Chapter I.

THE STATIONING OF AMERICAN TROOPS IN WESTERN EUROPE
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It has been an axiom of United States foreign policy, especially, since its emergence as a world power, that no potentially hostile nation should be in a position to upset the balance of power in Europe and to bring under its control the population and resources of that industrially advanced continent. The United States was of the view that developments in that direction would constitute a serious threat to its own security. Its interest in this respect coincided with those of Great Britain. A unique relationship had developed between the two English-speaking countries which found them bound with each other in two world wars against those whom they suspected of a desire to upset the balance of power and dominate Europe. The United States entered the First World War to frustrate what it described as the attempt of the Hohenzollern autocracy to establish its domination over Europe. More than two decades later, the United States again went to war when the Axis powers, with Nazi Germany in the lead, had brought most of Europe under their control. Victory in the Second World War did not mean that the United States was willing to give up or modify its basic approach. When differences with its war-time ally, the Soviet Union, began to gather momentum, the response of the United States was in line with that basic approach.

At the end of the war the United States emerged as the most formidable military power in the world. Even though its
army was smaller than that of the Soviet Union, it had an enormous edge over the latter in naval and air power. Its capacity to project its military force globally could not be matched by the Soviet Union. Over and above its superiority in naval and air power, the United States had the monopolistic possession of the Atomic bomb. American policy-makers believed that it might take several years for any other nation to produce an Atomic bomb. This belief, along with domestic pressure to "bring the boys home," was responsible for the rapid demobilization of its armed forces by the United States after the conclusion of the hostilities. However, the intensification of the cold war, the establishment of Communist-controlled regimes in Eastern Europe, the enormous superiority in conventional arms of the Soviet Union, and the enfeebled condition of Western Europe, induced the Truman Administration to undertake a vast programme of economic reconstruction and military collaboration represented by the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Administration made the unprecedented decision to maintain in Western Europe for an indefinite period a sizeable American military force in support of NATO, and as a deterrent to what it described as "Soviet expansionism."

Never before had the United States undertaken such an enormous programme of aid to other nations in peacetime. Never before had the United States committed itself to a multi-lateral military alliance with an integrated system of military
commands while not engaged in war. Never before had the United States stationed major military forces outside America in peace time. These actions represented a fundamental change in traditional American foreign policy, and reflected an appraisal on the part of American policy makers that their country's security could be ensured only in the context of the collective defence of Western Europe under US leadership.

Demobilization: Occupation Forces in Europe

When the United States was drawn into the Second World War, American policy-makers did not envisage the possibility of substantial US forces being stationed in Europe for a prolonged and indefinite period after the end of hostilities. Indeed, planning for demobilization began in 1943, over two years before the war ended. The unit system of demobilization which had most often been used in the past by the US Army was replaced by that of demobilization on an individual basis. A poll taken in the Army showed that a majority of soldiers favoured the change. A soldier was to be demobilized on the basis of his "Adjusted Service Rating," popularly known as the "Pants System". Each individual was eligible for a specified number of points for length of service, combat participation.

1 The Rio Pact or Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed in Rio on 2 September 1947, was a regional Collective Security agreement. Under the Rio Treaty every American State had to assist in meeting an armed attack upon another American State but there was no integrated command system or integrated force.
and awards, time spent overseas, and parenthood. By this means soldiers who had been in the service the longest, and participated in combat could expect to be released earlier.

The emergence of differences with the Soviet Union led President Harry S. Truman to be deeply concerned over the prospect of rapid demobilization. He sought to arouse the country to the importance of accepting legislation providing for Universal Military Training (UMT). However, the domestic pressure for "bringing the boys home" proved irresistible. On V-J day the military establishment of the United States had a strength of about eleven million men. It was not long before it was reduced to one million. The effect of demobilization on the numerical strength of the American forces in Europe was immense. From the total strength of 2,524,000 on V-J day it came down to 512,000 on 12 April 1946. When demobilization was completed by early 1947, the numerical strength of the American troops in Europe was only 188,000.

With the unconditional surrender of the German armed forces, a rigid military government was established in the U.K. zone of occupation. This zone included the whole of Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Hesse and Hesse-Assau, the northern portion of Baden, a portion of Berlin, the parts of Bremen and Bremerhaven, a portion of Austria and Trieste. The War Department fixed 400,000 military personnel as the required occupation.

2 Congressional Record, 71. 92, Part 3, p. 3539.
force for Western Europe. But the pace of demobilization came as a blow to the project. General Joseph T. McNarney, Commander-in-Chief, US forces in Europe, expressed the view that at least 300,000 troops would be needed for occupational purposes. Even this recommendation was not adhered to, and the occupation forces came down to 188,000 by early 1947.

Faced with the prospect of consistently dwindling US occupation forces in Europe, the United States put forward schemes at the various 4-Power Foreign Ministers Conferences in 1946 and 1947, for the reduction of the occupation forces of all powers including the Soviet Union. The reasons were obvious—to reduce the level of Soviet troops in its area of occupation. In April 1947 the Foreign Ministers Conference worked out an agreement on a reduction of occupation forces. While United States troops were reduced, the Soviet Union refrained from taking any measure towards reducing of its forces. There were, according to the New York Times, 400,000 Soviet troops in Germany, 60,000 in Austria, 250,000 in Poland, 250,000 in Rumania, 10,000 in Czechoslovakia, 8,000 in Yugoslavia, 3,000 in Albania and 85,000 in Bulgaria. But during the same period there were only 150,000 United States troops in Germany, 10,000 in Austria, and 28,000 in Italy or a total of 188,000 US troops in Europe.

By 1 February 1948, the US occupation forces dwindled to

4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
33,000 in Germany, 10,000 in Austria and 5,000 in Trieste. While the military continued to stress the importance of bringing troop strength to the desired level, there was no sense of panic in view of America's over-all military superiority, especially in the air-atomic field. While alert to the danger of a surprise attack by the Soviet Union, American planners did not regard it as very likely. When the Korean war broke out in June 1950, the American troop levels in Europe reached the lowest point since the end of the Second World War. The deployment of US military personnel by country as of 30 June 1950 is shown in the following table—a "confidential" document prepared by the Department of Defence at that time.

TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>97,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>9,308</td>
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<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>5,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenland</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>802</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afloat</td>
<td>815</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 115,867

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7 Source: US Department of Defense, "Confidential," "Deployment of Military Personnel by Country as of 30 June 1950." Such tables were prepared in the Statistical Services Center, Office of Secretary of Defense.
It was not as though the Truman Administration had been averse to an increased US military presence in Western Europe. It had actually been vigorously spearheading moves that were bound to turn the country towards such a course. However, there remained the vital issue of the right timing that could win for the Administration's course wide Congressional and public support. The Administration had to confront with the historic facts that the United States had never before had a vast standing army in peace time and, further, that never before had Congress and the American public supported the concept of stationing substantial US armed forces overseas in peace time. The right timing would be when the country and Congress would endorse the Administration's perception of the Soviet "threat", and the need for countermeasures to protect US national security, even if such measures had no historical precedent.

The present work is concerned with the issue of troop levels in Western Europe during the period 1950-1968. The role of four Administrations--those of Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson--fall within the purview of the discussion. Broadly speaking, policy-making on such a major issue of national security policy may be viewed in terms of the model of concentric circles suggested by Roger Hilsman. At the centre in the innermost circle stands the President, his close White House assistants, and his principal

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advisers on national security policy who constitute the National Security Council. These are the heads of the three Departments, State, Defence, and the Treasury, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Around the centre is an inner circle composed of heads of other departments and agencies of the government as well as senior deputies of the agencies whose heads are represented in the National Security Council (NSC).

in delicate matters touching national security policy where control of information is an important factor, and "secrecy" is acknowledged to be vital, Congress is not seen as figuring significantly even in this inner circle though, on occasion, selected "Congressional leaders" are inducted whenever

9 The National Security Council (NSC) was created by the National Security Act of 1947. Over the years and presently it is the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decisions. The manner in which the NSC system functioned, and its role in policy formulation, varied from President to President. Membership is restricted to a selected group, including as statutory members, the Vice-President, the Secretaries of State and Defence, and, in addition, such other Secretaries and Under Secretaries of the executive and military departments as the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, might appoint. Some modifications were made over the years, and non-statutory, advisory and invited officials have become part of the NSC. This group includes special assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretary of State. For details see, U.S. Senate, Congress 91, session 1, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Committee on Government Operations, Committee print, The National Security Council: Law, role and structure, February 4, 1969 (Washington, D.C., 1969).
the administration deems it prudent to promote its objectives or reduce anticipated damage. Congress figures in the outer circle where its role is significant. Along with Congress there also operates in the outer circle the influences of public opinion in the form of interest groups, the media, and the "attentive public".

The Chief Executive, in the American system, has extensive power, constitutionally authorized as well as "implied"—especially in the area of national security policy. But he is by no means a dictator. Congress has too its constitutional rights and the power of purse. Public opinion is a vital factor that the President has to reckon with in terms of its impact on Congress, his own re-election, and/or the prospects of the success of his party on election day. Support or opposition to his course from powerful interest groups or the media will have repercussions on public opinion.

The President is the head of a vast bureaucracy, and within each agency as well as among agencies the tugs and pulls of "bureaucratic politics" are ever at play. In such a situation the heads of each powerful department advising the President in the National Security Council puts forth the best possible consensus that he can manage to work out within his own organization. He then faces the prospect of "bargaining" with his counterparts representing other agencies, and work towards

By the term "attentive public" is meant, politically-conscious individuals often having affiliation with organizations of some significance, who follow and react to issues in the area of foreign policy.
the evolution of a decision approximating most closely to that of his own organization. In such a situation a Presidential decision itself is the best possible consensus that he can bring about that can keep his team together, and that has the best prospect of support from Congress, the interest groups, the media, and public opinion in general.

The capacity of the president to initiate a course vigorously and effectively will be determined by his ability to maintain harmony and unity within the Executive branch. The latter will also depend on the level of harmony and unity that can be maintained in the major departments. In the State Department the Secretary's capacity in this direction will depend upon the support that he can command from his deputies with differing jurisdictional interests, and also U.S. ambassadors to important countries. In the Department of Defence the situation is further complicated by the fact that it contains both civilian and military components. In the military component itself the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has to reckon with the positions adopted by his associates who head their respective branches of the Armed Forces. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Budget Director will look at the economic and fiscal implications of suggested courses of action, and will advise the President to weigh them against other demands on the national exchequer posed by other foreign and domestic programmes of the administration. The President has to steer his way through all these, and decide on a course that would be acceptable to Congress, and get the support of the public.
The President can employ a variety of devices to generate and mobilize public opinion. His task will be easier if a broad national consensus already exists in support of his major objectives. In such a case his task is to ensure that the base of support is further expanded, and not eroded. Public support will improve the prospect of his getting Congressional support, and such Congressional support will, in turn, strengthen his base of support from the public. The opposite will be the case if his course runs counter to strong currents in public opinion.

The President's task is easier if his party controls both houses of Congress, and if he can count on the support of a decisive majority of members of Congress belonging to his party. He will seek to strengthen his position by getting whatever additional support he could get from the opposition party. If he could succeed in enlisting the vigorous support of some leading figures of the opposition party in Congress, his burden will be lightened. The prospect of such a happy development, from his point of view, is heightened if the issue is one that the opposition party finds appropriate or expedient to support with minor reservations on which the Administration could make concessions while promoting the vital aspects of its programme.

The North Atlantic Treaty

There was agreement among the leading military as well as civil elements of the Truman Administration in 1948 that the rapid pace of demobilization and the small number of occupation force in Europe had left the United States in a relatively weak position against the Soviet Union. In Congress there was
widespread concern over the Soviet "threat". The establishment of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, Communist-led guerrilla activity in Greece, the mounting propaganda barrage of the Cominform, the coup in Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet bid to "blockade" West Berlin were regarded as positive indications of an expansionist trend on the part of the Soviet Union that could only be deterred by a show of superior military power, and a readiness to use that power if challenged. The presence of strong Communist parties in West European countries, especially in France and Italy, was regarded as posing a danger of internal subversion. The leaders of the governments of the West European countries shared the perception of the Soviet threat as analyzed by American leaders.

On top of these developments came the realization that the development of an atomic capability by the Soviet Union was inevitable, and that it would seriously erode the advantageous position enjoyed by the United States as long as it alone possessed the dreaded weapon. It was in response to such an anticipated situation, and to the developments in Europe that the United States took the lead in initiating negotiations culminating in the North Atlantic treaty. The move received strong support in Congress. Public opinion too strongly favoured the course. The Administration acted with great energy in promoting and organizing public opinion in its support. The treaty was signed by twelve "Atlantic" nations in Washington, D.C., on 4 April 1949. The twelve original signatories include: the United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, Italy, Portugal,
Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Iceland.

The course of events leading to this important event may be briefly described. Even before the Atlantic Pact was signed, collective defence arrangements for Western Europe had made some progress with friendly nudging from the United States. The Dunkirk Treaty between France and Great Britain, signed in March 1947, had provided a basis for collaboration between those two nations. The Treaty of Brussels, signed by the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), France and Great Britain in March 1948, had pledged its signatories to a joint defensive system and to closer economic and cultural ties. Article IV of the Brussels treaty stated that if any of the parties to the treaty was the object of an "armed attack in Europe", the others would give the attacked party "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power". In September 1949 the signatories of the Brussels treaty had created a military agency, the Western Union Defence Organization, with headquarters outside of Paris. Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery was named as permanent Chairman of the Land, Naval, and Air Commanders-in-Committee.

The North Atlantic Treaty carried forward the process further and brought in the United States as well as certain other countries into the alliance network. The most important

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article of the North Atlantic Treaty pertaining to military commitments were articles three, four and five. The members agreed "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid...to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack" (Article III). They were committed to consult together "whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened" (Article IV). Moreover, the Treaty provided that an armed attack against one or more of the signatories in Europe or North America would be considered an attack against all. The signatories agreed that if such an armed attack occurred, each of them would assist the "Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area" (Article V).

The ratification of the Treaty by the Senate by a vote of 82 to 13 was a triumph for the Truman Administration. Truman's victory in the elections of 1948 was accompanied by a

return to Democratic control of both Houses that had been lost in the mid-term elections of 1946. Fortunately for the Administration, a policy of close association with Western Europe to meet the Soviet challenge was not opposed by the Republican candidate, Thomas E. Dewey in the campaign of 1948. The Administration had moved skilfully to win bi-partisan support for its course, its task facilitated by strong support from the "attentive public", and strong anti-Soviet sentiments among the general public. Particularly valuable was the support of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (Republican, Michigan), a former "isolationist" who had undergone a "conversion" to "internationalism" towards the end of the war. The Administration had skilfully placated Vandenberg by including him in US delegations, and the State Department cultivated him assiduously by consulting with him often on European affairs, especially for the smooth passage of the Marshall Plan, and for the organization of European defence. At the request of Under Secretary Robert Lovett, Vandenberg, then Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, had prepared a draft of a Senate resolution providing for a regional pact. Subsequently, consultation with Foreign Relations Committee proceeded, and on 19 May 1948, it unanimously reported out, being promptly labelled as the "Vandenberg Resolution". Most of it dealt with the role of the United Nations in respect of security against aggression. But a crucial paragraph declared that American Government should foster "the progressive development of regional and other collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles,
and provisions of the Charter...." Seventy nine Senators stood with Vandenberg in support of the resolution. It had represented the first stage of bi-partisan collaboration towards erecting a North Atlantic defence organization.

The collaboration effort did not decline in the following year when Democrats were in control of Congress; Vandenberg was no longer the Chairman but only the ranking Republican of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Chairman Tom Connally (Democrat, Texas) went along with the Administration's tactic of associating closely with Vandenberg, and both were in close touch with the Administration when the secret negotiations on North Atlantic Treaty resumed in early 1949. In May the Foreign Relations Committee conducted hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty, and subsequently reported the North Atlantic Treaty unanimously without reservation.

On the Senate floor, chief opposition to the Treaty came from veteran Republican Robert A. Taft of Ohio. Taft, regarded as a conservative, had firm, principled views on the American constitutional system, and the implications of military alliances that might involve the United States in war. Taft's speech, Vandenberg acknowledged was "a first class headache...." Taft along with his Republican colleagues, Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska and Arthur Watkins of Utah, attempted to add a "declaration" to the effect that "the United States ratifies this treaty with the understanding that Article 3 commits none of the parties thereto

morally or legally, to furnish or supply arms...." Taft concentrated his fire against a peace time military assistance programme on which the Senate would be called upon to act after ratification of the Treaty. Perhaps he also sensed such a programme presaged a possible move by the Administration to send troops to Europe. With Vandenberg staunchly opposing Taft, the "declaration" was defeated by 74 to 21 on a roll call. Only eighteen Republicans voted with Taft while twenty-five lined up with Vandenberg. Democrats lined up solidly in support of the Administration, with 3 Democrats siding Taft. The North Atlantic Treaty itself, as mentioned earlier, was ratified unchanged by a vote of 82 to 13.

Early Steps in Defence Planning

At the time when the Treaty was signed there existed only a skeletal basis for collective defence arrangements. The number of divisions of the twelve signatories in Western Europe numbered from twelve to fifteen, and many of these were under-equipped and under-strength. Since these forces had been originally deployed for occupation duties, they were organized for ease of administration, rather than for defence of the area in the event of attack. Hence, the first tasks of the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty were to devise an agreed defence strategy, to create collective defence machinery, and to strengthen their


armed forces to meet security objectives.

Immediately after the signing of North Atlantic Treaty, defence planning was initiated by the military groups representing the Western Union countries and the representatives from the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Americans emphasized that the defence efforts of the parties to the Alliance should be based on a "logical and practical division of labor" by which "each member of the alliance will specialize in the kind of forces and the production of weapons for which it is best suited and which will fit into a pattern of integrated defense."

Although the contemplated "division of labor" upon which the integrated defence plans were based was not made public, it could be reasonably assumed to have been similar to the concept outlined to the Congress by General Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff, United States Army, on 29 July 1949:

First, the United States will be charged with the strategic bombing.

We have repeatedly recognized in this country that the first priority of the joint defense is our ability to deliver the atomic bomb.

Second, the United States Navy and the Western Union naval powers will conduct essential naval operations, including keeping the sea lanes clear. The Western Union and other nations will maintain their own harbor and coastal defense.

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19 Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, in a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committees, on 3 August 1949, in Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol. 21, 22 August 1949, p. 266.
Third, we recognize that Europe would provide ground power, aided by other nations as they can mobilize.

Fourth, England, France, and the closer countries will have the bulk of the short-range attack bombardment, and air defense. We, of course, will maintain the tactical air force for our own ground and naval forces, and United States defense.

Fifth, other nations, depending upon their proximity or remoteness from the possible scene of conflict, will emphasize appropriate specific missions. (20)

The American side was also of the view that a significant increase in the military capabilities of the Alliance partners should be achieved without undue delay. This view was indicated in testimony given by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the Joint hearings conducted by the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate. He said:

It is not intended that there should be maintained in Western Europe forces-in-being capable of defending all Europe against an all-out attack. But it is essential to international peace and our security that there be maintained in Western Europe forces sufficient to convince any would-be aggressor that he could not by quick marches gain easy victories. (21)

On 17 September 1949, the North Atlantic Council, set

20 US House, Congress 81, session 1, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (Washington, 1949), p. 71 [Italics added].

21 Acheson, n. 19, p. 263.

22 The Article IX of the North Atlantic Treaty provided a Council to be "so organized as to be able to meet promptly at anytime", and the Council was given discretion to create subsidiary agencies with emphasis on defence. It is composed of representatives of the member countries. The Council may meet at the level of Ministers or of Permanent Representatives. At Ministerial meetings of the Council, the members of the Alliance are represented by one--or several--of their Ministers (for Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, Economic Affairs, etc.) according to the agenda of the

(Contd. on next page)
up under the treaty established a Defence Committee. The Committee was composed of defence Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty nations. It was made responsible for drawing up unified defence plans for the North Atlantic area. Initially, three distinct plans were prepared and approved: the Short-Term, the Medium-Term and the Long-Term Defence Plans. The first plan was designed for emergency use only. The second was a battle plan that concerned logistics, strategic positioning and general build-up. The Long-Term plan was concerned with a force requirement of 100 divisions for the Western Brenner-Trieste area and the Scandinavian area. In spite of the approval of these plans, there were no rapid increases in Western European armed forces in 1949 and early 1950. By early 1950 the North Atlantic Alliance had only twelve divisions, all under national command. Its air power amounted to a mere 400 aircraft and it had only 20 airfields.

From the views expressed in his memoirs by Dirk U. Stikker, Secretary General of NATO between 21 April 1961 and 31 July 1964, it appears that the slow progress in the build-up of

meeting. The Permanent Representatives of the member countries, who hold the rank of Ambassador, meet between Ministerial sessions, thus ensuring the continuous functioning of the Council with effective power of decision. The Council meets at Ministerial level approximately two or three times a year, and once or twice a week at the level of Permanent Representatives.


Ismay, n. 11, pp. 30, 102.
force levels in Europe was due to the strategy preferred by the United States and supported by the United Kingdom (U.K.). The American strategy envisaged deterrence of the Soviet threat on the basis of the United States and Allied air power and American atomic monopoly. In the event of war and initial success for the opponent it envisaged a "liberation strategy" mounted from the peripheries involving full-scale mobilization, sending an expeditionary army to Europe, and eventual liberation of the continent. The "liberation strategy" was to come into effect if deterrence failed.

The alternate course which appeared to be favoured by some other countries, particularly France, was the so-called "defence strategy". This envisaged a state of substantial preparedness and, in the event of an attack, to have the capability to hold back the invader as close to his border as possible before atomic power could be called into play. But "defence strategy" would have entailed much more substantial inputs than the "liberation strategy" favoured by the US, especially in view of the economic reconstruction problems as well as the heavy cost of rearmament that the Alliance had to take into account. Thus, prior to 1950 the Alliance strategy came to be based on defence at the river Rhine. It implied, according to Stikker, that in the event of an attack from the east, the allied forces should withdraw from or abandon the northern portion of the Netherlands and all Germany east of the Rhine river, and later liberate it in the traditional pattern employed during
the Second World War.

The most important factor that was responsible for the slow pace of force levels build-up was probably the appraisal of American policy-makers that despite the Soviet Union's enormous local superiority in conventional capabilities it would be deterred by America's over-all military superiority and, in particular, United States atomic capability. Western military planners sought to effect a military balance between the Soviet conventional military capabilities and Allied capabilities through the superior American air-atomic capability and deterrence. Stikker recalls why there was no discussion of how and when the Atomic bomb should be used. All that the Western Allies had to go by, according to Stikker, was the fact that the American atom bomb existed, and that the President had proclaimed American determination to help Europe. As the French General Andre Beaufre points out, the European Allies recognized that the defence of their countries was based on the American nuclear deterrent.

Under the protective umbrella of the American air and atomic capabilities, the Western European countries gave greater emphasis to the task of economic recovery than to rearmament.


26 Ibid., p. 283.

Initially. They also recognized that progress in economic re-
construction was vitally necessary to reduce their vulnerability
to what they considered a mere serious threat at the time than
outright aggression, namely, subversion and "indirect aggression."
The United States largely concurred in the recognition of the
necessity for economic recovery. In fact, Congress declared,
while enacting the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949, that
"economic recovery is essential to international peace and secu-
rity and must be given clear priority."

Impact of the Soviet Atomic Explosion
and of the Korean War

The entire approach needed to be reviewed when a develop-
ment of far-reaching significance occurred toward the end of
August 1949. The White House announcement on 23 September stated:
"We have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion
occurred in the USSR." One American writer on strategic affairs
was to appraise the development as of momentous consequence. It
was Henry A. Kissinger who wrote in 1957 that "no conceivable
acquisition of territory—not even the occupation of Western
Europe—could have affected the strategic balance as profoundly
as did the Soviet success in ending our atomic monopoly."

The attainment of atomic capability by the Soviet Union
inevitably had its impact on the military calculations of the
Western Allies, and on the formulation of their instrumentalities.

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28 Richard B. Stetbins, et al., The United States in World

29 Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy
for collective self-defence. On 25 June 1950, a shooting war broke out in distant Korea which also was to have its repercussions on the Western military planners. The centrally-controlled and administered military institutions of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, came into being only after the Korean war began.

The attainment of atomic capability by the Soviet Union followed shortly thereafter by the emergence of the People's Republic of China quickened the tempo of thinking in the Western Alliance regarding the evolution of a strategic concept to respond to the changed situation. The Western Allies "began to think of creating a ground force establishment capable of deterring, if not defeating, a direct assault by the Red Army." On 1 December 1949, the North Atlantic Defence Committee agreed on a "strategic concept", and passed it on to be considered by the North Atlantic Council.

The "strategic concept" was not a plan but a collection of principles for devising an integrated defence. No European nation was to attempt a complete military establishment, but each was to make its most effective contribution in the light of its geographic position, economic capability, and population. The United States was to be responsible "primarily for naval and air forces with a supporting role on the ground." The British were to "concentrate on sea and air control of the Western approaches, the Channel and the North Sea, with an army of the Rhine." The

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French were to concentrate "largely on ground and air defences in Europe" and provide a naval force in the Mediterranean.

According to Dean Acheson, these were among the major ingredients of the "concept".

On 6 January 1950, the North Atlantic Council meeting in Washington approved the "strategic concept". The concept replaced the "balanced national force" by "balanced collective force". The earlier "liberation strategy" having lost its relevance, the new concept provided for "integrated defence" of the Treaty area and a "forward defence strategy". Briefly, the "forward defence strategy" meant that, in the event of an attack, the Alliance should have the capability to hold back the invader as close to his border as possible.

On 27 January, the President approved the "strategic concept". Four days later he signed a directive initiating the hydrogen bomb programme. Simultaneously he instructed the


33 In 1965, Colonel James J. Holland, Jr., Chairman of the Department of Strategy, United States Army War College, described the "forward Defence Strategy" as "a hallmark of NATO defense planning initially meant a defense on the Rhine. Later, forward defense moved eastward to a general north-south line marked by the Weser River in Western Germany." Recently, a new interpretation was placed on forward defense which has been referred to as 'Iron Curtain Forward Defense'." See, Colonel James J. Holland, "Allied Command Europe's Mobile Force", Military Review (Fort Leavenworth, Ks), vol. 45, no. 10 October 1965, p. 12.
Secretaries of State and Defence: "to undertake a re-examination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union." To carry out the instruction of the President, the two Secretaries established a joint ad hoc Study Group. The Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, Paul Nitze, was Chairman of the Group. The Secretary of the Staff was Secretary of the Group. Three other members of the Policy Planning Staff were also included as members of the Study Group. The Pentagon was represented in the Study Group by Major General James H. Burns (Retired), Major General Truman H. Landon, Major General Ray T. Paddock and Rear Admiral Thomas H. Robbins.

The State-Defence Study Group made a reappraisal of America's entire global strategy through the preparation of National Security Council (NSC) Paper-68. The drafting of the document occupied six weeks, beginning in mid-February and extending through March 1950. Once completed, the Study Group circulated the paper through the higher reaches of the Pentagon, and secured the endorsement of all three service Secretaries and the four Joint Chiefs. These developments took place mostly in the absence of Secretary of Defence Louis Johnson. He was away attending the North Atlantic Defence Ministers' conference.

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between 28 March and 3 April 1960, at the Hague. The document reached Johnson's desk two or three days after he returned from the Hague. Secretary of State Acheson had harboured some misgivings on whether the Defence Secretary might raise some objections, and was relieved when Johnson joined him in recommending the paper to the President. It went to the White House on 7 April, as a "Joint Report". On 12 April, the President implicitly gave the "Joint Report" preliminary approval by referring it to the NSE to estimate the programme's cost. On 25 April, the NSE met with the President in the chair. The "Joint Report" was discussed and NSE-63 became national policy.

NSE-63, as Paul Nitze described subsequently, contained a brief analysis of the nature of the US-USS conflict and an evaluation of their respective capabilities. It noted that the West's weakness in conventional forces was particularly critical in Europe in the face of overwhelming Soviet superiority in ground forces. The potential dangers confronting the US and its allies, it pointed out, were manifold: general war, piece-meal aggression, subversion, disunity in the Western Alliance, and loss of American will. NSE-63 rejected such alternative courses as doing nothing, engaging in preventive war, or withdrawing to the Western hemisphere. It advocated, according to

35 Acheson, n. 31, p. 374.

Hitze, "an immediate and large-scale build-up in our military and general strength and that of our allies with the intention of righting the power balance and in the hope that through means other than all-out war we could induce a change in the nature of the Soviet system."

Secretary Acheson, referring to the programme of action contained in NSC-68, in an anonymous article published in the Atlantic Monthly, in June 1951, stated that "the document charted the long-term project of restoring the threatened equilibrium." He wrote that while the study was going forward, other projects were also under way—the intensification of research into military applicabilities of atomic energy; charting of the expansion of US and Allied ground forces; expansion of the US radar warning network; the decision to build the H-bomb; and the decision to move "the North Atlantic Organization...towards the idea of unified armed forces under a single command."

Thus, after the Soviet atomic explosion, the United States began an appraisal of its global strategy and Alliance strategy, and initiated various studies and projects to develop the capabilities to meet the Soviet threat. But none of these studies or projects including the NSC-68 were officially implemented

37 Ibid., p. 61.
39 Ibid.
before the outbreak of the Korean war. "The dispatch of the
two divisions to Korea," wrote Acheson in his memoirs, "removed
the recommendations of NSC-68 from the realm of theory and made
them immediate budget issues."

On 25 June 1950, the Korean war broke out. This develop­
ment shattered the assumption that American atomic power would
deter the Communist forces anywhere from risking a military con­
frontation. The question was raised whether the Korean war was
a preliminary diversionary movement encouraged by the Soviet
Union as part of an eventual showdown with the West. President
Truman indirectly lent support to such a contention when he said:
"The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that
communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer
independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war." 41

The outbreak of shooting war made the domestic situation
more propitious for the efforts the Administration was interested
in regarding Europe. It could present them as part of a national
effort to respond to the Communist challenge not only in Korea
but elsewhere also. Jouncing the alarm on the global threat of
"international Communism," the Administration could move much
more vigorously in the direction of rearmament than it found
possible earlier. Even though the objective of rearmament was
regarded as a matter of high priority by the Administration
since the Soviet atomic test, it had not found it feasible to

40 Acheson, n. 31, p. 420.
present it to the public in such fashion as to command wide acceptance. In such a situation, Congress was likely to respond promptly and positively to an initiative by the Administration. as McGeorge Bundy acknowledged, it was not until shooting started in Korea that the Secretary of State had the "opportunity to adopt openly a policy urgently recommended in private for some months previously."

Acheson himself subsequently wrote that the outbreak of war in Korea added "urgency" to issues concerning the defence of Europe. Once such a sense of urgency could be communicated effectively to the public as well as to European Allies, the desired action could be expected to gain momentum. In his anonymous article mentioned earlier, Acheson thus described that the outbreak of war in Korea contributed to the plans that were being envisaged for Europe: "June 25, 1950, converted abstract plans into physical project. The United States and its allies began in many and vigorous ways to attempt to check deterioration in the military balance and to regain a stable equilibrium."

In July 1950, the United States requested all the North Atlantic treaty countries to indicate "the nature and extent of the increased effort each proposed to make." The European Allies, except Iceland and Portugal, announced plans for

44 Anon, n. 33, p. 22.
45 Ismay, n. 11, p. 31.
increasing their defence forces, periods of military service, and military expenditures. Great Britain, for example, increased its conscription period to two years, announced plans to form three new divisions, and undertook an arms programme which would raise defence expenditure to twelve per cent of the Gross National Product (GNP). France responded by increasing its budget by thirty per cent and announcing plans to increase the total number of its division to fifteen in three years. The British and the French emphasized at the same time that their ability to meet these new goals depended upon American military and economic assistance. In turn, the US announced that aid to Europe would henceforth be directed primarily towards rearmament efforts rather than to economic expansion.

The United States also launched its programme of rearmament. On 19 July, the President said in a report delivered to Congress:

Under all the circumstances, it is apparent that the United States is required to increase its military strength and preparedness not only to deal with the aggression in Korea but also to increase our common defense, with other free nations, against further aggression.

The increased strength which is needed falls into three categories.

In the first place, to meet the situation in Korea, we shall need to send additional men, equipment and supplies to General MacArthur's Command as rapidly as possible.

In the second place, the world situation requires that we increase substantially the size and material support to our armed forces, over and above the increases which are needed in Korea.

In the third place, we must assist the free nations associated with us in common defense to augment their military strength. (47)

The implementation of the above programmes required supplemental appropriations requests accompanying the regular fiscal-year bill. Thus, in July, the President signed fiscal year 1950-51 appropriations for mutual defence assistance of one billion two hundred million dollars and, in September, another four-billion-dollar supplemental appropriations. In August measures were taken to double the size of the armed forces. On 6 September the pre-existing Defence appropriations of fourteen billion six hundred million dollars was signed, and on 27 September another twelve billion six hundred million were added.

While the United States and the European countries were individually announcing expansion of their defence efforts after the outbreak of Korean War, they collectively took no decision on the question of establishing a central military command for the European theatre and appointing a Supreme Commander for allied forces, in the July and August meetings of the North Atlantic Council. Already it was assumed on the American side that a Supreme Commander for Allied forces would be an American. In the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) conference convened by Secretary of Defence James Forrestal, at Newport, Rhode Island, on 20 August 1948, it had been proposed that in the event of war there should be a "Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief (West),"

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who should be an American. The North Atlantic Council discussed the question of establishing a central command in January 1950 and later, in May, the question of Supreme Commander was also raised. But the idea was "left for future consideration."

The Decision to Send Troops to Europe

During July and August 1950, the Department of State reviewed America's European policy with a view to strengthening Western Europe's defence against a possible attack by a Soviet "satellite". At the outset the State Department was faced with the ticklish issue of German rearmament. For some years the Defence Department had held that Europe could not be defended without the willing and active participation of West Germany. The State Department, however, was slower in reaching that conclusion. After the outbreak of Korean war, the State Department received a steady stream of cables from American missions in London, Paris and Bonn, urging greater participation by Germany in European defence. In mid-July, John J. McCloy, US High Commissioner in Germany, put forward a strong case for German participation in European defence. He warned that Germany might be "lost" politically as well as militarily, unless a solution was found to the problem of enabling that country to fight

48 Millis, n. 6, p. 447.


50 Acheson, n. 31, p. 435.
in the event of an emergency. While such a course involved changes in policy, the Korean war had made it essential that the United States should find ways to initiate them, McCloy argued.

Acheson too became a convert to German participation in European defence. "The idea that Germany's place in the defense of Europe would be worked out by a process of evolution was outmoded," he recalled in his memoirs. "Korea had speeded up evolution. If there was to be any defense at all, it had to be based on a forward strategy. Germany's role must be not secondary, but primary—not only through military formations, but through emotional and political involvement," wrote Acheson.

Acheson did not, however, believe that German rearmament should take place immediately or in such fashion as might disrupt "everything else" that the United States was attempting to achieve. He told the President that a complete German military system, from general staff to the Ruhr munitions industry, would weaken rather than strengthen European defence and repeat past errors. The President agreed with Acheson's view.

By the beginning of August, the State Department produced a "package" of recommendations for strengthening Western defence. These recommendations were: the deployment of some American ground

51 Ibid., p. 437.

52 For details regarding the persons and various agencies of the State Department involved in this study, see Wesley B. Irwin, "The Troops to Europe Decision: The Process, Politics and Diplomacy of a Strategic Commitment" (Thesis, Ph.D., Columbia University, 1968), pp. 175-84.
forces to Europe, the establishment of a Supreme Headquarters, the naming of a Supreme Commander within the North Atlantic Alliance, and an increase in financial aid to European members. The Department sent the "package" for the Pentagon's consideration in mid-August. The Pentagon was prepared to accept the "package" on the condition that German rearmament would be included in it. Initially, Acheson did not believe that such course would be advisable. He believed that once the united Command and a planning centre were established, "the inevitable logic of mathematics would convince everyone that any plan without Germany was untenable. To insist on requiring the inclusion of Germany at the outset would delay and complicate the whole enterprise." He changed his mind subsequently as he became aware of the fact that apart from the Pentagon, there was support among some important persons in his own Department for German rearmament.

On 13 August the State Department informed the JCS of its readiness to endorse German rearmament. Some difference still existed between the State Department and the Pentagon. The State Department wanted the question of German rearmament to be discussed after the reinforcement of American troops in Europe and the establishment of the Supreme Headquarters and the Supreme


54 Acheson, n. 31, p. 438.

55 Martin in Stein, n. 53, p. 656.
Command. But the President took the opposite view. Acheson at this point called on the President to intervene. The President convened a meeting at the White House on 26 August. Acheson, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff attended the meeting. Urging them to work out a "unified American position", Truman gave Johnson and Acheson a list of questions upon which he wanted their joint recommendations by 1 September. The date was later extended to 5 September.

On 5 September both the State and Defense Departments finalized their joint recommendations: deployment of additional US ground forces to Europe of between four to six divisions; combining all the forces of the European members with an international staff and a Supreme Commander; adding a German contingent of divisional strength without a German general staff. They also recommended that the United States should accept the responsibility of Supreme Command only if the Allies requested it and if they undertook certain important obligations.

After three days of study and further discussion, the President approved the "package" on 8 September. The following day he issued a public statement:

"On the basis of recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred in by the Secretaries of State and Defense, I have today approved substantial increases in the strength of the United States forces to be stationed in Western Europe in the interest of the defense of that area. The extent of these increases and the timing thereof will be worked out in close coordination with our North Atlantic Treaty partners. A basic element in the implementation of the decision is the degree to

56 Acheson, n. 31, p. 438.
57 Ibid., p. 439.
which our friends match our action in this regard. Firm programs for the development of their forces will be expected to keep full step with the dispatch of additional United States forces to Europe. Our plans are based on the sincere expectation that our efforts will be met with similar action on their part. The purpose of this measure is to increase the effectiveness of our collective defense efforts and thereby insure the maintenance of peace. (58)

The President's announcement to send a "substantial" number of American troops to Europe was a landmark in the history of United States' relations with Europe. The US military presence in Europe, hitherto, was of a military occupational character. But the announcement envisaged a complete change in the character of US military presence in Europe. The substantial increase had no reference to the occupational forces. The objective enunciated by the President was "collective defence" of the North Atlantic Treaty area. It is noteworthy that Truman linked up the promised additional contribution to "the degree to which our friends match our action in this regard." Equally significant was his linking up of the issue of the dispatch of additional US troops to Europe to "firm programs" by the Allies 'for the development of their forces.'

Thus Truman's announcement was an effort not merely to reassure the European allies concerning America's commitment to their defence but also to demand for matching action from them. The President had obviously also taken note of the sentiment in Congress that the European countries should assume responsibility for contributing their fair share in support of the common effort. Such congressional sentiment, the administration realized, could

immediately and in future usefully serve as a prod on the European countries.

The establishment of an Integrated Force Command

On 12 September, Acheson attended the Western Big Three foreign ministers meeting in New York City. It was agreed at the meeting that there should be a "progressive return of Germany to partnership in Western Europe." The Big Three Foreign Ministers' meeting was followed by the North Atlantic Council meeting in New York City. General George C. Marshall, who had been named as the Secretary of Defence on 12 September 1950, attended the meeting along with Acheson. Both initiated a change in the American approach to minimize the difference between the North Atlantic Treaty members. Acheson and Marshall decided to try first for a collective force under an 'Unified Command', leaving German participation to be agreed in principle, for the future.

On 26 September, the Council agreed to establish at the earliest possible date an integrated force under a 'Centralized Command', which would be adequate to deter aggression and ensure the defence of Western Europe. The force was to be organized under the North Atlantic Treaty, which was to be responsible for its "political and strategic guidance". It was agreed that the Supreme Commander of these forces would be an American. He was to have "sufficient delegated authority to ensure that national

59 Truitt, n. 52, p. 283.
units allocated to his command are organized and trained into an effective integrated force in time of peace as well as in the event of war." The American representatives made it clear to the Council that the United States attached great importance to German rearmament and that if the issue was not settled satisfactorily, the US might not find it feasible to participate in the proposed 'integrated force and command'.

A month later, on 27 October, the North Atlantic Defence Committee was convened in Washington, D.C., under the chairmanship of Secretary of Defence Marshall, to discuss again some of the problems discussed at the North Atlantic Council. At this meeting some fresh problems emerged. France, which was not in favour of German rearmament, put forward the so-called Pleven plan for the creation of an "European Army". According to the plan, the "European army" composed of small military units from the West European countries, including West Germany, was to be under an European Defence Minister. Since the German participation in the "integrated force" was a political, as well as a military problem, the Defence Committee decided to refer the matter to Council Deputies and to the military


61 René Pleven, the French Prime Minister.

62 In May 1950, the North Atlantic Council created a civilian body "Council Deputies". This body, on which each government was represented by a deputy to its Foreign Minister, was to meet in continuous session in London.
Committee. It also directed the two bodies to report back on the problem to the Defence Committee, which was to meet in early December. In view of existing disagreements on the German re-armament question, the Defence Committee did not take steps to establish the desired "integrated force and command".

While the Council Deputies and the Military Committee were attempting to work out a compromise plan, another momentous development took place. Once again an external event acted as a catalyst. On 30 November, Chinese "volunteers" entered the fighting in Korea. It lent a new sense of urgency to the need for working out agreed conclusions relating to European defence.

The President said at a Press Conference on 30 November:

"Because the new act of aggression in Korea is only a part of a world-wide pattern of danger to all the free nations of the world, it is more necessary than ever before for us to increase at a very rapid rate the combined military strength of the free nations. It is more necessary than ever that integrated force in Europe under a Supreme Command be established at once." (64)

In his memoirs Truman explained why he regarded the immediate establishment of an integrated force in Europe under a Supreme Command as an urgent need at the very time when the Council Deputies was responsible for executing the North Atlantic Council directives and for co-ordinating all the activities of the Alliance.

63 On 5 October 1949, the Defence Committee established a Military Committee. It is composed of one representative (Chief of Staff level) from each nation. It is the principal military body of North Atlantic Treaty and responsible to Defence Committee.

64 Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope: Memoirs (New York, N.Y., 1956), vol. 2, p. 443.
United States was confronted with a serious military problem in Korea. He wrote:

The first commandment of Soviet foreign policy has always been to divide the enemies of the Soviet Union, and the unity that United States leadership had created in Europe was the most important target for world communism's attack.

I had no intention of allowing our attention to be diverted from the unchanging aims and designs of Soviet policy. I knew that in our age, Europe, with its million of skilled workmen, with its factories and transportation network, is still the key to world peace. (65)

One day after the presidential press conference the Council Deputies prepared a plan for the German participation in the North Atlantic integrated force. The compromise plan was finally approved by the Deputies, including the French Deputy, on 7 December. It came to be known as the Spofford plan, after Charles K. Spofford, the American representative who chaired the Council Deputies. The Plan provided for a West German troop contribution to integrated force. It was stipulated that German troops would be introduced into the integrated force in units no larger than regimental combat teams (not more than 6,000). Besides this limitation, there were some prohibitions also. The West German army was forbidden to have heavy guns. And there was to be no West German general staff or defence minister.

On 13 December, the Council Deputies and the Military Committee held a joint meeting. At this meeting the Spofford plan was approved by the Military Committee. It was also agreed at the joint meeting to forward the plan as a recommendation in a report to the Defence Committee and to the North Atlantic
Council which were to meet jointly a few days later in Brussels. While recommending the Spofford Plan, the report said that "an acceptable and realistic defense of Western Europe, and the adoption of a forward strategy could not be contemplated without active and willing German participation."

At the North Atlantic Council Meeting held in Brussels on 18 and 19 December, the Spofford Plan was adopted. With that the United States was committed to a far-reaching decision, namely, participation in an "integrated force". An American was to be named as the Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief of the integrated force. The President's choice as Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief Europe (SACEUR) was General Dwight D. Eisenhower. The appointment of the popular military hero of the Second World War was probably intended, among other things, to win the maximum possible support from the American public for the unprecedented new course that the President sought to work out for the United States. It was inevitable, however, that so radical a departure from America's traditional course would trigger a major debate in Congress and in the country at-large.

The Great Debate

The first shot in what subsequently came to be known as the "great debate," was fired on the day after General Eisenhower was appointed as SACEUR. The challenger was no less a person than former President Herbert Hoover who was held in considerable respect by the conservative elements in the country and
particularly in the Republican party. Hoover said in a radio speech on 20 December 1950:

"The foundation of our national policies must be to preserve for the world this Western hemisphere Gibraltar of Western civilization. ... the prime obligation of defense of Western continental Europe rests upon the nations of Europe. The test is whether they have the spiritual force, the will and acceptance of unity among them by their own volition. America cannot create their spiritual forces; we cannot buy them with money. (67)

Hoover opposed the commitment of American ground forces to the defence of Europe. He was of the opinion that any attempt to make war on the communist mass by land invasion, "through the quick sands of China, India or Western Europe" was "sheer folly". He asserted that the United States, instead of assuming Europe's burdens, should strengthen its air and naval power, rearm Japan and stiffen its Pacific front in Formosa and the Philippines.

Senator Taft, known in his party as Mr. Republican, also joined Hoover in criticizing the Administration. In a major speech in the Senate on 5 January 1951, the Senator raised issues whose significance was not adequately appreciated by his critics at that time but which, in recent years, have been seen to merit serious consideration. Taft challenged the right of the President to send American troops anywhere without proper authority. He said: "The President had no power to send American troops to fight in Europe in a war between the members of the Atlantic Pact and Soviet Russia. Without authority he involved us in the Korean war. Without authority he apparently is now adopting a

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similar policy in Europe." He objected, though not violently, to the appointment of an American as the Supreme Commander of the integrated forces of the North Atlantic Alliance. He believed that such a step would make the alliance "an American enterprise" without Europeans sharing appropriate responsibility. Like Hoover, Taft stressed that the US should depend on its sea and air power and let the Europeans supply the conventional forces. However, he did not oppose the commitment under certain conditions of "some limited number of American divisions." But he pointed out that the Administration had concluded an agreement to send a specified number of American troops to Europe without the concurrence of the Congress. He strongly objected to the growing tendency towards secrecy on the part of the Administration.

Taft's charges were denied by the Administration's supporters in the Congress. Senator Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told reporters on 6 January that the president was not by-passing Congress in sending troops abroad as alleged by Taft. He pointed out that the power of the President to move troops out of the country had never been successfully challenged. Many times in the country's history, the President had deployed troops under his prerogative as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. On 4 January 1951, President Truman himself claimed in his weekly Press Conference that he did not need the specific approval of the Congress "to send additional

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68 Ibid., 6 January 1951.
troops to Europe".

On 3 January, the President, in his State of the Union message, emphasized the importance of Europe to American security. He pointed out that national security would be gravely prejudiced if the Soviet Union succeeded in harnessing to its war machine the resources and manpower of the "free nations in the borders of its empire". He warned that if Western Europe was to fall to Soviet Russia, it would double the Soviet supply of coal, triple the Soviet supply of steel, and increase Soviet military capability to a point that the United States "could never hope to equal". "In such a situation," said Truman, "the Soviet Union could impose its demand on the world without resort to conflict simply through preponderance of its economic and military power. The Soviet Union does not have to attack the United States to secure domination of the world." Justifying the decision to send troops to Europe, Truman asserted that "strategically, economically and morally the defence of Europe is a part of our defence".

Immediately after the President's State of the Union message, Senator Sherry, the Republican floor leader, introduced a resolution. The Sherry resolution was referred without debate or voting to the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee.

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72 Ibid.
Committees. The resolution declared:

That the Committee of Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations are authorized and directed to meet jointly to consider and report recommendations on whether or not the Senate would declare it to be the sense of the Senate that no ground forces of the United States should be assigned to duty in the European area for the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty pending the adoption of a policy with respect thereto by the Congress. Such report, which shall be approved by a majority of the combined membership of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, shall be limited to the subject matter of this resolution, shall not contain any recommendation on any matter which is not germane thereto or which is in substantial contravention thereof or any recommendation either approving or disapproving the assignment of ground forces of the United States to duty in the European area for the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty, shall be made on or before February 2, 1951. (73)

The objective of the Cherrry resolution was to challenge the Administration's position that the President did not need the approval of Congress to send additional troops to Europe. It sought to assert a role for the Congress in respect of policy relating to assignment of American troops to Europe.

The first round of the Senatorial "great debate" concluded on 23 January, when the Senate referred the Cherrry resolution to the Joint Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. The second round of the debate began on 1 February, when the Senate Committees opened joint hearings on the issue of dispatching troops to Europe. The second round ended with the submission of a report by the Joint Committees and the introduction of "Senate Resolution 99" and "Concurrent Resolution 13" in the Senate on 14 March, by Senator Connally, on behalf of the Joint Committees. The third and the last round of the debate began on 16 March, with the opening of the Senate debate on "Senate

During the second and third rounds of the debate, various issues relating to the dispatch of troops were raised, which in recent years have assumed growing importance. The issues raised in 1951 related to political, military, strategic, economic issues as well as to the European contribution to the coalition effort. The political issues centered on the power of the President to send troops to Europe. The President initially claimed that he did not need the specific approval of the Congress "to send additional troops to Europe." However, with the introduction of the Chery resolution on 8 January, there was a change in Truman's approach. In a Press Conference on 11 January, he declared that he would consult Congress before sending American troops to Europe; but he made it clear that he would not seek Congressional permission for the assignment of troops to Europe.

Apart from that concession, there was no effort on the part of Truman to concede any limitation on the exclusive power of Commander-in-Chief of the American Armed Forces. The President challenged those in the Congress who threatened to exercise control over troop deployments by tying up military appropriations with such actions. "If they want to go to the country on that," said Truman, "he would go with them." He asserted that he had gone to the country once before and "licked" his Congressional critics. In a subsequent Press Conference on 18 January, the President reiterated that his constitutional authority to

send American forces to Europe was clear, and that it did not depend upon the consent of the Congress. But he disclosed that he would welcome a Senate declaration endorsing the dispatch of American troops to Europe. Such a declaration would make him "happy", Truman said.

Many Senators including Taft were not prepared to accept the exclusive authority claimed by the President. Taft said:

...the power of the President to direct occupation force is not the issue, for the simple reason that the contemplated forces would not be occupation forces in the true sense of that term in either American or international law. The power of the President to carry out the provisions of the treaty is not the issue, for the simple reason that there is no extant treaty authorizing or requiring such action. The power of the President to see that the laws are faithfully executed is not the issue, for the simple reason that there is no law authorizing or directing such action. The issue is clear—can the President commit American forces to an international army without enabling legislation by the Congress. (76)

Taft argued that, while the President was the Commander-in-Chief and director of foreign policy, the Congress had the constitutional authority to raise and maintain armed forces and to declare war. Therefore, he claimed that the President had no power to dispatch troops to Europe without prior Congressional authority. This point was further elaborated during the debate in the Senate. It was pointed out by critics that the appropriations already sanctioned by the Congress were for the existing troops deployed in Europe but not for the four fresh divisions to be deployed in Europe. Since it was a fresh decision of the Administration, the deployment could not be carried out

75 Ibid., 19 January 1951.
76 Congressional Record, vol. 97, Part 3, p. 2995.
under the existing appropriations and hence the approval of Congress was necessary.

Another Senator who challenged the exclusive power of the President was Republican Senator John William Bricker of Ohio. He argued that the project of an American standing army in Europe, involving perhaps three quarters of a million men, could not be called a mere "deployment". Bricker claimed that the proposal to place a permanent American garrison in the European continent was a political decision of "great magnitude". Explaining the implications of the decision, he said:

Any American troops which become a part of the international army do not become subject to the direction and control of President Truman as Commander-in-Chief. General Eisenhower's boss is the Defence Council established by the North Atlantic Pact Nation. Next year the Supreme Commander may well be a French, British or Italian General. President Truman is not Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic Pact army. Therefore, any conclusion that he has power as Commander-in-Chief over that army is a non sequitur. (77)

Wherry declared in the Senate on 16 January, that the assignment of American troops merely to protect personal property of Americans in a local action was one thing, but that their assignment in a situation that might involve the country in another world war was another. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., (Republican, Massachusetts) pointed out that there was a great difference between sending a limited number of divisions "in the spirit of the Atlantic Pact" and sending a huge land force. "If we are," said Lodge, "going to send beyond a limited number of divisions...certainly that calls for a major policy decision in

77 Ibid., Part 2, p. 2866.
which Congress should participate." Congressman Paul J. Shafer (Republican, Michigan) argued that the ultimate authority rested with the Congress. He said:

...there is a general agreement that the President has a constitutional right to use American Armed forces instantly to repel an attack on American territory or nations, without waiting for congressional approval. It is something vastly different to claim that the President has the right to enlist this nation to any war in Europe or Asia, without the prior authority of the Congress.... (79)

While the critics were challenging the President's power to send troop to Europe, two documents were released that sought to lend support to the Administration's position. One was prepared by the Administration and the other by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs which had a Democratic majority. The executive document was entitled: "Powers of the President to send the Armed Forces outside the United States." The main objective of the executive document was to justify the action of President Truman. The House document was titled: "Background Information on the Use of United States Armed Forces in Foreign Countries." It was a collection of opinions on Presidential powers. These opinions mainly reiterated that the President had power to send troops overseas to safeguard American interests. Though the executive document was not endorsed by the Joint Committees, it was made part of the combined Committees report.

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78 Ibid., Part 1, p. 148.
79 Ibid., Part 11, p. A1393.
80 US House, Congress 82, session 1, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Committee print, Background Information on the Use of United States Armed Forces in Foreign Countries (Washington, D.C., 1951), pp. 2-28.
The document of the Executive branch asserted that the President had acted properly and constitutionally in sending troops to Korea in response to the resolution of the United Nations. It claimed that the President would be acting lawfully and constitutionally if he sent troops to Europe to implement the North Atlantic Treaty. It said:

While the Congress has power to declare war, to raise and support armies, to make rules for the government and regulations on the land and naval forces, and other powers important and necessary to the conduct of foreign policy and to the defense of the United States...these powers are not to be so construed as to curb or cripple the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief.... The Power to declare war, which is vested in the Congress by the Constitution does not impair the authority of the President, in the absence of a declaration of war, to do all that may be needful as Commander-in-Chief to repel invasion, to repress insurrection, and to use the Armed Forces for the defense of the United States. (81)

The executive document also cited a number of precedents to justify President Truman's decision to send troops to Europe. It stated:

While the most numerous class of these incidents is that involving the protection of American property and American citizens in foreign lands, many of them--such as the intervention of Texas in 1845 and in Mexico in 1917, the intervention in Panama in 1903-4, the dispatch of troops to Iceland in 1941--are not concerned with the interest of individual citizens but with the general defense of the United States or the protection of some national interest or some concern of American foreign policy. (32)

The executive document claimed that whenever the President believed that national security required the sending of troops, he could dispatch them to any point in the world. Since it was a power which only he could exercise, the provisions of treaties

81 Quoted in Congressional Record, vol. 97, Part 3, p. 2983.
82 Ibid.
which were concerned with such measures of defence, were certainly addressed to the President. In sending armed forces to implement the provisions of the treaty, the President, according to the executive document, did not require any statutory authority. It further stated that in the absence of Congressional prohibitions, the President was entitled to interpret the obligations of a treaty, to respond to circumstances as they arose, and to act upon his own interpretation to the extent that was within his constitutional function to do so.

The document argued that under the changed conditions that existed in world politics, it was imperative to preserve the capacity of the President to react swiftly in defence of the national interest. It said:

As this discussion of the respective power of the President and the Congress in this field has made clear, constitutional doctrine has been largely molded by practical necessities. Use of the Congressional power to declare war, for example, has fallen into abeyance because wars are no longer declared in advance. The constitutional power of the Commander-in-Chief has been exercised more often because the need for armed international action has grown more acute. The long delays occasioned by the slowness of the communications in the eighteenth century have been given place to breath-taking rapidity in the tempo of history. Repelling aggression in Korea or Europe cannot wait upon Congressional debate. (33)

The report of the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services lent indirect support to the President’s action by declining to grapple with the issue of whether prior Congressional approval was necessary. The report stated:

Some witnesses before the Committee took the position that the President would be usurping a Congressional function in sending American troops abroad in time of peace to serve as

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83 Ibid.
part of what was described as an international army. Others maintained that if the President has authority to send American troops abroad in time of war or for the protection of American lives and property, he also has the duty in time of peace to organize our defenses in the most effective ways to assure victory if the security of the United States should be endangered by an attack anywhere, this included authority for the President to put American troops into an integrated defense force if advisable.... With the exact line of authority between the President and the Congress in doubt for the past 160 years, the Committee did not endeavour to resolve this issue definitely at this time. (84)

Along with the issue of "authority", the issue of "military strategy" was also debated. Hoover and Taft argued that if Europe was attacked, the United States should defend the continent by using its "overwhelming air and naval power". The Administration was not prepared to accept the Hoover-Taft strategy. It pointed out that although the main strength of the US military would be air and sea power, it was not possible to defend Europe against attack with air and sea power alone. Secretary of Defence Marshall elaborated this point. He said: "We are providing much more support on the sea and in the air than on the ground. But we are not neglecting the ground. The experience of battle from earliest times down to Korea points to the continued decisive role of ground forces. There is no new development that would relegate the foot soldier to limbo in the near future." Other Administration sources pointed out that if the United States hesitated to participate in ground defence, Western Europe would construe it as a sign of an American belief in the indefensibility of the continent. Such a reaction would produce a disastrous effect on the European defence effort.

84 Ibid., p. 2864.
During the Joint Committees hearings, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, joined their Army colleague of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, in reiterating that American air and sea power, no matter how great, could not alone save Europe if the Russians attacked. General Collins recalled that while air and sea support had been of great value in Korea, the fact remained that "neither ships nor planes stopped the Korean communists when they moved across the Thirty-eighth parallel." The General added: "...Korea demonstrated also how difficult it is to build up forces after the enemy has launched his attack. It is far better to have effective force in the field ready to meet such an attack rather than to extemporize them or move them into action from great distance after the attack is launched."

The nature of the European contribution to common defence was another issue discussed in the debate. Once again it was Hoover and Taft who raised the issue of an adequate European contribution. In his very first speech on 20 December 1950, Hoover said that the US should not send another man or another dollar to Europe until Western Europe had raised enough divisions to create a "sure dam" against the Red Army. Later, on 9 February 1951, Hoover declared that the United States should not

86 U.S. Senate, Congress 82, session 1, Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area (Washington, D.C., 1951), p. 155. / Hereafter cited as U.S. Senate, Hearings, Assignment of Ground Forces in the European Area.
send to European countries more money or troops until they had
.large forces" in sight. Explaining his position in his testi-
mony before the Joint Committees, Hoover said: "I would not send
any of our boys in there while there is a totally inadequate
support, when there is nothing but certainty of massacre. That
is what I object to."

Senator Taft added another important dimension to the
issue. He suggested that the contribution to the common defence
should be based on a ratio system. He insisted that the American
contribution to the common defence should be on an one to nine
ratio or one-tenth of the total. A young Congressman named John
F. Kennedy (Democrat, Massachusetts), in his testimony before the
Joint Committees, also insisted that the European countries
should be made to contribute to the common defence in ratio to
the American contribution. He asserted that without some such
stipulation the Europeans might not make the sacrifices required
to build up within two or three years a combined force large
enough to deter the Red Army. "While I am in favour of sending
those four divisions to add to the two that are there, I say
before any more divisions are sent I think that the Europeans
are going to have to put up their 36 [divisions], a 6-to-1
ratio, and for every additional division we send over, they are
going to have to put up 6," Kennedy said.

On 14 February, one hundred eighteen of the one hundred
ninety nine Republican members of the House, offered a "declaration

87 Ibid., p. 742.
88 Ibid., p. 429.
of policy", on which no specific Congressional action was asked. The declaration suggested, among other things, that the United States "refuse further aid of any kind to Western Europe unless persuaded that Western Europe is carrying its full share of the burden." Thus was introduced in the initial "great debate" itself the term "burden sharing" which was to acquire considerable currency in subsequent years.

The Administration was not opposed to the demand of members of Congress for greater European contribution to the common defence. It also stressed the importance of European contribution to the common defence. The 9 September 1950 announcement of President Truman on the decision to send troops to Europe had itself, as pointed out earlier, given importance for the European contribution to the common defence. "A basic element in the implementation of the decision is the degree to which our friends match our action in this regard," the President had said. During the Joint Committees hearings, the Secretary of Defence, the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the JCS, all spoke in favour of an appropriate contribution to the common effort by the European allies.

The Administration, however, was not in favour of introducing a ratio system for the contribution to the common defence. General Eisenhower stated that it was very difficult to introduce a ratio system. "...I don't believe that in advance, and as of this moment, when we are trying so hard to get everybody..."

30 Ibid., 10 September 1950.
to do his best, we should say, "we will do X over Y", or any other exact proportion at this moment..." he told the Senate Committees. Other Administration spokesmen also supported his view. Secretary Acheson took issue with the view expressed by some Senators that the United States should await the actions of the European countries for development of their defensive forces before making its own contribution to the common defence. He said:

Our allies are building their forces now; the time for our own contribution is now. If each of the North Atlantic Nations should wait to appraise its partners' efforts before determining its own, the result would be as disastrous as it would be obvious. Whatever risks we may run by following the policies which our country has pursued thus far, the greatest risk of all is that we might once again hear the bitter refrain: 'Too little and too late'. And this time there may be no opportunity to remedy the mistake. (92)

During the Joint Committees' hearings, Hoover, Taft and Congressman Kennedy argued that the European defence effort was slow. Kennedy pointed out that the defence efforts in relation to the amount of money spent by European countries was much less than that spent by the United States in proportion to their national income. "We are planning to spend for defense purposes about $52 billion, which is about one-fifth of our national income of $250 billion," Kennedy said. "But none of the other countries of the North Atlantic Pact are going to devote percentages of its income in any relationship of ours...."

91 US Senate, Hearings, Assignment of Ground Forces in the European Area, n. 86, p. 27.  
92 Ibid., p. 85.  
93 Ibid., p. 428.
The Administration did not go along with such criticisms of the European defence effort. John Sherman Cooper, adviser to the Secretary of State and alternate representative to the United Nations General Assembly, pointed out during the Joint Committees' hearings that while in comparison with the steps taken in the United States, the defence programmes of Great Britain, France, and Italy would not appear large, in terms of "their capabilities and responsibilities" they represented large advances. Acheson also defended the European defence effort. He said:

...I believe there is a very distinct manifestation of that [defence effort] both in acts and in statements. If you look at the...figures prepared, December 1950, the United States had 15 men per 1,000 of the population under arms; France, 17; the United Kingdom, 14; Belgium, 12; and the Netherlands, 11. That indicates that the efforts are very much in the same proportion, and it goes on to indicate the percentage of gross national product which over the various years they have been applying, and the amounts which they are now going to apply in the future for the military establishments. They are making a great effort.... (94)

The cost of American contribution to North Atlantic common defence was another issue that was debated. Once again it was Hoover and Taft who sought to highlight the issue. Hoover pointed out that to train, equip, place in Europe, and maintain for one year "ten of the usual combination of American divisions would cost about $4,500,000,000." This cost, Hoover argued, was a great "economic strain" because along with it, the United States also had to expand its sea and air power. If the same amount required for stationing troops in Europe was spent on purchasing aircraft, it would significantly increase the US strike capability. The operational cost too would be cheaper than the cost

94 Ibid., p. 36.
of maintaining troops in Europe. Endorsing Hoover's view, in it asserted that the military establishment planned by the Truman administration was "very near to" or perhaps even beyond the limit that the US could maintain in "economic health," and further ground troops commitments to Europe would tend to put the budget well beyond the danger line.

The administration did not seek to respond in detail to the criticism in respect of costs. In 1951, the issue did not have the dimensions of recent years. The Administration did not feel that undue budgetary strains would result owing to the projected programme. Hence, the Administration contented itself with informing the Joint Committees of the cost involved with regard to the stationing of troops in Europe. Military authorities estimated that the cost of transporting and maintaining the four American divisions to be sent to Europe would be $240,000,000 more for the first year than if those units remained in the United States. The added cost for the second year—that is above the maintenance expenditure required for four divisions in the United States—would be about $111,000,000.

As the debate progressed, the Administration remained confident that it would ultimately have its way, and that the number of all-out critics of its course would be relatively small. It made no effort that could be interpreted as applying pressure or arm-twisting tactics on individual member of Congress. Secretary of State Acheson, as the New York Times pointed, maintained an attitude of studied aloofness. Averell B. Harriman,

96 Ibid., 8 April 1951.
an important Presidential adviser, was not seen to engage himself in active lobbying. The Administration was content to leave the task to the Democratic leaders in the two houses who were helped by a favourable public opinion stimulated skilfully by the Administration, and sustained by major news media and interest groups. In the Senate Connally marshalled his forces effectively with the full co-operation of Georgia's Richard Russell, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee. Among Democrats who forcefully rebutted Republican critics were William Benton (Connecticut), Herbert Lehman (New York) and Hubert Humphrey (Minnesota). Republicans who spoke in support of the Administration included Margaret Chase Smith of Maine and Wayne Morse of Oregon. Vandenberg whose co-operation had been invaluable to the Administration in previous years was seriously ill, and took no part in the debate.

Senate Majority Leader Ernest W. McFarland of Arizona posed a problem to Connally and Russell. He approved sending four divisions to Europe but proposed an amendment that would require "full collaboration" with Congress on any future action. He was supported by Brien McMahon (Democrat, Connecticut) and Republicans Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. of Massachusetts and Irving M. Ives of New York. Connally disseminated the view that McFarland's position was "impracticable". He avoided tangling with the Senator frontally, and quietly managed the defeat of the amendment by 57 to 35 votes in the Senate.

The Democratic floor managers realized nonetheless that some gesture was needed that would mollify critics, and preserve

freedom of action in the future for Congress without affecting the implementation of the programme envisaged by the Administration. The final resolution incorporated an amendment moved by Senator John McClellan (Democrat, Arkansas), which was intended to resolve the issue of "authority" under which the troops were to be sent. The amendment expressed the "Sense of the Senate" that "no ground troops in addition to such four divisions should be sent to Western Europe in implementation of Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty without further Congressional approval." The resolution as amended also stipulated that "the major contribution of ground forces" in Western Europe should come from the European members of the Atlantic Alliance. On the main issue the resolution stated that: "It is the belief of the Senate that the threat to the security of the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty partners make it necessary for the United States to station abroad such units of our armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area."

The resolution was adopted by a comfortable vote of 69 to 21. Forty two Democrats and 29 Republicans supported the resolution while a mere 2 Democrats and 19 Republicans voted against. The Democratic Senators who voted against the resolution were J. William Fulbright of Arkansas and Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana. It is interesting to note that Fulbright explained that he had

98 _Congressional Record, vol. 97, Part 3, p. 3095._

99 Ibid., p. 3282.
voted against the resolution because of his belief that the moral restrictions placed on the President were unconstitutional. Thus, Fulbright at that time had no objection at all to the right of the President to send troops abroad. Ellender, on the other hand, stated that he was against the whole "troop enterprise". Two other Senators, Lyndon B. Johnson (Democrat, Texas) and Richard M. Nixon (Republican, California), who were to become subsequently Presidents of the United States, voted in favour of the resolution. Another Congressman, who in later years was to demand a substantial reduction in the United States troops stationed in Europe, did not play any significant role in the Congressional debate of 1951. He was Mike Mansfield (Democrat, Montana), who later became the Democratic Party leader from 1961 to 1976 in the United States Senate.

While the Administration was jubilant over the passage of the resolution, critics like Senator Taft could draw some comfort that the McClellan amendment had been incorporated in the resolution. Taft himself voted for the resolution.

The resolution itself was firmer in tone and content than the original resolution reported out of the Joint Committees. The McClellan amendment did keep alive the issue of Congressional participation in the future decision regarding additional deployment of troops. It had significant implications for the future. But since the requirement merely expressed the "Sense-of-the-Senate," the Administration could ignore it as long as the political balance in Congress and among the public was tilted in its favour.
The decision to send troops to Europe during peace time, was a significant landmark in US post Second World War foreign policy. That decision came only after a major system of Alliance had been evolved. The fact that the North Atlantic Alliance had already come into existence greatly facilitated the decision.

It is interesting to note that the United States did not seek to justify the decision to send troops to Europe on the basis of the "self-help and mutual aid" provision of Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Acheson pointed out that there was no binding commitment on the US to take such an action under the Article 3. The decision to send troops to Europe, Acheson clarified, had no connection whatsoever to any commitment under NATO or any later agreement. Even the quantum of troops to be sent had nothing to do with NATO or any other agreement, Acheson claimed. Thus, according to one of the principal architects of American policy, the decision to send troops to Europe was exclusively an American one, determined by American interests.

To US policy-makers, Western Europe’s independence and its association with America were indispensable to American security. Acheson, enlarging on what Truman had stated earlier, mentioned some of the reasons that influenced the Administration to uphold such a view. Firstly, outside the United States, Europe had the greatest number of scientists, the greatest industrial production, and the largest pool of skilled manpower in the

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100 Truitt, n. 52, p. 85.
world. Secondly, Europe’s coal, steel and electric power resources were enormous. Thirdly, Europe had a tremendous shipbuilding capacity, essential to control of the sea. Fourthly, through Europe’s overseas connections, the United States had access to a vast supply of raw materials which were absolutely vital to American industry. Apart from these four reasons, Acheson said:

As an ally, Western Europe represents more than 200,000,000 free people who can contribute their skills, their resources, and their courage to our common defense. Under the heel of an aggressor, Western Europe would represent 200,000,000 slaves, compelled to bend their energies and employ their resources for the destruction of the United States and the remainder of Western civilization. Under present world tensions there are but two possibilities for Europe. It will either be an adequately defended ally, a great addition to the defense of freedom, or it will fall under the control of the Kremlin, multiplying the military might of the Soviet armies. (101)

After identifying Western Europe as the area of highest priority as far as security of the United States was concerned, the Truman Administration attempted to evolve an appropriate US military posture. That military posture, the Administration indicated, could not ignore developing conventional and limited war capabilities, especially after the Soviet atomic explosion. However, the Administration believed at that time that such changes in US military posture would not necessarily mean giving up the basic US policy of deterrence. Acheson affirmed during hearings, that the United States prime purpose would still be to deter the aggressor from attacking Europe. He said that it would not be the United States’ main objective, to win a war after it

To prevent a military attack on Europe, Acheson stated, there were three deterrent factors. The first was "retaliatory power"—capability of striking with air power against the centers of aggression. The second was the "reserve power," capable of convincing the Soviet Union that they would not win in the end. And, lastly, there was the newly formed integrated forces-in-being of NATO. "This third deterrent factor is the one at issue," said Acheson. That deterrent, according to Acheson, was weak and the United States was striving to build it up as quickly as possible.

The administration's anxiety to build up the third deterrent quickly was the outcome of its awareness that one of the deterrents or atomic advantage would disappear in future. Under those conditions, a balanced collective force in Western Europe, the Administration indicated, could deter aggression and neutralize the Soviet conventional force superiority. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar M. Bradley, amplified this view during the Joint Committees hearings. He pointed out that if collective defense was built to a point where Western Europe would not be easy to overrun, then, the "chance of war" would be reduced materially. "These six U.S. divisions in themselves," said Bradley, "...would...add to the collective defense and help build toward that time when we would hope that the force is such that it would be a complete deterrent to..."
As far as the "retaliatory power" aspect of the deterrent was concerned, the Administration was of the view that it, by itself, was not a complete deterrent, because in 1950-51, the US did not possess a large enough intercontinental bomber fleet to enable it to fight a war exclusively from the home front. Many US bombers had to depend on overseas air bases for landing and refueling. "In other words, they cannot perform an operational mission against Eurasia from bases on this continent," said Lt. General Curtis E. LeMay, Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, during the Joint Committees hearings. Therefore, the security of the crucial overseas bases in Europe became a crucial factor. To safeguard bases the Administration pointed out, stationing of US ground forces in or around that bases was indispensable. General Bradley said: "...we cannot base our planes and ships on fields and ports that are undefended. The adequate defense of an area—and especially the important area of Europe—will require American divisions."

General Bradley did not, however, favor sending only ground forces to Europe. He said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation to the Secretary of Defence and the President on the number of land troops in Europe was, in substance, as follows:

103 Ibid., p. 135.
104 Ibid., p. 323.
105 Ibid., p. 127.
It is our opinion that additional United States forces should be committed to the defense of Europe at the earliest practicable date.... United States forces in Europe should include sufficient tactical air groups and appropriate naval forces, and the forces should be in place and ready for combat as expeditiously as possible. We are in favor of increasing our ground strength to approximately six divisions, and our tactical air force accordingly. (106)

The JC3 recommendation was approved by the President on 3 September 1950. That decision meant approving among other things the JC3 view that without adequate army force on the ground, backed up by tactical air forces, it would be impossible to prevent the overrunning of Europe by the Soviet Union.

The Administration, however, did not visualise only an overt Soviet aggression. It anticipated "another form of Communist aggression--disguised aggression through a satellite." To the administration, the North Korean "attack" provided the best example of such an "aggression". It believed that a similar contingency in Europe should be taken into account in American planning. Administration spokesmen described the \textit{Bereitschaften} or "alert troops" of the East Germany as fully indoctrinated in Communist ideology, and strongly equipped with tanks and heavy artillery. During the Joint Committees hearings Acheson pointed out that the force build-up in East Germany and "satellite states" was proceeding steadily. He argued that that build-up

\begin{itemize}
  \item [106] Ibid.
  \item [107] Ibid., pp. 154, 192, 193.
  \item [108] Ibid., p. 79.
\end{itemize}
contained the possibility of overt moves which could be "dis-
claimed by the real center of aggression". Such disguised
aggression, Acheson pointed out, could only be deterred by the
presence of adequate forces-in-being in Europe.

The American occupation forces in Germany, the Administra-
tion opined, could be hardly expected to perform the function of
detering "disguised aggression through a satellite," because of
their limited purpose. They were deployed to carry out constabu-
lary duty in the American zone of occupation in Germany. They
were not organized for combat purposes. Moreover, the Administra-
tion voiced concern about their safety in case of a military
attack from East. The point was emphasized especially after the
outbreak of the Korean war. General Bradley said:

...the two United States divisions now in Germany as part
of the occupation would, if war came, be in great danger. Increas-
ing the number to six divisions would immeasurably improve their
ability to defend themselves. I agree with General Eisenhower
that the increased forces would be able to take care of themselves
under almost any conditions.... (111)

The additional US divisions proposed to be stationed in
Europe, Acheson pointed out, would give the United States vitally
needed time to bring other home-based US forces into action in
the event of a flare-up in Europe. They would oblige the aggres-
sor to pay a high price and deny him a speedy fait accompli.
"These are forces that would prevent Europe, in the event of an

110 US Senate, Hearings, Assignment of Ground Forces in the
European Area, n. 36, p. 79.
111 Ibid., p. 126.
attack, from having to go through another occupation and liberation," Acheson said.

The Pentagon had its own special version of the security function that an additional US troops in Germany would perform. It believed that the stationing additional US troops in Germany would smoothen the process of German rearmament, a project it was deeply committed to, especially after the outbreak of Korean war. Vividly recalling German military capability as evidenced in the Second World War, the military and civilian leaders of the Pentagon were keen to harness the military potential of Germany into the NATO integrated command. They believed that the defence of Europe would be credible only if German rearmament was initiated and Germany actively participated in the defence of Europe. Nevertheless, the Pentagon was aware of the intense Soviet antagonism to such a project. They occasionally referred to the possibility of a Soviet or East German preventive attack. Additional US troops in Germany, the Pentagon argued, would provide the needed protection for Germany in its initial stage of rearmament.

The State Department, for its own reasons, did not give top priority to German rearmament. It had to take note of the sensitivity of West European countries, especially France, to a rearmed Germany. The Department put forth its own special version of the security function that the additional US troops in Germany would perform. It argued that apart from deterring a

112 Ibid., p. 80
Soviet military action, US troops in Germany would perform the function of diminishing the French fears of a rearmed Germany.

The administration also stressed psychological benefits in terms of improved morale among allies by the stationing of additional troops in Europe. Acheson pointed out that the United States having already taken the leadership in planning and organizing for "freedom" and "security" throughout the world, had a responsibility to set an example and to provide initiatives in the "period of action". Both Acheson and Bradley indicated that it would be inappropriate for the leader of the "free world" to say that it would withhold its contribution to collective security till other members pressed their willingness to contribute their fair share. As the leader of the Alliance, Acheson declared, the United States had no choice but to provide the initiative for the development of a "defensive force", and thereby strengthen the "morale of Western Europe". General Bradley said: "Free nations must have the will to fight. By sending additional troops overseas soon, we give reassurance that we intend to help them defend themselves. Their morale and their will to fight will certainly grow with every increase in the armed strength on the frontiers."

A high degree of agreement on policy objectives within each of the concerned Departments of the Executive branch, a noteworthy absence of any significant differences among the heads of

113 Rostow, n. 30, p. 220.

the Departments and Agencies, and the strong positive leadership of the President enabled the Administration to push unitedly for Congressional approval of the programme. Unity, harmony and determination on the part of the Executive branch would not necessarily guarantee Congressional acceptance of a programme, but they can contribute significantly to such an outcome. In any event erosion in those areas would very adversely affect smooth passage of suggested programme through Congress. Members of Congress are sensitive to public opinion reflected in representation from organized interest groups and constituent mail. A relatively smooth passage of a suggested programme through Congress would often depend upon the Administration's skill in mobilizing public opinion in favour of its course.

When the public opinion is aroused concerning the existence of a dangerous threat to national security from a powerful adversary, and if the response to the threat adumbrated by the Administration is vigorously supported by the Service Chiefs, the Administration finds it possible to move forward on the course determined by it with great ease. When among the spokesmen of the Administration and the military services were immensely popular war heroes such as Marshall, Eisenhower and Bradley, the Administration's case is greatly strengthened. Those were names that had a deep impact not only on the people at-large but on many interest groups, and even on members of the opposition party in Congress.

A massive and successful public relation effort was
mounted by the Truman Administration with the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine and the subsequent launching of the Marshall Plan and NATO. It continued to pay dividends. By and large the major economic interests, the academic community, and the "attentive public" endorsed the Administration's initiative. In such an environment the warnings sounded by men like Hoover and Taft regarding Presidential powers, Congressional responsibility, over-extension of commitment failed to receive significant support even from the Republican party. The Truman Administration could justifiably claim that the decision to send troops to Europe represented the broad national consensus on the issue.


116 In February 1951 Thirty-four "private witnesses" appeared before the Senate Joint Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees and gave their testimony on the assignment of US ground forces to European area. These witnesses represented various walks of life. For details see, US Senate, Hearings, Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area, n. 86, pp. 237-314.