Chapter V

ANZUS: THE BEDROCK OF
AUSTRALIAN SECURITY

They tried to fit you with an English tongue;
And clipped your speech in the English tale;
But even from the first the words were wrong;

...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...

And Thames and all the rivers of the King's
Ran into the Mississippi and were drowned.

- STEPHEN BENÉT.
Fear of Japan

For the people of Australia, the scourge of war was formally over when the Commander of the Japanese forces in Borneo and the Netherlands East Indies laid down his arms before them on 9 September 1945 at Morotai, an inconspicuous point in their Near North. To them, it was the happy denouement of the great dark plot which unfolded with the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse in December 1941 and moved to its climax with the bombing of the northern cities of Darwin, Wyndham and Broome on 19 February 1942.

For Field-Marshal Blamey, the Australian war leader, this was no occasion to be chivalrous to the fallen foe. The scars of a dirty war were still fresh on his mind, and also of so many of his countrymen. In his address, he sternly told the Japanese Commander:

.... I recall the atrocities inflicted upon the persons of our nationals, designed to reduce them by punishment and starvation to slavery... (1)

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In the years to come, there remained in Australia (as in the Philippines) a burning hatred of the Japanese, which shaped the attitudes of her people and coloured their vision of the fastly changing world. For some time, it would show itself sporadically in the form of discourtesy to the Japanese visitors, denying participation in official competitions to their athletes (2) and spontaneous outbursts when fishing and pearling interests would plan to bring in the skilled Japanese to assist them. Almost a decade after the fall of Singapore, Prime Minister Menzies wrote in a learned journal: "The Japanese soldier proved himself an uncivilized enemy and a brutal and inhuman jailor." (3)

The revulsion generated by the memories of Japanese atrocities was further intensified by the haunting fear that the vanquished Asian Power would rise again. Then, in its drive for revanche, not war


3 Robert Gordon Menzies, "The Pacific Settlement As Seen From Australia", Foreign Affairs, vol. 30, no. 2 (January 1952), p. 189. Also see CPD, Senate, vol. 212 (8 March 1951), p. 116 for an ALP Member's denunciation of "these barbarians, these cannibals, the Japanese who are to become our allies." For similar sentiments echoed in school text books, see G.S. Browne and N.D. Harper, Our Pacific Neighbours (Melbourne, 1953), p. 218. The text book wrote of "... the cruel tyrants of the Burma Railway and the P.O.W. camps."
but defeat in war would be considered a sin. The
Australians were afraid that the security of their
vaunted paradise would be imperilled again. "The
possibility of another Japanese invasion", remarked
John Foster Dulles in a broadcast in March 1951,
"seemed a reality to those who had recently experienced
that danger at first hand". (4) The people and the
Government of Australia were, thus, obsessed by the
war of yesterday and were, paradoxically enough,
desperate in their hour of victory. In 1945, there
was little prospect that, in future wars, their cousins
from the New World would appear in their millions upon
the battlefields of the Near North and the waters of
the South-west Pacific. The Australian people were
determined, as Gallup Polls in 1951 and 1952 revealed,
(5) that whatever new order was evolved in the South
Pacific, Japan should be kept weak and crippled, even
if through a Carthaginian peace. The Gallup Poll also

4 Broadcast of Dulles on 1 March 1951. Lok Sabha
Secretariat, *The Anzus Pact* (New Delhi, January 1955),
p. 9.

5 Australian Gallup Polls (February–March 1951). This
poll indicated that 58% of the Australians felt that
Japan should not be allowed to have army, while only
34% were in its favour. Also see ibid. (September–
October 1952), which showed that next year, 60% felt
that Japan was likely to threaten their country's
security in next 20 years, while only 26% opposed it.
showed that the Australians felt that the security of their country should, if possible, be tied to the boat-hook of the mighty United States. (6) Both these, it was felt, should be brought under the umbrella of collective security, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. For some time, these goals were diligently pursued by both ALP and Liberal-Country Party Governments, though not with much success. There was little doubt in the Australian minds that their future perils were to come from the direction of Southeast Asia. But on Southeast Asia itself, they had little vision, because the political kaleidoscope of Asia had yet to settle into a stable post-imperialist pattern.

Australians in all walks of life, therefore, demanded a harsh peace treaty so far as Japan was concerned. But Australia herself was no great Power. The success of Australian diplomacy depended upon its ability to make other Powers see its point. Canberra, therefore, played host to a conference of Commonwealth representatives in August-September 1947. This was the first Commonwealth event in which India and Pakistan took part as fully-sovereign states. The conference

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The poll indicated that 87% supported mutual assistance pact with the United States and only 7% opposed it. Ibid., June-July 1950.
agreed on several matters of detail relating to the final peace settlement with Japan. The group urged that in the peace conference later, the veto should be excluded and decisions should be taken by two-thirds majority. It was agreed that the Japanese sovereignty was to be confined to the four main Japanese islands, as indicated in the Potsdam declaration of 1945. It was pointed out that the first claim to reparations from Japan was to be of invaded and devastated countries, such as, Malaya, Burma and the bombed areas of Australia. Later on, the Prime Minister of New Zealand informed his country's Parliament that the main territorial question before the conference was the disposition of the south-ward lying islands of Japan, namely, Ryuku, Bonin and others.

Cold War and the Revolution in China

While Australia argued with Powers of the day over the fate of the vanquished Japan, there was a change in the international climate, as indicated by Winston Churchill's letter to Marshal Stalin in 1945, which said:

"I hope there is no word or phrase in this outpouring of my heart to you which unwittingly gives offence .... But do not, I beg of you, my friend Stalin, underrate the divergencies which are opening up about matters which you may think small but which are symbolic of the way the English-speaking democracies look at life." (7)

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7 Quoted by Evatt in CPP, NS, vol.3 ( 7 April 1954 ), p.129. For uneasiness in Australia about the emerging postures of Soviet Russia, see the editorial of Sydney Morning Herald, 16 October 1945.
Soon the Cold War became a fact of life in international politics. Australia took little notice of the events which, in October 1949, culminated into the proclamation of the Peoples' Republic of China in the ancient seat of the Manchu Emperors, though a Minister in the Liberal-Country Party Government later asserted that no great wisdom was needed to forecast that "... the guns of Yangate in 1949 were blowing out the lights of China and would soon throw Indo-China in the darkness." To the ALP Government, the Communist movement in China was a part of the world-wide scheme, controlled from Moscow, to "burrow and tunnel" to advance their position against "the citadels of freedom".

By the time Sir Robert Menzies began his 16-year Prime Ministership in late 1949, the area of the vast Communist landmass had extended from the Elbe and the

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8 For evidence of lower priority to the developments in China, see Evatt in CPD, vol. 201 (9 February 1949), p. 88. It is apparent from the fact that the statement of Dr Evatt, the Minister for External Affairs, covered many topics, but completely omitted any reference to the happenings in China. When interjected by a member on this point, the Minister talked of mediation by the world organization between the warring factions in China.

9 Ibid., vol. NS 4 (10 August 1954), p. 133. The remark is of Wilfrid Kent Hughes, Minister for the Interior.

10 For example, see Prime Minister Chifley in CPD, HR, vol. 201 (2 December 1948), p. 3891. He then stated that "the Communists go to every fire to pour oil on the flames. They have concentrated on the movement known as the Communist movement in China. Their
mountains of Austria in the west to the Yellow Sea in the east, and from the Arctic Ocean in the north to the borders of Iran, India, Burma and the then Indo-China in the south. Around the mass of Soviet unity, it was pointed out, the democracies were strung like a necklace, but the thin cord which held them together could be cut or torn at Soviet's will in a dozen places at once. (11) The Revolution in China was rather enigmatic to the large but rich and capitalistic Australia. It was a revolution with economic, military and power consequences. There was a fear, in Australia, of its drive - most likely - to the south. Marshal Chiang's China's Destiny, according to Prof. Crawford, sketched a policy of landward imperialism and Mao's China had added an ideological incentive to the likely expansion. (12) The Australian community, ever haunted by fears from Asia, now sensed a new menace from the direction of China. A well-known authority on China, Prof. Fitzgerald, explained his country's dilemma in these words:

influence is being exercised over a wide area of an important country. That contributes a grave danger to peace in Asia."


It was not merely Asian nationalism, which in certain circumstances could be embarrassing; but Asian Communism which in all circumstances must be alarming, which now confronted Australia. (13)

In November 1949, Commonwealth discussions on East Asia were held in Canberra between Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The topics covered in those parleys included the recognition of Communist China, co-ordination of (British) Commonwealth policy in the Pacific and the Communist activity in Southeast Asia. This was the last month of the ALP Government in office and the general election of 10 December 1949 brought into power a new Government, in which Percy Spender was the Minister for External Affairs. He represented his country at the conference of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers held in Colombo in January 1950. As stated in the communique of the conference, Asia was "the main focus of interest" to the assembled Foreign Ministers and this explained the choice of the venue also. Both China and Japan were taken up for discussion at the conference, but Australia found that no joint move could be thought of in Colombo owing to divergent views among Commonwealth members. At least five members of the group, namely, India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon

and the United Kingdom had recognised the new regime in China even before the conference opened on 9 January. The question of a Japanese peace treaty was discussed in a general way, but differences of viewpoint on this also were evident despite the 1947 Canberra Conference. It was agreed, on Spender's suggestion, that a working party on a high official level should be set up to examine and report upon the problem. (14) The working party of the Commonwealth representatives met in London from 1 to 17 May 1950 and it greatly modified the substance of the broad conclusions reached at Canberra in 1947. (15) The report of the working party was later handed over to the State Department of the United States in order that it should have before it the views of the Commonwealth countries.

Thus in Canberra's summer, the new Liberal-Country Party Government was grappling with two major issues of its international affairs, which were vital to its role in the Near North. One was the old question of the treatment to be meted out to Japan after its defeat at the hands of Australia and her powerful Allies. The other was about the

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15 Ibid.
position Australia should take on the ticklish question of the recognition of the new regime in China. The Australians, with the instinct of frontiersmen, had caught a faint something, a fleeting menace, from the actions and language of Japan in the years before the war. Now they again felt the same from the way the new regime in China was conducting the ancient country into the Family of Nations. Little did they know that those were not separate issues and would interact in the near future in such a way that the second would alter the outcome of the first. But on both, the new Government did not have anything original to offer. On Japan, the old arguments for a somewhat harsh peace were repeated, and on China, the Government did not know its mind at all. While Spender was away in Colombo in January 1950, Britain's lead in recognising Communist China did make some impression on the Press in Australia and most of the editorials except that of the conservative Sydney Morning Herald favoured the recognition of the Peking regime. (16) In Britain, both Labour and Conservative parties had supported the recognition of new China and even Churchill, the renowned foe of communism, had remarked on the floor of the House of Commons:

One had to recognise lots of things and people in this world of sin and woe that one does not like. The reason for having diplomatic relations is not to confer a compliment, but to secure a convenience. (17)

Although Sir Frederick Eggleston, Australia's first envoy to China, publicly exhorted the Australian Government to fall in line with Britain, (18) the two major parties in Australia remained undecided. Back from Colombo, Spender stated categorically that "for the time being", the Government would not recognise China. (18a)

While the recognition of new China was still a live issue with many in Australia, the outbreak of war in Korea shelved it for the time being. The debate on this question was frozen on 25 June 1950, when the Communist armies of North Korea crossed the 38th Parallel and penetrated menacingly into the non-Communist half of their country with a view to bringing the South and the North under one common flag. Australia was among the first to pledge armed assistance to the UN effort in Korea under the leadership of the United States. In November 1950, "volunteers" of Red China - 200,000 strong - crossed

18 The Sydney Morning Herald, 9 January 1950.
18a Albinski, n.16, p.9.
into Korea on the side of the Communist North and the Australian soldiers clashed with this disciplined and well-trained force of Asians for the second time in their living memory.

"The invasion of South Korea", an American scholar states, "was seen in Australia not as a narrowly limited object of Communist intentions, but as a part of a calculated strategy to encourage Communist movements in South-East Asia."(19) In his broadcast to the nation, Menzies said that "every Australian ... should regard Korea as his business, and not as some remote frontier incident."(20) Spender linked Korea with Southeast Asia more unambiguously. Speaking in Australian Parliament, he said:

If Korea were allowed to go under with our consent, leaders in some countries in South and South-East Asia and Europe might be tempted themselves to come to terms with the Communists. It would not be a case of letting Korea go and not having to fight anywhere else ... (21)

Casey, who succeeded Spender as Minister for External Affairs in 1951, also took up the same line and his opinions were also echoed in the Press. (22)

19 Albinsky, n.16, p. 22.
22 For example, see the editorial of the Sydney Morning Herald, 16 January 1951.
Stalin had described the process of his world revolution as "an entire historical era, replete with civil wars and external conflicts, with organizational work and economic construction ...." Success of his creed in China and conflagration in Korea were facets of this odd "historical era". To the Australians in responsible positions, this struggle was going to be a long and protracted one. Writing an year later, Spender asserted:

In my judgement, the struggle will not find its resolution in one decade; it may require two or three decades. (23)

While there could be no cherry blossom sentiments for Japan in Australia, communism and China were the source of new Asian threat in the country. This was precisely the mood in which John Foster Dulles found the Australians when he came to Canberra in February 1951 to discuss the proposed Japanese Peace Treaty and other matters.

Movement for Regional Organization in Australia

The ANZUS treaty was the fruition of Australia's age-old desire to have a regional arrangement in the area of its geographical location. This desire on the part of the Australians went back to the days when, in 1923, Prime Minister Bruce called for "a League of Nations of the Pacific". (24) Significantly enough, in May 1937, Prime Minister Lyons actually put a proposal for regional organization in the Pacific area before the British Empire, USSR, China, France, Holland, America and Japan. It did not materialize because Britain was lukewarm, Japan hostile and America aloof and non-committal, but a dispassionate commentator has observed that "like other missed opportunities in Europe in 1937-39, this was a chance too lightly lost." (25) In April 1939, Prime Minister Menzies talked about Australia's "primary responsibilities and primary risks" in the Pacific. It was with Evatt that the movement for a regional arrangement for this part of the world started getting momentum. He remained its principal champion from

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1943 onwards, though his proposals varied according to the fastly changing international scene. However, the constant theme in his speeches and writings was the "close relationship between the security and human welfare." On 18 June 1943, he referred to "zones of security" in Southeast Asia and South-west Pacific in a newspaper article. (26) In January 1944, Australia concluded the ANZAC Pact with New Zealand. This Pact provided for an international conference on a later date with Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, Portugal and France as the likely participants. In February 1947, he told his country's Parliament that instrumentalities similar to the South Pacific Commission should be established for Southeast Asia and West Pacific also. (27) Seeing the prospect of freedom in the Indian peninsula and sensing a growing ferment in Southeast Asia, Evatt told Parliament next month that interest in Pacific security had now become related to political developments in Southeast Asia. (28)

26 Ibid., p. 10. The article was published in Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 18 June 1943.
It would be worthwhile to examine the progress of similar and parallel movements elsewhere in Asia and the relationship Australia had with them. In those years, Manila, Canberra and New Delhi were the three capitals from which feelers for regional arrangement in Asia and Australasia emanated. One of the three resolutions passed by the New Delhi Conference on Indonesia in January 1949, in which Australia also participated, was entirely on this subject. In his speech, Prime Minister Nehru pointed out that he saw "creative and co-operative impulses seeking a new integration and a new unity" and thought that the free countries of the region "should begin to think of some more permanent arrangement than this Conference for effective mutual consultation and concerted effort in the pursuit of common aims ..." (29) India and Australia could have easily joined together to evolve a regional arrangement. But, as Werner Levi suggests, there was a minor tension between the two countries, which could be sensed but not seen. (30) On

30 Werner Levi, "Australia and the New Asia", Far Eastern Survey, vol. 19, no.8 (19 April 1950), p.74. He also stated in this article that "... many Australians adopted an attitude of paternalistic leadership toward Asian peoples and hoped to be recognised within the Commonwealth and by the Asian peoples as the benevolent dispensers of modern culture."
22 January 1950, the *Sydney Morning Herald* wrote in its editorial:

Why indeed should we seek to enroll as a junior partner in the Asian Confederacy - the role which Pandit Nehru for one seeks to assign us - when we stand on our own right as a Pacific Power with a part to play subservient to none? (31)

Quirino plan was another initiative in the direction of the regional integration of the area. The Philippine Republic of 7,000 islands is separated from the Asian mainland by a vast ocean moat. To the Filipinos, as to the Australians, the question of being (or not being) one with their Asian neighbours through some regional or treaty arrangement, has been of vital interest. After the conference in New Delhi, President Elpidio Quirino came out with his plan for a Pacific Union, which was anti-Communist in its emphasis. The Quirino plan was not well received in Australia. The *Sydney Morning Herald* characterized the offer as having "more the effect of a tin whistle than a trumpet." (32) Chifley later confirmed his country's disinterest in the project. (33) This plan from Manila's Malacanang was later taken up at the Baguio Conference held in May 1950, in which both India and Australia were

32 Ibid., 10 August 1949.
represented. This conference, held at Manila's initiative, did not succeed in its avowed purpose owing to differences in the basic approaches of Australian, Thai and Filipino delegates on the one side and Indian, Pakistani and Ceylonese on the other. In this, the former wanted to discuss military co-operation, while the latter were opposed to the idea.

In fact, Dr Evatt had his own plan for the regional set up of the area around Australia. His conception was that Britain, Australia, New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries (presumably India and Pakistan) should form a core of some pact, which might later be joined by the United States, the Netherlands and Portugal. It was different from the Quirino plan in the following way:

Quirino's proposal was in essence for a pact principally of "confrontation" to Communism in Asia whereas Evatt had, in contemplation, wider considerations of general Pacific security, human welfare, and collaboration between Commonwealth powers and the United States. (34)

Despite Evatt's steadfast effort, the Pacific Pact, as envisaged by him, did not come into being. Though Fraser (Prime Minister of New Zealand), Menzies, Eden and Churchill spoke in favour of such a pact, Nehru

made it clear at the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in 1949 that discussion on a Pacific counterpart of NATO was premature, so long as existing conflicts and disputes in Southeast Asia remained unsolved. What was in his mind was perhaps the conflict between Asian nationalisms and European colonialism, of which Southeast Asia was now the battleground. Later Chifley disclosed that America, Holland and Portugal had rejected the Australian plan. (35) He did not give American reasons for this rejection. But it is clear that Acheson had the same opinion as Nehru on this question. (36) The statement of Acheson to the National Press Club in Washington on 12 January 1950 provided an explanation of the American rejection. Talking about the "developing Asian consciousness", Acheson said:

They say and they believe that from now on they are on their own. They will make their own decisions. They will attempt to better their own lot and on occasion they will make their own mistakes. But it will be their mistakes and they are not going to have their mistakes dictated to them by anybody else .... Resignation is no longer the typical emotion of Asia. (37)

36 Starke, n. 25, p. 22.
Spender, who succeeded Evatt as minister, was also a supporter of the idea of a regional arrangement, (38) but was more cautious than his impulsive predecessor. He wanted not merely a regional pact, but a pact with backbone. On 20 February 1950, he stated that his country would join a Pacific Pact, if other powerful nations also did so. (39) Through his informal soundings in Colombo earlier, he had sensed that India and other Asian countries were reluctant to join a pact against China. (40) On 14 March, he delivered his maiden speech in Parliament. (41) In this, he said that all Governments interested in peace in South and Southeast Asia should consider creation of a regional defence pact, of which Australia, the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries would be the nucleus. But the membership of the United States was a must, because only that Power could give a real backbone to such a pact. He further said that it was fatal for Australia to rely solely on the United

38 Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, n. 14, p. 33.
40 Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, n.14, p. 13. "At Colombo", he wrote,"... any talk of military defensive machinery aimed at assisting the achievement and maintenance of political stability was strictly taboo." Also see M.N.Jha, Origins of Seato (Unpublished Ph.D.thesis,Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, 1963),p.84. "The strain (sic) of the Baguio Conference", observes this Indian study on the subject, "was that a professedly anti-Communist alliance could not develop under the conditions prevailing in Asia, although practical steps to that
Nations and, as such, some supplementary arrangements were also required. Significantly enough, the new Minister said:

... as far as possible it is our objective to build up with the United States somewhat the same relationship as exists within the British Commonwealth .... (42)

The Minister made bold but futile attempts throughout 1950 to achieve his pact. He could not arouse much interest in London, Washington and even Canberra. His own Prime Minister did not display much enthusiasm for a Pacific security mutual defence arrangement and described the idea as "a superstructure on a foundation of jelly". (43)

On 8 June, Spender told Parliament of the difficulties in having a Pacific counterpart of NATO. As such, he disclosed, his country alone would be prepared to enter into a Pacific Pact. (44) This gave the first indication of Australia's readiness to join the Pact even if it was without Commonwealth countries, including the Mother Country. Though pro-West, the Filipinos better understood

end could be taken. The Colombo Conference of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers emphasised that point; the Baguio Conference put further emphasis on it."

42 Ibid. Also quoted in Spender, n.14, p.17.
the difficulties of creating a Pacific duplicate of the NATO set-up, as is revealed from their Congressional record. Hermenegildo Atienza, member of the Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee in the Philippines enumerated these with a remarkable degree of lucidity on 8 April 1949. (45) He pointed out that, in the first place, there was the question of simple logistics, as the circumference of the Atlantic area was only 1/5 of that of the Pacific basin. This meant that America would be called upon to have more fleet in the Pacific than in the Atlantic, which was impossible, as 4/5 of the American naval strength was concentrated in the Atlantic because of NATO. Secondly, there was a conflict between democracy and imperialism, as the signatories of the Pact in the Atlantic were colonial or imperialistic in the Pacific. The "democracy that they claim for themselves", said the Filipino Congressman, "they deny to the people of the Pacific." In the next place, the raison d' être of NATO did not exist in the Pacific. It was intended to salvage the Marshall Plan in Europe, the like of which did not exist in the

Pacific. In the last place, Europe was more important to America's defence and security than Asia. "Even if a country could occupy the whole of Asia, and even the littoral islands off the continent of Asia, even as far as Guam, there would not yet be an immediate danger that America would be subjected to bombardment from Asia."
The Australian Minister, however, continued his advocacy of such a pact. On 13 September 1950, he told the Press in Washington of his views on the pact, the membership of which would be extended to Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the USA and the UK. (46) His statements gave the impression that he would like some countries of the West Coast of South America to join the pact, but he has denied any such implication of his statement in his Memoirs. (47)

Spender's words would have fallen into deaf ears, but for the interposition of the Korean War, which broke out on 25 June 1950. A number of statements coming out of the Pentagon Building reflected a slow but sure change in the attitude of the United States towards the vexed question of extending its commitments beyond the

46 For his version of the press conference, see Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, n. 14, p. 41.
47 For the report of the Press, see The Sydney Morning Herald, 18 September 1950 and The Times (London), 14 September 1950. For his own denial of the inclusion of these countries, see ibid.
"Acheson defence perimeter", (48) which excluded the Antipodes. Dean Rusk, the American Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, said in Philadelphia on 9 February 1951:

If the nations of Asia and the Pacific conclude that the time has come to move closer together in arrangements to safeguard the security and well-being of the area as a whole, the United States will take a sympathetic interest in such a development. (49)

On 21 February, Dean Acheson made a statement saying that the United States had discussed the matter "informally" with the governments concerned. (50)

Ultimately, after Dulles had been to Canberra for the purpose, President Truman himself made a statement on 18 April saying that he had instructed the State Department to pursue the matter further, "so as to strengthen the fabric of peace in the whole Pacific Ocean areas." (51)

Thus was realized, though yet in a rather truncated form, the dream which leaders of young Australia had seen almost since the early twenties.

48 For a definition of this "perimeter", see Dept. of State Bulletin, vol.22 (23 January 1950), p. 116. It connoted areas running along the Aleutians through Japan and Ryukus to the Philippines. Acheson stated in early 1950 that security of countries beyond this perimeter could not be guaranteed by the United States.

49 Ibid., (19 February 1951), p. 298.

50 Ibid., (5 March 1951), p. 369. He said: "The United States has long been aware of the desires of some of the countries of the Pacific for co-operative arrangements
Negotiation and Conclusion of the ANZUS Pact

John Foster Dulles came to Canberra in February 1951 as head of the US Peace Mission to Japan. At Parliament House in Canberra, he had "four days of uninterrupted conference" with Australian delegation led by Spender and Doidge, the New Zealand Minister for External Affairs. (52) The US Peace Mission was also flown to northern Australia to see "the scars from Japanese bombing" during the war. Dulles knew that the opinion in the Antipodes favoured a tough peace treaty with Japan. But his own ideas were quite different and he wanted the Australians to know them clearly. He distinctly perceived that the forces of communism, as pointed out by Prime Minister Yoshida of Japan a few months later, were "sweeping over half the Asiatic continent, sowing seeds of dissention, spreading unrest and confusion and breaking out here and there into open aggression - indeed at the very door of Japan." A humiliated Japan, argued Dulles, would turn Revisionist, like Germany in the pre-war years and could, of its own

in that area. The United States has been sympathetic to these desires and has discussed them with a number of governments concerned."

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For a fuller account of Canberra negotiations, see Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, n.14, pp.112-57.
choice, fall into the waiting arms of the neighbouring Communist states of Russia and China. Short of that, Japan would be subjected to their pressure, which the weakened and demoralized ex-enemy might not be able to withstand. An emaciated Japan, under pressure from the USSR and China, would have to be defended by the United States and other Western Powers, including Australia. "It would come as a shock to most Australians", wrote Prime Minister Menzies later, "to be told that, as a punishment for the Japanese, Australian troops were in future to defend Japan while the Japanese themselves went smiling and bowing about their affairs of production and commerce." (53)

In face of these firm views held by the representative of the Super Power, Australia did not have much scope for obtaining a harsh peace with Japan. At the most, she could try for American assurance of military assistance in the event of a future threat from the ex-enemy. In 1938, America had guaranteed the security of Canada through a mere presidential statement and Dudge felt that some such declaration on the part of the United States would be enough to satisfy New Zealand, as by every tie "except that of geography" she belonged as fully

as the US herself to the community of North Atlantic Treaty Powers. (54) But Spender was convinced that he should seek a more firm treaty commitment, as a declaration would have no effect, unless in treaty form approved by the US Senate. (55) But getting one from the United States was not easy. On international plans, Australia was "a small fry" before America and could not bluntly ask for such a treaty as a *quid pro quo* for its acceptance of a watered down peace treaty with Japan. A senior Cabinet colleague rightly summed up his country's predicament to Spender, when he said:

> Drive the best bargain you can Percy. You have little room for movement. Do your best. (56)

Spender did a lot of patient negotiating with Dulles. His colleagues were apprehensive that by standing out for a firm treaty, he might compromise his chance of obtaining a presidential declaration. At one stage, Dulles inquired if Japan and the Philippines could be included in the treaty. On Japan, Spender's reply was in the negative. In less than five years from the cessation of hostilities, it was not possible for the two Antipodal countries to sit down with the

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55 Ibid.,p.110
56 Ibid.,p.119.
Japanese for joint military staff talks. As to the inclusion of the Philippines, Australia was prepared to accept it "if that was the choice Australia must make", though New Zealand had some hesitation on this point. (57) Ultimately, it was found that a three-cornered treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States was the natural arrangement. Japan and the Philippines could be covered through separate bi-lateral treaties with America. All these treaties would then become "spokes in a wheel" of security with its hub in Washington. Thus was born an alliance, which both Australia and New Zealand had sought and longed for almost since the days of the débâcle of Singapore. It was a mammoth achievement of Spender as his country's Minister for External Affairs. This new ANZUS treaty was initialled in Washington in July 1951 and was signed on 1 September in a brief ceremony at San Francisco. It came into force in April 1952. The Japanese Peace Treaty was also signed in September 1951.

Almost a month and a half after the Canberra negotiations, Prime Minister Menzies made an election speech in Canterbury, Victoria. He mentioned these

57 Ibid., p. 128.
discussions and asserted that his Government had brought "realism" into the country's foreign relations. (58) Hindsight suggests that this claim was not entirely unfounded. The humiliation of Japan through a Carthaginian peace would have created more problems for Australia in its Near North than it would have solved. Early in 1952, the Prime Minister quoted a remark of R.G. Casey, Minister for External Affairs in his Government, which said:

To permit the Japanese people to recover their self-respect and some measure of economic independence offers the best means of promoting the growth of a workable democracy in Japan. (59)

Spender has gone to the extent of claiming that by its existence, ANZUS has provided a basis for creating permanent friendship and co-operation between Australia and Japan. (60) The people and Government of Australia, however, were to be disappointed in one respect at least. Prof. Norman Harper has recalled that there was a hope that a revived Japanese army would be left land bound by a treaty which would deny to it the mobility by sea and air so vital to any future southward thrust. (61)

59 Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, n. 14, pp. 189-90.
60 Menzies, n. 3, p. 193.
The Prime Minister did not mention the Japanese air power, but stated that Britain and the United States had been requested that there should be a prohibition upon the creation in Japan of naval units of a long range, that is, of an offensive character. (62) But these hopes remained unfulfilled.

During the ceremonies in San Francisco, President Truman declared on 4 September 1951 that it was "a treaty of reconciliation which looks to the future, not the past." In his assessment, Prime Minister Menzies was more realistic than Dr Evatt, who denounced the Japanese Peace Settlement as an "open, unashamed abandonment of all standards of international justice." (63) He forecast that the products of "low standard" Japanese labour would again swamp countries with higher living standards. Dr Evatt's outbursts of the period make a curious reading to one who, in the sixties, finds Australia as Japan's second best buyer and that the Japanese know-how is to be utilized in exploiting Australia's raw materials. (64) In passing, it may be said that this hatred of Japan was rather an emotional response to an ex-enemy nation and had no basis in the

62 Menzies, n.3, p. 191.


more solid facts of life. That is why when housewives' associations were vowing to boycott Japanese goods and when Japanese businessmen were barred from Australia, Australia bought 6.2 million Pounds (Australian) worth of goods from Japan in 1948-49 and sold those worth \( \text{6.5 million Pounds.} \) Happily enough, it may be said in all certainty that in any co-operative endeavour by Japan and Australia, the two legs of the great Japan- India-Australia tripod, for welfare, peace and stability of Southeast Asia, the hatreds of "forties" and "fifties" would count for next to nothing.

**THE ANZUS PACT: AN APPRAISAL**

The ANZUS Treaty was a "broad constitutional document" that was "not drafted in the precise and detailed language of the lawyers." (66) Unlike other multi-lateral treaties with which the world became familiar later, it had no elaborate machinery and its records and documents were to be kept at the minimum. As Casey told Parliament, it did not supersede normal diplomatic relations between the three countries. (67)

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65 Levi, n.30, p. 77. The author also adds that in the previous year, Australia bought £A 3.8 million worth of goods from Japan and sold £A 6.2 million.


Its meetings have been very informal and their minutes have never been maintained. Casey himself said after the first meeting of the ANZUS Council:

> We aimed at simplicity and lack of red tape. The machinery established is, I believe, neither complex nor elaborate nor expensive and yet should be sufficient and effective. (68)

Its meetings have been short and business-like. Of the five meetings held in the period under review, only the first two took more than a day. These procedures remind one of another Anglo-Saxon contrivance, namely, the Commonwealth of Nations. (69) But beyond this, the similarity ends. In fact, these procedures have helped the pact in remaining "buoyant without being bulky". That is why the practice of having public opening sessions (as in the case of SEATO and other pacts) was discontinued after 1953. Originally, it was planned that the ANZUS Council should meet one year in the United States and the alternate years in Australia or New Zealand, (70) but this decision remained "a dead letter" between 1953 and 1961. Until 1954, its members

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69 For a somewhat similar view, see Leslie in CPD, HR, vol. 216 (29 February 1952), p. 646. To the member, it was "a pact between English speaking peoples, who never broke their word."
70 Starke, n. 25, p. 161.
occupied themselves with setting up of machinery, dealing with those outsiders who wanted to join and to cope up with the crisis in Indo-China. ANZUS, as we shall see in the next Chapter, made a significant contribution to the creation of the SEATO Pact. "The existence of ANZUS", it has been pointed out, "had proved a spur to intensify contacts between the three allies."(71)

In the annals of history, treaties and alliances have come and gone. Some lasted over long periods of time, others were short-lived. Some of the nations cast into the storms of international strife in 1939-45 tried to create an everlasting condition of things by concluding the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance (26 May 1942), the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Alliance (10 December 1944) and the Treaty of Dunkirk (4 March 1947). In the Pacific, the ANZUS Pact was also concluded under the shadow of the experiences of the war with the Asian member of the Fascist Axis. But the first three of these treaties remain a reflection of the past events and not an indication of future alignments. The ANZUS treaty, by a curious blending of circumstances, proved more adjustable to shifting realities, to fresh opportunities and fresh dangers. Unexpectedly, the alliance has noticeably "flowered", particularly, after it was "upgraded" by the Kennedy Administration in 1961 and the signing of

71 Ibid., p. 169.
the agreement on North West Cape on 9 May accelerated the inevitable nuclearization of the alliance. (72) It can, therefore, be regarded as "durable" alliance, as Starke has called it. (73) "Above all", he writes, "there is a consideration that ANZUS would remain, even if there were a permanent impairment of SEATO." (74) To a former Secretary of the Australian Department of External Affairs, it represents "the most successful initiative taken by the Australian Government in the field of foreign affairs in the post-war period." (75)

It was through this Pact that the United States effected a political and strategic come-back in the South-west Pacific area after its initial retreat from there in the years following the defeat of Japan. The Pact brought the American line of Pacific defence from the Kuriles, through Japan, the Philippines and New Guinea to Australia and New Zealand. (76) It was thus salutary to Australia. America had made a real

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72 Ibid., pp.3, 173 and 229. "Upgrading" of the ANZUS followed the downgrading of SEATO.
73 Ibid., p. ix.
74 Ibid., p. 226.
contribution to Australia's security in the earlier decade, but the question was: what advantages did Australia offer to the United States? Australians (and New Zealanders) had acknowledged that they were within the American sphere of political and strategic interests. But the question, as posed by an Australian political geographer was: would the submergence of Australia by Asia be an irreparable blow to American security? (77) To most Australians, the answer was in the negative. It is true that Australia was the Allied base for operations against Japan during the war, but even then, after 1943, it started losing its value and in the final stages of the Pacific War, it hardly counted as a major base. An American writer, who has specialized on the Antipodes, has also stated:

It was disaster in the north that forced the use of Australia as a primary base... When the great dispersal of survivors of the Japanese attack on Southeast Asia took place, Australia became by force of circumstances the anchor of the American line of defence in the Pacific. (78)

No thinking Australian could miss the implication of this. Prof. MacMahon Ball also felt in June 1951 that, in a future war, Australia was not likely to have the same importance to America as it had in the last war. It was tending to drop out of the bottom of America's strategic

map. A similar view was also expressed in Prof. Crawford's *Australia*, published about the same time when the ANZUS Pact was concluded. (79) But this was not a comforting thought, especially when the trauma of Singapore had hammered home the need for getting America to underwrite the future security of Australia. The majority in Australia could not agree with the ALP spokesman, who argued, during the debate on ANZUS, that America came to the aid of his country during the war without the obligation of any pact and as such no pact was necessary for obtaining similar assistance in the future also. (80)

Hurried improvisation at the time of Korean War had shown the weakness of these informal relationships. (81) So responsible Australians would rather go with Stalin, who, as quoted by Dulles, had said in 1939 that "the only way to meet aggression was for countries to join together in collective security pacts because non-aggressive

81  Starke, n. 25, p. 63. Also, for somewhat similar views, see Nicholas Mansergh, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-39* (London, 1958), p. 353. Prof. Mansergh has stated: "Experience of co-operation with the American forces in the Second World War had convinced many Australians that the American forces worked best to prepared plans, and that plans for the defence of the Pacific were more likely to be prepared, and in good time, if formal agreement existed." This, it appears, contrasted with their experience of the British tendency of "muddling" their way through odd situations.
countries put together were stronger than aggressors." (82) In fact, "America's century in the Pacific" (83) began, not with the destruction of the Japanese fleet in the Pacific, but with the conclusion of its three pacts with the countries of the area and the ANZUS in itself was an important link in this chain and contributed to the establishment of a Pacific Pax Americana.

Though much has been said here and elsewhere about the great value of the treaty to the two countries of the Antipodes, it may well be remembered that, in actual fact, it would be operative after months and, may be, years of strife in the mainland of Asia and the island world of treaty Southeast Asia. The ANZUS would thus come into play at a rather late stage in the supposed struggle against the hegemonic forces in Asia bent upon advancing southwards. The area most sensitive to their impact would then have several lines of defence, as viewed from Australia. As the London Economist pointed out soon after the ANZUS Conference of 1953 (84), the first line of defence

82 The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 13 March 1956. The quotation, as cited by Dulles in Colombo, was: "Great danger came from the fact that non-aggressive countries did not practice collective security. They were practicing a policy of neutrality which meant conniving at war. The only way to meet aggression was for the countries to join together in collective security pacts because non-aggressive countries put together were stronger than aggressors."


would include Malaya, Thailand and the former Indo-China States. Outside the region of Southeast Asia, it would include Korea and Hokkaido (the northern-most island of Japan). Okinawa, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Sarawak, Sabah and Indonesia would then be in the second line. Thus the countries of this first line of defence are "continental" and thus vulnerable to a mighty thrust on land. Those on the second line, on the other hand, are "insular" with protective sea moats around them. Looked at from this angle, the Australians, who fought in Korea and Malaya (and Vietnam in a later period), were defending what in a way was their first line of defence. Those who fought in Sarawak and Sabah at the height of President Sukarno's konfrontasi with Malaysia in the recent past were operating on the second line. It should almost be impossible for an hypothetical aggressor from Asia to leapfrog these two lines and let itself loose over the continent of Australia. Two factors, which were non-existent before the war, would also provide some relief to Australia. One is that it may not be possible for a "continental" power in Asia to mobilize the sizeable armada required for the purpose of reaching Australia, which Japan - an "insular" power - could do with relative ease. The second is that the bridgeheads in the chain of islands in the Pacific, which brought Japan nearer to Australia during the war, are in the hands of America, an ally, and are a protective screen
rather than a strategic threat. "Australia", as a scholar from "Down Under" has aptly summed up, "is unlikely to be attacked by Asian Communist forces except incidentally in an overall Great Power struggle." (85) If Indonesia is counted out as a future aggressor (or, perhaps, an accomplice of some other aggressor), one can agree with The Economist when it says that

... ANZUS, useful though it may be in itself, belongs essentially to what may be called the third line of defence in the Pacific, and would hardly become operative as an alliance in war unless the first two lines had been lost. (86)

Looked at from this angle, the perennial preoccupation of the Australians with their security, sometimes bordering on obsession, often appears unreal, particularly to those in Asia, whose problems of survival as independent nations are more acute than those who live in the southern continent. Yet this preoccupation with security has often prevented the Australians from adopting relaxed and uninhibited attitude towards those very Asians. When the ANZUS Treaty was signed, America also undertook to defend South Korea, Japan and the Philippines through bi-lateral pacts. To the Australians, these various pacts in the Pacific were mere spokes with their hub in Washington, but

85 D.C.S. Sissons, "The Pacific Pact", The Australian Outlook vol.6, no.1 (March 1952), pp.21-22. He further wrote: "The threat of Communist invasion to Australia will follow defeat of her allies in a world conflict. Invasion will not precede a conflict or occur independently of it."

86 The Economist, n.84, p. 970.
no rim. Also between the weakened British defence line to Singapore and the American perimeter ending at Manila, there was the unsecured Southeast Asian gap. (87) The subsequent SEATO Pact, as we shall see, was an attempt to make up for this deficiency.

When it came to foreign policy, Australia was compared to a man juggling three enormous clubs (labelled Britain, America and Asia), each one bigger than himself, each one having its independent volition, and each one tending not to go in the required direction. (88) Coming to Australia's other club, namely Britain, we find that the ANZUS Treaty led to the repeated query, in both countries, whether Australia was ditching its ties with the Mother Country to forge new ones with the now stronger United States. Spender has taken pains to refute the allegation that Britain was deliberately "excluded" from the ANZUS Pact and has styled this view about Britain's "exclusion" as "a fable that is creeping into history". (89) But emotions were charged, both in the Mother Country and the Antipodes, when this possibility was mooted out in

88 "Australia's New Diplomacy", *The Times* (London), 7 April 1960. Also see G. Greenwood, ed., *Australia: A Social and Political History* (Sydney, 1955), pp. 403-4. In this, Australia is represented as juggling with four "balls" (clubs), the fourth being the "British" Commonwealth. In fact, the three clubs metaphor is an old one with variations: apart from the "British" Commonwealth, UN has also been included as a fifth club, which Australia has "juggled" with from time to time.
the early fifties. ANZUS was, in fact, a natural sequence of the famous Curtin appeal of 27 December 1941, though it was realized rather painfully at that time.

"The structural functionalism", as a Canadian writer asserts, "stood in stark contrast to the sentimental interior decoration." (90) The attitude of the critics in Australia was like that of the New Zealand parliamentarian, who declared:

I had rather be caged with John Bull and the British Lion than go places hanging on the coat tails of Uncle Sam. (91)

If the war in Vietnam is the first in which the Australians have fought without the British troops associated with them, ANZUS was the first international treaty concluded by Australia with an outside Power independently of Britain. "ANZUS", comments an American scholar, "illustrated that in practice even a Liberal Government had come to acknowledge America as the chief guarantor of Australia's security in the East." (92) In view of this Australian response to the shifting scene in Asia, one can agree with Britain's Kenneth Younger that the "exclusion" of his country, from the Treaty,

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meant open recognition of the changed power structure in
the Pacific. (93) Since Australia's ties with Britain
had been determined by biology and history, the cutting
and tying of the umbilical cord was a slow and painful
process. There was as much shock in Britain as in
Australia. In October 1952, Beaverbrook's Daily Express
(circulation 4,000,000) attacked Casey for keeping
Britain out of ANZUS and reportedly commented that
he took the King's shilling (because he was in Churchill's
War Cabinet) and then kicked Great Britain in the teeth. (94)
The Manchester Guardian complained of "a group of
Australians who have thought of Australia as taking over
the responsibilities formerly discharged by Britain in
Southeast Asia." (95) Little was known in those twilight
years of the British Empire in Asia that, in times to come,
Britain herself would turn to Australia to urge it to share
some of the burdens of the Mother Country "East of Suez".

91 Quoted in Dean E. McHenry and Richard N. Rosecrance, "The
'Exclusion' of the United Kingdom from the ANZUS Pact",
International Organization, vol.12, no.3 (Summer 1958),
p. 326.

92 Henry Stephen Albinski, Australia's Search for Regional
Security in South-East Asia (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of Minnesota, 1959), p.270.


94 Cited by Calwell in CPD, HR, vol. NS 4 (10 August 1954),
p. 128.

95 Quoted in Crawford, n. 79, p. 224.
Enough light has been thrown on the reasons which impelled an Anglophile Prime Minister of Australia to agree to the exclusion of the Mother Country from the Pacific Alliance. (96) But one thing is plain. There was a dichotomy between British and American interests in the East and Australia found herself more on the side of America than Britain. Britain's interests in China and Southeast Asia were mostly commercial and sometimes colonial; America's were strategic. Britain wanted the United States and Australia to devote more attention to Europe and West Asia. Since Australia found Britain's interests lacking east of Suez except in Malaya, she began to think in terms of being the sole representative of the Commonwealth of Nations in that area. Then, there were economic rivalries in the area almost at the doorstep of Australia. The United States wanted Japan to have bigger markets and better sources of raw materials in Southeast Asia. Britain feared it and tried to postpone Japan's entry into the GATT, though America had sponsored the move. Thus, in a nutshell, Australia, in allying with America, was looking for dynamism, where she really found it.

Asia was the third club which the jugglers in Canberra had to manage without letting go any of the other two. There is no doubt that the birth of ANZUS was partially from the fear that emanated from Asia, or at least some dominant Power in that continent. To the average Australian — the "dinkum Aussie" — defence meant defence from Asia. To him, Asia was one entity, solid and monolithic, that eyed his empty but prosperous country menacingly like an ogre. The idea that there could be an Asian balance of power, which could be manipulated in Australia's favour occurred only to very few but well-informed Australians. They felt that Australia should be responsive to the viewpoints of its Asian neighbours and, especially, the non-aligned core countries. It was in these countries that the Asian nationalism was more pointed than in the others owing to various reasons, historical as well as psychological. John Burton, who was the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs for a number of years while Dr Evatt was Minister, was most scathing in his attack on the ANZUS Pact. (97) But others worded their comments and warnings more mildly. Prof. Ball, for example, argued that "no outstretched

97 See John Burton, The Alternative: A Dynamic Approach to Our Relations With Asia (Sydney, 1954), pp. 75-76. In his view, the Pact "... extends the areas of possible conflict, antagonises All Asian neighbours who have been excluded from it, and draws Australia into any and every conflict in which America might be involved in the Pacific ... " For a detailed summary of Burton's viewpoint, see Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, n. 14, pp. 28-32.
Western hand, however friendly and strong, can give us lasting protection against a hostile Asia." (98) In Parliament, Senator Willsee sounded the warning:

I repeat that I deplore the tendency to aline the Pacific nations that is implicit in the pact. Even worse still, the pact will tend to widen the gulf between East and West. (99)

In his public lecture, Sir Douglas Copland observed:

Thus the question arises whether ... it would not have been wiser for both Australia and the United States to have made financial arrangements for supporting Australian development, rather than to have entered into the ANZUS Pact. (100)

Though the Asians were watchful, if not suspicious, of what the three Anglo-Saxon countries were doing in the name of Pacific security, few public comments were made by them on this Pact. (101) Senator Jose P. Laurel, a leading member of the Opposition in the Philippines Congress, denounced it as "a modern version of pre-war colonialism." (102) Ambassador Ben C. Limb of South Korea, writing in a learned journal, pointed out that such a pact would not promote the mutual and

98 Ball, n. 83, p. 490.
free co-operation of the Asian nations and that the
revulsion against the "White man's burden concept" was
so deep-rooted that the ANZUS might be construed as a
"White man's arrangement for the mutual safety of 'white' countries." (103) With all their anti-colonial and anti-
White overtones, these were the voices of "aligned" Asia.
They resented, not the creation of the Pact, but their
own exclusion from it. In August 1952, the Philippines
asked for observer status in the ANZUS, while Elizalde,
the Foreign Minister of the Philippines, stated on
7 August 1952 that his country and Japan might join the
ANZUS countries as five-power conference. (104) Similarly
on 21 August, the Korean Ambassador asked the United States
for a wider Pacific Pact, using the ANZUS as nucleus. (105)

Surprisingly enough, no such comments came from
what constituted the neutral arc of South and Southeast
Asia, whose champion was India in those days. The Cold

102 A. Vandenbosch, "Our Friends and Antagonists in
Southeast Asia", in Philip W. Thayer, ed., Southeast
Asia in the Coming World (Baltimore, 1953), p. 51.
Also see E. D. L. Killern, "The Anzus Pact and Pacific
(8 October 1952), p. 139.

103 Ben C. Limb, "The Pacific Pact: Looking Forward or
Backward?", Foreign Affairs, vol. 29, no. 4 (July 1951),
p. 540.

104 Starke, n. 25, pp. 215-16.

105 The Times, 23 August 1952. Also in ibid.
War had not become as acute then as it became later. Nehru was himself one of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, who had unanimously supported Britain's accession to the Brussels Pact in 1948. The view expressed by an Indian writer that India had criticised the proposed ANZUS Pact on the ground that such a pact was likely to aggravate the already unsettled conditions in Indonesia and Indo-China, but her opposition to its formation and later to its existence was not very vigorous, (106) is open to question. As we have seen before, Nehru was opposed to the Pacific counterpart of NATO, which would be a gigantic counter-weight against the struggling nationalist movements of Southeast Asia. But he had no apparent objection to the compact three-nation ANZUS Pact. More correct was perhaps a Canadian view that India understood and respected the need of Australia and New Zealand to secure for themselves the protection of America, which they got from ANZUS. (107)

One can agree with Spender, when he writes that

*No one with any show of reason would, I think, today assert that our Asian neighbours have since 1951 shown any antagonism towards Australia because of her membership of ANZUS.... (108)*

Asians, on the other hand, could have hoped now that, assured of its national survival in all times to come

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107 Bishop, n. 90, p. 408.

through the ANZUS shield, Australia would more freely play the role of a catalyst between East and West, as her leaders had professed in the past. A country that initiated the Colombo Plan, it was logical to expect, would now work for more institutions of co-operation acceptable to most nations, if not all, from Pakistan to New Zealand, which would make freedom real to those who had barely tasted it and were tenaciously holding to it lest it was lost again.

What is then the nature and extent of the assurance contained in the ANZUS alliance? Dr T.B. Millar, who is a keen student of his country's defence problems, has stated that the pact has a three-fold value for his country. (109) Firstly, the United States has publicly undertaken to consult in the event of a threat and to act, in some way, in the event of attack. Secondly, the ANZUS Council meets from time to time to take stock of the situation in the Pacific. Lastly, there is a clear moral commitment in the treaty from which the United States cannot absolve itself. As to the first, the quarter from which the security of the parties might be threatened is not defined, which, for Australia, is very important. This is one feature, which would keep the ANZUS going, even if the rest of

the American alliances actually "fade away", as predicted by Prime Minister Nehru of India. Any one who lived in Australia in 1964-65, when Indonesia's konfrontasi was in full swing (and some Australians were actually fighting against the Indonesians on the borders of Sarawak and Sabah) could sense the relief that the Australians had, because of the ANZUS Treaty. The ANZUS Council is a forum in which Australia can exchange ideas with America at the highest level. It was, however, feared in the early fifties that the three Powers were not equal and "the price of privileged access may be a degree of pressure." (110)

It is the third and last point, which the Australians feel, gives real teeth to the Pact. Public statements emanating from the United States have reiterated America's will to go into action under the ANZUS Pact. In January 1952, Dulles had told the Senate that an armed attack on Australia would "in fact involve the United States". Though it was complained that none

110 "ANZUS and the Crisis", Australia's Neighbours (August 1954). See Maurice Bourquin, ed., Collective Security (Paris, 1936), p.392, cited in Starke, n. 25, p.242 for a more lucid expression of this view. Bourquin wrote: ".... It is the greatest mistake in the world to think that when State A has given a guarantee to State B, then State B thereupon has carte blanche in its foreign policy. The fact that one State has guaranteed another puts that guaranteeing State in a position to give advice of a very authoritarian character."
of the powerful friends supported Australia when Sukarno landed his paratroopers in West Irian, (111) yet the same should not apply to Australian territories of Papua and New Guinea. In fact, Averell Harriman categorically affirmed that his country (USA) would fight to defend the Australian New Guinea, if threatened by Indonesia. The alliance is not one-sided only. Dean Rusk, the American Secretary of State meant this, when he said: "No defensive alliance was ever more firmly anchored in the solid realities of common interest, common ideals, and mutual confidence." (112) Thus through this "new and independent essay in Foreign Affairs", as Spender called it, (113) Australia gained much more than what it was supposed to have lost at a time when it stood unprotected in the Pacific. Truly, it is the bedrock of Australian security. Casey was voicing the general gratification of his countrymen when he wrote:

I believe that the ANZUS Treaty is the greatest step forward that Australia has made for many years in the field of international relations, and that it marks a new era in our Australian history. (114)

112 Millar, n.109, p.158.
113 in Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, n.14, p.162.
114 R.G. Casey, Friends and Neighbours (Melbourne, 1954), p. 86. For a Canadian view on the same lines, see Bishop, n.90, p.407. Also see Spender, n.14, p.189. To Spender, ANZUS is "the chief bastion between ourselves and any state that may threaten us..."