CHAPTER 4
NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH MEMORANDA

I. The Short Treaty Episode

The failure of the Deputy Foreign Ministers to resolve the stalemate on the Austrian treaty and also on other international issues of conflict led to the decision that further efforts should be resumed at a higher level. The deputies, therefore, were instructed to prepare an agenda for a Foreign Ministers' Conference. Meanwhile, a Soviet note of 24 February 1951 to the United States and Britain clarified that in "Austria the crux...lay in the Anglo-Saxon attempt to turn Austria, together with Trieste, into an aggressive base." It also made the United States and Britain responsible for the war in the Korea and the overall tension in the world. (1)

The Deputies of the Foreign Ministers started their work on the agenda on 5 March 1951 at Paris. The Soviet proposal did not include a discussion on the

Austrian Treaty. Gromyko, however, was prepared to include the Austrian Treaty in the agenda, provided the Trieste clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Italy were also discussed along with it. The Western representatives declined any such tie-in. (2) Even after seventy four meetings the deputies failed to agree on an agenda. The Western Foreign Ministers, therefore, extended a direct invitation to the Soviet Foreign Minister to meet at Washington at an early date. A similar invitation was already extended by the Western deputies at their conference at Paris. (3) Meanwhile, President Truman

(2) The omission of the Austrian Treaty was characterized as a drafting error by the Soviet deputy. S.T. Binkoff, "Four Deputies in search of an Agenda", World Affairs (Washington), vol. 114, p. 266.

(3) The main difference arose because of the Soviet insistence to include in the agenda the discussion on Atlantic Pact and the United States military bases with priority to the question of German demilitarization, but exclude Austria. While the Western Powers insisted on including Austria and excluding the other item specifically though they agreed to discuss it with the general problem of the reduction of armaments and armed forces of the Big Four. Department of State Bulletin (Washington, hereafter referred to as DOSB), 21 May 1951, pp. 803-5. DOSB, 28 May 1951, pp. 859-60, and DOSB, 11 June 1951, pp. 933-4. Text of the "Joint Western Declaration ending the Palais Rose Conference (Paris) and Renewing the Invitation to the USSR to attend a Four Power Conference in Washington," dated 21 June 1951 in RIIA, Documents, 1951, pp. 263-4. The Western demand was also held responsible to a great extent for the failure of the conference at Palais Rose. "Hair Splitting or Action?" Spectator (London), 8 June 1951, p. 740.
had asked the United States Congress to sanction 8.5 billion dollars for the safety of other free nations through "Mutual Security Program" and to help them to build the military and economic power needed to make impossible the communist dreams of world conquest. At the same time he declared U.S. preparedness to follow the road of peaceful settlement of disputes. The Korean Crisis, the Anglo-Iranian quarrel over oil and the Japanese Peace Treaty engaged the attention of the Big Powers for nearly three months. The signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan on 8 September 1951 without Soviet agreement created grave doubts as to further Soviet cooperation in solving other international problems including Austria. (4) The three Western Powers, therefore, formulated an extensive programme for the discussion and solution of international problems. Regarding Austria they decided "to make a new and resolute effort in the meetings of the Austrian Treaty Deputies to fulfill the long overdue pledge to the

Austrian people" and to undertake efforts to bring the Soviet government to the same view. (5)

The Soviet reaction was recorded in the Allied Council meeting a fortnight later in which General Sviridov accused Austria of reestablishing her war industry, thereby serving western rearmament. The Western Allies extended an invitation to the Soviet occupation authority for an inspection of the Western zones to remove these allegations which the Soviets declined to accept and the accusations continued in the subsequent years. (6)


The Soviet obsession with Austria's strategic position played an important role in Soviet charges of Austrian remilitarization. This was contd....
United Nations also the Soviet-American differences were highlighted. A difference of opinion was recorded on almost all the issues in the international field and Austria was no exception.

Earlier the Austrian Minister for Interior, Oskar Helmer, during his official visit to London appealed to the Big Powers to wind up the formalities and find out whether all agreed in principle to sign the State Treaty. Foreign Minister, Gruber, highlighted the fact that the whole world was facing two groups of states under the influence of two types of ideologies and the solution of any problem in such a situation needed coordination and a desire for coexistence. In an attempt to persuade the Big Four to reopen the Austrian question, he personally met the Soviet representative Vyshinsky, the United States representative Harriman, the French representative Schumann and the United Nations specifically expressed as early as January 1948. See ALCO (66) 718, 16 January 1948. Also see Oesterreichische Zeitung (Vienna) 18 March 1948. The Soviet Union asked specific assurances from the Austrian Chancellor to the effect that (1) Austria does not intend to substitute for a State Treaty, a separate treaty with individual powers, (2) that the Government upon the conclusion of the State Treaty will insist on the evacuation of all forces and will not make any secret agreements under which the occupying Powers could leave their troops in Austria, (3) that Austria, after the treaty is concluded, will not assume any military obligations, permit the establishment of bases or incorporate Austria in the Atlantic Pact.
Secretary General Trigve Lie, all of whom had assembled at Paris for the United Nations General Assembly meeting. The Federal Chancellor Figl, also warned Austrians to be prepared for continued occupation and at the same time appealed to them for maintaining unity inside which was an essential precondition for the restoration of independence. The Austrian Government on her part sent a note to the Occupying Powers requesting them to resume talks on the State Treaty for "the general termination of the presence of military forces in Austria". It also stressed that Austria could prove to be a starting point for the relaxation of tension in the world. (7)

None of the personal meetings and the appeals by the Austrian statesmen succeeded in bringing the foreign ministers to a conference on Austria and the year 1951 passed away without even their deputies coming into contact for discussing the disputed clauses of the

treaty. The foremost problem for the Austrian statesmen, therefore, was to somehow forge a way through that blockade and bring the Occupying Powers in contact at some level so that the ball may be set rolling. Towards the end of the year 1949 when no further progress was recorded there was almost nothing left to negotiate over in the treaty draft and it was not difficult to wind up the business. At that stage, however, there was a peak of tense international activity and the Austrian State Treaty was relegated to the backyard. (8)

Towards the end of December 1951, Reber, the United States Deputy, as the chairman of the next meeting, took the initiative in calling the deputies for Austria for further negotiations. A meeting was convened for 21 January 1952, but it could not be held because of the failure of the Soviet deputy to attend. The Soviet Union made the negotiations on the Austrian Treaty conditional to a discussion on Trieste, and to the demilitarization and denazification of Austria. The Western Powers considered that Trieste had nothing to do with Austria and the

questions of demilitarization and denazification were being taken care of by the Allied Council at Vienna. Still obsessed with the idea of a Western plot to link Austria with NATO and the formation of a West German army, the Soviet Union continued objecting to Austro-German contact at any level and warned the Western Powers of the fateful consequences of any such plan. (9)

Gruber resented this Soviet diplomacy of connecting totally unrelated issues to the Austrian question. He held that Trieste was a problem between Italy and Yugoslavia and relating it to Austria would be to make Austria a barometer to measure the political

climate of the world. He further emphasized that if Big Powers were unable to solve the problem by themselves, the other arena would be the framework of the United Nations. The Soviet Union on the other hand, was accusing Austria and the Western Powers of planning to divide the country by signing a separate treaty excluding the Soviet Union. (10) After prolonged consultations about the further steps to be taken for bringing Moscow to the conference table, the three Western governments issued a Declaration on Austria in which they specified that they were "urgently examining new proposals ... to restore to Austria her full freedom and independence". It was also stressed that no consideration was being given to the conclusion of a separate treaty for Austria without Soviet participation. (11)

(10) Niiener Zeitung, 27 January 1952. Enraged by the Soviet tactics, Gruber said that perhaps the Soviet Union wanted to include one more Article in the Austrian State Treaty obliging Austria for the UK-US withdrawal from Trieste.

On 13 March 1952 the three Western governments, through their embassies at Moscow, presented a new Austrian treaty draft to the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union. This was a Short Treaty of eight Articles. The accompanying note charged the Soviet Union of studiously evading "its obligations towards Austria undertaken in the Moscow Declaration" and stated: "Failure to reach an Austrian settlement has placed a heavy and unnecessary burden on the Austrian people and has contributed materially to the maintenance of the dangerous tensions which unhappily exist in international relations." (12) It also enquired whether the Soviet Government was prepared to instruct its deputy to renew negotiations on the new draft.

Gruber characterized the Short Treaty as "Quittungsprotokol" or "Sesumungsprotokol" i.e., a Protocol for the evacuation of the occupation forces from the Austrian territory. Vice Chancellor, Schaerf, who was on a state visit to the United States, clarified that Austria was incapable of any military or economic

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(12) Text of the note and the new treaty draft which came to be known as the "Abbreviated Treaty" or the "Evacuation Protocol", DÖSH, 17 March 1952, pp. 448-50.
contribution to Europe and the only alternative before her was to maintain her moral stand without inclining either to the West or to the East. Federal Chancellor, Figl, also emphasized the necessity of maintaining political and economic stability and making the best of the new efforts of the Western Powers for a treaty. He also drew attention to the likely possibility of a Soviet refusal and the need to be prepared with an alternative suggestion. (13) Complete silence on the part of Moscow in this connexion led Figl to stress the alternate channel of the United Nations as suggested earlier. He undertook a tour of the three Western Capitals to impress upon them the urgency of exploring that alternative. Simultaneously, he also contacted the UN Secretary General in this connexion. In response, Acheson, Eden Schumann and Trigve Lie visited Vienna, assuring the Austrian people, of their deep concern for the restoration of Austrian sovereignty. (14)


(14) For Figl's visits Ibid., 9, 12 and 27 May 1952. Trigve Lie's visit to Vienna, Ibid., 4 July 1952. Acheson's visit to Vienna, Ibid., 6 July 1952. Schumann's visit to Vienna, Ibid., 3 September 1952 and Eden's visit to Vienna, Ibid., 26 September 1952. In October Figl visited the Benelux countries to muster their support for the Austrian cause. Ibid., 18 October 1952.
The significance of these state visits lay in the fact that Austria obtained renewed assurance from the Western foreign ministers that Austria would not be forgotten during any contact of the four powers in future. This was more valuable from psychological point of view in keeping up the morale of the Austrian population. For nearly three years the Occupying Powers had practically stopped negotiating over Austria despite the agreement reached on almost all the important questions relating to Austrian political, economic and social life. The complete break of negotiations would have otherwise spelt widespread depression among the Austrian people and resulted in a lack of enthusiasm to strengthen their efforts. The exchange of visits kept the Austrian question alive on the international scene which under the prevailing circumstances would have normally receded to the backyards of international politics, where it could have been allowed to rest without much loss to any of the Occupying Powers. The Western Powers were thus, kept alert and even the Soviet Union was not permitted to sleep over the issue.

The lull was disturbed by the Western reminder to Moscow on 9 May 1952 asking the Soviet Government to reply the Western note of 13 March in which they had
proposed the Abbreviated Treaty. The Soviet reply could be obtained only after a further Western reminder on 11 August 1952, that too rejecting it. The main reason given was that it did not "guarantee the democratic rights and freedom of the Austrian people." The note further expressed Soviet objections to some specific omissions in the Short Treaty. Significant among these were "provisions for the elimination of National Socialist Party and its affiliates and organs on the territory of Austria" and the "right of Austria to have its own national armed forces necessary for the defence of the country."

The Trieste tie-in was again revived and the note stated that there "cannot be any guarantee that the peace treaty with Austria will not meet the same sort of fate." The foremost consideration for the Soviet Union was to "receive from the Government of the United States of America agreement on the withdrawal of the proposals regarding the so-called Abbreviated Treaty." (15)

A few days later, in the Allied Council meeting, the Soviet High Commissioner, Sviridov, violently attacked the Austrian

Government for its anti-democratic constitution working on the basis of hundreds of reactionary laws of the Hitler regime. Thus, lack of democratization was made still another roadblock for obstructing the treaty. (16)

A new Western note to Moscow dated 5 September 1952 stated that the Abbreviated Treaty being a simple draft for the termination of occupation in Austria did not need detailed provisions concerning Soviet points of objections. It specified that democratic rights and freedom of Austrian population were guaranteed by the Austrian Constitution and by Austrian legislation in force. Regarding the omission of the Austrian right to have her own armed forces, the note stated that, it was inherent in the acceptance of Austrian independence and sovereignty. Nonetheless, in order to meet Soviet objections the Western Powers were prepared to incorporate in the Short Treaty guarantees regarding these already approved of in the long draft. Accordingly, they suggested that four more Articles viz. 7, 8, 9 and 17 from the long treaty be added to the Short Treaty. The note further invited a Soviet representative to a meeting at London on 29 September 1952 for considering this.

Moscow expressed its inability to participate in any conference on Austria till the Abbreviated Treaty was withdrawn and obligations of the Italian Peace Treaty concerning Trieste were fulfilled. The Soviet note further referred to the question of demilitarization and denazification and expressed resentment about the omission of the economic clauses agreed upon in the earlier draft. (17)

The representatives of the three Western Powers, however, continued to meet to discuss what alternative steps could be taken to reopen the negotiations on Austria. Secretary Acheson, had made it clear that the United States and her British and the French associates were "determined to go ahead and do our very best to carry out the pledge which was made to the Austrian people in 1943...." Later he also stated, "we shall be quick to discuss any problems about which the Soviet Union wishes sincerely and honestly to negotiate". (18) The Soviet response was equally enthusiastic as expressed by Georgi

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Malenkov, Zhdanov's successor as Stalin's closest associate, who said, "peaceful co-existence between capitalism, and cooperation, were quite possible". (19) It was a clear indication of a shift in Soviet foreign policy, although a translation into practice was still to be evidenced.

II. Austrian Government Turns to the United Nations: 31 July to 20 December 1952

The Austrian Government had meanwhile been proceeding with a plan to bring its case before the United Nations in an attempt to arouse world public opinion. The stalemate in the treaty negotiations in 1950 and the absence of any visible sign of its resumption during 1951 and 1952 necessitated action on this plan. The first step in the direction was the submission of a well-documented memorandum to all the member states of the United Nations. This was submitted on 31 July 1952, in which the Austrian Government traced the history of the Republic since its establishment according to the Treaty of Saint Germain. Giving the background of the State Treaty negotiations

after the Second World War, the Memorandum stated that the success of these would achieve the long sought aim of the Federal Government. Should this attempt fail, the Government informed its intention to bring the question before the forum of the United Nations and "to appeal for their mediation to induce the four occupying powers to evacuate Austria at last and to restore the freedom that is her due." (20) Simultaneously Gruber visited some Latin American States and explained to them the difficulties experienced by Austria because of four power occupation. He requested their help in bringing the question before the United Nations. Brazil and Mexico agreed to initiate it in the General Assembly and to issue an appeal to the occupying powers to expedite the conclusion of the State Treaty. (21)

Accordingly, in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on 11 November 1952 the Foreign Minister of Brazil, Fontura, called attention to the fact that while the peace

(20) Text of the "Memorandum by the Austrian Federal Government Concerning The Termination Of The Occupation Of Austria And The Reestablishment Of Her Full Sovereignty", D/68E, 11 August 1952, pp. 221-3. Also UN Doc. no. 2166, Add. 1.

treaties had been signed with the ex-enemy states "the restoration of full sovereignty to Austria which had been the first victim of nazi slavery was being deferred and hindered in flagrant contempt of the Charter" and asked the United Nations to appeal to the signatories of the Moscow Declaration of 1943 to accelerate the action of fulfilling their promise by way of concluding the State Treaty soon. (22) Gruber had reached New York to personally request the heads of the delegations of the member states to extend their unqualified support to the initiative of Brazil. He received a sympathetic response from most of them. He, however, made it clear that the appeal through the United Nations was not the last card of Austria but a new starting point for the handling of the Austrian problem on a broader basis. (23)

On 17 December 1952 the first committee of the General Assembly took up the Austrian question despite earlier Soviet protests against discussing it in the United


Nations. The Soviet representative, Gromyko, stated that according to Article 107 of the Charter the question of Austrian treaty was not subject to be considered by the United Nations and that it concerned the four Occupying Powers only. He further blamed the three Western Powers for the stalemate in the treaty negotiations and clarified that his delegation would neither participate in a consideration of that question nor recognize the validity of any resolution which might emerge from this. Quintanilla, the Mexican delegate, however, went ahead with his resolution to invite Gruber, the Austrian Foreign Minister, to participate in the debate without the right to vote. This invoked further Soviet protests. Nonetheless, the resolution was accepted and Gruber took his seat in the committee. (24)

De Souza Gomes, the delegate from Brazil, specified that the four power resolution concerning Austria was sponsored by Brazil, Mexico, Lebanon and Netherlands because the United Nations could not remain indifferent to the subjection and partition of Austria. He clarified

(24) GAOR, session 7, Cttee 1, mtg. 553, 17 December 1952, pp. 321-3. Earlier at the 7th meeting of the General Committee, the Soviet Union had objected to the inclusion of the item of the Austrian Treaty on the agenda of the 7th session. The item was, however, included in the agenda by 12 votes to 2, ibid., session 7, Genl. Cttee. mtg. 79, 15 October 1952, pp. 3-4. In this meeting the question was discussed as agenda item 64.
that there was neither any intention on the part of the sponsors to accuse any one nor intervene in the matter of Big Four responsibility. He stated, however, that his delegation felt it was "the duty and the right of the United Nations to address itself to the governments directly responsible with a request that they produce an immediate solution of a problem with which everyone was concerned." He expressed the conviction that the solution of the question of an Austrian State Treaty would represent a decisive contribution to a healthier international atmosphere. He also justified the deep concern of the medium and small powers, for the deadlock in which the negotiations had remained since 1947 and stated that the objective of the sponsors was to have the General Assembly address a solemn appeal to the four powers to make a renewed and urgent effort to reach agreement on the terms of an Austrian treaty with a view to "an early termination of the occupation of Austria and the full exercise by Austria of the power inherent in its sovereignty." Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic thought the consideration of the question by the United Nations to be a violation of Article 107 of the Charter and declared it illegal. (25)

(25) For Soviet objections see Ibid., session 7, Cttee 1, mtg. 583, 17 December 1952, pp. 324-5. Text of the resolution, Ibid., Supplement no. 20, Resolution 613(VII) pp. 5-6.
Gruber characterized the history of negotiations for the Austrian treaty as "a typical example of the tactics of procrastination despite efforts of the Austrian Government to facilitate and expedite those negotiations."

Referring to the blunt refusal of the Short Treaty by the Soviet Union, Gruber stated that "it was necessary to assert at that point that the deadlock situation would not be accepted passively by the Austrian people, which did not care about the technical aspect of such a treaty but rather about the content and timing." (26) He warned about the risks inherent in the presence of foreign armed occupation troops in the midst of an increasingly angered population, and appealed for a prompt conclusion of a treaty. Gorostiza, the Mexican delegate, stated that the four power draft resolution on Austria could be regarded as an appeal on behalf of Austria in the name of all the peoples of the world. After a long debate in which the United States, the United Kingdom and France also participated and extended their support to the four power draft resolution, it was adopted by 48 votes to none with two abstentions. (27) The


(27) Mexican delegate's speech. Ibid., mtg. 554, p. 335. Rest of the discussion, Ibid., mtgs. 555 and 556, pp. 337-45. The abstentions were Pakistan and contd....
mediatory and conciliatory action of some of the member states of the UN was in the nature of persuasion. It aimed at getting negotiations started which was an essential step for any constructive and fruitful solution. (28)

The United Nations resolution was a great success for Austria. The sympathy and support of an overwhelming majority of member states of the United Nations signified that Austria could count on world Afghanistan who considered that the United Nations was not empowered to discuss the question though they supported the cause of Austrian independence.

(28) For a theoretical analysis concerning such activity see O. R. Young, Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises (Princeton, 1967), p. 60. Austria, however, did not call upon the UN member states for assuming any direct role, and hence, their action cannot be strictly termed as that of an intermediary in the sense in which Young discusses the role of the UN in crises. For an analytical study of mediatory and conciliatory role of third parties in conflicts see K. Barzun, "Conflict Resolution through Implicit Mediation", Journal of Conflict Resolution (Michigan), vol. VIII, pp. 121-30. Also see in this connexion a recent experimental analysis about the effect of mediation on the parties by Jerome E. Podell and William M. Knapp, "The Effect of Mediation on the Perceived firmness of the Opponent", Ibid., vol. XIII, pp. 511-20. The authors also point out that concessions are easily made by the parties in response to a mediatory action rather than directly.
public opinion in its future efforts to bring the occupying powers to the conference table and convince them of the justice of the cause. Gruber expressed his conviction that despite Soviet non-participation in the UN debates, the situation was unpleasant for the Soviet Union and might cause a change in her attitude. He, however, emphasized that Austria would not sign a separate treaty with the Western Powers. He also clarified the Austrian intention not to join the European Defense System after the restoration of her sovereignty and declared Austrian goal of acquiring membership of the United Nations and of working in harmony with the East as well as the West for the establishment of world peace. (29)

III. Correspondence diplomacy; 12 January 1953 to 26 May 1953 and The Western and the Austro-Indian parleys

On the basis of the UN resolution the Western Powers sent a note to the Soviet Union on 12 January 1953 which proposed a meeting of the Austrian Treaty Deputies to be held at an early date for the purpose of concluding

an Austrian treaty. The place suggested was London. (30) The Western representatives reached London according to the invitation, but the Soviet note of 27 January announced Moscow's inability to participate in the meeting.

Pronouncing the illegality of the UN resolution on Austria and also of the very act of raising the question in that forum, the note criticized the Short Treaty as a perspective of "a fascist regime in Austria" and a plan to use the country for "the aggressive plans of the NATO". It also objected to the omission of the economic clauses already agreed upon in the long treaty draft. The note further criticized the Austrian Government for its memorandum of 31 July 1952 expressing its willingness to accept the Short Treaty, which the Soviet Government considered "cannot assist in the matter of settling the Austrian question and in no measure whatsoever answers the national interests of the Austrian people." It was also conveyed that the Soviet Union would agree to resume negotiations on an immediate and categorical renunciation of the Short Treaty by the Western Powers and by Austria. (31)

(30) Text of the note, DOSHK, 26 January 1952, p. 135.
In another note dated 29 January 1953 the Western Powers made it clear that they did not consider it appropriate to impose prior conditions, for resuming discussion on the treaty. Once again they reiterated their invitation for a Deputies Conference to be held on 30 January but declared their preparedness to postpone it till 6 February, if the Soviet Union preferred that. A positive Soviet response enabled the deputies to meet on 6 February 1953 after a gap of more than two years. After a discussion about the possibility of the withdrawal of the Short Treaty the deputies adjourned for three days and when they met again on 9 February the Western Powers refused to withdraw the Short Treaty as a precondition for any further talks as insisted upon by the Soviet Union. (32)

The death of Stalin on 5 March 1953 led to many speculations in Western circles. Malenkov became the new Prime Minister. It was expected that this change in Soviet personnel at the highest office of Soviet Government might

(32) Wiener Zeitung, 7 and 10 February 1953. The deputies had held their last meeting, the 258th at London on 15 December 1950. At the 259th meeting held on 6 February 1953 the representatives were Gromyko for USSR, Harrison for the UK, Dowling for the USA, and Cronychanel for France.
lead to alterations in Soviet attitude in the international field. It was speculated that the Soviet Government might favour a general solution of Austrian and German problem on the basis of neutralization and might also like to come to a general international agreement on the principle of spheres of influence. (33)

Anthony Nutting, the British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, however, felt that there had been no sign of change in Soviet policy in relation to Austria, as it was obvious from the persistent Soviet obstructions in the Allied Council. President Eisenhower, however, asserted that the United States cared for -

sincerity of peaceful purposes attested by deeds. The opportunities of such deeds are many....Even a few such clear and specific acts, such as the Soviet Union's signatures upon an Austrian treaty or its release of thousands of prisoners still held from World War II, would be impressive signs of sincere intent. (34)

(33) Ibid., 10 April 1953.

Nearly a month later, Prime Minister Churchill made it clear that agreements or disagreements with the communists depended on the degree of their willingness to cooperate. He also referred to the change of attitude in the Kremlin resulting in a series of amicable gestures on the part of the new government. On the basis of these, he thought, it would be -

a mistake to assume that nothing can be settled with Soviet Russia unless or until everything is settled... A settlement of two or three of our difficulties would be an important gain to every peace loving country. For instance, peace in Korea, the conclusion of an Austrian Treaty... which might in itself open new prospects to the security and prosperity of all nations and every continent. (35)

He, therefore, suggested piecemeal solutions of individual problems through a conference on the highest level between the leading powers without long delay. Earlier, in the NATO Council meeting at Paris, the French Foreign Minister, Bidault, had also laid down three preconditions for the peaceful coexistence in the world - arms control, reestablishment of an independent and united Germany and signing of the Austrian State Treaty. (36)


After the NATO Council meeting the three Western Foreign Ministers held a separate meeting to discuss the problems of the near eastern command and the Austrian State Treaty. They gave serious consideration to the possibility of withdrawing the Short Treaty as a gesture of goodwill. Invitations were sent by the general secretary of the Treaty Deputies for Austria for meeting on 27 May at London without stating any conditions. (37) Two days before the session was scheduled, Malik, the Soviet ambassador at London, reported that the Soviet deputy was unable to participate in the meeting. The Soviet thesis this time was that the four power body of the Deputy Foreign Ministers for the Austrian treaty could be summoned only by the Council of Foreign Ministers. He also stated that there were "no grounds to suppose that the meeting of the Deputies which is now proposed would give any more successful results than the preceding meetings." He, therefore, proposed consideration of the question "through diplomatic channels by means of an appropriate exchange of opinions." (38)


(38) Text of the letter from Jacob Malik, the Soviet ambassador at London, dated 26 May 1953, Doss, 2 June 1953, p. 815.
This rejection was quite in conformity with the Soviet mood as expressed towards the end of Pravda editorial of 24 May 1953, in which the Soviet Union welcoming Churchill's foreign policy statement of 11 May regarding general issues, criticized him for holding Soviet Union responsible for the failure of Big Power negotiations at Panmunjon on prisoners of war, and on Austrian State Treaty. It was specified that the matters rested "with the United States and Britain, who have not as yet assumed their 'just part' either in the one or in the other case." The statement further expressed caution at the proposed meeting between the heads of the three Western Governments - the United States, Britain and France - scheduled at Bermuda. It was characterized as Western conspiracy against the Soviet Union and a contradiction of Churchill's call for a general conference at the highest level. (39)

It appeared strange that a body with a record of 260 meetings over a period of seven years, in all of which the Soviet Union participated, should now be deemed to be incompetent by the latter. Moreover, it was not clear what the Soviet Union meant by "diplomatic channels". It was, therefore, presumed in Western circles that this was just a stalling move by the Soviet Union, preserving the Austrian card to play it off later for a favourable compromise on Germany. Expressing their regret at the Soviet refusal to attend the meeting of 27 May, the three Western deputies reminded the Soviet Union of their stand intimated to it in their previous note that "they were prepared to accept any treaty...which would ensure Austria's political and economic independence." (40)

Internally, Austria was going through a serious crisis. The frail economic condition gave rise to tensions resulting in political conflict. The root cause was no doubt economic. The cut in the U.S. aid and the drop in the world prices leading to unemployment in the state erupted in a quarrel on the budget proposals. The People's Party

(40) Wiener Zeitung, 27 May 1953, Text of the joint reply from the Western treaty deputies to Jacob Malik dated 26 May 1953, DOSH, 8 June 1953, p. 815.
stood for the "sound money" policy and the Socialist Party favoured "full employment". The result was premature dissolution of the Parliament. Fresh elections were held on 22 February 1953. Despite the presence of many splinter groups the result was "a clear mandate for the coalition to continue along the path of compromise and collaboration" and all attempts of the People's Party to keep the Socialists out of the Government by trying to align itself with the newly formed WdU (Wahlpartei der Unabhängigen) - the League of Independents, which had emerged as the third largest party - failed. Five and a half weeks after the elections the Socialist Conservative Coalition Government was formed again and the situation stabilized. The elections brought about no improvement in the position of the Communist Party which still had about 4 per cent of the total votes and only 4 seats in the Parliament. (41)

The Soviet Union blamed the Marshall plan and the United States aid for the unemployment, for the decrease in production and for the loss of exports and

accused the Western Allies of exploiting Austrian economy to the advantage of the Atlantic bloc. The Western Allies and the Austrian authorities, however, tried to disprove these allegations. (42) Nonetheless, the United States had begun to realize that the aid which she was giving to Austria, based on strategic calculations and amounting to more than a billion dollars, was paying her no further dividends whatsoever. This was partly due to the exploitation of the country's economy by the states to the East and partly due to the mismanagement of the E.R.P. funds. These calculations had led to the imposition of cuts in the US aid to Austria. It was also obvious that the Austrian economy had reached a more viable stage than that

of the pre-Anschluss days and was likely to be much better after the Treaty was signed. Consequently, this was expected to lead to political stability of the state. The foreign policy objectives of the three Western Powers, however, remained unaltered and the conclusion of the State Treaty leading to the withdrawal of the occupation troops continued to be their ultimate goal. (43)

At this stage Austria took a curious diplomatic step unknown to the others for a considerable period of time. Gruber sought a meeting with the then Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, who was attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference at London. The task was in line with the declared Austrian diplomacy, to make as many world statesmen as possible aware of the Austrian situation and seek their help to persuade the Occupying Powers to resume negotiations. Indian help was sought particularly with reference to the Soviet Union. In a further meeting with Nehru at "Vierwaldstater See", on his return journey to India, Gruber explained to him in detail the Austrian situation and requested him to use his good offices to bring the Soviet Union to the conference table to negotiate

the Austrian treaty. The then Indian ambassador at Moscow, K.P.S. Menon, was also present at the meeting. Menon actually brought the issue before Molotov when he reached Moscow. Molotov explained to him that if Austria undertook not to join military pacts and not to permit foreign military bases on her territory the solution of the problem might not pose any difficulty. This was the line accepted and followed by Austria in her future course of action. The Austrian statesmen had attached great importance to the good offices of the Indian Republic because of Indo-Soviet cordial relations that existed during the period and the vigorous advocacy of the policy of nonalignment by Nehru which had caught the imagination of several people at that time. This was another attempt at getting the negotiations started. (44) Its significance lay in the signalling process. It was for the first time that the Soviet Union specifically indicated that the path of conflict resolution lay in neutralization of Austria.

(44) Ludwig Jedlicka, "Die Neutralitaet Oesterreichs und der Staatsvertrag", Oesterreichische Militaerische Zeitschrift (Vienna), Heft 3, 1966, pp. 149-51. Wiener Zeitung, 6, 20 and 23 June 1953. This was also confirmed by the then Indian Ambassador at Moscow, K.P.S. Menon in a personal interview. Mediation, Conciliation and good offices as significant activities in bringing the parties to a dispute at a common table are being dealt with by Arthur Lalli, Modern International Negotiations, Principles and Practice (New York, 1966), pp. 84-100.
IV. Soviet Concessions to Austria and Continuation of Correspondence; 30 July to 26 October 1953

A remarkable change was, however, witnessed in the internal administration of Austria as the Soviet Union started making widespread concessions to her. It lifted its boundary checkposts, returned the grounds used by Soviet occupation troops and later full-fledged political relationship at ambassadorial level was established with Austria bringing the Soviet position in line with that of the Western Allies. (45) These concessions were, however, no substitute for a State Treaty and were counteracted by simultaneous Soviet moves in the Allied Council for Austria when the Soviets refused to eliminate civil aviation restrictions in the country. The Austrian Government was also attacked for its participation in the meetings of European Coal and Steel Community at Luxembourg, on charges of helping to strengthen the Atlantic bloc. Lack of democratization and remilitarization of Austria were also reiterated once

more. (46)

On 11 June 1953 the Western Powers put forth a new note pointing to the different pretexts under which the Soviet Union had avoided the resumption of negotiations from 1950 onwards. In order to avoid unnecessary delay, the note asked the Soviet Government to inform the exact text of the treaty which it would be prepared to accept in order to ensure the political and economic independence of Austria. Federal Chancellor, Raab, also supported the Western stand in a memorandum to the Soviet Union but there was no Soviet response. Another Western note to the Soviet Union dated 15 July 1953 concerning Germany again reminded her about the Austrian question. Replying this, the Soviet Union stated once again her objections to the Short Treaty and clarified that it was the withdrawal from consideration of the draft Short Treaty which would permit the four Powers to renew their efforts for an Austrian State Treaty. (47) Although the Soviet policy

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towards Austria appeared less rigid, it was unrealistic to think that Soviet diplomacy would throw away the Austrian card without creating an advantageous climate for a Four Power settlement on Germany. In view of this assessment the Western Powers in yet another note on Germany suggested a conference of the Four Foreign ministers to discuss German settlement and in its first meeting to reach final agreement on the Austrian Treaty. (48)

The Soviet reaction to the proposed Four Power Conference on Germany and Austria was recorded in her note of 4 August 1953. It stated that China should also be invited to any such conference at the highest level and instead of limiting its scope, the conference should examine measures for lessening tension in international relations in general. It was also specified that restoration of German unity might possibly lead to success in a settlement on Austrian treaty. Earlier the Soviet Union had extended some concessions to the Austrian Government by way of renouncing its claim to occupation costs from 1 August 1953. Another Soviet note to Austria referred to treaty matters. Once again recording Soviet (48) DOSS, 27 July 1953, p. 105.
objections to the "Short Treaty" and to the Austrian approval of it in its memorandum of 31 July 1952, the Austrian government was specifically asked whether it still stood by that position. It was also clarified that further negotiations depended on Austrian response. (49)

These diplomatic steps of the Soviet Union were meaningful as they immediately followed one another. There was no time gap between the Soviet note to Austria and the Soviet note to the Western Powers. Moreover, issuing the note to the Western Powers on the eve of the German and the Austrian elections might have been a calculated step to exhibit Soviet desire towards relaxation of tension in the world. In view of the fact that the Western note of 11 June 1953 had already asked the Soviets to choose between the Short Treaty and the long treaty, repetition of the same conditions was the well-established Soviet diplomatic tactic to while away time. The


Taken aback by these Soviet gestures the British hastened to declare on 19 August 1953 that they would renounce occupation costs as of 1 January 1954. This was followed by a similar announcement by France. The United States had renounced these long back, Austrian Information, Vol. VI, no. 16, 1953, p. 3. Österreichisches Jahrbuch : 1953, p. 20. The text of the Soviet note of 4 August 1953, Soviet News, 8 August 1953, pp. 362-3.
Soviet Union still did not appear to be ready to leave the Austrian outpost, holding on to it in expectation of diplomatic gains elsewhere. A glance towards Germany, where so often Austrian destiny has been decided revealed no modification in the confrontation of the Big Powers. Hence, there was little hope for a change on the Austrian scene. (50)

Meanwhile concessions continued to pour in the internal administration of Austria as the Soviet Union abolished censorship in its zone on 11 August 1953, followed by the quadripartite decision to abolish all censorship throughout Austria. The Soviet Union also agreed to the abolition of all control over Austrian communications which was quite surprising in view of the continued Soviet opposition to any such step till then. Finally, the Soviet Union made a formal announcement of the end of Soviet censorship of RAPEG broadcasts, theatre performances and concerts, which was relaxed in

(50) The dependence of the economic and political development of the erstwhile Austro-Hungarian monarchy and later of the Austrian Republic on the politico-economic situation of Germany has been well brought out by Immanuel Birnbaum, "Deutschland und Oesterreich", Aussenpolitik (Freiburg), vol. II, pp. 521-9.
July 1952 and had in fact ceased to operate several weeks before the formal announcement to the effect. (51) Minister Helmer, however, was quick to warn that this sort of "Soviet peace offensive against Austria was only a great illusion and nothing remains of it but dis-illusionment, so long as the dichotomic policy of 'old abuses' and 'new concessions' continued." (52)

Nonetheless, the Soviet peace offensive did make the Western Allies and the Austrian statesmen a bit nervous as it was interpreted as an attempt by Moscow to entice Austria away from the Western camp. The earlier Soviet notes though conciliatory, had warned Austrians not to dream of a rebirth of the "Austria Mediatrix" of the Turkish era to serve as a liaison between the European Defence Community and the Balkans and specifically asked her to assume a neutral position between East and West. In accepting the Soviet concept of a neutral Austria removed from the game of world politics, Chancellor Raab exhibited the subtlety, realism and the imaginative character of Austrian

(51) Gazette of the Allied Commission for Austria (Vienna), no. 93, August 1953, pp. 11-12. AIC, (200) 1769, 14 August 1953.

(52) Arbeiter Zeitung (Vienna), 13 October 1953.
diplomacy. This indicated a clear recognition of the need of the time that turning "a cold shoulder to Moscow would not serve her primary aim of a State Treaty". (53)

The still greater task before the Austrian diplomacy was to see both Soviet Union and the West finally get away from "diplomacy by correspondence" and return to "diplomacy by conference". To reach that goal, Federal Chancellor Raab and Foreign Minister Gruber met the ambassadors of the four Occupying Powers in Vienna to explore the possibility of resuming State Treaty negotiations. At the same time Minister Helmer, made it very specific that Austria had no objections to the withdrawal of the Short Treaty and all that Austria would be interested in was a treaty that would reestablish Austrian sovereignty in political as well as economic spheres. A note to the effect was sent to the Soviet Union on 19 August 1953. While transmitting it, Chancellor Raab again emphasized that Austria was concerned not so much with the form, as the contents of the treaty which must reestablish a free independent and economically viable Austria. He categorically expressed the Austrian protest against connecting the Austrian question with other international

problems. Simultaneously, the Occupying Powers were assured that none of them would lose prestige if they helped the hard pressed people of Austria to regain their right to be sovereign. (54)

In Western Capitals, the Soviet note of 4 August was considered to be more positive than the previous ones. It had not specifically refused the proposal of holding a Foreign Ministers Conference but suggested a slightly different plan. Malenkov's address to the Supreme Soviet on 3 August 1953 was also encouraging on the issue. He stressed the responsibility of the Great Powers to bring about a relaxation of international tension by means

(54) Text of the Austrian Memorandum dated 4 August 1953, Wiener Zeitung, 5 August 1953. Chancellor Raab's appeal Ibid., 20 August 1953. In this connexion Chancellor Raab gave much importance to his talks with the Finnish Prime Minister, Kekkonen. He revealed that Kekkonen's information about positive attitude of the Soviet Union towards Finland inspired his resolve that Austria could also accept Soviet material demands bearable to Austrian economy in order to acquire the independence of the land. Raab disclosed this in the Parliament on 14 May 1960. Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, Fünfzehn Jahre Staatsvertrag Fünfzehn Jahre Zweite Republik (Wien, 1960), p. 8. Earlier in 1959, Chancellor Raab also revealed about his meetings with Ilyichev, the Soviet High Commissioner in Austria during the period preceding Berlin Conference of 1954 and even after it. In these meetings it was stressed that neutral politics for Austria would be a decisive basis for a satisfactory solution of the Austrian problem. Österreichische Neue Zeitung (Wien), 6 December 1959.
of negotiated settlement of disputes and declared Soviet preparedness in taking every essential step in this direction. Simultaneously, he emphasized the necessity of German settlement, which he said, would assist the settlement of the Austrian question too. A following Soviet note of 15 August 1953 stressed the necessity of a German settlement for reducing international tension but totally skipped over the question of an Austrian Treaty. (55)

With this note, the situation seemed to have become more complicated for Austria. The three Western Powers, therefore, sent another note to the Soviet Union specifically referring to Austria. It proposed that the Treaty Deputies be convened at London on 31 August 1953 in order to discharge their obligation towards Austria. The Western Government also took a clear undertaking "not to introduce for consideration the Abreviated Treaty on the understanding that there will be no extraneous issues raised" and that the political and economic independence of Austria was ensured by the treaty. (56) In response,


(56) Text of the Western note dated 17 August 1953, DOSH, 31 August 1953, p. 282.
however, the Soviet Union again sent a note declaring the Western proposal unsatisfactory and repeating the contents of its previous notes about a categorical withdrawal of the Abbreviated Treaty, the incompetence of any other body except the Council of Foreign Ministers to call a meeting of the deputies, and unavoidable connexion of the German and the Austrian problems. A Soviet note to Austria declared Austrian note of 19 August 1953 as unsatisfactory and a new and clear explanation was demanded about Austrian Government's stand on the Abbreviated Treaty. It was also reiterated that the Abbreviated Treaty was a deliberate Western obstruction to enable them to remain in Austria and turn it into a military bastion directed against the Soviet Union and "People's Democracies". (57)

Western response followed immediately, stating that the two problems were quite distinct and expressing their conviction that progress was more likely to be made by discussion of these problems than by a further exchange of notes. Consequently, they renewed the invitation to the Soviet Government to participate in a meeting.

of the four Foreign Ministers which could take place on 15 October at Lugano (Switzerland). (58) The Soviet response was vague. It suggested a conference of five - the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and the People's Republic of China to consider measures to lessen the tension in international relations, and a conference of four excluding China but with the representatives from both parts of Germany to discuss the German problem. (59) It was difficult to decide whether these parleys were influenced by the goals of power politics or by the motives of propaganda, but the net effect was obvious that the discussion on the State Treaty was postponed for some more time.

Hoping, however, that a conference of the Foreign Ministers might take place shortly, and remembering Western assurance to settle the Austrian problem in any such future contact, the Austrian Government had sent a note to the four capitals requesting them to include Austria as an equal negotiating partner in any future conference on


Austria. It was stressed that Austrian participation would facilitate and accelerate the fulfilment of the promise made to her years ago. The three Western Powers promised to support Austrian participation in any future four power conference on the issue, but stated that it needed the approval of the Soviet Union also. (60)

Although apparently the "Memoranda Diplomacy" in which the Occupying Powers had indulged during the preceding years seemed to be nearing its end, there was no guarantee that the Austrian problem would be discussed in future four power contacts as the Soviet Union avoided a reference to the Austrian question. Federal Chancellor, Raab, therefore, assured the Big Powers that an independent Austria would not be a pawn or springboard for any power on the demarcation line but would maintain proper contacts with all. He expressed his awareness of the price Austria would be required to pay for the treaty. The only difficulty he specified, was to take the first step and it was up to the big Powers alone to proceed with it. (61)

(60) Austrian note to the four Capitals, Wiener Zeitung 11 September 1953. For Western assurance to Austria see Ibid., 20 October 1953.

(61) Various appeals of Chancellor Raab, Ibid., 17, 20 September, 24 October and 1 November 1953.
In response to the Soviet demand for clarification, the Austrian Government had already informed the Soviet Union that though the Short Treaty brought some advantages to Austria in so far as it did not impose any economic burdens on the state, the Government was ready to withdraw its support to it. It also withdrew its support to its note of 31 July 1952 to facilitate a conference of the Foreign Ministers. It was further specified that Austria would agree only to a treaty acceptable to all. (62)

Still there was no reference to the Austrian question in the Soviet note of 28 September 1953. The Austrian Government, therefore, took another diplomatic step which indicated a slight revision of its approach in so far as it replaced the order of priorities by adopting a policy of limited objectives for immediate gains. A discussion on the Austrian problem being a doubtful premise, an attempt was made to persuade the Occupation Authorities to reduce the burden of occupation by way of reduction of troops and the transfer of the private buildings used by these troops to the charge of Austrian Government. The first step was taken with France when Federal Chancellor, Raab, and Foreign

Minister, Gruber, travelled over to Paris to put up the request to the French Government. Simultaneously, they sought help of the Occupying Powers for an early conclusion of the treaty which remained their main goal. The French Government promised to withdraw all forces from the French zone except a "symbolic occupation army" of 40 gendarmes. Earlier Britain had also informed the Austrian Government of its intentions to reduce its troops in Austria from three battalions to one as of 1 January 1964, the day from which she agreed to tear her occupation costs as well. (63)

(63) Ibid., 2 and 18 October 1953. British announcement of 4 September 1953, Austrian Information, vol. VI, no. 16, September 1953, p. 3. Towards the end of October 1953 Britain and France started withdrawing their troops. These withdrawals left the total strength of Western troops in Austria to a little more than 15,000 in contrast to the Soviet troops to the strength of 50,000. New York Times, 17 October 1953. Nonetheless, the effect of these withdrawals was tremendous. In an informal talk with some students in Vienna, I was informed by the residents of Vorarlberg and Tyrol - the French occupation zone - that these two provinces became independent a year and a half earlier than the rest of Austria. This clearly indicated the relaxation of French Occupation Authority quite before a final settlement. Perhaps the French attitude was guided by her internal political instability. Simultaneously, this also signified the near abandonment of the vital moderating role, France was performing in the initial stages of the State Treaty negotiations. Mario Einaudi, "The Crisis of Politics and Government in France", World Politics (Princeton), vol. IV, pp. 64-84.
On 8 October 1963 the United States and Britain announced their decision to terminate the Allied Military Government in zone "A" of the Free Territory of Trieste, "to withdraw their troops, and ... to relinquish the administration of that zone to the Italian Government." (64) It was a hopeful sign for the Austrian treaty as the Soviet Union had long been making a Trieste settlement conditional to the Austrian treaty. Two days before this announcement, Dulles referring to Korea and Austria, assured the Soviet Union that the United States had "no desire to use those areas as a base for any hostile intentions of our own." He also clarified that though the Soviet note of 23 September did not refer to Austria, his government would not allow itself to be discouraged "as long as there is any possibility of easing tensions...." (65)

Accordingly, the Western note of 18 October emphasized the necessity of German and Austrian settlements

(64) Text of the announcement DOSB, 19 October 1953, p. 529. A final agreement in this connexion was reached as per the "Memorandum of Understanding between Italy, the United Kingdom, the USA and Yugoslavia regarding Trieste, London, 5 October 1954", H.M.S.O., Command Paper 9238, pp. 1-6.

(65) Dulles' Press Conference of 6 October 1953, DOSB, 19 October 1953, p. 528.
for a lasting relaxation of international tension and for
the future of those countries. It stressed the importance
of frank discussion for real progress. Though the West
had no objection to the Soviet suggestion of exploring
normal diplomatic channels in case of Austrian State
Treaty, it was pointed out that no progress had been
possible till then through these. The note, therefore,
expressed Western preference for a foreign ministers' con
ference in order to end the stalemate and suggested
that it be held on 9 November 1953 at Lugano instead of
15 October as proposed earlier. (66) This was in complete
contrast to the Soviet note of 28 September which had
totally ignored Austria even to the extent of avoiding
reference to the State Treaty. At the same time the
Western embassies in Vienna, on the occasion of the tenth
anniversary of the Moscow Declaration, issued an appeal
for an immediate fulfilment of their obligation to
reestablish an independent Austria. (67)

(66) Text of the note Ibid., 26 October 1953, pp. 547-8.
V. Further Correspondence till the end of the year 1963

The hopes of the end of the era of Memoranda Diplomacy were eluded when, in response to the Western note, the Soviet Union again sent a long memorandum criticising at the outset the separate collusion of the three Western Powers preliminary to a conference of the four Foreign Ministers. It stressed that the most important questions were those of disarmament and of Korean and German settlements. As regards the Austrian treaty, the memorandum demanded a reply to the Soviet note on Austria dated 23 August 1963 and emphasized that the proposed "normal diplomatic channels" had not at all been resorted to. (68)

President Eisenhower considered the Soviet note as manifesting no intention to get together. The United States Government, he said, was prepared to discuss any issue with the Soviet Union under conditions which provided a clear and dependable basis for agreement. The French

(68) Text of the Soviet note dated 3 November 1963, UNSR, 30 November 1963, pp. 745-8. The reference to Western collusion was to the periodic consultations of the three Western Foreign Ministers on issues of international tension.
cabinet considered the Soviet conditions unreasonable and described the note as a specimen of "pure Molotov style". Eden also expressed his doubts about holding the proposed conference at Lugano. At the same time he made it clear that they were prepared to discuss Germany and Austria with the Soviet Government, at any time and at any place, and without any prior condition at all. (69)

Accordingly a Western note of 16 November 1953 informed the Soviet Union that the invitation addressed to the Soviet Government on 18 October to negotiate on vital problems of Germany and Austria still stood and expressed the conviction that settlement of these would improve the chances of reestablishing real peace in the world. Another Western note to the Soviet Union dated 25 November 1953 offered three possibilities for the resumption of Austrian State Treaty negotiations. These were: first, to convene a foreign ministers' conference; second, to direct the deputies to resume their work; and third, to submit proposals through the normal diplomatic channels, whichever was conveniently acceptable to

the Soviet Government. (70) Surprisingly enough the Soviet response this time was immediate and positive. It accepted the foreign ministers' conference but informed that the Soviet Union would raise at such a conference the question of convening a five power conference for the purpose of easing international tensions as suggested earlier. It also proposed that a convenient venue for the conference could be the city of Berlin. (71)

In their conference at Bermuda, the heads of the three Western Governments agreed to the Soviet proposal to meet at Berlin. A note was sent accordingly stating that the conference, among other things, should be mainly directed to discuss the German problem and the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty. The date suggested was 4 January 1954. The Soviet Union, however, asked for the postponement of the conference to 25 January 1954, and it was agreed to by the Western Powers. (72)


(71) Text of the Soviet note dated 26 November 1953, Soviet News, 2 December 1953. Conference at higher level being more conducive to concrete results rather than the one at a lower level has been dealt with by F.C. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York, 1964), pp. 126-7. He also refers to the extra tension in such conferences.

(72) Text of the Western note dated 8 December 1953, DOSB, 26 December 1953, pp. 851-3. Soviet note

contd....
The period following the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers in 1949, till the end of 1953 was marked with internal cleavages within the Western Powers themselves. Differences were recorded among Britain, the United States and France, particularly with regard to the problems of security in Europe and their dealing with the communist world. The Western position was, however, consolidated as they resorted to periodic consultations to discuss international problems, and with the signing of the Paris and Bonn agreements finalizing the plans of defence and security of Western Europe and the consolidation of the Western zones of Germany. (73)

The Soviet position during the period was shaken by Yugoslav defection and by the inferior Soviet power position in comparison to the United States. The testing

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(73) The main difference within the Western block was that of approach. Churchill had advocated "sailing up to the enemy and hailing him", while Acheson believed in first building up situations of strength" from where to try a settlement. UK, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, series 5, vol. 515, session 1952-53, cols. 884-97. Dossi, 26 June 1950, pp. 1037-41, p. 1056. Also see in this connexion Coral Bell, Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power (London, 1962), pp. 95-125.
of the hydrogen bomb by the Soviet Union on 20 August 1953 removed to an extent its fear of the United States negotiating from strength. The succession struggle within the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin and an attempt to break away from the cult of personality and establish "collective leadership", had threatened the internal solidarity which was considerably stabilized with the indictment of Beria towards the end of 1953. The Berlin riots also challenged the Soviet position in East Germany though the situation was quickly brought under control again. These events had weakened the internal stability and external position of the Soviet Union. (74)

Consequently, none of the Big Powers were perhaps serious about proceeding with actual negotiations leading to a successful conclusion of international problems facing them. This applied with manifold intensity to questions of unification of Germany and conclusion of a treaty with Austria, where the Big Four stood face to face even in the day to day administration of the areas. Moreover, this was the area, the decisions concerning

which were going to demarcate the boundary determining the extent of spheres of influence of the two blocks. Therefore, each side, while pronouncing the reduction of international tensions as being the proper goal of foreign policy, behaved with great caution before undertaking any step which might lead in any such direction. By the end of 1953, however, the parties had gradually evolved some sense of security and solidarity, which doubtless prompted them to come in personal contact to explore the practical implications of each other's declared aims of the peaceful conduct of international relations. (75)

There was, however, a marked change in the Soviet attitude towards Austria so far as her internal administration was concerned. The lifting of censorship and of zonal boundaries, the diplomatic recognition of Austria by replacing the Soviet consulate by the Soviet embassy and the renunciation of occupation costs were some of

(75) Besides the exchange of notes between the West and the Soviet Union the UN General Assembly debates during this period are characteristic of the declarations of high aims proclaimed by the Big Powers from time to time.
the striking Soviet concessions relaxing the strict Soviet control. This called for a careful and cautious observation of Soviet politics in order to deduce the ultimate goals of the changed policy. It was felt that the Soviet posture was probably a tactical move aimed at breaking Western unity at a relatively lesser cost. On the other hand, it was also interpreted to mean an attempt on the part of the Soviet Government to evolve some modus vivendi with the Western Powers after a long interval in the continued cold war. The Western initiative might also have been guided by similar desires. It was, however, necessary to stop the endless exchange of memoranda to prove their genuine desires for peace by actually coming to the conference table.

Before quitting his office as a Foreign Minister of Austria, Gruber warned that bringing the Four Powers to the conference table would not necessarily lead to required results as experience till then had revealed. He held that the real significance of a four power dialogue would be to get a clear statement of their diplomatic objectives for determining the steps to be taken accordingly, which needed greater caution for a fruitful utilization of future opportunities. He also
asserted the right of the Austrian people to participate in the process of deciding what was advantageous to Austria. (76)

The Soviet Union, however, made it specific that the blame for the deadlock on the Austrian problem rested entirely with the Western Powers which have been persisting in their efforts to impose the Abbreviated Treaty with all its defects. This Soviet tactic of refusing to acknowledge the Western and Austrian withdrawal of the Abbreviated Treaty further indicated that the forthcoming conference might not be a success for a settlement of the Austrian question. Nonetheless, it was hoped that a face to face renunciation of the Abbreviated Treaty by the Western Powers might stop Soviet repetition of the old arguments and prepare at least a basis for some further step. (77)

The efficacy of Austrian diplomacy emerges prominently during this phase of the absence of direct

(76) Wiener Zeitung, 15 October 1953.

(77) I. Alexandrov, "Who is delaying a settlement of the Austrian Question", Soviet News, 21 December 1953, pp. 2-3. Coval Weil holds that the reasons for the failure of any sort of east-west negotiations during 1962-1963 related to a greater extent to the domestic compulsions within the Western powers rather than those within the Soviet Union, see Weil, n. 73, pp. 188-210.
negotiations, particularly after the failure of the Western efforts for direct contacts with the Soviet Union via the media of the "Short Treaty". Resolute in their pursuit of national sovereignty, Austrian statesmen made various attempts to break the lull in negotiations and keep the issue alive. When Four Power contacts were severed at all levels, Austria sought the intervention of "third parties" to find a channel through this impasse. Although no direct intervention was envisaged for third parties in this situation, some Latin American states through the United Nations and India played significant roles as "intermediaries" in response to Austria's call. Their impact was decisively felt in arousing world public opinion. The side effects of these intermediary roles were a promise and a warning. The Soviet hint to the Indian ambassador at Moscow about the neutralization of the land as an acceptable proposition was the first articulated statement by the Soviet Union about a possible base for a settlement, a proposition which had been stressed time and again by the Austrian statesmen. At the same time the recurring Soviet stress on the unavoidable connexion of a German and an Austrian settlement, signalled the probable future
obstacle: which the State Treaty negotiators might have to overcome. Pending final conclusion of the treaty, the policy of limited objectives for immediate gains was successfully exploited by Austria in securing partial withdrawal of occupation troops in British and French zones, in getting assurances from all for bearing their own occupation costs and in having further relaxation of the administrative control in the internal affairs of Austria.

The assumption behind Austria's attempt to persuade the Big Four to reopen the Austrian question was that there were influences on their behaviour, particularly the Soviet behaviour that would re-orientate their negotiating techniques and permit them to give up perverse obstructiveness. In other words, with adequate understanding of the new weapons systems, strategic policy goals would create a new and compelling dimension to inter-Big power relations. Thus the unprecedented rise in international tensions contributed to the evolution of the view that an Austrian settlement could provide the "breakthrough" for a major new international effort to reduce friction and conflict in the world. The situation in 1951 served to point out the dangers that had arisen
for Austria's independent role-playing when pressing circumstances led to the precipitous decline of negotiations. In place of the give and take of conference diplomacy, the Soviets did not hesitate to exacerbate the political relationship with Austria by mounting attacks in answer to what they described as "western plots to link Austria with the NATO".

By accepting publicly an obligation not to sign a separate peace treaty with the Western Powers and ruling out participation in the European Defence System, the Austrians recognized the inherent danger of distortion of their national objective if they were to declare a total commitment to the West through a partisan alignment. Instead, the Austrian attention was focussed on the use of the United Nations as a world institution where there were opportunities for image-building and in an important sense it can be said that the Austrians demonstrated their competence to steer a course which avoided the interlocking of the Austrian problem with other serious conflict situations awaiting action by the world body.

The turning point towards the development of responsible bargaining was reached with the Soviet
concessions in 1963 which were an undisguised preparation for a Soviet peace offensive. There is considerable evidence that the moves for breaking the diplomatic deadlock were made more feasible by the Austrian political strategy of underplaying the ideological cleavage and encouraging Western negotiators to find the most efficient way to widen the area of cooperative relations with the Soviet Union with the loosening of the Stalinist straitjacket. This strategy paid off in that the negotiators agreed to meet and reopen talks for an Austrian settlement.