEMA-People Paradoxes," the Systems Analysis Office and ISA came to the conclusion that either the "intelligence estimates" of Soviet divisions were wrong or that what the Soviets called a "division" was far different from what the US called a "division." On the basis of further analysis they contended that at least half of the 175 divisions "were essentially paper units" with perhaps 10 per cent of their manpower on board and far from "100 per cent of their equipment." A fully mobilized US division force "had about three times" as many people as a fully mobilized Soviet division force. The US division had about 40,000 soldiers per division in Germany compared with about 13,000 for the Soviets. "Thus by 1965 we know that a Soviet division force cost only about a third that of a U.S. division force, had only about a third as many men, and (we had strong reason to believe) was only about one-third as effective," according to the Enthoven group.

54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., p. 140.
The Systems Analysis Office also examined the validity of the NATO military estimates that the Soviet forces had a superiority in number of aircraft compared with the NATO forces. As late as 1966, an Air Force briefing to a group of NATO Defence Ministers indicated that NATO was outnumbered 3 to 1 in deployed combat aircraft, and concluded that NATO would lose the air battle in a few days. But the Systems Analysis Office was not prepared to accept the estimate that the Soviet forces had a superiority in number of aircraft because a huge increases in US spending on tactical air force had continued since 1961. On the basis of their analysis, they asserted that part of the problem was that the military briefings usually compared nearly the total Soviet inventory with only part of the US inventory—the number of US aircraft in combat units. That kind of estimate made substantial difference because roughly about two-thirds of US aircraft were in combat units and the rest were functionally organized. An example cited was that in the United States advanced flying training units and combat units were different entities. In the Soviet Union the training function was performed by combat unit.

The Enthoven group also argued that many of US and NATO aircraft were assigned to various commands around the world which were not taken into account by military briefers in evaluating relative US-Soviet aircraft strength. Each commander tended to compare his own assigned force with practically all the forces available on the Soviet side. Again there were also

56 Ibid., p. 143.
aircraft assigned to nuclear missions which were not taken into consideration in announcing figures of US aircraft strength.

The Systems Analysis Office asserted that even under the assumption that NATO aircraft would be destroyed at the end of three days, NATO's total remaining world-wide aircraft inventory would be still much larger than that of the Warsaw Pact. The destruction of major part of Pact's aircraft in its confrontation with NATO at the end of three days should be also taken into account. So an opposite conclusion emerged for the Systems Analysis Office, namely, that at the end of "three days the Pact was in a considerably worse numerical position than NATO...."

The findings of the Systems Analysis Office resulted in McNamara directing it along with the JCS to prepare a joint memorandum comparing "Free World and Communist Tactical air inventories." When the Joint JCS and Systems Analysis memorandum was completed there was agreement by all parties that there was no "aircraft gap." The United States and its Allies, it was agreed, had substantially more tactical aircraft world-wide than the Soviet Union and its Allies. "In Europe, not only was the total aircraft inventory of all the NATO allies (central region and flanks) numerically larger but,...the aircraft were better designed for conventional operations," the joint memorandum declared.

Anthoven and Smith state in their work that the findings summarized above were the culmination of studies in progress

57 Ibid., p. 144.
58 Ibid.
since 1961 which were completed in 1966. No specific dates or
details, are, however, given by them concerning presentation
made by their office to the Secretary of Defence in 1966. Since
the group worked very closely with the Secretary, it is reason-
able to infer that the broad contours of the arguments were
known to McNamara, and were available to him when he received
the JCS memorandum. It is clear that the Secretary was not
ready or willing to accept the position of the JCS on the
inadvisability of implementing the dual-basing concept.

The President's Decision

Only a Presidential decision could break the stalemate.
Johnson moved to set up a high-level meeting in the White House.
On 23 February 1967 he had received a memorandum from John J.
McCloy (Chief US negotiator in the Trilateral Talks between USA,
UK and FRG), suggesting that it was vital to consult with the
Germans and secure agreement with other Allies before any deci-
sion was taken to go ahead with the dual-base concept. The
United States should also demonstrate effectively its capacity to
reinforce NATO forces as promised. It should pledge to make no
additional withdrawal unless there was reciprocal reduction of
forces by the Soviets or other "major changes in the security
situation." McCloy also conveyed his own view that dual-basing
should be applied to only one division and three air wings.
However, McCloy pointed out that his agreement was conditional.

59 Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of
the Presidency 1963-1969 (Delhi, 1971), Indian edn.,
p. 309.
On 24 February the dual-base concept was discussed at a White House luncheon conference. Those taking part, apart from the President, were Secretaries Rusk and McNamara; Under Secretary of State for political Affairs Eugene Rostow; Assistant Secretary of Defence John McNaughton; Under Secretary of the Treasury Frederick L. Deming; and Deputy Special Assistant to the President Francis Bator. Rusk stated that the State Department was in favour of using the dual-base technique to only one US Army division in Germany and to three of US nine air wings. McNamara, on the other hand, recommended that the dual-base concept should be applied to two divisions and six air wings. The Treasury Department, it was reported, favoured redeployment of at least one division from Germany.

After extensive discussions, the President told his advisers that he wanted "to move slowly." He indicated that he was concerned that "a large cutback" in US forces might tempt the Soviets to start trouble in Central Europe, especially in Berlin. That was an indication that the President favoured some reduction of US troops in Europe. To that extent it was a setback for the JCS. However, as often in such situations the President probably did not want any powerful element in the bargaining session greatly dissatisfied or nursing a sense of defeat. The JCS, with close ties to important members of Congress, especially those belonging to the Armed Services Committees, had the capability to create some complications for the President.

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60 Baltimore Sun, 4 May 1967; and Washington Post, 6 March 1967.
The President could also not overlook the capacity of the military to influence public opinion through Service Associations, Veteran's organizations and other "patriotic" groups. Such realistic considerations probably induced the President not to appear to be rejecting entirely the position advocated by the JCS. Dual-basing was to be accepted but the emphasis was to be on "moving slowly" and not to the extent advocated by McNamara. The final decision was to apply the dual-base concept to only one division and three air wings. The Administration made no immediate public announcement of its decision. On 27 February Johnson informed key Congressional leaders at a White House breakfast meeting that the Administration proposed to redeploy some US troops from Europe on the basis of the dual-base concept. All the Congressional leaders approved the Administration's plan to redeploy US troops from Europe on dual-base concept, 61 Johnson stated in his memoirs.

US Withdraws 35,000 Troops From Europe to Bases in America

The Administration was anxious to seek Allied approval before announcing US troop withdrawals. It put forth its proposal at the fourth session of the trilateral talks that was resumed on 20 March in Washington. No decision was taken, but a joint US-FRG group was constituted which began intensive study of the proposal late in March. By the third week in April full agreement was reached on all but one issue, the number of US

61 Johnson, n. 59, pp. 308-10.
planes to be removed. The United States suggested redeployment of 144 aircraft but the Germans argued that NATO air defence would be seriously weakened if more than 72 aircraft were redeployed. On 27 April while the fifth session of the trilateral talks was in progress in London, McCloy conveyed to the President his compromise for redeploying 96 planes. Johnson approved the suggestion, and the trilateral talks concluded the following day with the US move for troop redeployment from Europe to America on dual-base concept winning approval.

On 2 May 1967, the Department of State issued an official statement on the withdrawal of some American forces in Europe:

Since last October, the Government of the United States, United Kingdom and Federal Republic of Germany have been engaged in a series of discussions of the problems posed for the defense of NATO and the balance of payments position of the respective parties by the forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. The three Governments have now completed these talks.

...with regard to alliance strategy and forces and how available resources can be used most effectively for the common defense, the representatives recognized that the NATO Defense Planning Committee offers the best forum for continuing discussions of these matters.

...with a view to initiating such discussions in the Defense Planning Committee, the representatives concluded with respect to...the...United States forces,...that the flexibility provided by development in strategic mobility should permit some changes in the deployment of certain ground and air force units which could be made, without affecting their availability for combat in Europe within the time required.

The United States had proposed to NATO that it redeploy from the Federal Republic of Germany to the United States up to 35,000 military personnel. (63)

62 Ibid., pp. 310-11.

The issue came up for discussion at the semi-annual meeting of the NATO Defence Planning that met in Paris on 9 May. It was reported by the *New York Times* that the Defence Ministers adopted a basic document stating that the threat of Soviet military attack on Western Europe had become unlikely. Noting the improved mobility of Allied forces, it added that some reduction of numerical strength was inevitable in the face of the determination of various governments to reduce their defence costs. What it meant was that the NATO Defence Planning Committee had approved the withdrawal of 35,000 US troops from Europe.

The Defence Planning Committee's decision were embodied in a document designated MC-14-3 by NATO's Military Committee. The document was adopted by the Defence Planning Committee in its annual meeting in Brussels on 12 December 1967. It was also adopted by the North Atlantic Council in its annual Ministerial session on 14 December. The Council noted the force commitment undertaken by the member nation for the year 1968, which, as indicated earlier, included the announced redeployment of 35,000 US troops.

Approval of the Allies having been duly received, the Pentagon announced, on 20 December 1967, that US Commander-in-Chief in Europe, had been authorized to work out redeployment programme involving about 31,000 Army personnel and 3,400 Air

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Force personnel. The earlier announced redeployment schedule of 1 January 1968 was postponed and the military personnel redeployment commenced on 2 April. The Army redeployment programme was called "REFORGER" and the Air Force programme, called "CRESTED CAP."

By 30 April, 6,000 military personnel had returned to the United States. The withdrawal continued and, by the time Czechoslovakian crisis occurred, over 19,400 troops had returned to the United States. Immediately after the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia, the JCS had urged a quick deployment to Europe of the withdrawn forces. But the President was reluctant for a variety of reasons, to approve the JCS recommendation. DoD officials announced that the planned withdrawal would continue despite the Czechoslovakian developments. By the end of 1968 the redeployment from Europe to the United States was completed. The major units involved were two brigades of the 24th Infantry Division and appropriate associated units, which were moved to Fort Riley, Kansas; the 3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment, which was based at Fort Lewis, Washington; three squadrons of the 49th Tactical Fighter Wing, which was stationed in Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico; and the 417th Tactical Fighter squadron, which was redeployed to Mountain Home Air Force Base.

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Under the dual-base programme, a rotation of the Germany-based brigade was also provided. From time to time, the Germany-based brigade was to be replaced by one of the two brigades stationed in the United States. Once a year, all three brigades were to be in Germany for exercises involving the entire division.

The redeployment of US troops from Germany to the United States represented the first major withdrawal of US troops from Europe since the cold war era began. The reductions in US troops levels in Europe were dictated by three principal reasons, namely, political, financial and strategic. Politically, the move was designed to ease the pressure in the Senate for a substantial withdrawal of US forces from Europe. Financially, it was designed to ease the US balance of payments problem. Strategically, the move was designed as a test of the US capability to move large numbers of men rapidly to any part of the world. However, US troops in Europe were not reduced to an extent that would substantially solve the US balance of payments problem. Nor was the reduction such a magnitude as to alarm or provoke the military component of the Pentagon unduly. There were to be

still substantial US troops in Europe capable of serving adequately US and NATO objectives. DoD officials, it was reported, declared that the Army units could be returned to Europe if needed in 30 days and the Air Force units in 10 days. They stressed that this was a maximum time and considered it "an acceptable risk."

The redeployment also introduced a minor variation in US military presence in Europe. The policy adhered to thus far of stationing six US divisions in Europe was modified. Stationing more than five and one-third divisions in Europe was considered no longer necessary. Nevertheless, it was still acknowledged that the commitment of six divisions to European defence was essential. Through the dual-basing and rotation programme, the Administration claimed that it was continuing to fulfil the American commitment of six divisions to European defence.

Counterattack on the Systems Analysts

It is noteworthy that minor reductions continued during 1968—-a year that was marked not only by severe complications for the United States in Vietnam and the Administration in Congress but also by major development in Europe itself represented by the emergence of the Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia and the subsequent Warsaw Pact intervention in that country which began on 20 August. It was an especially uncomfortable time for the US military establishment. In Congress too the military's traditional allies, especially in the Armed Services Committees,

68 Baltimore Sun, 5 May 1967.
encountered increasing resistance from colleagues critical of the appraisal of the requirements made by the military for Vietnam as well as for Europe. In regard to the latter, the JCS appear to have been greatly concerned over the role of the Systems Analysis civilians. Having been forced to yield ground once by going along with the dual-base concept and relocation programme involving about 35,000 troops, the JCS watched with concern the continuing activity of the Systems Analysis Office in making comparative evaluation of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces which seemed to carry the implication that further reductions might be feasible.

It was probably at this point that the military conveyed its misgiving to its allies in Congress, particularly to the House Committee on Armed Services headed by the influential Democratic Congressman, Mendel Rivers of South Carolina. Reference has been made in the previous chapter to an extended review of the Vietnam conflict and its impact on US military commitments abroad undertaken by a Special Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee under the Chairmanship of Porter Hardy of Virginia. Chairman Hardy and his associates came to know that in December 1967 a representative of the United States, presumably a civilian, had advised a "NATO group" that "on the basis of U.S. studies then in progress, no great disparity exists between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces." That the military strongly disagreed with the appraisal and was "in complete disagreement with such an evaluation" was subsequently revealed in a report of the Hardy
group.

The military became even more perturbed by a briefing presented by Enthoven entitled: "Methodology for Evaluating Conventional Forces," to a "NATO group" in February 1968. The JCS, it appears to the present writer, felt constrained to enlist Congressional support to challenge Enthoven's analysis because of its continuing misgivings concerning the attitude of the Secretary of Defence. The departure of McNamara from the Pentagon on 29 February 1968 brought no respite to the JCS. Since the Systems Analysis set-up under Enthoven continued to function as before under the new Secretary, Clark M. Clifford, it became more than ever necessary for the military and its friends to confront, if not the Secretary directly, at least the Enthoven group.

Critical references to the Enthoven briefings were made by witnesses in the course of hearings held in May 1968 by the Special Subcommittee on National Defence Posture of the House Armed Services Committee. Subsequently, the Subcommittee asked for and obtained a copy of Enthoven's briefing paper and announced that it would "review the methodology involved in the evaluation and test the validity of the conclusions reached." The review, sharply critical of Enthoven's approach, was published on 4 September 1968 during a time of high excitement following the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia.

The report argued that while in February 1968 NATO representatives were "toiling" to make member nations understand the importance of significantly strengthening the Alliance, Dr. Enthoven had "appeared on the scene" with his methodology. The effect of his analysis "on the best laid plans of our top U.S. NATO military advisers" could hardly be described as "helpful". Indeed, according to witnesses who had testified before the Subcommittee, Enthoven's briefing was described "as having had extremely harmful effect." "If he [Enthoven] is right, our best military advisers are wrong; but on the basis of sworn testimony and documentary evidence which the Subcommittee has assembled, the Subcommittee finds adequate reason to question the validity of Dr. Enthoven's position."

The report charged that Enthoven had oversimplified his analysis of military problems. It argued that "in the highly complex problem of force planning," the systems analysis techniques that he relied on could prove to be "extremely dangerous if used as a substitute for subjective analyses and informed reasoning." Enthoven's analysis, the report noted, came after Franco withdrew from NATO and when a "concerted effort by the radical and leftist elements in some NATO countries," was in progress to bring about further reduction of their nation's participation in NATO. US representatives, on the other hand, were constantly seeking to induce the Allies to increase their defence effort.

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In such a complex situation Enthoven had chosen to tell a NATO group that there was "no reason" for them to increase their "planned military budgets" or "the size of their existing force" and that the then existing forces were "at least equal" to Warsaw Pact forces.

The report stated that Enthoven had compared the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces while ignoring the geographical difference between the adversaries. NATO was not a "continuous belt of strength" facing Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It was made up of islands of "variable strength," which might not be "mutually supporting," particularly after the French withdrawal from the NATO integrated command. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, "had all the classical military advantages associated with a large continuous land mass and interior lines of communication."

The Systems Analysis expert had sought to compare the strength of forces on a world-wide basis which was "patently irrelevant." "The British Defense Minister dealt with the speciousness of such a comparison..." when he said: "with great respect, I do not think you can really count on the British forces in Hong Kong as being available in case of war in Europe," the report stated.

Enthoven had mainly centered his attention on the "central region of NATO," where Alliance forces and those of the Warsaw Pact faced one another in Europe, the report noted. Such a focus

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71 Enthoven's presentation credited NATO with 5,570,000 men in uniform for all services and Warsaw Pact 4,200,000. The Tactical aircraft strength of NATO was shown as 11,500 and that of Warsaw Pact as 9,200. That gave NATO thirty per cent more fighting men and twenty-five per cent more planes. Ibid., pp. 2, 3.
overlooked the threat on NATO's flanks "now magnified by France's withdrawal and the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean." Enthoven had also ignored the fact that many NATO divisions were below their authorized strength. "Succinctly, it is impossible to compare NATO divisions with each other, much less with Soviet and Pact country divisions." Enthoven was unrealistic in taking conventional forces "out of context" by treating them as an independent segment than part of total military balance in Europe. "Any true evaluation of conventional forces demanded that they be viewed against a background of NATO and Warsaw Pact theater nuclear capabilities in several forms: demolition, artillery, rockets, bombs, and missiles." The Soviet Union had a substantial capability to strike with intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles. Enthoven had failed to make allowance for the fact that a computation of Allied conventional capabilities "must allow for the fact that some of our resources are, in fact, reserved for nuclear contingencies and must remain so," the report noted.

The report asserted that Enthoven's estimates of Soviet defence expenditures were incorrect and that he overlooked several relevant factors. "This oversight, if such it be, makes it impossible to arrive at any intelligent conclusions, yet Dr. Enthoven not only reaches conclusions, but in the process he apparently feels that this alchemy has changed estimates into what he characterizes as 'facts'," the report stated.

72 Ibid., pp. 3, 4, 5.
73 Ibid., p. 4.
The report complained that Enthoven had ignored Warsaw Pact "superiority" in armour, mobility, and firepower. At one point, he had suggested that through superior "engineer capability," NATO forces should be able to impede Soviet advance with "barriers" and "minifields." Challenging the suggestion, the Subcommittee remarked that the occupation of Czechoslovakia showed that the Warsaw Pact forces were "structured for swift, massive armored penetration" without telegraphing their punch and giving a foe time to prepare barriers. 74

"It appears that in order to support his general thesis, Dr. Enthoven has not hesitated to compare 'apples' and 'oranges'," the report asserted. It added:

Unfortunately, the systems analysis approach requires the isolation of data in such a way that they can conveniently be "managed." The result is very likely to be an oversimplification of some very complex interrelationships and a tendency to leave out whatever cannot easily be determined or expressed.

...If Dr. Enthoven's analysis, as employed in this presentation, represents the state of the art of systems analysis, the Subcommittee cannot accept its employment for strategic planning. Nor does it provide a basis for consultation with the alliance members on political and military matters.

...Even if all the data [offered by Enthoven] were correct, and the comparisons and criteria reliable, the presentation appears to have as its principal thrust the achievement of parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We think that the goal should be superiority, not parity.

...The Subcommittee is now as convinced as ever that there remains a substantial place for military experience, judgement, and professional expertise in military decision making and in military consultations with our allies. (75)

The report embodied substantially the point of view of

74 Ibid., p. 5.
75 Ibid., pp. 3, 4, 6, 7. Emphasis added.
the military establishment. Its sharp tone and strongly worded challenge to the Systems Analysis Office was a warning to the Secretary of Defence and the Administration. The document itself came out at what appeared to be propitious time as far as the position of the military in regard to the troop reduction issue was concerned.

The growing demand in the Senate for "a substantial" reduction of US troops in Europe became muted following the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The public pronouncements of the Administration laid stress on the increased Soviet threat in Europe and the imperative need for maintaining NATO's strength. But what is significant is that the public position taken by the Administration of an increased Soviet threat was not reflected in the thinking of the civilian component of the Pentagon represented by the Systems Analysis Office. The latter had not been deterred by the hostility of the House Armed Services Committee. This is proved by the contents of a document entitled: "Evaluation of NATO and Pact Conventional Forces in Central Europe," prepared by the Enthoven group. "Our purpose in doing the new analysis was simply realism," the group's report stated. "Our purpose in making it known is to show that the problems in the Alliance do not arise from numerical inferiority.... We do not believe...that we need for more money or manpower than at present," (emphasis in original). While not advocating unilateral force reductions "of any consequence" by any NATO nation, the report challenged the view held by the House Armed Services' Special Subcommittee and the JCS that NATO should aim for attaining
superiority over the Pact in military capability. "However desirable superiority might be," the report asserted, "it is far from being a practical possibility...." The debate and analysis should be focussed instead on "feasible defense postures and force improvements," the report argued.

The Systems Analysis Office document argued that "gross estimates" of rival forces made after the Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia indicated that neither "the short nor long term" threat to NATO's center region had undergone a "major change." Though additional Soviet divisions were deployed in Eastern Europe, not only had the "threat" not increased but it had, in fact, become less. The "net threat" had become less because of the decreased dependability of the Czech forces and the need for the Warsaw Pact forces to neutralize them and the Czech population, the Entheoven report asserted. The long term threat to NATO would increase if Soviets maintained the same level of readiness and if there was no doubt about the dependability of the East European forces in general and the Czech forces in particular. Quick mobility displayed by the Soviet Union had also introduced the "dangerous element" of increased "unpredictability," which might also increase the threat to NATO, the Systems Analysis Office document noted.

The document further pointed out that since the Soviet


77 Ibid., p. 36802.
Union had demonstrated its readiness to use military forces in Europe if political means failed, it was clear that NATO should have the ability to respond appropriately should the Soviets act in similar manner toward any NATO ally. The events in Czechoslovakia had underscored both the growing pressures within Eastern Europe for "liberation" and Soviet determination to "counter such pressures" even with force. Since the situation in Eastern Europe was "becoming increasingly explosive" there should be no major unilateral reduction of NATO forces, the Systems Analysis document asserted.

The timing and manner of the release of the new study of the Office of the Systems Analysis are very revealing. On 4 September 1968, the Special Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services had published its report containing a very sharp criticism of Enthoven's February 1968 briefing, described earlier. On 22 October 1968, Enthoven countered by sending a copy of his new report to Senator John Sherman Cooper (Republican, Kentucky), who was scheduled to participate in a conference of legislators from NATO countries in November. Interestingly enough, nine days later a NATO journal entitled Atlantic News published a story on Enthoven's new study. The present writer has not been able to determine whether the source for the journal was the Enthoven group itself, or Senator Cooper's office, or the US military elements which saw in the report points that could create complications for Enthoven. The Atlantic News story gave rise to a spate of reports and comments in several European and

78 Ibid., p. 36803.
British newspapers which highlighted the point that the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia had not only not increased the threat to NATO but had, in fact, reduced "the net threat."

American newspapers picked up the story and the New York Times, for instance, pointed out that General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe had just then made a speech in Washington in which he had taken a position which was the exact opposite of that of Enthoven.

It is interesting to note that US press reports on the repercussions in Europe of the Enthoven document were similar to those that had been voiced earlier by the JCS and the Special Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. According to the reports several of the Ambassadors to NATO headquarters were dismayed because many of them had been working hard in support of the position that the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia called for a strengthening of NATO. They felt that the Systems Analysis Office's conclusions would defeat their effort. They were confused by the inconsistency in US official policy because while Enthoven presented the position that the "net threat" had decreased, other US officials, especially the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defence and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, had been explaining to NATO Allies that the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia had tilted the European power balance in favour of the Communist countries.


The fire was in the fire and the military was finally in the happy position of finding Enthoven and his Systems Analysis Office in a quandary. Enthoven himself had claimed in his study that his purpose was "realism." His appraisal of the nature of the Soviet threat in the aftermath of the Czech intervention reflected that realism and was probably in line with the thinking of the civilian component of the Pentagon. However, since the public posture of the Administration had been all along different, it could not afford publicly to endorse the Systems Analysis Office's appraisal that the threat in Europe had become reduced. The Administration was constrained to reiterate its publicly stated position that the threat had actually increased. (It had, however, no intention of increasing its contribution of troops to Europe to meet the "increased threat.")

The situation was met by Enthoven retracting his statement on the magnitude of the threat. Newspapers carried reports of a second letter that Enthoven had sent to Senator Cooper in which he stated that an "unfortunate error" had crept into his earlier memorandum and that the portion relating to reduction of the Soviet threat should be deleted "so that the error will not be perpetuated...." Enthoven said: "In short, the net threat--including the availability of forces and the possible Pact willingness to risk their use against NATO territory--has significantly increased, not reduced." Senator Cooper told newsmen that in his report to the NATO Assembly he would convey his own assessment which was "that the Soviet action has increased the
The Administration Plans Further Troop Withdrawal

Enthoven's revision of the Systems Analysis Office's conclusions was a tactical move for public consumption. The Administration, especially the Office of the Secretary of Defence (OSD), did not undergo any conversion. Within the OSD, even after the Czech crisis, the appraisal that the Soviet threat to NATO had not increased, persisted. This naturally meant that the question of reasonable cuts in the troop levels, which would result in economies without endangering security or alarming the European Allies, continued to engage the attention of the OSD. Studies relating to possible cuts in Europe that were initiated by McNamara shortly before his departure from the Pentagon were continued by Secretary Clifford and were not shelved during or immediately after the Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. This significant information was revealed several months later by General David A. Burchinal, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of U.S. European Command, in testimony before a Senate Subcommittee.

"The cuts which that program reflected were introduced into the budget which the outgoing Johnson administration left for the incoming Nixon administration," the General stated.

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81 Correspondence of Enthoven with Cooper, printed in Congressional Record, vol. 116, Part 27, pp. 36803-04; and Washington Star, 9 November 1968.

A plan to withdraw about 30,000 troops from Europe, involving mostly administrative and support troops rather than combat forces, was prepared in the final weeks of the Johnson Administration. The plan was incorporated into the fiscal year 1970 budget presented to the Congress on 15 January 1969.

"Action contemplated in this budget," said President Johnson, "will support our share of the efforts to improve the combat effectiveness of the NATO forces and by streamlining overhead, will reduce the costs of maintaining U.S. forces in Europe."

About a third of the programme involved consolidation of bases and other actions that would not affect American commitments to NATO. This part of the reduction programme, Pentagon officials disclosed, could proceed without consultation with Allies. The rest required consultations. "We expect these steps to yield substantial savings in personnel expenditures, operating costs, and foreign exchange costs," said Secretary of Defense Clifford. However, the withdrawal proposal by the outgoing Johnson Administration was cancelled by the incoming Nixon Administration.