CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION
Introduction:

In the preceding chapters we discussed the nature of politics during the presidency of Khatami in Post-Revolution Iran.

As a matter of fact, as explained earlier, Khatami’s regime signified the reconciliation of the anti-U.S. spirit of the 1979 Revolution with that of the reformist and pro-modern tendencies within the confines of liberal Islam.

Through his policies and vision Mr. Khatami tried to show a new version of Islam by arresting the forces of excessive.

For about 20 years after the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, conservatism that would have led Iran to international isolation on the one hand and allowed the revivalist forces to overpower the path reformism which was perfectly acceptable to the basic principles of Islam.

The task was very difficult and was not free from difficulties. However, Mr. Khatami’ political awareness did work to overcome these difficulties to a greater extent. In this concluding chapter we would summarize the major achievements with reference to the following aspects.

Moreover, we have a brief comparing study between Iran and India political systems in four areas: economic developments, mass media, federalism and democracy process.

This comparing study helps us to understand the differences and similarity between the tow political systems.
India more than half a century after the independence has many positive achievements in areas of economic developments, mass media, federalism and process of democracy to transfer to other countries like Iran.

Therefore, in the last part of this chapter it is essential to have brief look at these achievements and to evaluate that could Iran use these experiences?

A) Post- Khatami's Constitutional Developments:

After President Khatami came to power one of the most important and major problem that he took account it in his agenda was the complete execution of some not executed or ill-executed articles of the Constitution like article 113 (it is about the authority of the president).

Another major constitutional development in Khatami's era was the establishment of Constitutional Supervisory Board in 29 November, 1997 (nearly 6 months after he came to power). This board was worked 8 years until the end of Khatami's government (August 2005). Dr. Hossein Mehrpour the head of this board at the end of their work printed an 870 pages book. He explained the legal activities of this board. ¹

Moreover some reformists opened a discussion about the inadequacies of the Constitution. For example, they believed that the responsibilities of President are not enough and they must be extended.

Most of the prominent Iranian reformist lawmakers believe that constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran like the other constitutions in other

countries need to revise and it is not an exception. It is the duty of new revolutionary descendants to discover its inadequacies and try to revise it. This is the main reason that Imam Khomeini ordered to revise of the constitution.  

In this case another example is: president Khatami in his second round of presidency tried to extend the authorizations of president because the reformists believed that the president is not so active and responsible and able to do his job according to the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The revision of the constitution is not so easy to start in a short time. This is a skilled work and it must be done by the lawmakers. Naturally it takes a long time to research in this case. The new generation in Iranian society has his or her own needs and they consider that their important citizenship rights ignored by the government.

Another example of Post-Khatami’s Constitutional development was the execution of article 7 of the constitution. In other words, the newest feature of the Iranian political system in Post-Khatami’s era has been the formation of City and Village Councils.

Article 7 of the Iranian Constitution declares participation by the citizenry in decision making as the most important condition for the establishment of a participatory system and identifies several types of popularly elected Consultative Councils as the means for ensuring mass participation in the society.

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2 - For example Sayed Mostafa Tajzadeh one the responsibility of the Home Ministry in the time of Khatami wrote many articles in this case in Shargh newspaper and other Second Khordadi’s Publications. Mohsen Sazgara another reformist wrote some articles in this case.
As such, February 26, 1999 marked the first ever holding of national elections for City, Town and Village Councils election and many pundits are of the view that this date will go down in Iranian history as the date of one of the most important socio-political events of Iranian history. In effect, the elections marked for the first time in Iran's 2,500 year old history the transfer of authority over the administration of cities and villages from the Central Government to the citizenry.

B) Economic Performances:

President Mohammad Khatami leaves office on Aug. 3, 2005, eight years after he took office in May 1997. He won two landslide elections in 1997 and 2001 with a mandate for ensuring social and political freedoms, but also took the country's ailing economy on the road to recovery.

In addition to creating a civil society, many say the charismatic president was equally successful in translating the economic development goals enshrined in the Third Development Plan (2000-2005) into reality. Khatami not only made great efforts to restore people's social rights for the first time since 1979 Islamic Revolution, but also encouraged them to articulate their demands.

In the conclusion it is necessary to analyze the major achievements of a president who succeeded more than any other Iranian official to improve the image of the Islamic establishment in the eyes of the world, at a time when the Western propaganda machine was relentlessly depicting Iran as a ruthless autocracy.
1-Money-Laundering:

One of the most challenging issues of Khatami's economic team had to tackle was money-laundering. It prepared the bill to combat money-laundering and sent it to the parliament for final ratification. Lawmakers are still working on the bill.

The High Economic Council also ratified regulations related to the initiative and the Central Bank of Iran directed all banks and financial institutions to observer these regulations.

Money-laundering implies engaging in financial transactions for concealing the identity, source and destination of the money involved. In the past, the term was used only for financial transactions related to the criminal activities.

Today its definition has been expanded by government regulators to encompass any financial transaction that is neither transparent nor lawful. On the other hand, the fight against money-laundering took the international center-stage following the drive to check resources sponsoring terrorism.

2-Banking Performance:

In his report to the cabinet, Economic Minister Safdar Hosseini said earlier this year that state bank deposits increased from 249.4 trillion rials in 2000 to 695.7 trillion rials in 2004. We can say in term of 4 years the deposits tripled and it shows people rely on the banking system.

State banks, the report added, extended facilities worth 616 trillion rials in 2004. The figure was 181 trillion rials in 2000. During the same period,
bank facilities to private companies rose from 117 to 491 trillion rials while the public sector’s share declined.  

The monetary market law was ratified last year, after being rejected five times by the constitutional supervisory body (Guardians Council), in order to organize the market in line with the Third Plan. The CBI is currently preparing its executive directives. The law would enable CBI to organize financial activities conducted by traditional micro-credit investment funds and leasing firms. It would also help supervise the activities of all financial institutions and assist them in streamlining their operations.

Financial institutions were not following a uniform procedure in the past. The law stipulates that the CBI must supervise the operations of all real and legal entities involved in banking activities.

In recent years many people lost their savings after depositing them in traditional investment funds, which usually create a religious ambience to expand business. Under the law, the unofficial non-profit investment funds, which have mushroomed all over the country, will henceforth function as financial institutions under CBI’s supervision.

3-Private Banking:

Another great achievement of the Khatami administration was to get the law on establishing private banks ratified in 2000. Four private banks, namely Eqtesad-e Novin, Karafarin, Saman and Parsian, started work while operation licenses were issued for Pasargad, Sarmayeh & Danesh.

3 -Central Bank of Iran Yearly Report, 2004
Private and foreign banks also became operational in free trade zones, following the ratification of the law on the administration of Free Trade Zone's and the relevant banking and monetary bylaws. Credit institutions were established to promote further participation of private sector and cooperative companies in financial activities.

The first non-banking credit institution, Construction Development and Reinforcement Credit Institute, was established in 1997, the same year Khatami took office. Two more institutions, namely Karafarinan and Saman Eqtessad, were set up in 1999 and licenses were issued for setting up Qavvamin, Basijian and Ansar Al-Mujahideen credit institutions.

4-Accomplishments:

In spite of barriers facing the economy’s quest for prosperity, economic indices during 1997-2004 improved remarkably in almost all key areas, most prominently in relation to employment, inflation, investment and production.

Statistics indicate that the Khatami administration realized most of the Third Plan’s economic objectives. The economy improved greatly, despite regional upheavals such as the US-led wars on Afghanistan and Iraq, which are Iran’s northeastern and southwestern neighbors respectively.

The 8-percent growth in investment, increase in non-oil exports and implementation of many phases of the giant South Pars gas field project are some of the Khatami administration’s major economic achievements.

Per capita income in Iran increased from $1,200 a year in 1997 to the current level of $2,000. Inflation rate also declined from 25 percent to an
average of 15 percent. While gross domestic product has increased by 60 percent since 1997, about $2.5 billion of the government’s debts have been repaid each year.

Moreover, some reformist analysts believed that Khatami's administration failed to publicize its economic achievements since the state broadcasting media was controlled by rival groups.

The May 1997 election of Mohammad Khatami as the fifth president of the republic was seen by many domestic and international observers as a step forward in respecting civilian and political rights. But Khatami’s economic performance is equally remarkable, thanks to his economic reforms that prioritized privatization and foreign trade. Khatami established the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security in the final year of his second term to create better living conditions for the population.

5-Monetary Reforms:

President Khatami maintains that the establishment of private banks would serve as a centerpiece of efforts to strengthen the private sector’s role in the economy and reform the monetary system. “I’m happy to see private banks being established in Iran, because this will help improve the quality of private sector activities in Iran, “he said. Undoubtedly, the establishment of private banks and financial institutions was a turning point in the post-revolution banking activities.

Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the interest-free banking was strictly confined to state banks without any legal and religious justification, but the Khatami’s administration managed to help establish private banks in
the face of opposition from the Guardians Council. Although the government failed to realize the Third Plan projections with regard to the liquidity growth rate, it did slow down the trend. The government also cut its current expenditures, reduced budget deficit and avoided borrowing from the Central Bank. Financial assistances from the banking system, even for implementing development projects, hikes liquidity and inflation rates. In fact, the term “budget deficit" was reworded as “failure to realize revenues "in order to organize efforts to offset budget shortfalls. Electronic banking was also launched to improve banking services. The development of electronic systems led to a huge rise in the number of automated teller machines (ATMs). There are 6.5 million subscribers to ATM and point-of-sale (POS) systems in Iran. Currently all banks offer ATM services. Bank officials have announced that the number of ATM card will rise to 10 million by March 2006.

Iranian banks have not been able to issue international credit cards, chiefly due to American sanctions and the gap between Islamic banking and those in other countries. This is while the government is obliged, during the fourth plan (2005-2010), to digitalize the entire banking system. Although Khatami’s economic achievements were dwarfed by his political accomplishments, even his most prejudiced critics cannot ignore them.

6-Self-sufficiency in Wheat Production:

Khatami's Minister of Agriculture Jihad Mahmoud Hojjati said on Tuesday Aug. first, 2005 that total agricultural production increased by 37 percent from 64.8 million tons in 2000 to 88.8 million tons to 2004.  

4 - Shargh Newspaper, 30 July, 2005
According to a report faxed to Iran Daily newspaper by the Public Relations Office of the Ministry of Agriculture Jihad, the official said “farming yield increased from 44.7 million tons in 2000 to 64.9 million tons in 2004. The minister further noted that horticultural production rose by 14 percent from 12.3 million tons in 2000 to 14 million tons in 2004, stressing that increased production has been achieved following an improvement in productivity rate.”

He said livestock production increased from 7.8 million tons in 2000 to 9.3 million tons in 2004, showing a 20-percent growth. On fishery production, the minister said production has increased by 11 percent from the 424,000 tons in 2000 to 470,000 tons in 2004.

Wheat production, he said, rose by 73 percent to reach a record 14 million tons over the same period. Wheat self-sufficiency is, undoubtedly, the greatest achievement of the Khatami administration in the key agro sector.

When Khatami assumed the presidency after his first landslide in 1997, the country used to import seven million tons of wheat annually. The remarkable improvement in the production of oil seeds, especially colza, sugar, maize and rice as well as the huge cut in import of agro products are among other important achievements of the Khatami’s administration.

Sugar is another strategic product, which enjoyed a great improvement in production over the period 1996-2004. Statistics show that sugarcane

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5 - Report of Ministry of Agriculture Jihad to the Iranian Newspapers about the achievements of Khatami’s administration in the area of agriculture.
production increased from 1.8 million tons in 1996 to 6.2 million tons in 2004, showing a rise of 286 percent.

Sugar production remained almost unchanged during 1996-2000, but began to go up from 2004 to reach over three million the same year. It increased to 6.2 million tons in 2004. Consecutive droughts failed to disappoint the agro sector as production rallied from earlier fluctuations to reach over 88 million tons last year.

7-Agro Output up 37% in Four Years:

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**8-Improving Social Security:**

Minister of Welfare and Social Security Mohammad Hossein Sharif-Zadegan said that reducing poverty, improving social welfare and creating insurance funds for rural areas were among the Khatami administration’s main achievements in the social security-related areas.

Additionally, the minister told “the ministry gave top priority to efforts to cede greater authority to the non-governmental charity organizations said the establishment of the Youth Marriage Fund, which came as part of efforts to protect the vulnerable strata and reduce their financial burdens, was a constructive initiative taken by the Khatami administration in its final days”. 6

Besides, the minister said “the rural insurance fund will cover 2.2 million rural families. He told that the Management and Planning Organization is against plans to dole out cash equivalent of subsidies directly to the people, stressing that the funds must be used to implement educational and health schemes. Proponents of the initiative believe that the wealthy

6 *Iran* Newspaper, Tuesday, 2 August 2005
sections of the society are taking much more subsidies than the underpaid population.”

Furthermore, a lawmaker said that the outgoing President Mohammad Khatami performed honestly, stressing that the chief executive failed to translate some of his objectives into reality despite his sincere efforts.

Rasool Seddiqi-Bonabi told that “Khatami managed to attain success in many economic areas, including fixing single-rate foreign exchange as well as formulating aggregate tax law and foreign investment law, etc. “However the most important achievement of President Khatami was the dialogue culture that he promoted in the society, paving the way for the press to criticize the government and leading the society towards religious democracy,“ He said, adding that Khatami belonged to all the people and political groups and parties. The lawmaker said Khatami’s administration was made up of representatives of different political groups. His administration scored its most impressive success in the economic sector despite the fact that it came to power on a pledge to create a civil society at the top of its high-profile mandate.”

In addition, experts say statistics speak of the pro-reform government’s successful economic performance. Khatami created the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security in the final year of his second and last term as president to create better living conditions for the population. But he was so powerful pre-

7 -Ibid.
8 -Interview of Moj news agency with Rasool Seddiqi-Bonabi a lawmaker in the parliament, Tuesday, 2 August 2005
occupied with removing political obstacles created by his opponents that he failed to make this a reality.

**9-Private Sector Controls 30% of Economy:**

Hamid Reza Baradaran-Shoraka, who heads the Management and Planning Organization (MPO), said in an interview with the Moj News Agency that the private sector’s share in the national economy does not exceed 30 percent, however, that the remaining 70 percent is not fully under the state control. ⁹ He told that the economy is mainly controlled by the governmental and quasi-state organizations, while private sector involvement remains low.

The official further said that the government has tried its best to transfer control of economic affairs to the private sector, adding that the third and fourth plans have given due attention to privatization. “Favorable efforts have been made to help the private sector attain its real status in the national economy,” he said. Baradaran-Shoraka expressed hope that the private sector’s role in the national economy would improve greatly in the future following the fourth plan (2005-2010)’s positive outlooks on the issue. ¹⁰

Additionally, Mir Ali Ashraf Abdollah-Pouri Hosseini the State Privatization Organization chief said earlier that the government must not let the private companies pay the price for ‘political red-lines’. He said certain miscalculations in foreign policy equations would lead to a decline in foreign

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⁹ - Interview of Hamid Reza Baradaran-Shoraka, who headed the Management and Planning Organization (MPO) in Khatami’s cabinet with the Moj News Agency, Wednesday, 3 August 2005

¹⁰ - Ibid.
investments. “Such problems could give rise to the flight of capital, “he said, adding that the private sector companies would largely suffer from the consequences of strained diplomatic relations.” 11

10-Observer Member of WTO:

Acceptance of the Islamic Republic of Iran as an Observer member of World Trade Organization is a great victory of Khatami’s administration. The organization agreed to start accession negotiations with Iran after the US dropped its long-standing veto on 26 May, 2005 after 21 times veto. Prospect of Iran’s membership in the WTO should have already sounded the alarm for the auto industry.

It is likely that the WTO Council would formulate a set of expectations from the Iranian government as a prerequisite for further consideration of Iran’s application. Consequently, the organization could test the resolve of the Iranian government in improving the very structures of the economy. The long-run benefits of joining WTO could far outweigh the initial costs Iran will have to pay to attune the economy to global trends. And, as the WTO is a rule-based system, in which the same rules apply to all countries, Iran could become a much more attractive place for foreign investors.

But, by simply opening our market and liberalizing, the economy overall would benefit. Consumers will have more choices and lower prices in the long run, industries will be able to import cheaper raw materials, and companies will learn how to be more productive and competitive.

11 - Interview of Mir Ali Ashraf Abdollah-Pouri Hosseini the State Privatization Organization chief with the Moj News Agency, Wednesday, 3 August 2005
11-Progress in Industrial Sector:

Industrial development initiatives aim to increase competitiveness for generating more wealth, creating more jobs and promoting the country as an attractive place to invest and do business. They assist individuals, firms and industries to identify opportunities and develop the capability to utilize these opportunities.

Industrial growth is a key component of sustainable development and is complemented by a range of policies related to human resources, regulation of business, provision of infrastructure and the viable use of natural resources.

Industrial development does not work in isolation. The government can play a key role in overcoming difficulties associated with undertaking industrial activities, penetrating new markets and overcoming trade obstacles. They can do this by providing access to resources (information, expertise and capital), building capability, creating a more responsive public sector and developing effective partnerships between private and public sectors, industrial organizations and individual enterprises.

Minister of Industries Es'haq Jahangiri is one of the most seasoned members of President Mohammad Khatami’s economic team. His successful track record is evident from the double-digit growth registered in the industrial sector over the past eight years. According to Jahangiri, the highlight of his success is in letting the private sector take over major projects. "The call for revising Article 44 of the Constitution is very clear: there should not be any
limitation on the private sector's role in and contribution to the economy," said Jahangiri.  

Question: You had earlier said that the achievements of the Ministry of Industries and Mines and the industrial sector have been beyond expectation. Can you verify this with data?

Answer: at present, up to 70,000 industrial units are operational and 13,000 under construction. Only last year (March 2004-5), the ministry issued permits for the construction of 30,000 units. In addition, gross domestic product grew by 4.8 percent last year compared with its previous year, while the industrial and mining sectors registered 12 and 8.8 percent growth respectively. From a general perspective, GDP increased by 5.4 percent during the Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan (2000-05), lower than the 11.1 and 5.4 percent growth recorded in the industrial and mining sectors respectively. During this period, the industrial sector generated nearly 800,000 jobs more than the 615,000 predicted in the Third Plan.

Question: what is the appropriate figure with respect to the sector's share in gross domestic product?

Answer: in industrial countries, the figure is as high as 25 percent. The 50-60 percent contribution by the services sector mostly relates to ancillary industrial activities. In other words, the services sector does not resemble what we have here. Another primary index of industrial growth, attributed to Khatami's presidency, is funds allocated to industrial projects through the Forex Reserve Fund. A total of $3.5 billion were allocated to the private sector

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12 - Iran Newspaper, Wednesday, 3 August 2005
under financial deals concluded during 1989-2001. That figure amounted to more than $6 billion in the past three years since the fund was set up.

Question: what has been the state sector's share?

Answer: that figure also exceeded $6 billion, including funds assigned to major steel, petrochemical and copper projects. Now let me give more details of the industrial gains. Industrial exports increased from $2.5 billion in the first year of the Third Plan to $5 billion last year. The share of industrial as well as engineering and technical services exported in overall non-oil exports increased from 53 percent in 2000 to 72 percent last year.

Question: how has the government performed with respect to industrial privatization?

Answer: to a large extent, there has been progress. For example, National Iranian Industrial Organization, formed through large-scale seizure of assets following the victory of the revolution, is now being dissolved because most of its affiliated factories have been sold to the private sector. There was a time when the organization ran hundreds of medium- and large-scale industrial units. The same holds true for the Bank Sanat va Madan that used to control many industrial factories.

Question: are you saying the bank no longer owns these shares?

Answer: except a few firms that supply raw materials for producing certain commodities. This necessitates that they remain under the control of the state sector. Is Bank Sanat va Madan involved in a whole new set of activities? Yes. For example, for the first time in its history, the bank is
issuing LCs in national currency. Moreover, the bank is acting on financial and industrial recommendations to give priority to the most profitable schemes. I can say with confidence that 90 percent of the government's privatization objectives pertain to the industrial sector. A number of advisory councils have been formed to incorporate the views of the private sector in industrial decision-makings.

Question: do these councils have leverage in macro and micro policies?

Answer: definitely, For example, when the Ministry of Economy and Finance planned to raise the foreign exchange rate, apart from relevant organizations, the same advisory councils had the most impact on preventing it. The private sector experienced an unprecedented growth during Khatami's presidency, but it lacks capacity.

Question: would a private entity be able to finance major projects like establishing a steel or auto-making factory?

Answer: the private sector in Iran was the victim of 'elimination' policy. After I took office, many contacted me and wanted the assets and properties confiscated after the revolution. The atmosphere that dominated the early post-revolution years was unsympathetic toward investors. What worries investors most today is legal restrictions and unsafe political and economic conditions that could hamper their profitability. Establishment of the Forex Reserve Fund has helped bolster private sector capabilities to a great extent. Still, the government controls much of the economy. Through its macroeconomic plans, the government has announced its intention to increase the industrial sector's annual investment growth, from 4.8 percent during the
90s to an average of 9.7 percent in 2010. To achieve this target, it is necessary that the government help attract foreign direct investments not only for utilizing international financial resources, but also for importing technology and promoting competitiveness and industrial exports.

Some Critics of Khatami's Achievements:

Rasool Seddiqi-Bonabi a lawmaker said that the outgoing President Mohammad Khatami performed honestly, stressing that the chief executive failed to translate some of his objectives into reality despite his sincere efforts.

He told that Khatami managed to attain success in many economic areas, including fixing single-rate foreign exchange as well as formulating aggregate tax law and foreign investment law, etc. “However the most important achievement of President Khatami was the dialogue culture that he promoted in the society, paving the way for the press to criticize the government and leading the society towards religious democracy,” He said, adding that Khatami belonged to all the people and political groups and parties.  

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13 - Interview of Moj News Agency with Rasool Seddiqi-Bonabi a lawmaker, Thursday, 4 August 2005
Moreover, experts said statistics speak of the pro-reform government’s successful economic performance. Khatami created the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security in the final year of his second and last term as president to create better living conditions for the population. But he was so powerful pre-occupied with removing political obstacles created by his opponents that he failed to make this a reality.

C) Communal and Ethnic Harmony:

Iran's announcement on Saturday 28 December 2003, that it had approved equal blood-money for Muslims and non-Muslims nationals were cheerfully acclaimed by the country's religious minorities. MP Morris Motamed, who represented the Jewish community in the Majlis, said the Expediency Council verification will have "a very positive effect" on the image of the Islamic Republic in the international community.  

Motamed told that he was happy that the efforts of Majlis deputies had materialized a “long-sought wish” of Iran’s religious minority. He thanked the Majlis deputies, particularly members of Majlis Judicial Commission, for following up the issue of equal blood-money for Muslim and non-Muslim Iranians.

The Expediency Council on 28 December 2003, approved a Majlis bill on equal "blood-money", or Diyeh, for Muslim and non-Muslim Iranian nationals. Mohsen Rezaei Expediency Council's Secretary told that under a state verdict by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah

14-“Iran's minorities hail approval of law on equal blood money”, Islamic Republic of Iran News Agency (IRNA), 29 December 2003.
Seyyed Ali Khamenei, Iran's religious minorities can enjoy a "blood-money" equal to that of Muslims.

MP Yonathan Bet-Kolia, who represents the Assyrians and Caledonians in the Majlis, said the approval of the bill was the greatest Christmas gift that the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei had given to the Iranian Christians. Bet-Kolia said the law on equal blood-money had materialized one of the 'long-sought' wish of Christians in Iran. "We, Assyrians, consider ourselves entitled to enjoy equal rights. This is because we are one of the most ancient tribes in Iran and have always been present in different arenas of the country during the war, the reconstruction and the reforms," he said. "We have taken small steps in the great history of Iran." Bet-Kolia further stressed that Ayatollah Khamenei has proved that he is following the path of Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) and Imam Ali (AS) by approving the bill.

He recalled the charges of violation of human rights against the Islamic Republic, stressing: "Today, we can strongly say that the religious minorities are free and equal in our country, and need no custodian".

MP Khosrow Dabestani, who represents the Zoroastrian community in the Majlis, told that 'the community is happy with the decision. Dabestani stressed that the Zoroastrians, in a letter to Majlis Speaker Mehdi Karroubi, thanked the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, President Mohammad Khatami, the Judiciary Chief Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, members of the Expediency Council and Majlis deputies for the measure. "

The Majlis had first submitted the bill, which is an additional note to the Article 297 of Iran's Islamic Penal Code, to the Guardian Council (GC) in January, but the council later in April rejected it citing certain discrepancies with the Constitution and the Islamic Sharia law. The GC had argued that the bill contradicted the Sharia law (the law of Islam) because the amount of Diyeh for recognized religious minorities in Iran is known in that law.

"If the Vali Faqih (the supreme jurisprudent) deems it right that a certain amount should be paid to the family of a non-Muslim victim in addition to his Diyeh to equal that of a Muslim, we will act according to his directive," the GC had stressed in a letter to Majlis Speaker Mahdi Karroubi. Under the bill, the blood money for recognized religious minorities in Iran -- Jews, Christian and Zoroastrians -- has become equal to that of a Muslim Iranian national.

According to the Sharia law, the family or relatives of a murdered person can either pardon the murderer or demand blood money or capital punishment. MP Leon Davidian, who represents the Armenians of Tehran and the Northern provinces in the Majlis, said the decision would have an extremely positive effect on stabilizing the conditions of religious minorities in Iran.

Davidian said the religious minorities consider themselves as Iranians and love Iran the same way that other Iranians do. "The implementation of this law will provide more security for the Iranian religious minorities, and will enable them to better perform their duties as Iranian nationals," he said.
"The approval of this law not only made Iran's religious minorities happy, but also frustrated the propaganda against the Islamic Republic regarding the status of human rights in the country." Davidian said the international human rights organizations are under the influence of the countries that are opposed to the Islamic Republic, stressing that the law on equal blood-money for all Iranians will be a firm response to the biased positions of those organizations.

Meanwhile, the Secretary of Islamic Human Rights Commission, Mohammad-Hassan Ziaeifar, said that the approval of the law on equal rights for Muslim and non-Muslims Iranians had been a positive development that could present an appropriate image of Islam at a global level. Ziaeifar also said the law would reinforce Iran's national solidarity given that it reduces discrimination among the Iranian nationals.\textsuperscript{16}

Furthermore, lawyer Mohammad Saleh Nikbakht said the law could be a positive and important move in preventing international human rights organizations from issuing legal resolutions against the Islamic Republic. Nikbakht added that the law can be a significant step toward Iran's recognizing the UN Declaration on Human Rights as well as the related international regulations.\textsuperscript{17}

He also said that measures such as the approval of equal blood-money for all Iranians will make an important contribution to improving the image of the Islamic Republic worldwide, and will prevent pretexts against Iran in the area of human rights.

\textsuperscript{16} - Ibid., (299/12/2003)
\textsuperscript{17} - Ibid., (29/12/2003)
Moreover, in November 1999, President Khatami publicly stated that no one in Iran should be persecuted because of his or her religious beliefs. He added that he would defend the civil rights of all citizens, regardless of their beliefs or religion.

Subsequently, the Expediency Council approved the "Right of Citizenship" bill, affirming the social and political rights of all citizens and their equality before the law. In February 2000, following approval of the bill, the head of the judiciary issued a circular letter to all registry offices throughout the country, which permits any couple to be registered as husband and wife without being required to state their religious affiliation.

This measure effectively permits the registration of Baha'i marriages in Iran. Previously, Baha'i marriages were not recognized by the government, leaving Baha'i women open to charges of prostitution. Consequently, children of Baha'i marriages were not recognized as legitimate and, therefore, were denied inheritance rights. The impact of the new registration policy on the status of Baha'i families remains unclear.\(^{18}\)

The last point, in early 2000, the Expediency Council ratified a general policy on minorities. At that time it was decided to prevent “abuse of tribal and religious minorities that could lead to infiltration of foreigners and thus harming national unity.” To this end, it was determined that “the culture and civilization of Islam and Iran, the Persian language and writing are key factors of solidarity.” Some analysts believe that the language used in the statements

about this policy suggests three things. 1-the state is aware of minority grievances and demands. 2-the state prefers to blame its difficulties on foreign scapegoats, rather than dealing with them. 3-national unity is more important to the state than minority rights. Yet this kind of policy on minorities and ethnicity is exactly what can be exploited with grave results for Iranian unity.

D) Foreign Policy:

The difficulties in the way of reintegrating Iran into the world economy get intertwined with serious foreign policy issues. No other issue at the moment seems as crucial as the shape of Iran's future relations with the United States. The principle reason for this is the drastic change in Iran's regional circumstances since the tragic terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001.

The American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq; the unprecedented rise in American military presence in these countries as well as the Persian Gulf region and Central Asia; and President Bush's inclusion of Iran, together with Iraq and North Korea, in the "axis of evil" have made national security Iran's number one priority. Even before these momentous events so dramatically changed the Iranian regional environment, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright aptly said that Iran lives in "a dangerous neighborhood."

American assurances and positive actions to dispel Iran's sense of grave threat to its security and stability are essential. In response to reporters in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake in the ancient city of Bam on 26 December 2003, President Khatami cast doubt on December 30, 2003 on the
idea that American humanitarian assistance, for which Iran was thankful, could assuage Iranian fears or helps relations with America to move forward. He said "They (US) keep saying that they want to overthrow the Islamic Republic. We have not seen good intentions. We hope that the United States will change its behavior so that this wall of mistrust will break." 19

Yet, two days later President Bush said more than enough to confirm Iranian suspicions of American motives. On the first day of 2004 he said that "we've got great compassion for human suffering" and yet in the same breath he gratuitously repeated U.S. demands, which "The Iranian government must listen to the voices of those who long for freedom, must turn over al-Qaeda that are in their custody and must abandon their nuclear weapons program...." On the same day Secretary of State Colin L. Powell also repeated the mantra that "we...stand by the Iranian people, and others living under oppressive regimes, as they strive for freedom," declaring "the 21st century will be a century of liberty worldwide." 20

Many conservatives and even some reformists interpreted these statements as the continuation of the Bush administration's efforts to interfere in Iranian affairs by playing the Iranian people against their government. Many Iranians found them contrary to the administration's own previous rhetoric. U.S. officials had said the administration did not seek "regime change" in Iran; it had praised Iran for its help in Afghanistan and Iraq and had welcomed Iran's signing the additional protocol to NPT aimed at intrusive inspections of covert efforts by Iran to develop nuclear weapons.

19 - Shargh Newspaper, December 30, 2003
20 - New York Times, January 2, 2004
Despite Bush's untimely and insensitive remarks, the Iranian government is willing in principle to resume conversations with American officials on Iraq and other issues. These talks had been broken off by Washington in May, 2003. This willingness is not new. As a matter of historical fact, revolutionary Iran has never closed the door on resumption of diplomatic relations with the United States.

Ayatollah Khomeini himself had declared that Iran would do so "if America behaves itself" (agar adam beshavad). And the Iranian interest in dialogue with the United States has intensified since the reformist President Khatami took power. He proposed the idea of exchange of professors, athletes and others between the peoples of Iran and the United States.

Against this backdrop it is reasonable to interpret the Iranian stance on the American offer to dispatch a high-level humanitarian mission to Iran, headed by Senator Elizabeth Dole, as more a matter of postponing the visit by the mission rather than rejecting it. Reportedly the Iranian officials had cited the overwhelming difficulties facing relief workers in the earthquake-stricken city of Bam as the reason Iran could not accommodate the American offer at the time.

The litany of grievances and differences between Iran and the United States over the past quarter of a century are well-known. But less noticed is that both sides have interests in moving forward toward sustained dialogue and reduction of tensions aimed ultimately at the resumption of diplomatic relations. “The majority of the people of Iran is pro-democracy and wants relations with America. But Iran needs to see the removal of American sanctions, a move which could significantly aid attracting badly needed capital.
and technology from other industrial countries as well as from the United States for economic development and privatization. That would require at least in part the removal of many financial, legal and bureaucratic bottlenecks.”  

It is necessary to attention that Iran will stick to its obligations under the NPT and the additional protocol without prejudice, of course, to developing its nuclear reactors. Efforts to go nuclear would greatly strain Iran's languishing economy and instigate regional states to emulate its example contrary to its own longtime preachment of the goal of denuclearization of the Middle East. Israel must desist from threatening military action and the United States must aid Iran's legitimate right under the NPT to develop its nuclear capability for peaceful purposes.

On the other hand, the United States has interest in Iran's continued cooperation in the processes of stabilization of Iraq. Iran has recognized the American-appointed Governing Council. It has also refrained from interfering in Iraq either directly or through the Iranian-trained Iraqi Badr Brigade. Washington also has serious interest in continued Iranian aid to the reconstruction and political stabilization of Afghanistan and in Iran's cooperation in stemming the rising tide of drug trafficking through its long and porous borders with Afghanistan.

The security of the flow of uninterrupted oil supplies from the Persian Gulf to world markets is a vital interest of the United States as well as Iran. In

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21 -For more information see “Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte”, a german magazine, 23 February, 2004.
the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 the former President Bush declared that "our vital national interests" depend on a secure and stable Gulf. The pre-1991 American projection of military power "over the horizon" did not insure that security and stability. Nor can the present American emporium in the region.

Iran located in a very sensitive and strategic area so, a rational foreign policy can help the country to solve the main external problems. For example United States of America is surrounded Iran from the East (Afghanistan), West (Iraq) South (Persian Gulf) and also North (Turkey and Azerbaijan), therefore, the national interest and national security of Iran and U.S.A. is connected to each other and they must cooperate in many cases like Iraq, Afghanistan and so on. On the other hand, some analysts believe that contrary to Khatami’s era, after president Ahmadinejad came to power, there was a unity of leadership and government in Iran. So, the time is best for solving the essential external problems of the country.

**E) Specific achievements of Islamic Democracy:**

The global movement of democratization reflects the universality of pluralistic ideals. However, for democracy to succeed it must adapt to local traditions, values and circumstances. The Western media's focus on anachronistic fundamentalist forces obscures the attempt by moderate Islamists to merge their re-conceptualized traditions with Western political heritage.

The melding of Islamic precepts with participatory paradigms will help the region join the global democratic society on its own terms. Such a
democratic structure will be far more durable, for it does not seek to simply
transplant Western idioms and attitudes but to strive for a complex adaptation
of two systems of thought.

The contribution that Iranian reformers are making to this debate is to
demonstrate a complementary relationship between the resurgence of religious
identity and the equally compelling calls for a representative society. The
ascendance of Muhammad Khatami to the presidency and the sixth
parliamentary election can thus potentially make a constructive contribution to
the evolution of the region's political order.

1-The Limits of Iran’s Democracy:

Iran's Islamic democracy will be different from the democratic order
that developed in Post-Reformation Europe. The Western democracies
dedicated themselves to protecting individual rights from all impositions,
including the church. Over the course of centuries, religion and politics came
to occupy distinct realms of society and the state, though constitutions sought
to limit the temporal influence of the ecclesiastical institutions.

From its inception, Islam has had a deep connection to politics and
viewed the state as a means of effecting religious precepts. An Islamic state's
emphasis on collective values makes a clear distinction between church and
state improbable. The clerics who view public affairs as one of their mandates
will not be circumspect in imposing limits on individual choices. Even
Khatami has cautioned that "a system like ours, based as it is on Islamic
ideology, is bound to restrict some individual liberties.”
The critical question is what role would the clerical estate have in such a society? The one area that is likely to remain under the auspices of religious authorities is the legal system. Given that law is the cornerstone of a viable Islamic order, family and penal law will be confined to Islamic Sharia (Islamic jurisprudence). As such, parliamentary decrees are unlikely to succeed in liberalizing women's rights in areas of divorce, child custody and inheritance. However, it must be noted that despite Islamic strictures, Iran has promoted women's professional and political activities.

The Islamic Republic's presidential cabinet, parliament and universities are populated by women who are asserting their interests and shaping their country's institutions. In terms of the penal code, Islamic jurists will sustain archaic practices such as capital and corporal punishments; limit the prerogatives of defense attorneys and the deliberations of juries. Given the primacy of sacred law, women's status and criminal codes are still going to be defined by standards that a Western society would find onerous.

In the realm of politics, religion will at times similarly circumscribe the popular will. Despite their declining numbers in the parliament, the clerics will sustain their general supervisory role of society and ensure that elected legislatures do not pass laws that contravene Islamic injunctions. For example, the clerical estate will not countenance parliamentary nationalization measures, as they would violate Quran's well-delineated property rights. In the meantime, Iran will never grant legal status to political parties espousing secularism or elevate members of religious minorities to positions of national leadership. In essence, on a range of issues, the public's determinations will still be restricted by edicts of the religious figures. The ayatollahs may concede power to non-clerics, but they will insist on their right to regulate the
political arena and ensure that the society's social mores conform to Islamic standards.

Iran's Islamic polity largely reflects fundamental features of democracy: free elections, separation of powers, freedom of assembly and a vibrant press. The struggle in Iran is about how, not whether, to limit the scope of government interference. The recent elections have testified that the trend is toward greater accumulation of rights by the citizenry and lessening of government intrusion. Iran's political system is attempting to balance Islam's emphasis on reverence with the population's desire for self-expression. Such a paradigm is not without contradictions and conflicts. Given the primacy of religion, most such conflicts are likely to be resolved in favor of faith and the maintenance of the Islamic character of society.

Iran is seeking to transform itself into a democracy while resisting features of classical liberalism. Classical liberal thought made protection of individual autonomy its foremost priority. The Iranian model will accept the importance of constitutionalism and the rule of law but still impose limits on civil freedoms that ordinarily accompany liberal governance. Khatami has stressed that "liberalism has an inner meaning which is not in accord with a religious-oriented society. To be totally in agreement with liberalism means one must accept secularism." To suggest that Iran's aversion to classical liberalism makes it an undemocratic state is to neglect potentially competing definitions of democracy and the prospect of the emergence of different democratic systems. The final product may not resemble the French Republic or the United States, but it will greatly contribute to the advancement of individual rights and the modernization of Iran's political institutions.
2-Democratic achievements in Khatami’s Era:

The Iranian parliamentary elections held on February 18, 2000, proved the high point of reformers fortunes as they captured an institution that had long served as the bastion of the conservatives' power. The reformers' parliamentary triumph is part of a gradual liberalization movement that is taking over key segments of Iran's body politic. To properly assess the impact of the recent election and the likely direction of Iran's reform movement, we must have an understanding of the internal debate that has been raging in Iran for several years. The Iranian reformers have embarked on a creative attempt to merge democratic ideals with Islamic values. Along the way, they are demonstrating to the region's reformers that the indigenous culture need not be sacrificed and Western models blindly emulated for a democratic order to evolve.

The recent electoral success of the reform forces owes much to Iran's constitution, which has already established democratic institutional arrangements. The president serves for a fixed term and is elected by universal adult suffrage. There are regular parliamentary elections and an independent judiciary. However, the constitution's democratic impulses were obstructed by conservative domination and the establishment of institutions such as the Supreme Religious Leader and the Council of Guardians, who vet candidates and legislation to make certain they conform to their rigid definition of Islam. Instead of the pledged democratic system, Iran's clerics constructed an autocracy and an oppressive cultural milieu.

In the aftermath of Ayatollah Khomeini's death, Iranian intellectuals began to coalesce in a variety of political and cultural groups to debate ideas
of reform and the means of broadening political participation. Among the prominent members were future stars of Khatami's cabinet and many members of the newly elected parliament such as Ataollah Mohajerani, Abdollah Nuri, Saeed Hajarian, Abdolvahed Musavi-lari and Abdol Karim Soroush.

The reformers faced two inescapable mandates. On one side is Islam with its holistic pretensions, maintaining how the society and individual lives should be organized. On the other side is the irreversible movement of political modernity with its democratic claims. The task of the reformers was to demonstrate that these two realms were incompatible in neither principle nor practice.

The basis of the reformers' ideas is that the interpretation of the scriptures cannot remain immutable and must adjust to the changing human condition. For religion to remain vital, it has to address the demands of the modern social order. Islam is not lacking in traditions that can address this challenge, as the well-established practice of ijtihad (interpretation) offers the reformers a path toward an evolved understanding of the sacred texts. As Iran's leading philosopher, Abdol Karim Soroush contends: “There is nothing heretical about new interpretations of Islam that differ from interpretations of the past. An ideal religious society cannot have anything but a democratic government. As interpretations or understanding of Islam evolves, Islamic law can even be the basis of modern legislation.”

In the hands of reformers, Islam is not merely a system for connecting man to his divine creator but a force for progressive change. The scripture's

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call for freedom from tyranny and human equality and Islamic civilization's historical legacy of intellectual inquiry are seen as the basis for reconstructing society along pluralistic lines. Moreover, the Quran's mandate that the community is consulted and rulers be held accountable establishes the platform for collective action and democratic participation. It was such ideas and thinkers that established the guideposts for an Iranian society that has been fully immersed in a dynamic internal debate.

The leading figure to emerge from Iran's reform movement was the former minister of culture and a widely read intellectual cleric, Muhammad Khatami. The starting point of Khatami's formulations is that the Islamic Republic has stagnated and is no longer sufficiently responsive to its constituents' political and social demands. As an intellectual versed in Western political thought, Khatami accepts Western civilization's economic progress and pluralistic achievements. However, it would be wrong to characterize Khatami as a Western-style democrat in clerical garb, as he is quick to criticize the West for its excessive materialism and insensitivity to man's spiritual needs. Khatami is articulating a path that incorporates the best of Western political heritage into Islam's concerns for values and human dignity. Before he became president, he emphasized that "our revolution can give rise to a new civilization if we have the ability to absorb the positive aspects of Western civilization." 23 In his speeches and writings, Khatami has called for a new "Islamic political society" that is religious in its values, rational in its thought and dynamic in its debate. Khatami's new society is indeed a fresh page in the annals of Iran's long history.

The obstacles in the way of reformers seemed insurmountable as they confronted a besieged presidency, a dogmatic Supreme Leader, a doctrinaire judiciary and a hard-line parliament. The first salvo in the great liberalization movement was the 1997 election of Khatami to the presidency. Upon assuming power, Khatami took the lead in restoring the rule of law and creating a civil society. The newly inaugurated president attempted to purge the security services and oversaw a proliferation of newspapers and professional associations. Even before the momentous parliamentary plebiscite, Iran held elections for local councils that were called for in the constitution but never implemented. The reformers' resounding triumph ensured that they will increasingly dominate municipal affairs. Indeed, February's parliamentary victory by reformers could not have been possible without the organizational and logistical support of the recently elected local leaders.

The next battleground between the reformers and conservatives became the parliamentary elections. Through their domination of the parliament, the conservatives attempted to stymie the reform movement by impeaching Khatami's ministers and passing stringent press laws.

In the months preceding the elections, the conservatives employed their institutional power to lessen the reformers' prospects by imprisoning some of their outspoken leaders and closing down liberal publications such as Salam and Khordad. The conservative-dominated Council of Guardians scrutinized the credentials of over 6,800 candidates and disqualified 669, most of who were from the reform faction. All these machinations failed as 80 percent of Iran's eligible voters went to the polls and affirmed the direction of the reformers. After a protracted process of recounting, the Guardian Council
finally confirmed the results of the elections, with the reformers winning 220 out of 290 seats. President Khatami celebrated the victory by stating: "It is a sign of our people's political maturity and their desire to move on a peaceful path toward pluralism and legitimate freedoms." 24

Although in most legislative elections local issues tend to obscure the larger national themes, Iran's parliamentary elections were different. The main reform parties, the Islamic Iran Participation Party and the Servant of the Construction Party, campaigned under the slogan of greater democracy and addressed important issues such as citizens' equality before law, the serial killing of dissidents and building a pluralistic society.

The new legislatures were aware of their mandate. Ahmad Bourqani, deputy from Tehran, emphasized "for the first time in Iran's history, people did not just vote for an individual; rather they voted for a group of people with a comprehensive reform agenda." 25

The parliamentarians are attempting to tackle thorny issues such as restrictive press laws, electoral regulations and liberalization of the cultural sector. Jamileh Kadivar, who garnered the second largest bloc of votes from Tehran, stressed that the main "priority for the Sixth Majlis (parliament) will be to institutionalize legitimate freedoms." 26

After the landscape victory of reformists in parliament election, under the auspices of Ayatollah Khamenei, the hard-liners have sought to reassert their influence by controlling the public debate. Iran's once-vibrant press has

26 - Tehran Times, March 5, 2000, p. 5.
been seemingly muzzled as the hard-liners have banned 25 publications and jailed over two dozen writers.

This is ultimately self-defeating, as in the era of internet, fax and satellite television, it is impossible to restrict the flow of information. Moreover, the conservative backlash carries the danger of galvanizing the reform movement, which seems to have stalled in the recent weeks. The reformist parliamentarians are defying even their spiritual leader in seeking to revisit the press law that is the basis for the recent closure of the newspapers. Khatemi has signaled his support for such measures by declaring that “he found the banning of the newspapers "painful," and saw the need for the government to create "a free atmosphere for the people to express their opinion." 27

Even the reliably hard-line judiciary seems less dependable, as the deputy head of the judiciary, Hadi Marvi, has emphasized, "The press crackdown is not unanimously approved by the judiciary. It is more the judgments of individual judges, and there are major disagreements over the crackdown among other judges." 28

The Islamic Republic is not a totalitarian state, as its measures and policies require a degree of public support. And this is where the conservatives' strategy falters. Ultimately, a reform movement that enjoys widespread public acclaim cannot be impeded through a series of arbitrary fiats.

27 - AFP, August 18, 2000.

The next institution that is likely to fall in the hands of the reformers is the judiciary. The clerical judges have employed their power to jail reform politicians and close down liberal newspapers on baseless allegations. The student uprisings of July 1999 were in fact triggered by the closure of the popular reform newspaper Salam.

In the past years, the judicial branch has squandered much of its credibility on its censorship campaign and prosecution of two important reform figures, Khatami's former minister of interior, Abdollah Nuri, on charges of apostasy, and the popular former mayor of Tehran, Gholam Hossein Karbaschi, on flimsy charges of financial corruption.

Nuri's spirited defense of his conduct and his eloquent challenge of the court's perversion of Islamic tenets, carried live on national television, caused widespread revulsion at the arbitrary practices of the politically motivated judges. The newly elected parliamentarians led by Muhammad Reza Khatami, the president's brother and the leading vote-getter in Tehran, have pledged to overhaul the judiciary and restore its integrity. One of the persistent themes of reformers' campaign speeches was the notion of accountability and the importance to a constitutional system of government of an impartial judicial branch. The anticipated reform of the court system will further diminish the conservatives' power base.

For Iran to continue to move along a democratic path, it must confront the institution of the supreme religious leader and its current occupant, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The influence of the leader is pervasive, as he appoints half the members of the Guardians Council, the head of the judiciary, commanders of the armed forces and the Revolutionary Guards. The leader
can dismiss the president and is responsible for confirming election results. An institution that can so easily countermand the popular will is inconsistent with democratic pluralism.

However, Iranian reformers can take comfort in the fact that most senior ayatollahs view the concept of supreme religious leader as an inappropriate innovation by the late Ayatollah Khomeini and a contravention of Shia Islam's canons. The appointment of Khamenei to this post has further eroded its legitimacy, as he lacks theological erudition and popular appeal, two important preconditions for such an august appointment. There is a growing sentiment within both Iran's enterprising intelligentsia and the traditional clerical community to limit the power of the leader and possibly subject the institution to electoral scrutiny.

The leading proponent of changing the institution of supreme leader is Ayatollah Ali Montazeri, Khomeini's heir apparent until his fall from grace in 1989 and the cleric in charge of preparing the Islamic Republic's 1979 constitution. Montazeri not only challenges Khamenei's credentials but also stresses that the leader was never designed to be unaccountable.

The original constitution stipulated that the leader must be chosen through general popular recognition of his outstanding merit. As Montazeri emphasizes, it is certain that the legitimacy of this post is acquired through popular election. In reality there is a social contract between the people and the Leader, and the Constitution was drafted on that basis. Accordingly, his term may be limited and temporary, like that of the president or a member of the parliament. And given that the Leader is accorded responsibility by the
people, he is not infallible. He must accept criticism and be responsible for his actions.

Given the centrality of the Supreme Leader to Iran's post-revolutionary system, its elimination would likely destabilize the entire political edifice. However, there is sufficient clerical support for revision of the institution and subsuming its powers within a constitutional framework. In the coming decade it is likely that the position of the leader will undergo transformations as its absolutism is widely challenged within both clerical and secular circles. The 1997 presidential election and the recent parliamentary vote are critical events in the evolution of Iran's Islamic polity. Despite sporadic setbacks, Khatami and his reform supporters are forging new paths and transforming politics into a meaningful representative practice. The Islamic Republic is not about to lose its religious raison d'être, but it is strengthening its republican pedigree. A politicized middle class, restive youth and an emboldened civil society make the recession of conservative power inevitable.
F)-Some Observations of Indian Politics:

As discussed in this thesis, one the main purpose of this work is to analyze the structure and functions of political system in Post-Revolution Iran. In this regard it is essential to assess the other countries in the world like India and in some cases to use their experiences. It is clear that India more than half a century after independence have many experiences in the fields of democracy, federalism, mass media and economic reforms to suggest to the other countries like Iran. So, as an Iranian scholar in India it is my duty to propose some of the significant achievements and outcomes of Indian political system for Iran.

Analyzing of India and Iran political systems showed that some of the positive of Indian democratic achievements in 4 main areas that Iran should use are as follows:

1-Iran must institutionalize the democracy in her respective country. In this case the performance of democracy in India should be model as explained earlier. Other step in institutionalization of democracy in the country is creating a modern multi party system. In this regard it is essential a multi party system with the participation of all political groups and Jinahs.

2-the meaning of federalism is not disintegration; on the contrary it means unity in diversity like India. The Indian experiences more than 50 years after independence shows that in federalism system the ethnic groups are more satisfied so; they cooperate with the central government. In Iran there some intellectuals start to discuss about federalism, it’s a start point but the geographical situation of Iran and the national security problems that Iran
concern about them are different from India, therefore a kind of federalism for Iran in the short term period of time is economic federalism. As Baradarane Shoraka previous head of Management and Planning Organization proposed to president Ahmadinejad about a kind of economic federalism in Iran, the new government must test this proposal and give more authority to the provinces in order to cease ethnic tension in future.

3-In case of economic reform the new government should continue the privatization of public enterprises, to increase the speed of privatization and facilitate the foreign investment in oil and gas sections. Otherwise, the monopoly of government in main economic section like automobile and telecom must be decrease.

4-in Khatami’s era he has done his best for improving print media but on the other hand some pressure groups and also Judiciary system closed about 100 publications and most of them were belong to Khatami’s and Second Khordad’s groups. However, the authority must know that free press like India is one of the primary needs of a democratic system. On the other hand, in Iran; the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting is a monopoly in audio-visual media arena. So, the people did not rely on the news broadcasting in the IRIB channels. In order to end this mistrusting of the people to the national media, Iran must allow to the non-governmental players to establish their own media like India. In other words, the government should allow to the person who want to establish private TVs to do it easily. Moreover, the Legislature should ratify the necessary rules to facilitate the establishment of private TV channels.