CHAPTER TWO

THE NATURE OF THE PARTY SYSTEM
Introduction:

According to article 26 of the Iranian Constitution “the formation of parties, societies, political or professional associations, as well as religious societies, whether Islamic or pertaining to one of the recognized religious minorities, is permitted. But, they do not violate the principles of independence, freedom, national unity, the criteria of Islam, or the basis of the Islamic Republic. No one may be prevented from participating in the aforementioned groups, or be compelled to participate in them.”

Moreover, there is a Party Law and Regulations that describe all the rules about parties and political groups. All the political group, bloc, association and so on only establish and work through these regulations.

Nature of the party and political groups in Iran is different from in the West. In Post-Revolution Iran most common points of all the political groups are ideology. This ideology might be Islam, Marxist and liberalism. On the other hand sometime, economic or political interests in a specific period of time causes establishment of political groups in political scene.

Another significant and essential point is the nature of party system in Iran understood only with meaningful the structure of Jenahs or political blocs.

The Revolution of 1979 brought about a fundamental change in Iranian attitudes toward politics. Under the monarchy the political culture had been elitist in the sense that all major governmental decisions were made by the Shah and his ministers. Most of the population acquiesced in this approach to politics.

The fusion of traditional Shia Islamic ideals with political values during the Revolution resulted in the emergence of a populist political culture. The principal characteristics of this political culture are pervasive feelings that the government is obligated to ensure social justice and that every citizen should participate in politics. These feelings are acknowledged by the political leadership, which constantly expresses its concern for the welfare of the *mostazafin* (downtrodden or oppressed people) and persistently praises the people's work in a host of political and religious associations.

The transformation of the political culture owed much to the charisma of Ayatollah Khomeini. He was determined not simply to overthrow the monarchy but also to replace it with a new political system based on Islamic values. Ayatollah Khomeini believed that the long-term success of such an ideal Islamic government was dependent on the commitment and involvement of the masses in politics. He also believed that politics is not separate from religion. He envisaged the clergy as responsible for providing religious guidance, based on their expertise in Islamic law, to the people as they worked to create a new society in which religion and politics were fused.
Ayatollah Khomeini's reputations for piety, learning, and personal integrity, as well as his forceful personality, have been important factors in the mobilization of thousands of committed followers to carry out the de-secularization of the country's political institutions.

Mass political involvement has been both an objective and a characteristic of Post-Revolution Iran. Political participation, however, is not through political parties but through religious institutions. The mosque has become the single most important popular political institution. Participation in weekly congregational prayers, at which a political sermon is always delivered, is considered both a religious and a civic duty. For political aspirants, attendance at the weekly prayers is mandatory. Numerous religious and political associations are centered on the mosques.

These organizations undertake a wide variety of activities, such as distributing ration coupons, investigating the religious credentials of aspirants for local offices, conducting classes in subjects ranging from the study of Arabic to superpower imperialism, and setting up teams to monitor shop prices and personal behavior. These organizations tend to be voluntary associations whose members devote several hours per week to their activities. Although most of these voluntary associations are for men, several are specifically for women.

Religious, rather than secular, organizations thus have the most important political roles. Factories, schools, and offices also have Islamic associations that undertake functions similar to those of the mosque voluntary associations. Although many secular groups exist, the majority of such associations as industrial and professional unions, university clubs, and
mercantile organizations have acquired religious overtones. These private organizations generally have religious advisers who provide guidance to members on prayer ritual, Islamic law, and Shia history. Associations that try to avoid mixing religion with business are suspected of being anti-Islamic and risk having their articles of incorporation revoked.

A) Pre-Revolution Party System in Iran:

The monarchy of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was in need of both legitimacy and support of the masses in the early 1960s after experiencing the debacle of the National Front era and the humiliation of being restored and propped up by Western powers. The Shah dutifully called for parliament elections to occur in 1960, which his government promptly and clumsily fixed. After an unexpectedly strong response from the electorate, the Shah called for new elections to take place in 1961, which if possible were even more flagrantly rigged than the previous ones. When the populace again reacted poorly, the Shah dissolved the parliament and ordered the prime minister to rule by decree in contravention to the constitution.

The Shah launched his White Revolution in 1963, seeking a number of economic, social, and political modernizations. As part of the package, he created the New Iran Party to replace the Melliyun (Nationalist) Party. He then pitted it against the Mardom (People) Party in an apparent attempt to decree a two-party system for Iran. The resulting 1964 parliament elections were relatively clean -- after pressure from the Shah's Western patrons -- and the deputies returned were more independent in action than the Shah had expected or wanted, making this his last real experiment with a relatively unspoiled election.
A further move towards absolutist consolidation occurred in the 1970s as the shah disbanded both parties and announced the formation of the Resurgence Party (Hizb-e Rastakhiz), which was to be the sole party of the state and an agent of popular mobilization for the Shah's government. Furthermore, in an attempt to combine the authoritarian benefits of a one-party system with the appearance of legitimate debate in a two-party system, the Shah maintained the fiction of two wings within the party, though the Shah himself in fact chose the leaders of the “progressives” and “liberals”. Why the Shah moved in the direction of a single party is not clear. To most observers, it hardly mattered, because he would never allow autonomous groups to compete for power. The most likely answer is that he had become so confident of his position at home and abroad that he felt he could orchestrate developments, much like a conductor leading musicians through a musical score.²

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As a mobilizing agent, the Resurgence Party was an abysmal failure, attracting support from few others than individuals who wanted jobs in the public sector. Instead, a number of different guerrilla groups -- both secular and religious -- were organizing to challenge Pahlavi rule. In addition, the shah considered the clerical establishment to be hopelessly medieval and backwards. Since the clergy -- excepting those individuals he had co-opted -- opposed his modernization programs, he treated them like political enemies. Meanwhile, he also attempted to buy off the business elite, allowing them to become rich on the condition that they stay out of politics.

By the end of the 1970s, the shah's regime faced a number of challenges which it ultimately could not surmount. The economy was in shambles after a reckless government spending spree following the dramatic increase in oil prices in 1973 followed by a retrenchment and borrowing when the oil glut
hit. The Resurgence Party had failed to mobilize a significant segment of the populace behind the shah's rule. Finally, the government in 1978 made the critical mistake of criticizing the Ayatollah Khomeini, which it had previously exiled. This touched off a wave of popular unrest that never settled, as every conceivable opposition faction within Iran emerged in an anti-shah alliance to bring down the monarchy.

Finally, as mentioned earlier, during the ending years of the Pahlavi monarchy, only a single, government-sponsored political party, the Rastakhiz, operated legally. Nevertheless, several legally proscribed political parties continued to function clandestinely. These included parties that advocated peaceful political change and those that supported the armed overthrow of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.

Among the former parties was the National Front, which actually was a coalition of democratically inclined political parties and other organizations that originally had been founded in 1949; the Nehzat-e Azadi-yi Iran, or the Iran Freedom Movement (IFM), established in 1961 by democratically inclined clergy and laymen; and the Tudeh Party, a Marxist party that had been founded in 1941. The two most important guerrilla organizations were the Mojahedin Khalgh Organisation and the Marxist Fadayan (Cherikha-ye Fadayan-e Khalq, or People's Guerrillas), both of which had been largely suppressed after carrying out several sensational terrorist actions in the early 1970s.

B) Pre-revolution Opposition Groups:
In the years that followed the riots of June 1963, there was little overt political opposition. The political parties that had been prominent in the 1950-63 periods were weakened by arrests, exile, and internal splits. Political repression continued, and it proved more difficult to articulate a coherent policy of opposition in a period of economic prosperity, foreign policy successes, and such reform measures as land distribution. Nonetheless, opposition parties gradually reorganized, new groups committed to more violent forms of struggle were formed, and more radical Islamic ideologies were developed to revive and fuel the opposition movements.

Both the Tudeh party and the National Front underwent numerous splits and reorganizations. The Tudeh party leadership remained abroad, and the party did not play a prominent role in Iran until after the Islamic Revolution. National Front parties that managed to survive the post-1963 clampdown; the most prominent was the Nehzat-e Azadi-yi Iran, or the Iran Freedom Movement (IFM), led by Mehdi Bazargan. Bazargan worked to establish links between his movement and the moderate clerical opposition. Like others who looked to Islam as a vehicle for political mobilization. Bazargan was active in preaching the political pertinence of Islam to a younger generation of Iranians. Among the best known thinkers associated with the IFM was Dr. Ali Shariati, who argued for an Islam committed to political struggle, social justice, and the cause of the deprived classes.

Ayatollah Khomeini, in exile in Iraq, continued to issue antigovernment statements, to attack the Shah personally, and to organize supporters. In a series of lectures delivered to his students in Najaf in 1969 and 1970 and later published in book form under the title of *Velayat-e Faqih* (The Vice Regency of the Islamic Jurist), he argued that monarchy was a form of government
abhorrent to Islam, that true Muslims must strive for the establishment of an Islamic state, and that the leadership of the state belonged by right to the *faqih*, or Islamic jurist. A network of clerics worked for Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. He returned from periods of imprisonment and exile to continue their activities. Increasing internal difficulties in the early 1970s and Ayatollah Khomeini’s charismatic personality gradually won a growing number of followers for him.

In the meantime, some younger Iranians, disillusioned with what they perceived to be the ineffectiveness of legal opposition to the regime and attracted by the example of guerrilla movements in Cuba, Vietnam, and China, formed a number of underground groups committed to armed struggle. Most of these groups were uncovered and broken up by the security authorities, but two survived: the Fadayan (Cherikha-ye Fada-yan-e Khalq, or People's Guerrillas), and the Mojahedin (Mojahedin-e Khalq, or People's Struggle).

The Fadayan were Marxist in orientation, whereas the Mojahedin sought to find in Islam the inspiration for an ideology of political struggle and economic radicalism. Nevertheless, both movements used similar tactics in attempting to overthrow the regime: attacks on police stations; bombing of United States, British, and Israeli commercial or diplomatic offices; and assassination of Iranian security officers and United States military personnel stationed in Iran. In February 1971, the Fadayan launched the first major guerrilla action against the state with an armed attack on an Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie (the internal security and border guard) post at Siahkal in the Caspian forests of northern Iran. Several similar actions followed. A total of 341 members of these guerrilla movements died between 1971 and 1979 in
armed confrontations with security forces, by execution or suicide, or while in the hands of their jailers. Many more served long terms in prison.

C) Post-Revolution Party System:

A political party is an organized group that seeks to gain political power either by itself or on coalition with others. To the extent that political organization is essential to the functioning of modern political system, it is difficult to conceive of realistic alternatives to political parties. Competition between parties gives practical meaning to democracy. In a system of competitive elections, the parties also play an important educative role through the promotion of principles and alternative conceptions of the good life by argument and debate. They are the most important two-way link between society and government. They give national dimension to local politics and translate public opinion into public policy. By performing the function of interest aggression, political parties convert a number of different individual and social demands into collective goals. They are also the channel for recruiting and socializing elites into the political process and mobilizing the populace for the tasks of nation-building and state-building. One of the important functions of political party is modernizing the society.  

Iran during the Shah regime was an autocratic and tyrannical rule. In this kind of rule tyranny is the overruling culture, so democratic rule like real party system could not exist in short term. Moreover, if there was a political party, it is belong to the system and create by them. So, they are not independent parties.

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The victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 opened a new window for political activities in Iran. Especially it caused birth of different parties, political groups and etc. As a matter of fact, in the first year of victory of the Islamic Revolution all the different political groups that combated with the Pahlavi regime gathered under one umbrella. This chapter concentrates mainly on the legal and constitutional parties.

As mentioned earlier, the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran recognized establishing of parties and political groups in article 26. Moreover, the Islamic Consultative Assembly ratified the Law on activities of political parties, associations and societies as well as the Islamic and recognized religious minorities, societies, in its August 29, 1981 session. These rules were confirmed by the Guardians Council, on October 4, 1981. In order to know the history of Post-Revolution parties’ activities in Iran we may divide this period of time (25 years) in three distinct times:

1-From the date of establishment of the Islamic Republic party (IRP) in 1979 until the government was put ban on this party in 1987 (1979-1987).

2-From the disbandment of the Islamic Republic party until second of Khordad Movement, that have been brought Khatami to power (1987-1997)

3-After the victory of president Khatami on second of Khordad (May 7, 1997) till date (1997-2005).

1- Era of Islamic Republic Party:

   Islamic Republic Party Created in February 1979. It was the first official party in post-revolution Iran. This party established by clergy who had been students of Ayatollah Khomeini before his exile from the country in
1964, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the IRP emerged as the country's dominant political force.

Core members included ayatollahs Beheshti, Abdol-Karim Musavi-Ardabili, Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani, Ali Khamenei, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Bahonar. All had been active in mobilizing large crowds for the mass demonstrations during the Revolution. Following the overthrow of the Shah, the IRP leaders continued to use their extensive contacts with religious leaders throughout the country to mobilize popular support.

Although Ayatollah Khomeini himself never became a member of the IRP, the party leaders exploited their close association with him to project a popular image of the IRP as the party following the line of the imam Khomeini. This implicit identification helped IRP candidates win a majority of seats in the elections for the Assembly of Experts that drafted the Constitution.

During the 1980 elections for the first Islamic Consultative Assembly, IRP candidates and independents sympathetic with most IRP positions again won a majority of the seats. The party's effective control of the ICA emboldened the IRP in its harassment of opponents. Throughout 1980, IRP organized gangs of *Hezbollah* used intimidation tactics against supporters of other political parties, and consequently, most of the secular parties were cowed into silence as their leaders fled to foreign exile.⁴

By 1981 the only political group that could seriously challenge the IRP was the Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO). The ideological conflict between the MKO and the IRP was serious because the former rejected the IRP argument of a religious basis for the political principle of *velayat-e faqih*. In fact, in June 1980 Ayatollah Khomeini denounced the MKO on account of the organization's insistence that laymen were as qualified as clergy to interpret religious doctrines. Although the MKO closed most of its branch offices following this verbal assault, unlike the secular political parties it was not easily intimidated by IRP-organized political violence. On the contrary, MKO members engaged in armed clashes with Hezbollah. Tensions between MKO and IRP partisans intensified during the political conflict between Bani Sadr and the IRP leaders. The MKO lent its support to the beleaguered president; after Bani Sadr was impeached, the organization rose in armed rebellion against the IRP dominated government.

Several of the small leftist parties joined the MKO uprising. These included the Paykar, a pre-Revolutionary Marxist splinter from the MKO, and the Fadayan Minority. The latter had split from the main Fadayan (thereafter referred to as the Fadayan Majority) in 1980 after a majority of the group's Central Committee had voted to support the government. Both the Paykar and the Fadayan Minority shared the view of the MKO that the IRP was "merely a group of fascist clerics blocking a true revolution." The MKO had a much broader base of support than did either of its allies, but the combined strength

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5 - MKO is not only a political group but also is completely terrorist group. Officially they called Monafeq means false-faced and mischief making persons. Mojahed are people who do Jihad and try their best in living in the way of God. So, their terrorist activities are not Islamic however extremist and contrary with Islam doctrine.
of all the groups could not match the capabilities of the IRP in terms of mobilizing masses of committed supporters.

The MKO stepped up a campaign of sporadic and highly demoralizing bombing throughout the country that killed many clerics and government leaders, including the bombing on June 28, 1981, of the headquarters of the ruling Islamic Republican Party, in which 73 people were killed. Bani-Sadr's successor, former Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Rajai, and his prime minister were killed in another bombing on August 30.

Not all of the leftist parties supported the MKO's call to arms. Significantly, both the Tudeh and the Fadayan Majority condemned the insurrection and proclaimed their loyalty to the constitutional process. Even though these parties were permitted to function within narrowly circumscribed limits, the IRP leaders remained deeply suspicious of them. Both parties were distrusted because of their espousal of Marxist ideas. In addition, a widespread perception prevailed that the Tudeh was subservient to the Soviet Union, an attitude derived from the Tudeh's historic practice of basing its own foreign policy stances upon the line of the Soviet Union. In the autumn of 1982, toleration for the Tudeh dissipated quickly once the party began to criticize the decision to take the Iran-Iraq War into Iraqi territory. In February 1983, the government simultaneously arrested thirty top leaders of the Tudeh and accused them of treason. The party was outlawed, its offices closed, and members rounded up. Subsequently, Tudeh leaders were presented on television, where they confessed to being spies for the Soviet Union.

After the spring of 1983, the only nonreligious political party that continued to operate with legal sanction was the IFM. Prominent members
included the former prime minister, Bazargan, and the former foreign minister, Ibrahim Yazdi, both of whom were elected to the first Majlis in 1980. The IFM opposed most of the policies of the IRP. Whenever Bazargan or another IFM member dared to speak out against IRP excesses, however, gangs of Hezbollah’s ransacked party offices. Bazargan was subjected to verbal abuse and even physical assault. He was powerless to protect one of his closest associates from being tried and convicted of treason for actions performed as an aide in the provisional government. Although Bazargan was reelected to the Majlis in 1984, he was barred from being a candidate in the 1985 presidential elections. In practice, the IFM has been intimidated into silence, and thus its role as a loyal opposition party has been largely symbolic.

The IRP’s success in silencing or eliminating organized opposition was directed not only at political parties but also was extended to other independent organizations. Even religious associations were not exempt from being forcibly disbanded if they advocated policies that conflicted with IRP goals. Although it emerged as the dominant political party, the IRP leadership failed to institutionalize procedures for developing the IRP into a genuine mass party. IRP offices were set up throughout the country, but in practice these did not function to recruit members. Rather, the offices served as headquarters for local clergy who performed a variety of political roles distinct from purely party functions. At both the national and the local levels, the IRP’s clerical leaders perceived themselves as responsible for enforcing uniform Islamic behavior and thought. Thus, they generally viewed the party as a means of achieving this goal and not as a means of articulating the political views of the masses. In actuality, therefore, the IRP remained essentially an elitist party.
The debate within the political elite on power distribution and economic policy also adversely affected the IRP. Intensified dissent over economic programs, beginning in 1986, virtually paralyzed the party. Consequently, President Khamenei, who had become the IRP's secretary general in 1981 following the death of Beheshti and several other key party leaders, decided it would be politically expedient to disband the IRP. Khamenei and Rafsanjani jointly signed a letter to Khomeini in June 1987, in which they notified him of the party's polarization and requested his consent to dissolve the party. The faqih agreed, and the political party that had played such an important role during the first eight years of the Republic ceased to exist.

D) Jenah or Political blocs in Iran Politics:

1-What is Jenah?

Some party analysts like Dr. Sadegh Zibakalam and Dr. Saeed Barzin believe that in the Islamic Republic of Iran there is no any political party, because the party in the modern countries has its own specifications. But in Iran we have Jenahs instead of parties.⁶

After the victory of Islamic Revolution in Iran, there were many different Jenahs in the political system of Iran. Now there are three main questions. First, what is jenah means? Second, what is the difference between Jenah and party? Third, why political party (like the other countries in the world) did not create in Iran’s political scene?

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Jenah means there are different ideas about political, economic and cultural issues in the society. So, the ideas which are close to each other come together in an umbrella of one Jenah. Then, jenah as political institution is bigger than a party and it is near to a political bloc. In other words there are no any special words in English language to specify the exact meaning of a Jenah. Although, in some case we can use words like bloc, association, society, alliance and group instead of this word, but for understanding the exact meaning, it is recommend using the original word in most cases. The main differences between Jenah and party are:  

**First:** Jenah doesn’t have the specification of a party. For example party has its own constitution and regulations. One of the first steps of a party making is outline a constitution and bylaws. But Jenahs don’t have any constitutions. Although, some of the groups or parties that make these Jenahs or political blocs have their own constitutions.

**Second:** every party has its own program and plan to come to power and for reaching this goal they prepare the personnel they need. But, Jenah doesn’t have any program and doesn’t work on personnel and they shift their perspectives during the times.

**Third:** political parties have an extended network across the country that connected to the central body of the party. But, Jenahs do their works intensive. Moreover, some of the Jenahs prefer to affiliate with the people traditionally not in the framework of a party system.

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Fourth: the main goal of creating a party is capture power however; some of the Jenahs in Iran because of lacking of qualified personnel and program for leading the country can not do this. Nevertheless, they influence government policies.

Fifth: parties followed distinct policies but, Jenahs act like a thought spectrum. In other words, they have different perspectives and viewpoints on same issues. They are not solidity.

Sixth: most of the parties in the world are not absolutism and they attract a section of a society but, the Jenahs suppose themselves above the parties.

2-Different views about existence of Jenah in Iran:

There are different views about existence of Jenahs in Iran. Some analysts recognize the existence of Jenahs as necessary for the society but, some of them do not recognize. We can divide these views in 3 categories: 

A-analyst not recognizes Jenah:

The followers of this view believe that in the Islamic Republic of Iran there is no room for Jenahs. Moreover, they believe that the creation of Jenah is most of the time, an act of “external hands”. The majority of the followers of this view are inside Iran and their political leaning is near to the Association of Militant Clergy (a prominent Right Jenah). For example Sayed Reza Akrami a member of this Association said that “I do not accept the definition like left, right, traditional and modern. For me there is the only truth and there is no so on thing as Jenah.

8 -Ibid., pp.7-9
B- Jenah as governmental creation:

Followers of this view believe that Jenahs are made by the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran. They said that Iran’s regime creates this conception that inside the country there are many Jenahs, position and opposition facilitating political discussion and dialogue. Although, they have different viewpoints, they live together.

They said that the government creates this misgiving in order to suppose that in Iran society there are freedoms and liberty and we can hope to change the situation through dialogue and peaceable means. This view is put forward by the royalist, which is an opposition outside the country.

C-Jenah as a real political phenomenon:

Followers of this view believe that Jenah in the Islamic Republic of Iran is a real political phenomenon and for knowing of political structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran it is necessary to know the perspectives of these Jenahs in political, economic and cultural issues.

Inside Iran, Association of Militant Clerics (a prominent Left Jenah) was the followers of this view. In this regard, Organization of the Mojaheddin of the Islamic Revolution, divide all the Jenahs in 4 groups:

1-Traditional Right
2-Modern Right
3-Left
4-New Left

Abas Abdi one the main member of Salam Newspaper editorial board divides the political wings in 4 groups:
1-Traditional Right
2-Modern Right
3-Extremist Right
4-Left

Moreover, Alireza Alavitabar, chief editor of Bahman weekly said: “inside the Islamic Republic of Iran we can divide the believer of this regime in 3 main groups:
1-modern and traditionalist groups’
2-advocates of authoritative rule groups and democratic groups
3-left and right groups”

Following to this 3 point of view we can divide all the political groups in Iran.

Mohammad Javad Hojati Kermani, a writer and researcher divide all the wings and groups in 2 main blocs. He said: our political and religious thoughts can be divided in 2 main blocs’ 1-Traditionalist 2-Modern. Then within the above blocs we can find moderates and extremists. In other words we can divide all the Jenahs in 4 categories as follows:

1-Extremist Traditionalists
2-Moderate Traditionalists
3-Extremist Moderns
2-Moderate Moderns

Also, some of the experts outside the country support this view. For example Dr. Saeed Barzin, professor of political science in Exter University in England divides all the wings in post-revolution Iran in 5 blocs:
1-Libr al 2-Hizbollah 3- Moderate Right 4-Left 5-Rihgt
He believes that at the present time there are 4 main blocs in Iran as follows: 1-Right 2-Moderate 3-Left 4-Hizbollah

Jan Peer Pern, in an article in “Liberation Newspaper” published in Paris, believes that there are 4 Jenah inside Iran:
1-Left Islamic
2-Technocrates
3-Resalatis
4-Supra-Conservatives

E) Creation of Jenahs in Iran Politics:

Before the ousting of President Abolhasan Banisadr on 21st June 1981, all the Jenah in the Islamic Republic of Iran were only of two kind: Islamic and Nationalists. After that, new Jenahs like left and right were came in to existence.

From the mid-1983 onward this kind of Jenah emerged at the governmental and Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles-e Shuray-e Eslami) level. Initially the bases of these Jenahs were economic. However, in the course of time it extended to encompass the other related issues such as governmental control over the distribution of resources interpretation of article 44 of the constitution on legality or illegality of cooperative activities and rule of nationalization of industries and so on.

At the threshold of third parliament election, many political changes have been made in Iran. For example, in 1988 Association of Militant Clerics separated from the Association of Militant Clergy. This important change officialised the existence of two foremost Jenahs in Iran.
Moreover, the economic crisis of 1986 to 1988, end of war, reconstructions and the new economic views like privatization, borrowings and new political and cultural issues caused the emergence of new Jenahs in Iran. The main issue before them was how to face the problem of falling of the oil prices in Iran.

In the left wing there were two different streams of thought. Some of them supported the export of non-oil product, took of foreign loan for capitalizing in infrastructures and privatization, however, some of them opposed it.

Furthermore, the issues of freedom, cultural invasion and the way to counter it, the freedom of press etc. also occupied the minds of these new-fangled groups.

The above political changes caused the creation of novel political groups like Ansar-e Hezbollah and Servants of Construction (Hezb-e Kargozare-e Sazandeghi) at the threshold of fourth parliament election. Till then Servants of Construction did not known officially.

Between the fourth and the fifth Islamic Consultative Assembly election, perspectives of Jenahs on different issues became more transparent and their divergence of opinions increased. So, a new group called Society of Defending of Values of Islamic Revolution (Jameyat-e Defah az Erzeshhay-e Enghelabeh Eslami) officiallised.

Up to this time there was a possibility of cooperation between Servants of Construction and Association of Militant Clergy, even the names of 10 candidates of Association of Militant Clergy were on the list of Servants of
Construction but in the future, criticisms of this Jenah against Servants of Construction separated them from each other, so that in the seventh parliament election Servants of Construction supported the opponents candidates of Association of Militant Clergy.⁹

F) Electoral Performance of the Parties and Jenahs:

1-Islamic Republic Party:

As mentioned earlier, the first official Post-revolution Iran’s party was IRP. So, it is very important to look at its seat in the Islamic Consultative Assembly. First Iranian Post-revolution Parliamentary elections were held in two stages in March and May 1980, amid charges of fraud. The official results gave the IRP and its supporters 130 of 241 seats decided (elections were not completed in all 270 constituencies). Candidates associated with Bani Sadr and with Bazargan's Iran Freedom Movement each won a handful of seats; other left-of-center secular parties fared no better.

Candidates of the radical left-wing parties, including the Mojahedin, the Fadayan, and the Tudeh, won no seats at all. IRP dominance of the ICA was reinforced when the credentials of a number of deputies representing the National Front and the Kurdish-speaking areas, or standing as independents, were rejected. The consequences of this distribution of voting power soon became evident. The ICA began its deliberations in June 1980. Hojjatoleslam Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, a cleric and founding member of the IRP, was elected as ICA’s speaker.

⁹ -Ibid., pp.9-11
2-Liberal Jenah:

The first Jenah that established in Post-revolution Iran was the Liberal bloc under the leadership of Mahdi Bazergan the prime minister of provisional government. This Jenah made the first Post-revolution government and nine month captured the power. This bloc resigned after tension with the revolutionary and extremist activists and simultaneously occupied of US embassy in Tehran by the students of Imam Khomeini’s Line.10

After the above political changes, the liberals only preferred to apparent in the parliament till 1981. Mojahedin Khalgh Organisation military operations changed the situation for liberals and they preferred semi and non-official activities. So, until 1991, they did not do any important political activity in Iran.

In 1994, fifth parliament election, they were more active than before and tried to take part in the election but not very extended. At the last moment of the election they objected the improper atmosphere of the election and did not take part. Liberals then continued their non-official activities. Although this group did not take part in the parliament election but their views affected on the Pragmatist and Reformist groups.

3-Establishment of Hezbollah:

Hezbollah was one of the oldest political groups in Post-revolution Iran. This group was established after the victory of counter royalist revolution.

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Hezbollah believed that outside the governmental bodies (that were under the effect of the former regime) it was need to establish revolutionary organizations to ensure the safeness of the Post-revolution regime. But the Liberal Jenah opposed with these viewpoints and tried to rectify the old governmental bodies.

This bloc was very active in political scene like government and also parliaments until 1991. They were very active in the first decade of Post-revolution Iran. For example, they captured a large number of seats in second and third parliaments in a manner that we can say it were a predominant Jenah in those times. From 1992 steps by step this Jenah downfall. Because, Iraq imposed war against Iran was one of the most important bases of their existence. In each third and forth parliament they had only 15 seats.11

The most prominent papers that published their views were Sobh, kayhan and Jomhuri Eslami. These papers non-officially published the views of Hezbollah. This Jenah was active in Tehran and Mashhad cities.

4-Moderator or Pragmatist:

Pragmatist or Moderator Jenah came to scene after downfall of Hezbollah Jenah in 1991. Moreover 3 important events escalated replacing of these two Jenahs with each other. First, the demise of Ayatollah Khomeini as founder of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran created many changes in the political scene and one of them was balance of power between the political groups. Second, cease fire with Iraq. Third, capture of

11 -Ibid.,pp53-58
power by President Hashemi Rafsanjani as a main supporter of this new bloc.\textsuperscript{12}

Support of President Hashemi Rafsanjani and the rational economic and social plans of this Jenah for reconstruction of the country caused a huge victory for them in fourth and fifth ICA’s elections. This Jenah has been won 30 seats in fourth and 100 seats in fifth parliament elections. It was a triumph for this Jenah in fifth ICA to have the majority for ratifying its programs according to construct the countries infrastructures.

Hashemi Rafsanjani, Gholam Hossein Karbaschi, Attaollah Mohajerani, Hasan Rohani and Ebdolah Noori were the most prominent responsibilities that support this Jenah.

Two major papers with high circulations, Hamshahri and Iran non-officially supported this Jenah in their publications, predominantly in 1990’s decade.

5-Right or Conservative Jenah:

If comparing this Jenah with the others, it is necessary to say that it is more traditionalist than the others. So, their ancient social bases are Bazars, Religious Schools in Qum and Mashhad, Mosques all over the country and other religious institutions.

This Jenah have been solidified in fourth parliament. It came to the scene in the campaign of fourth ICA’s election with the motto of “supporting the Leader and President”. In the first step they were with the moderatos but

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid. pp.58-59
after 2 years of cooperating, they divide their lines. They feared of the development economic plan.

The Conservatives or Rightist came to power in the Majlis in 1992 on Rafsanjani's coattails. At the time, they were considered moderate reformers, advocating eased social restrictions and better ties with the west so as to address Iran's economic isolation. The bloc held a slim majority in the 1996 elections, and began to face a relentless onslaught from the left-wing, which had retooled itself as a reformist faction. By the 2000 elections, the bloc was essentially referred to as "hardline," the label given to the Radical Leftists in 1992 when the Conservatives had ousted them. It lost control of the majlis in a landslide victory for the reformists.

This Jenah was the predominant blocs in the fourth parliament. They woned 150 seats in this round of election and it was a victory for them. But in the next parliament election, they decreased their seats to 130.

6-Left or Reformist Jenah:

This Jenah was younger than the others. It was established in 1994. School of thought of this Jenah is near to the Hezbollah Jenah. So, it could be said that this Jenah was a revision of Hezbollah Jenah in a new shape. But their views had completely changed and a new-fangled and independent Jenah was borne.

They insisted on the necessary of the execution of constitution articles particularly, the articles about the nation rights and theirs freedom.
This Jenah was born from the forth ICA’s election. But it was very weak in the fourth and fifth parliament. Because, it wined only 15 seats in each parliaments and it was very low dominant. So, they tried to change their views and perspectives. This Jenah, with assist of the other groups supported President Khatami, predominant in the sixth parliament. They had totally about 189 eats in this parliament.

The Reformist bloc is essentially a retooling of the Leftist bloc toward a more moderate ideology which stresses the rule of law, personal freedoms, and better ties with the west. Led by President Mohammad Khatami, the bloc took the presidency in 1997 in an election over the Conservative speaker of the ICA, won Iran's first municipal elections in 1999, and took control of the parliament in 2000 in a landslide.  

G) Main Political Jenahs and Groups:

1-Association of Militant Clergy:

Assembly of Militant Clergy (Jame'eh-ye Ruhaniyat-e Mobarez) established at the threshold of victory of the Islamic Republic of Iran. But up to time that Islamic Republic Party (IRP) worked, it was under the umbrella of this party. This is a conservative Islamic faction, officially recognized by the interior ministry in 1989 and led by recently Ex-Parliament Speaker Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri (Khatami's defeated opponent in 1997 presidential election) and Ayatollah Mohammed Reza Mahdavi-Kani. It is supported by traditional

13 - Michael Theodoulou, “A chance for the Reformist to take on the Conservative”, Iran Mania Web Site, for more information please see the site http://www.iranmania.com/elections/articles/reformist.asp
bazaar merchants and a number of clerical organizations, including the Qom Seminarians' Association.

In the first parliament election, in March 1980, this Association along with the leader of IRP came opposed to the other political groups like Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO), Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI) and left groups.

After ousting of Abolhasan Banisadr from the presidency, all of the political groups inside Iran divided in two main Jenahs viz, Islamists and Nationalist.

This Jenah is a hard line conservative traditionalist cleric. The conservative traditionalists favor a market economy, are hard-liners on foreign policy and ultra-conservative on cultural policy. This group closely supports Iran's Supreme Leader and Jurisprudent, Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khamenei, and advocates an absolutist interpretation of the *Velayat-e Faqih* doctrine that ultimate decision making authority belongs to the *Vali-e Faqih*, or Chief Jurisprudent, whose knowledge of God's will is believed to exceed that of other citizens.

This Jenah was the main organization supporting the candidacy of Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri in the Iranian presidential elections of May 23, 1997. One of the main newspapers supporting this bloc is the daily *Resalat*. 
2-Assembly of Militant Clerics:

Assembly of Militant Clerics (*Majma’-e Ruhaniyune Mobarez*) is a bloc made up of clergymen associated with the left of the Islamic political spectrum.

This organization takes a more flexible position on cultural matters than the conservative bloc and has been calling for greater political freedom and the strengthening of "civil society."

Members of this bloc support government measures to create employment, social assistance for the poor, and continuing state intervention in the economy. Members of this Jenah have recently supported Khatami's finance minister's budget balancing austerity effort. Previously members of this bloc were associated with radical anti-U.S. positions in foreign policy, but some have moderated their positions in recent months showing openness to a dialogue with the West. This bloc supported Khatami in the recent presidential election.

3-Organisation of the Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution:

Organization of the Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution (*Sazman-e Mojahedin-e Enqelab-e Eslami*), was created in 1979, shortly after the revolution, from small Islamic guerrilla organizations, several of whose leaders had formerly been Marxists.

The political ideology of members of this group today is similar to that of the *Khat-e Emami* groups. Recently representatives of this group and their student supporters have launched the bi-weekly newspaper *Asr-e Ma*. 
One of the leading figures behind Asr-e Ma is Behzad Nabavi, one of the founders of the who acted as chief negotiator for Iran during the discussions with US officials over the fate of the American hostages and who also served as Minister of Heavy Industry. Behzad Nabavi and some of his younger student supporters have recently written articles in which they try to reconcile the Velayat-e Faqih or guardianship of the supreme jurisprudent with popular sovereignty in political decision making. This organization supported Khatami's presidential candidacy.

4-Servants of Construction:

At the beginning Servant of Construction Party (Hezb-e Kargozaran-e Sazandegi) was a political group but now it is officially a party. None the less, they acted as a bloc. As mentioned earlier, in fifth parliament election they were very powerful.

These are a party of technocratic supporters of former president Hashemi Rasfanjani. Members of this party favor market economic reforms, a relatively liberal cultural policy and an improvement in relations with western countries in order to break Iran's economic isolation.

This group was formed by several leading Rafsanjanites at the time of the elections to the 5th Majles in 1996. Among the prominent members of this group are Gholam Hossein Karbaschi, the popular mayor of Tehran and Mohsen Nurbakhsh the governor of the National Bank of Iran.
5-Students Groups:

In recent months a variety of student organizations have become revitalized and active demanding greater political freedom and the strengthening of civil society, a theme which was very much present in Khatami's presidential campaign. Some members of these student organizations have recently advocated limits on the power of the Supreme Leader, an end to domination of political discourse by the conservative clerical faction, and improved relations with the west.

The most important reform oriented student organization whose members have advocated such views is the Union of Islamic University Associations. Members of this group launched the publication *Payam-e Daneshju (message of student)* which was banned by the conservative judicial authorities. One of the most outspoken leaders of the new student movement is Heshmatollah Tabarzadi a radical turned democrat, who is president of the Union of Islamic University Associations and also editor of Payam-e Daneshju. The views of the students who publish Payam-e Daneshju are in many ways similar to those of Iranian dissident scholar Abdul Karim Sorush, who has argued that Islam and democracy are compatible and has called for an end to the clergy's near monopoly on political power.

Another nation-wide university organization is the *Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat* (Office for Strengthening of Unity) which has close relations with the *Khat-e Emami* groups and the *Mojahedin-e Enqelab-e Eslami*. The views of this group of students and academics are often represented in the newspaper *Asr-e Ma*. Members of this group, while supporting Khatami's call for greater political freedom, are less outspoken than those close to Tabarzadi on the need
to limit the powers of the Supreme Leader. Members of the pro-Khatami pro-reform student organizations played a major role in mobilizing voters for Khatami in the presidential elections.\textsuperscript{14}

In addition to the organizations which support democratizing political reform, there are organizations which support the Supreme Leader and an absolutist interpretation of the Velayat-e Faqih doctrine. Over the past year members of the reformist student organizations have been physically assaulted by members of Hezbollah youth organizations.

\textbf{6-Ansar-e Hezbollah:}

This group is a loose organization of radical conservative elements, whose political methods are similar to those of Mussolini's fascists. Members of the \textit{Ansar-e Hezbollah} have carried out physical assaults on liberal intellectuals and political figures and have ransacked headquarters of liberal publications. Members of this organization act as enforcers for the ultra-conservative traditionalists. In November 1997, the group led an assault on the offices of \textit{Salam}, the main newspaper supporting President Khatami. Their violent actions have occasionally been criticized by some of the conservative clerics.

\textbf{H) Political Groups in Post-Khatami’s Era:}

Important differences in the Iranian political arena emerged in the early part of the 1980’s. At that time, the major issues on the political agenda of

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{14} - Majid Mohammadi, (1999), "A Study of Student Political Behaviors in Today’s Iran" (Tehran: Kavir Publications)
\end{flushright}
different Jenahs were religious law and economic development. Not much later, however, differences sharpened over issues of public planning, foreign affairs, and the reshaping of the political system. Khatami’s ascendancy to the presidency represented a profound turning point and created a system of two powerful political blocs, viz, Conservatives and Reformists, besides, the other smaller groups also exist.\(^{15}\)

Those political factions that give precedence to defending the status quo and opposing reformist demands represent the conservative camp. The main point of reference for conservative groups is the institution of *Velayet-i Faqih* and they consider it as the bastion of all laws and norms. Other references are the call for continued Islamisation of the state and the reflection of this religious character in all matters of state, absolute obedience to state authority, and absolute state hegemony in the political realm. The foremost groups in this camp are the Hezbollah along with more moderate conservative groups.

The Hezbollah organization considers itself to be the only legitimate authority in the Iranian political system and regards all means as acceptable in order to safeguard the revolution.\(^{16}\) In their view, human history is a mammoth struggle between the forces of good and evil, and it is a religious duty to engage in the war against all evil forces. This group was the leading force in the Iranian political scenario until 1988; since that time, it has continued to serve as an extremely important pressure group in Iran. It still holds great power over the military, as well as government, intelligence, and security

\(^{15}\) - see also, Sayyed Mohammad Khatami, (2001), ”*The Political Parties and the Councils*,” (Tehran:Tarh-e-Now Pub.)

institutions. The history, ideology, and legacy of this movement have largely been shared by the Islamic Revolution Resistance Front (Jebhe-e Mokavemete Engelabe Eslami) as well as Ansar-e Hezbollah.

Conservative groups followed Ayatollah Khomeini in asserting that religious leaders should govern the state based on shari'a (Islamic law). These groups have accepted the leadership of the Velayet-i Faqih and have stood opposed to the development of democracy and civil society as Western inventions. Jame-e Ruhaniyete Mobarez (Community of Struggling Mullahs), Jemiyete Motelefe-e Eslami (United Islamic Community) and Peyrevan-e Khatte Emam ve Rehberi (Followers of the Line of Imam and Religious Leader) may be considered to be the forerunners of this ideological front.

The reformist bloc consists primarily of those groups which are in favor of reforming the Iranian political system and institutionalizing these reforms through constitutional amendments. The groups gathered in this bloc were among those responsible for the revolution, but, over time, they gradually became alienated from the regime. This bloc demonstrated quite dramatically, in the 1997 presidential elections, that it had greatly increased support among the Iranian people. The reformist bloc argues that democratic principles are or can be compatible with an Islamic order. They see tolerance and consensus as integral parts of social life and civil society as a positive project that is necessary for the respect of human rights and political freedoms. In contrast to conservatives, they seek to restrict the role of Velayet-i Faqih and to create a legal framework for this position. The reformist bloc can be classified into two different groups: moderate reformists and leftist reformists.
Moderate reformists are gathered together under the leadership of former President Rafsanjani. They seek to increase the public welfare and overcome the difficulties or roadblocks to economic development. This group consists of technocrats, managers, industrialists, and upper level bureaucrats. The groups in this camp include *Khizb-e Karguzarane Sazendegi Iran* (Servants of the Reconstruction Party) and *ve Khizb-e Etedal ve Tosee* (Moderation and Development Party).

The leftist reformists argue that the most important obstacle to the development of Iranian society is the failure to broaden participation in the political realm and provide more freedom in this sphere. They see this as necessary to overcome what they see as a bottleneck in the Iranian political system. They argue that the minority which holds political power in Iran is not open to popular accountability and that their performance leaves a great deal to be desired. This, they argue, is why the dominant group has lost support and is no longer seen as legitimate by the Iranian people. *Mejme-e Ruhaniyon Mobarez* (Community of Struggling Mullahs), *Sazman-e Mojahedin Engelab Eslami Iran* (Comabatants of Islamic Revolution), Khizb Khembestegi-e Iran-e Eslami (Islamic Solidarity Party of Iran), *Jebhe-e Moshareket-e Iran-e Eslami* (Islamic Participation Party of Iran), *Khizb-e Kare Eslami Iran* (Islamic Labor Party of Iran) are the principal parties that comprise this bloc.

For reformists, once the republic--as it is defined in the constitution--has been established in Iran, then the political system will be improved to a considerable extent. The influential Iranian thinker, Abdul Karim Soroush, known as intellectual architect of Khatami revolution, is in favor of keeping religion aside when it comes to ruling the state. He argues that shari’a may be basis of modern legislation but it should be flexible and adaptable rather than
being static. The power of the intellectuals in Iran, and in other areas with a Muslim majority or minority, is increasing and also gaining transnational status since their publications are rapidly translated to other languages.

The groups that do not belong to either of these two major power blocs fall into two categories. While some of these organizations, like the Iranian Freedom Movement, are mild reformists, others seek a radical transformation of Iranian society. These especially radical factions are organized into a broad range of different groups, the best-known being the People's Combatants. These groups have found only limited opportunity for involvement in the political system in legal ways. Perhaps as a result, some have extended partial support to the Khatami bloc; at least this was the case in the elections to parliament in February 1999. Still, they generally consider the reformist bloc to represent a lesser evil.

While the electoral process in Iran is still tightly controlled by Guardian Council, opposed to reform, there have been important changes in the character of the Islamic Republic since 1979. In fact, the electoral process in Iran has given rise to four unique eras, or Republics:

1-The Liberal-Nationalist Republic  2-The Conservatives Islamic Republic 3-The Pragmatist Republic  4- The Reformist Republic.

In all these eras, except that of the Reformists, one social stratum achieved hegemonic status, while others were marginalized. But even the

fundamentalists, with their power over the electoral process, have been unable to sustain total control of the Iranian political system at least by now. Today, for the first time, there is a balance of power between two rival factions: Conservatisms and Reformists. The former has the structural power within the state, the latter has the power of popular support, and the pragmatists play a balancing role between them.

Reform Obstacles:

Two rounds of President Khatami’s presidencies showed that there are a number of political and institutional factors which could limit, delay or even halt the process of political participation:

1. Ideological:

The parties being formed are restricted in their operation to the strictly limited bounds of an 'Islamic civil society', which differs from more liberal concepts of democratic participation. The constitution of the Islamic Republic only envisages the existence of political parties on condition that they do not "violate the principles of independence, liberty, national unity and Islamic standards and the foundation of the Islamic Republic". Thus, while a gradual process of Islamic localization could provide the platform for a cumulative process of full democratization, the reforms will, at least in the short term, be limited to the formal recognition of factions within the regime.

2. Procedural:

The stringent vetting procedures of the Special Commission on Political Parties -- comprising Majlis members and officials from the interior
ministry, Prosecutor- General's Office, the Supreme Judicial Council and the Information Ministry -- foreclose the formal recognition of any real opposition to the regime. The commission, which includes a preponderance of conservatives in its ranks, has traditionally taken a restrictive line on applications.

3. Institutional:

The institutions of the Islamic Republic, many of which are headed by direct appointees of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, continue to be largely dominated by conservatives committed to the primacy of the velayat-e faqih (meaning literally the rule of the jurisprudent, but in effect the rule of the supreme leader) over the constitution and opposed to multi-party pluralism. The power struggle between the modernizing president and conservative Islamic groups led by and loyal to Khamenei will Spill over into the formation of parties and a party system.

4. Factional:

Differences exist amongst the existing Jenahs, which could mitigate the pluralist trend. The Association of Militant Clerics has until now declared itself opposed to the formation of a formal western-style political party. The Society for the Defense of the Values of the Islamic Revolution also remains opposed to a multi-party system as inimical to the velayat-e faqih. Thus, even if a multi-party system were to emerge, the factions within the ruling elite which maintain an anti-pluralist stance, as reflected in commentaries in widely-read newspapers, would not only reduce its scope by remaining on the sidelines but also actively work to undermine it.
I) Tables and Charts

Table I-1: Classification of main political Jenahs (blocs) in Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jenah</th>
<th>Non-official names</th>
<th>Official names</th>
<th>Official and non-official papers</th>
<th>High authorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Modern Right, Expediential</td>
<td>Servant of Construction</td>
<td>Ettelaat and Hamshahri</td>
<td>Gholam Hossein Karbaschi, Abdolah Noori, Hasan Rohani, Ataollah Mohajerani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>Conservative, Traditional Right</td>
<td>Association of Militant Clergy, Islamic Coalition Society, Homolateral Bodies</td>
<td>Resalet</td>
<td>Nategh Noori, Mohammad Javad Larijani, Morteza Nabavi Hojatoleslam Khoinehi, Abbas Abdi, Bezad Nabavi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>Traditional left</td>
<td>Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution, Association of Militant Clerics</td>
<td>Salam and Asr-e ma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>Expeditious, revolutionist, new left</td>
<td>Ansar-e Hizbollah, Society of Defending Values</td>
<td>Sobh, Kayhan and Jomhuri-e Eslami</td>
<td>Ayatollah Janati, Mohammad Rayshahri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Liberal Nationalist</td>
<td>Freedom Movement</td>
<td>Iran-e Farda</td>
<td>Ebrahim Yazdi, Ezzatollah Sahabi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I-1(continue): Classification of main political Jenahs (bloc) in Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>Internal policy</th>
<th>External policy</th>
<th>Economic plan</th>
<th>Social statutes</th>
<th>Seats in fourth and fifth Majlis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Open Economy and government role</td>
<td>Middle Class and Borocrates</td>
<td>About 30 and 100 seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>Conservative, Traditionalist</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Open Economy and private sector role</td>
<td>Bazaar and traditionalist Middle Class</td>
<td>About 150 and 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>Expeditious</td>
<td>Insist in role of government</td>
<td>Middle Class and below Middle Class</td>
<td>About 15 and 15 seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Expeditious and Revolutionary</td>
<td>Insist in role of government</td>
<td>Below Middle Class and below Middle Class, borocrates</td>
<td>About 15 and 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Reform of Constitution</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td></td>
<td>And private sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table I-2-Seats of Factions in Sixth Islamic Consultative Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Factions</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-Reformists or Second of Khordad Groups</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Conservatives or Right Islamists</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Independents</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Religious Minorities</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Numbers</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 - Internet Site of *Iran Mania*: http://www.iransonia.com