CHAPTER VI
BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE AND REALITY HOUSE

In the present chapter, we will analyze in greater detail the field of interactions and interrelationships between Reality House and the Board of Probation and Parole. Our objective in doing so is to gain insight into the unique factors, both internal and external, that characterize the relationships between these two organizations.

The Board of Probation and Parole is a statewide agency. In addition to the central office at Jefferson City, the BPP has 27 regional offices located in different parts of the state and also four institutional offices.

The Reality House program has been instituted mainly to serve referrals from Region III of the MMCCJ as the program is financed mainly from Region III LEAA grants and also the local governments of the city of Columbia and the Boone County Court.

Therefore, this study is concerned with only those regional and institutional offices of the Board of Probation and Parole that serve the residents of Reality House, i.e., District 6 Probation and Parole office at Columbia and the central and related institutional office at Algoa.

The Missouri State Board of Probation and Parole describes its mission as follows:
Our ultimate mission is to help the client assigned to us to become a responsible citizen who can and will live in society without reverting to criminal behavior. In order to accomplish this mission the support of the community and the people we serve is essential (MCPP, 25th Annual Report 1973-74:3).

The clients assigned to the Board are probationers and parolees.¹

In addition to assisting them toward a successful re-entry into the community, the board also aims at:

1. reducing prison commitments
2. reducing the number of offenders returning to crime
3. providing an alternative to prison
4. working with family and community
5. providing for community involvement
6. providing greater protection to the society
7. benefiting the offender
8. benefiting the society
9. facilitating greater chances of rehabilitation
10. facilitating long-range economics
11. helping to prevent further involvement in violations.

With regard to parole:

1. relieving prisons from crowded conditions
2. lowering costs of confinement

¹Probation: Probation is a sentence served under community supervision rather than in a prison or jail. The sentence may either be imposed or suspended at the discretion of the judge, based upon the individual's involvement.

Parole: Parole is a conditional release of an offender from a prison or jail to serve the unexpired sentence in the community under supervision. The offender must observe certain rules of conduct specified by the paroling authority.
(3) helping re-integrate the offender into society
(4) motivating good behavior
(5) providing support during critical adjustment
(6) reinforcing the rehabilitation process
(7) reducing recidivism

The central, the institutional and the regional offices all carry out their respective specific duties in the total division of labor. At the central level is the board, which has two functions to perform; one is the administration of the agency and its personnel and policies, and the other is the granting of parole and related procedures. At the institutional level, the board has established institutional parole offices to help them perform the second task. The IPO has two functions to perform. The IP officers serve on classification teams along with the institutional personnel in order to help the inmate formulate plans for what he will do during his confinement. They also prepare reports for the parole board to aid the board in making the decision on whether or not to parole an inmate. At the regional level, the probation and parole officers are the ones who actually supervise and work with the probationers and parolees in an effort to reintegrate them into the open society. The regional offices have two functions; one is to assist the courts with pre-sentence investigations and the other is to supervise and work with those who are on probation and parole.

Among probationers and parolees, some require more help than others. They require more structure, more supervision, more treatment to adjust to the society. The Division of Probation and
Parole is not in a position to provide all these services at present. Reality House's program does to a limited number of residents.

Reality House has received referrals in the past both from the institutional parole office and from the regional office. The field probation officer may advise his client to get into the Reality House program as an alternative to incarceration when the latter is experiencing difficulties in the community and has the potential of committing a new crime. Similarly, the IPO may advise that the paroled inmate be sent to Reality House in order to help him make the transition into the community.

Once the referrals are made and received at Reality House, the two agencies work together in order to accomplish their common objective, i.e., reintegration of the offender into the open society.

Organizational analysts have pointed out that interactions between agencies take place at two levels; at the level of performing the mandated functions and at the level of acquiring the scarce resources. Interactions at the former level are said to be associated with interactions at the latter level. In what follows, we will analyze the patterns of interactions at both the levels and discern the factors that have contributed to the emergence of such patterns.

The rise and fall of relationships between the two agencies can be traced through four stages: (1) initial stage, the period of sponsored relationship, (2) second stage, the period of resistance and conflict, (3) third stage, the period of reconciliation and cooperation, and (4) fourth stage, the period of conflict and isolation.
Initial Stage: Sponsored Relationship

The relationship between the two agencies during the first thirteen months can be described as protégéous, the Board of Probation and Parole being the sponsor and administrator of Reality House program. Two factors led the Board to sponsor and administer the program. On the one hand, federal monies were made available to the state and local criminal justice agencies to jointly plan and sponsor programs that would help to reduce crime and delinquency. MMCCJ was formed for this purpose and was eager to help individual agencies that would come up with new ideas and programs. On the other hand, a dynamic person holding a middle management position as district supervisor in the Division of Board of Probation and Parole conceived the idea of community-based residential treatment as an alternative to incarceration, convinced the top management of the novelty and utility of the concept and pursued the agency to sponsor the Reality House program. Thus, a single individual, in order to bring fruition to his new ideas, encouraged his agency to seize an external opportunity to meet its internal needs by sponsoring a community-based residential treatment program. The agency committed 40% of the program's expenditure from its resources in the form of personnel, equipment, training and research expenses. The remaining 60% help came from MMCCJ. The program was administered by BPP assisted by MMCCJ. The program then became, according to the board's secretary, "the agency's baby." The chairman of the board "became personally interested" in the program. The chief State Supervisor "hoped that this program would become the nucleus of a statewide chain of halfway houses" (interviews, Jan. 18, 19, 1976).
The program was small in size and limited in its objectives. The agency utilized the program more as a traditional half-way house facility than as an experimental and innovative program. More than one third of the clients served by the program during the first year were parolees. Some of them were middle-aged and third- and fourth-time offenders. Thus the original intent of the program to serve mainly first time young offenders was not fulfilled. The staff was employed by the agency and was responsible to the agency. For all practical purposes, the program was treated as one of the agency's branches.

Second Stage: Period of Resistance and Conflict

Meanwhile during the first thirteen months, the originators of the community-based residential treatment concept continued their search and research for the refinement of this concept and for its organizational arrangement. As a result, it was decided to expand the program in terms of both size and scope to deal with greater numbers of offenders under a more comprehensive program of treatment and rehabilitation. The Board of Probation and Parole was asked to make a greater commitment for the expansion of the program. The Board expressed its inability to do so. Consequently, Reality House separated itself from the Board of Probation and Parole and registered with the Secretary of State, Missouri, as a not-for-profit, private corporation. The Board of Directors of Reality House appointed the district supervisor of the Probation and Parole office at Columbia, as the director of the Reality House program on a full-time
basis, beginning December 1, 1971. The separation was smooth and friendly.

However, Reality House, in its efforts to procure the necessary resources and survive as an independent agency acted in ways that strained the relationship between the two agencies.

(1) The Congressman who has been a member of the Board of Directors of Reality House, a representative in the Missouri State legislature, Vice Chairman of MMCCJ, and a member of the House Appropriations Committee, introduced an amendment to the Bill No. 5 in the State legislature appropriating $10,000 from the Board's 1972 budget for Reality House. The Chairman of the Board of Probation and Parole became furious over the matter, and called the executive director of the Mid-Missouri countil on criminal justice and let him know his feelings about it. Subsequently, a luncheon meeting was arranged between the congressman and the Board's Chairman during which it was agreed that the said money be spent for the appointment of a probation officer by the Board to supervise the residents of Reality House. "This arrangement was forced down their throats."

(2) Subsequent to the District Supervisor becoming the Director of Reality House, five of the Probation and Parole officers resigned from their jobs—and joined either on the staff of Reality House or some other project the director of Reality House was associated with. These resignations shook up the Board. The Board perceived the Reality House director as a threat wanting to build his own empire or dynasty within as well as outside of the Division of Probation and Parole. The Board looked at him as a "competitor doing a better job at serving probationers and parolees than the
division could be able to do" (interviews with the executive director of MMCCGJ, and two probation officers).

(3) About this time, there was a change of government in Missouri state. After a long time, Republicans took over the administration of the state. Consequently, the head of the Board of Probation and Parole who was associated with the initial planning and development of the Reality House program was replaced with some other person. The new chairman of the Board of Probation and Parole was disturbed by the resignations of five of his officers to take up jobs with Reality House. The Board felt at this point that it was necessary to appoint a person who would be able to curb the influence of the director of Reality House over the local Probation and Parole office.

(4) Also, as per the agreement between the congressman and the Board's chairman, a probation officer was assigned to supervise the residents of Reality House. This officer assumed his position at a time when the program was undergoing a drastic change in its design by incorporating the views of the residents in the program. The officer raised objections to some of the decisions arrived at by the residents and the staff. One of the objections, for example, was to the group's decision to "grant drinking privileges to those residents who can handle it." The idea here was that if a resident had a drinking problem, it was wiser to deal with it while he was in the program, when help was available. The probation officer objected to this decision and walked out of the group meeting. He later warned the program coordinator that he would dismiss him if the program was not run as per his directions. He was advised at this point that the program organization and operation were none of his
business. The program staff felt that this officer "was sent to create a headache" in the program. They did not want to work with this officer any more. They asked for a particular probation officer from the local office to be assigned to the program. The Board had to comply with the demand as it was obligated to pay $10,000 for Reality House program by legislative appropriations.

However, in the 1974 and 1975 budget appropriations to the Board of Probation and Parole, the congressman line-itemized $10,000 and $15,000 respectively to be given as outright grants to the Reality House program. Instead of giving away this money outright, the Board worked out with Reality House a mutually agreeable compromise by signing a contract to pay per diem cost for the services rendered to its clients at the prevailing rates of the Division of Corrections. This contract did not have any effect on the Reality House program since it had been serving parolees anyway from the time of its inception. However, it was a face saving device for the Board because it allowed them to say that they were simply paying Reality House for the services to their clients. The only clause in this contract favorable to the Board was that Reality House agreed to continue serving parolees if the appropriated money was used up toward the payment of per diem cost.

Thus, interaction between the two agencies was taking place at three levels: for funds, for referrals, and for delivery of services to the referrals. As regards to funds, Reality House was receiving legislative appropriations in the annual budget allocations of the Board of Probation and Parole much against the latter's will. By entering into a contract to get this money by way of per diem cost,
Reality House was also assured of receiving a certain number of referrals from the Institutional Parole Office. And, finally, to work with referrals while they were in residence, Reality House got an officer of its choice assigned to the program who was most cooperative with the program staff in discharging his professional duties.

It is necessary in this connection to recognize the various levels in the Board of Probation and Parole—the central, the institutional, and the regional and district offices besides the individual officers as each one of these segments deals with different phases or aspects of referral process. It is important to analyze the relationship between the two agencies keeping in view these different levels of interactions.

The relationship between the central and the institutional offices on one hand and Reality House on the other can be described as minimal, formal and antagonistic. When the central and the institutional offices have an inmate to be paroled who is considering Reality House as part of his parole plan, they would instruct their regional office at Columbia to find out whether or not Reality House is in a position to admit a referral. If Reality House has a vacancy at the time and the referral is acceptable, then they would admit the referral as per the terms of the contract they have already entered in the beginning of the year. The referral at this point would be transferred to the regional office for supervision under one of its field officers. Afterwards the only relationship that exists between the central office and Reality House is a financial transaction regarding payment of the bills to Reality House for the services rendered to the Board's clients.
The personnel involved at this level do not "trust each other." The Board's officials are critical of the activities of Reality House concerning personnel and selection criteria of referrals. Reality House officials think that the Board is more interested in annexing or destroying the program than in being helpful.

The relationship between the district office and Reality House can be characterized as hostile and derogatory. The hostility centered more around the heads of the two agencies than the other personnel involved in the agencies. While the head of the district probation and parole office was critical of the head of Reality House as a "politician," "power monger," and an "empire builder," the latter characterized the former as "rule-minded," "isolationist" and the "board's mouthpiece." The district office head said that he did not trust or respect the director of Reality House. He was skeptical of the way the program was set up and operated. He did not think that his clients--probationers and parolees--would benefit from the program. He openly adopted a negative stance toward the program.

With regard to other probation and parole officers in the district office, the relationship can be characterized by indifference and lack of knowledge. First, a majority of these officers are young, fresh appointees and have assumed their positions after the present head of their office has assumed his duties. Second, they were not briefed of the program and therefore did not know much about it. Third, the negative evaluation of the program by the head of their office discouraged them from showing any interest in the program. Hence, there was no active flow of referrals from this office.
However, the probation officer who was assigned to work with the residents of Reality House established quite a cordial and cooperative relationship with the staff of Reality House. The director of Reality House specifically expressed his preference for this officer to be assigned to the program. This officer happened to work with the director while the latter was the district supervisor of probation and parole. He also worked with the director in the initial development of the Reality House program concept. He had some personal investment in the program. Added to this, the other two staff members at Reality House were also once colleagues of this officer before they joined the Reality House program. There was mutual respect, trust and understanding between this officer and the program staff. There was high level of cooperation and coordination between them in developing treatment strategies, sharing of information and office facilities and coordination of their work schedules. In doing all this, the officer fulfilled only his professional duties and his job performance could not be faulted. The impression gathered during the course of interviewing was that this officer was denied promotion for his involvement in and active cooperation with the program.

Third Stage: Toward Reconciliation and Cooperation

In the beginning of 1973, the director of Reality House resigned from his job to join the Boone and Callaway County Circuit Court as the director of court services. In leaving the program, he recommended to the Reality House Board that the program coordinator be appointed as his successor. At the same time, to fill in the vacancy of program coordinator, an outsider who happened to be a good friend of the new...
director was recruited overlooking a lady counsellor who joined the program a few months earlier, and who possessed the necessary credentials. The lady counsellor worked as probation officer with the district office at Columbia while the former director of Reality House was its supervisor. She resigned her position with the Probation and Parole and joined the Reality House as a counsellor.

In early 1974 the disgruntled lady counsellor made a series of allegations² against the director of the program to the Board of Directors of Reality House.

The Board assigned one of its members, the former director of Reality House, to investigate the charges. Upon investigation, the charges were found to be baseless.

As a result of these developments within Reality House program, the new director of Reality House sent feelers to the district supervisor of the local Probation and Parole office indicating his willingness to work closely with that agency. The director realized at this point that without active cooperation by the Division of Probation and Parole office it would be hard for Reality House to survive, as it is one of the very important referral sources. The importance of the agency was heightened due to the fact that the former director who inquired into the allegations about the present director happened to be the director of court services, the court being another major referral source. Further, it was also suggested that the program might face some difficulty with regard to juvenile referrals as these are under the direct administrative control of

²Upon the request of the Director of Reality House, details on this matter are omitted from the text.
the director of court services. For all these reasons, the director of
Reality House felt it safer and wiser to re-establish cordial relations
with the Division of Probation and Parole. Toward this end, a series
of measures were taken by both Reality House and the regional office of
Probation and Parole.

In early 1975, the staff of both agencies met at the
district office of Probation and Parole at the instance of the
Reality House director and explained to one another the activities
of their respective agencies. Both parties asserted that they would
need each other’s services and that they should work together for
mutual benefit. It was agreed at this meeting to open up agency-
wide communication between them. Instead of one officer working
with all the residents of Reality House, it was decided that whoever
makes a referral to Reality House would retain the supervision of that
referral while he is in residence. Everyone was pleased with the
decisions made at the meeting and promised his or her utmost
cooperation.

Similarly, the Reality House staff visited the Institutional
Parole Office at Algoa to explain the program to the officers
there and seek their full cooperation with and participation in
the program by making appropriate referrals. The emphasis in this
meeting was that the Reality House program is not a traditional
halfway house facility but that it is an intensive treatment
program aiming at changes in the attitudes of their clients.
They also emphasized that it would be necessary therefore to
refer or admit only those inmates who have demonstrated evidence
that they are motivated and willing to change.
The IPO's seemed to appreciate the visit by the Reality House staff and they promised to give their utmost cooperation to the program. IPO's expressed some concern about the not-too-friendly attitude of the Board members toward the program and advised the Reality House staff to take the necessary steps to soften their attitudes.

These and other similar moves on the part of the Reality House staff have helped to establish a fairly good working relationship between Reality House, on one hand, and the local and IPO on the other. These moves created a favorable impression among the Board members. In appreciation of these moves by the program, the Board paid about $1400 over and above what was earmarked in their annual budget of 1975 for purchases of services from Reality House.

Again, it is important to separate the district probation and parole office from the central and institutional offices for the purpose of analyzing the relationships between Reality House and the Division of Probation and Parole. Even though the district, institutional and the central offices are all of one and the same organization, the Division of Probation and Parole, there seems to be differences among these segments in work experience, interest and pressures from within and without. Therefore, we treat the relationship between Reality House on the one hand and the various segments of the Divisional Probation and Parole on the other rather separately. During this period, the relationship between the local
office of Probation and Parole and Reality House has been the most extensive, articulated and flexible of the pairs of relationships under investigation. The relationship between the two agencies is described by the various personnel involved as "social," "friendly," "informal," "understanding," "open," "warm," "cordial," and "supportive."

The relationship has involved mutual sharing of information, providing office facilities to the probation officers whenever they hold individual sessions with their supervisees, developing and coordinating their treatment strategies, and consulting and coordinating their recommendations to the courts on the progress made by the residents. At times, particular probation officers request the Reality House staff to evaluate their clients on the street and suggest some treatment strategies for them to adopt. Once a year, for the last four years, a particular probation officer has organized a float trip for the staff and residents of Reality House. These occasions have greatly facilitated informal interactions between parole officers, Reality House staff, and the residents.

The two agencies also participated in the development and coordination of a volunteer force to work with the residents of Reality House. The director of Reality House and the district and assistant district supervisors of the local Probation and Parole office have been working together on the subcommittee of MMCCJ and have been supportive of each other. The local probation
office has written letters to the central office, to the city council and to the community services council highly recommending the program and its usefulness to the community in connection with the funding applications of Reality House.

The relationship between the two agencies is well-articulated in the sense that the personnel involved are well aware of each other's activities, purposes, and limitations in their performances. Previously, most of the probation officers in the local office were under the impression that Reality House was traditional halfway house and therefore was of no use to their clients. However, after they began working closely with the residents and staff, they developed a better appreciation of the program. They think that the Reality House staff was sincerely concerned with helping the problem youth and in fact they accept the most difficult of their clients. They have no complaints against the selection process or criteria applied by Reality House before they accept any client. They agree with the Reality House staff that it is a waste of time, money and expertise to work with those who are incorrigible. The Reality House staff in turn understand the limitations under which the probation officers are working--their heavy case load that prevents them from working more closely with the residents of Reality House and their helplessness in regard to revocation of parole violation cases.

The contacts between the two agencies are very frequent, informal and friendly. No communication in writing is necessary from either side. Whenever some one wants something from the other agency, he or she will pick up the phone and get it done. Some of
them casually drop in to discuss their clients. To give the reader an idea about the routine that takes place between the two agencies from the time a referral is made until he is discharged, a selection of excerpts from the telephone conversations recorded for this research by the counselors in the Reality House program are given below:

**Counselor A:** Wednesday, November 19, Probation Officer 1 at the local office called concerning a referral which he would like to make. We established an appointment for staff here to interview this referral and decided that I would get back to him on Friday, November 21, concerning a report on that interview. He described to me in detail information concerning the referral and stated that he was looking for any assistance that he could find in dealing with the individual. The tenor of the conversation was very positive, there was a very evident feeling of cooperation between this officer and myself whether or not the individual enters Reality House is understood that we will do whatever we can to assist him in developing a treatment plan for the individual.

**Counselor B:** Probation Officer 2 from the Hannibal probation office visited the program with a referral he seemed bery much at a loss as to developing a treatment plan for the referral. He has been working with the referral for six months and has achieved very little success. He was turning to the intense supervision in treatment offered here as an alternative to incarceration, for the referred individual. The contact was very cordial; it was established that he would receive a copy of the first progress report.

On Monday, November 24, 1975, I had a conversation with Probation Officer 2 in Hannibal, Missouri,
concerning a resident referred
by him who recently entered
the program. The conversation per-
tained to two different areas, first
of all and most importantly the
resident's poor adjustment. I wanted
to express to this officer that his
referral was really resisting treatment
here and that I saw it as very likely
that the referral would leave the
program within a short period of time
and abscond from his probation. The
other subject of the conversation
was in reference to some clothing
and identification the referral had
left in the Hannibal area. The
referral wanted to know if this officer
could obtain possession of those and
hold them until the referral had a
chance to pick them up. The conversation
was very business like, the officer
related well to my information concerning
the resident's resistance to treatment;
he felt that if the individual did
not make it in the program and did
not abscond the individual would
go to jail. He was willing to take
the risk concerning the possible
absconding in order to provide for the
potential treatment. The officer
seems to view the program as a valid
treatment alternative. Our relation-
ship seems very cooperative and we
seem to be coordinating our efforts.

Counselor B: On Tuesday, November 22, Probation
Officer 3 called me concerning two
referrals, one from Fordland Honor
Camp near Springfield and one from Algoa.
I told her that I could very easily
begin a referral process on the young
man from Algoa but I could not pursue
the referral process with the inmate
from Fordland. A personal interview
is a prerequisite part of considering
a man for entrance into this program;
due to the distance involved I would
not be able to travel past Springfield

3These terms were used by the counselors on my advice to specifically
describe the tone of their conversation and the nature of the relation-
ship between the two agencies as they perceived it.
to interview a referral. She gave me the phone number of Probation Officer 4, the institutional parole officer involved in the Fordland referral. She recommended that I call him concerning arranging a more convenient place for an interview. She seemed to well understand the difficulties involved and I perceived no conflict of interest.

On Tuesday, December 2, I called Probation Officer 4, in reference to a referral from Fordland Honor Camp. This officer was handling the parole planning for the individual and had referred the individual through the Columbia office to Reality House. I indicated to him our policy concerning the prerequisite of a personal interview previous to confirming or denying entrance into the program. He said that he was able and willing to arrange to have the individual transferred to the Jefferson City area for a day in order to provide me an opportunity to talk with the referral. I indicated that if he could do this then I would talk to the referral.

Counselor A: Called Probation Officer 1 concerning a resident who had been expelled from the program during group meeting on the previous night. I explained to this officer the three main reasons that the resident was expelled: 1. his resistance to treatment, 2. his hostility directed towards other residents which resulted in intimidation, 3. the fact that he seemed to be using Reality House as an escape rather than as a place to do some work for himself. This officer had been informed earlier through the head of this office that there was expected to be a decision made concerning this resident's stay at the house. He seemed to understand what had happened and to be comfortable with the decision made by our staff.
However, he seemed at a loss for an alternative. He had no immediate plan in mind as for placement for the individual. I told him that the individual had some very serious problems and that he would need intensive supervision and that it would be best that he were referred to the Med. Center. Officer I seemed very open to the referral to the Med. Center and made no statement concerning my caution that the individual was particularly dangerous. While there was no great conflict between P.O. 1 and I on this occasion I feel that he was well cognizant of the information I was giving him. He made very little commitment as far as the action he would take in regard to this resident. I felt he was taking the information I was giving him in a very business like manner and that he would use the information in the normal bureaucratic process. I felt that there was urgency in this case that made it advisable to circumvent the process and take some immediate action. P.O. 1 seemed resistant to taking whatever quicker immediate action I advised.

Counselor B: On Tuesday, December 9th, P.O. 4 called. He informed me that the referral from Fordland Honor Camp would be transported to Church Farm in Jefferson City, Missouri. This would allow me to interview the individual and to consider him for admission into the program. P.O. 4 seems to be offering a great deal of cooperation in order to procure the service for his client.

On Thursday, December 4th, I visited the local probation and parole office. First I conferred with P.O. 5 concerning a referral to the Reality House program. The referral was a young man from Fulton, Missouri, who was having difficulty in the initial stages of adjusting to probation. P.O. 5 felt that the structure offered
at Reality House would greatly aid him in adjusting to probation. The referral also has a chronic alcohol problem which P.O. 5 feels that we can help him deal with. I collected the written case material as well as his personal impressions regarding the individual. This officer showed a great cooperative attitude and gave me the feeling that he really respected the service which we had to offer. I felt his personal feedback concerning the referral was an important considerable supplement to the ready material. He offered good justification and cause for the individual coming to Reality House for treatment. Since this is the thing we are beginning to stress most in our contact with referral agencies, I responded very positively to his approach.

Counselor B: January 14, 1976, P.O. 6 called me in reference to one of our residents. He was doing an initial progress report on this parolee and was calling to find out how he was adjusting to the program. I gave him general information relating to the individual's adjustment and progress. The contact was very casual and once again indicated cooperation and coordination between the two offices.

Counselor A: On January 19, 1976, I went by the Probation and Parole office to drop off a form. It was a release of information form from Mid-Missouri Mental Health Center for one of the probation officers, P.O. 7. One of the residents currently residing in the program is a probationer under his supervision. He desires to gain access to information concerning the resident's stay at Mid-Missouri. I coordinated the communication between the other two agencies.
Counselor B: January 15, 1976, there was a flurry of contact between the house and two agencies in the area. We had found an amount of marijuana and a hash pipe in the house and were trying to coordinate some action in regard to this incident. Initially the director of Reality House contacted the local city police department to see if there was any action they would be interested in taking. They responded that they were limited, because we had removed the marijuana from the room without a search warrant. The director indicated that we would get back to them if we could find no other avenue. Next I called P.O. 6. We have had a very good working relationship with this officer in the past year or so. We indicated to him that we had found the grass, that we wanted to terminate the resident and that we preferred that he be immediately incarcerated. P.O. 6 said that he would have to check that possibility, and that the resident probationer officer was not in the office at that time. I related the details of the incident to this officer and he promised to get back to me. Later that afternoon he called back. He said he was certain that a warrant could be issued and that the individual would be arrested probably that night if not the next morning. Even later that evening P.O. 6 had the individual's probationer officer call. The probation officer here was P.O. 8. He called to say that the warrant had been issued and that the sheriff's office would come whenever we indicated that the resident was available for arrest. He also indicated that in order to proceed with a revocation hearing the individual would have to admit that the marijuana was his property and that he had brought it into the house. I indicated that I could handle this, and that I would confront the individual with the marijuana when he returned to the program. When the individual did return he did admit that it was his property and that he had brought it on the premises. After talking to the resident I recontacted P.O. 8,
indicated that he had admitted it was his property, and said that he would be available for arrest at that time. I felt in this instance that P.O. 6 was very open to working with us. And that he cooperated in doing what we felt was better both for our program and for the individual involved.

On January 16, I called P.O. 8 concerning the marijuana that was discovered the day before. I was still holding said property. We arranged for me to transfer the property to P.O. 8 on the next working day, which was a Monday. P.O. 8 also had a referral from the institution at Algoa. I told him that the director of Reality House was now handling all referrals and that I would transfer the call to him.

On January 20, 1976, P.O. 8 called me in order to further check the details of the incident on January 15. Although we are not really pursuing a treatment goal, there is considerable cooperation and coordination going on in regards to this incident.

Counselor B: On January 19, 1976, P.O. 9 called from the Probation office in reference to a resident. She was interested in the resident's progress towards discharge. The resident is within one month, most probably, of discharge. I indicated this to P.O. 9 and told her that I foresaw no hitch in the resident plan. She has evidently been getting another message from the resident, and was somewhat confused about the goings on at Reality House. Hopefully her initiative to straighten out the matter has cleared up questions in her mind. It is also indicated a certain amount of manipulation being displayed by said resident.
On January 26, P.O. 8 called me concerning a hearing for a resident who had recently been arrested in the program. He gave me the time and places of hearing and indicated what kind of information I would be requested to give. Through the whole procedure of arresting this resident and up until now P.O. 8 has been very cooperative and cordial towards this counselor.

Counselor A: On January 27, I called P.O. 5 concerning a new referral which he had made to this program. I told him that he had set up the referral quite well and that mainly due to that the referral was acceptable to the program. We established a date of January 28, as the time of the resident's entry. I took responsibility for contacting the perspective resident. The way P.O. 5 set up and handled this referral indicates that he is both knowledgable of what Reality House desires and extremely cooperative in regards to meeting our expectations.

Counselor B: On January 27, I called P.O. 8 concerning the resident who had been arrested the previous week. He said the resident was having a hearing the next day and I questioned P.O. 8 concerning the possibility of bringing his belongings to the hearing. P.O. 8 said that this would be perfectly appropriate and that the county sheriff's office would take possession of the three bags of personal belongings.

Counselor A: On January 27, I called a perspective resident for the program. I told him that he should enter the program on January 28. I said he should bring items for personal hygiene and his clothing and indicated what services and goods the program provided. He is to show up afternoon, tomorrow.

Counselor B: On January 19, P.O. 10, a local probation officer, called me concerning a resident who desired
to leave the program. I informed her that I thought the resident's discharge at this time would be premature, and indicated that the resident had recently been involved in drug abuse and other irresponsible behavior. I told her that I felt very strongly about this case and that the resident should remain at the house. She accepted my judgment and said that she supported that line of thought. This resident has consistently pressed P.O. 10 for an administrative release from this program through the Probation and Parole department. I am not sure what P.O. 10's communication with the resident has been, but to me she has been very firm in her stands.

This does not mean that there is uniformity of cooperation among the personnel involved across the two agencies. Variations are found among parole officers and between the personnel of Reality House and the district office of probation and parole. While some parole officers have a great appreciation of the program and its staff, a few are lukewarm and impersonal and business-like. The parole officers who are new to the job are somewhat hesitant or reluctant to engage in dialogues concerning the clients with the "professional" staff of Reality House. A streak of professional inferiority complex is discernible in their interactions with Reality House staff. The variations among these officers seem to be due to variations in their ability to establish rapport with one another, the number of referrals made and the frequency of contacts concerning these referrals and the personal interest and philosophy of the officers involved.

While all of the other probation officers and the Reality House staff have welcomed the idea of opening up channels of communication and of creating an opportunity for all supervisors to work with their clients, the probation officer who was assigned to Reality House
earlier by agreement between the two agencies, has an opposite point of view. He thinks that involvement of several parole officers would dilute the effectiveness of the treatment strategy. It may not be possible to have a unified treatment modality. A probation officer who has sympathy and understanding for the kinds of things that Reality House tries to do is inclined to be more supportive and cooperative. He thinks that he has established an excellent rapport with the program staff as well as residents. He has synchronized his activities so well that he thinks that he has become an integral part of the program. Hence he does not see any advantage in the diversification of supervisory personnel.

However, others involved in the program contend that involvement of as many probation officers as possible will open up channels of communication and opportunities for others to know about the program which will be advantageous and beneficial to the program in the long run. From the point of view of Reality House staff, opening up the program to as many parole officers as possible will increase the sources of referral to the program by that number. An uninvolved parole officer is not likely to take as much interest in the program by referring clients as one who is involved. Therefore, the decision involving all the parole officers with the program is generally welcomed.

In general, the relationship between the local probation and parole office and the Reality House program has been very cordial, open and cooperative during this period. The initiative taken by the director of the Reality House program towards normalization of relationships between the two agencies seemed to have paid good dividends.
There seemed to be a mutual appreciation of the difficulties involved and a willingness to share the experiences. Thus a good working relationship between the two heads of the agencies and willingness on their part to cooperate with each other seemed to have greatly facilitated the agencies' personnel at all levels to work in unison and to everyone's advantage.

**Relationship with IPO (Algoa)**

The Missouri Intermediate Reformatory at Algoa is the only prison of its kind in Missouri. It houses young offenders between the ages of 17 to 25 years who for the first time incarcerated with sentences ranging from 2-7 years of imprisonment. Sixty percent of its population comes from the two cities, Kansas City and St. Louis. Obviously only a fraction of the inmates belong to the region III of the MMCCJ, the region to be served by Reality House. Thus, the number of people eligible for referral from the Intermediate Reformatory is very limited. Often Reality House had admitted referrals belonging to other regions. But its basic policy is to admit referrals only from Region III of MMCCJ. This geographical restriction for admission into Reality House is one potential area of conflict between Reality House and the central and IP offices. While the central and IP offices insist that admission into Reality House should be free from regional limitations, Reality House contends that it is the requirement of their funding agencies and therefore it can not be helped.

The relationship between the two agencies is limited and formal. Once the Board (central office) finds that a particular
inmate is eligible for parole and desirous of going to Columbia, he will be asked to formally apply for a place in Reality House. The Board instructs the local office to find out whether or not Reality House is in a position to accept a referral from Algoa. The Board also sends his application along with his case history file including information on psychological tests to the local office where it is passed on to Reality House for their perusal. If Reality House finds the referral suitable for admission, they indicate to the local office their willingness to interview the person. The Reality House staff, then, goes to Algoa to interview the inmate and if they find him suitable, they ask the IPO to transfer him to Reality House. Once the inmate is transferred to Reality House, he is placed under the supervision of one of the local parole officers. Except for money matters (in this case payments to Reality House in the form of per diem costs), all other transactions regarding this case will shift to the local office. With regard to money matters, Reality House sends the bill to the central office at the end of each month.

Interactions between the two agencies such as making referrals, sharing information about the referrals, interviewing them, accepting them, paying money for the services rendered to them—are all a matter of routine without much articulation on either side. They have no appreciation of each other's activities, purpose, needs and interests. The Reality House staff complains that neither the Board members nor the Institutional Parole officers are interested in helping their clients to adjust to community life. They are mainly interested in getting the inmate out of the prison system. Reality House fulfilled
this need in the beginning in order to keep up its population. By accepting parolees, Reality House takes on the parole plan—something that the parole officers find very burdensome and difficult to develop. The parole officers would naturally feel happy about Reality House admitting a number of their clients. If Reality House does not, they are criticized for being highly selective. Reality House's goal of judging whether the referral needs and is open to treatment is in conflict with the goal of IPO's and the referral.

The IPO's on the other hand think that Reality House "is not interested in serving people having difficult problems. They only take the cream of the crop. They want to earn a good name for their agency and show good statistics in order to get funding. The guys they accept will make it on the street anyway without anybody's help. They should take those who have real problems, difficulty in making it on the street and need professional help" (interview with IPOs, Oct. 17, 1975).

As for the personnel in the central office, their understanding of the program is evenly divided. Half of them argue along the same lines that the Institutional Parole officers argue. The other half seem to have recognized that Reality House is "a treatment program that should not be treated like a traditional halfway house. If board and lodging are what we need, we might as well contract with a motel and place our clients there. We need both traditional halfway houses and intensive treatment facilities like Reality House. We have not developed here any criteria of separating apples from oranges and when some professionals try to do it we should not find fault with their practice" (interview, Jan. 17, 1976). It is
interesting to note that these people are those who were associated with the initial development of the program concept and who worked with the then district supervisor at Columbia.

Fourth Stage: Period of Conflict and Isolation

As a result of the initiative taken by Reality House and the local Probation and Parole Office and their willingness, particularly on the part of the heads of the two agencies, to work together in their best interests, the relationship between the two organizations seemed to have put the two agencies on the road to reconciliation and cooperation. The results of reconciliation and cooperation were made visible by both the agencies, the Board of Probation and Parole paying $1400 in the 1974-75 fiscal year over and above what has been earmarked for the services rendered to their clients by Reality House, and Reality House by serving parolees in the early part of 1975-76 fiscal year without receiving per diem payments from the Board when the Board was unable to afford the payments.

However, the honeymoon did not last for long for the following reasons:

The prisons were getting overcrowded. There had been increasing pressure from the Division of Corrections to ease the situation by paroling out those who have become eligible. A number of parolees were accepted into the program during 1975. Some of these parolees walked away from the program and violated the rules and regulations of the program. Reality House officials strongly recommended to the concerned parole officers for parole revocation of their clients. The parole officers in turn submitted these recommendations to the Board after giving their endorsement. The Board did not take any
action. They said that there is no place in prison to put a fellow there for "drinking a couple of beers" or for "being a few minutes late." As a result, a number of other parolees walked away from the program during the latter part of 1975 which created problems both within as well as outside of the Reality House program.

The Reality House Program had been under severe attack by the police department and by the city council of Columbia for allegedly increasing crime in the area. The program felt increasing pressure from the local community to do something in this regard.

A sequence of exchanges took place between the two agencies which gives us an idea of the tension and the problem.

In a letter written to the Chief State Supervisor in February, 1976, the director of Reality House complained that none of the 8 parolees admitted into the program during the period June 1975 to January 1976 completed the program. They either ran away from the program or had been administratively discharged.

"The word is out among parolees," writes the director, "that once they get to Reality House, they can abscond from the house or get kicked out of the house and do nearly as they please, short of conviction on a new offense, without fear of any significant consequences. In my opinion, this kind of a situation feeds antisocial behavior and has a contaminating affect on the entire corrections effort. It especially contaminates the effectiveness of a close treatment situation like Reality House where other young men must effectively deal with their problems or face imposition of their sentence...We simply cannot continue to serve as an instrument by which potentially dangerous people are imported into Columbia as
eventually such a practice will only serve to undermine this program... In order to effectively treat anti-social personalities there must be some controls and consequences for them...Therefore...we must deny admissions unless we can work out some therapeutically workable solution to this problem."

In response to these charges, the Chief State Supervisor replies that "The Board has expressed concern over the type of parolees that they have thrust on you during the past year. These were difficult cases. We would hope that your resource would remain open to us for residents in the area and would expect you to closely scrutinize those non-natives that we might submit for consideration.

"...assure you of our continued cooperation in working with Reality House."

The director of Reality House was not satisfied with the reply. He thought the issue was avoided. So he wrote back saying that,

"the problem is not the difficulty of the recent cases referred to...but the absence of any controls...I am disturbed by the suggestion that the primary problem is the difficulty of the cases...Let me reaffirm my desire not to table the matter but to work together in developing a solution."

In reply to this letter, the Chief State Supervisor writes that "I am sorry there was a misunderstanding of my earlier letter... open to any suggestions you might have...you send a list of those parolees who the Board has failed to control. This may be a starting point...to sit down and talk..."
The director of Reality House provided the Board with a list of names who exemplified the lack of control problem. There was no response to this letter from the Board. The Board of Reality House met in March 1976 and decided not to entertain parolees or work releasees anymore in the program.

The Reality House Board of Directors swiftly moved to call for a conference of judges and prosecuting attorneys of Region III. A major policy shift was made by the Board of Directors of Reality House to the effect that the courts be requested to direct the probation officers to consider Reality House as one of the viable alternatives in their presentence investigatory recommendations. The local circuit court issued a letter to that effect. These events clearly indicate that phenomena at different levels of inter-organizational reality are closely related with one another. While pressures in the political economy of the network brought about changes in the paradigm commitment of the member agencies, the change in the internal paradigm of Reality House has effected a change in the referral network. Also, by virtue of their interlocking and interpersonal networks, the Board of Directors of Reality House could influence the local circuit court to issue a directive to the Board of Probation and Parole forcing the latter to consider Reality House as an alternative to incarceration in their presentence investigatory recommendations.

Since this time, the Reality House program closed its doors for parolees. Only first or second time young offenders referred by the courts pending imposition of sentence are admitted for a sixty day evaluation. The program is responsible directly to the
courts during this period and submits periodic progress reports on the conduct of its residents. In case of satisfactory adjustment on the part of residents during this period, the program reports the same to the courts. The courts in turn suspend imposition of sentence at this point and place the residents on probation instructing them to continue in the program until their satisfactory discharge. At this point, the program staff and the local probation officers start working together with the residents coordinating their treatment strategies.

However, the enthusiastic, informal and cooperative exchanges that characterized the relationship between the local Probation and Parole office and Reality House during the third stage seem no longer to exist. The lower level officials of these two agencies seem to be simply reflecting in their interactions with each other the indifferent attitude that is prevailing at the higher echelons of their agencies. Thus, the relationship between the two agencies at the time of closing the fieldwork for the present study can be characterized as passive, indifferent and routine.

In addition to the historical reconstruction of the relationship between Reality House and the Board of Probation and Parole, I also attempted to obtain data pertaining to the sentiments and values of the members of these two agencies, i.e., agreement or disagreement between the members of these two agencies on the domain, ideology and work evaluation of each other. This interview material

4 First, the respondents were asked what they meant by these terms. They did not have any difficulty with "Domain," "Technology," and "Work evaluation." However, most respondents failed to identify the ideology of their respective agencies. At that point, the researcher spelled out three alternative ideologies that they can identify their agencies with—incarceration, reintegration, and rehabilitation or clinical approach.
is intended to compare and contrast the results of present research with that of conventional interorganizational research.

Domain Consensus/Dissensus Between the Two Agencies: As per the legislative mandate, the Missouri State Board of Probation and Parole is charged with a three fold function: (1) pre-sentence investigation for the courts, (2) granting of parole and related procedures, and (3) community supervision of probationers and parolees. Under the last category, the Board has set for itself the following tasks:

1. to help the client find a job and a place to live,
2. to help the client stay away from trouble by supervising his activities in the community,
3. to refer the client to various service agencies that provide the needed services,
4. to help the client adjust to his family, community and society.

Reality House on the other hand is a community residential treatment center. In contrast to typical halfway houses, Reality House is designed to serve as an intensive treatment facility for high risk probationers as opposed to providing transitional living services for inmates released from correctional institutions. Services provided by Reality House are as follows:

1. psychological evaluation
2. individual and group psychotherapy
3. employment seeking and employment maintenance skills counselling
(4) specialized educational and vocational counselling
(5) social-recreational skills counselling
(6) high school equivalency program
(7) communications skills counselling
(8) alcoholism and drug abuse counselling
(9) intensive behavioral supervision (including drug screening).

Also, depending on each individual's needs, various community resources such as the Mid-Missouri Mental Health Center, the University of Missouri Medical Center, the Job Center, Alcoholics Anonymous and the Adult Learning Centers are utilized.

The stated objectives of both the agencies are: to protect the society from criminal behavior and to rehabilitate and reintegrate the offender into the society. In order to accomplish these objectives, they work with the offender in the open community, they help him reach the community and other services, they help him to learn responsible and responsive behavior and they help him integrate into the open society.

In our interviewing, the respondents belonging to these two agencies were specifically asked whether or not they perceive any duplication of services or conflict over domain between the two agencies. Personnel in both the agencies unanimously said that the two agencies are complementary to each other. Probation and Parole personnel including the Board members emphasized that "halfway houses are a very much needed facility
for our agency. (They) have a definite place in criminal justice system. (We) needed a variety of halfway houses" (interview with board members, January, 1976). Several of the field probation and parole officers recognized that "while we emphasize securing employment, shelter and maintenance of the client in the community, Reality House focuses on the inside of the individual, in bringing about changes in his attitudes and behavior." Probation officials contend that some of their clients "are one step away from the penitentiary." They are not able to get along with society. They are young people coming from hopeless family backgrounds with no positive support at all. They do not deserve to be sent to prison. If they are put in a structured environment where twenty four hour supervision and guidance is available, they will be all right," (interviews with probation officers). One of the probation officers has put it as follows: "We cannot provide a home atmosphere, a living situation. That is what they need. We cannot provide 10-15 hours of counselling. We cannot verify his (client) day to day behavior in the community. We cannot provide group intervention and peer pressure...All probationers and parolees do not need Reality Houses. We are good enough to take care of such cases. But there are some border line cases needing intensive help. Reality House is a good place for such people." In summary, while Reality House emphasizes (1) intensive supervision, (2) intensive treatment and (3) structured home atmosphere, the Board of Probation and Parole focuses on stability at job and stable behavior.
While both of the agencies agree that each has a place in criminal justice system and has a task to perform which is complementary or supplementary to the other, there are certain areas of conflict concerning the services rendered to the clients.

The central and institutional parole officials are critical of the selection process that Reality House goes through for providing the stated services. They say they have clients who badly need these services and that Reality House ought to be able to provide services to these clients. The field officers, however, (with the exception of two) are not critical of the selection process. They think that the hardest of their cases are accepted by Reality House and those that are rejected, they admit, are incorrigible anyway. "We cannot blame them (Reality House staff) for rejecting such guys."

The Reality House staff contends that it is a waste of resources and professional time to bring in those who are not ready for change.

The majority of the board members, including some field officers think that they should take over halfway houses. The chairman of the board lists the following reasons for such a takeover:

(1) Money is going to be a major problem for halfway houses to come up with on their own. The state is legally responsible for adult offenders. It is legitimate therefore for the state to take over the financial and administrative responsibilities.

(2) It is necessary to coordinate the activities of halfway houses, their programs, treatment modalities, standards, etc. They are running in a state of confusion now. No common standards or guidelines exist.
(3) There are some communities which cannot afford a halfway house. These communities also need such facilities. State control of halfway houses would facilitate transfer of offenders from place to place depending upon the needs of the offender. Crime does not know geographical boundaries and therefore there is no teeth to the argument that local communities are not in favor of locating halfway houses or admitting offenders into them.

(4) If courts want to receive maximum help or benefit from halfway houses it is logical to put them under the control and supervision of the probation and parole officers who do pre-sentence investigation for the courts and supervise the probationers and parolees.

One of the members of the Board claimed that "if a state agency is to take over halfway houses, it is legitimate that the Board of Probation and Parole should do it. The function of corrections is to incarcerate while that of the Board is to reintegrate. Moreover, the Missouri legislature passed new legislation requiring all those who were committed to corrections to come under the supervision of the Board of Probation and Parole. All the personnel in the Division of Probation and Parole contend that it is illogical to place halfway houses under corrections.

It is evident from these assertions that the Board of Probation and Parole is in competition with Corrections for control of Reality House and the other halfway houses. The Board has provided innumerable justifications for their claim over Reality House including the ideological and technological similarities between the two. However, the Board could not do anything about it as it is under the direct
control of the Division of Corrections. Competition for domain over halfway houses has remained a potential source of conflict between the Board and the Division of Corrections.

On the other hand, Reality House officials think that it would be a disaster for the halfway houses to come under the control of any state agency. Other states have tried and failed. It would not be different here. Reality House staff strongly feels that BPP's recent adventures into treatment are ridiculous. "Neither their work load permits them to do it nor do they have the trained manpower. They have no idea of what treatment is. If they are honest about what they are doing they should either get out of treatment or get in with adequate preparation. They are suffering from a complex. They are afraid that we are doing a better job and that they will have to dismantle their empire in such case...Also, they say that they mobilize and use community resources. How can they do that locating their officers at Columbia for eight or nine counties? It is a big farce!" (Interview with Reality House staff.)

Ideology: With regard to ideology there do not seem to be many differences between the two agencies. First of all no one has vouched exclusively for any one ideology. The consensus was that a combination of all the approaches would be more effective than exclusive emphasis on one approach. However, a significant majority of the employees of Reality House and BPP said that each of their respective agencies as well as their personal preferences are more in favor of the "reintegrative approach" than the punishment or clinical approaches.
However, a few respondents have expressed different points of view. One respondent said that he strongly believes in capital punishment. A few individuals are incorrigible. They can never live in society. "Charles Manson is very dangerous to society. He must be hanged to death. It is foolish on the part of the law to let him out." The same respondent contends that "organizations do not have ideologies. Individuals do. Organizational ideologies change with the changes of individuals at the top" (interview with the head of the Regional Probation and Parole office).

Another respondent decries that "All criminal justice agencies including Reality House exist to uphold the middle class ideology. They have no relevance to what we do in our everyday life. Our caseload is so high that we cannot implement these ideologies. Inadequate budgets, an insufficient number of staff, lack of training, poor administration and community disinterest are our perennial problems. We have to solve these problems before we think of ideologies" (probation officer).

Technology: As regards to techniques that the two agencies use for accomplishing their tasks and objectives, the Board of Probation and Parole has officially adopted individual counselling, group counselling and Reality therapy, whereas Reality House has chosen transactional analysis in addition to the above three. Reality therapy is the main technology of both the agencies. Thus, no major differences or grievances or conflicts are expected between the two agencies regarding the treatment modalities.
However, the major emphasis of Reality House is on group therapy. The main belief here is that both the staff and the residents mutually share the responsibility of defining, developing and implementing a therapeutic community to meet both the needs of the residents and society's demand for control of illegal behavior. This emphasis on group therapy and peer culture pressure is not in good standing with the Institutional Parole officers and the Board members. They think that "the parolees go to Reality House from a closed and distrustful atmosphere and to expect them to open up and discuss their problems in groups in Reality House is too much. The parolees should be given the option of staying away from groups until they feel comfortable enough to join them. It is therefore necessary for Reality House to adopt individualized treatment modalities."

Probationers do not have serious problems with the groups. The field officers do not have any complaints whatsoever about the treatment modalities in use in Reality House.

The Reality House staff contends that positive "peer pressure" is one of the most effective treatment modalities with young offenders. Once certain individuals are exempted from attending groups, it will have a deleterious effect on the treatment effectiveness. "It took us a long time to realize that parolees are different from probationers. To mix them together for treatment purposes is not desirable."

Work Evaluation: Work evaluation in the case of these two agencies is one sided, the Probation and Parole officials giving a positive evaluation of the Reality House program while the latter giving a negative evaluation of the former. With a few exceptions, the
BPP personnel have spoken highly of the Reality House program. "Reality House is one of the best in the state," says the secretary to the Board. The Board chairman views it as "one of the top two programs." "Reality House is a proven kind of program," according to the Research and Training officer.

The Institutional officers have been very cautious in their evaluation of the program. They said that they "do not know that much about the program...It is very difficult to evaluate the human service programs." However, they remarked that the staff of Reality House "are dedicated, competent and they know what they are doing."

The personnel at the regional office on the other hand have high appreciation of the program. According to the chief of the regional office, "We have basic respect for the program, feel comfortable...and do not have any complaints." The second in command tells that "We have a high level of respect...no hostility." Other officers have made comments like, "They are doing a very good job, they are committed to what they are doing...I have not seen Reality House picking up the cream of the crowd...They stick out their neck to choose difficult cases." Another P.O. says that "They are better trained...they have a tough program...they are competent...we respect their judgment."

The Reality House staff on the other hand are very critical of the Board of Probation and Parole and how they are operating. "Both the Board and the Institutional office have no idea of what treatment and rehabilitation are. They want us to function like a traditional halfway house, they treat us like a last ditch to dump their cases. They are only interested in getting the inmates
out of the prison regardless of whether or not they make it on the street out there...The Board is isolated from reality. Parole is a joke at the institutional level. They have no knowledge of the people they are paroling. They hold hearings for about 15 minutes and decide to parole an inmate. A con can easily get away from them. They all (inmates) know that. That is why Glasser is in favor of its abolition." Another staff member says that "their caseload is so heavy there is no way that they can do their job effectively. The field officer has too much to do--presentence investigation for the courts and community supervision of about 70 to 80 probationers and parolees. They are not able to do an effective and good job at either of them. The whole Division is not equipped to do the treatment job; there are no qualified and trained personnel." Another counsellor castigates that "BPP claim that they work with the offender in the community and use community resources for reintegrating the offender, but they do not have anyone in these communities. For eight counties or so around here, they have a regional office in Columbia and all these officers supervise their clients from here (Columbia). They do not see their clients for weeks. It is ridiculous to say that they can be effective."

Thus, there is a great disparity of work evaluation between the two agencies. While the Board of Probation and Parole gave a favorable evaluation of Reality House, the latter was very critical of the former. The comments made by the members of the two agencies

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5William Glasser is a prominent person in therapeutic circles. He is the author of "Reality Therapy" a book published by Harper & Row, 1965, New York. Reality Therapy is a label given to one of the therapeutic techniques popular at present.
reflect more the disagreement on personnel training, recruitment, and workload than disagreement on ideology and technology. The Board of Probation and Parole personnel are largely untrained in therapeutic techniques and overloaded with cases, while Reality House staff are professionals by training and could pay individual attention to their clients by virtue of much smaller number of cases to each counselor.

Summary Analysis

In the initial stage of relationship between the two agencies, the Reality House program was treated essentially as a branch of the Board of Probation and Parole with the basic organizational paradigm commitments left unfulfilled. In the second stage, the political strategies of the Reality House board of directors substantially defined the pattern of power and authority between the two agencies in their favor. The relationship between the two agencies was strained during this period. During the third stage, certain interpersonal conflicts and antagonisms that occurred within Reality House between the director and his staff set the stage for the redefinition and renegotiation of the relationship between the two organizations. The overlaid texture of interpersonal tensions, jealousies and conflicts that evolved in the second stage were dissociated to some degree from the current program and were replaced by verbal cooperative commitments. The relationship between the two agencies was characterized during this period by one of cooperation and reconciliation.

In the fourth stage of relationship between Reality House and the Board of Probation and Parole, the interaction between the director of Reality House and the central office changed from cooperation to
conflict and isolation. The political and economic developments in the Division of Corrections and the local community (such as overcrowding in prisons and pressures from the local police and city council) served to dredge up the fundamental contradiction between the paradigm commitments of the Reality House staff (to serve first time offenders) and the interests and expectations of the central and institutional officials of the Board of Probation and Parole.

As regards the sentiments and values surrounding the exchanges between the two agencies, the interview data seem to indicate a fairly high amount of agreement between the personnel of the two agencies over domain, ideology and technology. Yet, as ascertained through more informal interviews, participant observation and inter-organizational memos, there seemed inconsistencies between more specific interests and paradigm commitments of the agencies.

Thus, in the Mid-Missouri criminal justice network, Reality House penetrated the Board of Probation and Parole at two somewhat distinct levels—at the central and institutional offices on one hand and the local regional office on the other. In most respects, the mode of interactions between these two organizations has been largely conditioned by the social production at the central level. At central level, contracts and agreements are negotiated involving the general terms of resource flow. Interactive contexts at the lower level have been largely controlled and defined by these agreements and understandings. Thus, the explanation of shifting modes of coordination between Reality House and the Board of Probation and Parole can only be understood in the historical reconstruction of the series of accommodations adjustments made by the administrative elite of both organizations.