Chapter II

FORCE LEVEL BUILD-UP
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In April 1951, an integrated command consisting of representatives from all the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance was created during a period of peace. No such organization had ever previously existed. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had been appointed to the post of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), set up his headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), at Rocquencourt near Paris, France.

The mission of SACEUR was to ensure the security of western Europe by unifying Allied defence plans, strengthening Allied military forces in peace time and planning for their most advantageous use in time of war. In view of the large size of the area covered by Allied Command Europe, subordinate commands were established, first the Central, then the Northern, later the Southern, and the Mediterranean. Along with the establishment of SHAPE and various Commands, the North Atlantic Treaty was transformed into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The deployment of the additional four American divisions in Europe began on 27 May 1951, with the arrival in Bremerhaven of the vanguard of the US Fourth Division. It ended on 8 December 1951, with the arrival at the same port of the last unit of the US Twenty Eighth Division. The four divisions along with the equivalent of two divisions that were already stationed in West Germany, were organized into the US Seventh Army, which was formally reactivated on 24 November 1951. The Seventh Army

Headquarters were established at Stuttgart, Germany.

The disposition of US troops in Germany was reported in the Washington Post. According to the report, the units of the US Seventh Army were mainly deployed on the southern section of the Central Command. The constabulary forces were placed in the rough arc along the frontier of the Soviet zone. This "contact line" ran through the localities of Fritzlar, Bad Hersfeld, Fulda and Freiberg and covered the Fulda Gap, the valley route from the Soviet zone to Frankfurt and the shortest route of attack to the Rhine. The Fourth Division, with headquarters in Frankfurt and regiments to the north and northeast of the city, remained guarding the Fulda Gap. The Second Armoured Division, with headquarters at Bad Kreuznach in the French zone, was to be in reserve behind this sector.

The First Infantry Division, with headquarters at Darmstadt, 25 miles south of Frankfurt, had regiments at Nuremborg, Bamberg and Aschaffenberg. Finally, there were two National Guard outfits, the Twenty-eighth Division, with headquarters at Stuttgart, and regiments disposed in reserve position in Northern Bavaria, and the Forty-third Division, with headquarters at Munich. Besides the Seventh Army headquarters, there were two Corps Commands: the Fifth Corps in the North, with headquarters at Frankfurt, and the Seventh Corps in the South, in the Stuttgart area.

Along with the decision to send ground troops to Europe, the Truman Administration took a decision to commit the Navy and...
Air Forces deployed in Europe to the NATO integrated command. On 5 June 1951, President Truman as Commander-in-Chief of the US Armed Forces, directed the Sixth Fleet to support the North Atlantic Command of General Eisenhower. The Sixth Fleet had two responsibilities. Firstly, its task was to carry out national commitments and interest in the Mediterranean and the Middle East without being controlled or directed by the NATO integrated command. Secondly, it was charged with a duty to carry out NATO responsibilities during an emergency under the direction and control of the NATO integrated command. The US Air Force strength in Britain, France, Germany and Italy was also increased in 1951 and 1952. Thus, in 1952, the United States military strength in Europe reached the highest level in peace time thus far. Table 2 prepared from a Pentagon document, indicates the US troop levels in Europe as of 30 September 1952.

It may be appropriate at this point to explain the expression "General Purpose Forces"—a term that only came to be subsequently used to describe the forces of the type the United States had positioned in Europe. (The term actually came into use from 1961.) The Pentagon definition of "General Purpose Forces" is:

The general purpose forces, as in the past, include most of the Army's combat and combat support units, virtually all Navy units, all Marine Corps units, and the tactical units of the Air Force. These are the forces upon which we rely for all

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3 The US Sixth Fleet deployed in Mediterranean was constituted in June 1948. For details, see Commander Salvatore Licoli, "Twenty Years of History in the Mediterranean: 1948-1968", NATO's Fifteen Nation (Amsterdam, The Netherlands), vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 54-55, 58-64.
### TABLE 2

US General Purpose Force Levels in Europe

(As of 30 September 1952)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy &amp; Marine</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>8,264</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
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Total | 291,411 | 20,031 | 91,260 | 402,702 |

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4 Source: US Department of Defense, "Confidential", "Deployment of Military Personnel--30 September 1952". Such tables were prepared in the Statistical Services Center, Office of Secretary of Defense.
military actions short of general nuclear war; i.e., limited war and counter-insurgency operations. (5)

For the sake of convenience the term, general purpose forces is used throughout the present work in the sense in which it is used by the Pentagon.

**NATO Force Goals**

The United States general purpose forces stationed in Europe are not an independent entity, but they are part of NATO forces. With an increase in the American contribution to NATO integrated command, there was a simultaneous increase in the European contribution. In the beginning no NATO force goals had been established. However, in 1950 a long term plan was evolved. It provided for 30 to 85 divisions for the central front in Europe, 10 for the Brenner-Trieste area, and 5 for the Scandinavian area, making a total of about 100 divisions.

By April 1952, the NATO forces in Western Europe had grown in number and in capability. In Germany, where a year earlier the task of holding a Soviet attack had been regarded as hopeless, there were seventeen Allied divisions confronting twenty two Soviet divisions in 1952. The seventeen divisions included: six US divisions, four British divisions, five French divisions.

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Commenting on the Allied build-up, General Eisenhower wrote:

Already our active forces have increased to a point where they could give a vigorous account of themselves, should an attack be launched against us. In terms of army divisions, whether in service or quickly mobilisable, our forces in Western Europe have nearly doubled in number.... Today, the combat readiness of our troops has improved markedly. Readjustments in their deployment have enhanced their potential effectiveness against the threat from the East. Behind them is a steadily expanding supply system, and a command organization to plan and direct our coordinated efforts... and the tide has begun to flow our way and the situation of the free world is brighter than it was a year ago. (8)

It was not until the North Atlantic Council meeting in Lisbon, Portugal, in February 1952, that specific force goals were adopted. The main reason for the delay was due to the fact that the member nations felt no great sense of urgency for a build-up to higher military levels. However, the outbreak of the Korean war and the establishment of the integrated command increased the importance of establishing NATO force goals. The meeting at Lisbon formulated an ambitious plan for NATO defence. It approved for 1954 a ground force goal for the Central European front of between 25 and 30 combat-ready divisions and between 30 and 35 reserve divisions capable of being mobilized within one month.

At the same meeting, an agreement was reached on West

7 Washington Post, 23 April 1962.
German contribution to NATO integrated command. It was anticipated that West Germany, along with at least five other European countries, would join a proposed European Defence Community and would contribute 12 divisions to a projected European army of 43 divisions, to be assigned to JACEUR. Also, in February 1952, Greece and Turkey formally acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty and SaCEUR thereby gained the promise of additional forces to the NATO integrated command. At the same time, it meant that the defence responsibilities of the NATO command were significantly extended in southeastern Europe.

In the evolution of the decision relating to NATO integrated command and the establishment of NATO force goals, the executive branch encountered no significant opposition or resistance from Congress. Only a few members chose to offer any comment at all on these matters. For instance, in early 1953, Senators Alexander Wiley (Republican, Wisconsin), Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Guy Gillette (Democrat, Iowa), a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, expressed some doubts on the prospects of attaining the set goals. Gillette said in a Senate speech that of the 50 divisions most frequently mentioned as part

10 The European Defence Community (EDC) was conceived under pressure from the United States as a convenient means of employing the unused potential of West Germany in the service of Western defence without at the same time reviving a German military threat. The EDC was a French project written into treaty in May 1952, by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. All the countries ratified it except Italy and France. The project failed with the refusal of France to ratify in August 1954. For further details see, Joseph T. Kay, "John Foster Dulles and the European Defence Community" (Thesis, Ph.D., Kent State University, 1969).
of NATO forces, "only 20 or 25" were actually in a state of combat readiness. Many divisions included in the announced total strength of NATO, Gillette pointed out, were standing guard in Turkey and Greece, and could not be counted on for the defence of Western Europe.

NATO forces continued to grow, but the provisional Lisbon force goals could not be met by the end of 1954. The United States, however, maintained its commitment equivalent to six divisions. NATO forces on the central European front reportedly amounted close to 25 nominally combat-ready standing divisions and about 25 reserve divisions in various stages of readiness. But withdrawal of French divisions for services in Algeria, beginning in late 1954, were to reduce these levels. At the same time, arrangements for a West German contribution to NATO forces had to be renegotiated in the fall of 1954 following the French Assembly's rejection of the proposed European Defence Community Treaty. West Germany became a member of NATO in May 1955, and steps to raise a West German army were deployed until 1956. The death of Generalissimo Stalin in 1953 and the abatement to a certain extent of fears aroused by the Korean war contributed to a growing European reluctance to increase or even maintain the pace of rearmament in order to create stronger ground forces. Changes in strategic thinking in progress in the United States helped in some measure to reinforce this reluctance.


The "New Look" in Defence Strategy in the United States

A broad national consensus had already developed in the United States in support of the US commitment to NATO and stationing of US troops in Europe. In 1952 Presidential election the Democratic candidate was Governor Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois, a warm supporter of the major foreign policy decisions of the Truman Administration, and who had been appointed during 1946-47 to serve in the US delegation to UN General Assembly. In his campaign speeches Stevenson stressed the contribution of two and a half million troops provided by Western European Allies for the common defence, and asserted that America's patient and determined efforts had brought in sight the goal of security in Europe.

That there would be no significant break in US policy towards NATO and Western Europe in the event of a Republican victory became evident when the Republican convention rejected Taft and nominated Eisenhower.

By and large the Eisenhower Administration endorsed the Truman Administration's assessment of the Soviet threat to Western Allies. Specifically, the Eisenhower Administration believed that a Soviet threat to the North Atlantic area existed. However,

13 Address by Adlai E. Stevenson before the State Committee of the Liberal Party, New York City, 22 August 1952; Address by Stevenson in Campus Square, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1 September 1952; and Address by Stevenson in San Francisco, California, 9 September 1952. For details see, Adlai E. Stevenson, Major Campaign Speeches of Adlai E. Stevenson 1952 (New York, N.Y., 1953), pp. 37, 45, 25.

it also had a political problem in having to demonstrate that its approach to meet the Soviet threat was different and more effective than that of its predecessor. The Eisenhower Administration initiated with much fanfare a "New Look" at American military strategy and military posture. The formulators of the "New Look" accepted the view of the Truman Administration that the United States must maintain over an indefinite period a large military capability of land, naval and air forces. However, they were also deeply fearful of adverse economic consequence that might result from prolonged outlays of vast appropriations for national defence. To meet the problem, they opted to rely more heavily upon strategic and tactical nuclear weapons as a deterrent with the rationale that such a strategy could produce significant savings in money and manpower. The Eisenhower Administration made no secret of its intention to depend upon nuclear weapons to balance the equation between national defence and fiscal solvency.

By the end of 1953, the "New Look" defence policy was adopted by the Administration. The new policy placed emphasis on procurement of nuclear weapons and reduction of conventional personnel strength of the Army and the Navy. It appeared to


entail some changes in the basis of planning for the security of the West—that is, from dependence upon conventional forces and weapons to nuclear weapons. A debate had taken place between 1949 and 1953 within the Administration on whether the United States should go in for tactical nuclear weapons. While the Truman Administration had displayed no great enthusiasm for the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons in ground warfare, the Eisenhower Administration showed willingness to go along with the arguments put forth by the military planners for their deployment.

Two main reasons were put forward by the Army planners for adopting tactical nuclear weapons to ground warfare. First, it was argued that even if bombers of the Strategic Command destroyed major targets in the Soviet homeland, the defence of Europe would require utilization of tactical nuclear weapons. Secondly, the employment of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons in local land-battle warfare would prevent or restrain conventional probes from escalating into large scale war. The military planners believed that the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons in local warfare would give NATO a greater chance of winning than conflict conducted exclusively through conventional means.

Did the "New Look" indicate that the Eisenhower Administration was determined to move in the direction of any significant

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17 For details see, Comfort, n. 15, pp. 59-106.
18 Osgood, n. 12, p. 123.
reduction in the US force level of six divisions in Western Europe? The Administration itself made no specific references and its Democratic critics too chose to concentrate on broad implications of hasty reductions in Army and Navy personnel. Senator Stuart Symington (Democrat, Missouri), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, was a leading critic. In a Senate debate in March 1954, Symington charged that "phony slogans" were being used by the Administration to indicate a degree of military readiness that was neither present nor in prospect. He charged that much emphasis was laid on nuclear weapons at the cost of the Army and the Navy which would jeopardize the security of the country. Symington's stand was supported by four other Democratic Senators, Lister Hill of Alabama, a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee; Henry M. Jackson of Washington, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee; Mike Mansfield of Montana, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee; and John C. Stennis of Mississippi, a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee.

Senate Minority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas and Richard B. Russell (Democrat, Georgia), ranking minority member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, were also critical of the "New Look" policy essentially for its programme of reduction of the Army and Naval personnel strength. They asserted that "qualitative as well as quantitative superiority" was necessary...
to meet any Soviet challenge. Senator Wayne Morse (Independent, Oregon), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, joined the Democratic assault with the assertion that unwise Administration military economics might one day mean "the loss of millions of American lives." Given such views, clearly these Senators would have been vigorously opposed to any reduction in U.S. troops committed to NATO.

The Administration's "New Look" policy was strongly defended by Republican Senators led by Chairman of the Armed Services Committee Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts and Chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Department of Defence Appropriations and head of the Republican Policy Committee Homer Ferguson of Michigan. In the House, the Administration's spokesman were Chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Department of Defence Appropriations Richard B. Wigglesworth (Republican, Massachusetts) and Leslie C. Arends of Illinois, the Republican Whip and a member of the Armed Services Committee. In the whole, it was partly due to the strong support of the Republican majority in Congress, and mainly due to Eisenhower's prestige as a military leader that the Administration was able to pursue its "New Look" policy in spite of Democratic opposition. Nevertheless, to placate the Democrats and military brass, the Administration made some modifications in the "New Look" policy. The shift in plan was not an abandonment of the "New Look" but a


"stretching" of the reduction of Army and Navy personnel strength over four years instead of three years. However, the emphasis on the procurement of nuclear weapons continued.

Another facet of the "New Look" policy was the strategy of "massive retaliation". In his speech of 12 January 1954, the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles said:

Local defense will always be important. But there is no local defense which alone will contain the mightily land-power of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him.... The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing. (24)

What the Secretary of State tried to convey was that the conventional defence would be maintained for local defence but, at the same time, "massive retaliation" by nuclear weapons to even a local incident could not be assumed by the adversary to be precluded. In subsequent speeches, Dulles gave the impression that the United States' response to overt aggression by the Soviet Union could be massive retaliation by nuclear weapons at places and times determined by the United States. The adversary could not assume that the US response would be confined only in the locality where the incident might originate. The strategy rested on the assumption that the adversary would be deterred from

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attempting aggression at trouble spots of his choice since he might face massive retaliation.

The Secretary of State's exposition aroused considerable speculation regarding the capacity of the United States to deal with large or small emergencies. One question, for example, often asked was, how far the strategy would serve to meet possible local conflicts. Dulles sought to clear such doubts in his Press Conference of 16 March 1954, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 19 March 1954 and, later in an article in the April 1954 issue of Foreign Affairs. He pointed out that in organizing collective defence, "the free nations" should not attempt "to match the Soviet bloc man for man and gun for gun." They must have the mobility and flexibility to bring collective power to bear against an enemy on a selective or massive basis as conditions would require. It must include a wide range of air, sea and land power based on both conventional and atomic weapons. These weapons, Dulles indicated, could be used not only for strategic purposes but also for tactical purposes. The greatest deterrent to war, Dulles claimed, was the ability of the "free world" to respond by means best suited to the particular area and circumstances. "There should be a capacity," said Dulles, "for massive retaliation without delay. I

point out that the possession of that capacity does not impose the necessity of using it in every instance of attack. It is not our intention to turn every local war into a general war." The United States, Dulles pointed out, was not committed to instant "massive retaliation" against any form of aggression.

In October 1957, Dulles once again clarified the concept of "massive retaliation" in another article in *Foreign Affairs*. He explained that "massive retaliation" would be a last alternative. He indicated that the possession of low-yield nuclear weapons, which would be confining destruction to the battle field area, would mean less reliance on massive retaliatory power. "It may be possible," wrote Dulles, "to defend countries by nuclear weapons so mobile, or so placed, as to make military invasion with conventional weapons forces a hazardous attempt."

These views were elaborated by the Secretary of Defence during the House Appropriations Subcommittee's hearings on the Department of Defence Appropriations for Fiscal Year (FY) 1958. He told the Subcommittee:

... our basic defense policy is based on the use of atomic weapons in a major war and is based on the use of such atomic weapons as would be militarily feasible and usable in a smaller war, if such a war is forced upon us.

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In other words, the smaller atomic weapons, the tactical weapons, in a sense have now become conventional weapons. (28)

As Dulles envisaged it, nuclear weapons would be used more or less on an ascending scale on the basis of "graduated deterrence". This term "graduated deterrence" has been given a variety of meanings. It was defined as a policy by which a nuclear power or state would declare its intentions to use atomic weapons in a tactical way to fight off local aggression too powerful for conventional forces, but might renounce the use of thermonuclear weapons for mass destruction of cities unless an aggressor used them first. It was also defined as a policy for limiting war to the minimum forces necessary to deter and repel aggression, prevent any unnecessary extension of the conflict, and permit a return to negotiation at the earliest opportunity without seeking total victory or unconditional surrender. In


29 A military policy of "graduated deterrence" was proposed by Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, member of the British Strategic Joint Planning Staff during the Second World War and Director of Naval Intelligence in London from 1951 to 1954. The Briton's views were contained in an article entitled "Massive Retaliation and Graduated Deterrence", World Politics (Princeton, N.J.), vol. 8, no. 2, January 1956, pp. 228-37.

any event, the "graduated deterrence" of 1958 represented a modification of the policy of "massive retaliation" when it was originally enunciated.

**NATO Adopts "Massive Retaliation" Strategy**

The "massive retaliation" strategy was adopted by the NATO Council in its December 1954 meeting. With the Council's acceptance, NATO became dependent upon nuclear weapons not only for deterrence against aggression but also in planning defence. There were many factors responsible for the acceptance of the "massive retaliation" strategy by the European NATO members. The high cost of maintaining conventional forces side by side with highly expensive nuclear weapons was one of the important factors. Further, the Europeans could not envisage with equanimity the prospect of their countries becoming a theatre of limited war. They also believed that it was due to the nuclear deterrent that the Soviet Union had refrained from aggression in Europe on the Korean pattern. Heavier reliance on nuclear power, the Europeans opined, would also mean lesser diversion of human and material resources in support of a substantially larger conventional force that would otherwise become necessary.

Partly to fill a gap in conventional defence, and partly to "modernize" NATO defence posture, the NATO Council in December

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1951, authorized MACUR to base NATO's strategic plans on the use of tactical nuclear weapons regardless of whether the aggressor used them or not. Within the next several years, American forces first, and then Allied forces, received an increasing number of delivery vehicles for tactical nuclear weapons. While the delivery vehicles like the 280-mm "Atomic Cannon" and the Honest John and Redstone missiles were owned and controlled by the Allies, the warheads remained in American custody.

In December 1957, NATO's nuclear posture was strengthened still further. The NATO Heads of Government decided in the NATO Council meeting in Paris shortly after the launching of first Soviet Sputnik, to establish a stockpile of American nuclear warheads in Western Europe, and to deploy American Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) in NATO countries willing to accept them. Through 1958-1959 Jupiter and Thor IRBM's were deployed in Italy, Turkey and the United Kingdom. These countries accepted the American offer to deploy IRBM's under the "double veto" system—that is, each country and the United States were required to authorize the joining of the warhead to the missile


for employment in various contingencies. However, Denmark, Norway and France refused the offer because the United States, under the arrangement, owned the missiles and controlled the warheads. They feared that that arrangement would give the United States complete control over the employment of nuclear weapons in various contingencies.

The impact of these developments on US force levels in Europe was not significant. The atomic massive retaliation "Sword" was unsheathed. But along with the sharper "Sword", a stronger "Shield" was envisaged as part of NATO's military posture. "Forward defense" was to continue and "no major withdrawal and protection of the people and territory" were to be objectives. The "Sword" represented the long range striking forces which would give the alliance the ability to retaliate immediately with nuclear weapons in the event of aggression. The striking forces of the "Sword" were the United States Strategic Air Command and the United Kingdom's Bomber Command. The "Shield" represented land, sea, and air units defending the forward line from the Arctic Circle in Norway, down through Central Europe to the eastern borders of Turkey—a distance of more than 4,000 miles. They would also safeguard the bases from where the retaliatory forces would operate.

Among the strongest early supporters of increased NATO "Shield" forces was General Lauris Norstad, who in November 1956, succeeded General Alfred K. Gruenther as Supreme Commander, Allied Forces in Europe. Norstad, who viewed NATO's conventional forces as an indispensable and vital part of the NATO deterrent, saw serious danger if NATO forces in Central Europe were not increased to an "irreducible minimum" of thirty combat-ready divisions. In fact in 1957 new conventional force goals of thirty combat-ready divisions and considerably fewer reserve divisions for the period 1953-1963 were adopted by NATO countries, following a study report—EC-70—by NATO's Military Committee. Despite Norstad's urging, these force goals too were never met. By the end of 1960, NATO's "Shield" remained at little more than half the operational strength projected in 1957 as the minimum for adequate NATO defence. Although ostensibly 31½ combat-ready divisions comprised the central front forces, most observers estimated that a more accurate assessment was 12 to 16 divisions and regarded even these as reported to be seriously inferior to the Soviet bloc forces in Central Europe.


38 Osgood, n. 12, p. 163.
The "New Look" policy and the elaboration of the doctrine of "massive retaliation" strategy by Secretary of State Dulles and other officials aroused speculations on the possibility of reduction of the United States non-nuclear force in Europe. This was mainly due to the fact that the Eisenhower Administration along with the announcement of "New Look" policy had initiated the process of reduction of the US Armed Forces. On 13 July 1956, the New York Times published a story to the effect that Admiral Arthur W. Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had prepared a memorandum that advocated a substantial reduction of military personnel. It was reported that he favoured a reduction of 800,000 US military personnel and maintenance of only a "token" US forces in Europe. Contradicting the report Admiral Radford said: "The individual who attributes certain definite views to the Chairman is anticipating conclusions which the Chairman himself has not yet reached." Secretary of Defence Charles E. Wilson repudiated the report by declaring that "there have been no recent decisions changing the strengths of any of the services...."


41 "Text of the Statement on Military Manpower made by Admiral Arthur W. Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Charles E. Wilson, the Secretary of Defense", New York Times, 14 July 1956.
Nevertheless, during the Eisenhower Administration a reduction in the strength of the US Armed Forces was actually carried out. The total US Armed Forces strength of 3,655,000 in June 1953 was reduced to 2,476,000 by June 1960. It would be difficult to establish that these reductions were totally the result of "New Look" and "massive retaliation" strategy. Most of the reductions were from the Korean war build-up. Be that as it may, the key factor in respect of our theme is that the reduction of more than one million US military personnel did not affect the number of divisions stationed in Europe. The equivalent of six divisions committed or stationed in Europe during the Truman Administration was retained throughout the Eisenhower Administration. Tables 3, 4, and 5 prepared from the Department of Defense sources would indicate that the "New Look" policy of the Eisenhower Administration did not mean any significant change of course as far as Western Europe was concerned.

A glance at table 3 would indicate that by and large the troop levels in Europe were stable. Some reductions were carried out through a programme of streamlining the support forces without affecting the combat force levels and the total six divisions stationed in Europe. These reductions were made mainly in the

### TABLE 3

US GENERAL PURPOSE FORCE LEVELS IN EUROPE

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy &amp; Marine</th>
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<th>Total</th>
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<td>43,185</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13,541</td>
<td>15,115</td>
<td>13,928</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greenland</td>
<td>5,683</td>
<td>6,441</td>
<td>7,289</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3,978</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Ireland</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>8,239</td>
<td>11,673</td>
<td>5,068</td>
<td>7,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>1,382</td>
<td>1,948</td>
<td>2,970</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>839</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afloat</td>
<td>16,927</td>
<td>9,967</td>
<td>28,295</td>
<td>21,047</td>
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Total: 398,110 405,403 419,466 408,994

Table 5

DEPLOYMENT OF US GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
IN EUROPEAN Nato COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>1957</th>
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<th>1960</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>250,339</td>
<td>234,903</td>
<td>239,861</td>
<td>236,688</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>55,277</td>
<td>51,534</td>
<td>45,936</td>
<td>41,336</td>
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<td>7,556</td>
<td>5,844</td>
<td>6,360</td>
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<td>5,253</td>
<td>4,956</td>
<td>6,245</td>
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<td>10,230</td>
<td>9,164</td>
<td>9,164</td>
<td>9,966</td>
</tr>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4,210</td>
<td>6,528</td>
<td>6,528</td>
<td>7,219</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>1,608</td>
<td>1,628</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>472</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>502</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>272</td>
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<td>261</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afloat</td>
<td>14,172</td>
<td>30,416</td>
<td>27,463</td>
<td>23,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>393,880</td>
<td>382,108</td>
<td>376,314</td>
<td>364,433</td>
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</table>

support forces stationed in Germany, France and Britain. In fact some of the reductions could be attributed to the termination of "the occupation regime" in Austria and Germany in 1955. Most of the occupation forces were administrative or support forces. In Austria alone, the occupation forces withdrawn amounted to about 15,000 troops. Further, the table reveals that the components of the US military presence in Europe did not essentially change under the "New Look" policy. The army still had the biggest contingent in Europe, followed by the Air Force and the Navy. And together they represented a continuance of the "balanced collective force" principle of NATO established during the Truman Administration.

Tables 4 and 5 establish the fact that the deployment of US forces among NATO countries did not change significantly under the "New Look" policy. The major portion of US troops was stationed in Germany, followed by France and Britain, as was the case during the Truman Administration. In Azores, Greece and Turkey US troops were not only maintained but consistently increased. All these indicates that the Eisenhower Administration continued the "forward defence" policy of the Truman Administration.

The status quo in the United States general purpose forces presence in Europe during the Eisenhower Administration indicates that despite the enunciation of the strategy of "massive retaliation", the Administration, so far as Europe was concerned, had probably no intention to turn a local conflict in the area automatically into a general all-out war. In fact, in the European
context, the massive retaliation strategy was one that might have relevance only in a situation of direst extremity. The Administration was undoubtedly aware of the point that the strategy lacked credibility after the loss of atomic monopoly. Still it advocated massive retaliation as the global strategy. There could be four possible reasons for its posture. Firstly, the Administration probably believed that it was politically useful to unveil a strategy that could be depicted as different from and more effective than that of the Truman Administration. Secondly, Dulles and his associates believed that it would breed confidence not only at home but also among the Allies. Thirdly, it is possible that the Administration also believed that the public announcement and reiteration of the "massive retaliation" strategy would be a demonstration of American "will", and deter a pre-emptive Soviet attack, thereby providing some protection to the growing NATO conventional force build-up. Fourthly, it could be that certain officials were so impressed with the "assured destruction" capabilities of the nuclear arsenal that they favoured advocacy of the "massive retaliation" strategy in spite of its shortcomings.

In the European context, however, as mentioned earlier, the Administration's military posture was not primarily based on "massive retaliation" strategy. Had it been so, it would have logically led to a reduction of the United States non-nuclear military presence in Europe. The defence of Europe would have been predicated on an extensive deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and units of
the Strategic Air Command, supported by only the minimum requisite US ground troops. The very fact that the equivalent of six divisions committed to Europe was retained even after the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, does suggest that the defence of Europe was primarily based on conventional defence initially. It is possible to infer that the Administration reserved the "massive retaliation" strategy as the ultimate option in Europe, and not as the only response to any conflict in Europe.

It might be relevant here to refer briefly to a criticism that was made of the Eisenhower Administration's global military posture and strategy. Some critics asserted that the Administration was preoccupied with the threat of a Soviet "surprise attack" or with a massive Soviet attack, and that it refused to take seriously other possible types of Soviet aggression. The "massive retaliation" strategy, critics claimed, was an effective deterrent to a general, "all-out" war but not to situations short of a general war or limited war. The critics missed the point that despite the rhetoric "massive retaliation" was not regarded as the only response to any Soviet military move. The presence of six US divisions in Europe, the stationing of US

46 "General war" is defined by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff as: "armed conflict between the major power of the Communist and free worlds in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy." Limited war is defined by the JCS as "armed conflict short of general war, exclusively of incidents, involving the overt engagement of the military forces of two or more nations." For details see, Department of Defence, Joint Chiefs of Staff, A Dictionary of United States Military Terms, prepared for Joint Usage of the Services (Washington, D.C., 1963), pp. 101, 127.
troops in Germany so as to have a forward defence capability, the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe, suggest that the importance of having an appropriate "mix" to meet situations ranging from border skirmishes to local conflicts and limited war was recognized and provided for. The integration of the limited war capability into the massive retaliation strategy was not publicly acknowledged. Frequent iteration of the massive retaliation concept probably had some negative impact on the clear evolution, or at least dissemination, of policy guidelines for achieving positive goals. One possible reason for the failure (or reluctance) of the administration to provide such policy guidelines was, as Kissinger put it, its preoccupation with the problem of a Soviet surprise attack or a massive attack.

The status quo in the US general purpose forces presence in Europe indicates that the administration's policy was based on defending Western European soil rather than coming in and engaging in liberating areas after a conflict had been in progress. The policy required a substantial US force stationed in Europe rather than mobilization and reinforcement from the United States. Hence, the administration took interest not only in maintaining its own commitment but also encouraging the conventional build-up of the alliance. Its anxiety to obtain the ratification of the European Defence Community Treaty of 1952 (EDC) and Paris Agreements of 1954—both had a framework for a

conventional force build-up of Allies, especially West German participation in the defence of Western Europe--are examples which indicate the Administration's interest in the build-up of non-nuclear forces in Europe. Moreover, in order to speed up the ratification of the EDC treaty, President Eisenhower gave the following pledge to the signatories on 16 April 1954:

The United States will continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area while a threat to that area exists, and will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defense of this area. (48)

In addition to the promise to keep an "appropriate" level of troops in Western Europe, and to treat an attack on any partner as an attack on the United States, Eisenhower offered to consult with the North Atlantic Allies and EDC partners on the level of respective armed forces in the defence community. He also told the six signatories of the EDC that the US regarded the obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty as "of indefinite duration rather than for any definite number of years."

Eisenhower said in his statement that the "essential elements" of the US position had been discussed with leaders of both political parties, but a number of key men at the Capitol Hill said that they were not consulted. Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Alexander Wiley (Republican, Wisconsin), termed the pledges as largely a restatement of what had been said earlier. But he said that he had no advance knowledge that

the note would be sent. Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Leverett Saltonstall made a similar comment. He said in a TV interview: "When I saw what the President had said, I wondered if it would not be wise to consult Congress...."

Ranking minority member of the Senate Armed Services Committee Richard B. Russell told reporters that he too was not informed of the pledge to keep troops in Europe indefinitely. Senator Like Mansfield, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, while acknowledging that proposal had a great deal of merit, said: "I am disappointed that the Chairman and ranking minority members of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee were not informed. A State Department official, however, denied the allegations. He said that the President discussed the declaration with GOP Congressional leaders at the White House on 8 March, and that leaders of both political parties were subsequently informed.

Except for the allegation that the Congress was not properly consulted in respect of the Presidential pledge, an overwhelming majority of Senators supported the continued maintenance of US troops in Western Europe at the then existing level. In February 1955, a bi-partisan group of thirty Senators and Congressman urged the President to work towards a tighter Atlantic Union. They introduced a joint resolution in both houses of Congress exhorting the President to explore the extent

50 Ibid.
to which NATO countries could be further united "in defence, economic, and political Union." Senator Estes Kefauver (Democrat, Tennessee), the principal spokesman of the group, emphasized that the "threat" to Western Europe had increased. He asserted that the resignation of Georgi M. Malenkov as Soviet Premier and his replacement by Marshall Nikolai A. Bulganin was "a warning flag that shows that the danger of war is nearing, not receding." Such changes in the Soviet Government added "greater urgency...long and growing need to unite the Atlantic community effectively..." taking advantage of the favourable mood in Congress, Eisenhower reiterated his pledge in letters addressed to signatories of the Paris agreements on 10 March 1955. (The agreements provided, inter alia, for membership of the Federal Republic


From 28 September to 3 October 1954, a Conference was held in London to normalize relations between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the Western nations. A further meeting was held in Paris from 20 October to 22 October 1954, and a series of agreements were signed the following day. These documents have come to be known collectively as the Paris Agreements. Generally speaking, the documents served to normalize relations between FRG and the Western nations and provided a framework for West German military participation in the defence of Europe. More specifically, the agreement among other things resolved a number of outstanding disputes between France and Germany. It terminated the occupation regime in the FRG and provided a new basis for stationing Allied forces there. The agreement offered membership to the FRG and Italy in the Western European Union (the Brussels Treaty), and regulated the production of armaments in the FRG. Membership for the FRG in NATO was also provided by the Paris Agreements. The Paris Agreements were ratified by the signatories including the United States in April 1955.
of Germany in NATO, and a new basis for the stationing of Allied troops in the FRG). Eisenhower's object was to obtain a speedy ratification of the agreement. It may be relevant to point out that though the pledges in 1954 and 1955 were made in the context of ratification, they had other implied significance also. The pledges made it clear that the United States, while seeking a conventional build-up of the Alliance, would not contemplate a withdrawal of the United States troops from Europe in the near future. The United States military presence was to continue in Europe so long as a threat to that area existed, and so long as US troops were needed as part of the NATO strategy for the defence of the area. In addition, the pledges revealed that the Administration was not subscribing to the view that the initial defence of Europe should be carried out by the European states only and that the United States' active participation would depend upon the course of events. In fact, from the pledges it could be inferred that the Administration's policy was based on a participation in the conventional defence of Europe along with other European nations from the outset in any conflict.

A few other factors, particularly the crises in Europe, West Asia and East Asia probably also influenced the Administration to maintain the status quo in the United States general purpose forces presence in Europe. In 1956, there occurred the

Hungarian uprising and the intervention of Soviet troops in that country. The crisis erupted after certain other developments, though it was not related to them—the admission of West Germany in NATO in May 1955 and the formation of Warsaw Pact Alliance in May 1955. The crisis bred fear among West Europeans, specially Germans, concerning Soviet intentions. While strongly denouncing the Soviet action and emphasizing the danger of Soviet expansionism, the Eisenhower Administration refrained from any action to intervene in Hungary. Under the circumstances, the United States chose to retain its military presence in Europe without any significant change to eradicate the fears of its Allies. Any reduction or change in the United States general purpose force levels in Europe would have possibly led to weakening the solidarity of the Alliance and to creating

54 On 23 October 1956, anti-government demonstration in Budapest forced a reshuffling of the Government. Revolutionaries demanded that the Government should denounce the Warsaw Pact as well as seek the complete liberation of the country from the Soviet troops. On 30 October, Moscow promised major concession. But later on 4 November, the Soviet troops and tanks opened a violent assault on Budapest and a new all-Communist Government subservient to the Soviet Union was set up.

55 The origin of the Warsaw Pact Alliance could be traced back to the Conference of Communist bloc leaders held in December 1954, called by the Soviet Union. The conference was a Communist response to the signing of the Paris Agreements of October 1954, which among other things ended the occupation of Germany and provided membership for West Germany in NATO. On 11 May 1955, six days after the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO, the Soviet Union organized at Warsaw, Poland, a "Conference of European Countries for the Protection of Peace and Security of Europe." On 14 May, a Pact was signed between the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and German Democratic Republic. The Pact laid the foundation of Warsaw Pact Alliance, a Communist counterpart of NATO.
doubts concerning the credibility of the US commitment to NATO. Further, the establishment of the Warsaw Pact reinforced the case against a reduction in the United States general purpose forces presence in Europe on the ground that such a course might encourage adventurism on the part of the Warsaw Pact Alliance.

The Hungarian crisis was followed by a momentous event. On 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union successfully launched into orbit a man-made satellite—the "Sputnik". The event confirmed to the Europeans and Americans the existence of a Soviet long-range missile launching capability. The United States was now faced with a vulnerability problem in greater magnitude than even before. The view began to gather ground even in military circles that the Soviet Union had achieved something equivalent to a nuclear parity with the United States. As a result, a state of mutual deterrence or intimidation would ensue. It would mean that in future a general war would be improbable while limited wars might be more likely. Some scholars like Henry A. Kissinger and Robert B. Osgood declared in 1957 that the "massive retaliation" strategy had lost its credibility with the loss of nuclear monopoly and superiority, and that a new strategy should be adopted to deal with aggressions short of a general war. It was no secret that the conventional forces


that the Soviet Union could bring to bear on Western Europe had all along been superior to what the Alliance could muster.

Under the circumstances the Eisenhower Administration appears to have decided to maintain the status quo in the US general purpose forces presence in Europe in spite of the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the region.

The events in 1958, in East and West Asia were likely to have influenced the Administration's troop levels policy in Europe. In the Quemoy and Matsu crisis and in the Lebanon crisis, the United States employed only conventional forces.

58 The Quemoy and Matsu offshore islands, geographically and historically appertaining to the Chinese mainland, were held by the Nationalist Chinese—late Chiang Kai-Shek group—when they withdrew to Taiwan. Since the Chinese Communists found the Nationalist Chinese occupation of these islands and their presence in Taiwan a constant threat to their security, they wanted to liquidate Chiang Kai-Shek regime. In September 1954 and August 1958 the Communist Chinese bombarded the Quemoy and Matsu islands. These incidents developed into crises. In 1954, however, no significant American military involvement in the defence of Quemoy occurred. But in 1958 American physical involvement in the crisis took place. In September the US Seventh Fleet began to furnish naval escort to Nationalist convoys to the beleaguered garrison of Quemoy, but halted three miles short of the objective to remain outside the Chinese territorial waters. The crisis ended in a curious kind of truce. Chiang Kai-Shek, after a visit from Dulles, announced that the Nationalist restoration of freedom in the mainland China would be carried out through propaganda and not primarily through force. Thereupon the Communist Chinese ordered a brief cease-fire on 6 October and on 25 October they announced that they would reserve the right to bombard the islands on alternate days of the month. This signaled the end of the acute phase of the Taiwan crisis and beginning of relaxation of tension.

59 In early 1958 Egypt and Syria merged to form the United Arab Republic (UAR) under Nasser's Presidency. This

(Contd. on next page)
In the Lebanon crisis, a contingent of the US force stationed in Europe landed in Lebanon. Those events served to check any tendency in the Administration favouring a reduction of the United States military presence in Europe.

It is noteworthy that while the developments described above served to reinforce the US course of maintaining its force levels, the outbreak of a "crisis" over Berlin on 27 November 1958 did not lead to any action to increase US troops in Europe.

The second Berlin crisis, which resulted from the Soviet victory of Arab nationalism was a threat to the other Arab states. On 9 May 1958, an armed rebellion with the support of UAR broke out in Lebanon. While Lebanon seemed on the verge of failing, a revolution suddenly (14 July 1958) erupted in Iraq. The King, the Crown Prince, and the Premier were assassinated. The government of Lebanon and Jordan, fearing it was their turn next, appealed for military protection to the United States and Britain. The appeals met prompt response. On 15 July, the United States move the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean and landed 14,000 Marines and air-borne troops in Lebanon. The British also dispatched 3,000 paratroopers to Jordan. The American and British troops were withdrawn in October and November, with the arrangements for the United Nation "presence" in Lebanon and Jordan were made.


61 The second Berlin crisis was precipitated on 27 November 1958. The Soviet Government in notes addressed to the American, British, French and West German governments, informed its intention of terminating what it described as the "occupation regime" in Berlin. The Soviets insisted that six months was a sufficient period of time in which to accomplish this goal. Failure to comply would result in the Soviet transfer of all of its responsibilities in Berlin and East Germany to the Ulbricht regime. The Western Powers dismissed the Soviet "ultimatum" but offered to discuss the Berlin and other related

(Contd. on next page)
ultimatum to terminate the "occupation regime" in Berlin continued till the last days of the Eisenhower Administration. Apparently, the Administration was confident that the situation was unlikely to erupt into military conflict. No reinforcements or any airlift similar to that in the first Berlin crisis of 1948 were announced. In a special National Security Council meeting held on 5 March 1959, the President even rejected the proposal for a general or partial mobilization for constant readiness against a surprise Soviet attack. Later, in a news conference on 11 March, the President said: "What good would it do to send a few more thousands or indeed, a few divisions of troops to Europe." To attempt to fight the overwhelming Soviet forces on the ground, the President warned, would be "miscalculation" and an "error". "We are certainly not going to fight a ground war in Europe," the President affirmed.

Not only did the Administration rule out a general or partial mobilization, and reinforcements to Europe, it also

problems in a conference at the foreign ministers' level. The conference was convened at Geneva and with the exception of two weeks, met continuously from 11 May to 5 August 1959. No substantive political agreements were forthcoming from these discussions. Ultimately, the negotiations at Geneva, the visit of Vice-President Nixon to Russia in July 1959, Premier Khruschev's tour of America in September 1959, and the agreement among the Four Powers to meet at the Summit in the summer of 1960, all contributed to a relaxation of tension. However, this relaxation quickly disintegrated with the occurrence of U-2 incident in May 1960. Thus the German problem remained on dead center—that is precisely where it had been at the outset of the second Berlin crisis in November 1958.

announced its decision to implement its scheduled plans to make some reductions in overall American military manpower that had been suspended during the Quemoy crisis. Secretary of Defence Neil H. McElroy justified the decision at a news conference on 6 March by pointing out that the Berlin crisis was different from the Taiwan and Lebanon crises. The Far East situation, McElroy stated, involved "limited war" and American moves at that time were aimed at preventing its spread. But if fighting developed over Berlin, he went on, "I don't quite see how you would avoid involving Russian forces" and, therefore, "it would be very difficult to keep it a limited war." The military crisis that developed in Berlin, McElroy argued, probably would not be solved by additional troops. Unlike the Lebanon and Taiwan crises, the one in Berlin would not force a delay in scheduled military manpower reduction, the Defence Secretary said.

The President also defended the Administration's decision to go ahead with its existing reduction plans in the two meetings he had on 6 March with the Congressional political leaders of both parties and the Chairmen and ranking members of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives. At the same meeting, after Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), had given a report on Berlin, Congressman Carl Vinson (Democrat, Georgia), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, asked whether "it not inconsistent to go forward with the Administration's cuts in the manpower of the armed forces in the light of

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64 Washington Post-Times Herald, 6 March 1959.
the disturbing report just given to the group by Dulles?" The President replied that it was not. While the Berlin crisis was serious, the United States had enough atomic and conventional forces to deal with it, Eisenhower asserted. He also told the Congressional leaders that he needed no additional money for missiles or conventional warfare forces to deal with the Berlin crisis.

The decision taken during the Berlin crisis to go ahead with the scheduled reduction, did not, as mentioned earlier, affect the United States posture in Europe. The equivalent of six divisions stationed in Europe was maintained. The obvious conclusion could be that the Administration was in favour of neither increasing nor decreasing the US divisions stationed in Europe. It believed that additional troops would not solve the Berlin crisis and it relied on its overall deterrence capability. Perhaps it also believed that proceeding with a minor scheduled decrease in overall military manpower would be a signal to the Soviet Union that it had no interest in escalating the Berlin crisis. The Administration too was apparently not fearful that the dispute over Berlin would be escalated by the Soviet Union. There was no disposition on its part to escalate unilaterally in view of the danger of nuclear war. The "balance of terror" pointed to negotiations as the key to a solution of the crisis. That the Administration was in favour of solving the Berlin crisis through diplomacy rather than through military confrontation is brought about by subsequent developments—its active
participation in the Foreign Ministers' conference (May and August 1959), exchange of visits by Premier Nikita Khrushchev and Vice-President Richard M. Nixon to the United States and the Soviet Union (in 1959) respectively, and mutual interest in Summit level meetings. Any increase in the US military presence in Europe under the circumstances might have had adverse effects on the prospects of negotiation efforts. The Administration came to regard the maintenance of the status quo in the US general purpose forces in Europe as the most suitable posture for its diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis.

In his book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, published in 1957, Henry A. Kissinger pointed out that the United States believed that the purpose of diplomacy was to make peace, while the purpose of war was to achieve victory. "Neither could reinforce the other, and each began where the other left off." Such insistence on divorcing force from diplomacy caused American power to lack purpose and American negotiations to lack force, he asserted. The question arises whether the Eisenhower Administration's course of not increasing the US general purpose forces in Europe and engaging in diplomatic moves warranted criticism under the Kissinger dictum. The present writer is of the view that the Administration did attempt a blending of force and diplomacy to achieve its objective. It believed that maintaining the status quo in the US general purpose forces in Europe and avoiding troop reductions in the region would be

66 Kissinger, n. 47, pp. 40, 51.
enough to provide the force and purpose for its diplomacy.

The "New Look" policy propounded by the Eisenhower Administration had hardly any effect on the US troop levels policy in Europe. The introduction of nuclear weapons in Europe did not reduce the total of six divisions stationed in Europe. The Administration's assertion that the "New Look" policy with its emphasis on nuclear weapons, would reduce manpower requirements and the defence budget did not encounter serious challenge. It was the conclusion of the Korean war that provided the Administration an opportunity to reduce the US Armed Forces and also reduce the defence budget. Most of the reductions in the US Armed Forces during the Eisenhower Administration were from the Korean war build-up. The Administration could claim these reductions to be the result of its "New Look" policy. In reality, the claim was only partly true. Side by side with these reductions the Administration was able to expand a nuclear weapon programme without seriously impinging on its non-nuclear military presence in Europe. Further, the "New Look" policy gave the Administration an opportunity to introduce tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, thus going beyond what had been attempted during the Truman Administration. These developments enhanced the capability of the US forces stationed in Europe to handle the Soviet threat than had been the case earlier. The moves that the Administration made received broad support in Congress and occasioned no sharp controversy. They were military matters and the President was a military hero whose judgment commanded respect in Congress. Powerful leaders of the opposition party
like Majority Leader Johnson and Armed Services Committee Chairman Russell showed a willingness to co-operate with the Administration. The issue of maintaining the status quo in US troop levels in Western Europe commanded broad bi-partisan support in Congress, and was also not a matter of controversy among the public or major interest groups.

**Kennedy's Decision to Dispatch Reinforcements**

In the elections of 1960 the Republican candidate, Vice-President Richard M. Nixon, was defeated by the Democratic challenger, Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts. In January 1961, before the new President took office, Eisenhower submitted to Congress the budget request for fiscal year 1962. In his message Eisenhower stated that there would be "revised military plans for NATO" forthcoming and that "some change in U.S. force deployment may become advisable in light of continuing studies of overall U.S. programs." Eisenhower's hint that there might be a reduction in the US forces deployed in Europe was not confirmed by President Kennedy in his State of the Union message on 30 January 1961. On 2 February 1961, the first sign of the Kennedy Administration's rejection of Eisenhower's suggestion was recorded. The new Secretary of Defence, Robert S. McNamara, indicated the Administration's concern over NATO's conventional

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strength and ruled out the Eisenhower's suggestion that American forces in Europe might be reduced. He affirmed that neither re-deployments nor cuts in the overseas forces were being contemplated.

A week later, on 8 February, President Kennedy made a statement in his third Press Conference, which dispelled any idea of a reduction in the ground force stationed in Europe. He said: "This is our central and most important defensive alliance, but in the largest sense it is much more. We, for our part, mean to go on as full and energetic partners in NATO, and in particular we wish to maintain our military strength in Europe."

Kennedy also announced that America's NATO team would be strengthened by the creation of an advisory group headed by the former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. Acheson would work with the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and Thomas K. Finletter, the Permanent United States Representative to NATO, to determine the nation's future course in the Alliance, the President added.

Again on 15 February, Kennedy pledged that the United States would maintain its full military commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and work to strengthen Atlantic co-operation in the economic, ideological and political spheres. This pledge was part of a special message to the Permanent Council of NATO.

68 News Conference, the Secretary of Defence, Robert S. McNamara, 2 February 1961, at the Pentagon, Text.
Thus, within a month after assuming office, the Kennedy Administration made clear its unwillingness to initiate any troop reductions, and thus by implication endorsed the maintenance of the status quo, while not foreclosing the option to bring about an increase if it so desired. As directed by the President, McNamara constituted a Strategic War Committee under Charles J. Hitch, Assistant Secretary of Defence (Comptroller) to undertake a review of national military policy. The Administration apparently wanted to find out quickly what changes might need to be worked into the first defence budget request. It was also interested, as is every new Administration, in enunciating its own "new" strategic war philosophy to be presented to the public with fanfare along with the promise that the strategy would be translated later into a specific Administration policy that would give the country greater security than the Republicans had provided!

While the Strategic War Committee was engaged in its review, Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent to the Pentagon a tentative proposal on national military policy. The Washington Star reported that Rusk's memorandum to McNamara had stressed that even a "massive" attack on Europe should be met with "conventional", non-nuclear weapons, unless the enemy started to use nuclear weapons. Lincoln White, the State Department Press Officer, denied that Rusk had made any such suggestion. White stated that the tenor of the Rusk memorandum was an emphasis on strengthening the conventional forces of NATO.

By the beginning of March 1961, the Pentagon's preliminary review of the national military policy was completed. On March 1, the President stated in a news conference that he had under consideration recommendations from McNamara for increasing the conventional war forces. Perhaps most of the recommendations were accepted by the President before the message to the Congress on the budget on 28 March 1961. On US military posture the President said:

The primary purpose of our arms is peace, not war—to make certain that they will never have to be used—to deter all wars...—to provide backing for diplomatic settlement of disputes—to insure the adequacy of our bargaining power for an end to the arms race. (72)

After describing the military mission of the United States Armed Forces, the President emphasized the need to bolster the conventional forces and made the following recommendations:

A. Strengthen capacity to meet limited and guerrilla warfare: Limited military adventures and threats to the security of the free world that are not large enough to justify the label of "limited war".

B. Expanded research on nonnuclear weapons: ...what is needed are entirely new types of nonnuclear weapons and equipment—with increased firepower, mobility, and communication, and more suited to the kind of tasks our limited war forces will most likely be required to perform. (73)

During April 1961, McNamara appeared before the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of both houses and in each


instance he amplified the President's recommendation with the following policy statement:

There has been a tendency since the end of the Korean war to emphasize the nuclear capabilities of forces. These capabilities are, of course, essential to our overall national strategy, since all of our forces have a role in general nuclear war. Even in limited war situations, we should not preclude the use of tactical nuclear weapons, for no one can foresee how such situations might develop. But the decision to employ tactical nuclear weapons should not be forced upon us simply because we have no other means to cope with them. There are many possible situations in which it would not be advisable or feasible to use such weapons. What is being proposed at this time is not a reversal of existing national policy but an increase in nonnuclear capabilities to provide a greater degree of versatility to our limited war forces. (74)

The new Administration wanted that its NATO allies should follow a parallel course and bring about an improvement of NATO forces both in quality and quantity. On 10 April Kennedy informed the NATO Military Committee that "...there should be a reinforcement of the capabilities of NATO in conventional weapons. NATO needs to be able to respond to any conventional attack with conventional resistance which will be effective at least long enough, General Norstad's phrase, to force a pause." The Administration shared the opinion of General Lauris Norstad that the strengthened NATO conventional forces would slow down any Soviet attack and allow a "pause", during which time both sides could consider whether or not to resort to nuclear weapons.

74 Testimony of Robert S. McNamara, the Secretary of Defence, US Senate, Congress 87, session 1, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Military Procurement Authorization, Fiscal Year 1962 (Washington, D.C., 1961), p. 17 [Italics added].

In an address to the Canadian Parliament the following month, the President reaffirmed the American troop commitment to Western Europe. He pointed out that the Alliance had been originally devised "to meet the threat of a massive conventional attack, in a period of Western nuclear monopoly." He went on to say:

Now, if we are to meet the defense requirement of the 1960's the NATO countries must push forward simultaneously along two lines:

First, we must strengthen the conventional capability of our Alliance as a matter of the highest priority.

To this end, we in the United States are taking steps to increase the strength and mobility of our forces and to modernize their equipment. To the same end, we will maintain our forces now on the European Continent and will increase their conventional capabilities. We look to our NATO Allies to assign an equally high priority to this same essential task.

Second, we must make certain that nuclear weapons will continue to be available for the defense of the entire Treaty area, and that these weapons are at all times under close and flexible political control that meet the needs of all the NATO countries. We are prepared to join our Allies in working out suitable arrangements for this purpose. (76)

At the time when the Kennedy Administration was emphasizing an increased conventional build-up of NATO, a deterioration in the United States-Soviet Union relations over the status of Berlin again developed. At a "summit meeting" in Vienna on 3 and 4 June, Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev held discussions. Khrushchev presented Kennedy with an aide memoire which demanded, among other things, an end to the occupation of West Berlin. The demands were not acceptable to the United States and the

Vienna meeting ended in the words of Kennedy, with "no spectacular success...either achieved or pretended."

Following the Vienna meeting, a series of steps was taken to increase American military capability. On 26 July Kennedy announced partial mobilization. The President asked and received from the Congress additional appropriations to increase the combat-ready divisions of the Army and Marine Corps, to expand the American airlift capacity, and to set up the development and procurement of advanced conventional weapons. On 13 August the Berlin crisis worsened and the Berlin wall began to go up. This action had the political implication of confirming the division of Berlin and the isolation of West Berlin, and denying the principle of four-power control in the eastern sector of the city.

Kennedy took two major steps to give assurance of American support in the crisis. On 18 August, he announced that Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson would visit Berlin. The move was described as a "show-the-flag" gesture. Later on the same day, Kennedy ordered the dispatch of reinforcements for the 5,000 men of the United States garrison in West Berlin. By January 1962, when the Berlin crisis ended, the US reinforcements to Europe crossed 50,000 military personnel. United States troop levels in Europe reached the record strength of 434,000.


The Flexible Response Strategy

Had the Kennedy Administration initiated any basic shift in US policy regarding placement of troops in Europe? Or was it mainly beating the drums for its own "new" strategy, even as the Eisenhower Administration had done with the so-called "New Look"? In examining these questions, it is relevant to describe briefly the new strategy that the Kennedy Administration claimed to have adopted. Following the launching of the Soviet "Sputnik" debate on American strategic doctrine in the nuclear age became more intense. The Eisenhower Administration's "massive retaliation" strategy was questioned by many among the community of "defence intellectuals". Scholars like Henry A. Kissinger and Robert E. Osgood, RAND Corporation analysts like Albert Wohlstetter and Bernard Brodie, and some retired military men like former Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor, were among those who participated in the public debate. Many of them argued that American strategic nuclear superiority on which the "massive retaliation" strategy was based, had lost its credibility, with the existence of the Soviet nuclear capability and the prospects of its growth. The new Soviet nuclear capability,

Kissinger indicated, could not be restrained by superior American weapons in greater number. A deterrent force, Wohlstetter pointed out, existed only if there was a capability for inflicting reprisals. He wrote: "To deter an attack means being able to strike back in spite of it. It means, in other words, a capability to strike second."

Brodie seemed to share the view of Wohlstetter that the credibility of deterrence depended on a strong retaliatory force. But he wanted the retaliatory forces to be organized under three strategies. They were: Counter-force strategy or attacking the enemy's strategic retaliatory forces; Counter-economy strategy or striking at the enemy's industrial economy; and Counter-cities (population) strategy or hitting at the enemy's cities. Brodie was not in favour of exclusively developing any single strategy. He believed that all three strategies should be part of the US strategic planning.

Osgood emphasized that it would be inadvisable for the United States simply to work out its military policies to deal with major aggression that would culminate in total war. Such an approach, he believed, rested on the premise that lesser aggression could be met in a makeshift fashion with whatever could be spared from the "total-war arsenal". Osgood's view was similar to those of Kissinger and Taylor. They pointed out that the "massive retaliation" strategy was an effective deterrent to general war but not to the situations short of a general war.

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They recommended that the United States should develop military capabilities to deal with the situations short of a general war. General Taylor wrote:

The strategic doctrine which I would propose to replace Massive Retaliation is called herein the strategy of flexible response. This name suggests the need for a capability to react across the entire spectrum of possible challenge, for coping with anything from general Atomic war to infiltration and aggression such as threatened Laos and Berlin in 1959. The new strategy would recognize that it is just as necessary to deter or win quickly a limited war as to deter general war. Otherwise the limited war which we cannot win quickly may result in our piecemeal attrition or involvement in an expanding conflict which may grow into the general war we all want to avoid. (81)

Kennedy, who held Taylor in high esteem, was ready to jettison the "massive retaliation" rhetoric of the previous Administration and proclaim the adoption of a new strategy embodying Taylor's concept of flexible response. In his State of the Union Message in January 1962, the President said that America's military strength might be tested at many levels by its adversary. "We intend to have at all times the capacity to resist non-nuclear or limited attack—as a complement to our nuclear capacity not as substitute. We have rejected any all-or-nothing posture which would leave no choice but inglorious 82 retreat or unlimited retaliation." What the President implied, was that he intended to have a choice of alternatives when faced with a crisis. General Taylor who was advisor to the President was named as the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1962.

The "flexible response" strategy as developed and advocated during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations had various elements or components. The strategy provided a wide range of alternatives even for the contingency of general nuclear war. McNamara explained in some detail the strategy of nuclear options in an address to the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation in Chicago on 17 February 1962:

...our forces can be used in several different ways. We may have to retaliate with a single massive attack. Or, we may be able to use our retaliatory forces to limit damage done to ourselves, and our allies, by knocking out the enemy’s bases before he has had time to launch his second salvos. We may seek to terminate a war on favourable terms by using our forces as a bargaining weapon--by threatening further attack.

In any case, our large reserve of protected firepower would give an enemy an incentive to avoid our cities and to stop a war. Our new policy gives us the flexibility to choose among several operational plans, but does not require that we make any advance commitment with respect to doctrine or targets. We shall be committed only to a system that gives us the ability to use our forces in a controlled and deliberate way, so as best to pursue the interest of the United States, our Allies, and the rest of the Free World.

In the light of all the measures undertaken to improve our strategic striking forces--with respect to their survivability, strength and control--it is clear that we have upgraded rather than downgraded our thermonuclear power. (83)

The second important component of the "flexible response" strategy was the doctrine of the conventional option. The doctrine called for an increase in the conventional forces of the Allies. The basic philosophy behind the non-nuclear build-up was enunciated by Alain C. Enthoven, Deputy Assistant Secretary

of Defence for Systems Analysis, in a speech before the Loyola University Forum for National Affairs, in Los Angeles, on 10 February 1963. He stated that a nation or an Alliance which maintained a strong nuclear posture combined with a weak conventional force was placing itself at a great disadvantage in a confrontation with another power that had both a strong nuclear force and a strong conventional force. Because nuclear war was so destructive and had to be reserved for vital issues, the side with a strong conventional force was likely to have its way on all issues less than vital. It would use "salami slice" tactics, or make its aggression piecemeal in the confidence that it would be able to have its way. In order to resist such aggressions, Enthoven asserted, the President must be provided with a strong conventional force option. A strong conventional option would deter such aggressions, and if deterrence failed, it would give an opportunity to arrest such aggressions.

Enthoven pointed out that a strong conventional force was indispensable to deal with many situations in which the threatened use of nuclear weapons would be ineffective and inappropriate. He said:

As the destructiveness of nuclear war increases, and as nuclear weapon systems become less vulnerable to sudden attack, the effectiveness of the threatened use of nuclear weapons as a substitute for conventional forces will diminish, and we will have no sensible alternative to building up our conventional forces to the point at which they can safely resist all forms of non-nuclear aggression. Our forces will be adequate if we can never be forced because of weakness to be the first to have to resort to nuclear weapons. (84)

84 Address by Alain C. Enthoven, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), before the Loyola University
Enthoven also put forward a "fire-break" concept to justify the non-nuclear build-up. He said: "The day will come, if it has not come already, when there will be nuclear weapons of smaller yield than the largest high explosive weapons. When that day comes, will there no longer be a distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons? Some have argued to that effect. But they are mistaken." An important distinction, a "fire-break", Enthoven indicated, existed between nuclear and non-nuclear war. If that "fire-break" was not recognized and nuclear weapons were used against a conventional aggression, then there would be no recognizable limitation on nuclear weapons "all the way up the destructive spectrum to large scale thermonuclear war." These circumstances, Enthoven emphasized, pointed to the importance of a conventional force build-up to deal with conventional aggression.

Another element of the "flexible response" strategy was the tactical nuclear option. During the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, an attempt was made to redefine its role. Earlier, it was to be employed in case of all-out conventional force attack by the Soviet Union in Europe or in case of any Soviet aggression which threatened the possibility of Europe being overrun. But McNamara and his associates were not in favour of using tactical nuclear weapons in the event of Soviet conventional attack. McNamara repeatedly pointed out that

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"tactical nuclear weapons involve a grave risk of escalation and should not be considered a substitute for conventional defense." During the defence appropriations hearings in February 1963, McNamara pointed out: "The principal reason for having strong tactical nuclear forces is to cover the intermediate range between conventional war and global war." In another place, he suggested that small nuclear weapons to close a pass or low up a bridge would "not necessarily" escalate to a higher threshold. The ambiguity in these statements was perhaps calculated. McNamara suggests that under certain contingencies tactical nuclear weapons could be used but to employ them in certain other situations might bring on a general nuclear war.

On 23 February 1966, McNamara stated: "A theater nuclear capability is to deter Soviet use of tactical nuclear weapons in an attack on Western Europe, to permit us to respond in kind if such weapons are used, and to support U.S. and allied forces as may otherwise be required." Except for the last part of the statement, it is clear that the tactical nuclear weapons would be used only in retaliation. But at the same time there were also clear statements made in favour of using the tactical


87 Ibid.
nuclear weapons in case of a massive Soviet conventional attack. Hence, it is difficult to state precisely that the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations had assigned a role for the tactical nuclear weapons in a nuclear war only. However, it could be stated that both the Administrations wanted the tactical nuclear weapons option to be one of the options in a nuclear war, without ruling out totally the possibility of their employment in a conventional warfare also.

A counter-insurgency capability was also one of the elements of the "flexible response" strategy. But this had relevance only to "wars of national liberation" in the developing nations, and not to the European situation. While the Kennedy Administration announced its determination to develop capabilities to deal with the unconventional or guerrilla warfare, it had also decided not to draw on troops reserved for other contingencies to deal with the problem.

Thus, the various components or elements of the "flexible response" strategy provided the President with a wide range of options in situations of warfare—"some thing for every occasion." It was not as though the options were not available to the Eisenhower Administration or were wholly unperceived by it. But getting away from the rhetoric of massive retaliation was in itself an advance. The Kennedy Administration claimed that the

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flexible response strategy meant that the armed forces of the United States were to be trained to acquire a flexible, balanced defence posture, to give them the capabilities to deal with varying kinds of conflicts, from counter-insurgency and anti-guerrilla warfare through large scale conventional (non-nuclear) warfare, through major thermonuclear war. Enthoven claimed that it would make it possible for the United States in all cases "to make the punishment fit the crime."

Conventional Force Build-up Solicited

While the United States wanted its European Allies to endorse the "flexible response" strategy, it was opposed to the national forces of European countries developing all the elements or options of the "flexible response" strategy. It wanted the European Allies to complement some of the options of the "flexible response" strategy. The United States was specially opposed to the growth of national nuclear forces of European countries. Kennedy described the French force de frappe (French national nuclear force or strategic force) as imimical to NATO. McNamara's criticism was also equally blunt. He said in an address delivered at the commencement exercises of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, on 16 June 1962:

In particular, relatively weak national nuclear forces with enemy cities as their targets are not like to be sufficient to perform even the function of deterrence. If they are small,

89 Enthoven, n. 84, p. 3.
90 Kissinger, n. 86, p. 366.
and perhaps vulnerably on the ground or in the air, or inaccurate, a major antagonist can take a variety of measures to counter them. Indeed, if a major antagonist came to believe there was a substantial likelihood of it being used independently, this force would be inviting a pre-emptive first strike against it....

In short, then, limited nuclear capabilities, operating independently are dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent. (91)

Similar hostility was shown to the view that the availability of tactical nuclear weapons made unnecessary increases in conventional strength. The Administration believed that it might not be possible to limit the employment of tactical nuclear weapons to a geographically confined area. McNamara repeatedly pointed out that using of tactical nuclear weapons would involve a serious risk of escalation to a general nuclear war and that it should not be substituted for a conventional defence.

Since the United States considered the European national nuclear forces irrelevant and tactical nuclear weapons over-valued, the argument followed that the European contribution to NATO should be in the field of conventional defence. The Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs, Paul H. Nitze, presented a strong case for the build-up non-nuclear forces by the Allies in an address to Amerika-Gesellschaft,

92 In fact, McNamara stated in February 1966 that: "It is not yet clear how theater nuclear war could actually be executed without incurring a very serious risk of escalating to general nuclear war." Quoted in Amme, n. 86, p. 61.
at Hamburg, West Germany, on 11 April 1962. Rejecting the argument sometimes put forth in Western Europe that any clash in arms would inevitably and immediately escalate to a general nuclear war and that the build-up of NATO's non-nuclear forces was "defeatist, divisive," and undermined the credibility of Western Allies nuclear deterrent, Nitze said: "I believe that the non-nuclear buildup materially enhances the credibility of our deterrent. Furthermore, in its own right it gives us the means directly to counter and thus to deter, certain important options which otherwise would be available to Communists." He also emphasized that the non-nuclear build-up was a prorquisito for a true "forward strategy" for the defence of Europe.

A more convincing and forthright argument for a conventional build-up was put forward by McNamara in his Ann Arbor address. He pointed out that although the Soviet Union had superiority in non-nuclear forces in Europe, it was by "no means overwhelming". Collectively, the Western Alliance had the potentials for a successful defence against the Soviet forces. In manpower alone, NATO had more men under arms than the Soviet Union and its European satellites. Moreover, "in order to defend the population of the NATO countries and to meet our treaty obligations, we have put in hand a series of measures to strengthen our non-nuclear power," McNamara said.


94 McNamara, n. 91, p. 13.
After stating the various measures the United States had taken to strengthen its own non-nuclear forces, McNamara insisted that Western Allies should also undertake to strengthen further their non-nuclear forces and improve the quality and staying power of those forces. He assured the Allies that, "with improvements in alliance ground forces strength and staying power, improved non-nuclear air capabilities, and better equipped and trained reserve forces, we can be assured that no deficiency exists in the NATO defense of this vital region, and that no aggression, small or large, can succeed."

Around this time, other Pentagon officials also tried to argue that Soviet conventional superiority was a myth. Their primary motive in such explanation was to contend that the conventional defence of Europe was possible and to justify the non-nuclear build-up to meet the initial stage of any conventional conflict. On 2 March 1963, Assistant Secretary Nitze, in an address to the Cleveland Council of World Affairs, depicted the Soviet conventional superiority as a mirage. He said:

On the non-nuclear side, there has grown up in the west a myth of overwhelming Soviet non-nuclear superiority over the West. The spectre of Russian hordes pouring into Western Europe can lead us to paralysis. From the USSR, however, it may look as if it is NATO which has the hordes. Why? Because NATO has more men under arms and greater over-all strength than the Russians, both worldwide and in Europe. Worldwise, NATO has 5.8 million men under arms to a total for the Warsaw Pact countries of 4.3 million. NATO ground forces total 3.2 million of whom are in Europe. Active army units of the Soviet Union (not counting the satellite) total about 2 million men, which, under Western standards of ground force organization and not their own, would suffice to man between 40 to 60 divisions.

95 Ibid.
Today, in a conflict along Western Europe's central front, the Communist side could not count on having clear superiority. There are 22 understrength but probably "combat-ready" Soviet divisions in East Germany and Poland supported by about 35 satellite divisions in lesser states of readiness and of doubtful reliability under many circumstances. NATO has about 25 M-day divisions available for a Central front, with additional divisions in France which should be available in an emergency. NATO has more and better tactical aircraft and more air defense missiles, and of course superior sea power. Most of NATO's aircraft, for example, can carry twice the payload twice as far as their Soviet counterparts. In short NATO is more powerful and the Soviet less overwhelming than generally realized. (96)

Similar arguments were presented by Secretary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance, in a speech at the Southern Governors' Conference, White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, on 20 August 1963. He rejected the view that the Soviets, with an army of 2 million men, would be able to field about 150 divisions within several weeks of the time they were called up. They would not be in a position to field an effective force of that strength in less than several month's time. He pointed out that there were many practical limits to the number of divisions which could be supported from the Communist logistic base in Russia. The forces that a Communist planner could count on, Vance argued, were limited by the same constraints as limited the Allies, by the inherent capabilities of the transportation net leading into the theater, by the damage he could expect Allied interdiction to wreak on that net, and by the adequacy of his home supply base.

96 Remarks by Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze to the Cleveland Council on World Affairs, "Atlantic Partnership and the Common Defense", Sheraton-Cleveland Hotel, Cleveland, Ohio, 2 March 1963, Text.
Vance argued that the Soviet forces were circumscribed by the competing demands of other areas. Even if the combat was limited to the NATO's center, there were the Manchurian, Mongolian and Sinkiang borders to be watched, internal security had to be met, while NATO forces on the northern and southern front had to be reckoned with. All these, Vance emphasized, would strike divisions from the "available list." Vance concluded:

...the ready Soviet conventional forces which can be brought to bear against NATO are significant, but far from overwhelming, and the Soviet mobilization capability, though great, is no more capable of conjuring up first-rate armies overnight than the Free World's. NATO can, if it will, defend itself successfully, advisedly choosing the weapons and strategy to accomplish the task. (97)

The Pentagon officials conceded that it was not possible to draw the conclusion that NATO was superior to the Warsaw Pact non-nuclear forces or had even reached parity. They pointed out that NATO had many problems. It was vulnerable to a sudden attack and if a Communist build-up was unmatched by Western reinforcements, a full-scale Soviet attack could have a high probability of breaking through NATO defences. However, they affirmed that if NATO could meet its existing prescribed force goals in both quality and quantity—including a well-trained ready reserves—it forces would be adequate to put "a stout, extended, non-nuclear fight" along the frontier. "That is why...we believe...," said Adam Yarmolinsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defence, "that with significant, but not unreasonable

97 Address by Secretary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance before the Southern Governors' Conference, Greenbrier Hotel, Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, 20 August 1963, Text.
improvements in the conventional forces available to NATO, we can build a defense which will not leave us teetering in any major crisis between the tragic alternatives of appeasement or nuclear war."

State Department officials also joined the Pentagon officials in soliciting enhanced conventional force build-up by the Allies. The Under Secretary of State, George W. Ball, said in an address to the Eighth Annual NATO Parliamentarians' conference in Paris that such a build-up was "eminently feasible". In population and gross national product, Ball pointed out, the NATO countries were more than a match for the Soviet Union and its East European allies. He contended that there was no reason why the NATO countries could not increase their conventional forces.

Ball also tried to justify the need for a conventional build-up by referring to the Cuban crisis of October 1962. He stated that the United States was able to modulate and attune its response to the degree needed to accomplish its objectives, mainly due to its ability to deploy a very large variety of land, sea and air forces. Ball argued that because the United States had a clear superiority of conventional forces, it was able to avoid the dilemma of having to utilize major nuclear weapons or to retreat from its objectives. "In the same way we must increase the spectrum of our military choices on the

98 Remarks of Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Adam Yarmolinsky before the Regional Foreign Policy Conference, Boston, Massachusetts, 11 September 1963, Text.
Continent of Europe. If we do so—always preserving intact the ultimate nuclear deterrent—we increase our ability to achieve the purpose of the Alliance at the smallest risk of nuclear annihilation," Ball asserted.

The Kennedy Administration's conventional build-up policy was supported by members of Congress in overwhelming majority. Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Richard B. Russell, Senators Stuart Symington and John Stennis, members of the Armed Services Committee, were the principal spokesmen of the Administration. They defended the conventional build-up against the criticism expressed by such Republican Senators as Margaret Chase Smith of Maine and Barry Goldwater of Arizona. Some Republican Senators like Sherman Cooper of Kentucky and Jacob Javits of New York supported the conventional build-up policy. In the House too the Administration was strongly backed by Democrats led by Chairman of the Armed Services Committee Carl Vinson of Georgia and George H. Mahon of Texas, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Department of Defence Appropriations of the Committee on Appropriations. They defended the Administration's policy against the strong criticism of such Republican Congressmen like Leslie C. Arends of Illinois, Charles Gubser of California, Alvin E. O'Konski of Wisconsin, all members of the House Armed Services Committee. On the whole, the Democratic majority in

both the houses held firm and was joined by Republican supporters. It enabled the Administration to pursue its conventional build-up programme with ease. Opposition from Congress did not pose any serious threat to the Administration's course.

In general, the conventional forces of the United States increased during the Kennedy Administration. Simultaneously during the same period, US troop levels in Europe also increased and, as mentioned earlier, reached the highest mark in 1962—434,000. It would be appropriate to reiterate that the high point was reached in response to the Berlin crisis of 1961. The increase was not a direct result of conventional build-up policy advocated by the Kennedy Administration. In respect of Western Europe the conventional build-up favoured by the Kennedy Administration related to the Allies and not to the United States itself. Thus, in effect, despite all the rhetoric about "flexible response" and increased conventional capability, the Kennedy Administration showed a disposition to get along with the established 6-division US force levels, and to bring about an increase of a mere 50,000 in response to a "crisis". Like the "massive retaliation" concept of Eisenhower, the "flexible response" strategy of the Kennedy Administration was not intended by its promoters to effect any major change in the level of US troops as envisaged initially by the Truman Administration.

The Kennedy Administration's emphasis on the importance of conventional build-up by the West European Allies continued during the Johnson Administration. It reflected an attempt to project the view that the Allies could and should do more for the common defence. After assuming office, Johnson promptly assured the nation that he would support the defence policies of his predecessor. In December 1963, in his message to the North Atlantic Council, Johnson reaffirmed his country's commitment to the creation of a "balanced NATO defense posture, including powerful nuclear and nonnuclear forces, which will deter aggression and enable NATO to deal with any aggression with the force appropriate to the threat." While he pledged the continued presence of six American divisions in Western Europe "so long as they are needful," he also observed: "I am confident that our allies will also make their full contribution to this NATO defense, so that the burden and responsibilities of partnership may be equitably shared."

The State Department and the Pentagon officials continued to exert pressure on the European Allies for a conventional force build-up. Most of the arguments and facts presented during


the Kennedy Administration to justify the conventional force build-up were repeated. They sought to drive home the point that the United States had been assuming a "fair share" of the burden and that it was necessary for the Allies to do likewise.

On 27 January 1964, Secretary McNamara said in a statement before the House Armed Services Committee:

Our most recent studies support the general conclusions reached last year; namely, that: (1) The force envisioned in NATO plans for the end of 1966, fully manned, trained, equipped and properly positioned, could hold an initial Soviet attack on the central front using nonnuclear means alone;...

Although the current force goals are well within the capabilities of NATO, we are still some distance from achieving them. We believe that the present U.S. contribution of five M-day divisions and three separate regiments, plus other backup divisions, is a fair share of the total requirement, considering our responsibilities for furnishing the strategic nuclear forces for NATO and for supporting allies in other parts of the world. Accordingly, we still hold to the position that the balance of the NATO force requirements should be provided by our NATO partners. And this was the view I reiterated to the NATO Council of Ministers last December. (104)


Substantially similar views were expressed by McNamara on 2 March 1965 and later on 14 February 1966, during the hearings on Department of Defence Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1966 and Fiscal Year 1967, before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations.

The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations' emphasis on Allies conventional force build-up was not without reason. By emphasizing on conventional force build-up, both the Administrations hoped to induce the European Allies to assume an appropriate role in the NATO. However, the role envisaged was one that would not threaten the United States leadership of the Alliance. In this context it would be significant to recall a criticism of Henry A. Kissinger regarding the all-out-war strategy of the Eisenhower Administration. He pointed out that if all-out-war was the only response to an overt Soviet aggression, then there would be no role for America's Allies to play. If their existence was threatened and the United States promised to retaliate with atomic weapons, there was nothing for them to do but wait and depend on the United States. The lack of any role for the Allies, Kissinger believed, would adversely affect America's relations with them. The Kennedy and Johnson


106 Kissinger, n. 47, pp. 41-42.
Administrations appear to have taken this aspect into account, especially in the context of the strains in the Alliance on the question of the increasing interest of some partners in a national nuclear force. Both the Administrations sought to provide a role for the Allies, among other things, to discourage their interest in the national nuclear force. One US response to the problem put forth by the Kennedy Administration was the so-called Multilateral Force (MLF), a proposed allied force of 107 surface vessels with jointly owned nuclear weapons. The ships would have been manned by mixed crews of personnels from all the NATO countries. At first glance it looked like a good way to relive allied fears over exclusive US control. Later, however, in attempting to work out the detailed arrangements, it became clear that such proposals raised exceedingly complex problems regarding political sovereignty, military command and the requirement of US permission before bombs or nuclear warheads could be used. George Ball expressed the view subsequently that the responsibility for the failure of MLF should rest principally on the United States—"it was largely because... of...the tentativeness and lack of conviction of the government that had originally proposed the idea."

A Mixed Response to NATO Force Goals

The efforts of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations to encourage NATO Allies to increase their contribution to NATO conventional forces produced mixed results. Some success was attained at certain points. The 1961-1962 Berlin crisis, for example, provided a temporary impetus for building larger and more effective conventional forces. The communique of the North Atlantic Council meeting in December 1961 declared:

Ministers noted the improvements made by member countries in their force contributions, particularly in response to the aggravation of the military threat arising from the deterioration in the Berlin situation. Units have been reinforced and their state of readiness enhanced. A mobile Task Force has been established. There have been advances in cooperative programs for defense research and production, as well as in communications and infrastructure. Ministers also noted the progress made by the Council in its study for the long term problems of improving the deterrent and defensive strength of the Alliance. (110)

In 1962, the Federal Republic of Germany increased its conscription period from twelve to eighteen months. By December 1962, eleven West German divisions had been committed to NATO as a result of the handing over of three more divisions during that year. With increased tension on the Continent, almost all NATO allies increased their defence expenditures in 1962, and undertook programmes of re-equipment of their forces.

On 21 June 1966, McNamara told a Senate Subcommittee that between 1961 and 1965, the defence budgets of the NATO nations, excluding the United States, rose about thirty per cent. As a result, the military capabilities of those forces had increased.

"dramatically", he claimed. "The number of combat capable divisions in Central Europe increased about fifty per cent between 1961 and 1963 or 1964. This was brought about in part by the increase in defense budgets I just referred to," said McNamara.

By 1965, the NATO general purpose forces under the Allied Command Europe (ACE) increased significantly from what it was in 1961. In 1965 the ACE was composed of four field commands: Allied Force Northern Europe, Allied Force Central Europe, Allied Force Southern Europe and Allied Force Mediterranean. The Allied Force Northern Europe included: all Danish and Norwegian land, sea and tactical air force, one German division, and two German airwings and its Baltic Navy. The Allied Force Central Europe comprised of: two Belgian divisions, three British divisions, two Dutch divisions, two French divisions, eleven German divisions,


112 In 1961 the NATO ground forces in the ACE included: "Seven West German divisions, five American divisions, three French divisions, and three British divisions in West Germany, one Norwegian division in Norway, one Danish division in Denmark, two Dutch divisions in the Netherlands, seven Italian divisions in Italy, twelve Turkish divisions in Turkey, five Greek divisions in Greece." For details see, Baltimore Sun, 3 September 1961. The report of Baltimore Sun, was based on General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, testimony made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1961.

and equivalent of six American divisions. The Allied Force in Southern Europe consisted of: fourteen Turkish divisions, eight Greek divisions, seven Italian divisions, and tactical air force from these countries. The United States Sixth Fleet, cruising in the Mediterranean would become a Striking Force if NATO became involved in a war. The Allied Force Mediterranean included: naval fleets and maritime air force of Italy, Greece and Turkey, and the British Mediterranean Fleet.

No doubt the NATO force build-up by 1965 was more than what it was in 1960-61 or 1961-52. But still the build-up was short of the NATO force goals envisaged in the NATO Military Committee document MC-70 or MC-26/4. In the Central front, which had been given key importance, the total divisions were still short of the mid-sixties force goal of 28 combat-ready divisions envisaged in MC-96. Although West Germany had met its commitment of twelve divisions to NATO, these divisions suffered from a shortage of manpower, especially of officers and trained technical specialists. The actual strength of the West German contingent was only equivalent of eight divisions rather


than the twelve divisions on paper. Though in 1962, at the end of the Algerian war, France brought its one-and-a-half divisions NATO contribution in West Germany up to the strength of two divisions, these divisions suffered from deficiencies in combat effectiveness because of shortage in major items of equipment. The three British divisions in West Germany were also under strength for several years due to overseas emergencies as well as balance of payments problems.

While the European Allies failed to keep up their commitment to NATO force goals, the United States between 1961 and 1965, maintained its commitment of six divisions to NATO, increased the troop levels during the Berlin crisis (1961) and prepositioned equipment for two additional divisions on the continent to permit reinforcements from the United States to become combat-ready quickly in the event of emergency. The United States conventional build-up policy and the strategy of "flexible response" were the main factors responsible for the continued American conventional military commitment to NATO. Under their influence the United States policy during 1961-1965 was one of maintaining its commitment of forces in Western Europe as long as the situation demanded. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and Administration officials reiterated that policy.

from time to time. In March 1965, for instance, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said:

The armed forces we maintain in Europe are the best evidence of the importance that we have attached, and continue to attach, to close defense ties between the United States and a uniting Europe. They attest to our abiding conviction that the defense of the North Atlantic Community is indivisible. Those troops will stay in Europe as long as they are needed and wanted. (117)

American military involvement in the Vietnam war introduced a new and important factor with potential implications for US troop levels policy in Western Europe. During hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on the Department of Defence of the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on the Armed Services in 1965, Secretary McNamara was asked if he had considered taking troops out of Germany for use in Vietnam. He replied that he had considered it but found that it was not necessary to take troops out of Western Europe, with some minor exceptions. "I think the main reason for leaving our combat troops in West Germany at this time is to insure that the Soviets don't embark on some military activity there that could cause us serious pressure and concern at a time we are engaged as deeply as we are in Southeast Asia," he said. From the McNamara statement it could be inferred that the Administration was not prepared to


create a situation which would encourage a Soviet move adverse to American interests in Europe. And it was also anxious to prevent conditions which might result in fighting a war on two fronts—Southeast Asia and Europe. However, the immediate reason that would have influenced the Administration to reject the proposal for a withdrawal of troop from Europe could be due to Administration's feeling in 1966 that the Vietnam requirement could be met without reducing force levels in Europe.

Along with maintaining the commitment of six divisions to NATO, the United States also increased the combat capability and readiness of its forces in Europe. The United States provided for its forces in Europe a steady supply of the latest weapons and equipment such as SERGEANT and PERSHING missile systems, 175-mm self-propelled guns, 155-mm self-propelled howitzers to replace 105's, and additional HONEST JOHN rockets. The NATO forces in northern Italy continued to receive from the US Southern European Task Forces ground-delivered atomic support weapons, including the SERGEANT missile system.

In October 1963, the United States gave a dramatic demonstration of its ability to reinforce NATO forces in Europe. Army units from Texas, Oklahoma, Kentucky, Georgia, North Carolina and Virginia—over 16,000 in all—were transported by air to Europe in Exercise BIG LIFT. The main body, consisting of


the Second Armoured Division, two artillery battalions, three truck companies, and a transportation battalion headquarters detachment, began to be deployed in Europe on 22 October in Military Air Transport Service (MATS) planes and completed two days later. A United States based composite air strike force was deployed concurrently to provide close air support for the BIG LIFT units.

Moving quickly to depots where prepositioned stocks awaited them, the BIG LIFT forces drew their equipment, and advanced to the assembly area. By October 27 they were in place, two days ahead of the planned schedule. Shortly thereafter they participated in a NATO-sponsored field training exercise. When the training exercise came to an end, the BIG LIFT forces returned the equipment to storage, moved to the airfield, and flew back to the United States.

The Pentagon claimed that operation BIG LIFT was a "success". McNamara wrote:

The exercise showed that the training and operating procedure of the U.S.-based forces were compatible with those in Europe and that the U.S.-based units could be integrated into combat operations with a minimum of orientation. BIG LIFT also successfully tested the concept that the prepositioned equipment could be stored, maintained, and issued in a combat serviceable condition despite some deterioration in the equipment as a result of outside storage. In addition, it provided an opportunity to use a large portion of the prepositioned equipment under field conditions. All in all, BIG LIFT was a tremendous performance by all participating units. (121)

The exercise was intended to reassure Allies and warn adversaries concerning US airlift capability. Its very success

121 Ibid.
was, as will be seen subsequently, to have implications for the issue of US troop levels in West Europe.

US general purpose force levels in Europe between 1961-1965 were by and large stable as indicated by the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy &amp; Marine</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>244,010</td>
<td>33,883</td>
<td>96,065</td>
<td>373,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>263,436</td>
<td>28,016</td>
<td>100,427</td>
<td>391,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>251,430</td>
<td>31,117</td>
<td>96,675</td>
<td>379,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>252,150</td>
<td>26,641</td>
<td>86,628</td>
<td>365,419</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that the troop levels in Europe in 1962, 1963 and 1964 were greater than what they were in 1961, but only marginally. In 1962 highest mark was reached. This was due to the reinforcements sent from the United States to Germany during

Pentagon's streamlining programmes were about 7,475 military personnel. These reductions, Pentagon officials emphasized, were made in the non-combat forces and would not affect the combat capability of the six divisions committed to NATO or stationed in Europe. In fact, McNamara, in a statement in March 1966, refuted the allegation that the reductions in support forces had weakened the combat capability of the United States troops in Europe, and reduced the United States commitment to NATO. He said:

The total strength of United States Army Europe is today almost identical to what it was in 1961 before the Berlin crisis. The strength of the support units organic to the Seventh Army has been increased since that time while at the same time the strength of the nonorganic support has been decreased. The decrease is offset to a significant degree by reorganization of supply and support units to provide greater efficiency and by the far greater capability to deploy men quickly from CONUS [Continental United States]. Finally, the support-to-combat ratio of the U.S. Army in Europe is higher than that of any other Army in Europe. (125)

One significant fact that emerges from the tables on troop levels given in this chapter is that despite the rhetoric of policy-makers in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations, and the early phase of the Johnson Administration, the initial decisions on the desired force levels made during the Truman Administration remained by and large unchanged, with only marginal fluctuations of no great military significance.

"Six US divisions" had become a mystic number representing the American "commitment" to the defence of Western Europe.

Successive Administrations, despite differing styles, clung to the figure and, by and large, received substantial Congressional support for their course. Wide support for NATO, cutting across party lines in Congress, reflected the positive attitude of public opinion endorsing the continuance of the American military presence in Western Europe at the established level.

It is noteworthy that neither the Executive branch nor Congress sought during the period under review to bring about a substantial increase in the number of US troops to be stationed in Europe. Both branches voiced opinions to the effect that the United States was fully discharging its responsibilities. Inevitably this left open the question whether the same could be said of the Allies. Thus when the United States experienced economic problems domestically, it was not surprising that critical attention came to be directed, especially in Congress, on the "drain" caused by maintaining a large body of US troops in Western Europe. Demands came to be voiced that the Allies, having become economically strong and prosperous, should assume "a fair share of the burden" or confront the prospect of a reduction of US troops committed to NATO. America's own balance of payments difficulties was yet another factor that entered into the debate on the level of US forces in Europe.