CONCLUSION
THE EMERGENT PATTERN

1. Implications of the Test Case

The reestablishment of an independent and democratic Austria by the provisions of the State Treaty of 16 May 1955 turned a new page in the history of the Austrian Republic and of the world diplomatic practice. The process of conflict resolution successfully applied in the Austrian case reveals a significant pattern in the post Second World War relations among the Big Powers and a successful exploitation of the evolution of their interdependence by the Austrian political elite. It marked round one in the beginning of the end of the cold war which had precariously engulfed the world from mid-forties to mid-fifties. Of the innumerable techniques employed in the elimination of tension in the world, conference diplomacy or the negotiated settlement of disputes has always been awarded pride of place. Since the earliest times states have been negotiating on international conflict situations with the ultimate objective of maintaining peace and stability in the world state system. Numelin refers to the existence and tactics of "peace negotiators" in primitive societies to settle disputes about grazing grounds, cattle and other matters of mutual interest. (1)

When threatened with war from a neighbouring state, the Greeks used to conscript their finest orators to negotiate with the adversary. The context in which De Callieres stressed the need of continual negotiations in Europe in the early eighteenth century anticipated its absolute necessity in the modern age on the world arena. (2) In the nineteenth century Felice considered the psychological interplay of negotiators as the very heart of diplomacy. Recently Heinrich Wildner subtitled his book on the Technique of Diplomacy as the Art of Negotiator.

Till the end of the Second World War, however, nations had the alternative to continue diplomacy by other means by resorting to force. Escalation of conflict to the level of a total war was not an unacceptable proposition for decision makers of militarily powerful states. Today, in the thermonuclear setting of world politics violent wars - total or limited - are no longer rational solutions. Prolongation of the cold war has at a number of places created actual confrontations with credible threats of mobilizing military force. Thus, survival and security needs have forced a more or less permanent

march from the battle field to the conference table, which calls for still greater planning of strategies and counter-strategies for the attainment of one's goals.

One of the immediate objectives in Big Power search for stability had been some sort of "power management". In this endeavour they seemed to have found a basis for cooperation for limited gains although they have been at variance in several other fields. The alliance system reinitiated by the Western Allies after the end of the Second World War revealed its paradoxical nature in relation to security needs. It enhanced "the appeal of a more direct resolution of the problems of mutual security by negotiated accommodation with the Soviet Union intended to mitigate the political sources of strategic difficulties." (3) The technique proposed was disengagement and was focussed mainly on the problem of German reunification. However, due to politico-military calculations on the part of the super powers the plans remained impracticable so far as the expanded region of Germany was concerned. Moreover, in Europe none of the Big Powers had found it

possible to disengage from the areas through which its armies had passed during the course of the Second World War without creating some sort of politico-military stronghold. No plans of disengagement through "arms limitation and control", "thinning out of forces", and "freezing of arms" in central Europe, "demilitarized area between East and West", "European middle zone", "atom free zone", "demuclearized zone", "neutral belt from the Baltic to the Adriatic", "international safety belt", and the like could be agreed upon, although the Powers concerned persistently toyed with these ideas as a means towards political settlement ultimately resulting in stability and peace in the world state system. (4) One significant exception to all these efforts was provided by the territory of Austria on which a definite and total "withdrawal" was staged by the Big Four on the basis of neutralization of the area. The concept of disengagement did succeed though on a very limited field and so far without repeating the Korean performance where disengagement paved the way for stumbling into war. The dictum of power management

through neutralization could find its credibility in a localized context. Its wider applicability is a doubtful premise, but as Black and others point out "its supplementary role in the overall process of managing power in international system" cannot be refuted. (5)

The strenuous and persistent efforts through conference diplomacy yielded a positive solution by an agreement on certain negative actions in the sense that the Big Powers agreed not to use the area for military purposes. This was not due to the sudden emergence of a technique of conflict resolution, but the result of a distinct evolution in the relations between the Big Four, which so shaped Soviet and Western attitudes as to lead to the evacuation of Austria. A change, marked by a problem in international conciliation was first explicitly detected towards the beginning of 1953, although the background for such a new turn of events had started altering, albeit slowly and imperceptibly, much earlier. The conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty was the outcome of this evolutionary change towards a relaxation of tension leading to a sort of détente. The Big Four seemed to have

(5) Black and others, Neutralization and World Politics (Princeton, 1968).
learnt from their experience of a decade long muddling as to how they could arrive at successful solutions of problems of a limited nature.

Initially though there were serious obstacles in reaching agreement on the Austrian treaty questions, the area of disagreement decisively contracted with the French and Soviet proposals for the economic sections of the draft treaty submitted at London in 1948. Despite bickerings and fallouts in the other European scenarios, particularly Germany, "speaking terms" were maintained on the Austrian question for a considerable length of time. A further contraction in the area of disagreement was witnessed with the Paris decision of 1949 to reestablish Austria within the boundaries of 1 January 1938. Though this was followed by a break in the process for a period of nearly five years from the point of view of concrete achievements, a significant change was taking place in the attitudes of the powers concerned that they came to look upon this area as a trial ground for gestures of goodwill. This was particularly evidenced from the fact that the Soviet support to the Communist Party of Austria was always short of military involvement. A relaxed attitude in the internal administration did develop despite numerous asymmetries thrust in the treaty negotiations which were carried on in that phase.
mostly through an exchange of memoranda. At the conference held at Berlin in 1954 an agreement had been evolved on all issues except the question of interdependence of the German and the Austrian problems, but this was of substantive importance and stood in the way of normalization of relations between Austria and the Big Powers. In early 1955 the negotiations had achieved a common level of priorities and a concrete experiment was undertaken in disengagement.

The emergent pattern after persistent and patient chiseling of the issues at stake highlights certain processes and strategies peculiar to the framework of Austrian conflict resolution and makes it a model in itself whose applicability becomes highly restricted. This was the first issue in the cold war solved to the best possible satisfaction of the occupying powers at the initiative of the Soviet Union who had started a peace offensive at this stage and almost forced the Western Allies into cooperation which otherwise would have tarnished their image as peace constructionists.

The realistic adaptation of the communist ideology to their policy objectives and the planning of their bargaining strategies accordingly by the Soviet decision
makers, exercise of tight control over their negotiators, sidetracking major issues and negotiating with "tie-ins" when not ready for a decision, love for procedural matters, all in general coincide with the traditional Soviet pattern of international negotiations. The Anglo-American latitude to their negotiators, their haste in evolving rapid solutions, their tendency to rely on reaching "agreement in principle" and their dictum of negotiating from positions of strength brought much discredit to them on the propaganda front. France tried to compromise between their extreme positions by focussing the negotiations on concrete issues. A distinct motif was skilfully interwoven by the Austrian political elite in this routine behaviour pattern of the Big Four negotiations by way of exploiting their interdependence and expanding multipolar and multidimensional approach, reaching beyond the confines of East versus West formulations in the dynamically changed setting of international relations. The Austrian behaviour pattern based on their doctrine of "self-determination" and "abstentionism" gave decisive turn to the system of negotiations leading to a successful resolution of the conflict. (6) Being a "liberated" country,

(6) The concept of "self-determination" is used in this context to denote the resolve of the Austrian people to have sovereign control over their destiny devoid contd....
she was deprived of any direct influence on the course of negotiations till the Berlin Conference of 1954. In spite of this significant disadvantage, her role remained one of persistently although indirectly and slowly, so proceeding as to turn the tide in her favour and thus contributing towards restoration of Austria's undivided entity.

In the precariously peculiar formulation of Austria's liberated identity after the Second World War her initial experience was one of frustration. Nonetheless, in the presence of Four Power occupation surprisingly enough, a united common government emerged in Austria in early 1945. This called for troops withdrawal of the Big Four. The Austrian objective was, however, obstructed as, the Big Four tried to settle down on their small territory due to their politico-military calculations in the entire region. The Austrian political elite, therefore, through the process of selection and emphasis shaped the "overriding value goals of the body politic" into an ideology and national identity bringing it into conformity with the political, economic, military, moral and social

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of any foreign pressures; similarly by "abstentionism" is denoted the Austrian attitude to keep themselves aloof of the Big Power entanglements, and their intentions to bring Austria under their politico-military fold.
needs of the time. A "positive self-image" was cautiously projected to brush aside the "ego-damage" which Austrians experienced for being denounced for participating in the war on the side of Nazi Germany. (7) Emergence of a common coalition government lent support to the need of unity within. Striking differences among the parties were persistently kept aside so long as the "outsiders" were present on the territory. As a result all communist efforts to grasp power failed in Austria despite the unstable economic situation and effective Soviet occupation in a part of the country. Thus it was the "concentrated coalition" maintained by the political elite at the governmental level that found an echo in the national behaviour.

No opportunity was missed in bringing home the absolute need for unity in a nation which finds itself in a situation like Austria. The greetings conveyed by the men in power to the people on every New Year, Easter or Christmas, their messages on the anniversaries of the Moscow Declaration or of the establishment of the UN and their policy statements on specific treaty questions

hammered home the theme persuasively. The united internal position of Austria gave it a position of strength vis-à-vis the occupying powers who were trying to project themselves as "peace constructionists" throughout, but their actions fell much short of their pronounced images. This was the distinctive feature peculiar to the Austrian situation alone and was one of the weaknesses which led to Germany's vulnerable position. Later this very element of internal disruptions led to more or less permanent partitions of Vietnam and Korea.

Simultaneously, it was impressed time and again on the occupying powers that Austria could best manage her house if left to herself. Her insistence that the Big Four should negotiate "with" Austria and not "on" Austria was the most significant articulation of their unflagging demand for self-determination, which assumed with the Austrians an almost doctrinal importance. At the same time there was constant resistance to the process of Big Powers "dealing with Europe while negotiating on Austria."

The reestablishment of an economically viable Austria was given utmost importance in the "public language" of the political elite since the very start, because the precarious economic position of the state
had very often been the cause of her political demise. In the face of the threat of losing a significant portion of property by way of Soviet claims to German, External Assets in Austria, no efforts were spared to stress that all Austrian property should be placed at the disposal of the Austrian Government. The successful resistance to the Soviet bid for an Austro-Soviet company and the passage of the nationalization law were bold attempts of the Austrian Government to preserve their right to have complete control over their economy.

As a measure of compromise for an early solution of the total problem, a conciliatory attitude was displayed on the issue of the Austro-Italian territorial dispute. Nonetheless, when faced with the possibility of further slicing of the land on the Austro-Yugoslav frontier, Austria almost threatened to dismantle the Big Four negotiations. No doubt, she rested on the solid support of the Western Allies in the pursuit of these policy objectives.

No sooner did the leaders get an inkling of the possibility of restoring sovereignty on the basis of neutralization, than they vehemently started emphasizing it in their public discourses. In an attempt to impress on the occupying powers that no "stilting politics" would be followed
in future, the Austrian Government tried to maintain balanced relations with all the occupying Powers despite its inclinations towards the West. Emphasis was laid on the policy that no separate treaty would be signed by Austria with any one of the Powers individually or with any congruence of these. An Austrian delegation was present at every place where Austria sensed the possibility of the Austrian question being discussed by the Big Four. Contacts were established with the representatives of all the occupying Powers outside the conference hall and regular information was obtained about what conspired within. An effort was simultaneously made to impress on these representatives, the Austrian view on the treaty questions. This process was at its height during the Austro-Soviet bilateral talks at Moscow in April 1955. The Western suspicions about Austrians leaning towards Moscow were effectively controlled at this time by way of constant contacts and exhaustive briefing to the Western Ambassadors at Moscow about the parleys at the bilateral negotiations. The climax was reached when Austria, on the basis of the United States support, demanded that neutralization should be a self-declared policy goal of Austrian Government and not an enforced status, and it was consented to.
Another characteristic feature of the Austrian behaviour pattern was her unfailing effort to keep the Austrian dialogue continuous. Whenever the Big Four relapsed into a mood of quietness, Austria took the initiative in pursuing them to resume the process of negotiations by sending notes and issuing appeals. Whenever the Big Four brought in extraneous issues burdening the frame of Austrian negotiations, Austria tried to steer the proceedings back on to the proper track. Austrian statesmen undertook extensive tours to explain their major policy objectives, and to induce the Big Four to concentrate on these. In the event of complete severance of the Four Power contact on the Austrian question, Austria turned to the United Nations and requested India to use her good offices with Moscow to bring her to the conference table. When all her efforts seemed to yield no immediate results, Austria tried to get at least a reduction of her occupation burdens by way of partial troops withdrawal. Thus in the absence of a continuous overt dialogue on the Austrian question among the Big Four, Austria tried to keep it going at some level or the other, thereby slowly progressing towards her set goal of restoring her sovereignty.

The policy of "abstentionism" was a logical corollary of all these efforts. Internal unity was maintained
not so much by the forces of unity within as by the process of abstaining themselves from being divided. In a way it was an attempt at preventing the political erosion of their position which otherwise would have been an inevitable process. It was quite surprising that the Communist Party of Austria could not make any headway even in the Soviet Occupation Zone despite the decade long military presence of the Soviet Union. This may no doubt be accounted for by the attitude of abstentionism developed by the people over a period of time which helped them in abstaining from the Soviet Imperium on the one hand and the Western Alliance politics on the other.

The traditional Soviet policy of Imperium on the territories of central Europe was an inheritance from Czarist Russia and a realist political need. Despite the Soviet Power and her actual military presence in Austria, Austrians evaded all the techniques for the extension of this policy on her territory. She received decisive Western support in this effort. Initially the Soviet policy of economic integration through a proposal for an Austro-Soviet company was foiled by the Austrian Government with the object of escaping that Imperium. The dissociation of the Socialist Party of Austria from the general strikes of 1950 at a critical stage was
another significant case in instance. Ultimately acceptance of heavy economic burdens in lieu of the "German external assets" was also a step to avoid that Imperium. No foreign economic control was accepted by Austria; she preferred to meet demands strictly under the surveillance of her own government.

On the other hand Austria abstained from being entangled in the Western Alliance system in Europe. It cautiously shaped its attitude towards the Western military pact coming on the heels of the Truman Doctrine to contain communism. Marshall Aid was the earlier instrument of this policy and Austria did reap immense advantages from that economic aid. It was visualized by cautious observers that the Western policy of integration of the "West German Trizonia" in NATO may find its further expansion in Austria as well. Inclusion of an "Austrian Trizonia" would have been a helping hand to this military pact as it would have established a continuous landlink between the northern and the southern flanks of NATO. Loss of an independent sovereign identity even within such an "Austrian Trizonia" would have been a logical corollary. Austrian statesmen, therefore, left no stone unturned to impress on the occupying powers that she would not join the Western Military Alliance. Moreover, it also seemed in the interest of the Big Powers
themselves to avoid any such eventuality because Austrian territory was the only ground left in Europe which could have been used for trial steps in international conciliation. Consequently, this gave an added support to the Austrian policy of abstentionism.

Thus, Austria regained her sovereign democratic existence through the hard and bitter process of negotiations spread over a decade after the Second World War. Besides affording an example of the possibility of East-West accord, it offered grounds for hope that other intractable international problems could also be resolved through sustained multilateral negotiations, rather than by military means. Though the results did not satisfy all the main objectives of all, or some of the parties, they did provide a basis for agreement on terms acceptable to all.

The stability of the Austrian solution can fairly be accepted after a decade and a half of its continued existence in which it withstood the thunders of the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and later of the Czechoslovak incidents of 1968 - both her neighbouring states under a different politico-economic system. Nonetheless, the continued survival of the permanent neutrality of Austria depends to a
considerable extent on the willingness of the Big Powers concerned to respect that neutrality. This is particularly true until such time as Austria has the power to militarily defend any violation of her neutrality. This was clearly evident when the US planes violated Austrian airspace in the southwest during the Lebanese crisis and a similar violation was reported of the Austrian northeast airspace by the Soviet planes during the Czechoslovak crisis. The response was Austrian protest notes to the powers concerned.

The State Treaty does not impose any obligations of neutrality on Austria, nor is there any specific guarantee by the Big Four in this regard except for the fact that the neutrality law passed by the Austrian Parliament has been recognized by the Big Four and by the other states with whom Austria maintains diplomatic contacts. Austrian membership of the United Nations can be said to have extended her a sort of latent understanding to respect her neutrality in the community of nations. And yet much depends on the Big Powers' desire and their fitting actions to keep the area neutralized. Legally speaking, Austria was not specifically neutralized, but the entire process which led them to adopt the status of Permanent Neutrality
has definite indications of the phenomenon of "neutralization". Nonetheless, it cannot be refuted that the entire pattern of the Austrian case and the definite degree of its stability has its own characteristic features which would very much restrict its applicability as a model for other areas demanding conflict resolution.

The case of Laos clearly reveals the contrast. Thirteen big and small powers gave an international guarantee to Laotian neutrality and established an International Control Commission to enforce it. (8) And despite this specific guarantee and a formal enforcement machinery, the neighbouring states almost immediately started violating Laotian neutrality. Even in the absence of these formalities Austrian neutrality has proved itself much more stable. The contrast of the Laotian canvas is also evident in the lack of its internal development, of proper communication between the political elite and the masses, and of unified leadership, the factors which were at the disposal of the Austrian state despite its division into occupation zones and its burdens.

The Austrian success is a combination of the horizontal movement to bring together the Four Powers, erstwhile Allies but now divided into opposing camps, and the vertical mobilization of Austrian resources around the new nationalism of Austrians whose scope for political action was severely limited by the restraints imposed by the Soviet and the United States confrontation in Europe in the post war period.

The Austrians demonstrated a capability of absorbing pressures which in other conflict situations decreased the level of political participation by the political society over which the Big Powers were in dispute. In the Austrian case efforts were made to avoid political passivity and in effect this represented a planned deployment of Austrian diplomatic resources to reduce the susceptibility of Big Power negotiations to degenerate into interventionism.