criminal justice spectrum from incarceration to treatment and rehabilitation. The top administrators of the Division of Corrections were progressive individuals ushered in by a new state government in the liberal reform years of the 1960s. These men were very supportive of independent halfway houses in Missouri and generally endorsed the Reality House program. In contrast, the corrections officials at the middle-management level were well entrenched bureaucrats who were integral parts of the traditional criminal justice system and were very critical of the proliferations of independent human service organizations in the criminal justice field. Though believing in the general concept of community-based residential treatment centers, these middle-management officials were very dissatisfied with the performance of independent halfway houses and continually attempted to penetrate and control the internal operations of these facilities establishing the Division of Corrections as the overarching agency in criminal treatment and rehabilitation. The middle-management, despite the general support of the top administration, undertook a series of political strategies to alleviate the problems they perceived in treatment and rehabilitation. In 1972, these administrators attempted to redefine the terms of exchange between halfway houses and the Division of Corrections by reinterpreting Senate Bill No. 78 covering the mandatory expenditures of the Division to the independent treatment and rehabilitation facilities. As mentioned under proposition two, the middle-management of the Division of Corrections sought and was rewarded a 2.2 million dollar grant in 1975 to establish a system of community treatment centers with no indication of the utilization of existing halfway house
facilities. Thus, the perceptions and orientations of the middle-management in the Division of Corrections produced an atmosphere of tensions and distrust with Reality House officials resulting eventually in a conflictual mode of exchange with each agency fearing the other's encroachment.

The relatively smooth and cooperative mode of exchange between the local courts and Reality House were largely the artifacts of the overlapping memberships and personal ties of the circuit court judge and the director of court services, the former director of Reality House. The referral flow to Reality House and the structure of ongoing programs were continually influenced by these individuals in their roles of Reality House board members and in their roles as a major referral source. The circuit court judge and the director of court services were integral parts of the Reality House program and continually defended their interests and commitments in ongoing programs especially involving first-time young offenders by mobilizing political sentiments and resources in the local community and in the federal and state governments.

In summary, the emerging modes of exchange between Reality House and the local courts, the Board of Probation and Parole and the Division of Corrections resulted to some degree from the expectations and perceptions of elite pursuing their own interests and commitments within the criminal justice field. The interlocking worlds of organizational elite in the Mid-Missouri criminal justice network constitute an intricate web of divergent social worlds crosscutting organizational boundaries and extending into the environment. The criminal justice administrative elite brought
unique contents to their organizational roles tracking in orientations and meanings from different times and situations and pursuing different career lines with unique sets of interpersonal resource networks. As revealed in the brief historical sketches under the third proposition, seemingly ideological and organizational clashes and unions were partially artifacts of interpersonal antagonisms, jealousies and friendships which tempered interorganizational events from 1971 to the present. The organizational elite in the Mid-Missouri criminal justice network made substantial impact on the shifting modes of exchange and patterns of power and dominations in the network not only by managing the delivery of goods and services of lower-level, boundary personnel but also through efforts to direct and contain certain political and economic developments in the criminal justice environment.

4. The interorganizational network as encountered by organizational elite consists of a tenuously imposed texture of sedimentations and contradictions occasioning continual social production and mobilization.

The tensions and antagonisms among organizational elite in the Mid-Missouri criminal justice network were to some degree reflections of the structure of contradictions in the intraorganizational fabric. The sequences of social production and mobilization from 1970 to the present were addressed largely to reoccurring dilemmas faced by organizational participants emanating from contradictory agency tasks and operations, intraorganizational cleavages, and tensions and inconsistencies in the organization's environment nexus.
This overlaid structure of contradictions in the criminal justice network was never fully resolved but was constantly being submerged, renewed, and dissolved according to the shifting pattern of interests, advantages, and commitments in the network and political and economic developments in the environment.

The organizational tasks and operations of the criminal justice agencies in mid-Missouri constituted in essence rough mosaics of temporal accommodations made by organizational elite in quite different historical contexts. As presented in the first and third propositions, the Division of Corrections was crosscut with a number of departmental factions representing conflicting commitments deriving from past sequences of social production. The central administrators in the Division entering during the liberal reformation of the late 1960s were largely concerned with the transformation of existing correctional facilities in Missouri and were generally supportive of independent halfway houses as supplementary services to their role in the criminal justice field. On the other hand, the middle-management personnel dealing with community affairs and pre-release programs were committed to the expansion of the role of corrections in treatment and rehabilitation and continually attempted to mobilize resources to control and administer independent halfway houses. These tensions and inconsistencies in domain commitments forged in the organizational fabric of the Division of Corrections personnel especially in their relations with Reality House.

When the Reality House program was conceived and enacted in 1970, the organizational structure and operations reflected the diversity of interests and commitments in the Board of Probation and
Parole. The Board Chairman wanted the program to be a nucleus for a statewide chain of BPP controlled traditional halfway houses in Missouri and thus defined the facility primarily as transitional living space for parolees. The district supervisor, the circuit court judge, and the local BPP officials were concerned with first-time probationers, mostly young offenders, and wanted to create a truly innovative treatment and rehabilitation facility. After the separation with the Board of Probation and Parole, the director and staff of Reality House molded their policies and treatment modalities to accommodate first time juvenile offenders in a loosely structured community-based program. Because of its initial protegous relationship with the Board of Probation and Parole, Reality House's official domain was defined as a general rehabilitation facility for probationers as well as parolees and work releasees. This very vague paradigm commitment provided a framework for the emergence of a series of contradictions between referral objects and the program intentions of Reality House officials. The referral objects that were received from the Board of Probation and Parole and the Division of Corrections, mostly parolees and work releasees, were inconsistent with Reality House program requirements and caused many intraorganizational problems and dilemmas. Reality House officials continually acted to resolve these tensions and inconsistencies within the program through the redefinition of their modes of exchange with the Board of Probation and Parole and the Division of Corrections within the political and economic limitation posed by the environment.
The Board of Probation similar to the Division of Corrections contained certain organizational cleavages which structured certain orientations among its personnel toward other criminal justice agencies, especially Reality House. The central and institutional offices of the Board of Probation and Parole were predominantly concerned with the monitoring and control of parolees as they attempted to make the transition from prison to the local community. The regional office on the other hand was largely concerned with probationers assigned to them by the local courts. The regional probation officers worked closely with the local judge and director of court services in pre-sentence investigations and the construction of individual probation programs. They also worked very closely with local juvenile officers and halfway house officials in the fulfillment of probation and parole programs. Thus, the interests and commitments of the central and institutional officials in the Board of Probation and Parole were more statewide in nature and concerned third and fourth-time adult offenders. The regional officers formed a well articulated relationship with local criminal justice officials and were more concerned with first-time juvenile offenders and thus were more amenable to the Reality House program.

In addition to these significant intraorganizational inconsistencies and cleavages, the patterns of contradiction within the mid-Missouri Criminal Justice network were further revealed through the tensions between the official organizational commitments and ongoing programs of Reality House and the Division of Corrections and the Board of Probation and Parole. The political and economic developments in the environment in the early 1970s plus the rising
crime rate brought forth a proliferation of state and federal legis-
lation and funding agencies and a multitude of human service orga-
nizations which composed an overlaid sedimentation on the traditional
criminal justice field in Mid-Missouri creating certain characteristic
tensions and inconsistencies between organizations. As mentioned in
the first proposition, the pre-existing criminal justice network in
Mid-Missouri consisting of the Division of Corrections, the Board of
Probation and Parole and the courts presented a relatively stable field
of action up to 1970 with the flow of referrals being non-problematical
and the supply of resources firmly grounded in local state appro-
priations. The emerging political and economic realities in the
early 1970s prompted a reformulation of the terms of exchange
and patterns of power and authority in the network. The Board of
Probation and Parole and the Division of Corrections both attempted
to mediate and control the flow of federal and state resources into
the criminal justice network consolidating their positions in face
of the changing political and economic realities in the environment
and thus bringing Reality House and other treatment and rehabilitation
facilities under their field of domination. Both criminal justice
agencies attempted to penetrate and define the internal operations
of Reality House to be commensurate with their needs and interests.
The Division of Corrections viewed Reality House as a viable outlet
for their overcrowded prisons and a possible antidote for their high
rates of recidivism, now a highly salient political issue. The
Board of Probation and Parole defined Reality House largely as an
inexpensive appendage which could lighten their heavy caseload and