Chapter VI

THE EMERGENCE OF THE DEMAND FOR PARTITION
Chapter VI

THE EMERGENCE OF THE DEMAND FOR PARTITION

The Second World War began on September 3 and India was immediately dragged into it by the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow without any consultation with Indian leaders. This very much irked the Congress and it was prepared to offer only conditional support to the war effort. Its Working Committee seized the opportunity to ask the Government for a clear declaration of the British war aims and made it clear that it could not countenance the country being made a party to the war unless India was treated as an independent nation whose policy would be guided in accordance with the wishes of the people.

This tipped the scales in favour of the Muslim League. Linlithgow sought the help of Jinnah towards securing the wholehearted support of the Muslims and showed an increasing tendency to treat the League on a par of equality with Congress. In an interview held on 4 September he reminded Jinnah of the usefulness of British rule for safeguarding the interests of Muslims, and asked whether Jinnah had not told him "again and again that he regarded the influence of the British in India as essential to the survival of his own community." Linlithgow also told Jinnah that Zetland

1 [Congress and War Crisis (Allahabad, n.d.), p. 118.]
2 Linlithgow to Zetland, 4 September 1939, Linlithgow Collection.
and he had reached the conclusion that the British had decided "in view of the onset of war, suspend the work in connection with the Federation." The reasons given for this decision were that the complicated process of arranging for a large number of Instruments of Accession of Indian states and the negotiations to be carried on for this purpose could not be undertaken while the war continued. When Linlithgow referred to Sikandar Hyat Khan's expression of loyalty and cooperation with the British in the war, Jinnah could not resist assuring him that he also "shared those sentiments of loyalty and that same readiness to give his full support." He, however, took care to point out that "he was a public man and had to think of his followers."

Being a shrewd politician Jinnah was convinced that the Government was desperately in need of Muslim support to maintain the status quo and resist the Congress demands. He wanted that the Congress should be meted out the same treatment by Linlithgow as had been done by Willingdon. Linlithgow's correspondence with Zetland, giving the account of his interview with Jinnah is quite revealing. Linlithgow informed Zetland:

---

3 Ibid.

4 On 3 September Sikandar Hyat Khan sent him a message assuring that the Punjab and Bengal were behind the government in the prosecution of the war. Linlithgow to Zetland, 5 September 1939, Linlithgow Collection.

5 Linlithgow to Zetland, 4 September 1939, Linlithgow Papers.
He 

hoped I would do what I could to strengthen his hand: That was why he wanted something positive to take to his followers. They were saying to him: "Why should we fight to perpetuate conditions in India that must shortly bring about complete domination by the Hindus." What could he say to that? Hence his anxiety that His Majesty's Government should soon, if not immediately, announce that the constitution was to be completely overhauled and reshaped.... His friends in the Congress provinces were suffering cruelly. Let His Majesty's Government at least protect them in the enjoyment of their lives, their property and their own culture and mode of living. I said, "Do you want me to turn Congress ministries out?" To this Mr Jinnah at once replied, "Yes! Turn them out at once. Nothing else will bring them to their senses. Their object, though you may not believe it, and though I did not believe it till 2 years ago was nothing less than to destroy both you British and us Muslims. They will never stand by you." On this I made no comment.

Linlithgow also tried to probe Jinnah's mind about the statement made by him that he did not believe in democratic government in India and raised the question that "if democratic government was unsuitable to this country, how was she to obtain her goal of self-government. Was such a policy not to condemn India to a perpetual condition to communal strife?" It is significant to note that this solicited from Jinnah the reply that "...escape from the impasse ... lay in the adoption of Partition."

At the Working Committee meeting on 18 September, the

---

6 Note of an interview between Jinnah and Linlithgow, 5 October 1939, Linlithgow Papers.
7 Ibid.
8 Linlithgow to Zetland, 4 September 1939.
Muslim League passed a resolution on the outbreak of war. It appreciated the invitation extended to Jinnah by Linlithgow to apprise him of the international situation. In order to impress Linlithgow it emphasized that the Viceroy's declaration regarding the suspension of Federation was in the interests of India and particularly of the Muslims. It demanded that the federal scheme instead of being suspended should be abandoned completely without further delay. It also urged upon the government that the entire problem of India's future constitution should be considered de novo.

Emunrating the reasons for the change in League's stand the Committee pointed out:

... It had hoped to occupy an honourable place in the national life, government and administration of the empire and work for a free India with free and independent Islam in which they could play an equal part with the majority community with a complete sense of security ... but the developments that have taken place and especially since the inauguration of the provincial constitution based on the socalled democratic and parliamentary system of government and the recent experiences of two years have established beyond doubt that it has resulted wholly in a permanent communal majority and the domination of Hindus over the Muslim minorities whose life and liberty, property and honour are in danger and even their religious rights and culture are being assailed and annihilated every day under the Congress government in various provinces.

---

9 Indian Annual Register, 1939, vol. 2, p. 351.
10 Ibid., p. 354.
Linlithgow's answer to the demand of Congress for "more marked constitutional changes" and the Muslim League's demand for "special protection" was the reiteration of the intention of the British government that "Dominion Status was the natural issue of India's progress." He announced that at the end of the War, His Majesty's Government would enter into consultation with representatives of the "several communities, parties and interests in India with a view to secure their aid and cooperation in the framing of such modifications in the details of the plan embodied in the Act of 1935." Alluding to the communal differences between the Congress and the Muslim League, he made it clear that they could not be brushed aside. He said: "... these differences of view, deeply and sincerely held... by those who have abandoned them to me, should be borne in mind when we consider our present problems, for they have a very direct and obvious relevance to them."

Feeling encouraged Jinnah now demanded that "no new pronouncement or new constitutional departure should be made without the approval of the League." Though this would place him in the commanding position of being the arbiter of future policy, Linlithgow was prepared to give him this power. While

11 Speeches and Statements of Linlithgow, 18 October 1939, Linlithgow Papers.
12 Ibid., 18 October 1939.
13 Linlithgow to Zetland, 5 November 1939, Linlithgow Papers.
14 "Note of a conversation between Linlithgow and Jinnah, 12 January 1940. Enclosure, Linlithgow to Zetland, 12 July 1940, Linlithgow Papers."
conveying Jinnah's demand to Zetland, he wrote: "We ought to recognize that in dealing with Muslim leaders we were dealing people who were reasonable men and also that they were out, as anyone else, for India's advance."

Nehru now realized the dangers of the developing situation and approached Jinnah with a view to persuading the League to forge a united front with the Congress in its opposition to the war-aims of the government. He confessed to Jinnah that he had neglected the solution of the communal problem. In a rather apologetic tone, he observed:

... I entirely agree with you that it is a tragedy that Hindu-Muslim problem has not so far been settled in a friendly way. I feel terribly distressed about it and ashamed of myself in so far as I have not been able to contribute anything substantial towards its solution. I must admit to you that in this matter I have lost confidence in myself though I am not usually given that way. But the last two or three years have had a powerful effect on me.

A draft statement was also prepared by the Congress which it was hoped, might be issued under the signatures of Rajendra Prasad, Nehru and Jinnah. It was said there that the Congress and League leaders had met together on several occasions and "although there was much in common" between them on the political issue (political crisis in India caused by the European

15 Ibid., 12 January 1940.
16 Nehru to Jinnah, 18 October, 1939, Nehru Papers.
war) and their general objective, they did not see eye to eye in regard to "some matters affecting the approach to question and the immediate steps to be taken." It was also specified that they had discussed only the political issue and the communal problem was left for future discussion. But Jinnah refused to agree and thus the statement could not be issued.

In the same month Prasad had also approached Jinnah in order to break the communal impasse. He stressed that the charges of atrocities levelled against the Congress Ministries were unfounded and were based on "misapprehensions" and "one-sided reports". He broached the subject of appointing Maurice Gwyer, Chief Justice of the Federal Court, to inquire into the matter. But now Jinnah had pinned his entire faith on the Viceroy. His reply to Prasad's proposal was that the matter was under His Excellency's consideration and he was "the proper

Draft to be issued under the joint signatures of Rajendra Prasad, Jinnah and Nehru, 4 November 1939, Nehru Papers.

Rajendra Prasad, President of the Congress, showed a genuine desire for settlement with Jinnah and in October he had stressed its urgency to Nehru. His contention was that the communal question was the dominant question because "not only the decision of the British government but any future line of action that we may decide upon depends to a large extent upon its satisfactory solution". Prasad to Nehru, 14 October 1939, Rajendra Prasad Papers, National Archives of India, New Delhi.

authority to take such action and adopt such measures as would meet our requirements and would restore complete sense of security and satisfaction among the Mussalmans." In a meeting held with Gandhi at Delhi in October he flatly stated that (1) so long as the Congress was not prepared to treat the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organization of the Mussalmans of India it was not possible to carry on talks regarding the Hindu-Muslim settlement, and (2) that the League would not endorse the Congress demand for the declaration of British war aims till the two organizations reached an agreement with regard to the minority problems.

In the meanwhile, the Congress Working Committee at its meeting on 22-23 October 1939, considered Linlithgow's declaration about British war aims as a reiteration of the old imperialist policy. It took particular objection to the stress on the differences among Indian parties, describing it as a 'screen' to hide the true intentions of Great Britain. The Working Committee categorically declined to admit any necessity for prior agreement with the Muslim League as a condition precedent to the fulfilment of its demands. Its contention was that the Constituent Assembly would adequately secure protection.

20 Ibid.
21 Jinnah to Nehru, 13 December 1939, Nehru Papers.
for Muslims. To express its disapproval of the Viceroy's statement the Committee called upon the Congress ministries to tender their resignations.

This led to the resignation of Congress ministries from office and left the field open for Jinnah to raise his demands and extract concessions from the government. He made an appeal to the Muslims to observe 22 December 1939 as the "Day of Deliverance". He also expressed a deep sense of relief and rejoiced that the Congress ministries had ceased to function. In an appeal to the Muslims, he ridiculed the High Command of the Congress and accused it of being mainly responsible for the "wrongs that had been done to Muslims." He accused the Congress of flouting Muslim opinion both in the discharge of their administrative duties and in the legislature and of destroying Muslim culture and interfering with their religious and social life. He also emphasized that if the appeals had been heard at the proper time no such action would have been necessary. While this action of Jinnah led the Congress to 'bang' the door of negotiations with him as it was felt futile to have any further meeting with him, Linlithgow sent him an assurance that "His Majesty's Government are not under any misapprehension as to the importance of the

22 Congress and the War Crisis, n. 1, pp. 137-38.
contentment of the Muslim community to the stability and success of any constitutional development in India." He was also asked not to entertain any fears regarding the weight which his community was going to exercise in future.

The strategy adopted by Linlithgow was to lay continuous stress on divergence of views between the two communities in his public speeches and in his dealings with the Congress. At the same time he went on assuring Jinnah that he had decided to safeguard the position of the minorities. In January 1940 he wrote to Zetland about his decision to "effectively safeguard the minority position and his determination to avoid allowing ourselves to be stampeded into measures for which this country was not ripe." Linlithgow was determined not to hand over the government machinery to the Congress nor to assist the latter in keeping 'their opponents' in India under effective control. He was so contemptuous of Congress that he felt it was not capable of running the machinery of the government. His contention was that one of the main difficulties in considering constitutional progress in India was the "finding of shoulders broad enough to carry the burden which we should relinquish."

24 Linlithgow to Zetland, 4 January 1940, Linlithgow Collection.
25 Linlithgow to Zetland, 4 January 1940, Linlithgow Collection.
26 Linlithgow to Zetland, 30 January 1940, Zetland Collection.
Unlike Linlithgow, Zetland was not averse to giving some
consideration to Congress. He prepared a memorandum where,
while opposing the possibility of imposing on any large section
of India's population a self-governing constitution against its
wishes, he also added that the British could not allow any minority
to interrupt the course of reforms. He desired that Linlithgow
should tell the two communities that the British had their own
'desiderata' which must be secured. The outlines of the 'desiderata'
as framed by Zetland were as follows:

A) Arrangements for the defence of India as part
of the Empire;

B) Security for the service of the sterling debt
held in this country;

C) Sufficient control of the services to secure
their reasonable rights including their rights
to career for which they were recruited,
though recruitment by the Secretary of State was
to end at a fixed date;

D) The maintenance for some time at least of the
commercial safeguards in the existing constitution;

E) Such a position in India as would enable the
British to discharge their obligation to the
states in so far as the states were not incor­
porated in the new Dominion of India.

Of course Zetland too felt an anathema towards the
Congress. But the repeated exhortation of the opposi­
tion that the policy of inaction as pursued by Linli­
thgow would do considerable harm as it was widening
the gulf between the two communities and might lead to
a civil war in India prompted him to take some decisive
action. Salisbury had complained to Zetland about
Linlithgow's policy: "...What is good of his reiteration
about Dominion Status? Of course we all know that
Dominion Status is the settled ultimate goal of the policy
of His Majesty's present Government." He stressed that
it was neither "accurate nor dignified to say again and
again that communal difficulties were the biggest hurdle
in the way of constitutional development."

Zetland to Linlithgow, 4 February 1940, Zetland Collection.
Zetland felt that if all this was made clear, the British could avoid the accusation that they were insincere in their professions and establish that they were anxious to help India to achieve Dominion Status at the earliest possible and that were not using the minorities "as pawns in a Machiavellian game of Divide and Rule". He had also asked the Cabinet that it should assume the responsibility for telling the Congress and the minorities that "provided our desiderata were met to our satisfaction we would accept a constitution framed by Indians themselves."

But Linlithgow had firmly committed himself to a policy of inaction. He wrote to Zetland that the British must refrain from taking any concrete action. Thus he was doing what Jinnah wanted him to do - to avoid committing himself to any scheme. He told Zetland that "...We should make a very great mistake were we in the present circumstances to start running after the Congress." His strategy was to keep "reiterating the generous offer we have made dressing it, if necessary in somewhat different garments," a process to which he had been completely devoting himself since the last three months and not "extending or amplifying" it. What he favoured was a continued insistence on the necessity for Hindus and Muslims getting together themselves.

28 Ibid.
29 Linlithgow to Zetland, 13 February 1940, Linlithgow Collection.
As has already been mentioned, Jinnah had not completely ruled out the prospects of working with Congress though this had to be on his own terms. In an interview/Linlithgow in January 1940, he enumerated his terms for an understanding with the Congress: coalition ministries in the provinces; no measures to be forced through any legislature if two-thirds of the Muslim members of the Assembly objected to it; Congress flag not to be flown on public institutions; Bande Mataram to be abandoned as a National anthem; and Congress to abandon its wrecking tactics against the Muslim League. Any prospect of the Muslim League joining hands with the Congress in its demand for complete independence was, obviously inimical to British imperial interests. Linlithgow certainly did not like it. As early as October 1937, he had remarked: "from our point of view, desirable as agreement between all parties may be made in principle, I am not sure that such a consummation is entirely to be welcomed." By 1940 the need for continuing disagreement between the main political parties in India, from the British point of view, had only increased, and not been reduced. It is not, therefore, surprising that the Viceroy set himself the task of prompting the League leaders to devise constructive scheme of their own and to present the Muslim

30. Note of a talk between Linlithgow and Jinnah, 16 January 1940, Enclosure 2 to letter dated 13 January 1940, Linlithgow Collection.

League as a formidable opponent of the Congress.

Linlithgow’s chief concern now was to bring home to these leaders that their ambivalent attitude towards the constitutional issue would prove to be disastrous to them. It should be noted here that already Jinnah had mentioned about taking recourse to partition in case Muslims were asked to evolve an alternative to the federal scheme. Now he also stopped characterizing the Muslims as a minority. Instead, he started emphasizing that Hinduism and Islam “represent two distinct and separate civilizations and moreover are as distinct from one another in origin, tradition and manner of life as are nations in Europe.” He, however, did not yet insist on partition and observed:

A constitution must be evolved that recognized that there are in India two nations who both must share the governance of their common motherland. In evolving such a constitution the Muslims are ready to co-operate with the British Government, the Congress or any party so that the present enmities may cease and India may take its place amongst the great Nations of the world.33

Thus it is clear that he had not ruled out his association with the Congress if the latter decided to agree to his demands. Apparently Linlithgow did not relish this. In


33 Ibid., p. 124.
his interview with Sikandar Hyat Khan on 3 February he complained that Muslim position as maintained by Jinnah was unhelpful and "static to a dangerous degree." When he met Fazlul Huq to ascertain his views on the Muslim position, the latter started convincing Linlithgow of his entire support to the government by declaring that "He was a Muslim first, always and his duty to his community was one which he could not at any stage forget." He also complained to Linlithgow that the Muslim case had not been fully understood either in India or Britain. He also pleaded with Linlithgow for an assurance that the latter would not try to enlist the support of Congress which was constantly making trouble for the government. But to the great despair of Linlithgow he also referred to the contingency of working with the Congress if it finally decided to accept the principle of coalition in provinces with joint policies to carry out a common programme. Referring to the Muslim position he said: "the Muslims were on the constant difficulty of being on the defensive. They could not recommend any recession from the present position in regard to constitutional advance or publicly reject the principle of Home Rule or Dominion Status."

---


35 Note of a conversation between Linlithgow and Sikandar Hyat Khan and Fazlul Huq, 14 February 1940, Linlithgow Papers.
Linlithgow’s letter to Zetland about the account of
the above meeting is self-explanatory. Taking credit for what
he had done for Muslims he wrote:

I said ... whether I had thrown away the
Muslim or the minority case in any respect,
and if so how? They both replied at once
"No" Sir Sikandar later amending his reply to
"Not yet"! I said that I had listened with
interest to Mr Huq's exposition of the position
as he saw it. ... I would take only one point
which he had raised. He had made the comp­
laint that the Muslim case had not been pro­
perly presented. Why was that? Who was to
blame? ... I went on to say that if he and
his friends could secure that the Muslim case
was better understood nobody would be better
pleased than I would.36

Linlithgow also informed Fazlul Huq and Sikandar Hyat Khan that
so long the Muslims adopted a negative attitude and unconstruc­
tive policy, it would be very difficult to make it understood
in Great Britain, the United States and even in this country.
He gave an illustration that during a conversation between one
Kline, the representative of the Associated Press of America,
and his Private Secretary, the former had mentioned that in
fifty minutes, Gandhi had given him enough press material while
after his two hours discussion with Jinnah he had been left with
the impression that the League had no constructive programme.

As for Fazlul Huq's suggestion that coalition on some
common agreed programme might be the solution of their estrange­
ment with Congress, the Viceroy impressed upon him the seriousness
with which the Muslims would view any concession to the Congress

36 Ibid.
if it was unaccompanied by some satisfaction of their demand. He also reminded him that the Congress would not be allowed to have its ministries to return to office in the provinces and at the same time secure advance at the centre, until it had satisfied the minorities. If the Congress was not prepared to satisfy the minorities before returning to office in the provinces, then it was in his view "essential that no concession should be made to them at the Centre."

Khaliquzzaman has written that on 6 February Jinnah had informed Linlithgow about the partition scheme but the Viceroy's note of the interview between the two immediately after the above mentioned meeting bears no evidence of it. It is true that Linlithgow enumerated to him the advantage of an alternative scheme for the benefit of Muslims and repeated the argument he had put forward before Fazlul Huq and Sikandar Hyat Khan. Jinnah had raised the question to him as to what Muslim League should do in those circumstances. Linlithgow encouraged him to have a positive scheme of his own and emphasized the disadvantages of maintaining only a negative attitude. Jinnah's reply to him was that given the failure of his effort to arrive at an agreement satisfactory to all parties he should "make it clear to Congress without undue delay that there was nothing doing; and this nonsense had to stop, in the same way as Lord Willingdon

37 Ibid.
had done some years ago." It shows that Jinnah wanted Lin-
lithgow to take some stern measures against the Congress which
would enable it to be more reasonable and accommodating towards
the Muslim League.

About the future constitution Jinnah had told Linlithgow
that he was not in a position to present in detail "the con-
sidered opinion of his colleagues and himself on this very
important subject and that he would be very shortly ready to
do so." Probably Jinnah was unwilling to divulge the details
of his scheme; quite often his colleagues also used to complain
that he never took them into confidence regarding any of his
schemes.

Thus Linlithgow remained dissatisfied with the stand
taken by Jinnah and even exhorted him that this won't ease the
situation as it would become very difficult for him to educate
public opinion in Great Britain and more particularly the "600
odd representatives of constituencies by the submission of a
formal memorandum to His Majesty's Government." It can be
discerned from Linlithgow's interview with Jinnah that he was
doing his best to encourage Jinnah to have an alternate scheme
of his own; he, of course, knew that since last year various

38 Note of an interview between Linlithgow and Jinnah,
Enclosure 3 to Letter dated 6 February 1940 from
Linlithgow to Zetland, Linlithgow Collection.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.
schemes were being examined to formulate an alternative to the federal scheme. Jinnah's interview with Linlithgow leads to conclude that he was perhaps not yet in a position to bring out his scheme in full details. Even then Linlithgow remained persistent in his insistence that the negative policy being pursued by Muslims would do them great harm. The following remarks of Linlithgow addressed to Jinnah are indeed extremely important for a proper understanding of the prelude to the emergence of the demand for Partition:

If he and his friends wanted to secure that the Muslim case should not go by default in the United Kingdom it was really essential that they should formulate their plan in the near future. At the risk of wearying him I was bound to repeat what I had often said before that I was convinced that it was quite useless to appeal for support in Great Britain for a party whose policy was one of sheer negation.41

Jinnah had replied that he and his friends would "make public at any rate the outlines of their position in time to enable him to explain the Muslim position in Great Britain and in India." This he was able to do by the end of February. On 25 February at a meeting of the Council of the All-India Muslim League, Jinnah said:

... People ask me what is our goal. ... The whole question is very simple. Great Britain wants to rule India. Mr Gandhi and the Congress want to rule India and the Musalmans. We say that we will not let either the British or Mr Gandhi or [sic] rule the Musalmans. We want to

41 Ibid.
be free. He asked the Musalmans to organise themselves and wished the members present to convey the message of the League to every Muselman and explain the message of the League and what it stood for.\textsuperscript{42}

On 22 March, Jinnah came out with the proposal of separating the Muslim majority provinces from India. His presidential address was in the nature of a rejoinder to the Congress and its proposal (affirmed at its Ramgarh session held in March) that the Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of adult franchise would satisfy the minorities' legitimate interests. His analysis of the Hindu-Muslim problem was that it was not of an "inter-communal character but manifestly of an international one" and the best course would be "to allow the major nations separate homelands by dividing India into autonomous national states." To make the demand for separation more convincing and justifiable it was emphasized by Jinnah that Hinduism and Islam were "different and distinct social orders because they belonged to two different religious philosophies, social customs and literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine together and indeed they belong to two different civilisations." Arguing that "Muslim India could not accept any constitution which must necessarily result in a Hindu majority government" Jinnah made it clear that since Muslims were a nation, they must have their "homelands, their territory and their state." He further added: "We wish our people to develop

\textsuperscript{42} Jamiluddin, n. 23, p. 137.
to the fullest our spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political life in a way that we think best and in consonance with our own ideals." The Muslim League session adopted a resolution which declared:

...No constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz. that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign; that adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in the units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them; and in other parts of India where the Muslims are in a minority, adequate and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.

A perusal of the several schemes framed during the last decade with a view to safeguarding Muslim interests would show that the demand for Partition was neither sudden nor new. Nor was it the handiwork of Jinnah alone. We may begin with Muhammad Iqbal's presidential address delivered at the

44 Ibid., p. 341.
annual Muslim League's session at Allahabad in 1930, because very often Iqbal has been held responsible for devising a scheme for the separation of India. What he had advocated there was the creation of "Muslim India within India" (he did not include Bengal) by the creation of an autonomous state based on the unity of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic interest. This was not only his desire but also the desire of other Muslims like Jinnah, Mohammad Ali, Shaukat Ali and Muhammad Shafi at that time. Iqbal was not a politician but was first and foremost a student of Islam. Defining his solution of the communal problem, he had stated in his presidential address that:

"...if the principal that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian homelands is recognized as the basis of a permanent communal settlement he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India." 45

He had also emphasized that "the life of Islam as a cultural force in this country very largely depends on its centralization in a specified territory." Pointing out the advantages of this scheme, he had explained that "...possessing full opportunity of development within the body politic of India, the North-West Indian Muslims will prove the best defenders of India against a foreign invasion." 46

45 Shamloo, comp., *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal* (Lahore, 1948), p. 11.

46 Ibid., p. 13.
That Iqbal did not ask for partition of India has been acknowledged by Chowdhry Rahmat Ali who pioneered the Partition scheme and had coined the word 'Pakistan' in 1933. He has written that Iqbal was supporting the Muslim League's demand for an Indian federation comprising of even the Muslim majority provinces. According to Rahmat Ali: "...By the word 'state' he meant not a separate or sovereign state but a big province within and as part of the proposed Indian federation." As for himself, Rahmat Ali had believed from his very childhood that:

---


48 Rahmat Ali has written that this belief— that Muslims should be treated as a distinct nation and not as a minority belonging to Indian nation was imparted to him in his childhood by his father Haji Choudhary Shah. "I grew with it and it grew with me." It became the dominating passion of his life. He gave his first political expression to it in 1915 when in his inaugural address at the Bagem-i-Shibli, he said:

North of India is Muslim and we will keep it Muslim. Not only that, we will make it a Muslim state. But this we can do only if and when we and our North cease to be Indian. For that is a pre-requisite to it, so the sooner we shed 'Indianism' the better for us all and for Islam.

The immediate occasion for this statement was the negotiation which was going on between Hindu and Muslim leaders for an understanding on the basis of the national unity of India and which resulted in the Lucknow Pact of 1916. After the Pact, he severed his connection with a revolutionary society of Hindu and Muslim young intellectuals, most of whom had supported the Lucknow Pact.

Ibid., p. 214.
"Muslims are a Millat distinct from the caste Hindoo Jati, that our destiny lies in integration with other Muslims and not with caste Hindus; that among other territories the north-western provinces of present day 'India' belong to us." He had always deprecated the activities of other Muslim leaders as leading to "Indianization of our nation and our lands."

Rahmat Ali was particularly vehement in his condemnation of the federal idea which according to him involved the "renunciation of Pak nationhood" and the Muslims' acceptance of Indian nationhood. It was his contention that this made "our absorption by the caste Hindus a certainty and its acceptance by us an act of self-immolation." By 1933 when the scheme of an all-India federation became a reality he became more vociferous in his condemnation of this development, because "it portended an immediate peril to the life and liberty of our nation." His reaction to it should be noted in his own words:

... I warned the Muslim delegates. I knew that their action had obliterated the twelve centuries of our history, destroyed the very foundations of our heritage and crippled all hopes of the fulfilment of our mission. I begged them to realize their responsibility before Allah and His Rasool and to withdraw their demand for the Indian Federal Constitution and ask for a separate federation of our north-western homelands.50

Failing in his efforts, the feeling gripped him that "Allah had assigned that fateful task to me"; and he directed

49 Ibid., p. 213.
50 Ibid., pp. 222-3.
all his activities towards the achievement of a Muslim homeland. Thus inspired by this objective he concluded that "it was now or never; that any further silence would be fatal." In pursuit of that decision he drafted the statement, 'Now or Never', which embodied the first part of his plan. This statement was a proclamation of "the freedom of the Muslims from the British-Bania domination, the release of our nation from the bonds of minorityism." Here he condemned the activities of Muslim delegates to the Round Table Conference and denounced their attempts to include Muslim 'homelands' in the all-India federation. He also demanded the "recognition of our distinct nationhood in Pakistan and urged the creation of a Federation of India."

The word 'Pakistan' as coined by him was composed of letters taken from the names of various states which, according to him constituted the Muslim homelands - Punjab, Afghania (North-West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Iran, Sindh (including Kachch and Kathiawar), Tukharistan, Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Its meaning was defined as "land of the Paks - the spiritually pure and clean." In 1935 when final shape was being given to the Government of India Act, he issued a circular letter from Cambridge where he emphasized that the "Government of India Bill, based on the Indian Federal Scheme has created an

51 Ibid., p. 227.
52 Ibid., p. 224.
acute crisis in the national life of Pakistan and has raised a supreme issue - an issue of life or death for its national future." He also hoped that fullest support would be given to the "inexorable demand of Pakistan - a demand based on justice and equality - for the recognition of its sacred right to a separate national existence as distinct from Hindoostan."

His primary concern was to draw the attention of the British people and Parliament and also that of 'Hindoostan' to the vital distinctions - social, cultural, religious - which separated 'Pakistan' from Hindoostan. The following excerpt from his letter pointed out the vital distinctions between the two communities:

...The very basis and content of our national life is founded on fundamentals essentially different from those on which Hindooism lives and prospers. Our agelong social system and our ancient national tradition have given us a civilization with a philosophy - a culture, language, a literature and an art basically and fundamentally different from that of Hindoostan. This is not all. We do not interdine; we do not intermarry. Our national customs and calendars, even our diet and dress are different.53

He also emphasized that "geographically also the lands comprising Pakistan form a separate and distinct Unit." Therefore, according to him, nature had decreed that Jumna should flow as 'boundary river' between Pakistan and Hindoostan. He also emphasized that the "Indo-Pakistanian problem is not an inter-

communal issue but is an international problem" and would be solved on that basis alone.

The scheme as outlined by Sikandar Hyat Khan in 1937 was in the form of an alternative to the federal scheme of the government and the idea of Constituent Assembly as desired by the Congress. Some of the salient features of the scheme were:

(1) Instead of bringing British Indian Provinces and Indian states into the Federation as two distinct components, it provided for their entering it together on a regional basis which would be conducive to the solidarity of the country and the stability of the central government.

(2) It would encourage collaboration between contiguous units, including British Indian Provinces and Indian States, whose geographical proximity, common language and affinity of economic and other interests formed natural ties to bind them together. For instance,

(a) In administrative matters, particularly those pertaining to law and order, this scheme would encourage the various units in a zone to make reciprocal arrangements and when necessary to devise a common line of action.

(b) In the economic field it would enable the units to share in common arrangement for the establishment of institutes for industrial and agricultural research, for experimental and demonstrative forms and other similar matters.

---

Ibid.
(3) By thus encouraging collaboration between British Indian Provinces and Indian States it would tend to reduce causes and occasions for friction which would otherwise be constantly present if British Indian and Indian States units were kept in two watertight compartments.

(4) By confining the jurisdiction of the Federal Executive and Legislature to a few specified subjects of common concern, it would enable both the British Indian units and the Indian States to enter the Federation on a uniform basis. At the same time it would allay the doubts and misgivings of the units by eliminating the possibility of undue interference by the centre in their internal affairs.

(5) It would ensure the willing and loyal cooperation of the Units with the Federal Centre and thus avoid the growth of any fissiparous tendency among the Units.

(6) It would effectively safeguard the integrity and autonomy of British Indian and Indian States units; and

(7) It would give to the Minorities a greater sense of security.

For the establishment of an All India Federation on a regional basis, the country was to be demarcated into seven 'zones' as under:

Zone 1: Assam and Bengal (minus one or two Western Districts in order to reduce the size of the 'Zone' with a view to approximate it to other zones) Bengal States and Sikkim.

Zone 2: Bihar and Orissa (plus the areas transferred from Bengal to Orissa)
This would benefit Orissa which was handicapped to some extent on account of its limited resources and area.

Zone 3 : United Provinces and U.P. States.

Zone 4 : Madras, Travancore, Madras States and Coorg.

Zone 5 : Bombay, Hyderabad, Western India States, Bombay States, Mysore and C.P. States.

Zone 6 : Rajputana States (minus Bikaner and Jaisalmer), Gwalior, Central Indian States, Bihar and Orissa States, C.P. and Berar.

Zone 7 : Punjab, Sind, N.W.F Province, Kashmir, Punjab States, Baluchistan, Bikaner and Jaisalmer

Sir Sikandar also laid down that there would be a regional legislature for each zone consisting of both British Indian and Indian States Units. One-third of the total number of members of the various regional legislatures were to constitute the Central Federal Assembly.

Another scheme was put forward by Syed Abdul Latif of Hyderabad in 1939 before the sub-committee of the League. He contended that India was not a composite nation and Hindus and Muslims belonged to two distinct social orders and prescribed the division of India into four cultural zones for the Muslims and eleven zones for the Hindus. The Indian States were to be distributed between the different zones in accordance with their natural affinities. Each zone would form a homogeneous State

---

55 Henry Craik to Linlithgow, 5 June 1938, Linlithgow Papers.
with a highly centralized form of government. The following zones were demarcated to be assigned to the Muslims:

1. **North-West Block** - There was a great Muslim block in the North-West consisting of Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province and Kashmir, the Indian States of Khairpur and Bahawalpur. This area might be converted into a single autonomous state formed on the basis of federal relationship between the six units thereby allowing over 25 million of Muslims a free home of their own.

2. **North-East Block** - Right on the other side of India, the North-East, there was also a solid block of Muslims in Eastern Bengal and Assam of over 30 millions, who might be assigned a free political existence.

3. **Delhi-Lucknow Block** - In between the two above mentioned blocks the Muslims were unevenly distributed. Those of this area living close to each of the two blocks should be attracted for naturalization to the one nearer to them. The rest, the great bulk, belonging to the United Province and Bihar numbering about 12 millions might be concentrated in a block extending in a line from the Eastern border of Patiala to Lucknow and rounding up Rampur on the way. The block was carved out to allow the Hindu nationality to keep within its zone all its great religious centres like Banares, Hardwar, Allahabad and Muttra. To shift it on to any other part of the North would defeat that purpose.
4. **The Deccan Block** - The case of the Muslims below the Vindhyas and Satpuras called for a special consideration. They were scattered all over the South in colonies of varying size and exceeded 12 millions in number. From them a zone was to be carved. The Dominion of Hyderabad might provide such a zone with a strip of territory in the South running through the districts of Kurnool, Cuddapah, Chittoor, North-Arcot and Chingleput down to the city of Madras. Such a strip with an opening to the sea would be found absolutely necessary to settle the large Muslim mercantile and marine community living for ages on the Coromandel and Malabar coasts.

According to this scheme, exchange of population was also desired "to assure Hindus and Muslims freedom to live their own cultural lives in homelands of their own and to promote the cause of India's unity."

The scheme known as "Confederacy of India" by "A Punjabi" published in 1939 was also worked out in great detail. The underlying assumption behind that scheme was that Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations with different religion, culture and conflicting political and economic interests. Like others, he also advocated the reshaping of the map of India. His scheme was as follows:

---

56 For Syed Abdul Latif's scheme, see *Indian Annual Register, 1940*, vol. I, pp. 360-70.
1. The Indus Region's Federation with the Punjab, NWFP, Kashmir, Baluchistan, Bahawalpur, Amb, Dir, Swat, Chitral, Khairpur, Kalat, Las Bela, Kapurthala and Malerkotla as its federal units.

2. The Hindu India Federation with the United Provinces, Central Provinces, Bihar, with some portions of Bengal, Orissa, Assam, Madras, Bombay and the Indian States other than the Rajasthan and the Deccan States included in the States' Federation as its federal units.

3. Rajasthan Federation with the various States of Rajputana and Central India as its federal units.

4. The Deccan States' Federation comprising the Hyderabad, Mysore and Bastar States.

5. The Bengal Federation: The prominent Muslim tracts of the Eastern Bengal and Goalpara and Sylhet districts of Assam as its provincial unit and Tripura and other states lying within the provincial unit or cut off by its territories from the Hindu India, as its State units.

Each federation joining the confederation of India was to have a governor-general, with the governor of its provincial units under him, who was to be responsible to the central confederal authority, in relation to the confederal subjects and matters relating to the rights and obligations of the Crown in respect of the Indian States within the federation. The confederal authority would be vested in the Viceroy assisted by a
confederal assembly consisting of members drawn from the various Indian Federations.

The author did not favour exchange of population.

His contention was that in case Hindus disagreed with his idea of a confederacy then Muslims should insist on separation.

He said:

... We should be separationists-cum-confederationists and if the Hindus disagree with the idea of a confederacy of Hindu India and Muslim India, then we should be simply separationists, demanding secession of our regions from Hindu India without any link between them. We should desire separation simply because we want to evolve a happier and more contented India, whether it be by separation of the Hindu cultural zones and Muslim cultural zones to be linked together in a confederacy quite independent of and separate from each other except for the confederal bond or complete separation in order to constitute our regions into federated states independently and separately from Hindu India.57

Explaining the reasons for advocating such a scheme, he observed: "The failure of Hindu-Muslim relations ... point to the one conclusion that the Muslims will either have to remain content with the present state of affairs or discover some new political ideal wherein all clash between their various loyalties could cease. Through the scheme the territorial loyalties of the Muslims and their allegiance to their faith would find a "happy compromise". It would also ensure them their economic and cultural interests backed by "an

57 "A Punjabi", Confederacy of India (Lahore, 1939), p. 17.
absolute political power." It was further stressed that it was the "legitimate heritage" of Muslims to enjoy full state powers in all those parts of India where they were in an overwhelming majority and the establishment of their own states would mean "revival of Islamic culture and orthodox Islam, the betterment of the Muslim masses, the securing of trade and industrial interests and the restoration of 'self-respect'."

Lastly, the Aligarh scheme proposed by Syed Zafrul Hasan and Mohammad Afzul Hussain Qadri in 1939 aimed at the division of the country into Hindu India and Muslim India. The principles on which it was based were as follows:

(1) The Muslims of India were a nation by themselves. They had a distinct national unity wholly different from the Hindus and other non-Muslim groups. Indeed they were more different from the Hindus than the Sudetan Germans were from the Czechs.

(2) The Muslims of India had a separate national future and had to make their own contributions to the betterment of the world.

(3) The future of the Muslims of India lay in complete freedom from the domination of the Hindus, the British, or for the matter of that, any other people.

(4) The Muslim majority provinces could not be permitted to be enslaved into a single All India Federation with an

58 Ibid., p. 147.
overwhelming Hindu majority at the Centre.

(5) The Muslims in the minority provinces should not be allowed to be deprived of their separate religious, cultural and political identity and should be given full and effective support by the Muslim majority provinces.

The scheme intended to divide India into several wholly independent and sovereign states:

1. Pakistan comprising the Punjab, NWFP, Sind, Baluchistan and the States of Kashmir and Jammu, Mandi, Chamba, Saket, Sumin, Kapurthala, Malerkotla, Chitral, Dir, Kalat, Loharu, Bilaspur, Simla Hill States, Bahawalpur, etc.
   Population - 3,92,74,244
   Muslims - 2,36,97,538; 60.3 per cent

2. Bengal (excluding Howrah and Midnapore districts), Puran district (Bihar), Sylhet division (Assam)
   Population - 5,25,19,232
   Muslims - 3,01,18,184; 57.0 per cent

3. Hindustan comprising the rest of India and Indian States (excluding Hyderabad, Pakistan, Bengal and the States included therein).
   Population - 21,60,00,000
   Muslims - 2,09,60,000; 9.7 per cent

4. Hyderabad comprising Hyderabad, Berar and Karnataka (Madras and Orissa)
Population - 2,90,65,098
Muslims - 21,44,010; 7.4 per cent

a) Delhi Province including Delhi, Meerut Division, Rohilkhand division and the district of Aligarh (Agra division)
Population - 1,26,60,000
Muslims - 35,20,000; 28.0 per cent

b) Malabar Province consisting of Malabar and adjoining areas, i.e. Malabar and South Kanara.
Population - 49,00,000
Muslims - 14,40,000; 27.0 per cent

The author of this scheme also desired that the three States of Pakistan, Bengal and Hindustan should enter into a defensive and offensive alliance on the following basis:

1. Mutual recognition and reciprocity.
2. That Pakistan and Bengal be recognized as the homeland of Muslims and Hindustan as the homeland of Hindus to which they could migrate respectively if and when they wanted to.
3. In Hindustan the Muslims were to be recognized as a nation in minority and part of a larger nation inhabiting Pakistan and Bengal.
4. The Muslim minority in Hindustan and the non-Muslim minority in Pakistan and Bengal would have (i) representation according to population, and (ii) separate electorates together with effective safeguards guaranteed by all the three States. Separate representation according to population might be granted
to all considerable minorities in the three States, e.g., Sikhs, non-caste Hindus, etc.

5. An accredited Muslim political organization would be the sole official representative body of the Muslims in Hindustan.

Each of the three independent states of Pakistan, Hindustan and Bengal were to have separate treaties of alliance with Great Britain and separate Crown representation. There would be a joint court of arbitration to settle any dispute that might arise between the different states or between them and the Crown. Unlike the other schemes which treated Hyderabad also as one of the Indian states, it claimed for it a sovereign status.

While the schemes of Sikandar Hyat Khan and Abdul Latif proceeded upon the assumption that India was not a country but a subcontinent consisting of several countries which should enter into a confederacy, with each unit in the confederation functioning as a federation of several units within itself comprising both British-Indian Provinces and States, the schemes propounded by Rahmat Ali, 'A Punjabi' and the two Aligarh gentlemen laid more emphasis on Hindus and Muslims being two different nations with nothing in common between them. Therefore, according to them the only solution of the problem

59 Rajendra Prasad, Pakistan (Bombay & Calcutta, 1940), pp. 38-41.
was separation of the Muslim majority areas from India.

Among the schemes discussed here, the most important was, of course, the one devised by Rahmat Ali. When he had come forward with his partition scheme in 1933 it had failed to receive support from any important section of Muslim leadership but as shown in this and the preceding chapter, a lot had happened between 1937 and 1940 to bring about a dramatic change in the situation. The Muslim League evidently based its Partition scheme essentially on the plan devised by Rahmat Ali and had only modified it by also asking for the separation of the North-eastern region from India. In his presidential address to the League's session which adopted the partition demand Jinnah mainly echoed the sentiments voiced several years ago by Rahmat Ali. Even the words used were not very much different.