CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
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In the present work an attempt has been made to trace the evolution of American policy in respect of assistance to the Volta River Project in Ghana, the first Black African country to attain freedom from British rule.

Foreign aid is an instrument of foreign policy. It is sought to be given by donor to another country at a time and in a manner to promote its own national interest, to maximize its advantages and to minimize its own problems in respect of its relations with the recipient in particular and of its objectives in the region in general. The donor will also weigh the implications of its growing aid to a country in the context of its relations with a major ally that may have special interests in or relations with the recipient country. The timing, the manner and the dose of assistance are decided upon on the basis of discussions in which the Executive branch of the United States Government plays the principal and often a decisive role.

Within the Executive branch itself differences do often arise in regard to the issue of giving aid at all and of the time, manner, and the quantum of aid to the recipient concerned. While the broad policy objectives and specific aid

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decisions are dealt with by the President on the basis of discussions with the National Security Council, a variety of actors play a role both before decisions are taken and subsequently in respect of their implementation. The Defence Department engages itself in a continuing appraisal of the short term and long term security interests of the United States and views the aid programme in that context. The Central Intelligence Agency evaluates the domestic situation in the foreign country concerned and the evolving nature of the country's relationship with other nations, and especially with those who are regarded as hostile to the United States. The CIA's intelligence estimates are also a factor taken into account in formulating aid policy. The State Department which is the open diplomatic arm of the United States, makes an important contribution to policy-making. The Secretary of state makes his recommendations on the basis of his consideration of appraisals made by the US Ambassador in the country concerned, the Agency for International Development, and the headquarters personnel assigned with responsibility for the region. The Treasury Department and the Bureau of Budget play a role in respect of the financial and fiscal aspects.

Within each of the agencies mentioned above, it is only natural that differences of opinion often exist in respect of the timing, quantum, and the manner of assistance to any particular country. While on occasions these differences get to be known outside as a result of inspired "leaks" or "digging" by
newsmen, much of the internal disagreements inside each agency and among the various agencies generally remain unknown to the public and often even to Congress.

Once the Executive branch desires to move in the direction of possible aid to a country, it has to reckon with the role of public opinion. Where substantially favourable public opinion towards the intended recipient already exists, the task of the Executive branch is relatively simple. But when the public opinion is ambivalent or hostile, the Executive branch has to exert itself more to allay misgivings and to stress the prospect of promotion of American objectives by the contemplated programme. The task is lightened if the proposal is supported by a politically significant domestic constituency that can play a role in building public opinion and bringing influence to bear on the Congress. The Executive, of course, has to run the gauntlet of the Congress and obtain approval for the funds needed for the proposed aid programme. Apart from partisan considerations, members of Congress are likely to be influenced by public opinion in their own constituencies towards foreign aid in general and towards the proposed recipient country in particular. Sometimes members of Congress are likely to react adversely to some incident or some action or statement of the leaders of the country and, on that basis, to criticize or even oppose the aid proposals submitted by the Executive branch.

During the period under review, when cold war considerations were still quite strong, the Executive branch was
able, by and large, to get Congressional support for major programmes requested by it. The chief danger it faced was in respect of cuts in appropriations requested by it in Congress. To meet this contingency, the Executive branch usually asked for a somewhat larger amount to enable Congress to have the satisfaction of making cuts and, at the same time, avoid serious damage to the basic programme contemplated by the Executive.

A foreign aid proposal that has the support of one or more major American Corporations can expect to have more sustained support in the Executive branch and relatively smoother passage through Congress than a programme that does not have such support. Interested in promoting and safeguarding its own investment and operational activities in the recipient country, the major corporation uses its varied skill, in winning friends and influencing people in both the Executive and the Legislative branches in support of a particular programme. When the Corporation succeeds in establishing close and friendly relations with the leader or the ruling group of a recipient country, it tries hard to defend the regime when the latter's course evokes press or Congressional criticism in the United States.

The offer of aid to a country is itself intended to influence the recipient country to follow a course that would be broadly in consonance with the interests of the United States, or, at the minimum, not hostile to those interests. The continuance of aid and the unspoken threat of cancellation,
reduction, and deferment are devices or techniques that the donor is in a position to employ to induce the recipient to "see reason." While the donor is seldom in a position to dictate to an independent and strong-willed leader enjoying substantial political support in his country, it is still in a position—where the quantum of aid is significant—to make the leader ponder the implications of a cessation of aid as well as the prospects of the donor switching to a course of covert support to his domestic enemies.

It has been argued in the present work that the United States did not seek to provide aid to Gold Coast as long as it was a colony ruled by the British. As the Gold Coast moved towards independence American interests in developments in that country increased and it was noted that a project to which nationalists attached great importance was the Volta River Project. Since American policy-makers subscribed to the view that the newly freed colonies could usefully maintain close economic and political relations with the erstwhile metropolitan country, and, more especially since Great Britain was America's own close ally, the United States did not seek to play a role in respect of Volta River Project. The project itself at that time was to have been undertaken as a co-operative effort between the Government of Gold Coast and Great Britain and with the participation of British and Canadian Aluminium interests. Both the country and the Project were regarded by American policy-makers as legitimately
falling in Britain's area of influence. Since this general position was well understood by major American Corporations themselves as well as by the Congress, there was no significant demand that the United States should seek to play a role in the project. The only constituency in which there was some sentiments that the United States should extend a helping hand to new African nations was the Black Community—or, more correctly a few articulate spokesmen of the community. Nevertheless, in view of the general approach of the United States Government, the efforts of Dr Horace Mann Bond, the Negro educator to win the government support for the Volta River Project, could not produce any significant results. Kwame Nkrumah, with his American background with entirely comprehensive knowledge of how things work in America did not place too much hope in the efforts of Dr Bond, though, as a shrewd operator he did nothing to discourage Dr Bond's efforts on his behalf.

It was only when there were clear indications that the British Government might not be in a position to go ahead with its planned association with the Volta River Project, the way was opened for the concrete emergence of United States participation. Viewing the situation in the context of the emerging economic aid offensive initiated by the Soviet Union under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, the Eisenhower Administration decided to move in the direction of encouraging Nkrumah to seek aid from the United States Government as well as its good
offices in securing loans from the World Bank. The opportunities that opened up were promptly perceived by the enterprising and dynamic leadership of the Kaiser Corporation which from that time onwards worked shrewdly and effectively both to win the confidence of Nkrumah and the support initially of the United States Government and subsequently of Congress.

Eisenhower Administration was not willing to make any open-ended commitment to Nkrumah. It conducted itself in such a way as to induce Nkrumah to seek the participation of American private investment for the aluminium venture and to reiterate assurances in respect of such issues as nationalization and payment of appropriate compensation. The Administration was of the view that the prospect of the offer of aid would be an important factor in influencing Nkrumah's internal and international behaviour. Nkrumah himself was not unaware of this situation and he too played his cards fairly shrewdly seeking to preserve his freedom of action internally and internationally, and, at the same time not endangering his efforts to win favourable action from the United States Government.

The Kaiser Corporation skilfully used the situation to induce Nkrumah to accept much lower power rates for its proposed aluminium smelter than Nkrumah had initially envisaged. The Corporation had good friends in the State Department and Nkrumah was left in no doubt that if the power rate issue was not resolved to the satisfaction of VALCO, the Consortium put together by Kaiser, VALCO might have second
thoughts about its participation, which, in turn, might endanger the prospects of aid from the US Government. There was nothing much in the shape of American public opinion, black opinion or Congressional support that Nkrumah could seek to manipulate to stand up to Kaiser. On the other hand Nkrumah had to look upon Edgar Kaiser as his trump card in his bid to obtain support from the United States Government.

By the time the Eisenhower Administration came to an end all that Nkrumah had, apart from his arrangements with VALCO, only a letter from Eisenhower expressing interest in aiding the Volta River Project if Nkrumah was able to arrange support from the World Bank and provide for the association of American private investment. The Kennedy Administration took a public posture of friendship towards the newly independent African nations by assisting them in their economic development. The steps that John F. Kennedy took to indicate his interests in Africa have been described in the work. With the intensification of the Soviet economic offensive, the evidence of increased contacts between Ghana and the Soviet Union and the problems created by the Congo crisis, the President weighed the pros and cons of a decision committing funds to the Volta River Project. In view of developments in Africa, public interest and Congressional concern were significantly greater than in earlier years. Nkrumah’s own image had suffered owing to his international policies which were regarded as pro-Communist and pro-Soviet, and his domestic policies which were regarded as dictatorial. There was hardly any favourable comment about
Nkrumah and his rule in Ghana came in for sharp condemnation from members in the Congress and the major American newspapers. The considerations that Kennedy weighed in regard to "cancellation" and "non-cancellation" of the offer of American aid and the role played and the attitude taken by such figures in the Administration as Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams, Chairman of Policy Planning Council Walt W. Rostow and Attorney General Robert Kennedy have been described. The persistent efforts of Edgar Kaiser in supporting a favourable decision on the part of the Administration have been noted. The present writer has also sought to attempt an analysis of the factors that influenced Kennedy to take a favourable decision.

The President made his decision without very significant consultations with Congressional leaders and Dean Rusk suggested at the crucial National Security Council that such consultation might be in order. And the President breezily responded: "No, this is one where we will have to take the risk ourselves." Kennedy apparently felt quite confident that opposition from Congress, if it materialized, would be manageable. His judgement turned out to be correct. Criticism was confined to a handful members of Congress with Senator Albert Gore as the most persistent and vociferous opponent. His efforts to depict in unfavourable term, Nkrumah's domestic and foreign policy, utility of the Volta River Project, the undesirability of American involvement and the pecuniary motives of the Kaiser Corporation failed to win much support in the Congress and even to attract national attention. The vigorous efforts made by
the Administration to respond positively to the various points raised by the senator have been described. It has also been shown that the criticisms voiced against American aid to the Volta River Project during Congressional hearings for foreign assistance were more or less of a routine character and posed no serious threat to the programme itself. The tangential onslaught mounted by Senator Thomas J. Dodd proved to be short-lived. During this period also the strong expression of support to the Administration's position by Chad Calhoun, the indefatigable executive and lobbyist of the Kaiser Corporation was probably a fairly significant factor in influencing Congressional opinion.

It was not as though there was no misgivings within the State Department itself and even in the White House concerning Nkrumah's domestic and international course and anti-American incidents in Ghana itself. The emergence of differing points of view in the State Department and the sentiments of the American Embassy and the AID Mission in Ghana itself against further aid have been described. One of the questions at issue, relevant for the purposes of this work was whether the State Department should defer giving the green signal to the Kaiser Corporation for the commencement of construction work on its smelter. The Johnson Administration showed its displeasure by not responding to certain other requests made by Nkrumah around this time and did not want to endanger the American position by any action relating to the Volta River Project which was so dear to Nkrumah and which was the factor in respect of
"American presence" and influence in Ghana. The argument of those who urged that in view of Nkrumah's own shaky domestic position, a decision should be deferred was not accepted. The counter-argument that an American association with the project was valuable and important in itself, from the point of view of American interest, irrespective of whether Nkrumah remained in power or not, won the day. The Kaiser Corporation too, from the point of view of its own interests strongly favoured the latter decision. The Administration sought to extract some advantage from its awareness of Nkrumah's anxieties for the start of the smelter construction and his awareness of his domestic problems by deputing Averell Harriman and Edgar Kaiser to visit Accra. Their responsibility was talk firmly to Nkrumah about the need for checking anti-American demonstrations and about the implications of developments that might endanger the relations between the two countries. The Administration gave green signal to Kaiser for the starting of the construction work on the smelter. The Volta dam itself was inaugurated on 22 January 1966 with Nkrumah paying glowing tributes to the aid extended by the United States, encouragement given by President Eisenhower and help extended by President Kennedy.

As an exercise in foreign aid diplomacy, the United States could regard its association with Ghana's great project as a reasonable success, from its point of view. Despite differences of opinion there was a certain continuity in approach during Eisenhower and Kennedy Administration.
Formulated in the executive branch, the aid programme was sustained with reasonable vigour and piloted successfully overcoming sporadic Congressional opposition and substantial adverse press criticisms of Nkrumah. At critical stages the pros and cons of the programme were presented for Presidential evaluation and decision. That a major Corporation, skilled in international operations had its own interest in US support for the Project was a positive factor at virtually each important stage.