Chapter II

CHANGES INTRODUCED BY THE ALLIED OCCUPATION
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(a) Legal and Constitutional Changes

The distinctive feature of the American occupation of Japan which strikes any one is its peaceful character. A nation in defeat and disarray accepted without opposition, almost docilely and at times with welcome, foreign occupation. An attitude which puzzled even the occupiers, some of whom suspected an attempt to deceive and lull them into complacency before they rose up in revolt. They even claimed to have found evidence of a deep-seated conspiracy.

When no such reaction occurred observers attempted to find other explanations for this unusual phenomenon. It was argued that the Emperor's command to 'endure the unendurable' was the cause of this complete turnabout but while his hold on the people was undoubtedly strong, to give it as the sole cause is to ignore the use made of the Emperor, at times in complete disregard of his views throughout Japanese history. To explain their compliance by postulating an undue regard for authority also ignores their tradition and ideologies for given circumstances they could be defiant of authority. Another explanation, that they had learned to bend with authority is neither an explanation nor justifiable but seems to be part of the myth of the orient and the passivity of its people as concocted by the West.

The complete destruction of Japanese morale, through war and total defeat had created a situation where surrender had was
welcomed by the people. They were completely unprepared for even the possibility of defeat. Propaganda and the call to duty had impressed on them that they could not lose and so when they did, the debacle left them utterly lost and without any accepted norm of behaviour. It there ore became easier to follow the laws of the occupation authorities.

In such a situation their flexibility may be seen in terms of the values of their society. Firstly Japanese society was still governed by situational ethics. Western civilization developed a universal ethic where man in theory was equal before God and the law. Therefore, in theory his actions with other men would be governed by universal laws. To take one example, in the Western intellectual tradition one major assumption is the universality of reason, which has two facets. One, that empirical verification can be applied to questions of the human mind and two, that the value of knowledge is determined by the correct application of these rules and that all humans are able to think according to these rules.

In Japan Confucianism had inculcated precepts based on the family, out of which the doctrine of 'meibun' (mei = name; bun = station or sphere), where 'name' defined position and summed up moral qualities required by that position hence each man's 'mei' differed according to his 'bun'. This ethic meant that no two individuals could be treated equally and by extension every action had to be governed by precepts, that is an individual had to be prepared so that he would act correctly. Placed in a situation
where the rules did not apply, he was at a loss, for his ethic did not provide him with universal laws applicable eternally. The occupation was a new situation for which rules were not available, yet rules had to be found so occupation rules were accepted since it was the proper thing to do, perhaps there was an element of "self-gratification and comfort in conforming to an exacting set of new rules."

Moreover the rules of the occupation were 'modern' and Japanese history has been a search for the 'modern'—modernity being judged by the degree of success and power. So in a new situation they accepted the new rules, till they could, having accepted them, change and modify them to suit their ideas. The history of Japanese borrowings, right from the time they borrowed Chinese institutions and writing, has shown this facility to adopt. They accept wholeheartedly, but slowly change the whole ethos of the idea- and institutions till they are in consonance with the givenness of their tradition.

The occupation in its first phase found support among organized labour, the communists and the thwarted liberals and democrats of the 1920s. Support from these groups and the personal charisma of General MacArthur, a strange mixture of sincerity, intense idealism, egoism and a mystic view of himself as the chosen instrument to bring the light of democracy and

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salvation for the "misguided" Japanese helped the efforts of the occupation.

The occupation, in name was an allied effort, but in fact American, in conception and in its implementation. So as not to leave out the allies totally, a Far Eastern Commission with eleven (later thirteen) members was set up, with its headquarters in Washington, D.C. and its decisions, while dependent on majority vote had to include the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China. The power of veto was however effectively held by the United States for it could issue "urgent unilateral interim directives" if it felt that the Commission was not acting with despatch.

There was an Allied Council for Japan set up in Tokyo composed of representatives of the United States, the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union and China. While its function was advisory it became a forum for harangues against American conduct particularly by Russia otherwise its meetings were of no consequence and its effect on policy making non-existent.

General MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers had under him various staff sections common to any military headquarters and also various sections which closely paralleled ministries in the Japanese government. Some of these were Economic and Scientific Section, Civil Information and Education Section, Natural Resources Section, Public Health and Welfare Section.
The occupation of Japan, then differed in one respect from that of Germany, it did not constitute a strict 'military government' since Japan's governmental machinery was still intact the Occupation forces merely set up a supervisory structure which did the actual work of running the government. Their policy was to work through their counterpart in the Japanese government and hence there was no contact with the people.

From the Japanese Government a Central Liaison Office was established, staffed largely from the Foreign Office which handled and made working arrangements but was, as both sides became familiar, largely bypassed.

The garrison forces consisted largely of the United States Eighth Army with a small contingent of British Commonwealth contingent, largely formed by the Australians and garrisoned in the Kure area.

The policy which was to govern Japan was laid down in the "United States Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan." Later it was elaborated in the "Basic Presidential Policy Statement" issued by President Truman.

In the Potsdam declaration in July 1945 it had been laid down that "There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who had deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest" so that "a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world." One month later
the two ultimate objectives of occupation policy were stated:

"(a) to insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world; (b) to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people." (3)

The reforms carried out by the Occupation authorities were so wide ranging and sweeping that to some writers they represented a revolution and a "transformation which assumed the character of a national movement." Though by the end of 1947 the emphasis shifted from reforming a defeated nation to building a potential ally for the United States in the Cold War--a shift which many supporters of democracy decried--it was a shift in consonance with the nature of events. It would be an indefensible naivete to suggest that the American Occupation was carried out of altruism and goodwill towards the Japanese people. This is not to decry or question the sincerity of many of the officials who worked in Japan.

The Occupation authorities began a programme to demilitarize Japan and for this attacked the organization and dissemi-
nation of ideas through the educational process. If democratic ideals were to be made a reality than the traditional beliefs of hierarchy and unquestioning obedience could not be tolerated or accepted in the school system. So the basic and clearly expressed aim was that, "only the achievement of our educational reformation and the complete democratization of Japan's educational reformation will make it possible to save our much-loved fatherland from the errors, disgraces and miseries deliberately woven out of its near modern nightmare, so that it may be allowed an honourable seat among the international community."

On the one hand then ultra-nationalist ideologies had to be suppressed and on the other democratic ideals and procedures consciously spread. To spread these ideals organizational changes were necessary. Various directives on teachers, support of State and Shrine Shinto and the suspension of morals classes were issued.

On 15 December 1945, a directive on the disestablishment of State religion was issued, with the intent that it would "free the Japanese people from direct or indirect compulsion to believe or profess to believe in a religion or cult officially designated by the State" and to further assist them "in a rededication of their national life to building a new Japan

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based upon the ideals of perpetual peace and democracy." It was laid down that no financial support would be extended by the State and the Shrine Board (Jingi-in) of the Ministry of Home Affairs was abolished. Further "dissemination of Shinto doctrines in any form and by any means in any educational institution supported wholly or in part by public funds is prohibited and will cease immediately."  

It was also stated that no teachers manual or textbook which would be used in any institution supported by the State would contain any Shinto doctrine. In short the purpose was to separate religion and State. For Shinto myths and beliefs had been used to propogate and spread the ideas of a rabid nationalist doctrine. 

On March 31, 1947 the Fundamental Law of Education was passed as Law No. 25. It had been proposed and formulated by the Educational Reform Committee, the year before. Its aim, as expressed was to establish a system of, "education which aims at the creation of culture general and rich in individuality". In Article 1, we find a repetition of this theme, thus the use of phrases, 'esteem individual value' and 'imbued with individual spirit'. In Article 2, again the 'development of culture by mutual esteem and cooperation.' In Article 3, it was 

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7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., p. 865.
provided that all would have equal opportunities and Article 4 that nine years general education would be free. Article 5 provided for co-education and Article 7 for general education for workers, adults and for facilities like libraries. Article 8 that no political line would be propagated but only general principles necessary for good citizenship. Article 9 laid down that schools would refrain from religious education.

In June 19, 1948 the Imperial Rescript on Education was denied as were the other Rescripts to the Army and Navy and the like on the grounds that they had lost their validity and it was proposed that "we shall conscientiously strive to disseminate the new educational concepts manifested by the Basic Law of Education." In consonance with these aims the reciting and delfication of the Rescript on Education was summarily banned.

Between 1945 and 1946 a programme of revising school textbooks was begun and as well as the re-education of teachers. The same 600,000 teachers were re-educated between 1947 and 1949. A system of authorizing government textbooks was instituted. In this process the educational Ministry provided an outline for the course of study. Between November and December various publishers present drafts which are then referred by the Ministry to five readers to determine whether they are politically and religiously neutral and in harmony with the fundamental law. After this they are reviewed by a sixteen-man committee. The

9 Ibid., p. 585.
books which are selected by this committee are then displayed in exhibits held throughout the country from late June. Here the schools can select the books they will use to teach from. In 1952 for instance 92 textbooks publishers printed 230,000 textbooks. Thus a sixth grade had a choice from 173 textbooks.

Since the nationalist period had seen the use of history, geography, civics and morals or 'shushin' to inculcate and spread the consciousness of the unique superiority and mission of the Japanese, the occupation authorities integrated these subjects into Social Studies. The range of subjects was expanded in lower and upper secondary schools and in the teaching techniques the project and problem method was stressed. Unlike the pre-war system where group discussion and group learning were the backbone of the teaching system, now the students were encouraged to use libraries on their own. The change can also be seen on the basis of evaluation for now they attempted to clarify the characteristics of each individuals growth rather than merely ranking them.

The School Education Law passed by the Diet established 10 the 6-3-4 school system. The lower secondary school was added so that everyone could enjoy at least nine years of education. The law decentralized the educational system and the Ministry could no longer exercise direct control over elementary and

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secondary schools. The aim, further was to provide a national university in each prefecture so that elementary and lower secondary school teachers could be provided. The shortage of trained personnel was perhaps the greatest drawback when these reforms were instituted.

In the universities, the courses were also liberalized. Thus they were divided into three broad groupings, cultural, social and Natural Sciences. The student was required to take at least two courses from each and one foreign language and in the total he had to have more than ten courses. For students of science the minimum was more than nine. In other words for graduation the requirement was one-third for general courses. Various part-time courses for those otherwise employed were also instituted.

Thus a concerted attempt was made to remake the educational system of Japan, for it was correctly realized that if a democratic and liberal ideology could succeed, it would be only when the values traditionally inculcated in the individual were eradicated. The approach of the authorities to the purpose and method of education was totally different and based more on the American pattern than that of Europe.

On 20 July 1948 the Kigensetsu (Empire Foundation Day) holiday of February 11, the anniversary of Emperor Jimmu's supposed accession to the throne in 660 B.C. was declared illegal. The circulation of Kokutai no Hongi (The Fundamental Principles of the National Structure) and Shimmin no Michi (The Way of the
Subject) by the government was prohibited as were the use of terms with ultra-nationalist connotations, such as, *Hakko Ichiu* (The Eight Corners of the World under one Roof) and *Dai Toa Senso* (Greater East Asia War). All public buildings were ordered to remove *kamidana* (god-shelves). Finally a detailed definition of ultra-nationalistic ideology was spelled out: "(i) The doctrine that the Emperor of Japan is superior to the heads of other states, because of ancestry, descent or special origin. (ii) The doctrine that the people of Japan are superior to the people of other lands because of ancestry, descent or special origin. (iii) The doctrine that the islands of Japan are superior to other lands because of divine or special origin. (iv) Any other doctrine which tends to delude the Japanese people into embarking upon wars of aggression or to glorify the use of force as an instrument for the settlement of disputes with other peoples."

Then came the Emperor's message to his people denying his divinity. Even earlier, as when, he made the Emperor come and see him, MacArthur had made it very clear that he would not accept the divinity of the Emperor. A photograph of the two, showing an informally dressed MacArthur towering over a formally dressed Emperor in the newspaper was perhaps the most shattering incident of the Japanese, as they had been brought up never to

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commit the unthinkable crime of a subject looking down on the Emperor.

In the non-divinity Rescript the Emperor pointed out the ties with his subjects were based "upon mutual trust and affection" and did not depend "mere legends and myths" for they are predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine and that the Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to seek the world.

This denial of divinity was a major step for, up to now the Emperor myth had been sustained and his role as a link between heaven and earth and as the incarnation of virtue had been used to rule the nation. In his name the 'moral managers' had demanded perfect obedience because they based their authority on the final truth, viz., that the Emperor of Japan had descended from Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess.

Allied with the downgrading or humanizing of the Emperor (dubbed Mr Ah so because of his habit of saying "Oh, I see) was the attempt to associate the Crown Prince in official functions and thereby enhance his status. Since he could not be associated with the rejected ultra-nationalist past he could be used as a symbol of Japan's present with no political colourings. Holtom goes so far as to say that the change in the Emperor's status was the greatest change in the history of Japanese political thought.

12 Ibid., p. 4.
13 Ibid., p. 5.
Professor Kinoshita, however, goes as far as to say that while the purges were an important means to democratize and demilitarize Japan by not abolishing the Emperor, an important nucleus of old militaristic Japan was allowed to remain in force. The next to feel the blows of the Occupation measures was the Imperial Army. It had been the driving force behind Japanese nationalism and had given practical support to right wing groups among the civilians. While we must not forget that the army and the ultra-nationalists cannot be treated as monolithic forces, with no internal dissensions it still remains valid to say that by and large the army had provided them not only with prestige but the resources of power without which they would have been a powerless and impotent force.

The occupation authorities began a systematic purge of ultra-nationalist elements from public office, the dissolution of ultra-nationalist organizations and the arrest, trial and conviction of 'war criminals' who were held responsible for furthering the cause of militarism. This purge, according to Kinoshita constitutes the 'nucleus of democratization' of the Japanese government.

In the first phase the purge was limited to politician's and army; the second phase, which was timed to coincide with the general elections of 1947, included all first grade civil servants,

15 Quoted in Morris, n. 11, p. 7.
16 Ibid., p. 8.
Diet members, officials in large business companies, banks, newspapers and broadcasting companies. The various ordinances applied to relatives up to the third degree of those purged. Kingly and Turner have estimated that it probably affected one million people.

By late 1947 the purge went into its third phase where it was applied to important positions in business and in the mass media of public information. While all known ultra-nationalists were purged, lesser men holding similar views were discreetly moved into their positions and the purgees, particularly men from business, continued to exercise influence from behind the scenes. As far as the organizations of ultra-nationalists is concerned the actual disbandment owes perhaps less to legislation then to the general debacle of war, for as Brown points out the G-2 section which was responsible for finding evaders was unenthusiastic about the whole programme and as early as 1948 was being helped by some ultra-nationalists to gain information about communist organizations.

With the removal of the army as a possible base for support and influence of ultra-nationalist ideology, groups holding such views would have to look for support in other areas such as conservative politicians, powerful business groups or even mass support. The various economic measures which were directed against the zaibatsu and the improvement of land tenure

were designed to remove the second group as a possible support. It was hoped that the growth of a free economic system would encourage the development of a liberal democratic system of government. So while on the one hand attempts were made to exclude personnel from positions of management on the other it was declared that "Policies shall be favoured which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade."

Here again it must be remembered that the connection between the ultra-nationalists and monopoly capital had not been without conflict for the Reformist and National-Socialist right wing had been consistently opposed to monopoly capital to the extent of assassinating Baron Dan Takuma, chief director of the Mitsui Zaibatsu (March 1932 by member of Inoue Nissho's Blood Pledge Corps).

(b) Institutional Changes - Education and Economy

The occupational authorities saw economic concentration as a major factor which enabled the preservation and continuation of semi-feudal conditions. Also economic concentration in the hands of a few Zaibatsu enabled the suppression of political ideologies and created a situation where dissent could not be tolerated.

Democracy presupposed the need for political discourse and therefore the destruction of the Zaibatsu was vlied as a major policy objective in SCAP's Report of the Zaibatsu Mission. These aims and ideals were expressed with great clarity in the first article of the Anti-Monopoly Law. "By prohibiting private monopolization, unreasonable restraints of trade and unfair methods of competition, by preventing excessive concentration of power over enterprises and by excluding undue restriction of production, sale, price, technology... aims to promote free and fair competition... and thereby to promote the democratic and wholesome development of the national economy as well as to assure the interest of the general consumer."

The policy of rebuilding Japan's economic strength was not initiated from the beginning of the occupation. The allied programme had in the beginning envisioned drastic restrictions on industrial activity and their policy had called for heavy reparations. The early years of the occupation saw Japan economically prostrate, there was little to prohibit or restrict. Organizational disruption had immobilized existing factories, raw material was practically non-existent and production was about 10 per cent of the normal pre-war level. The neglect of farm land, thus chemical fertilizer plants had been converted to making explosives and a prolonged spell of bad weather had

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reduced the harvest. Official rations dropped to 1,050 calories per person a day, a third of what is normally required and even this little amount was being delivered late. Fortunately the Occupation started bringing in food, though not until the spring of 1946 and then only about eight hundred thousand tons during the following year.

Successive missions of experts, who came to examine and propose an economic policy for Japan finally came to the conclusion that the problem was "not to keep Japan down but to hold her up." Thus began the cessation of reparations and the encouragement of the Japanese economy.

The Americans realized that if reparations were acceded to then in order to prevent the total collapse of the Japanese economy as much economic aid would have to be sent in as would be taken out in reparations. In effect it would be the Americans who would have to pay. So through "urgent unilateral interim directives" the United States, in the spring of 1949 overrode the Far Eastern Commission and declared the reparation programme to be at an end.

The next major task was the dissolution of the Zaibatsu, the family dominated conglomerates which controlled the economic might of Japan. Thus in 1945 the top holding companies along (of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, etc.) controlled 22 per cent of

21 Kazuo Kawai, n. 1, p. 138.
22 Ibid., p. 141.
Heavy Industry, 33 per cent of Banking, 42 per cent of Mining and 44 per cent of Electric goods. Professor Corwin Edwards of North Western University had made a study of the Zaibatsu and his report (mentioned above) was used as a basis in the beginning. The Holding Company Liquidation Commission handled the disposal of shares to the general public.

The next step was the adoption of the Anti-Monopoly Law, which incorporated anti-trust legislation prohibiting trusts, cartels, inter-locking directorship and controls, agreements in 'restraint of trade' and other practices leading towards monopoly control. The law created a Fair Trade Commission to enforce the law. Controversy was however generated by the Deconcentration Law (Elimination of Excessive Concentration of Economic Power) which was pushed through the Diet in December 1947. This law gave the Holding Company Liquidation Commission, working under SCAP control the power to dissolve or reorganize any corporation.

It was the furor in America, where the law was denounced as socialistic and where business groups protested that it would lead to the atomization of the Japanese economy which caused the Deconcentration Review Board to cut down the number of corporations to be dissolved from 1,200 to 325 then to 30 and then to 19 and when 9 corporations had been dissolved it claimed the programme had been completed. Or as E. C. Walsh, Chief, Anti-Trust and

23 Hadley, n. 20, p. 215.
24 Kawai, n. 1, pp. 146-47.
Cartels Division of Headquarters observed in late 1948, "...what was initially considered...a major objective of the Occupation had become...a major embarrassment to the Occupation. Without formally questioning the desirability or broad purposes of the policy, it was decided to take measures which would minimize the actions prepared for carrying out the policy. Facts of the last war faded...and conjectures on the next war took their place."  

Further, the FTC Chairman, Nakayama, informed their intention of amending provisions of the law governing corporate securities, multiple directorates, mergers and transfers, etc. He stated on 28 September 1948 that, "it was going a little too far when all provisions of the law are written for the sole purpose of enabling the strictest possible enforcement of the law." While the original aim was deflected some 5,000 companies were forced to reorganize and 83 zaibatsu holding companies had been broken. The conservatism of American businessmen, exigencies of the cold war and in part the lack of enthusiasm on the part of Japanese businessmen mitigated the effect of the total break up of the corporate power of the zaibatsu. It was also seen that the zaibatsu, as businessmen would not necessarily approve of militaristic ventures for in peace greater profits can be made and taxes for armaments would eat up profits. The 1949 Amendment by Law No. 214 on 18 June 1949, lifted the prohibition of inter-

26 Ibid., p. 198.
corporate stock-holding and mergers, it abandoned the restriction on multiple directorships. Thus began the gradual emasculation of the law and the reassertion of economic control by the conglomerates.

Japanese agriculture had up to 1949 shouldered heavy burdens and was suffering under the impact of inflation, heavy taxes and the sale of foodstuffs to the government at low prices. By the time of surrender about 70 per cent were either fully tenants or had to rent some land to supplement their income. Some two thousand individuals owned, as much as 100 acres, a colossal amount when the average size of a farm was about two and a half acres. Rentals in kind commonly went as high as 50 per cent of the main crop of rice, subsidiary crops were kept by the tenant but the return on investment was considerably smaller in comparison to other possible farms.

Suggestions from the Allied Council and SCAP's views were adopted into the Farm Land Reform Law, passed by the Diet in 27 October 1946. By this law the government purchased all the tenant lands of the absentee landlords and as a general rule sold them to the tenants. From 1947-1950 some 1,933 thousand hectares of land were liberated through sixteen transactions. Thus, while in 1946 tenant land accounted for 46 per cent of total farmland by 1950 it had come down to 10 per cent. Further

27 Takekazu Ogura, ed., Agricultural Development in Modern Japan (Tokyo, 1963), pp. 69-72; also Kawai, n. 1, pp. 171-76.
tenancy rent was switched over to a fixed controlled rate by revaluation of one Koku of rice to 75 yen.

Tenancy rent had been handicapping capital accumulation in agriculture and also hindering the development of commodity production. The outflow of funds, usually investment by landlords in other industries was brought down and this decrease made possible the rise in income of farm labour. However the minute and dispersed nature of farming was not touched and this has acted as a hinderance. Yet the basic problem of Japanese agriculture remained, the lack of land. This can only be tackled by increased productivity and population control.

These reforms were effective in that the Japanese farmer was released from economic bondage and misery. True the social traditions remained and since forest lands remained unaffected the landlords retained some power. However a beginning had been made for without economic dependence a man can assert and demand his rights. The probability of blindly following the pronouncements of the landlord are lessened. Thus the reduction of the power of the landlords, reduced the power of another important group which had provided support for the extreme right-wing and secondly by alleviating the condition of the tenant and small farmer they ensured that aggrieved farmers would not turn to ultra-nationalist societies to find redress.

It is in the constitution of 1947 drafted by Occupation authorities that the essence of the various reforms are enshrined. Since the Japanese were unwilling to effectively change
the general nature of the Meiji Constitution MacArthur, despite his earlier pronouncements, imposed his own draft on them.

In Article I the divinity of the Emperor found legal denial thus: "The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power." At one stroke the entire basis of the traditional kokutai (national polity) was removed. Earlier history had shown that various groups in power had relied on the principle of Imperial supremacy to gain and strengthen their absolute authority and this channel was now closed. Further, the Diet was made supreme, with the Cabinet responsible to it, and the people's fundamental rights defined.

Article XXIV made the provision that "laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes" for family laws. This was a blow against the family ethic of paternalism which served as the basic social pattern which furthered and nurtured the ultra's ideology.

However, since the Constitution had been imposed from above and by a foreign power it lacked the support of the people. So even though there was no real opposition vocally the attempt at democratizing Japanese life remained more on paper than in life. Yet as we shall see the ideals embodied in the Constitution have come to be more permanent than it was thought possible at that time.

(c) The Position of Ultranationalists

Ultra-nationalist groups attempted to resist surrender to
the Americans and it was with this aim that on August 14 a
group attempted to seize the Emperor's surrender broadcast,
realizing quite correctly the effect it would have on the
people. Some even claimed that they could not remain loyal to
an Emperor who would command the country to surrender; loyalty
required that they be disloyal. Thus we find that Oi Atsushi
of the Defend the Divine Land faction of officers stating:
"...loyalty...lies in defending the fundamental principles of
our national polity... even if this means that we must tempo-
rarily violate the intentions of Emperor Hirohito". In other
words loyalty was given to the institution rather than just the
person of the Emperor.

In most cases these various incidents were poorly organized,
the efforts of desperate men who lacked support from either the
army or the people. For a while many ranking officers had
opposed surrender but they were ready to abide by the decision
of the Emperor once it had been handed down. Others, who faced
the painful agony of having to choose between 'unquestioning
compliance with the Emperor's wishes' (shosho-hikken) and
'defending the Divine Land' (shinshu-bosei) committed suicide like
General Anami Korechika, Vice-Admiral Onishi, General Sugiyama
and others.

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28 Morris, n. 11, p. 25.
29 Ibid., p. 25.
There were also incidents involving ultra-nationalist societies which attempted to stop the Emperor from surrender by committing suicide or attempting to assassinate the Prime Minister, his Cabinet and various other important leaders. But what is important to note are not the few incidents but the fact that the majority of right-wing supporters, who had boasted of dying for the nation and Emperor did not choose to die, for the disgrace they had wrought on their traditional symbol.

Defeat in war had brought into question the whole idea of 'the National Polity that stands foremost among all nations' for the ideal, 'flawless like a golden chalice' had been based on political and military superiority and the fact that the divine land (shinshu no ryodo) had never been polluted by an invader. Defeat meant the collapse of the ideal and led the ultra-rightists into a period of 'ultra depression'.

Defeat and privation impressed on the Japanese the undeniable fact that they had been defeated by pure economic and technical superiority and it was towards this end that the machinery of government was aimed. Social moves with their insistent inculcation of serving the state through one's occupation made possible an easy receptivity among the people and so the transition from the ideals of Japanism to that of Westernism was fast, efficient and effective. But we find ourselves wondering, how deep and lasting was the change or is the matter

of ideology an unimportant one in the Japanese value system? Is it possible to forget ideals, based on unimpeachable tradition and impressed on the people by a thorough and insistent propaganda machine?

Tsurumi has offered an explanation that certain words and phrases perform an amuletic function. Thus in the heyday of ultra-nationalism phrases like 'Hakko-Ichiu' (the eight corners of the world under one roof) had a function, but once the ideology was vitiated by defeat the Japanese looked towards their victors and adopted amulets like 'democracy', 'freedom', 'people's rights which were in effect charms against ill-luck. It has also been found that the most enthusiastic users were those who had been most rabidly nationalistic and the fact that they had no qualms is probably because having pondered on the amuletic nature of these words they had, "come to realize that a change in the words could take place without any change in content."

This phase then of intense Westernization in appearance was a product of defeat and economic disruption, a fact further underlined in the rural areas, where food shortages and inflation resulted in advantages, there was much less of foreign influence and the hold of traditional nationalism much stronger.

In this period nationalism was quiescent but not dead. For the Japanese nationalism based on a long tradition of the

31 Quoted in Morris, n. 11, p. 34.
uniqueness of Japan and her people and influenced by Western ideas of the nation-state since the Meiji Restoration had been used and maintained by political indoctrination, largely through state education had yet failed in developing autonomous strength but rather had continued to be allied and based on a feudal and paternalistic tradition that showed a basic attachment to the family. National pride had undoubtedly helped the isolation and enhancement of the chauvinistic and expansionistic aspects. In Europe nationalism had carried the hopes and desires of the middle class and in China it had been anti-imperialistic and the vehicle for a social revolution. In Japan it became the major prop of a dream, a Greater Asia Co-Property Sphere.

The stand of anti-government and radical nationalism, as represented by people like Saigo Takamori and Oi Kentaro has always ended in defeat because government forces had incorporated the symbols of nationalism too effectively. But with defeat began the process of the demobilization of nationalism, which began replacing the traditional symbols by older ones and one's with no political significance; loyalty to the Emperor began to be replaced by loyalty to bosses of local groups. To quote Prof. Maruyama, "nationalist feelings were atomised, disappearing from the political surface and becoming embedded in the lower strata of national life."

32 Morris, n. 11, p. 39.
33 Ibid., p. 40.
The defeat and dispersal of the ultra-nationalists has importance in that it reveals the basis of their support. Authorities like Maruyama and Fujiwara concur in the view that these groups represented feudal elements in Japan and for their effectiveness as a social and political force they relied and were dependent on the bureaucratic oligarchy and the military. They had by and large failed to gather popular support or respect. With the defeat the main symbols of Japanese ideals denigrated and their ideology in disarray thus became a politically impotent force. This internal disruption of ideology and organization was affected further by the policies of the occupation, which was actively purging the members and disbanding the societies.

While some like Minoda Kyoki, leader of the pre-war Fundamental Truth Japan society committed suicide and many societies were disbanded others more pliable, adopted democratic fronts, names and slogans. Thus the National Essence Mass Party, founded in Osaka in 1931 became the National League of Working People until it was purged in 1946. It is worth bearing in mind that when it revived in 1954 under Yoshimatsu Masakatsu, it reverted to the original name.

However, by the end of 1949 most of these societies were disbanded—-one hundred and eighty-three of them. Ultra-nationalism, of the pre-war variety had an important strain of anti-urban feeling

35 Morris, n. 11, p. 42.
combined with a demand for agricultural autonomy and many now found it natural to revert to rural districts and devote themselves to working for the improvement of farm lands by methods of increasing crop yields, particularly as the country was faced with very severe food shortage. Thus Tachibana Kosaburo, who had played an active role in the 15 May Incident (1932) went back to his farm in Ibaraki Prefecture and worked at developing cooperative agriculture. His group, the Institute for Local Patriotism, cut itself loose from politics and influenced the formation of other groups, like Kasumigaura Farm and Tokorozawa Farm to work for the building up of agricultural villages and increasing food production.

Even Ishiwara Kanji stressed not political change but local development and frequently reiterated the need for fundamental change. The people needed to cast off the filth of egoism and materialism which clung to them in these degenerate times. Thus what we see is that while the ultra-nationalists deprived of their main props collapsed, a large number of them managed to adapt themselves, to the new situation accepting democratic slogans, none attempted any sort of resistance. This opportunism is perhaps a reflection of the lack of any ideological and organizational unity. Being largely formed on the basis of personal loyalty they lacked the cohesiveness of a mass party, such as the fascists in Italy and Germany. Consequently they could not be des-

36 Ibid., p. 44.
troyed so easily but managed to hold out, to permeate down to the subculture.

The post war rise of the left wing is perhaps the most important cause for the rise of ultra-nationalist groups which have been frequently called 'apure' (apres-guerre). Occupation policies in the early stages encouraged progressive forces, resulting in growth of trade unions, increase in the power of the socialists and expansion of the Communist Party which, for the first time, became legal after the war and by 1949 had an official membership of 100,000. But with the confrontation between America and Russia, American policy became more concerned with maintaining the status quo and the JCP at its Sixth National Conference in December 1946, emphasized the 'strict application of the Potsdam Declaration', implying that the Occupation was no longer attempting to eliminate the authority and influence of those who had misled Japan down the path of militarism and world conquest.

However, the JCP's aggressive policy of strikes and the critical economic situation turned public sympathy away from them. This was further aggravated by their anti-Emperor attitude, as popular opinion was still very much on the side of the Emperor and their emphasis on mass struggle and building up armed revolutionary strength after the Cominform had criticized, in January 1950,

37 Morris, n. 11, p. 60.
38 Ibid., p. 61.
their 'lovable party' thesis. Further the party became identified with the Soviet Union. Over her attack six days before the ending of war; their limitation on fishing limits in the north the JCP lost support and sympathy, which was gained by America. America appeared fair and generous by helping to rehabilitate Japan's economy. This, in an international situation where tension was increasing, and the outbreak of war in Korea made the JCP's policies and connections appear highly suspect.

Most of the new groups, were effectively able to conceal their anti-labour bias or in some cases discard it and so were able to capitalize on the anti-communist feelings prevalent. For in Japan communism was never able to ally with the forces of nationalism. These groups, like the Japan Revolutionary Chrysanthemum Flag Comrades' Association combined anti-communism with opposition towards monopoly capitalism. Typically it also claimed to promote, "common action for the purpose of ensuring that ideological aims of the Allied Supreme Command will become the central force among our people".

In these groups leadership was in the hands of young people and they found it easier to disassociate themselves from the more blatantly reactionary past but in most cases pre-war influences continued to remain strong. Thus the Japan Anti-Communist League bandied about 'democratic slogans' but its direct tradition could

39 Ibid., p. 63.
40 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
be traced to the National Founding Association and its successor, the Greater Japan Imperial Way Association under the guidance of Akao Bin. Leaders of the pre-war variety like him came into conflict with the younger leaders and this conflict became one of the most important disruptive factors in the post-war extreme right wing movement.

Again it is in their anti-communism that we see that the aim of ultra-nationalist societies has been destructive, negative and that they were never able to agree on any single programme or find a common platform. Perhaps, the only one other policy they could really agree on was their anti-Korean feeling (Koreans in Japan).

The distinctive element among the ultra-nationalists was the attempt to generate a genuine mass movement rather than utilize the existing state machinery. In so far it came closer to the pattern of European fascism. The groups combined effective slogans which showed their reliance on the 'people' with denunciation of the failures, the elitism and obscurantist theories of the pre-war leaders. Thus Shimazu Sadayasu, one of the main leaders of the Chrysanthemum Flag movement argued for the need to cultivate 'progressive nationalism' to develop 'a people's freedom movement from below.'

Yet, this socialistic facade did not prevent them from

41 Ibid., p. 68.
42 Ibid., p. 72.
envisioning a revolution under the auspices of the Emperor. They thus combined a traditional reverence for the Emperor and Imperial symbolism with the ideology of a mass movement from below aimed at securing popular right, a phenomena defined by Fujiwara as 'reversed communism'.

Despite their slogans and efforts these ultra-groups failed to develop mass support and even those that survived the occupation purge tended to be confined to small, local groups of fanatical followers. The one basis on which they might have acquired popular support was anti-communism, particularly among the petty bourgeoisie, the small shopkeepers who feared proletarization in a communist regime but here the occupation by reversing its attitude towards the left, stole their trump card.

The failure of these ultra-nationalists to generate a mass movement is perhaps an important pointer to the lack, in Japan, of a truly middle class revolution. Most of the slogans of the ultras were however taken up by the left wing. Their success would depend on an alliance with an effective force and later groups realized this and began to abandon attempts at mass organization in favour of the traditional fanatical nationalistic elites and on developing close relations with people in the Government or with economic power.

43 Ibid., p. 73.