continued to send their replies direct to the Soviet Union.

Some circles in Japan hoped that negotiations for the normalisation of relations might be given a start, through utilising the opportunity of the correspondence about the status of the Mission. (14) However, there was no concrete move from either side. Moscow Radio reported on 10 July 1952 that the Japan problem could be solved by the withdrawal of the Occupation troops and the grant of equal rights to other countries also. (15) Though there was a feeling that this might be taken as a move for Peace Treaty from the Soviet Union, no other specific proposals came forward. On the other hand, Chinese leaders visited Moscow in August 1952 and after talks lasting nearly a month, the notes exchanged between Soviet Union and China were published. According to these, China and Soviet Union agreed to the retention of the Soviet Troops in Port Arthur till a Peace Treaty between Japan, China and Soviet Union was concluded. (16) This

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14 Asahi editorial, 1 June 1952 "New Beginning in Soviet-Japanese Relations".

15 Yomiuri (evening), 10 July 1952.

Addressing the Russian Garrison in Dairen in February 1953 Chou-En Lai stated that Russian troops should remain stationed in Port Arthur to prevent the place being used as a bridgehead for an invasion of north-east China. Survey 1953, p. 231.
At the time of the Geneva Conference (April 1954) a member of the Chinese delegation told foreign correspondents that Russian troops in Port Arthur were there for the purpose of preventing aggression by Japan or by forces connected with Japan and that he thought that they should remain there till Japan became a truly democratic nation. Survey 1954, p. 241.
clearly showed that the Soviet Union and China wished to have a counterpoise ready in answer to the continuation of the stationing of American troops in Japan. The fact that they were very much concerned about the American militarisation of Japan is also clear from their repeated references to Japan being a military base of USA. Since the presence of American troops hurt the pride of the Japanese as a whole, irrespective of their ideological sympathies, the Soviet Union's darts hit close to the mark.

**Internal situation**

The discontentment within the country led to the bloody May Day Riots in 1952. They were not only quelled quickly, but the Government were actually strengthened by these incidents to pass the Anti-Subversive Activities Prevention Law. The protests of the people and the Opposition Parties could not prevent its passage. However, the anti-American feelings could not be channelled and fused to yield results fruitful to the Soviet Union, viz., expulsion or the voluntary withdrawal of American troops. The country was actually enjoying the boom created by the Korean War and the grant of independence opened up more channels of fruitful overseas trade. The presence of American troops also ensured the continuation of the profits of special procurement. Thus no remarkable change could be brought about within the country.
The year 1953 brought about dramatic developments within the Soviet Union; they led to a thaw in Soviet relations with Japan. Stalin's death in March 1953 produced a change in leadership. In the field of foreign relations, there was a growing tendency in Soviet agreements to reduction of tensions. Armistice was declared in Korea and though the anti-American line was continued, the attacks were not vitriolic. In his speech at the Presidium on 8 August 1953, G.M. Malenkov made a statement, that with the truce in Korea, the time had come for the normalisation of relations between the various countries in the Far East and especially between Soviet Union and Japan. (17) This statement seemed to indicate that Soviet Union would give due consideration to any proposal for normalisation put forward by Japan.

1954 witnessed a detente between the East and the West starting with a conference in Berlin from 25 January 1954 to 18 February 1954 over the German question. The Soviet Union continued to give indications of her desire for normalisation of relations with Japan and a flexible policy towards her. In April 1954, the Soviet Union did not oppose Japan's entry into ECAFE. Through ECAFE Office, Japan was also extended an invitation to send a delegation to accompany

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delegations, being invited from South East Asian countries, to inspect the agricultural and manufacturing industries of the Soviet Union. Japan did not decline the invitation and the delegation spent one month in the Soviet Union. This delegation also brought back the impression that the Soviet Union was very keen on normalisation of relations and expansion of trade relations. (18)

**Soviet feelers towards Japan**

The Soviet Union's views were once again made clear in the replies given by V.M. Molotov to a questionnaire sent by Chubu Nippon Agency and which were published in the Soviet Press on 13 September 1954. Molotov repeated the Soviet view that the obstacle in the way of normalisation was subservience to the United States. The Soviet Union felt that Japan should have armed forces sufficient enough to defend herself independently just like any other sovereign independent nation. (19)

The question of relations with Japan formed a part of the joint communique issued by N.S. Khrushchev and Chinese leaders on 12 October 1954 on the occasion of his visit to China for the fifth anniversary celebrations of the

18 Ibid., pp. 667-8.

19 Ibid., pp. 668-9.
People's Republic of China. Both the leaders expressed their readiness to normalise relations with Japan. At the same time, the arrangement made in September 1952, that Soviet military establishments would continue to remain in Port Arthur till a Peace Treaty was concluded with Japan, was reconsidered and it was decided that these establishments should be returned to China without payment of any compensation and also that the Soviet troops should be withdrawn by 31 May 1955. (20) This could be explained partly by the relaxation of tension in the world in general, viz., truce in Korea and peace in Indo-China, as the communique itself specified. At the same time, the confidence of the USSR in the ability of the Chinese Republic to look after her own defences might have been one of the factors. The Soviet Union and China, seemed to have recognised the impracticality of drawing Japan out of the security treaty system of the USA, while they continued to be in a state of war with her. The Soviet Union and China realised that if they did not insist stubbornly on the abrogation of the San Francisco treaty system, normalisation of relations with Japan might become a possibility. This change in the views of the Soviet Union and China, which was also consistent with the broader principles of peaceful co-existence set forth by the new Soviet regime, was made the more explicit by

Moscow radio's interpretation of the joint communique of 12 October 1954 that neither the Soviet Union nor China required of Japan to break the good relations she maintained with other countries. (21)

**Internal pressures and politics**

Let us now turn to the pressures within the country for the normalisation of relations. The business circles in Japan foresaw that the truce in Korea and the corresponding reduction of special procurement for US forces in Japan was bound to have an impact on the Japanese economy. Japan was already facing a fall in her exports, as there was a dollar shortage, especially in the sterling area where the nations had to resort to a policy of import restrictions and export expansion. There were two ways open to get out of this difficult situation. One was the extension of trade with the Communist Bloc and the other the strengthening of economic co-operation with the USA.

In April 1952, when the Soviet Union held a World Economic Conference and sent invitations to eight notable

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In an article in Izvestia dated 22 December 1954, it was made quite clear that though Soviet Union and China felt that the San Francisco Treaty subjugated Japan, they did not think that this Treaty stood in the way of their having good relations with Japan. Sovieto Nenpo 1955, p. 672.
notable personalities in the business world and the academic world of Japan, it aroused quite an interest in Japan. Through this Conference the Soviet Union tried to show the great vistas of trade which the Communist Bloc could offer and also the possibility of increased trade relations between countries under different political systems. With the outbreak of the Korean War, the Western Powers through the COCOM banned the export to the USSR of a number of articles, including strategic materials, and in early 1951, the Kem amendment to the Appropriations Act of 1951 laid down that no economic or financial assistance should be provided to countries which exported to USSR or communist countries articles banned by COCOM. (22) Japan's trade with the Soviet Union had thus come to a standstill. The invitations to the Conference, therefore, created quite a stir and were taken as an opportunity to be utilised. But, much to the disappointment of the invitees, the Government would not think of allowing such a step and refused to issue passports. (23) Among the business circles, opinion was divided. The group under the leadership of Keidanren

22 Documents 1951, p. 43. Resolution of the Supreme Soviet on 6 August 1951 condemned the Kem Amendment as US attempt to terminate trade with the Soviet Union and countries friendly towards Soviet Union.

23 Asahi, 19 January 1952.
(Federation of Economic Organisations), headed by Ishikawa Ichire, felt that no purpose would be served by attendance, while the group under the leadership of Murata Shozo favoured participation. The latter group appreciated the fact that Government could not commit itself politically, but felt that there would be no harm, if private participation was allowed. They were of the view that Japan would be losing an opportunity to present her views, while other nations would be doing so and thus would be isolating herself from the world. (24) But, in spite of these opinions, the Government decided against participation in the Conference. (25) However, Kora Tomio, a Councillor of the Upper House, who was in Paris for a UNESCO Conference, entered Moscow and attended the Conference. (26) The chief of the Japan-Soviet Trade Association, M.V. Nesterov, referred in his speech to the Soviet interest in trade with Japan. (27) As New York Times stated later, the Economic Conference by making an offer of about $10 billion hit the West in a vulnerable point, as unemployment in Europe had risen alarmingly due to shortage of export markets and the prospect

24 Jiji, 2 February 1952.
26 Asahi, 7 April 1952.
27 Sovieto Nenpo 1955, p. 662.
of a rouble market had a definite appeal, as it was also an alternative to US economic aid. (28) Japan, nevertheless, preferred to adhere to the policy of co-operation with the USA rather than expanding her trade with the Communist Bloc and only barter trade continued, till an official trade agreement was signed in 1957. However, the business circles continued to exert their pressure on the Government for early normalisation. The composition of Japan's trade with the USSR and the various problems connected with it will be taken up in a separate chapter.*

Another important group which was interested in early normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union was the fishery interests. (The pressures exerted by them before the negotiations and during the negotiations would also be dealt with subsequently)** It was clear that both the trade circles and fishery circles felt that the furtherance of their interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union would become impossible, if negotiations at an official level were not started. The Soviet Union also indirectly encouraged the activities of these interest groups with regard to the normalisation of relations.

As long as Yoshida was at the helm of affairs, neither the activities of the interest groups, nor the public statements made by the Soviet Union elicited any

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*Chapter V.

**Chapter VI.
positive statement from the Government about their desire to launch on any negotiations. In fact, early in 1953, the Government seemed to be troubled by the problem of reconnaisance flights by Russian aircraft from Northern Kuriles over northern Hokkaido. Even an actual encounter between Soviet and American aircraft over Hokkaido was reported on 16 February 1953. (29) On 2 April 1953, a new Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation was signed with the USA, in Tokyo, which provided for freedom of commercial activities by the nationals of either country in the territory of the other on a basis of most-favoured nation treatment. (30) This Treaty put Japanese commercial relations with the USA on an equal footing, which had been suspended since 1940, when USA denounced the Treaty of 1911. In mid-July 1953, discussions between Japan and the USA progressed on the question of conclusion of a Mutual Security Agreement, whereby the latter agreed to render financial and technical assistance for the development of Japanese military forces. Ikeda Hayato was sent to the USA as Yoshida's personal representative and on 30 October 1953, a statement was issued after Ikeda's talks with the Assistant Secretary of State, Walter S. Robertson, which announced the American aid of $ 50 million

29 Survey 1953, p. 274.
DSB, 26 January 1953, pp. 134-5 gives the notes exchanged between Japan and USA on this subject.

to Japan. Again, though a formal Mutual Security Agreement was not signed, it not only paved the way for a later Agreement but also strengthened Yoshida's position. The Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement was signed on 28 March 1954. Dulles visited Japan in August 1953 and announced the return of Amami Oshima islands, the northern group in Ryukyus. This could be considered as a partial appeasement of the demand for return of Ryukyus and Bonins. (31) But through a coincidence, Malenkov's statement indicating the Soviet Union's softened attitude was also announced on the same date.

The year 1954 started off badly for the Japanese American relations. The "Ash of Death" that rained on the Fukryu Maru, (the Japanese fishing boat which passed into the danger zone near Bikini, where the hydrogen bomb was being exploded) sent a wave of panic among the Japanese and revived the bitterness against the USA for infecting Japan with radioactivity. The Bikini incident, however, did not prevent the final conclusion of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement on 8 March 1954. In September 1954, the USA transferred the responsibility of ground defence of Hokkaido to Japanese forces. (32)

The internal political conditions were far from stable within the country in 1953. It may be recalled that Hatoyama Ichiro, who was elected President of the Jiyuto (Liberal Party) after the War, had to retire from active politics, as he became the victim of the purge and Yoshida became the Prime Minister. (33) In 1951 when Hatoyama was depurged, he returned to the fray with the hope that his disciple would step down in his favour of his own accord. However, Yoshida had tasted power and also established himself well and would not give up easily. The result was the split of the Jiyuto into Hatoyama and Yoshida groups confronting each other. Hatoyama was supported ably by Kono Ichiro and Ishibashi Tanzan. His conflict with Yoshida came in the open on many occasions. When the House tabled a no confidence motion against Ikeda Hayato, Minister for International Trade and Industry, the absence of Hatoyama and his group weakened the ruling party and the motion was carried. The conflict deepened and in February 1953 when the opposition parties tabled a no confidence motion against Yoshida, Hatoyama along with twelve followers including Kono Ichiro and Miki Bukichi resigned from Jiyuto and voted for the resolution,

33 The official charges against Hatoyama leading to his purge have been explained in Hans Baerwald, The Purge of Japanese Leaders under the Occupation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1959), pp. 21-24. It appears Gen. MacArthur told Yoshida that Hatoyama was purged at the specific insistence of the Soviet Union, probably because of his anti-communist speeches. Yoshida feels that he was partly to blame as he encouraged Hatoyama to include anti-communist policy as one of the main planks of the Jiyuto. Shigeru Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs (London 1961), pp. 164-5.
along with the opposition parties. The motion was thus carried and Yoshida immediately dissolved the House and called for fresh elections. As a consequence, the Hatoyama group, which resigned, formed a new party, the Hatoyama Jiyuto, with Hatoyama as the President, on 18 March 1953. This new Party also drew into its fold more than ten members who had been expelled from the Jiyuto after the no confidence motion. In the elections which followed, Yoshida Jiyuto secured 199 seats, Hatoyama Jiyuto secured 35 seats and the Kaishinto (Progressive Party) 76 seats. Yoshida had to ask for the cooperation of the opposition groups among the conservatives to get a majority. Kaishinto refused to cooperate unless Shigemitsu Mamoru was made the Prime Minister. Yoshida was thus placed in a very difficult situation. But he managed to carry on, though hedged in by opposition among the conservatives themselves. His popularity was on the wane. Finally he prevailed upon the Hatoyama group to return to the Party by conceding the establishment of a Constitution Research Council to review the Constitution, particularly Art. 9. Hatoyama Jiyuto became Nihon Jiyuto in which Kono Ichiro and Miki Bukichi continued.

Things came to a head when there was opposition from all sides with the manner in which Yoshida prevented the arrest of Sato Eisaku who was wanted in connection with the Shipping scandal case. The Deputy Prime Minister, Ogata Taketora, tried to save the situation by proposing a merger of Jiyuto with Kaishinto, the next big conservative group.
Kaishinto put forward the condition that Yoshida should retire. In the meantime, Hatoyama once again left Jiyuto in November 1954 and joined the new Party Nihon Minshuto, formed by the amalgamation of Kaishinto and Nihon Jiyuto. Yoshida, however, would not agree to retire and wanted to dissolve the House. But most of the members of Jiyuto, headed by Ogata, were against another dissolution. Finally, Yoshida had to bow to their wishes and the Cabinet resigned. Following this, Minshuto (Democratic Party) formed the Government with Hatoyama as the Prime Minister and Shigemitsu Mamoru as the Foreign Minister. Hatoyama promised that he would get the acceptance of the people for his leadership by having general elections very soon. (34)

The conflict between Hatoyama and Yoshida has been dealt with at length as it gives an indication of the opposition he would have to encounter - and which he did encounter - when he assumed power. Apart from the opposition from Jiyuto, the Minshuto itself was a coalition of two groups which merged only to overthrow Yoshida, and not necessarily because they held the same views on all policy issues. It was also doubtful whether the Socialist Parties, who worked with Hatoyama for bringing about the down-fall of Yoshida,

34 For a deep analysis of factional politics and their motivations, during this period, see, Yoshitake Oka, ed., Gendai Nihon no seiji katei (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 93-102.
would support him on all issues. While it is true that the Socialist Parties welcomed Hatoyama's plans for the normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union and China, they were not very happy with Hatoyama's ideas of rearmament, revision of the Constitution and support of the San Francisco security system. It cannot, however, be denied that there was a general feeling of relief in that the autocratic one-man rule of Yoshida, which seemed to turn the clock back to the pre-war days through various measures like the centralisation of police forces, etc. was at last brought to a close. While the new Hatoyama Cabinet was not likely to swing away from USA, it was hoped that he would pursue a more independent policy. (35)

On assumption of office, on 11 December 1954, Shigemitsu made the announcement that

while fully cooperating with the free world without any prejudice, we hope to normalise relations with the Soviet Union and China on terms mutually acceptable ... we do not expect spectacular expansion of trade, but we do welcome an increase in the small volume of trade.

Molotov replied to this in a Moscow broadcast to the effect that as already pointed out in the Sino-Soviet Declaration


The authors rightly feel that the change was only from a "policy of dependence (on USA)" to an "amended policy of dependence (on USA)". This is revealed in the negotiations with the Soviet Union.

In 1954 polls, 56.4 per cent stated that Yoshida should retire. Allan B. Cole and Naomichi Nakanishi, ed. Japanese opinion polls with socio-political significance, 1947-57 (Michigan, 1959), p. 188.
of 12 October 1954, the Soviet Union was ready for normalisation, if Japan truly desired to do so. (36) However, no diplomatic moves were made by Japan and she continued her "wait and watch policy". Jiyuto also advised caution and called the positive attitude taken by Minshuto as a pose for rallying support in the ensuing elections.

SOVIET UNION TAKES THE INITIATIVE

It was the Soviet Union which took the initiative of sending a note to the Japanese Government through their representative Andrei Ivanovich Dominitsky. Dominitsky first tried to approach the Foreign Office to hand over his proposal but was repulsed. Then through Kuhara Fusanosuke, President of the Nichu Nisso Kokko Kaifuku Kaigi (National Council of Associations for the normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union and China), he approached Sugihara Kota, Member of the House of Councillors and a close friend of Hatoyama. He was able to meet Hatoyama at his residence on 7 January 1955 and found him responsive. Though the Foreign Office, including Shigemitsu, were displeased with Hatoyama for responding to such private overtures, Hatoyama could prevail upon Shigemitsu to take action on the note handed over to him on 25 January 1955. The note, which was

36 *Mainichi*, 17 December 1954.
neither dated nor signed, mentioned the Joint Sino-Soviet Comminique of 12 October 1954 and the Molotov statement of 16 December 1954 as indications of the Soviet intentions to enter into negotiations and the statements made by Shigemitsu on 11 December 1954 as well as Premier Hatoyama's statement as expression of Japanese views. The note was concluded with the statement that, in consideration of the above facts, the Soviet Union was ready to assign representatives to start negotiations either in Moscow or in Tokyo. This note thus solved the embarrassment for Japan of making the first formal move, while at the same time earning for the Soviet Union the prestige of breaking the ice. Tokyo or Moscow as venue of the talks were, however, not acceptable to Japan as there was no Japanese Mission in Moscow and no official Soviet Mission in Tokyo. Japan's suggestion of New York was turned down by the Soviet Union. Finally, there was agreement on London being the venue and the talks were scheduled to begin on 1 June 1955. Matsumoto Shunichi was appointed Ambassador Plenipotentiary for carrying on the negotiations and the Soviet Ambassador at London, Jacob Malik was assigned as the Soviet representative. (37)

When we analyse the stand taken by the Japanese Government before the beginning of the talks, we find that there was a difference of approach in the stands taken by Hatoyama and Shigemitsu. While both were agreed on principle that normalisation should be effected, Hatoyama felt that the first step to be taken was an end to the state of war and resumption of diplomatic relations. He argued that all the pending problems between the two countries could be taken up for consideration later, on terms of equality. On the other hand, Shigemitsu felt that a more cautious approach was needed. If Japan accepted only a declaration ending the state of war for resumption of diplomatic relations, it would in effect mean Japan's acquiescence of Soviet occupation of Habomai and Shikotan. In other words, there would be no scope for mentioning Japan's reservations. Again, Japan's bargaining position would become weak once she agreed to the restoration of diplomatic relations without getting agreement on the pending question. The best policy therefore would be to put across the table all the pending issues and sound the Soviet opinion. Shigemitsu also felt that such a policy alone would remove any misunderstandings which UK and USA might have about Japan's intentions. In his assessment, without a proper understanding of Japan's foreign policy moves by these powers, restoration of relations with the USSR alone would not make the future very bright for Japan. (38) Jiyuto maintained its stand

38 Asahi, 5 February 1955.
that the Soviet Union's new move was only intended to drive a wedge between the USA and Japan. In fact, in their election campaign, Jiyuto stated that once they were returned to power, they would stop negotiations with the USSR. However, public opinion was steadily moving in favour of putting an end to the state of war with neighbouring countries, even at the same time advocating a cautious policy. (39) While, therefore, Jiyuto's stubborn non-cooperation was criticised, Hatoyama's urgency in restoring diplomatic relations, initially shelving the pending issues, was also criticised as taking too soft a stand. A unified stand in the government level on this issue was continuously urged. (40)

USA and UK did not voice any protest against the developments at this stage. The British Foreign Office only commented that the problem was primarily Japan's and that they welcomed all steps of relieving tension in Asia. James Reston, commenting in the New York Times, said that the USA was not afraid that the Soviet Union would be able to offer more concessions than what she herself was offering. The other comments in the world press were to the effect that this particular move was made by Japan in order to prove that she was not a US satellite country. The Soviet initiative was interpreted as an attempt to capitalise on neutralist sentiments in the country. Sydney Morning Herald

39 Mainichi (evening), 10 February 1955, gives Jiyuto's chairman's election speech in Tohoku.

of Australia commented that the free world had to relax trade restrictions if she wanted to retain Japan within her camp. (41)

FIRST LONDON TALKS

Again this background of national and international opinion, the talks were started at the Soviet Embassy in London on the 3 June 1955. There were fifteen rounds of talks till 13 September 1955, when Matsumoto returned home for consultations and the talks were adjourned for some time.

The issues proposed to be discussed at the London Conference could be enumerated as follows:

1) Repatriation of the Japanese interned in the Soviet Union.
2) Territorial problem.
3) Safe fishing in the northern seas.
4) Expansion of economic relations.
6) Assurances regarding respect for territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, etc.
7) Soviet support for Japan's entry into the UN.

41 London Times, 2 June 1955.  
Sydney Morning Herald, 31 May 1955.  
Times of India, 2 June 1955.
The negotiations at London were started on the basis of the memorandum setting out Japan's views on the above issues. In brief, the memorandum incorporated the following:

i) It is requested that with the beginning of these talks, the Soviet Union should effect the unconditional return of all the Japanese interned in the Soviet Union as early as possible and also give a full report about these internees.

ii) The rights and duties which both States have under international law should be respected. Particularly, the rights and duties mentioned in the San Francisco Treaty and Security Treaty should be upheld.

iii) Historically speaking, Habomai, Shikotan and Kuriles and South Sakhalin are Japanese territories and they should be returned to Japan after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty.

iv) Since fishing in northern waters has great economic significance for Japan, it is hoped that the Soviet Union will cooperate in enabling safe fishing operations in the area. The early return of the captured fishermen and the boats seized is also requested.

v) Economic relations should be increased. For this purpose separate negotiations should be undertaken.

vi) There should be mutual respect of the principles set in the UN Charter for the continuance of peace, mutual respect of each other's territorial integrity, settlement of disputes through peaceful methods and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
(vii) USSR's support of Japan's entry into the UN is requested.

A draft Peace Treaty incorporating the provisions of the Memorandum was submitted at the eleventh round of talks on 16 August 1955. (42) In this connection, it should be pointed out that Japan's stand on the territorial issue was not considered as a final demand, which could not be altered. Actually Matsumoto had been given the following private instructions regarding the territorial issue: (43)

1) Unconditional return of Habomai and Shikotan was satisfactory ground for conclusion of a Peace Treaty.

2) Southern Kuriles could be demanded for historical reasons but were not essential for/overall settlement. South

3) North Kuriles and/Sakhalin were mentioned only for bargaining purposes.

It is clear that when Japan began the talks, she was prepared to conclude a peace treaty only with the unconditional return of Habomai and Shikotan. As against the Japanese Memorandum, the Soviet Union presented a

42 Matsumoto, n. 37, Appendix 8, pp. 181-90.

43 Ibid., pp. 29-32.
Donald Hellman, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics. The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union (Thesis, Ph.D. University of California, Berkeley, 1964), pp. 136-7 and foot notes 41, 42.
draft Peace Treaty of twelve clauses as follows: (44)

i) The contracting parties mutually agree to respect each other's sovereignty and not to commit aggression against each other or to interfere in the internal affairs of each other.

ii) The contracting parties mutually agree to respect the UN Charter and to settle all international disputes through peaceful means and not to endanger international peace and security. Japan agrees not to be a party to any alliance or military alliance directed against any of the countries which had participated in the war against her.

iii) The Soviet Union agrees to renounce all claims for reparation from Japan in respect of the loss she and her people might have incurred in the period from 9 August 1945 till the War lasted, through the activities of Japan and the Japanese people.

iv) Japan also renounces all claims from the Soviet Union for any damages which she might have incurred during the period of the actual war and the state of war which existed in the Far East.

v) Japan recognises the complete sovereignty of the Soviet Union in South Sakhalin including the adjacent islands and Kuriles and moreover renounces all her rights and claims in the above territories. The boundary between Soviet Union and Japan will lie in the middle of Nemuro Straits, Notsuke Straits and Goyomai straits.

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Matsumoto, n. 37, Appendix 6, pp. 182-6.
(vi)(a) The contracting parties agree not to restrict the free navigation in Soya Straits, the Nemuro Straits, Notsuke Straits and Goyomai Straits. Japan also agrees not to restrict free navigation in Tsugaru Straits and Tsushima Straits. The above Straits will be open for the free commercial navigation of all countries.

b) The Straits mentioned above would be open only for warships belonging to the coastal countries of Japan Sea.

(vii) The Soviet Union will support Japan's entry into the UN.

(viii) The contracting parties mutually agree to enter into negotiations for improving their economic relations and to conclude a Commercial and Navigation Treaty. Till such a Treaty is signed and for eighteen months after this Treaty, the contracting parties agree to accord each other most favoured nation treatment in respect of tariff, use of each other's ports for entry of vessels, fuelling, buying provisions for ships, etc.

(ix) The contracting parties mutually agree to enter into negotiations for concluding a Treaty or Agreement in respect of the catch of fish and other marine products, with the object of conservation of the marine life sources.

(x) The contracting parties mutually agree to enter into agreement in respect of postal services, parcel posts, telephone services and wireless services.
(xi) The contracting parties agree to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of a cultural agreement with the object of fostering cultural cooperation and promoting cultural cooperation and promoting mutual understanding.

(xii) This Treaty will have to be ratified and will become valid when the ratification documents are exchanged.

It may be noted that no mention is made of repatriation in the Soviet draft treaty, while Japan had made it one of her first demands. Again, the Soviet draft treaty contained a provision by which Japan accepted Soviet sovereignty in South Sakhalin (including the small islands lying close to it) and Kuriles and relinquished all her claims and rights in these territories. The boundaries between Soviet Union and Japan were thus termed to be the central line of Nemuro Straits, Notsuke Straits and Goyomai Straits. There was still another provision which, while opening these Straits and the Tsugaru and Tsushima Straits for the free navigation of all commercial ships, restricted the right of passage of war ships to the coastal countries only. This was only a bargaining provision as later negotiations revealed. The other clause, which was controversial, was on undertaking from Japan that she would not enter into a military pact with any country which had participated in the War against her. Hence the main points of conflict could be reduced to the territorial
problem, the repatriation issue and the question of military alliance.

On the question of territory, as against the Soviet claim based on Potsdam Declaration, Yalta Agreement and SCAPIN 677 that the territorial question was a settled issue, Matsumoto insisted that Habomai and Shikotan were enumerated separately from the Kurile islands in SCAPIN 677 and that SCAPIN 677 was only an order for military surrender and did not determine the territorial sovereignty of Japan. Again, though Japan relinquished the Kuriles and South Sakhalin in the San Francisco Treaty, the Soviet Union was not a party to that Treaty and the Treaty also did not transfer the territories to Soviet possession. These territories could, therefore, be only said to be under the occupation of the Soviet Union and the question could not be considered to be already settled.

On the question of participation in a military alliance, Matsumoto argued that the Security Treaty was strictly based on the principle of individual and collective self-defence, recognised even in the UN Charter and could not be said to be directed against any country. On the other hand, the Treaty of 1950 between Soviet Union and China was definitely aimed at Japan. The Soviet Union by trying to include a provision in the Peace Treaty, that Japan could not participate in any military alliance with any other nation, was putting restrictions on Japan's
sovereign rights and therefore could not be accepted. (45)

Finally the Soviet Union decided to withdraw the provision about the military pact. As regards the territorial demands, Malik made it clear on 9 August 1955 that the Soviet Union was prepared to finalise the talks on the basis of returning the "small Kuriles", Habomai and Shikotan. (46) When Matsumoto reported this to the Japanese Government, he received instructions that a Peace Treaty could be concluded only on the basis of the return of Habomai and Shikotan and the South Kuriles together with an agreement that the future of the remaining territories would be decided in an international conference. (47) The Soviet Union on her part inserted a condition

SCAPIN 677 stated in para 3
"For the purpose of this directive Japan is defined to include the four main islands of Japan (Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku) ... and excluding ... (c) the Kurile Islands, the Habomai Island Group and the Shikotan Island"

46 Matsumoto, n. 37, pp. 41-44.

47 In Tokyo, Shigemitsu continued his go slow policy and instructed Matsumoto to have talks only once a week, instead of the initial proposal of twice a week. Hatoyama was not kept informed of the details of the negotiations. Shigemitsu not only made public the Soviet draft treaty, against all diplomatic convention, but also made a comment that the provisions of the draft Treaty were the same as the proposals made by Gromyko in the San Francisco Conference. The climate in Tokyo was explained to Matsumoto by Kono on his way to Washington and Kono also instructed that the negotiations should not be pushed till he returned from USA. Ibid., pp. 45-46.
that Japan should give an undertaking that she would not have any military bases in these areas. (48) Thus, when Japan increased her territorial demands, Soviet Union also displayed a rigid attitude and even inserted a condition in the return of Habomai and Shikotan. As regards repatriation, the Soviet Union promised the return of sixteen war criminals and also gave a list of detainees in the Soviet Union.

The first session of talks thus ended on the above note, as Malik left for United Nations and the talks had to be suspended for a while. Clearly, considerable ground had been broken and both sides exchanged their versions of the Peace Treaty.

The initial flexibility displayed by the Soviet Union in the negotiations conformed with the "spirit of Geneva". However, the views of the United States on the territorial issue as well as the pressures within the Party led to an expansion of Japan's territorial claims. (49)

MERGER OF THE CONSERVATIVES

It has already been mentioned how the divisions among the conservatives helped to bring Hatoyama into

48 Ibid., p. 49.
49 The views of USA are dealt with in detail in Chapter VII "The Northern Territories".
power. But his party, Minshuto, not having an overriding majority was harassed and obstructed both by the Jiyoto on the right and the Socialists on the left. The probability of the merger of the Socialist Parties also seemed to make Minshuto's position precarious. (50) As a result, an amalgamation of the conservative forces became necessary in the interests of the smooth operation of the Government, apart from the need for wider support for Government policy in the Soviet negotiations. Minishuto's intentions in this regard were made clear by Miki Bukichi in a Press interview. He stated:

It is impossible to implement policies with a minority party of only 185 members. Minshuto does not want to employ the tactics of breaking the Jiyoto or spiriting away members from that Party but would formally call for the concentration of conservative forces in the near future. This can take the shape of amalgamation, coalition or asking for co-operation.

50. The Japanese Socialist movement had split up in 1951 over a disagreement about security against communism. A relaxation of world tensions strengthened the argument of the Left Socialist Party which had argued that Japan need not rearm and did not need a defensive alliance. This brightened the prospects for reunification. Again, in the domestic front, the divisions among the various conservative Parties and socialist gains at successive elections made it seem possible that a united socialist party might soon be in a position to form a majority Government. Thus, after two difficult years of negotiations, the two Socialist Parties united under their old name, the Japanese Socialist Party, in October 1955. The socialist unification gave the conservative parties an impetus to form a united party at least in name. J.A.A. Stockwin, The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism: A Study of a Political Party and its Foreign Policy (Melbourne, 1968), pp. 70-81.
He also surprised the audience by adding that if the presence of Hatoyama proved to be an obstacle in the concentration of conservative forces, Hatoyama Cabinet was prepared to resign. The President of the new amalgamated Party could designate the Cabinet. (51)

Apparently, Miki's public announcement was made after obtaining an informal assent from Jiyuto's President Ogata Takteora. This becomes evident from Ogata's announcement that he would not be averse to considering Miki's proposal. There was considerable opposition, however, from the Jiyuto's rank and file. They felt that it was a move to secure their support for getting the budget through the Diet, in return for very little gains. Yoshida opposed the merger on personal grounds of animosity towards Hatoyama and his successor Ogata. Headed by Shigemitsu, the old Kaishinto group within Minshuto did not welcome this proposal. But Kishi Nobusuke and Kono Ichiro finally persuaded Shigemitsu to give his concurrence. The insistence by the Jiyuto group that there should be a Presidential election after the merger also posed difficulties. The Minshuto's undertaking was that, while Hatoyama would continue to be President for the time being, Ogata would succeed him. Finally, a compromise was arrived at. Hatoyama would only

51 Matsumoto, p. 37, p. 66.
continue to be the Prime Minister and the post of the President of the Party would be kept vacant. A representative committee, manned by Hatoyama, Ogata, Miki Bukichi, Ono Bomoku, and with Kishi as Secretary General and Ishii Tsunejiro as the chief of the Executive Board would manage the Party affairs. The Presidential elections would be held in the spring of 1956. (52) Obviously, thus the Minshuto group had to concede the future Presidentship to a Jiyuto candidate. In the matter of Soviet negotiations, the Minshuto undertook to expand Japan's territorial claims.

The Jiyuminshuto (Liberal Democratic Party) was inaugurated on 15 November 1955. The new Party had a strength of 299 members in the House of Representatives and 118 members in the House of Councillors. Hatoyama formed a new cabinet including members of former Jiyuto.

The Japanese Government's revised stand to insist on the return of South Kuriles as well, before conclusion, of a Peace Treaty with the Soviet Union, did not augur well for the future negotiations. The Soviet intentions had once again been made clear. Khruschev in his interview on 21 September 1955 to the visiting Japanese Diet Members Delegation, headed by Kitamura Tokutaro, reiterated that even the return of Habomai and Shikotan under certain

52 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
conditions, was not on the basis of Japan's right to these islands but as a friendly gesture on the part of the Soviet Union to promote good neighbourly relations. (53) The Minshuto had sacrificed the Soviet negotiations for the sake of achieving merger of the conservatives.

The Soviet veto in the UN Security Council in December 1955 against Japan's admission to the UN also made it clear that an early normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union was a necessary step to make Japan a full-fledged member of the world community. (54)

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54 Japan submitted her application for membership to the UN on 16 June 1952. In the 601st Meeting of the Security Council held on 17 September 1952, USSR's representative opposed Japan's entry into UN and also stated that she could think of supporting Japan's case only when all foreign troops were withdrawn and when a multilateral treaty was signed. However, by 1955, Soviet Union came round to the view that she was in favour of Japan's membership, but suggested that the question of Outer Mongolia and Japan should be taken up in the next session. But, USA objected to the linking up "a great nation like Japan with a geographical abstraction like Outer Mongolia in a sordid package deal". Finally, Japan's entry into the UN was again postponed.

*SCOR*, yr. 7, mtg. 601, pp. 1-20

" 8, Annexes, Agenda item 22, pp. 2-21.
" 8, Plen. mtg. 453, p. 252.
" 9, Plen. mtg. 501, pp. 330-1.
" 10, Plen. mtg. 552, pp. 409-20.

*SCOR*, yr. 10, mtg. 701, pp. 1-21; mtg. 702, pp. 1-15;
mtg. 703, pp. 1-13; mtg. 704, pp. 1-22;
mtg. 705, pp. 1-14; mtg. 706, pp. 1-22;
mtg. 708, pp. 1-18.
SECOND LONDON TALKS

When Matsumoto left for London in January 1956, the Japanese Government did not revise its stand. The instructions on the territorial problem were that the return of Habomai and Shikotan and South Kuriles should be insisted; the title to the rest of the territories would be determined by international agreement.

The second phase of talks in London started on 9 January 1956 and ended on 20 March 1956 with eight rounds of discussions in all. Between 11 February and 8 March 1956 Malik went to the Soviet Union to attend the Communist Party meeting and also to utilise this opportunity to have consultations with the Soviet Government. In the second London talks also, Japan could not get Soviet agreement to deal with the repatriation problem, separately from the Treaty, and had to yield to the Soviet view of including it as one of the provisions of the Treaty. Again, agreement was reached on all issues except the territorial problem, in which both the sides adhered to their own stand. Since the talks got into a deadlock, Matsumoto was preparing to return home for fresh consultations, when on 21 March 1956, Japan was shaken by the publication of the decision of the Soviet Council of Ministers regarding salmon and trout fishing in the Pacific. Under this decision, fishing could be done only under express permits
from the Soviet Union and limitations were also placed on the area of fishing, duration and the quantity of catch. This decision was justified as a means of conserving fish, as there was a rapid decline in the resources. Even in the London negotiations, while discussing the fishery clause, Malik talked in terms of regulation and limitation of catch on the ground that, due to reckless fishing by Japanese, the stock of fish in the Soviet riverbeds had shown a decline. With the announcement of this decision, the emphasis in the talks between Japan and the Soviet Union turned on the fishery problem.

Matsumoto put forward a proposal that early negotiations should be started to discuss the problem in detail with the assistance of specialists on the subject, either at Moscow or at London. After Matsumoto's return to Japan on 9 April 1956, Ambassador Nishi Haruhiko at London received Soviet agreement to the proposal for talks on fisheries at Moscow. The talks were begun on 29 April 1956 by the Japanese delegation headed by Agriculture Minister, Kono Ichiro. (55)

The effect which the Soviet proclamation had on Japanese fisheries, the activities of the fishery interests to expedite the fishery negotiations and the details of the fishery negotiations which paved the way for the early

55 Matsumoto, n. 37, pp. 75-98.
restoration of relations, would be taken up in a separate chapter on Fisheries (Chapter VI). It is sufficient to point out here that the USSR affixed the signature to the Fishery Convention on 14 May 1956 on the express condition that the negotiations for normalisation of relations would be taken up again in the near future, but not later than 31 July 1956. The venue of the negotiations could be either Moscow itself or even Tokyo or London. In short, the Soviet Union drew the fishery talks to a close in such a way that the Japanese Government had no other alternative but to recommence the talks in the near future. The Soviet Union had assessed properly the climate of public opinion within Japan, which had become weary of long-drawn out talks and which wanted an early firm policy on normalisation.

FIRST MOSCOW NEGOTIATIONS

In order to honour the public commitment made by Kono for re-commencement of talks, an early decision had to be made about the venue of the talks as well as the composition of the delegation. While, for reasons of convenience, it was decided to continue the negotiations at Moscow, the decision about the leader of the delegation was very much affected by the factional politics within the Party. Finally, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu's candidature was approved, as he could represent the hard
Matsumoto Shunichi, who had so far been conducting the negotiations, was also asked to assist Shigemitsu. The Soviet Union intimated that Foreign Minister D.T. Shepilov would represent them in their talks.

The first Moscow negotiations lasted from 31 July to 13 August 1956 and no solution seemed to be at sight when they ended. Shigemitsu hoped that his rigid attitude would yield some results but it only tended to stiffen the Soviet attitude further. Apart from his talks with Shepilov, Shigemitsu also approached Khrushev and Bulganin for a change in their stand but without success. Shigemitsu proposed to Shepilov that while Habomai and Shikotan could be restored along with the Peace Treaty, there could be an understanding that the problem of the remaining territories would be settled at a future date. This proposal was not accepted. Shepilov stated firmly that even the restoration of Habomai and Shikotan was only agreed to, on taking into consideration the sentiments of the Japanese people and the Soviet Union's earnest desire to maintain friendly relations with Japan. Therefore, he contended that with the restoration of these

56 The candidature of Sunada Shigemasa of former Jiyuto, was opposed on the ground that he was in good terms with Hatoyama and Kono. Former Ambassador Sato Naotake's name had to be dropped because of his affiliation to the Green Breeze Society, which could not be termed "main stream". Matsumoto, n. 37, p. 102.
islands, the territorial issue between the two countries should be considered to be settled. Thus it was clear that the Soviet Union did not want anything to be left vague and considered that with the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, the boundaries between the two countries should be clearly delineated. By 11 August 1956, Shigemitsu had not advanced even one step further than the conclusions reached between Malik and Matsumoto in London. The stiffness of the Soviet attitude and the rather tense atmosphere in the talks was a reflection of the general international situation, as there was an immediate danger of the Suez crisis blowing up into a large-scale war. Faced with the immutable attitude of the Soviet Union, Shigemitsu on 12 August informed Shepilov that he would consider concluding the Treaty on the lines indicated by the Soviet Union and would put forward his detailed views within three days. (57) While making this proposal, Shigemitsu felt that as head of the delegation, he was vested with the authority to make concessions, depending upon the circumstances and did not consider it necessary to seek fresh instructions from Tokyo. It is also possible that Shigemitsu felt that since Japan was not in a position to bring any other pressure on Soviet Union, a compromise would be best in the circumstances. Again, it may not be incorrect to

conclude that Shigemitsu also had an eye on the political gains he might reap by making this diplomatic coup of successfully concluding a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. Shigemitsu had ambitions of becoming the Prime Minister. He accepted the Vice Presidentship of Minshuto with full expectations, if not promise, that he would succeed Hatoyama as Prime Minister. In his memoirs, Hatoyama states that he hoped to appoint Shigemitsu as his successor because of the concessions he agreed to make for the formation of Minshuto. Shigemitsu continued to nurse his ambition, but did not cultivate a faction which would rally to his support. His position within the Party worsened as factional rivalries grew. The merger of the conservatives reduced his chances further. By the middle of 1956, it was clear that he could not depend on party manoeuvres alone for his success. He needed a foreign policy coup. His volte face in Moscow seems to have been an attempt to bring the thorny issue of normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union to a settlement and ride over the crest of this victory to premiership. (58)

When on second thoughts, Shigemitsu did wire Tokyo about the compromise solution, he had in mind, it created a furore in the party and government circles. He

58 Hellman, n. 43, p. 143.
Ichiro Kono, Imadakara hanaso (Tokyo, 1958), pp. 55-56.
Japan Times, 12 August 1956.
immediately received instructions that since a compromise at that stage would not at all appeal to the Party as well as the public opinion, he should ask for a recess in the talks and attend the Conference on Suez in London. (59)

On 18 August 1956, when Shigemitsu met Shepilov again at London and stated that he was considering the Soviet proposal, Shepilov reiterated that the return of Habomai and Shikotan would be the final concession on the part of the Soviet Union.

At this stage, the strong opinion expressed by Dulles to Shigemitsu in London introduced a new external factor in the territorial issue, which seemed to rob Japan of any possible political initiative in finding a solution to the territorial problem and effecting normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union. Dulles stated that if Japan accepted the Soviet proposal, it would in effect mean that Japan was granting to Soviet Union concessions of wider scope than contemplated by the San Francisco Treaty. Hence, in accordance with Art. 26 of the Treaty, USA would also be constrained to annex Okinawa. He

59 Matsumoto, n. 37, pp. 111-5.
Shigemitsu's initial rigid attitude was supported by Mainichi editorial, 1 August 1956, Asahi editorial, 5 August 1956, Sankei 8 August 1956.
When Shigemitsu changed his attitude and it leaked to the Press, there was bitter criticism and opposition to accepting a "humiliating Treaty". Mainichi, 11 August, 13 August 1956.
Sankei, 14 August 1956.
further clarified that the territories specified in the Yalta Treaty could not be ceded to the Soviet Union without a separate Peace Treaty and that, therefore, Soviet Union had no basis on which to demand that Japan recognise Soviet sovereignty in those territories. So, if deemed necessary the USA had no objection to issue a statement in this regard. (60) The statement of Dulles came as a shock to Shigemitsu, who had almost decided to accede to the Soviet proposals. In his preoccupation with domestic political 

60 Note that Dulles at a news conference on 28 August 1956 denied that he made any specific statement to Shigemitsu that USA might demand the sovereignty over Okinawa, if Japan recognised Soviet claim of sovereignty over Kuriles. DSB, 10 September 1956, p. 406. The Japanese Ambassador in Washington was also informed of the same views as given by Dulles to Shigemitsu. Dulles, on 24 August 1956, tried to soften the blow by stating that he only meant to strengthen Japan's bargaining position. Matsumoto, n. 37, pp. 116-7. The US aide memoire of 7 September 1956 clearly stated ... "Yalta agreement ... simply a statement of common purposes by the then Heads of the participating Powers, and not as a final determination by those Powers or of any legal effect in transferring territories. The San Francisco Peace Treaty (which conferred no rights upon the Soviet Union because it refused to sign) did not determine the sovereignty of the territories announced by Japan, leaving that question ... to international solvents other than this Treaty. ... Japan does not have the right to transfer sovereignty over the territories renounced therein ... . The United States has reached the conclusion after careful examination of historical facts that the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri (along with the Habomai islands and Shikotan islands, which are a part of Hokkaido) had always been part of Japan proper and should in justice be acknowledged as under Japanese sovereignty". DSB, 17 September 1956, p. 484.
gains, he had overlooked the international consequences of his bold decision. The Dulles' threat strengthened the go-slow faction, which was warning about the possible repercussions that a soft line with Soviet Union would have on Japanese-American Relations. (61)

HATOYAMA'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

Although the first Moscow talks were broken up, the Government did not give up its policy to continue the talks and left some officials in Moscow for going liaison work. Hatoyama also announced on 19 August 1956 that if the Party and Government considered it proper, he was prepared to visit Moscow, provided his doctors permitted him to do so. This changed the focus of the problem from normalisation to the necessity of Hatoyama's visit to the Soviet Union. (62)

Hatoyama's visit was strongly supported by Kono Ichiro and the early normalisation group but widely

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61 The Dulles statement to Shigemitsu leaked to the Press and evoked comments from Yoshida that this showed American displeasure of Hatoyama's pro-Soviet views. Sankei, 23 August 1956 (morning) and (evening).

62 Matsumoto, n. 37, p. 120.
criticised by the old Jiyuto group. (63) Hatoyama wanted to fulfill his public promise of normalising relations with the USSR and it is possible that just as Yoshida had the honour of signing the San Francisco Treaty, Hatoyama wished that the honour of solving the thorny issue of normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union would fall on him.

Hatoyama's supporters also believed that this would be the best way of his retirement from politics gracefully. However the old Jiyuto group suspected that Hatoyama would try to ride over the crest of popularity created by the success of normalisation and justify his nomination for Presidentship. Hence an undertaking had to be given that Hatoyama would retire, once normalisation was effected and this closed the ranks partially and made his visit to Moscow possible. (64)

Japan decides to adopt Adenauer formula

Since the inclusion of the territorial problem was bound to bring about a deadlock once again, it was

63 Asahi, 4 September 1956. Mainichi, 5 September 1956. Mainichi editorial of 5 September 1956 points out that there was no point in discussing whether Hatoyama should or should not visit Moscow without Government deciding on their future policy about the whole proposal. Tokyo reflecting Jiyuto's views called for the early retirement of Premier Hatoyama rather than go to the Soviet Union. Nihon Keizai 6 September 1956 stated that Tokyo and Kansai business circles asked for retirement of Hatoyama. A poll conducted by Asahi on 27, 28 August 1956 and results published on 7 September showed 41 per cent of the public favoured a Cabinet change.

decided to shelve the problem for the time being and get Soviet views on the following five questions:

a) End of state of war.
b) Establishment of diplomatic relations.
c) Early repatriation of Japanese interned in Soviet Union.
d) Implementation of the Fishery Agreement.
e) Soviet support of Japan's entry into UN.

On informal consultations with the Soviet representative, Sergei Tchivinsky, at Tokyo, by Kono and Matsumoto, it appeared that the Soviet Union would not be averse to negotiations being restarted on the above basis. Accordingly, a note was sent by Hatoyama to Bulganin on 11 September 1956 stating that, on condition that the territorial problem would be taken up for consideration at a future date, the Japanese Government was prepared to normalise relations between the two countries, provided that agreement was obtained only on the five issues mentioned above. It was also proposed that the points of agreement reached at the London Conference should be adopted as far as possible and that the talks might be held in Moscow. Bulganin's reply of 13 September made it clear that the Soviet Union was in agreement with the proposition. (65) However, the letter was silent on the

65 Matsumoto, n. 37, pp. 121-4. Notes exchanged, pp. 201-3.
point that the Soviet Union had accepted Japan's condition that the territorial problem should be taken over for consideration at a future date. In order, therefore, to get an iron-clad clarification on this point, Matsumoto was sent to Moscow. The Matsumoto-Gromyko correspondence, made public later, reveals that the Soviet Union was prepared to consider a peace treaty including the territorial question after the diplomatic relations were restored between the two countries. (66)

The Party could not raise any more objection to Hatoyama's visit to Moscow. However, before his departure, it was decided at the Party meeting that the negotiations should be pursued on the following lines:

1) Immediate unconditional repatriation of the Japanese detained in the Soviet Union.

2) Immediate return of Habomai and Shikotan.

65 contd.

There was criticism about the five point formula, that it was mooted in the interests of the main stream of the ruling party and not in the national interest. Again, it was also felt that keeping the territorial issue pending meant in effect signing off South Kuriles to the Soviet Union.

Yokota Kisaburo in Tokyo, 13 September 1956.

66 Text in Matsumoto, n. 37, pp. 203-5.
3) Restoration of Kunashiri and Etorofu should be negotiable even after the conclusion of the Agreement.

4) The other territorial concessions should not go against the San Francisco Treaty.

5) The rest of the provisions should be in line with the agreement already reached between Malik and Matsumoto at London.

Based on this policy directive, the Government prepared three alternate plans. Firstly, an attempt should be made once again to conclude a Peace Treaty with a settlement on the territorial issue. The settlement should insist on immediate return of Habomai and Shikotan and the restoration of the South Kuriles after Okinawa is returned to Japan by USA. Japan should renounce her rights in North Kuriles and South Sakhalin.

If attempts at a Peace Treaty did not succeed, a Basic Treaty might be concluded with the Soviet Union incorporating all the issues on which settlement had been already arrived at in London, except the territorial issue. Soviet agreement should be obtained for the consideration of the territorial issue along with the question of the Peace Treaty at a later date.

If the Soviet Union would not agree to the conclusion of a Basic Treaty, open letters subject to a provision that they would be validated through ratification, might be exchanged between the two Governments. The open letters would incorporate all the issues mentioned in the
Basic Treaty, shelving the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with a territorial settlement to a later date. (67)

The delegation, headed by Hatoyama, reached Moscow on 12 October and the Joint Declaration was signed on 19 October 1956.

SECOND MOSCOW NEGOTIATIONS—THE JOINT DECLARATION

During the negotiations, Kono tried in his talks with A.A. Ishkov (Minister for fishing Industry) as well as Khrushchev to obtain Soviet agreement on the point that while Habomai and Shikotan should be immediately returned, Kunashiri and Etorofu would be restored, when the USA returned Okinawa. Khrushchev, however, stated that the Gromyko-Matsumoto letters indicated mutual agreement on the point that territorial provisions would be held over for the present. If the territorial provision regarding Habomai and Shikotan was to be inserted, Japan had to agree to conclude a Peace Treaty and not a Joint Declaration. But even when agreement was obtained that only a commitment need be made, Khrushchev made out a draft indicating that Habomai and Shikotan would be returned after a Peace Treaty was concluded and moreover after Okinawa was returned by USA. Thus the Soviet draft put two conditions, viz., the conclusion of a Peace Treaty and the return of Okinawa

67 Ibid., pp. 139-42.
even for the restoration of Habomai and Shikotan. However, Khrushchev was prepared to conclude a gentlemen's agreement that Habomai and Shikotan would be returned, after a peace treaty, without linking it with the return of Okinawa. Hatoyama's discussions with Bulganin also did not yield any more results than that achieved by Kono. Finally, Kono put forward a draft that Japan and Soviet Union agree to start negotiations for a Peace Treaty including territorial issues after diplomatic relations were restored. Kono also added in the draft that the Soviet Union, acceding to the demands of Japan and also taking into consideration the interests of Japan, agree to return Habomai and Shikotan; the actual return of these islands would, however, take place after a Peace Treaty was concluded. Khrushchev found it difficult to agree to this draft. He wanted the omission of the words "including territorial issues" in the Japanese draft. Kono argued that they were very important, as the Party directive placed great emphasis on the territorial question. The reply made by Khrushchev to this argument was that, in that case, it could be stated clearly that with the return of Habomai and Shikotan after the Peace Treaty, the territorial issue between the two countries would be considered settled. Since Kono obviously could not agree to this, Khrushchev stated that the draft handed over earlier and the gentlemen's agreement would be their final concession. After further consideration, Kono felt that since linking up the Okinawa
issue with the northern territories would not be proper, the territorial issue could be finalised in the following way:

1) The fact that Habomai and Shikotan would be returned at the time of conclusion of Peace Treaty should be clearly mentioned in the Joint Declaration.

2) The Gromyko-Matsumoto correspondence of 29 September 1956 should be made public.

3) The words "including territorial issues" should be dropped from the Declaration.

The Soviet Union accepted the draft incorporating the above provisions. In other words, the Soviet Union made a concession that reference could be made about the return of Habomai and Shikotan in the Joint Declaration, as against their earlier stand that territorial issues would not be mentioned at all in the Declaration. At the same time, no definite commitment was made in the Declaration about a further discussion of other territories. However, the Soviet Union too did not insist on a categorical assertion in the Declaration that the territorial problem should be considered to be a settled issue once Habomai and Shikotan were returned. (68)

68 Ibid., pp. 143-9.

It should be pointed out in this connection that Hatoyama and Kono did not make it clear during the continued:
When Tokyo was informed of the final compromise solution arrived at, the old Jiyuto group opposed it on the ground that it was against the Party directive. But the majority believed that such a compromise was inevitable. At the same time, they felt a definite commitment for future discussion of territorial issues should be obtained. Moreover, there was general agreement that the Party could not influence the foreign policy any further. Probably, the agreement was also motivated by the fact that the issue could be used for insisting on the early retirement of Hatoyama. (69) Once again, a consensus was arrived at possibly motivated more by intra-party interests rather than national interest.

Apart from the territorial issues, in Hatoyama's

68 contd.

interpellations in the special committee constituted for discussing the Declaration, that the Okinawa question was linked up with the return of the Kuriles. When pressed, whether it was not brought up at all, they took shelter by saying that it was not in the public interest to disclose the details of the negotiations.

Japan, House of Representatives, 25th Session Proceedings of Meeting of Special Committee on Joint Declaration with the Soviet Union, 20 November 1956. However, Khrushchev disclosed in a later interview with Chief Editor of the Asahi Shimbun that the return of Okinawa was linked up with the return of the Northern territories. Pravda, 30 June 1957 in CDSP vol. 9; no. 26, pp. 3-7.

69 Matsumoto, n. 37, pp. 151-2.
discussions with Bulganin, the Soviet Union was prevailed upon to include a definite provision that she would support Japan's entry in the United Nations, though initially the Soviet Union felt that a verbal commitment would be sufficient. In the joint sub-committee, which drafted the final declaration, Matsumoto succeeded in deleting the provision in the Soviet draft that "after discussion of the various international problems, the two countries were of the same views". The final draft also included the other provisions on which agreement had been reached between Malik and Matsumoto in the London Conference in March 1956. (70)

The Joint Declaration was signed on 19 October 1956. The main provisions of the Declaration included, inter alia, an end of state of war, restoration of diplomatic relations, regulation of mutual relations according to the UN Charter, Soviet support of Japan's entry in the UN, repatriation of Japanese detainees, mutual relinquishment of the right for reparation, early negotiations for concluding a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, affirming the validity of the Fisheries Agreement signed on 14 May 1956 and accord on early negotiations for conclusion of a Peace Treaty, after which Habomai and Shikotan would be returned. (71)

70 Ibid., pp. 149-51.
Territorial settlement

The provisions regarding the return of Habomai and Shikotan in the final draft reads as follows:

The Soviet Union in response to the aspirations of Japan and after due consideration of the interests of Japan, agrees to return the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan. These islands would be actually returned after a Peace Treaty is concluded between Japan and the Soviet Union.

While all along the discussions, it was understood by Japan that the return would be at the time of or along with the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, the insertion of the word after in the Joint Declaration seems to have been overlooked by the Japanese drafting committee. This makes the actual date of return of the territories rather vague. The Japanese delegation could have paid a little more attention to the wording of this proviso, unless the insertion of the word "after" was deliberately done by Soviet Union and the Japanese delegation had no other alternative but to accept it.

After all the vicissitudes the territorial discussions went through, the final settlement made by Hatoyama was in no way more favourable than that arrived at by Matsumoto in London or by Shigemitsu. In fact, at the end of the sixteen months of negotiations, Japan could not achieve even the actual return of Habomai and Shikotan. Neither could a Soviet agreement be obtained on the point
that there was an unsettled territorial issue, even if Habomai and Shikotan were returned. However, the Soviet Union also could not succeed in getting Japanese acceptance and recognition of Soviet sovereignty over the disputed territories. To this extent, Japan did not also go beyond the provisions of the San Francisco Treaty.

Repatriation problem

The other important irritant between the two countries was the repatriation of Japanese detained in the Soviet Union and it is worthy of some close attention. (72)

Japan unsuccessfully tried to separate the repatriation problem from the issue of the main peace treaty. Japan's contention was that, since she did not invade the Soviet Union, it was not proper on the part of Soviet Union to detain them as war criminals and link up this issue with the Peace Treaty as in the case of Germany. However, Malik pointed out in the London talks that Japan was a defeated country which had surrendered

72 Mainichi Polls of 14-16 October 1955 showed that 40.9 per cent gave first priority to repatriation problem, Mainichi, 24 October 1955. When negotiations were temporarily suspended, 15-17 June 1956, polls showed that this problem was placed even ahead of the territorial problem, Mainichi, 12 July 1956.
unconditionally and the repatriation problem would be settled only along with the Peace Treaty. (73)

It may be recalled that the Soviet Union had started repatriation from 1946 in accordance with an agreement with USA, which stated that 50,000 persons should be repatriated every month. Only, the repatriation, did not proceed according to schedule and mention has already been made of the allegations that the Soviet Union was subjecting the Japanese to indoctrination before returning them. Finally it was announced on 22 April 1950 that there were only nine sick persons and 2,458 war criminals in the Soviet Union and only the sick men were returned by Soviet ships. Repatriation was completely stopped. (74)

But in November 1953, through the good offices of the Japanese Red Cross, repatriation was again started. Ultimately, the list which Malik produced on 5 September 1955, during the London talks, had only 1,364 persons, while the list prepared by Japan included 11,177 persons. (75) Thus the "battle of lists" started. It is difficult to accuse

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73 Matsumoto, n. 37, pp. 32-33, 77-78.

74 Japan got a motion tabled on this problem in the UN 5th General Assembly and tried to use UN offices for solving this problem. *Sovieto Nenpo* 1958, p. 376. GAOR, Session 5, Annexes, Agenda item 67, pp. 15-18; Session 5, Plen. mtg. 325, pp. 668-9.


Even while the negotiations were going on, the Soviet Union was releasing people in small lots in accordance with the Red Cross Agreement. *Pravda*, 26 August 1956 in CDSP, vol. 8, no. 34, p. 19.
either the Soviet Union for suppression of actual figures or Japan of padding up the lists in order to inflame anti-Soviet sentiments. The extremely confused conditions prevailing after the War might have made the task difficult. Later investigations also showed that many Japanese called themselves North Koreans, married Koreans or Russians in order to escape detention as Japanese. This too might have falsified the figures. (76)

As long as the agreement was not signed, the issue was used to put pressure on the Japanese Government for early conclusion of talks and feelings were considerably roused that the Soviet Union did not take a humane attitude and separate the problem from the main Treaty. However, it is quite possible that the Soviet Union was not willing to separate this issue, as the National Council of Organisations of Families of Japanese Detainees would also put pressure on the Government for early normalisation. This is borne out by the fact that in the Joint Declaration, the Soviet Union not only agreed to return all the Japanese detained but also undertook to investigate the whereabouts of those who were considered to be missing, as no positive proof of their death could be obtained. In the succeeding years, it transpires that the Soviet Union did make an attempt to continue the investigation and periodically reported to the Japanese Government requesting for arrangements to be made for their repatriation. While initially

76 Asahi, 20 October 1956.
the detainees were sent in groups, later on it was decided to repatriate them individually, if they so desired. A committee of Diet members is also seized of the problem, apart from the close contacts being maintained through the Red Cross. It appears that all the Japanese held in detention and desirous of returning have been repatriated. Efforts are still being made to trace those whose whereabouts are not known. (77)

SUMMARY AND SOME CONCLUSIONS

Looking back briefly over the eventful period of 1952-56, we find that changes in the leadership of the Soviet Union produced the policy of peaceful co-existence, which led to an attitude of attempting to find areas of understanding between the two blocs and solving problems through negotiations. This was reflected in the truce in Korea, signing of the Austrian neutrality treaty, recognition of West Germany by Soviet Union, etc. The effect

77The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium passed a decree that all sentenced Japanese should be released and returned to Japan. Pravda, 14 December 1956 in CDSP vol. 8, no. 50, p. 51. See details of repatriation in Sovieto Nenpo 1959, pp. 378-9 and "Nisso Kankei no keiei to so no genjo" Chosa Geppo (Japan, Cabinet Research Office, Tokyo), June 1966, pp. 11-12.
of this policy was also felt in the Far East. The change in political leadership in Japan made Japan also responsive to the moves made by the Soviet Union. However, the political process, which transferred the reins of Government from Yoshida to Hatoyama, was rooted in factional politics within the conservative parties rather than on the acceptance of the need for a change in policy. Hatoyama made a public commitment for carrying out normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union. While he took this stand to demonstrate his independent foreign policy, this distinguished him from the Liberals and also deprived the socialists of their slogan. But it was difficult to carry out this policy against the strong opposition of the Jiyuto as well as the go-slow policy of the Shigemitsu group within the Minshuto. Thus, within the ruling party itself, there was conflict of opinion between the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister's group on this issue, though it is difficult to draw a parallel with the conflict between the civil and the military in the 1930s. An attempt was made by Hatoyama to bypass the advice of the Foreign Minister from the time he accepted Dominitsky's note. He did not always go through the Foreign Office and had direct talks with the Soviet representative to ascertain the Soviet views. He selected one of his own supporters, Matsumoto Shunichi, to conduct the negotiations. When Shigemitsu went to Washington, he sent Kono Ichiro and Kishi Nobusuke to make sure that the views of the Japanese Government were properly represented.
He encouraged Kono to make a commitment about the future talks on normalisation, when Kono visited Moscow for the fishery talks, even though a decision was taken by the Government not to do so. Hatoyama was not troubled so much about proper agreement on the outstanding issues between the two countries. He would rather have restoration of diplomatic relations as early as possible.

Shigemitsu, backed by the Foreign Office, tried to curb Hatoyama as much as he could. In this he had the support of the Yoshida group. However, having failed to build up his own habatsu (faction) and desirous of Hatoyama's sponsorship to become the next Prime Minister, his opposition was restrained.

A merger of the conservative parties could not produce the desired unity in the policy towards the Soviet Union. In fact, to achieve the merger, the Hatoyama group had to accept the Jiyu-to's demand to increase the territorial claims, although the Japanese Government had started the negotiations with the intention of concluding a Peace Treaty only with the return of Habomai and Shikotan. Thus a rigid stand was taken on the territorial issue, which made the possibility of a settlement more remote. The negotiations were prolonged without achieving any concrete results. The fact that the individual opinions were not based so much on national interest became clear, when Shigemitsu was prepared to accept the Soviet concessions without
reservation, if such a settlement would help to enhance his prestige and bring him the Premiership. Again, opposition to Hatoyama's visit to Moscow melted, when he gave an undertaking to refrain from a cabinet reshuffle and also to retire from politics once this issue was settled. If the opposition had been based on the fear that any settlement by Hatoyama in Moscow would be against the national interest, the opposition should have continued even after he gave such undertakings. Actually when Hatoyama left for Moscow, Japan had more or less accepted the Adenauer formula of restoration of diplomatic relations, while shelving the disputed territorial problem to a later date. In other words, the conservative opposition, which was all along protesting that restoration of relations, without definite settlement of the territorial problem, would in effect mean signing away the territories, was willing to overlook this issue, if this would bring a fulfilment of their political ambitions of ousting Hatoyama from power.

Hatoyama and his group had very little hopes of achieving substantial concessions from Moscow. But the Moscow trip and a final settlement would give them an opportunity to effect Hatoyama's retirement gracefully and also give him the honour of effecting normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union. Hatoyama did not seem to be concerned about Japan's future difficulties in negotiations of this problem, since her bargaining power
would be weakened, once the Soviet desire of restoration of diplomatic relations had been fulfilled. It might be argued that after the fishery talks, Japan had no other alternative but to agree to restoration of relations sooner or later, if she wanted to avoid the aggravation of the fishery problem. It has to be conceded that the Soviet Union played her cards very skilfully. At the same time, Japan weakened her position by the lack of unity within the conservative ranks. This at times was not so much due to irreconcilable policy differences on the issues at hand, but rather was motivated by personal ambitions and rivalries. The fact that this was one issue in which opposition parties' support was available in principle, if not in the details of the Government proposals, did not seem to help the Government.

The Government policy was not necessarily guided by the patterns of public opinion. The public seemed to favour a quick solution of the problem or, in other words, the restoration of diplomatic relations first and settlement of territorial problems later. There was a consistency in this view, as the following poll results indicate: (78)

78 Mainichi, 24 October 1955.
Asahi, 7 December 1955.
Yomiuri, 20 April, 22 September 1956.
"Do you think diplomatic relations should be established first and the solution of territorial problem postponed"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>October 1955 (%)</th>
<th>November 1955 (%)</th>
<th>April 1956 (%)</th>
<th>September 1956 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus the Government policy and mass opinion were running in parallel lines. As regards the extent of northern territories to be returned, there was always a strong demand for the return of all the northern territories and opposition to concluding a settlement on the return of Habomai and Shikotan only, as indicated by the following polls. (79)


*Asahi*, 2 September 1956.
"How much of the Soviet occupied territory do you think should be returned?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>30-31 July 1955 (%)</th>
<th>14-16 October 1955 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuriles and South Sakhalin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habomai and Shikotan</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>64.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuriles, Habomai and Shikotan</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kuriles and Habomai and Shikotan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habomai &amp; Shikotan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Should Japan accept the Soviet offer to return Habomai and Shikotan only?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and Period</th>
<th>20-21 Nov. 1955 (%)</th>
<th>12-14 April 1956 (%)</th>
<th>15-17 June 1956 (%)</th>
<th>27-29 August 1956 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The timing of change in the Government's policy regarding expanded territorial claim was not based on mass opinion.
The effectiveness of such opinion, on Government decision making, is highly uncertain. Hatoyama's Moscow trip was strongly opposed by the public, but it nevertheless was undertaken.

Next to the territorial issue, it was the repatriation problem which was foremost in the minds of the people and there was unanimous feeling that steps should be taken for early repatriation of the Japanese in the Soviet Union. But the National Council of Organisations of Families of Japanese Detainees, headed by Arita Hachiro, could not exercise a very decisive influence on the Government. The Government was not willing to agree to the restoration of diplomatic relations only on the basis of the settlement of the repatriation issue. (80)

Turning to the business group, which usually plays a vital role in influencing government policies, we find that opinion was divided initially and its interest in the matter came out in the open only when the differences within the Party seemed to be leading to political instability. The business groups interested in manufacturing industry were keen that the settlement should not have any repercussions on their trade with USA, while the small

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80 Nihon Keizai editorial of 3 April 1956 and Asahi, 31 March 1956 explain the dilemma in which Government was placed and stated that this problem should best be treated separately from normalisation.
and medium business groups and the trading firms looked forward to the increased avenues of trade, which might be opened once normal relations were restored. However, it is difficult to conclude that the business leaders could effectively influence Government decision-making on this issue. (81)

The only interest group which put pressure actively and persistently and reaped the results, was the fishery group. Its main channels of action were through direct contacts with the conservative party group and the Government circles, thus also serving as a liaison between the Soviet representative in Japan and the Government. The leaders of the fishing industry, e.g. Hiratsuka Tsunejiro, Onishi Rensaka, etc. used the agency of Nichu-Nisso Kokko Kaifuku Kaigi for their liaison activities. The fisheries problem was directly instrumental in bringing the negotiations to a close.

The role played by USA in influencing the Japanese policy during the negotiations cannot be minimised. The US reaction to Japanese policies was a factor which was never allowed to be forgotten in the foreign policy process.

81 For the division of opinion within the business circles on this problem, see Tokyo, 1 June 1956. Yomiuri (evening), 5 June 1956. The consensus which was reached later is indicated in Mainichi, 3 July 1956, Asahi, 7 July 1956. Also see Hellman, n. 43, pp. 84-90 and 183-204.
USA tried to bolster up Japan's claims of northern territories, motivated by power politics and her conception of security in the Far East.

It is also worth noting that during the negotiations, there was a tendency on the part of Japan to overestimate her importance, without realising that her bargaining position was weak. Every important issue under negotiation affected Japan's interests more than that of the Soviet Union. But the tenor of the negotiations was such that it seemed that Japan by agreeing for the resumption of diplomatic relations had a right to all the concessions she asked for. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Soviet delegate did not fail to state at times that Japan was forgetting that she was a defeated nation and had surrendered unconditionally. (82) Even so, the negotiations revealed to the world the self-confidence which Japan had gained.

The Soviet attitude, while motivated by the

82 Khrushchev, in his interview with the Japanese Diet delegation on 21 September 1955, stated "The Soviet Union was the victor in the War. The defeated side is now unwilling to accept our proposals". CDSP, vol. 7, no. 37, p. 4.
Malik also stated in the London Conference that Japanese delegates' remarks about the Soviet Union were not suitable for a delegate of a country which had surrendered unconditionally. Matsumoto, n. 37, pp. 77-78.
spirit of co-existence, also stemmed from her consciousness of a position of strength. She took a realistic stand when she did not insist on China also being made a party to the Peace Treaty talks. Inclusion of China would have complicated matters and Japan could not have been brought to the conference table. The Soviet Union might also have hoped that success in her attempts to normalise relations with Japan would pave the way for Japan initiating talks with other communist countries in general and also finally with China. In other words, this was the initial step taken for the gradual strengthening of relations between Japan and the Socialist Bloc.

China was not averse to this initiative taken by the USSR, though it meant that she would have to negotiate separately with Japan. It is probable that China and the Soviet Union had some understanding on this issue. This can be inferred from the absence of any published statement by China accusing Soviet Union of sacrificing China's interests. If there had been any such feeling, China would have included it in the various charges levied by her against the Soviet Union, with the worsening of the rift.

The Soviet Union made statements after signing of the Joint Declaration that she hoped Japan would normalise relations with China also. On 8 October 1956, when a Japanese correspondent asked Chou-En Lai what steps China would take towards the resumption of relations with
Japan, in case of success of the coming Japanese-Soviet negotiations, Chou-En Lai replied that diplomatic relations between the two countries would eventually be resumed. He added that China desired early renewal of diplomatic relations. "However, in view of the difficulties, the Japanese side was facing, we are willing to wait". Chou's statement also makes it clear that while normalisation would not be pressed for immediately, they hoped that this would be effected in due course. (83)

USA feared these developments, particularly Japan taking an initiative to strengthen her relations with the People's Republic of China. Walter S. Robertson, Under Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department, warned Japan of the dangers of strengthening her relations with China as a corollary of normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union. However, the Japanese leaders, including Hatoyama, were conscious of the difficulties of taking steps for normalisation of relations with China. (84)

Did the negotiations and the settlement augur well for future relations?

84 Matsumoto, n. 37, pp. 153-4.
The termination of the state of war with one of her powerful neighbours did create the feeling that an abnormal situation had been corrected. However, the long-drawn out negotiations and the attempts made by the Soviet Union to utilise some of the problems, especially repatriation and fishing, for forcing the hand of Japan evoked criticism and the image of Soviet Union using her status of a big power and a victor, to turn the negotiations in her favour, loomed large. The hardening of the Government policy on the territorial issue, resulting in the expansion of territorial claims, probably to suit intra-party politics, did not receive much attention, while the Soviet Union received its full measure of blame for refusing to part with Japanese territory. The Press reiterated the justness of Japanese claims. The final settlement, therefore, came as a disappointment and hardly helped to promote the popularity of the Soviet Union. In short, the negotiations and the settlement did not contribute to changing the suspicions with which the Soviet Union was held. The groups, which held communism as an unholy and dangerous doctrine, feared that the restoration of diplomatic relations would open the route for espionage and subversion. They, therefore, argued that even while accepting that restoration of diplomatic relations could not be avoided with a neighbouring country, Government should strengthen internal security
The Declaration had only agreed, in principle, about the commercial and navigation provisions. The details of such an agreement had to be worked out. The resumption of diplomatic relations was welcomed by the trading circles as the trade route could be placed on a more formal and solid basis. The relaxations in the COCOM list also opened more avenues of trade and hopes were set on a formal commercial agreement. The regularisation of the fishing agreement was, no doubt, welcomed by the fishing circles. Yet, the shelving of the return of even Habomai and Shikotan killed the hopes of small-scale fishermen, who would have profited by the extension of the territorial waters, available for fishing. The problem of seizure of fishermen, who strayed into these waters advertently or inadvertently, was in no way alleviated.

The determining factor for the development of future relations lay not so much in the provisions of the settlement as such, but rather in the course of the internal politics. Hatoyama had the satisfaction of fulfilling his

85 Sankei, 22 March 1955, Feature article.
Asahi, 21 October 1956 reports business world's concern about internal security.
Some rightist organisations held meetings to prevent ratification and even attacked the Soviet Mission.
Nihon Keizai, 11 November 1956.
Asahi, 20 November 1956.
public promise but at the price of retirement from politics. The faction which favoured him had already lost a strong man in the death of Miki Bukichi and it was difficult for them to stem the tide of the ascendancy of the other factions. The evasive answers given by Hatoyama and Kono in the Special Committee, constituted for discussion of the Declaration, heightened the suspicions that more informal commitments might have been made than those actually mentioned. As the ratification vote showed, the old Jiyuto opposed it. A secret ballot of Jiyuminshuto, on 26 November 1956, showed that while 182 members supported the Declaration, 58 members were against it. On 27 November 1956, in the House of Representatives, although all the 365 members present voted for the Declaration, there was a notable absence of 82 members. In the House of Councillors, on 5 December 1956, while there were 227 votes for the Declaration, 3 voted against it. The ratification instruments were exchanged in Tokyo on 12 December 1956. The same day, the Security Council adopted a resolution recommending Japan's entry into the United Nations. (86)

SCOR, Yr. 11, Supplement for October-December 1956, p. 145.
GAOR, Session 11, Supplement no. 17, p. 60.
Hatoyama resigned on 14 December 1956. The way seemed open for a faction with definite pro-American sentiments to come to power and the prospects of better relations with Soviet Union appeared dim.

It is now left for consideration how the opening of formal relations with the Soviet Union actually improved the economic relations between the two countries and whether Soviet goodwill was observed in the northern fisheries problem, in the succeeding years.

Though the Soviet Union signed the Declaration fully conscious that Japan was part of the San Francisco security system, it remains to be seen whether she resigned herself to the fact that Japan could never be drawn out of that set-up. Could she utilise the more open contacts with Japan to improve her image in Japan as well as help to correct the "lean-to-one side" policy of Japan?