Chapter One

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The foreign policy of a country is conditioned by an interplay of various factors and forces which are technically termed "determinants" of policy. These factors and forces can be divided into two broad categories: (1) environmental or situational and (ii) predispositional. While the first includes the prevailing international situation, economic compulsions, strategic considerations, historical legacies, etc., the second refers to the foreign policy outlook of the decision-makers, i.e. "the attitudinal prism" through which the decision-making elites view the existing environment. The post-war British foreign policy in general and British policy and attitude towards the Indian subcontinent in particular can be explained and analysed in the light of this general framework.

The end of the Second World War marked a turning-point in the history of international relations in general and in British outlook on world affairs in particular. International politics entered upon an era of new power relationships among

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the nations of the world. While the Soviet Union emerged as the massively industrialized Communist country having all the potentialities of a Great Power, the United States moved out of isolation with a tremendous capacity to influence the course of international politics. Britain surrendered its primacy in the hierarchy of power. It was no longer in a position to exercise massive influence as it emerged from the war economically crippled, politically powerless, and strategically vulnerable. It, therefore, started thinking of its future in terms of survival in a world dominated by two giant Powers -- the USA and the USSR.

However, Britain was not prepared to surrender its obligations as a Power of status and authority. It has been rightly said:

In terms of her world responsibilities, Britain came easily second, and although her power to discharge them might be limited, she nevertheless rightly felt herself to be still the same sort of power that she had been before, handicapped indeed by lack of resources, but still cast for a world part, which no one else, for the time being, could play in her stand. 3

The world-wide overseas empire of Great Britain started crumbling immediately after the Second World War. Its foundations of power in the Far East, South-East Asia, and the Middle East was undermined by the emergence of Russia and China, which

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3 Younger, n. 1, p. 3.
shattered the *status quo* and greatly altered the balance of power in Asia. Moreover, the transfer of power in 1947 to India and Pakistan severely affected Britain's economic and political status in the world. But the end of empire did not bring the end of responsibilities so far as Britain's world-wide role was concerned. Out of a dying empire there emerged an institution unique in history, a living and growing multi-racial Commonwealth. Britain was ready for this change. Indeed it felt a sense of fulfilment rather than of loss in the emergence of the multi-racial Commonwealth.

Though Britain lost the economic and military bases of its status as a Great Power, it remained a Power with world-wide interests. There were in fact certain permanent problems which British foreign policy had, since Tudor times, been called upon to solve. The most important of these problems was that of ensuring the peace and security of the realm. Then there was the problem of providing for the prosperity of the people through the development of overseas trade. The problem of

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protecting Britain's overseas interests and lines of communication was another important concern.

In shaping its diplomacy so as to protect its overseas interests and lines of communication, Britain relied on its naval supremacy and such military forces as it could bring to bear. This meant, at any rate until recently, the safeguarding of the road to India. The road to India was also the road to the Far East and to Australia. In short, the course of Britain's foreign policy was substantially determined by the range and vulnerability of its overseas commerce and other overseas interests.

Thus the primary interest of the United Kingdom in the conduct of its post-war foreign relations was to ensure freedom of access to overseas sources of raw materials and other supplies not available from domestic production. The problem of protecting Britain's overseas interests and lines of communication had a number of distinct aspects -- political, strategic, and economic. Politically it was in the interest of Britain to maintain peaceful and friendly relations with as many other countries as possible. It was the strength which came from these overseas connexions that enabled Britain to win its way through the great European crises. Strategically, it was vital to ensure the freedom of navigation along the principal sea routes and airways of the world. This meant maintenance of

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6 Ibid., p. 385.
7 Ibid., pp. 386-7.
8 Ibid., p. 390.
naval supremacy and freedom of the seas and lines of
communication to all parts of the world. Economically, the
objective was the establishment and maintenance of a system
of international trade and payments, such as would enable
Britain to procure its imported supplies in sufficient quantity
and on favourable terms. In short, economic compulsions and
considerations were a predominant element in the British
approach to foreign policy.

But so far as the attainment of these foreign-policy
objectives was concerned, certain factors and forces affected
the course of British diplomacy in the Indian subcontinent.

II

British economy, which came under severe strain at the
end of the Second World War, became a major factor influencing
the course of its foreign policy in general and its policy and
attitude towards the Indian subcontinent in particular. The
war cost Britain a substantial portion of its overseas invest-
ments that paid for nearly a third of its total imports. The
war effort is estimated to have cost Britain a quarter of its
national wealth or some £7,300 million. Even physical
destruction on land accounted for some £1,600 million.

9 P.A. Wilson, The Political, Strategic and Economic
Interests of the United Kingdom (London, mimeographed,
10 UK, House of Commons, Debates, vol. 413, session 1945-46,
16 August 1946, col. 123.
Moreover, the internal disinvestment caused by the failure to replace plant and machinery totalled some £900 million. The most severe compulsion in the financial crisis, however, was the sale of foreign assets valued at £4,200 million, towards payment for essential imports and military supplies received from abroad during the war. 11

In 1945 Britain sold about £1,100 million of her overseas investments, which was about a third of the pre-war assets. Further, it incurred a debt of about £2,000 million, in addition to the loss of about £150 million of gold and dollar reserves. Britain's sterling balances amounted to approximately £3,700 million against a reserve of £610 million. In short, the balance-of-payments difficulties aggravated the economic crisis in Britain. In the words of Fitzsimons: "The British economy was no longer to be strongly supported by earnings and returns from abroad, and at the same time debtor British economy was ill-equipped for the necessary effort to increase production and exports." 12

In view of this extremely vulnerable state of its economy during the post-war period Britain was compelled to follow a

foreign policy which was to some extent different from the one it had followed in the past. The economic crisis made it depend on the aid of the United States and the Dominions. Practically all its debts were in sterling, and it was in the centre of the Sterling Area which involved almost all Commonwealth countries. It, therefore, looked to the Commonwealth countries for sympathy and support in its efforts to tide over its financial crisis.

Britain's post-war foreign policy had two broad economic objectives — to ensure its ability to purchase large quantities of food and raw materials from foreign countries and to promote sale of its finished products abroad. The co-operation of the countries falling in the Sterling Area became indispensable for Britain.

Successive British Governments maintained economic relations with the Commonwealth countries through trade, economic aid, and capital investment. The Sterling Area was also one of the bases of Britain's economic relations with those countries. Britain maintained preferential trade relations with those countries to keep up exports of manufactured goods in exchange for imports of food and raw materials from abroad. It also supported the economic development of its former colonies by providing financial and technical aid to them. Moreover, it encouraged private investment in foreign countries which constituted a major source of income from abroad.

Although the war had definitely and decisively crippled Britain's capacity for overseas investment and the country was no longer in a position to invest private capital abroad on as large a scale as before, Britain made a great effort to sustain
flow of capital to overseas countries for their economic development. Its main motive was to maintain the strength of the sterling and to develop its economy.

Britain pursued these economic interests in the Asian region, particularly South and South-East Asia, which was especially relevant to the framework of its foreign-policy objectives. The stakes of British industrial, financial, and commercial interests remained very substantial even after the transfer of power in the subcontinent. This region furnishes the United Kingdom with essential supplies of wool and livestock products, rubber and tin, jute and tea and manganese.

Britain's share of private capital investment in India and Pakistan after the transfer of power in 1947 is a great deal larger than that of any foreign Power, including the United States. Britain has maintained a leading position in the foreign trade of both the countries. At the beginning of the sixties, the British share of all private foreign investment in India was almost 80 per cent and worth £ 300,000,000, i.e. more than double the figure for 1948. Britain also retains a large share of India's foreign trade: in 1965 it accounted for 19 per cent of India's exports and provided 12 per cent of India's imports. Similarly, British private investment at the beginning of the sixties in Pakistan was estimated at £ 60,000,000. This was 52 per cent of all foreign private investment there, compared with 15 per cent for US firms.

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15 See Cmd 237 (1957), pp. 3-4.
16 Wilson, n. 9, p. 12.
However, the British lead in the foreign trade of Pakistan is not so large as it is in the case with India. In reality, the main British concern in this area is to institute a full-scale Marshall Plan for India to save it from Socialist and Communist penetration.

However, Britain's declining position in the world economy in general and its chronic balance-of-payments difficulties in particular severely limited its capacity to meet India's growing need for financial aid in the sixties. India, which relied heavily on its large sterling balances immediately after Independence, could not get long-term British aid at a sufficiently high level. It, therefore, turned elsewhere for help. The Soviet Union provided large credits on easy terms for industrial projects. International agencies like the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association, as well as the United States, extended massive economic aid to India. So the decline in the British position in the subcontinent became a reality in the sixties.

III

Strategic considerations also influenced the course of Britain's post-war foreign policy towards the Indian subcontinent. Britain maintained a large net-work of military bases in and around the Commonwealth countries. This was done partly to

17 For these data, see Donald Maclean, British Foreign Policy since Suez, 1956-68 (London, 1970), pp. 234-42.
facilitate control of its major sea routes and partly to ensure the security of the Commonwealth and empire. Its military bases in the Indian Ocean area in particular were a major source of defence strength at the cross-roads in the Indian Ocean. Singapore assumed great importance in Britain's Far East defence strategy.

Though Britain pulled out all its forces from India and Pakistan after the transfer of power in 1947, Britain gave adequate assistance to them in the establishment of their own defence forces. It did so even though there existed no defence agreement between Britain and India or Pakistan. The strategic location of the Indian subcontinent continued to be important in British eyes as it occupied the central position in the still far-flung British defences extending from Hong Kong to the Middle East, from East Africa to the northern passes of Burma.

It was the earnest desire of Britain to maintain its obligations of defence towards the Asian regions even after the Second World War. The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, stated in the House of Commons on 21 February 1946:

I think the policy we have to follow so far as the dependent territories (India, Malaya, Ceylon) are concerned which are emerging into independence, is


20 Even before the transfer of power in 1947, the need for close co-operation between India and Britain in future had been advocated in two separate studies. See K.M. Panikkar, The Basis of an Indo-British Treaty (Bombay, 1946); and Guy Wint, The British in Asia (London, 1947).
to nurse them, guide them, help them to change over as a going concern, to keep their administration intact, to provide them with experts. I am not too sure that from the point of our own interests in this country we should not do far better by helping these countries and assisting them from a purely trade point of view in trade and commerce than we did under the old fashioned colonial system of the past. That is our policy for the Far East. 21

The British Defence White Paper of 1945 spelt out two objectives in broad terms — economic reconstruction at home and maintenance of responsibilities overseas, which included the safeguarding of their communications and the upkeep of their bases. 22 The Defence White Paper of 1948, which placed special emphasis on the defence of the Commonwealth, also stated:

The security of the United Kingdom is one of the keystones of the Commonwealth defence, but equally the United Kingdom alone, without the support of the Commonwealth, would lose much of its effective influence and power... The control of communications and of strategic keypoints is essential to the achievement of this aim. 23

As Britain alone could not have defended the Commonwealth, it wanted to evolve a policy of collective self-defence. This policy was spelt out in the Defence White Paper of 1950. It was a policy of seeking "security through the development of collective self-defence, within the framework of the United Nations Charter, in co-operation with the other members of the Commonwealth, the United States and the like minded nations." 24

The White Paper of 1953 made it more explicit by dividing the defence programme into two parts -- first, overseas obligations and commitments in resisting Communist expansion; and second, preparations together with Commonwealth partners and allies against the risks of direct Communist attack.

These considerations led Britain to welcome the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955. The United States became its principal and most dependable ally in all defence organizations in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. In SEATO Britain found an alliance to resist the spread of communism in South and South-East Asia where it had Commonwealth and colonial interests. In fact, its primary interest in SEATO was the security of the Asian members of the Commonwealth.

Thus, in the decade after the Second World War, Britain's defence policy was concentrated basically on securing and encouraging a permanent system of defence in strategically important regions. The first area of major concern was Europe, where the Communist danger seemed most perceptible. The second in priority came the Middle East, where Britain's economic interests were at stake.

The White Paper of 1957 spelt out British obligations in South-East Asia in explicit terms:

In South East Asia, apart from defending her colonies and protectorates, Britain has agreed to assist in the external defence of Malaya after she attains independence. Britain also has an international commitment, as a member of the SEATO and ANZUS defence systems, to help preserve stability and resist the extension of Communist power in that area. It is proposed to maintain in this theatre a mixed British Gurkha force and certain air force elements, together with a substantial garrison in Hong-Kong and a small naval force based on Singapore.... It is the Government's intention to maintain British naval strength East of Suez at its present level. One carrier group will normally be stationed in the Indian Ocean. 27

However, Britain alone was not in a position to defend the Asian region militarily. It, therefore, encouraged the United States to take over some of the responsibilities for the security of the area. This led to Britain's fully co-operating with the United States defence schemes in the area. As Pakistan co-operated in such schemes, and India went on opposing them, Britain came to share the US commitment to maintain Pakistan's military and political importance in the South Asian region at a sufficiently high level.

IV

The Commonwealth has been one of the most important factors influencing the course of British foreign policy in one form or another since the Second World War. When the British Empire became transformed into a Commonwealth, it

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27 Cmd 124 (1957), pp. 5-6.

28 For British interests in the Commonwealth, see Peter Lyon, "Britain and the Commonwealth", in Leifer, n. 1, pp. 120-49; and J.D.B. Miller, "British Interests and the Commonwealth", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, November 1966, pp. 120-50.
produced a psychological satisfaction; the Commonwealth became a substitute for the old empire. The Commonwealth connexion became a vital economic and strategic concern for successive British Governments, which derived strength from, and placed high hopes in, the Commonwealth.

The post-war evolution of the Commonwealth and the radical change it underwent in its composition and character conditioned Britain's outlook on world affairs. The two milestones -- multiraciality and equality of status -- in the post-war evolution of the Commonwealth represented two distinct phases in the British attitude towards the association. Britain at first evinced much enthusiasm towards the Commonwealth very warmly. Indeed it took special interest in bringing new members into this association. When the Attlee Government initiated the process of decolonization, it was anxious to ensure that the newly independent nations became members of the Commonwealth. It was especially so when the Indian subcontinent gained independence. Attlee "secured the willing decision of India and Pakistan to remain in the Commonwealth" even after the transfer of power to them.


India also wished to be a member of the Commonwealth for various considerations. In fact a mutuality of interests brought India and Britain closer to each other and helped in dissipating whatever bitterness there had been generated during the struggle for independence. It has been rightly pointed out that "it was past associations, community of economic and strategic interests, community of political faith and the fear of isolation which induced India to remain in the Commonwealth".

The heterogeneity and diversity that the Commonwealth acquired with the expansion of its membership affected Britain's position in the association. The diversity came to the surface when some members of the Commonwealth refused to endorse the British line on certain important international issues like the Suez crisis. This diversity of opinion among the members of the Commonwealth grew with time. As Britain ceased to be a *prima inter pares*, its status as a world Power suffered decline. This, in its turn, affected Britain's foreign policy. Britain had to take into consideration the viewpoints of other members of the Commonwealth increasingly in order to preserve the organization intact.


34 See, Frankel, n. 1, pp. 222-33.
The Commonwealth connexion acts as a constraint on British foreign policy in different ways. The growing independence of action among the members of the Commonwealth, the desire for consultations among them, the impact of disputes within the Commonwealth, the importance of economic considerations to both independent members of the Commonwealth and the colonies, etc., put some limitations on Britain's freedom of action in international affairs.

The trend towards independent action among the members of the Commonwealth became marked especially after 1947, when India and Pakistan achieved independence. Even after becoming a Republic, India wished to remain in the Commonwealth, but showed no anxiety to fall in line with Britain's policies on many international issues. It thus took a stand critical of the Western countries in the Korean crisis of 1951, raised its voice against the formation of regional military alliances in Asia such as SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, and attacked the United Kingdom and the United States for their roles in the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 and in the Hungarian crisis of 1957.

In spite of India's sharp differences with it on different world issues, Britain regarded India as a major asset to the Commonwealth. It also thought of India as a bridge of communication with Communist China and with the new states both inside and outside the Commonwealth. Similarly Britain attached much importance to Pakistan's membership of the Commonwealth. It

treated Pakistan as a bridge of communication with the countries of the Middle East. These Middle Eastern countries were culturally very close to Pakistan. Some of them had military alliances with Pakistan as well.

V

Yet another important factor influencing the foreign policy and attitude of Britain towards the Indian subcontinent has been the consideration of historical legacies which continued to dominate the minds of foreign-policy decision-makers even after the transfer of power in 1947. The British administration in India covering a period of more than a hundred and fifty years left a number of legacies paving the way for continued co-operation and consultation in different spheres between India and Pakistan on the one hand and Britain on the other.

India and Pakistan each inherited a highly efficient and well-trained bureaucracy, a well-equipped army, a system of law and judiciary based on the British principle of the rule of law, the governmental organisation, structure, and procedure based on the British parliamentary system, etc. These institutions continued to provide a link between Britain and the Indian subcontinent even after Independence.

Moreover, Britain left a system of education which was conducive to the promotion of very close co-operation even after the transfer of power in the subcontinent. The English language

remained a major lingua franca in India. Almost all the Indian leaders who received English education had developed a sense of respect for British political ideas and values. Even in the field of economy India and Pakistan inherited a system of trade and commerce in which Britain was a major partner. The old British liberal traditions still survived.

Furthermore, India and Pakistan with their common experience of British rule share a tradition of British method, and institutions in law, education, and training. They use a common language -- English -- in all their dealings with one another. Such a tradition, along with the smooth transfer of power, which created a favourable image of the British character provided a possibility for larger and larger co-operation and consultation in future.

VI

In order to have a proper perspective on the British attitudes towards the Indo-Pakistani conflict, it is imperative to go into the background of the partition of the Indian subcontinent. The British role in this development is still a controversial issue. However, there is no doubt that the predispositional attitudes or images of the British elites, political and administrative, have determined the course of events leading to the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947.

Successive British Governments stressed the importance of giving due weight to the demands of the Muslims and repeatedly
underlined the differences between the Hindus and the Muslims.

This view is confirmed by the confidential correspondence that took place in 1939 between Lord Zetland, the then Secretary of State for India, and Lord Linlithgow, the then Viceroy of India. Zetland wrote to Linlithgow on 9 May 1939 on the vexed problem of communalism in the subcontinent. He said: "The deep-seated dislike and fear of the Hindu domination on the part of ninety million Muslims is a thing which we cannot possibly brush aside."

Viceroy Linlithgow, too, felt alike, and declared:

"There are grave differences of view which have to be taken into account, which should be bridged. There are strong and deeply rooted interests which are entitled to the fullest consideration and whose attitude is not a thing lightly to be brushed aside. There are minorities which are great in numbers as well as great in historic importance and in culture. These are all factors to which due importance has to be given."

Further, in one of his letters to Zetland, Linlithgow suggested that due weight should be given to the size and cultural and religious divisions among the major communities in India. The letter said:

"We may have to go a good deal further than we have done in giving weight to their [Muslims'] point of view.... It might be of value... that considering this problem one did definitely have to give weight not only to the size of the minority -- twice the population of British Isles and as large as the whole of the German Reich -- but also to the deep cultural division and the fundamental cleavage on the religious issue.... The issues raised by Jinnah are very


38 Indian Annual Register (Calcutta), vol. 2 of 1939, p. 411.
substantial indeed; and we shall have to be extremely careful as to what we say to him and as to the manner and form of any reply. I do not in the least want to discourage the Muslims. 39

These statements are sufficient indication of the British decision to go on encouraging the Muslim League in its anti-Congress postures. This ultimately widened the differences between the two organizations. Britain took advantage of the divisions that existed between the two major communities in the subcontinent. In fact it used the communal divisions as the main justification for the prolongation of its rule over the subcontinent. The communal situation thus deteriorated progressively and prepared the ground for the partition of the subcontinent.

A few days after the passage of the Pakistan Resolution, the Viceroy wrote to the Secretary of State in a mood of great satisfaction. He sought to focus attention especially on the categorical stand taken by the Muslim League. He even suggested that there could be no question of their overruling or ignoring the Muslim opposition. He further commented: "Silly as the Muslim scheme for partition is, it would be a pity to throw cold water on it at the moment, though clearly we cannot accept it or associate ourselves with it...." 41


40 The Muslim League at its twenty-seventh session held at Lahore on 22 and 23 March 1940 passed the famous Pakistan Resolution demanding the partition of India.

41 Veerathappa, n. 39, pp. 582-3.
The new National Government headed by Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill gave the Muslim League a virtual veto over India's constitutional advance, a veto which the League had been demanding since the outbreak of the war. The Viceroy declared in a statement of 3 August 1940: "It goes without saying that they [the British Government] could not contemplate transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life."

The new Secretary of State for India, Leopold S. Amery, made it clear that this declaration was based on a clear acceptance of the two-nation theory propounded by the Muslim League while demanding partition. He accepted the existence of two communities in India which could not be described as a majority and a minority but which in fact constituted two separate nations.

The British Government clearly conceded the demand for partition in a formal State Paper brought to India by Cripps in 1942. It also indicated, through the Cripps Plan, its preparedness to accept such partition if demanded by any Province or group of Provinces. Again, the Wavell Plan of 1945, which suggested communal parity in the appointment of representative Indian leaders as members of the Viceroy's Executive Council,

43 See Amery's memorandum of 23 January 1942, ibid., p. 82.
44 Ibid., pp. 82-83.
were a tremendous source of encouragement to separatist and disruptionist forces.

In consequence of such a policy on the part of the British, the Muslim League was able to exercise its veto against the Wavell Plan in the Simla Conference in June 1945. This openly indicated the British decision not to proceed with any plan which did not have Jinnah's concurrence. The British abandoned the plan and thus "undoubtedly strengthened the position of Jinnah and the League".

According to Leonard Mosley: "One British Governor of an important Indian province successfully wrecked a conference at Simla at which the Hindus and Muslims had come together, firstly advising Jinnah on tactics and using his influence on the Viceroy to make sure that the tactics worked."

While the Cabinet Mission in a statement of 16 May 1946 rejected the demand for partition on administrative, economic, and military reasons, it took note of "the very real Muslim apprehensions that their culture and political and social life might become submerged in a purely unitary India, in which the Hindus with their greatly superior numbers must be a dominating element". Its suggestion for the solution of the communal differences in India represented a definite advance upon the Grips Plan from the League's point of view. As was stressed by

45 Menon, n. 4, p. 215.
46 Mosley, n. 4, p. 15.
47 Menon, n. 4, pp. 466-75.
48 For the Cabinet Mission scheme, see Cmd 6821 (1946), pp. 1-9.
the Muslim League in its resolution of 6 June 1946, "the basis and foundations of Pakistan are inherent in the Mission's Plan by virtue of the compulsory grouping of the six Muslim Provinces in Section B and C". The Muslim League also took due note of "the opportunity and right of secession of Provinces or groups from the Union, which have been provided in the Mission's plan by implication".

Lord Mountbatten came with a clear directive to find an agreed solution for a United India on the basis of the Cabinet Mission plan. In the course of his talks, however, with party leaders, particularly with Jinnah and his colleagues, he became more and more convinced that there was no prospect of any agreed solution. He, therefore, realised that it was imperative to devise an alternative plan for transfer of power and implement it without loss of time. And he devised a plan for transfer of power on the basis of communal division, and partition came along with independence on 15 August 1947.

Prime Minister Attlee has explained the thinking behind British policy in the following words:

My colleagues and I saw all the difficulties of a division of India into two states — Hindus and Muslims — for any such partition would necessarily leave minorities in both States. We doubted also whether Pakistan with an important unit geographically separate from the real centre of the new State was viable. My cabinet colleagues and the Viceroy, therefore, spent many hours seeking to get a solution which would satisfy both communities. The difficulty did


50 Menon, n. 4, p. 353.
not lie with any unwillingness of Britain to part
with power, but arranging for succession.... I had
come to the conclusion that it was useless to try to
get agreement by discussion between the leaders of
the rival communities. Unless these men were faced
with the urgency of a time limit, there would always
be procrastination.... Indian leaders were constantly
reminded that the sands were running out. Hindus and
Muslims, however, found it impossible to agree on a
single government for the whole of India the solution
which we had striven to effect — and it was by the
decision of the Indians themselves that partition
was made. 51

To say all this is not to deny that the primary
responsibility for partition rests on the leaders of the Congress
and the Muslim League. The idea is only to stress that the
British believed that there were fundamental socio-cultural
differences between the Hindus and the Muslims and that the
Muslims did not feel themselves secure in living with the Hindu
majority under a common government. This was bound to colour
Britain's thinking regarding the Kashmir problem, which has
been the main source of conflict between India and Pakistan
ever since 1947.