CHAPTER V
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ADMINISTRATION WEIGHS NKRUMAH'S COURSE AND DOMESTIC CRITICISM OF PROPOSED AID

NKRUMAH'S TRIP TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

On 10 July 1961 Nkrumah, accompanied by a large delegation of his party members, reached Moscow to begin a tour of Communist countries. The countries that were in his itinerary included, apart from the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and finally, China. Suddenly, during the trip, he made a dash to East Berlin and was received by the Mayor of the city. The visit to East Berlin was regarded in the United States Government circles as provocative and unfriendly.¹ Nkrumah stayed in the Communist countries till 31 August 1961 after which he flew to Belgrade to attend the Non-aligned conference. During his tour as well as at the Belgrade Conference Nkrumah made statements supporting Moscow on a wider number of subjects ranging from Berlin to nuclear disarmament. The attitude of Nkrumah and other neutrals at the Belgrade Conference irritated the United States. This was reflected in a comment by President Kennedy himself on the Belgrade Conference: "In the administration of funds, we should give greater attention and consideration for those nations who have our view of the world crisis."²

¹. Interview, Francis C. Green.
The United States was not unaware of the steady growth of opposition to Nkrumah within the country itself. Following Nkrumah's departure on his foreign tour, a critical situation developed in Ghana. An austere budget was presented to the Parliament which featured heavy import duties on all items, and a purchase tax of between ten to 66% per cent for all sorts of luxury items. The most controversial item of the budget was the imposition of compulsory savings for all workers and wage earners in the country to the tune of five per cent on their salary. As a result of the heavy taxation, Ghanaians suddenly faced a twenty per cent increase in the cost of living. \(^3\) Popular resentment was reflected in a general strike by railway and port workers of Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi paralyzing virtually all activities in these cities. The GOG had to declare a limited state of emergency in Sekondi-Takoradi.

The budget had so many unpopular provisions that even the Ghanaian press which had been docile all along and never dared to criticize the government came out with sharp criticisms. For instance, the Ashanti Pioneer in an editorial challenged the Government to show why the Ghanaians were being compelled to undergo such serious sacrifice and hardship while the country was facing no national crisis. The paper regarded the harsh provisions of the budget as inflicting serious inroads on day-to-day private needs of the Ghanaians and described the tax proposals

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as challenges to "freedom". In another editorial the same paper criticized the Government of Ghana for the manner in which it pushed property tax into the budget and a scheme for compulsory saving which would create overwhelming hardship for the people. It pleaded that the whole scheme should be scrapped.

In the United States even the sympathetic *Christian Science Monitor* commented that for the first time since assuming power, Nkrumah was confronted by mutterings and rumblings of internal discontent over the budget on a significant scale.

On his return from Belgrade Nkrumah found the country riven by the strike and he followed a policy of conciliation and aggression to tackle the problem. He dismissed two top members of his cabinet, K.A. Gbedemeh and Kojo Botsio, who were regarded as pro-West. He also ordered the arrest of fifty persons belonging to the opposition and dismissed a top British civil servant and seventy of the two hundred British officers serving in the Army including Major-General H.T. Alexander, Chief of Army Staff.

Nkrumah's speeches in the Communist countries, his stance at Belgrade and his actions on his return from the tour disturbed the State Department. The anti-Nkrumah group now argued that in the name of bringing about socialism to Ghana, Nkrumah was in fact trying to make his country a Communist State.

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5. Ibid., 29 July 1961, p. 2.
Even some sympathizers of Nkrumah in the State Department viewed Nkrumah's belligerent speeches against the West with concern and began to wonder whether Nkrumah was taking United States participation in the VRP too much for granted. Discussion went on within the Department and the White House on the course that the United States should follow.

AMERICAN PRESS CRITICISMS OF NKRUMAH'S POLICIES

The American press reflected the misgivings of the Administration. On 22 August 1961, the Christian Science Monitor reported that the Communist "presence" in Ghana was clearly stronger at that time than on any other occasion since independence. In a subsequent column, the paper described Nkrumah as a "puzzling paradox" or "Marxist Socialist", but not a Communist in any sense. Commenting on American participation in the VRP the Monitor declared that the VRP would be a test for Western diplomacy. It noted that one group inside the United States strongly pressed for a cancellation of aid to Ghana and divert it to some friendly regimes in Africa. The Administration, on the other hand felt, the Monitor said, that such a course of action on the part of the United States would create an impression that America was eager only to buy friendship for it through aid in Africa.

7. Interview.
The New York Times said that the Administration was worried over Nkrumah's pro-Soviet stance in foreign affairs and a policy of "Marxist dictatorship" that he was pursuing at home. The paper asserted that though Nkrumah was not a Communist, a review of American aid to Ghana was necessary to weigh the "positive" character of his neutralism. 10 The New York Times also reported that Kennedy himself wanted re-assurances from the Government of Ghana that it would fulfill its financial obligations of the Project and that he had asked for an assurance from Nkrumah on the political orientation of his regime. The paper predicted that the President would send a mission to Accra to "rivet something down" before signing of the agreement and that G. Mennen Williams would probably head such a mission to Ghana. 11 It was of course, unlikely that the President would have seriously considered Williams for heading such a mission in view of the latter's enthusiastic support for American aid to African nations. The question was who would be a suitable person to head the mission, both from the point of view of making clear to Nkrumah the US point of view and getting support domestically also for any decision that the President might eventually take.

The inclination on Administration's part to give a second thought to the assistance encouraged the conservative

press in the United States to lash out at Nkrumah and to exhort Kennedy not to go ahead with the proposed assistance for the VRP. In an editorial the U.S. News and World Report stressed that both internally and externally Ghana was becoming more of a "Marxist police state" than a democracy, more pro-Communist than neutral. The paper posed the question whether it was worth pouring more American money into aiding a country which seemed to be going Communist in spite of the aid.12

The Barrons published from Boston characterized the VRP as a "Monument to Folly". It called upon the United States Government not to subsidize Ghana's power venture.13

The Niemen Reports also published from Boston remarked that the proposed American assistance for the VRP would eventually prop up Communist regimes in Africa and would work against the foreign policy goals of the United States.14

The Conservative press accelerated their campaign to block any aid to Nkrumah when in November 1961 Kofi A. Busie, the exiled Ghanaian leader reached the United States to obtain support for fair trials for the Ghanaians imprisoned under the 1958 Preventive Detention Act and to seek help for Ghana's political refugees. Busie in a statement said that Ghana which began its debut with so full of hope and goodwill from the

world at large had now been turned into a state where people were less free now than they were before under the colonial rule.15

THE DEBATE WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION

The Administration was sharply divided over the question of American support for the VRP. Among those in the Administration who supported the view that the United States should go ahead with participation in the VRP were Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser State Department, Chester Bowles, Under Secretary of State, William, the Assistant Secretary and his deputy, Wayne Fredericks. The opposition group consisted of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the President's brother, Douglas Dillon, the Secretary of Treasury and George Bell, the Under Secretary of State. Even a well wisher of the project like Adlai Stevenson, the American permanent representative to the UN suggested that the aid be suspended.16 It was noteworthy also to find that during the thick period of the controversy both President Kennedy and Edgar Kaiser found to their surprise that their respective parents had been insisting almost on the same lines to reconsider the wisdom of the whole venture.17

The supporters of the venture believed that the United States should look at the whole matter with a long term perspective. It was not advisable to be influenced unduly by the statements and postures of Nkrumah. In fact, the United States

should look beyond Nkrumah and squarely ask itself the question whether the project would benefit the people of Ghana and bring goodwill for the United States in that country and in Africa. These men conceded that American assistance might bolster Nkrumah’s position and contribute to a prolongation of his rule. Such a risk would have to be taken. At any rate American aid to VRP would at least provide some sort of restraining influence on Nkrumah that might be totally absent were the United States to withdraw its offer of aid.  

The opponents were strongly critical of Nkrumah’s domestic policies and felt that the American assistance would merely stabilize his regime in Ghana. The United States, they felt, had no stake in prolonging Nkrumah’s tenure. With regard to Robert Kennedy’s well-known opposition against Nkrumah, a Kennedy appointed Ambassador to an African country told the present writer in an interview that Robert Kennedy’s distaste for Nkrumah began from the time of his visit to Ivory Coast in December 1960. There, according to the source, the President’s brother had been told by President Houphet Boigney of Ivory Coast that it would be a mistake for the United States to court Africans like Nkrumah whose main interest seemed to be to cultivate the Soviet Union. The present writer was not able to find any corroboration for this particular story but other evidence is available including that of Walt Rostow which indicate

18. Interview.
19. Interview.
that Robert Kennedy was clearly opposed to any major American aid to Nkrumah.

The President was clearly aware of the disquiet caused in the Congress over Nkrumah's speeches and the possibility of strong opposition developing in the Congress towards aid to Ghana. He realized that the men selected for heading the mission to Ghana should be acceptable to Congress and should also provide the President with a hard-headed appraisal of Nkrumah and the trends developing in Ghana.

On 13 September 1961, Walt W. Rostow, Chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council forwarded to Kennedy a report to the effect that Nkrumah had during his stay in the Soviet Union entered into an agreement under which the Soviet Union had promised to train two hundred officer cadets for the setting up of a so-called "African High Command". Rostow also endorsed evidence to indicate that Nkrumah's action had evoked strongly opposition from the Army Chief of Staff of Ghana, H.T. Alexander. In view of the implication of this development Kennedy probably was convinced that the proposed American mission should also include some competent observers who could give him a candid appraisal of where actually Nkrumah was heading, the prospect of his continued stay in office and implications to the United States of either extending or withholding

assistance to Ghana in the early future. Rostov himself submitted to Kennedy on 2 October 1961 a comprehensive document spelling out both the case for and against cancellation of aid arrangements for the dam. 23 The memorandum will be described and examined subsequently.

By now it was becoming clear that the Administration was going to take a second look at the VRP before committing funds. The New York Times reported that Williams had a meeting with W. Halm, Ghana's Ambassador to the United States, after which the latter told the press that Ghana was not leaning towards the East. The Ambassador added that he had no evidence to suggest that the United States was thinking of cancelling aid to Ghana. 24

The Ghanaian Embassy in Washington and the World Bank had indicated to the press that an agreement relating to the United States aid to Ghana would be signed at Accra on 5 October 1961. At a press conference in the Department of State on 22 September 1961, Press Officer Joseph W. Reep was asked to comment on the report. Reep admitted that such a proposal did come from the Ghanaian side but that it was not accepted by the United States. He told the press that the Administration had taken no decision on the issue of assistance and the matter was in the final stage of review. 25
Nkrumah was clearly disturbed over the developments. He realized that the appointment of a mission to take a second look at the project (and at himself too) was imminent. It could only mean delay and even uncertainty. He decided to take up the matter directly with Kennedy. In early October he wrote two letters to Kennedy rebutting the alleged charge that Ghana had openly identified itself with the Soviet Union. In the first letter Nkrumah wrote to Kennedy that in view of letter's note of 29 June, he had taken the American participation as certain. The World Bank too had earlier given assurances of assistance if the United States support was forthcoming. But the Impresit (the Italian group which had won the dam contract) had imposed on the Government of Ghana a deadline of 17 October 1961 to commence the work. In view of these circumstances, Nkrumah wrote, he would be "grateful" if the United States mission "could come in sufficient time to permit you to inform me definitely of your Government's position by Friday, the 13th of October, at the latest."26

Scott Thompson in his study of Ghana's Foreign Policy refers to the appraisal of the London Financial Times to the effect that Nkrumah's letter was an "ultimatum" to Kennedy and an indication that Ghana might turn to the Soviet Union if a favourable response was not forthcoming.27 The present writer has not been able to find any reliable evidence in support of

this appraisal. After all, Nkrumah had simply stated the facts. He had reminded the American President of the contract deadline and had requested a reply at least four days of the deadline so that work on the project could start on schedule. That this analysis is probably nearer the mark is also indicated by Kennedy's response. He did not try to wrap Nkrumah on the knuckles, but obliged him by dealing with the problems he had posed. Kennedy simply arranged that the contract deadline be extended by sixty days.23

That Nkrumah was not thinking in terms of ultimatum at this time but only removing misapprehensions was brought out by a second letter that he wrote to Kennedy. This letter, made available to the present writer by an unimpeachable State Department source described at great length Nkrumah's views on world affairs and his domestic policies. He took great pains to explain his policy of non-alignment, compared that with India and claimed that it could not be described as leaning to the East or the West. He refuted the charges that had been made that the policies he had initiated constituted the imposition of dictatorial rule in Ghana. Reminding the President of the travails that newly independent countries had to undergo and recalling the experience of the American Republic in its early days, Nkrumah argued that these domestic measures were intended to preserve order and promote progress and safeguard hard-won independence in his country.29

23. Ibid.
29. Source, State Department.
It is noteworthy that Nkrumah wrote several letters to the British Prime Minister Harold McMillan and Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys exhorting them to proceed as schedule with the Queen's visit to Ghana in November. The letters were in response to bombings in Ghana and bitter criticisms in British press against Nkrumah and a demand for the cancellation of the visit on the ground that a royal visit would merely serve to strengthen Nkrumah's dictatorial rule. These letters indicate that Nkrumah was not at that time anyway in the mood for sending out ultimatums to America or Britain. Nkrumah also knew that the American President and the British Prime Minister were in close contact and that both of them would consult with each other concerning Ghana.

British Prime Minister McMillan in his memoir, Pointing the Way writes that on 10 October 1961 after a full discussion in the cabinet, it was decided to advise the Queen to go on with her visit to Ghana as per schedule. But on 18 October 1961 he wrote to Kennedy informing the President of his hesitations and fears regarding the trip. McMillan felt that if conditions in Ghana deteriorated further, the British might be compelled to call the tour off, which would probably have the effect not only of driving Nkrumah out of the Commonwealth but pushing him straight into the Soviet arms.

Such a step, McMillan indicated, would be one which both Britain and the United States would try all out to prevent.

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Referring to the American mission visiting Ghana, the Prime Minister guessed that the final decision on the VRP would be announced during the early part of November.

McMillen requested the President that if the decision was going to be positive he would appreciate if it could be announced before the Queen's visit. If the verdict was going to be negative, the Prime Minister requested the President to suppress the information until 20 November when the Queen would have left Ghana. The Prime Minister further wrote that the President replied immediately promising to avoid a negative verdict at an inconvenient time. 31

THE RANDALL MISSION

On 20 October President Kennedy announced that Clarence B. Randall would lead a special mission to review the United States participation in the VRP. His statement added that Randall would depart for Accra on 24 October for an on-the-spot examination and discussion with officials there regarding the project. He would meet with President Nkrumah for extensive conversations about conditions in Ghana and their relations to the project and would report to the President directly. The other members of the mission, the announcement said, were Abram Chaya, Legal Adviser, State Department, and Harry M. Shooshan, Assistant Deputy Managing Director for Operations, Development Loan Fund. 32

31. Ibid., pp. 463-4.
Clarence Randall, a former Chairman of Inland Steel was a Republican. He had served under Eisenhower as a Chairman of the Council on Economic and Foreign Policy and also as an Assistant to the President. Kennedy had retained him as a Consultant to the United States Government on Special Foreign Assistance Projects. A fiscal conservative, Randall was not known to have any strong views for or against the Project. The appointment of a Republican to head the mission appeared to be intended to get bi-partisan support for the Project in case a decision was to be made to go ahead with an aid programme.

The decision to depute the mission end to name Randall as its head appear to sustain the appraisal in the American press at that time that Kennedy was seriously re-thinking the American commitment. The possibility that was not considered in such press reports that the President might have hit upon the idea of mission as a tactic to meet the immediate problem posed by the widespread comments in the press and by some Congressmen that Ghana had begun to move significantly towards the Soviet side. This interpretation is supported in a reply that he had posed to an American diplomat who was acquainted with developments during the period. The diplomat wrote that "Randall mission was a piece of play-acting. Kennedy was not rethinking on the commitment, but he was compelled to adopt that stance when someone

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did not care to cross told the press Nkrumah's Soviet ties had prompted a re-examination. 34

The identity of the person whom the President did not choose to cross is not clear. His brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy had reportedly voiced to the President his misgivings over aiding Nkrumah. 35 Another reliable American source which claims to have seen President's notings at the time of the appointment of the mission told the present writer that Kennedy took note of the Attorney General's position but he was not thinking in terms of re-examination as a possibility leading to cancellation of the American commitment. 36

It is noteworthy that one of the two persons appointed to the Commission was known to be a supporter of the aid to the Project. He was Abram Chays, a former Harvard Professor, known within the State Department to be a strong supporter of the Project. It is not clear why Shooshan was included into the mission. Shooshan told the author that his background was in financial administration and that he was a bureaucrat who had been loaned out to the USF from the Department of Interior. He had no political backing either in the State Department or at the White House. He was himself pleasantly surprised when the White House contacted him to join the mission. However, Shooshan felt that he was probably taken in to arm the mission

34. Reference: Letter of the diplomat to the present writer.
36. Interview.
with a tough financial administrator to examine Ghana's real
economic capabilities to meet its financial obligations if the
VRP were to be undertaken. 37

On the eve of sending the mission to Ghana, Kennedy
took three other steps with regard to American assistance for the
VRP. First, he sent Williams on a tour of Africa which included
Ghana to examine Ghana's Cold War orientation. Next, a circular
was sent by the State Department to the overseas American
missions in Africa to ascertain from the highest circles in
each country concerning their reactions to the issue of American
assistance for the VRP. Finally Kennedy asked Keiser and
Calhoun to proceed to Accra for what Arthur Schlesinger describes
as "tough talks" with Nkrumah. 38

The three members of the mission were asked to attend
a series of briefings at the State Department. During the
briefing sessions it was pointed out to them that the United
States was committed to the project and they should look at the
matter from a positive angle. At the same time, according to
Shooshen, they were asked to investigate the following issues:
(1) Was Nkrumah a Communist? (2) What would be the consequences,
if US support for the Project were withdrawn. (3) What was the
attitude of Ghanaians and other Africans towards US aid to the
Project? (4) What were the inherent merits in the Project?
(5) Would Ghana be able to meet its financial obligations if the

37. Interview, Harry M. Shooshen, Department of Interior.

38. See Schlesinger, n. 16, p. 493, and Scott Thompson, n. 27,
p. 191. Harry Shooshen in the course of his interview with
the present writer confirmed the statements made by
Schlesinger and Scott Thompson.
Randall and Shoosben flew together to Accra while Chays flew to Accra via London. Randall alone met Kennedy the previous night before their departure for Accra and received direct instructions. Chays went to London to consult the British and joined the others in Accra. Thus Randall alone had an opportunity to know Kennedy's purpose in sending the mission. The other members thought that at the end of their labours they would sit together and draft a joint report. But Randall told them, according to Shoosben, that they should separately turn in their reports to him, and that he, in turn, would hand them over to Kennedy. Thus Randall saw the reports of the other two members while neither Chays nor Shoosben had the chance to look into what Randall himself recommended.

According to Shoosben, in Accra itself purpose of their visit appeared to be known to one and all. Among those he met were representatives of the local American business community, the Kaiser group, officials of Ghana's Finance Ministry, and the VRA Secretariat. The local US business community gave him the impression that if the United States were to back out of this undertaking, it was quite possible that American property in Ghana would be expropriated and even their lives might be at stake. The representatives of Kaiser showed him statistics to support their view that in spite of the lower power rate, Ghana

39. Interview, Shoosben.
40. Ibid.
would still be able to make a profit. After his discussions with Ghanaian officials, Shoochen concluded that Ghana would be in a position to fulfill its commitments.\footnote{41}

Though Rendell instructed his colleagues to report separately, he gave the impression to the Embassy people in Accra by repeating at least three to four times that he and he alone would make the final recommendation to the President on whether or not the United States should give aid to Ghana. The other two were only his deputies, appointed by Kennedy to assist him.\footnote{42}

The members of the mission met Nkrumah at a couple of dinner appointments. Shoochen recounting to the present writer the lively sessions with Nkrumah, commented that Nkrumah showed himself to be "a marvellous actor" on those occasions. He depicted himself as a troubled head of state who was fighting hard to achieve unity and consensus in tribal and highly fragmented society. He implied that some of his domestic policies which had been criticized as authoritarian were unavoidable in such a society and indeed necessary to hold the state together. Nkrumah spoke of his deep concern for the economic well-being of his people and the part that the VRP could play in bringing about prosperity and progress to Ghana. The successful completion of the Project would have an impact on African development

\footnote{Ibid.}
as a whole, as it would be an example for others to follow. 43

During the mission's stay in Ghana, a crucial meeting took place between Randall and Nkrumah. Ambassador Francis H. Russell was present during the discussion and took down notes. The meeting lasted for fifty minutes and a transcript of Ambassador's note was later submitted to the Under Secretary of State, George Ball. This transcript was made available to the present writer by an American official whose identity cannot be revealed. 44

Randell began by saying that Kennedy had been deeply impressed by the manner in which Ghana won its independence and the way it had emerged as a strong and influential non-aligned country. Ghana could be a model for other emerging African countries. The infrastructure of the country was sound and its economic performance following independence appeared to be satisfactory. But in the recent past certain economic policies of Ghana had aroused misgivings and that the United States had been in consultation with the British with regard to the ultimate implications of these policies as well as on Ghana's economic performance in general.

Randell told Nkrumah that Kennedy was worried over press reports in the United States to the effect that he was ruling Ghana in a dictatorial fashion. The American press was also

43. Interview, Shoosha.

44. Source: A highly-placed American Diplomat of the period who wanted to remain unidentified.
critical of Ghana because of what it regarded as the "gagging of the press" and denial of permission to some foreign press correspondents to visit Ghana. As a case in point, Rendell cited the recent instance of refusal of permission to an American journalist to Ghana. The critical attitude of the American press would have its own impact because the Congress might not view with favour any big programme of assistance. Kennedy feared the possibility that aid to Ghana might be blocked. The President conveyed jocularly a remark to Nkrumah that he envied the latter because he did not have to contend with a press that could sway public and parliamentary opinion. Nkrumah intervened to say that the case of the American journalist mentioned by Rendell had probably been dealt with in a routine manner by the Ghanaian authorities responsible for such matters and promised that he would look personally into the case once again.

Rendell indicated that Kennedy would like Nkrumah to know about the fear and the concern that the American business was having over a fact that Nkrumah might initiate large scale nationalization of all industries in the country. A firm commitment and a public statement from Nkrumah to the effect that he did not intend to nationalize all industries would clear the air. If the situation remained cloudy and if, for instance, there was a possibility of an American enterprise like VAICO having to face early nationalization, the United States might seriously have to consider bowing out of the VBP, Rendel indicated. Nkrumah replied that the policy of his Government was to invite foreign investment and not to scare it away. He pointed out
that he had introduced several measures to make the climate for capital investment in Ghana attractive. His Government had paid equitable compensation for enterprises taken over by the Government in line with its national policy. He drew Randell's attention to the fact that in addition to opposition from other political parties, he had also to confront the hardliners in his own CPP who were critical of his posture of seeking aid from the Western sources. He was personally convinced of the usefulness of association with the United States and was prepared to push ahead. Even though his position was clear enough on this point he was prepared, in response to Kennedy's suggestion, to make a statement to the press denying categorically that he had any intention of nationalizing all foreign industries with immediate effect. He would send Kennedy a copy of the text of such a statement well before its release and would welcome the President's comments.

The notes of the Randall-Nkrumah discussion further show that the Ghanaian leader patiently but spiritedly defended his policy of non-alignment. He emphasized that he was neither ashamed nor apologetic about his views. He had always been frank with the President in his communications to the latter and would continue to speak frankly on the matter in the future. 45

Shooshen told the present writer that both he and Cheys made a favourable recommendation concerning US aid to the

45. Ibid.
VRP. They looked at the project from a positive angle and took a long range view of the VRP. They were of the view that aid to the project would be a good political investment whether Nkrumah stayed in power or not. In response to a question from the present writer whether he had a chance to go through the reports of US Missions in Africa with regard to the State Department's queries concerning proposed American assistance for the VRP, Shooshen said that he had an opportunity to look into the replies sent by various American missions in Africa. Almost all reports, Shooshen said, had indicated that aid to Ghana should not be stopped. Both Cheys and Shooshen felt at that time that from the American point of view, repercussions of cancellations of the proposed aid would be even more disastrous politically in Africa than the Aswan episode in 1956. The reaction of the Commonwealth countries would also be adverse. Shooshen indicated that in his report he had depicted Nkrumah as a nationalist. He could not take seriously the assertion of some Americans who after a brief visit to Ghana described Nkrumah as a Communist. Shooshen wondered as to how could one pass judgement on such a basis or even on the basis of a couple of meetings with Nkrumah himself. For his part, Shooshen had, on the whole, a favourable impression of Nkrumah.46

Cheys, in a letter to the present writer, stated that he had all along been a supporter of the Project and that he

46; Interview, Shooshen.
had never regretted having made a favourable recommendation concerning aid to the Project. The eventual acceptance of his position, Cheys wrote, was something that he "had always regarded with pride". 47

Rendell did not inform his two colleagues, Shooshen and Cheys about his final recommendations. But from a very confidential source, Shooshen told the present writer, he gathered the information that Rendell had presented a negative conclusion to the President. In his earlier informal conversations, however, according to Shooshen, Rendell had given them an impression that he too was inclined to favour American assistance. 48 According to other US diplomatic sources interviewed by the present writer, Rendell, even while he was in Ghana, confided to an American diplomat in Accra and later to a few friends at a party in New York that he had advised against any assistance to Nkrumah on the ground that the Project was too costly and that Nkrumah's allegiance to the West was extremely doubtful. 49 When asked to comment on the matter, Shooshen told the present writer that Rendell, reared in the cold war politics of the Dulles era could not find it possible to accept Nkrumah as the ideal case for American assistance. 50

47. Letter, Abram Cheys to the present writer.
48. Interview, Shooshen.
49. Interview, US diplomat stationed at Accra.
50. Interview, Shooshen.