Chapter III

SURRENDER AND OCCUPATION
The fear of communism following the Soviet entry into Japan may be stated to be one of the factors influencing Japan's decision to accept the terms of the Potsdam Agreement and surrender to the Allies, once the Soviet troops entered into Manchuria. (1) The Japanese leaders had feared that the extreme hardships to which the people of Japan were being subjected to in the course of the War, when not rewarded by the fruits of victory and a return of an era of prosperous peace, would result in a state of explosion in the form of a communist revolution. They felt that the disillusionment of the people might lead them to believe in the millenium which communism might usher in. The Soviet entry into Japan and their presence would only encourage such beliefs and aid such

movements. The leaders felt that in spite of the close cooperation between the USA and USSR during the War, the USA would not take up a pro-communist stance. Therefore, it is probable that the USA might have been more welcome as an occupying Power than the Soviet Union. They might have calculated that, however, severe the American occupation policies might be, the USA would not let Japan fall a prey to communism. Subsequent events proved them to be right.

While it is true that Japan had no positive role to play in the settlement of the surrender terms and the post-surrender occupation of Japan, the United States own policy reduced the Soviet influence in Japanese affairs to the minimum. The United States turning down of the Soviet request for the occupation of Hokkaido thwarted all designs of a north-south division of Japan. This decision won for the United States a good deal of favour in Japan. (2)

However, as early as 5 June 1945, the President had approved a proposal of the State War Navy Co-ordinating Committee (SWNCC) for a Far Eastern Advisory Commission on the lines of the European Advisory Commission, composed of

Allied Nations, who actively participated in the War with Japan. It was the considered position of the State Department that it would be in the best interests of the USA to share with her Allies the matters pertaining to unconditional surrender. (3) Therefore, on 21 August 1945, the proposal for a Far Eastern Advisory Commission (FEAC) was submitted to the UK, China and the USSR. The countries which were also invited to participate were France, Philippines, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the Netherlands. The terms of reference made it clear that the FEAC with its headquarters at Washington would be entrusted with making recommendations for carrying out the policies for the Occupation of Japan, in accordance with the principles laid down in the Instrument of Surrender.

Though there was no mention of the methods of voting within the FEAC, the USA had all along held the view that she should have controlling authority. In actual fact also, the President had approved on 18 August 1945 the national composition of forces for occupying Japan, which indicated predominant American military strength. This proposal was also publicly stated in the "United States Initial Post-

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Surprisingly, USSR and China agreed to the proposal for the establishment of FEAC, but it was UK which insisted on a Control Council, as the Commission would have only advisory powers. UK later agreed to waive the objection. But the Soviet Union changed her mind and at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in London in September 1945, though Japan was not on the agenda, Molotov insisted on reading out a statement outlining the Russian proposal, for an Allied Control Council of the Four Powers, which would "define and formulate the policies of the Allies towards Japan". This was followed up by a letter from Molotov to Byrnes stating that it would be wise to have an Advisory Commission composed of more than four major Powers under US Chairmanship but she could not agree to this proposal without the creation of a Control Council. (5) In other words, the Soviet Union desired to share with USA the responsibility for both the formulation and execution of Occupation policies. (6) However, since


6 Blakeslee, n. 5, p. 122. Molotov in his letter to Byrnes stated that there should be an allied organ through which "the four Powers who played the decisive role in the defeat of Japan would put into effect in Japan an agreed policy and assume joint responsibility".
the proposal of FEAC was agreed to in principle, Byrnes suggested that this Commission should meet and discuss the need of a Control Council.

The Far Eastern Advisory Commission held its meetings at Washington from 30 October 1945 to 21 December 1945, which were attended by all other members except the Soviet Union. These sessions were mainly ceremonial. On 26 December 1945, the US representative on the Commission, Gen. Frank R. McCoy left Washington for Japan with the FEAC policy paper, "Post Surrender Policy for Japan" following closely the "United States Initial Post Surrender Policy". (7) In the meantime, correspondence continued between USA and USSR on the question of the Control Council. The USSR made clear her fears that the unilateral policies of the USA might result in a Japan antagonistic to the USSR, and considering the fact that Japan had been a constant menace to the Russian security for the past two decades, her desire to be free from the threat was justifiable. (8) USA, however, stuck firmly to her decision that neither the US Government nor General MacArthur would

7 Blakeslee, n. 3, p. 9
There was a slight change which could be considered significant. The sentence "In the event of any differences of opinion among them (the Allies), the policies of US will govern", was omitted in the "Post Surrender Policy for Japan". However, it should be noted that while the overt expression was omitted, the US intentions did not seem to have changed.

8 Blakeslee, n. 5, p. 127.
allow themselves to be divested of the responsibility for making and enforcing final decisions. But, at the Moscow Conference, lasting from 16 December to 27 December 1945, a compromise was arrived at. Under the Agreement, provision was made to set up an Eleven Power Far Eastern Commission (FEC) with the headquarters at Washington and a Four Power Allied Council (AGJ), which would consult with and advise the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP) while, however, the Supreme Commander would retain a controlling authority. The USA was able to get agreement on the supremacy of the SCAP in Japan by quoting the powers of the Soviet President in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, where the provision, that the British and American representatives should be consulted, was not always strictly interpreted and the Soviet President's actions were not fettered in any way. The power of veto was accepted in return for the USA's right to issue interim directives, subject to review by the Commission, on the ground that, where there was a deadlock due to disagreement among the members, there must be an alternative to keep the Occupation machinery running smoothly. The USA was, however, willing to concede that the fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure or in the regime of Occupation would be made only after prior consultation and agreement with the Commission. (9)

9 Ibid., pp. 130-4. Political Representation of Japan, n. 4, vol. 2, pp. 421-2. The members of the Far Eastern Commission were USA, USSR, UK, France, China, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and Philippines. The members of the Allied Council for Japan were, USA, USSR, China and a member jointly representing UK, Australia, New Zealand and India.
Analysing the struggle by USA and USSR over the control machinery of Japan, it may be concluded that though the United States stepped down from her original stand of unilateral formulation of policy to govern Japan, she also did not fully concede USSR's demand for participation in the formulation as well as execution of policies governing Japan. USSR obtained the right of discussion of policies in the Commission and also a veto right to turn down policies disapproved by her. At the same time, the power of issuance of interim directives by USA and her own veto rights, in effect, would prevent the formulation of any policies not approved by USA. In the field of operations, though the Soviet Union's demand for an Allied Council was agreed to, the investment of the sole executive authority in the Supreme Commander again left very little scope for placing restrictions on him by any other country other than the United States. In short, the Soviet Union succeeded in getting two organs, which could be used by her as boards for sounding her opinions, but which held little guarantee that a future Japan not inimical to the Soviet Union would be shaped out of the broken pieces of devastated Japan. But, the Soviet Union obtained the privilege of watching closely on the spot the process of reshaping Japan.

At the same time, though the channels of the control machinery were closed to her, her direct contacts with the people kept open the possibility of achieving some degree of success in her efforts to mould a Japan friendly with
the Soviet Union.

SOVIET UNION AND THE JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Legal Status of JCP

In a way, the SCAP unwittingly helped the Soviet Union to establish easy contacts with the people by granting for the first time in Japanese history a legal status to the Communist Party. The Japanese Government, was always haunted by the fear of communism spreading in Japan and, in fact, particularly feared its resurgence on the eve of surrender. So, even after the acceptance of surrender terms, the wartime censorship or arrest of communists was not relaxed. But the SCAP directive of 4 October 1945 suspended all decrees and laws maintaining such restrictions on freedom of thought and speech and all the latent revolutionary forces were revived.

(10) The released leaders of the Communist Party, who had fought consistently against Japanese militarism, could effectively disclaim any responsibility for the War and could

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10 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Documents concerning the Allied Occupation and control of Japan (Tokyo, 1951), vol. 2, pp. 82-86.
present themselves as the true champions of democracy. (11)

Japan, after the War, also presented ideal conditions for the revival of the Communist movement. The ruins, the chaos, the disintegration of the nation's economy, hunger, and above all, the disillusionment of the people about all the ideals and values which they had cherished about their invincible Japan and their race, could be effectively utilised to the spread of an ideology, which could appeal directly to the down-trodden and which could establish the validity of its principles by stating that it had all along predicted this collapse. As far as the intellectuals were concerned, for a good number of them, Marxism had a strong appeal since the beginning of the twentieth century. However, the fear of severe persecution by the Government forced them to conceal these "dangerous thoughts". But after the war, the newly acquired freedom of thought and expression enabled them to propagate freely their beliefs in Marxist doctrines with greater conviction. The communists were quick to take charge of this situation. The Occupation's zeal to revive and strengthen Japan's democratic trends was also effectively taken advantage of by the communists. The Occupation

11 Tokyo 19 April 1947. The editorial attributes the success of the JCP leaders to their "passport" of 18 years loyalty to their cause, consistently criticising the War. Nikkan Rodo Tsushin Sha, Rodo Kumiai no Shido woneru Nihon Kyosanto (hereafter Rodo Kumiai) (Tokyo, 1954), p. 18.
encouraged communist forces, as they apparently considered that all democratic forces, even if they were communists, would provide a proper counter-balance for the rise of ultra-rightist movements, which might be slowly gathering strength underground. In view of the fact that nationalist feelings had been raised to the highest pitch right through the War, these fears of the Occupation could not be called completely groundless. But the fact that such resistance movement did not gather strength in Japan, might have been due to the sense of apathy, which extreme privations had driven the people to and also to a sense of shock that the cherished values had all been mere myths. Again, with the collapse of Japanese authority, the beliefs fostered by them also were blown to the winds, as fear of persecution by authority seemed to have been a greater cohesive force than the actual conviction of opinions. At the same time, the pragmatism and easy adaptability of the Japanese might also have been one of the factors.

The Occupation's zeal for a free Press, revival and formation of labour unions and encouragement of their activities facilitated communist action. In fact, the SCAP welcomed the participation of communists in important bodies as the Central and Local Labour Relations Commissions. Tokuda Kyuichi, who subsequently became the Secretary General of the Communist Party, was one of the members of the Labour Relations Commission (Romu Hosei Shingi Kai) set up by the Government on 27 October 1945 for drafting trade union
(12) The Communist Party, in the first instance, hailed the Occupation as Liberators and identified itself with the objectives of the Occupation. (13) They also showed unexpected restraint and spoke often convincingly of achieving social justice and of building a democratic Japan through a process of peaceful revolution. After his return, Sanzo Nozaka, who had absconded to Soviet Union and China during the 1930s, was included in the Central Executive Committee. Nozaka openly stressed that the Communist Party should be made into a lovable party and should become a People's Party. (14) At the Fifth Convention, held in February 1946, the Party passed a resolution that they would aim at the establishment of a democratic people's government by carrying out a bourgeois democratic revolution and after reaching that stage would go forward to the step of socialist revolution. The Party again stressed that peaceful democratic means would be used in carrying out this revolution. (15)


15 Rodo Kumiai, n. 11, pp. 78-79.
MacArthur's policy of not interfering with Japan's affairs directly, unless security was endangered, also possibly helped communist activity. The communist organ Akahata was issued within ten days of the release of the communist leaders. The communist leaders toured the country to enlist support for the establishment of "democratic people's government".

JCP and the Labour movement

Since the Labour Unions were "training schools for carrying out class struggles", the communists attempted to take over their leadership. In fact, the Action Policy passed at the fourth Party Convention, held in December 1945, had made clear their target, of the establishment of one trade union in each industry. MacArthur's directive of 11 October 1945 to Baron Shidehara demanding among other things encouragement of unionisation of labour, abolition of all repressive laws including police control in spheres of industrial relations, gave a great impetus to the reorganisation of trade unions. By December 1945, labour unions had increased from 6 to 509 with a membership of 380,677 and the number continued to increase at a rate unparalleled in Japanese history. (16) The Trade Union

16 Ayusawa, n. 12, pp. 257-8.
Act promulgated in December 1945 went into effect in March 1946. This law guaranteed the rights of organisation and collective bargaining to all wage earning workers, including public servants with the exception of policemen, jailors and firemen and made illegal discriminatory treatment by employers on grounds of organisation of trade unions or engaging in Union activities.

Beginning with the re-organisation of the Seamen's Union by the veterans of the pre-war days, labour unions sprung up separately in all enterprises led by the leaders of the old Sodomei. (17) Sodomei was itself re-organised on 1 August 1946. The leaders of the leftist leanings were also not slow to reorganise. Responding to the appeal made by the Communist Party, they first met on 5 December 1945 and again on 6 January 1946 and formed the Kanto Regional Council. With the employees of Newspaper, Communication and Broadcasting Agencies as the core, the new organisation, Nippon Sangyo Betsu Rodo Kumiai Kaigi (Sanbetsu) was formed with 1,574,000 members on 14 August 1946. As against Sodomei which consisted of craft unions, the

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17 Sodomei was the abbreviated form of Dai Nippon Rode Sodomei Yuikai. This name was given to the workers' organisation Yuikai started by Suzuki Bunji in 1912 on the idea of ro-shi kyodo (harmonisation of capital and labour). But in 1919 the emphasis of Sodomei was changed to class struggle. However, in 1924 as one section of Sodomei insisted on more radical action, there was a clash and the extreme left wing quit and formed the Kanto Chiho Hyogo Kai. After this split between the (continued)
Sanbetsu was a federation of industry unions. (18) In the executive committee of Sanbetsu out of nineteen members, thirteen members were Communist Party members and out of the total forty-three members of the Action Committee, thirty were Communist Party members. It should also be noted that many of the labour unions in government enterprises, like Railway Workers Union, all Communication Workers Union, etc. irrespective of whether they formed part of Sanbetsu or not, were led by communists. (19) In other words, the communists more or less held the life line of the nation. Sanbetsu even proposed to Sodomei the formation of a national united front, but this was flatly turned down. In spite of this, the initial success of the communists in taking over leadership of labour unions was considerable.

The communist leaders encouraged the workers to direct action. The workers, who had all along been

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moderate right wing and the extreme left wing, there was another split in 1926 by a group in the Centre who disliked both the extreme groups and considered them as un-Japanese. Between 1926 and 1940, Sodomei underwent three more splits in 1929, 1932 and 1939, when finally in 1940 like all the other associations it was dissolved and merged with the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

18 Ayusawa, n. 12, pp. 257-8.

19 Rodo Kumiai, n. 11, pp. 23-25.
exploited by long hours of labour on low wages and who were also oppressed by the rising prices, shortage of food, etc. were eager enough to accept the leadership of the communists. The workers were led to usurp control over manufacture and sale of products and thus withhold owners from having any voice in the management. This, in effect, meant taking over the management and engaging in the production and delivery of goods or services for the management. The two newspapers with a very large circulation, viz., *Asahi Shimbun* and *Yomiuri Shimbun* were seized by the employees and "democratised" by October 1945. (20) With this success, the seizure of control of industries became one of the tactics used by the labour unions for "democratisation" and satisfaction of their demands. The success of labour unions in realising their major demands, viz. union recognition, right to bargain collectively, shorter working hours, increase in the days of paid leave, improvements in working conditions, etc. immediately after the war, should not be attributed entirely to the strength of the movement or the effectiveness of the leadership but rather to the state of stupor (*kyodatsu jotai*) in which the employers seemed to have fallen. However, when the tactic of production control (*seisan kanri*) spread to government and municipal offices in Tokyo, the Government issued a statement on 13 June 1946 declaring production control as illegal and in the same

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(20) *Sengo Nihon Shi*, n. 14, p. 97.
statement also warned the managements that the sabotaging of production would be dealt with severely. Thus while effective police intervention gradually put down the novel method of production control, the fundamental difficulties inherent in this method also led to the suspension of its practice. When control meant only supervision of processes, manufacture and distribution, there was not much difficulty. But the workers did not have knowledge or experience when it came to financial or commercial management. (21)

Apart from the new tactic of taking control over the management, the other weapon used by the Unions was the time-honoured method of strikes. The industrialists and the Government were fully conscious of the stiff attitude of the Occupation towards them, who, at the same time, maintained a sympathetic attitude towards the new upsurge in the country of insisting on rights. Again, the reparation question was not yet settled and the economic and political situation was very uncertain. In these circumstances, the management loosened their grip and this facilitated the activities of the workers.

As the economic hardships increased and the food crisis worsened, the Communist Party played up the difficulties of the people and organised a series of demonstrations, intimidation of the management, etc. These

21 Ayusawa, n. 12, pp. 259-62.
Rodo Kumiai, n. 11, p. 21.
reached their climax in the May Day demonstrations and the food riots, which brought to mind the rice riots of 1918. The increasing confusion in the country elicited MacArthur's statement of 20 May 1946 giving a warning that if such violent activities continued, he would be forced to take the necessary steps to control and remedy the situation. The Communist Party did not take the hint. They engineered the so-called October offensive on the part of the Electrical workers demanding a wage increase, repeal of income tax on wages and recession of limits fixed on wages paid in cash. The Government immediately hastened to enforce the law for adjustment of labour relations under which workers in public utility enterprises had to observe a thirty-day cooling off period before they resorted to strike. Though this was severely criticised by the workers, since the Government acceded to the major demands on 19 December, 1946, the October offensive did not flare up into anything bigger. Even while the Electricity Workers dispute was continuing, civil servants of various Government Departments presented demands for higher wages, and in the cooling off period of thirty days, they formed an All Government Municipal Employees United Struggle Committee and presented ten demands to the Prime Minister on 3 December. If these were not met by the end of December, they proposed to stage a nation-wide strike. (22)

22 花野 春重, 紫陽終末期 十年史: 労働 (Tokyo), 1966, pp. 7-11.
The continued successes in most of their direct actions, their increasing influence among the workers, the moderate non-interfering attitude adopted by SCAP and the legal weapon granted by Art. 6 of the Principles for Japanese Trade Unions adopted by the Far Eastern Commission, viz., "Trade Unions should be allowed to have part in political activities and to support political parties", encouraged the communists to entertain the naive idea that if they staged a nation-wide crippling strike and succeeded in overthrowing the Government, the SCAP would give its blessing to this change of government through the "freely expressed will of the people of Japan". (23) But the proposed nation-wide strike of 1 February 1947 ended in a fiasco. Though the SCAP called the leaders of the Joint Struggle Committee to refrain from excesses and to call off the strike, the leaders did not yield even at 2.30 a.m. on 31 January, just nine hours and two minutes before the deadline. Therefore, MacArthur issued his formal order forbidding the strike. The Communist Party had to request the workers to comply with it. (24)

The failure of the Communist Party to carry out the strike brought down its prestige and popularity. In the General Election held in April 1947 under the new Constitution


\[24\text{Shiryo Rodo, n. 22, pp. 49-51. Ayusawa, n. 12, pp. 270-2.}\]
though the Communist Party put up 120 candidates for the House of Representatives, only four were elected. In the House of Councillors also they could get only four of their forty candidates elected. Even within Sanbetsu, the criticism was mounting against the communist leaders and in February 1948, there was a split within Sanbetsu with the birth of Sanbetsu Minshuka Domei. (25) Among the organised workers in general, the new Mindo movement, started with the initiative and encouragement of the SCAP, gained strength rapidly and became an efficient counter-balance for the communist labour organisation. The Communist Party was losing its grip over the labour movement. However, the Party did not seem to have taken any positive steps to regain its lost position. Ironically, the only Socialist Party Government, which Japan ever had, could not remain long in the saddle and did actually resign, on the issue of non-fulfilment of the promise made to the public enterprise employees and the Municipal and Government employees for payment of 2.8 months salary. The Katayama Government had accepted the award of the Central Labour Relations Commission, which had mediated in the dispute raised by the workers against Government's system of average wages. Though the Government could pay two months salary by the end of the year, they could not find resources for the remaining 8/10ths of a month's salary and

resigned in February 1948. (26)

The next major strike launched by the Railway workers and the All Communication Workers in March 1948 was nipped in the bud by the SCAP's intervention. The measure taken by SCAP to avert the July offensive by the workers had a far-reaching effect in that it was the starting point for imposition of greater restraints on freedom of action by organised labour. In his letter of 22 July 1948, MacArthur suggested that the right of collective bargaining of the public servants shall be subjected to limitation as "a strike of public employees means nothing less than an intent on their part to restrict or obstruct the operation of government until their demands are satisfied. Such action looking towards the paralysis of government by those who have sworn to support it is unthinkable and intolerable". (27) If the Communist Party entertained any hopes that it could use the liberal tendencies of SCAP and succeed in overthrowing the government, through the strength of the workers, a careful study of this letter should have killed its illusions and also forewarned it of the future. The resignation of the Chief of Labour Division in SCAP, James E. Killen and his Deputy Chief, Paul Stanchfield on the ground that they could not adjust to the new SCAP policy of denial of collective


bargaining of legally constituted unions and SCAP's justification of his action also indicated the changing trends in SCAP's policy. The Purge programme was considered to be virtually complete by December 1947 and US Army Secretary Kenneth C. Royall's statement of 6 January 1948 made clear the softening of US attitude towards the "men who were most active in building up and running the war machine". (28)

But the Communist Party did not heed the handwriting on the wall.

Based on MacArthur's letter mentioned above, Government Order No. 201, popularly known as Potsdam Decree No. 201 was issued, as a comprehensive revision of the national Public Service Law, could not be undertaken immediately, since the Diet was not in session. But this revision, accomplished in December 1948, was accompanied by the enactment of three laws, the Japanese National Railways Act, the Japanese Monopoly Public Corporation Act and the Public Corporation and National Enterprises Labour Relations Act. By the enactment of these laws, the national public servants (the officials, or white collar workers of the central government) and the blue collar workers engaged in the various enterprises of the government (organised

28 Royall's speech in Documents concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan, n. 10, vol. 2, pp. 4-10.

Macmohan Ball, Japan Enemy or Ally (New York, 1949) pp. 129-30.
henceforth into "public corporations" or "public enterprises") were completely separated from the jurisdiction of the Central Labour Relations Board. This weakened the labour movement since it separated the large body of public workers who occupied the commanding position in the movement from the workers of private industries. One third of Japan's Unions and about the same proportion of organised workers were deprived of their right to strike. (29) The Communist Party, which had depended upon the strength of the influence over public workers, was also thus stripped of its legal weapon of direct action. While the failure of February 1947 strike brought down her prestige, the restrictions in workers' freedom of action, imposed by the Government, were attributed to the misguided violent policies of the communist leaders, who seemed to be motivated by their political plans of carrying out a "peaceful revolution". Thus the communist leadership not only did not produce any fruitful results for the workers but rather they even lost the rights which had been granted at the beginning of the Occupation. This also brought down the popularity of the communists.

JCP brings down Soviet popularity

The Communist Party blundered through in other

29 Shiryo Rodo, n. 22, p. 108.
Ayusawa, n. 12, pp. 293-4.
respects also and brought about its own unpopularity. Before the War, it had been stigmatised as a foreign-directed Party and had also been associated generally with violence and bloodshed. Nozaka's declaration of the Communist Party being a "lovable Party" and Secretary-General Tokuda's repeated denials of any liaison with the Soviet Union also marked a new change in the tactics of the Communist Party. The Party seemed to have realised the tremendous possibilities of success, if it insisted on an "independent character". Therefore, as a measure of expediency, it reduced its material ties with the Soviet Union, but there is every reason to believe that their basic relationship remained unchanged. (30) The Soviet Mission in Japan maintained a of staff/500 men, as against 334 persons of the other 16 Foreign Missions put together. This was reduced to 312 in 1947 only after repeated protests and deferment of payment of their maintenance bill. But it is difficult to assess the physical assistance to the Japanese Communist Party by the

30 Swearingen, n. I, pp. 134-5, pp. 230-1. Paul Langer and Rodger Swearingen, "The Japanese Communist Party, the Soviet Union and Korea", Pacific Affairs (New York), vol.23 December 1950, p. 345. At the 1946 Party Convention, Secretary General Tokuda Kyuichi stated "At present we have no relations whatever with the Soviet Union ......... I should like to state here that in the future as well our Party will never have relations with the Soviet Union ......... ".
Russian Mission. (31) The Soviet Union maintained a cautious attitude till 1950, but further events clearly show that the ties with the Soviet Union were never broken and the Party would act only under the direction of the Soviet Union. Even during the years 1945-50, the Japan Communist Party's stand on the Emperor system echoed only the Soviet Union's point of view, though the question of the Institution of the Emperor was relegated as of lesser importance, in deference to the wishes of the vast majority of the people who still held the Emperor in respect. (32) Though the Republic of China and Australia also had their own misgivings about the continuance of the Emperor system, their protests were milder, and they seemed to have become resigned to the


It is noted that the JCP while crying for the immediate overthrow of the "feudalistic, autocratic, monopolistic Imperial System" stated that the question of the "maintenance or abolition of the Imperial Family" would be settled according to the wishes of the people after democratisation had been completed.

For public opinion on this question, note that the results of the public opinion polls published in Asahi of 4 and 9 December 1945 show that only 5% wanted the Emperor system to be abolished and even among the intellectuals, only 6% wanted it to be abolished, while 75% wanted it to be reformed and retained. The fact that this opinion did not change as time passed is clear from the editorial in Mainichi of 3 February 1950 which states that the Japanese are happy with the Emperor system as it is and would not like him to be tried.
continuance of the Emperor under the new Constitution. But the Communist Party was consistent in its protests. The fact that its stand was not basically changed became clear when, in 1950, once again, the Party became vociferous in its demand for the abolition of the Emperor system. It was at this time that the Soviet Union, which had been silent for some time revived her demand that the Emperor should be tried as a war criminal. (33)

Repatriation Question

The Communist Party's ties with the Soviet Union were made more clear on the question of the repatriation of prisoners from the Soviet Union. While all Japanese residents of non-Soviet areas had been repatriated by the end of 1946, repatriation of Japanese nationals from Siberia and other Russian territories did not begin until 19 December 1946. The Soviet Union at the outset had announced her intention to utilise the Japanese prisoners for reconstruction of war-devastated areas. This demand was opposed by the

33 Akahata, 3 February 1950.
After giving a gist of Soviet Ambassador's note to the US Government for trying the Emperor as a war criminal, it goes on to say, "our Party put the Emperor's name first in the list of the war criminals and our stand is not altered". Also see Akahata 5, 7, 16 February, 1950.
In the Soviet Press, the demand for trying the Emperor as a war criminal was continued even later. See New Times (Moscow) 1 March 1950, pp. 21-22, 15 March 1950 pp. 26-27; 1 May 1950, pp. 26-27.
United States which insisted that, as stated in the Potsdam Declaration, all the Japanese prisoners should be repatriated as early as possible. (34) However, the Soviet authorities on their own part, continued to use the prisoners in reconstruction work and repatriation proceeded at snail's pace, in spite of sharp protests from the SCAP in the Allied Council for Japan. (35) When "climatic and icing conditions" were adduced as reasons for suspension of repatriation for months, the SCAP offered to dispatch ice breakers to Soviet ports, but this was not accepted. The repatriation was possibly delayed to subject the Japanese to a course of indoctrination in order to reinforce the Communist Party in Japan. (36)

34 Byrnes, n. 5, p. 243. Dallin, n. 31, pp. 240, 270-4. Pravda (Irkutsk) in December 1946 accepted for the first time that Japanese prisoners of war were used for railway and highway construction.

35 In June 1946 when in the ACJ Gen. K. Deravyanko was asked about the Soviet repatriation schedules, he stated that this was outside the purview of the Allied Council. Dallin, n. 31, p. 274. SCAP signed an accord with USSR to bring repatriates back at the rate of 50,000 per month. Nippon Times, 21 December 1946.


stated that SCAP was doing propaganda to
Some sort of direct liaison also seems to have been established by the Japanese Communist headquarters with the Russian repatriation agencies, though this was constantly denied by the Japanese Communist Party. (37) In fact, it was even alleged that the Japanese Communist Party had specifically requested the Russian repatriation agencies not to return these prisoners without indoctrinating them. (38) Whether this indoctrination was carried out at the instance of the JCP or not, the behaviour of the repatriates gave sufficient proof that they had been so indoctrinated. Their treatment of the captain and the crew in the repatriate ships, the shouting of slogans against American imperialism and monopoly capitalism and above all, their ignoring their own families, who had anxiously waited for them so long, but


38 Pravda report on 5 March 1950 of Tass denial that Secretary General Tokuda had demanded holding up of repatriation until indoctrination of prisoners of war had been completed. It was termed a malicious fabrication by the Americans. Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York) (hereafter CDSP), vol. 2, no. 11, p. 22.
The allegation made against Tokuda was investigated by a Special Repatriation Committee and though he continued to deny this charge as a "plot of Government", the Committee on basis of the evidence presented, concluded that Tokuda did make such a demand. Asahi 26 March 1950.
The investigation and Tokuda's behaviour during the trial turned public opinion against JCP. See Mainichi editorial 27 March 1950. Asahi editorial 26 March 1950.
In fact, Mainichi editorial of 1 May 1950 states that though JCP claims to be the "People's Voice", it is actually the people's enemy.
hastening to the local Communist headquarters to pay their homage filled the people with disgust. If they had behaved quietly and fanned through the whole of Japan, their propaganda would have had much more effect, but their crude tactics alienated the people not only from communism but also from the Soviet Union. (39)

The Soviet Union also used radio broadcasts from Vladivostok, Khabarovsk and Moscow to Japan for stressing the themes that peace of Japan and the Far East was threatened by American imperialism and the Soviet Union was the only country genuinely desirous of peace. The broadcasts appealed to the people of Japan to support all movements that worked for peace and recommended that the only Party which advocated real peace was the Communist Party. (40)

Cominform criticism: JCP changes her policy

Yet, these appeals failed to have the desired effect especially after Nozaka, recanting at the request of the Comintern, changed his tactics from that of creating a "lovable Party" to a more radical approach. The change in the policy of the JCP was first revealed in the General Report of the Eighteenth Convention of the Central Executive

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39 Wildes, n. 31, p. 283.

Committee. While the slogan raised was "Peace and Independence", it clearly implied that the Communist Party would no longer limit itself to the domestic question of "overthrow of the Yoshida Cabinet", but would take the stand of anti-Americanism and anti-Imperialism. It was clear that the soft approach had been abandoned. (41) The change in communist policies, after a directive from a foreign agency, was viewed with disgust and it turned into revulsion when the policies were translated into action and there was a spate of strikes and increased violence. (42) While it is difficult to say with certainty that all strikes and violence were communist inspired, the fact that some of them were proved to be so, easily turned public opinion against them and made them the culprits, whenever public order was disrupted. (43) The Government used this threat

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41 Cominform's criticisms and Pravda's comments were published in Asahi 9 January 1950. Akahata 24 January 1950. Asahi 24 January 1950 "Emphasis of struggle on an international scale".

42 Yomiuri editorial 28 July 1950; Jiji editorial 30 August 1950, 25 September 1950; Tokyo editorial 11 June 1950. Asahi editorial 18 June 1950 while deprecating the violent methods of the Communists and appreciating the order for purging the Communists, warned that banning the Party would incite more violence from underground.

43 Shiryo Seiji, n. 13, pp. 71-73 gives newspaper reports of incidents in 1949. Shiryo Rodo, n. 21, pp. 127-34 gives the Communist Unions' protests that the charges of violence levied against communists are plots nurtured by the reactionary Government to discredit communists. Rodo Kumiai, n. 11, p. 33 gives the conclusions of the Committee of the House of Representatives on the various incidents that the communists were involved in most of the incidents.
to the law and order situation as an argument to ram through the Subversive Activities Prevention Bill, in spite of the fierce opposition put up by the opposition Parties, the intellectuals and the Labour Unions. (44)

The change in the Soviet Union's campaign in Japan may partly be attributed to her realisation of the losing war she was fighting in Japan. In 1947 when the Cold War increased in momentum, while she had already taken up a hard line in Europe, the special conditions in Japan, due to the Occupation made her approve a soft line in the case of JCP. However, by 1950, she began to feel that though the soft line adopted by JCP seemed to yield some initial results, the "old camp" had not been dislodged even by an inch, but was rather more firmly entrenched and the possibility of even a "peaceful revolution" being staged by the people seemed to be remote. At the same time, the establishment of the

44 Ayusawa, n. 12, pp. 322-3. The Subversive Activities Prevention Act was promulgated on 21 June 1952. It was clearly aimed at suppression of subversive activities of the communists. As will be noted, it was brought into force after the signing of the San Francisco Treaty and could be considered as one of the measures taken by independent Japanese Government to control the law and order situation. The Bill brought back unpleasant memories of the Chian Iii Ho of 1925.
Sohyo's statement of 1 April 1952 opposing the Bill and Government's appeal of 11 April 1952 to the workers not to resort to strike and explaining the purposes of the Act in Shiryo Rodo, n. 22, p. 192.
For criticisms of intellectuals, the labour unions, teachers and the summary of discussions in the Diet, the Legislative process and the interpretation of law, see Hakai Katsudo boshi Ho, special supplement to Horitsu Jiho, August 1952.
Chinese People's Republic in 1949 also seemed to have influenced her decision. The military offensive which was about to be launched in Korea needed a militant Communist Party in Japan and the preparation of the people of Japan to catch up the mood. These may be some of the factors which might have led to Cominform's criticism of the JCP.

The Soviet Union and the JCP overplayed their hand. As already explained, the communist fortunes began to be on the wane starting from the labour ranks. When, early in 1949, the communist dominated Unions were forcefully resisting the Government's personnel retrenchment programme, the anti-communist Mindo, though opposed to the 'reactionary' Yoshida Government, recognised that the Government had no alternative but to carry out this programme and adopted a more moderate position. The Occupation also favoured the Mindo Unions and Sanbetsu, by June 1950, had dwindled to slightly more than one quarter of its former membership. The Communists lost all hopes of staging a come-back with MacArthur's directive for purging the Communists. (45)

45 Asahi 7 June 1950 published MacArthur's directive to purge all the 24 members of the JCP Central Executive Committee. The scope of the purge was widened later. This was followed by a ban on Akahata for 30 days. Asahi 24 June 1950 Later a ban was imposed on all communist publications Asahi 24 July 1950.

This brings home another miscalculation made by the JCP. The breeze of freedom for the communists, which blew over Japan and the support of the Occupation authorities to their fanning out over the whole country lulled it into a false sense of security. The Occupation authorities had never concealed their feeling that they would on no account allow Japan to be engulfed by communism and so it was but natural that MacArthur came down heavily on them when he perceived the danger of total subversion. Communism failed to appeal to Japan and so also its sponsor and supporter, the Soviet Union, failed to catch up with the imagination of the Japanese people. (46)

45 contd.

All the newspapers criticised the violent tactics of the Communists and supported the action taken against them. It is not possible to say whether this reflected the true feelings, because with the Press Code in operation, it would have been difficult for the newspapers to criticise MacArthur's action. However, the public opinion polls also show the decreasing popularity of the communists. *Jiji* editorial of 25 September 1950, however, points out that since experience with a legal Communist Party has been too short, it cannot be said that the anti-communist feelings are complete and that Japanese have become immune to the threat of communism.

46. US representative in the Allied Council stated in 1946, "US Government was no more disposed to favour communism in Japan than in America". Yoshida, n. 2, p. 228. In the public opinion polls, taken during 1945-52, when asked which Party would you vote for, the highest percentage of support obtained by JCP was only 5% and generally it ranged only from 2 to 1%. In 1951 it dipped down to 0.4%. Again, Soviet Union stands at the top of the list, when asked which country you dislike most and at the bottom of the list, when asked which country you like most. Allan B. Cole and Naomichi Nakanishi Comp. and ed. *Japanese Opinion Polls with socio-political significance 1947-1957* (Ann Arbor, 27 Michigan, 1959), pp. 3, 5, 8, 10, 11, 21-24, 27, 30, 33, 36-37, 56, 61, 63, 65, 80, 648-9.
While the Soviet Union's attempts to spread her influence in Japan through the means of the JCP did not register any spectacular success, let us review her performance in FEC and ACJ and try to evaluate whether she was able to formulate policies, which would be in her own national interest or at least prevent formulation of policies, which would be detrimental to her interests or her expectations in the Far East.

**Constitution**

According to the Agreement evolved at the Moscow Conference, the United States Government may issue interim directives to the Supreme Commander pending action by the Commission, whenever urgent matters arise not covered by policies already formulated by the Commission; provided that any directives dealing with fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure or in the regime of control or dealing with a change in the Japanese Government as a whole will be issued only following consultation and following the attainment of agreement in the Far Eastern Commission. (47)

Therefore, the Soviet Union had enough grounds to feel satisfied that no fundamental change in Japan would be carried out without taking her opinion and wishes into

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account. However, MacArthur managed to lay down the blueprint of Japan's future through a new Constitution even without consulting the US Government or even keeping them informed of this momentous reform he was engineering in Japan. The United States Government was presented with a fait accompli and they did not have much more scope than sign on the dotted line confirming their approval.

MacArthur was in complete disagreement with the principle of surrendering America's unilateral authority over Japan and subjecting her freedom of action to the unwieldy framework of two international bodies. (48) Yet, his protests could not prevent the formation of the FEC and the ACJ, though it became his confirmed policy to treat these bodies, as if they did not exist. As the Supreme Executive Authority in Japan, he also possessed enough latitude in action and neither the FEC nor the ACJ could manage to frustrate his actions through their directives. But as MacArthur realised that his freedom of action in bringing about fundamental constitutional changes would be restricted, once the FEC officially came into being, on his orders, the great task of drafting the Constitution for a

new democratic Japan was accomplished within six days. (49)

While it is true that SWNCC had sent a policy decision, viz. "Reform of the Japanese Governmental System" on 11 January 1946 for MacArthur's information, in this paper there was a specific statement that "only as a last resort should a formal instruction be issued to the Japanese Government specifying in detail the reforms to be effected". Again, the instructions left open the question whether the Imperial institution would be retained or not; and while it made clear that the military should be subordinated to the civil, there was no provision regarding renunciation of war. (50)

MacArthur obtained the concurrence of the Japanese Cabinet to his draft and also drove home the need for an early implementation of the draft, by insisting that this was the only means of preserving the Throne. He warned that if the Japanese Government did not forestall a FEC draft by the

49 Gen. Whitney's memo to MacArthur suggesting that SCAP will not be exceeding his powers, if he approves a Constitution technically initiated by the Japanese Government before the FEC comes into being, is interesting. Two days after receipt of this memo, MacArthur ordered the Government Section to draft a model constitution for the guidance of the Japanese Government, although on 30 January 1946, he had told the visiting members of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission that constitutional reform had been taken out of his hands by the Moscow Agreement and he had ceased to take any action on it. Political Reorientation of Japan, n. 4, vol. 2, pp. 622-3.


50 McNelly, n. 48, pp. 178-180. Ward, n. 49, pp. 989-91 (Footnote 23)
Constitution drafted by SCAP, there was the possibility that a Republican Constitution eliminating the Throne might be forced upon the Japanese. (51) MacArthur's arguments would have sounded quite plausible as the Soviet Union had already voiced her demand for trying the Emperor as a war criminal and the JCP were calling for the abolition of the Imperial institution. It was common knowledge that the other allies, viz., Australia and Republic of China were also not too happy over the continuance of the Imperial system. MacArthur therefore touched the most vulnerable point of the Japanese to gain acceptance of his draft. Again, his ominous threat that if the Cabinet did not approve his draft, he would bring the issue before the people, was a sufficient "whipstroke" since the Government leaders could hardly conceive of a Constitution being formulated "in the market place". (52) The Japanese seemed to prefer to deal with the "known dangers presented by SCAP rather than the unknown perils of a remote and complex international agency of which the USSR was the most decisive and important member". Thus, though MacArthur stated that "a Constitution imposed by

51 McNelly, n. 48, pp. 187-8. Toshio Sugimoto, Senryo Hiroku (Tokyo, 1965) pp. 97, 101-3. It is stated that MacArthur's delegation threatened that if the Constitution was not accepted, "the person of the Emperor would not be guaranteed" and gave only 20 minutes for consideration, before formal acceptance. According to Whitney, they gave one hour. In any case, the time allotted was too short for calm consideration being given to the problem.

bayonets could not last the Occupation and though there is a feeling in some circles in Japan that no coercive measures were used by the Occupation, in the formulation of the Constitution, the fact remains that the manner in which the Constitution was drafted and accepted by the Cabinet, could hardly be called a free expression of the will of the Japanese people and of their democratic tendencies. Yet the provisions of the new Constitution (excepting for the retention of the Imperial institution) were idealistic enough to appear to be an expression of the democratic tendencies of the Japanese people.

The Soviet Union's objective of abolition of the Imperial institution and the curtailment of the power of the "old guard", while increasing the right of the workers, was defeated by this fait accompli of an "idealised version of Anglo-American political institutions hastily patched together". The Constitution was considered more as a weapon for defeating Russian intrigues in the Occupation of Japan, rather than as a document expressing and fostering democracy in future Japan. As pointed out by McNelly, ever since Perry's visit, international politics rather than domestic development has been instrumental in the development of Japan's legal and political institutions. In the twentieth century, the Japanese Constitution was a "child of the cold War" and in addition, an "accouchement force".

The State Department learnt of the new Constitution when it was published in the Tokyo Press on 6 March 1946, with
the comment that it had received MacArthur's personal approval. The FEC considered this as an affront to the international body and a challenge to its authority. Initially, the Commission sought to pass a Resolution requiring MacArthur to submit the Constitution for approval by the Commission and also ask for the postponement of the elections. However, under the threat of the American veto, the Commission modified its stand and only asked to keep them informed of the progress of the draft in the Japanese Parliament and also to give an opportunity to the Commission to approve the final draft. But the Constitution was discussed in the FEC and certain basic principles were agreed to. These were basically as those contained in the directives given by the State Department to MacArthur. The Soviet representative's demand for amending the Constitution to include provision for unicameral legislature, elected judiciary and social welfare measures, was not approved by the other members. But the Commission passed a resolution to the effect that the new Constitution should be submitted to the people after two to three years, for a review. The Soviet representative in the Commission felt that the essential question was not the review as such, but the fact that the Commission was not paying heed to the question that even "the few democratic provisions which were contained in it were being systematically violated by US Occupation authorities and the Japanese
Government. (53)

The Soviet Union's attempts to postpone the elections on the ground that the democratic forces needed more time to gather strength and that early elections would only return the old guard into power, also proved futile. In this case, though the Commission requested SCAP to consider the advisability of postponing the elections, MacArthur refused to accede to this request. (54)

Labour Legislation

On the labour front, the FEC unanimously passed a Resolution on 16 December 1946 incorporating principles for

Borton points out that the Renunciation of War Clause did not originate in Washington. The State Department actually had desired to give as much consideration as possible to the views of Allied Powers without infringing on US objectives. However, the Defence Department sympathised with MacArthur's feelings of not countemancing outside influence. Ward, n. 49, pp. 1006-8. Ward states "Neither the State War Navy Co-ordinating Committee nor any other civilian agency of the Government saw the specific or complete terms of any constitutional draft prior to their publication in March 1946".

As already mentioned, as early as 21 December 1945, a Labour Union Law was passed giving the workers right to organise and press their demands by collective bargaining and strikes. But when the Labour Relations Adjustments Law was proposed, putting some restrictions on the right of Government and public utility workers to strike, on 10 July 1946, the Russian representative in the Allied Council called the provisions of the Law inadequate and presented a twenty one point programme guaranteeing workers freedom to strike and control production, if necessary. This radical measure (workers' right to control production), which does not exist in the Soviet Union either, was however not accepted. (56) A series of threatened strikes and violence on the part of the workers seemed to justify the Government's further revision of the labour laws under directives from MacArthur. The revised laws denied the right of strike and collective bargaining to Government workers but allowed the employees of Public Corporations the right of collective bargaining without any right to strike. These laws brought a spate of protests by the Russian representative in the FEC. He held that the laws should be

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abrogated as they contravened the FEC Policy decision, which made no discrimination against the Government employees. The Australian representative felt that while the Occupation authorities could have discretion to prohibit strikes or stoppages of work, when they went directly against the objectives or needs of the Occupation (the Policy decision provides for this), as a matter of policy, the Principles of Trade Unions passed by the FEC should be applied to workers in Japanese Government enterprises. This resolution in the Steering Committee had the approval of six nations (Australia, Canada, France, India, New Zealand and UK). But the US representative defended MacArthur stating that he had acted within the proper limits of his executive authority in interpreting the policy. The legislation only forbade strikes but provided for collective bargaining, arbitration, etc. If the FEC passed a policy decision giving government workers unrestricted right to strike, this would discredit the SGAP and cripple its authority. The US position received no support from other countries. But Australia did not press for a vote on her resolution, as it would have embarrassed the US Government and forced her to use her veto powers. (57)

57 Blakeslee, n. 3, pp. 170-5, contains FEC discussions in the FEC. In the ACJ, the Soviet representative gave a speech on the 28 August 1948 attacking the revision. Soren wa Nihon ni nani wo nozomu ka, n. 36, pp. 123-8. Corrected verbatim Minutes of the Allied Council for Japan, Meeting of 28 August, 1948 (microfilm)
Miscellaneous

It is noted that MacArthur's actions were justified by the US Government not only in this case but also in other cases, as it was felt that the decision of the Theatre Commander, who had to tackle the problems on the spot, would generally be right and should not be fettered in any way. The US Government paid more heed, therefore, to MacArthur's recommendations regarding imports of food supplies by Japan, freedom of fishing and whaling, etc. On the question of fishing, though most of the members of the FEC were prepared to agree to the provision that SCAP would consult the country whose interests might be affected, Soviet Union insisted on the condition that Japanese fishing areas could be extended only with the prior authorisation of the FEC. Thus no policy decision was passed, but this did not affect SCAP exercising the right to extend these areas at his discretion under the US Government directive.

In the case of whaling, though UK and Australia were strongly against Japanese whaling operations, they had to bow down to US pressure, and the policy paper was removed from the agenda. SCAP succeeded in authorising a SCAP controlled whaling expedition each year. (58) It is possible

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that the Soviet Union's opposition to measures giving the Japanese a better deal in these respects, while on the other hand, the United States was actually providing her with supplies and also arguing in the FEC for a less harsh treatment, might have turned the public opinion against the Soviet Union.

On the question of permitting Japanese nationals to visit other countries and participate in the Conferences organised for exchange of technical information, commercial purposes, etc., the Commission had passed only two policy decisions granting very restricted privileges. In April 1949, USA put up a proposal to the Commission for "Japanese participation in international relations" which envisaged that, subject to SCAP's discretion and control, Japan should be permitted to participate in conventions, meetings, consular arrangements or other bilateral or multilateral accords, which SCAP might consider necessary to be in the interests of the Occupation. This was opposed, not only by the Soviet Union but also by other members of the Commission as well, on the ground that Japan as a defeated nation did not have this right and that Japanese nationals once abroad might do propaganda to obtain a softer peace treaty. However, through interim directives, USA enabled the increase of external activities of Japan and also obtained for Japan full membership of the Universal Postal Union, International Telecommunications Union and several other specialised
agencies of the UN. (59) These freedoms might have mollified
the hurt feelings of the Japanese to a great extent as only
the US Government seemed to feel that the Japanese were
sufficiently reformed to be put back into circulation.

Reparations

The Soviet Union's stand on the question of
reparations could also not have put her in a favourable light
in the eyes of Japan. The obligation of Japan, for paying
reparations, was stated in the Potsdam Declaration, US
Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan of 29 August 1945
and also the FEC Basic Surrender Policy for Japan passed
on 19 June 1947. (60) The Pauley Report on Reparations, as
amended by the SWGCC of US Government was submitted to the
FEC. On the basis of this, the FEC drafted a policy on
Interim Reparations Removals, which was more favourable to
Japan than that submitted by the US Government. However,

59 US Department of State, Far Eastern Commission, Second
Report by the Secretary-General, July 10 1947 -
December 23 1948, pp. 22-23, 36-37.
Blakeslee, n. 3, pp. 78-80.
It is interesting to note that the SCAP had given friendly
dvice to the Japanese Government to orient all Japanese
nationals who travelled abroad to the effect that they
should be careful in making statements, as their comments
might be interpreted as propaganda or an attempt to
influence outcome of a Peace Treaty.
Documents concerning Allied Occupation, n. 10, vol. 2,
p. 59-60.

Activities of the Far Eastern Commission, n. 23, pp. 56-57.
the resolution could not be implemented until an agreement could be reached on the percentage of reparations to be allocated to the various countries. (61) The main obstacle in arriving at a decision was the Soviet Union's insistence that her removal of Japanese assets from Manchuria, Kuriles and Sakhalin should be treated as war booty and must not be discussed, while settling the reparation percentage. The USA tried to meet her half way, when she suggested that all countries could retain the Japanese assets held by them on 1 June 1946. However, the total amount of such assets, including the war booty held by them, should be considered in determining the percentage of reparations. But the Soviet Union insisted on the exclusion of Soviet war booty removals from the common reparations fund. The USA then decided to issue suitable interim directives after due consultations with the Governments concerned separately. But there was a general feeling of keeping the reparations question within the Commission and the US representative Gen. McCoy himself advised against it, as it would make co-operation with the Soviet Union more difficult. On 13 February 1947, the USA presented to the FEC a policy paper entitled "Advance Transfers of Japanese Reparations". The percentages proposed were China 15 per cent, Philippines 5 per cent, Netherlands (for the Indies) 5 per cent, UK (for

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61 Blakeslee, n. 3, p. 125, Ball, n. 28, pp. 98-102.
Burma and Malaysia) 5 per cent and the others were to receive nothing under the Advance Transfers Programme. This was, therefore, resented by other countries. But an Interim Directive was issued on 3 April 1947 and the deliveries started rolling in. (62) But with the change in US attitude towards Japan in 1949, from reform to rehabilitation, the US Government came round to MacArthur's stand that though ethically Japan should pay reparations, economically she was unable to do so. A stabilised economy in Japan was more important than payment of industrial reparation, as otherwise the US costs of supporting Japan would be proportionately increased. Accordingly, the Advance Transfers were stopped with the US decision of 12 May 1949. The question of reparations was temporarily shelved, but the USA issued a directive on Economic Stabilisation of Japan: (63)

Economic stabilisation

During the first two years of the Occupation, the SCAP refrained from issuing concrete directives for economic stabilisation and increase of agricultural and industrial production. This was considered to be the responsibility of the Japanese Government and it was hoped that the Japanese

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industry and foreign trade would revive more or less of their own accord. Yet only when it was found that the Government had failed to carry out their full responsibility in the vital fields of food collection, tax collection or coal production, did the Occupation intervene and assume direct control. (64) By 1947, it had become clear that the USA could no longer afford to take a detached or incidental interest in Japanese recovery, as the trade deficit borne by the United States totalled 300 million dollars. On 21 January 1948, the United States gave a statement to the FEC that "the establishment of a self-supporting economy in Japan, without which the achievements of the Occupation cannot be consolidated, has not yet been accomplished".

Concerned with the situation, the United States despatched the Young Mission which called for the immediate institution of a comprehensive economic stabilisation programme stressing particularly stabilisation of wages, strict price control, credit and raw materials allocation controls, increased tax collections, reduction of government spending and the early establishment of a single general rate of exchange for the yen. SCAP immediately urged the Ashida Government to implement a ten point programme modelled on Young Mission's recommendations. The Ashida Government did not have the

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64 Ball States "Japan's present economic difficulties are mainly the result of the failures of her own government" Ball, n. 28, p.102. The same criticism can be found in Hugh Borton et al., The Far East 1942-46 (London, 1955), p. 349.
political courage to implement this. The succeeding Yoshida Government also tried to stall the issues but in December 1948 the US Government issued an interim directive to the Supreme Commander to implement the economic stabilisation programme. The public directive of MacArthur with the full backing of the US Government relieved the Yoshida Government of any responsibility for the stringent austerity measures called for by the programme, which would be in contravention of the election promises made by him a few weeks before. MacArthur also received the assistance of Joseph M. Dodge to supervise the programme. But the stabilisation programme resulted in large-scale retrenchment of employees in Government and private industries. (65)

The Soviet representative in the FEC stated that he agreed to the need for the revival of Japanese peace time industries, but suggested that a Management Board comprising of the nations, which fear the revival of the War industries, should be established for a few years to supervise that only peaceful industries were revived. (66)


In the FEC, it was not only the Soviet Union but other nations also were wary of Japan's revival. The SCAP, however, went ahead with the Economic Stabilisation Programme and though the Soviet Union and the JCP criticised all the measures as "road to fascism", "capitalist offensive", "Slavery to foreign Capital", etc., the scheme was put into effect just as the USA desired. (67) The Soviet Union, therefore, utilised the JCP to rouse the people to prevent implementation of the Dodge Plan under the slogan of "Peace and Independence". But their plans backfired; MacArthur issued the directive for purging the Communists. The Japanese people also were disappointed with the militant and reckless action of the Communists and in a way believed that these activities had deprived them of the advantages and privileges enjoyed by them in the earlier phase of the Occupation. At this stage, the Soviet Union attempted to revive the issue of trying the Emperor as a war criminal by bringing forth new charges against the Emperor that during


*Pravda*, 20 February 1949 reports Panyushkin's criticism in FEC against the grant of privileged conditions for American monopolies to invest in Japan. *CDSP*, vol.1, no. 7, pp. 27-28.

"The Colonial Policy of Imperialists in Asia", *Izvestia*, 6 March 1949 (summary in *CDSP*, vol. 1, no. 9, pp. 22-23) stresses that "USA plans to utilise Japan as a sphere for investment of American Capital and turn her into a dependent colony, while Soviet Union aims to develop the Far Eastern countries through creation of national industries". Also see *Akahata*, 6 June 1950.
the war, he blessed the plans for a bacteriological warfare. The Communist Party enthusiastically endorsed this. This also did not particularly endear the Soviet Union to the Japanese people.

PEACE TREATY

The Soviet Union had one more area left, where she might be able to assert her rights. This was in the field of Peace Treaty negotiations. As early as in March 1947 MacArthur had recommended an early peace treaty with Japan, as he felt that this would have a stimulating effect on the economic recovery of Japan. (68) There was also pressure from some economy minded Senators that an early Treaty should be concluded with Japan to cut down Occupation costs. The War and Navy Departments were, however, against the conclusion of an early Peace Treaty because of the military vacuum in the Pacific. After the experience of deadlock over Germany in the Foreign Ministers' Conference, the United States decided not to utilise that Body for discussing the Japanese Peace Treaty and sent an invitation on 11 July 1947 to all

Borton points out that the State Department in early 1947 actually compiled a first draft of the Peace Treaty and informed MacArthur of its contents. However, they did not authorise him to make a public announcement of it. Hugh Borton et al., n. 64, p. 422.
the other ten members of the Far Eastern Commission to participate in a preliminary Conference, where voting would be by two-thirds majority. The tentative date suggested was 19 August 1947. (69)

Fully aware of her disadvantageous position in such a Conference, the Soviet Union stated in her reply of 22 July 1947 that the Potsdam Conference had made the Council of Foreign Ministers, with all the Powers carrying veto rights, the body for preparation of the Treaty. Gen. Marshall Secretary of State, in his aide memoire on 12 August 1947, stressed that in US view the formation of FEC, composed of representatives of the eleven Powers, constituted a recognition of the primary interests of these Powers in post-surrender policy matters and hence the Japanese peace settlement. And the Conference which would consider a Peace Treaty should, therefore, be larger in composition than the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Soviet Union in her reply of 29 August 1947 reiterated that the Council of Foreign Ministers was established to carry out the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlement and this decision by no means limited

69 Dunn, n. 68, pp. 62-9. US, Department of State Bulletin (hereafter DSB) 27 July 1947, p. 182. The Japanese Press displayed interest in the early attempts at peace and without exactly showing disappoint­ment at Soviet insistence, commented that an agreement was bound to come in due course. Asahi editorial 18 July 1947. Yomiuri 15 July 1947. Yomiuri, on the other hand, warns that, if Soviet intransigence leads to a separate peace treaty, it would worsen the Far Eastern situation.
the work to the peace settlement of European countries. The inclusion of China's representative testified that peace settlement with Japan also would fall under its purview. The USA continued to substantiate her stand on the absence of a written agreement at Potsdam that she would be willing to entrust the Peace Settlement of Japan to the Council of Foreign Ministers. (70) But, as a matter of fact, at Potsdam, when Secretary of State Byrnes was urging at a meeting on 18 July 1945 the participation of China in the Council of Foreign Ministers, he argued that China's presence in the Council would be of considerable advantage when the time came for discussion of peace with Japan. (71) At that time, USA also seemed to have visualised the Council of Foreign Ministers as a body for discussing the Peace settlement. But, as time passed and the USA became determined that Japan should be kept on the side of the western nations, she realised that the Council of Foreign Ministers with its unanimity principle was not a suitable place for the discussion of a Japanese Peace Treaty.

China raised objections to the mode of voting. In the first instance, China proposed that negative votes by any two of the Big Four would constitute a veto. Later she changed her proposal and agreed with the USSR that a negative vote by a single one of these Powers would be a veto.

71 Potsdam Papers, vol. 1, p. 67.
Probably China feared that her participation in a Peace Conference, from which Soviet Union abstained, would be construed as a violation of the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1945, which forbade a separate peace with Japan. The Soviet Union might use this as an excuse to aid the Chinese Communists. (72)

Great Britain and the Commonwealth countries declined to send representatives by the date proposed, as it conflicted with the Commonwealth Conference scheduled for 26 August 1947 in Canberra. The deliberations of the Commonwealth Conference revealed the unity of the participants in favouring a restrictive treaty with Japan. Australia and New Zealand did not share MacArthur's optimism that Japan had been converted to pacifism and democracy. Great Britain feared the ruinous competition she might have to face once Japan regained her sovereignty and her industrial recovery was unchecked. In short, Great Britain and the Commonwealth countries were concerned about the trends in American policy of relaxation of economic and political controls in Japan. (73)

Thus the proposed Conference never materialised. In a way, this ultimately was to Japan's advantage, as the restrictive punitive measures included in the early draft

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72 Dunn, n. 68, p. 65

73 Ibid., p. 67
underwent a drastic change, as the Cold War intensified. Slowly, the opinion gained ground that the Treaty should be so designed as to have an economically strengthened Japan, which would be friendly to the USA on her own initiative. To achieve this atmosphere, it was realised that Japan should be treated more on grounds of equality than as a defeated enemy and provisions of the Treaty should be liberal enough to forestall any Soviet or Chinese moves of undercutting the USA and offering more attractive terms to lure Japan into the Communist Bloc. Therefore, though there was a long-drawn out dispute carried on the level of procedural difference of opinion, it really was a part of a deep power struggle in the Pacific. (74)

The Soviet programme of extending her influence in Japan through the communist forces could not be called much of a success. However, during the Occupation period, there were effective deterrents, like the presence of the Occupation forces, the American economic aid, the rehabilitation programme, along with the deep rooted fear and hatred of the traditional enemy, the Soviet Union. The memories of the last-minute entry of the Soviet Union into the War, like a stab in the back, were still fresh and also partly accounted for the alienation of the Japanese people from the Soviet Union. But in different circumstances, Japan could could be a convenient target for communist encroachment. The structure of Japanese society was not fundamentally resistant

74 Ibid., pp. 76-84.
to totalitarianism and there was a large industrial proletariat sympathetic towards the Communist ideology. (75) Among the intellectuals also, there was a good percentage with leftist tendencies. The successful communist revolution in China, which had the tradition of supplying spiritual guidance to Japan and which could also hold out the offer of rich supply of cheap raw materials, badly needed by Japan, could be shrewdly exploited to draw Japan into the communist fold. The pre-war rivalry between the Soviet Union and Japan for supremacy in the Far East was no longer a decisive factor, considering that Japan had been limited to her four islands under international agreement. Furthermore, it was probable, that more practical economic benefits accruing from friendship with the Soviet Union and China would soften the

Collectivity orientations have remained a dominant part of the social environment of Japan. The traditional values laid stress on unconditional loyalty and obligations to the group, rather than on individual rights, on conformist harmony and orthodoxy rather than on free choice. In fact, the individual accepted the goals and aims of the collectivity and any distinction between the individual and the group tended to dissolve. These values were essentially alien to a liberal democratic approach. Again, the Japanese people had long been used to unlimited extension of the functions of the State, even reaching up to their private daily lives and regulating them. At the same time, there was a sense of distance which separated the masses from the centres of political power, retarding the growth of political maturity. The concentration of power in the hands of a few had been the tradition. All these traditional values made them responsive to a totalitarian system. The postwar reforms of institutional democratisation had not succeeded in supplanting this strong heritage and instilling the spirit of individualism and democracy.
violently anti-communist stand taken by Japan. It may be pertinent to note here that the Soviet Union's attitude in foreign policy in those years was that of a "black capitalist world" encircling the "white socialist State" and with China and North Korea already having been "liberated", the prize of an industrial Japan presented the most alluring prospects of the Pacific area being fully "liberated" as well as doubly strengthened. For the West, a series of shattering events like the fall of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Blockade, the formation of the People's Republic of China and the shooting war in Korea seemed to leave no alternative, but to pool all her energies to safeguard Japan from falling a prey to the subversion of communism, even if it meant granting concessions.

The big task facing the USA, thus, was the conversion of her other allies to view the Peace Treaty as a means of strengthening the Free World rather than that of settling their scores with Japan for the ravages suffered by them at the hands of Japan. The USA found that the war memories were still strong and she had to appear as a guarantor for Japan both in the matter of security in the Pacific and in the world of trade. In other words, the United States began to isolate the Communist Bloc from her own pattern of peace-making and the problem of receiving the co-operation of the Soviet Union receded to the background. (76) By 1949, with

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76 As early as April 1947, MacArthur in his talk with
China falling into the Soviet orbit, the focus of strategic planning was on Japan and the point at issue became security against USSR. The Peace Treaty being one of the strategies for security against USSR, it was hardly possible that the USSR's cooperation would be coming forth.

The USSR could not delay the Treaty indefinitely against the firm determination of the USA to grant independence to Japan as early as possible. On 14 September 1950, President Truman announced that the State Department had been authorised to initiate discussions with member nations of the FEC regarding a Japanese Peace Treaty. (77) A Seven point memo prepared by John Foster Dulles was sent to all the member nations and it was announced that the parties to the Treaty will be any or all nations who waged war with Japan, and who were willing to make peace with Japan. Therefore, instead of an all-Power Conference, the method proposed was bi-lateral discussions. The Kremlin's reply to the memo assumed a form of queries as follows (78)

76 contd.

Hugh Borton indicated that an early Peace Treaty should be concluded with or without the approval of the Soviet Union. But the US Government came round to this view only much later, after the intensification of the Cold War. Borton, et. al., n. 64, p. 422.


78 Ibid., pp. 3-5, 117-120; Dunn, n. 68, pp. 110-2.
(i) Signatories of the Declaration of United Nations on 1 January 1942 had undertaken not to conclude peace separately. Did USA contemplate a Treaty in which only some would participate?

(ii) Why should the question of Formosa, Pescadores, Kuriles and Sakhalin be subject to a fresh decision when it had already been decided by the Cairo Declaration, Potsdam Declaration and the Yalta Conference?

(iii) Why should Japanese sovereignty be removed from Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, when Cairo and Potsdam Declarations had not talked of trusteeship?

(iv) Would the Treaty lay down a definite programme of withdrawal of US troops?

(v) FEC's Basic Surrender Policy of 19 June 1947 prohibited an army, navy or air-force for Japan. Would the USA explain the joint responsibility between Japan and USA under the heading security?

(vi) Is it the intention to remove all restrictions regarding Japan's development of peacetime economy and grant her equal rights in world trade?

(vii) What was being done to ascertain the views of the Chinese People's Republic?

Thus the Soviet Union, without actually laying down the principles she wished to be incorporated in the Peace
Treaty, seemed to appeal for greater political and economic independence and welfare of Japan, while safeguarding her own interests in Kuriles. She seemed to echo the sentiments of the Japanese people in inisting on an over-all Peace Treaty and also the participation of Communist China in the Conference.

The United States met the Soviet objections in their memorandum of 27 December 1950. She argued that the real purpose of the 1942 Declaration was to make sure that all nations would continue to fight till victory was won, and that that purpose had been accomplished. USA further held that no single nation could use this provision to block any kind of Peace Treaty which that nation did not desire. As regards the question of the territorial provisions, the USA stuck to her position that the war time agreements, like the Cairo Agreement, were subject to confirmation in a peace treaty to be concluded in consultation with States that had taken part in the war against Japan. Even though the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations had not definitely mentioned the trusteeship of Ryukyus and Bonins (since the Potsdam Declaration had stated that Japan would be limited to her four main islands and other small islands to be determined by the Allied Powers) the trusteeship was also well within the power of the victors. The USA maintained that while military occupation would be ended with the signing of the Treaty, the stationing of the American troops in Japan for security purposes, under an agreement with the Japanese
Government, would be well within the provisions of Art. 51 of the UN Charter. The USA also made clear that her intention was not to put any restriction on the development of the peacetime economy of Japan. She felt that the question of ascertaining the views of the Chinese People's Republic did not arise, as USA had not recognised the communist regime there. (79)

The USSR made another bid to outmanoeuvre the USA by proposing a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Big Four in June or July 1951 as a preparatory meeting for a Peace Conference. Washington killed this move by replying that the Potsdam Agreement had not laid down that the Council of Foreign Ministers would be used for settling the Japanese Peace Treaty. Actually, this gave a secondary role to the nations which had shared a greater burden in the Pacific War than the Soviet Union did. After USSR's consistent opposition to the Peace Treaty, as proposed by USA, Washington expected the Soviet Union to absent herself from the Conference. But she was surprised by the Russian acceptance of the invitation. This did not mean a change in the Soviet views of the Treaty but rather indicated that the Russians hoped to wreck the Treaty at the Conference. The US State Department, therefore, presented a note to Moscow on 16 August 1951, in which it was pointed out that the

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79 Japan, National Diet Library, Nisso Kokko Chosa Mondai kiso shiryo shu (Tokyo, 1955), pp. 33-34.
purpose of the Conference at San Francisco was to conclude and sign the final text of the Treaty of Peace and not to reopen negotiations upon its terms. The Russian Press and radio in reply declared that Andrei Gromyko would indeed present new proposals for a Japanese Peace Treaty. (80)

Even though Japan was under occupation, the Japanese Foreign Office started examining the problem of Japan's future security within the framework of Art. 9 of the Constitution, as early as in 1947. In the first instance, the proposals seemed to have centred round the permanent neutrality of Japan under international agreement and at the same time, regional security arrangements being made by all the eleven nations of the Far Eastern Commission. In 1947, it appears George Atcheson, United States Political Adviser to SCAP, advised that there was no other alternative but to entrust Japan's future security to the UN. The Foreign Office, on the contrary, felt that unless the United Nations was able to offer an iron-clad security guarantee, the only one way to ensure security was in the form of an alliance with a third Power.

In July 1947, during the Katayama regime in which Ashida Hitoshi was the Foreign Minister, an aide memoire was drafted outlining Japan's ideas about her future security

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80 For the full correspondence exchanged between USSR and USA (regarding the Treaty) from December 1950, see Ibid., pp. 31-54.
and this was handed over to Courtney Whitney, Chief of the Government Section in SCAP General Headquarters (GHQ). Though Whitney first accepted this Memo, he returned it later stating that GHQ was not in a position to accept it. The Memo was accordingly handed over to George Atcheson, who was on his way to Washington, so that he could talk it over with the US authorities. Unfortunately, Atcheson died in an air crash. One of the immediate motivations of this note appears to be the growing tension between the USA and USSR, which led the Foreign Ministry to come to the conclusion that Japan should depend upon the USA for her security. Therefore, the Foreign Office tried to find out some method of communicating the Japanese Government's views to the USA. Finally in September 1947, this aide memoire was handed over to Gen. Robert Eichelberger, Commander of the Eighth Army, by the Bureau Chief of the Liaison Office at Yokahama. (81) The contents of the Memo were that Japan would take charge of internal security by increase of the police reserves, if necessary. In view of the unstable international conditions, Japan's security from external aggression should be guaranteed

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See evidence of Katsuo Okazaki, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Katayama Cabinet, before the Commission on the Constitution on 6 May 1959. Kempo Chosa Kai Dai 3 jinkai dai 30 kai sokai qijiroku, pp. 2-4. It is interesting to note that this important memo drafted by the Foreign Office and proposed to be sent to the authorities in the USA was issued from the Liaison Office. It appears that the Foreign Minister stated that he was
by the USA through a bilateral treaty, which Japan was willing to conclude with her. This Treaty should have effect till the UN peace-keeping operations became realistic enough to guarantee Japan's security. The Memo did not envisage the stationing of the US troops within Japan, but it was proposed that they should be stationed elsewhere and should come to Japan's aid at her hour of need. The idea of actual stationing of troops within Japan was a later development. (82)

No documentary evidence could be traced to show the action taken by Washington authorities on this note. However, Yoshida states that when he resumed as Prime Minister in October 1948, this policy was approved by his Cabinet without any change. (83)

81 contd.

81 contd. willing to take up responsibility, if there was any difficulty (i.e., probably if the matter gets leaked to the Press or others and there are interpellations in Diet). It also appears that such an important memo was not actually put up for discussion in the Cabinet either. Even Premier Katayama was supposed to have been informed by Nishio Suehiro, as Ashida prepared the Memo in consultation with Nishio. Ibid., pp. 4, 23-24. Also see Yoshida Memoirs, n. 2, pp. 264-5.

82 Kempo chosakai, n. 81, pp. 5-7. Okazaki explains that the actual stationing of troops within Japan to ensure Japan's security was agreed to, because it was felt that once the troops were stationed outside, it was not certain that US troops would come to the aid of Japan, especially when there was danger in some other quarter also. However, once the troops were stationed in Japan, an attack on Japan would be an attack on USA. The US presence in Japan would thus deter any probable aggressor. Again, owing to the Vandenberg Resolution, once the troops were stationed outside, it would be difficult to make USA fulfill her duties, since Japan could not have her own corresponding defence arrangements.

On Dulles' first visit to Japan in June 1950, the security of Japan was discussed in general terms. Under Yoshida's instructions, in October 1950, the Foreign Office prepared a draft Security Treaty and Administrative Agreement (84) After Dulles' seven points were issued, Yoshida sent a short memo to him which explained that while the internal security would be Japan's responsibility, Japan should be protected from external aggression by the combined efforts of the USA and UN. In this Memo Yoshida also explained that it was not possible for Japan to re-arm, since apart from the constitutional binding, her economic recovery was not complete and any steps taken for re-armament might not only invite the doubts of the neighbouring nations about a revival of Japanese militarism, but there was also a fear that rearmament might kindle the dormant spirit of militarism.

Dulles in his second visit to Japan, however, stressed Japan's own responsibility for her defence. When Yoshida would not admit this, they took their differences to MacArthur, who felt that Japan could contribute to world peace by methods other than rearmament. But Japan had to concede finally

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84 It appears that Yoshida also got another draft Treaty prepared in which he visualised Korea and Japan as demilitarised zones with a wide area around this zone being manned by forces of USA, UK, China and Soviet Union. Depending upon world conditions, Yoshida proposed to use either of the two drafts. (See evidence by Nishimura Kumao (former Chief of the Treaty Bureau) in Kempo Chosa Kai, n. 81, pp. 11-13)
that she would gradually reinforce her defence power after independence. (85)

Thus, as early as 1947, the Japanese Government was thinking in terms of securing herself through a military alliance with the USA. It may not, therefore, be incorrect to say that the provisions of the Security Treaty and the Administrative Agreement were based on proposals put forward by Japan herself. However, the initiative taken by the Japanese Government to align with the USA has not been publicised. As such, there was a feeling within Japan, as well as outside, that defeated Japan was not given any choice in the matter of deciding her security arrangements and was forced to accept the Security Treaty as a price for achieving her independence. On the contrary, Japan was very conscious of her importance as a Power. This became apparent in Ikeda Hayato's talks in the Pentagon in May 1950. Ikeda seemed to have hinted that the possibility of Japan considering a Soviet offer of Peace Treaty, if it proved more advantageous, could not be ruled out. (86) While it is not

Yoshida states that the points agreed to between Dulles and Yoshida were put in writing and were signed by John Allison and (Sadō) Iguchi, on the understanding that though they were not binding, this marked a stage reached in general peace negotiations. This statement was signed on 9 February 1951. Another document by which Japan committed herself to continued co-operation with the UN forces in Japan, for the prosecution of Korean War, was similarly signed at the same time.

suggested that the USA was alarmed at this possibility and concluded the Security Treaty, she could not dismiss the pulls from the Soviet Union and China very lightly. Japan also attempted to secure the best terms utilising her growing strategic importance in the continuing conflict between the "free world" and the communist world. The public was, however, unaware of the above facts and it viewed the whole problem from a different angle.

The general consensus of opinion was that there should be no Peace Treaty, which would commit Japan to either side in the Cold War. In a public opinion poll taken between 17-19 November 1949 by Mainichi Shim bun in Tokyo and Osaka, on the question of the future security of Japan, 48.4 per cent favoured permanent neutrality, 14.0 per cent asked for regional security arrangements and only 20.5 per cent favoured dependence on USA. 2.1 per cent favoured other measures and while the "don't know" answers were 14.8 per cent, those who declined any answer constituted 0.2 per cent. (87) While there was a feeling of indignity involved in the indefinite stationing of foreign troops in Japan, the demand for neutrality was also motivated by an element of realistic

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anxiety. Would it be in Japan's national interests to alienate herself completely from the Soviet Union? Soviet Union; also being an atomic power, wasn't there a possibility of the clash of interests between the Soviet Union and USA resulting in Japan unwittingly being caught in another War? Again, would not the complete exclusion of China from the Peace Treaty deprive Japan of the big China market?

At the same time, there was a feeling that there should be an early Peace Treaty. The same Mainichi Shimbun polls revealed that 49.2 per cent favoured an early Peace Treaty, while 33.8 per cent felt that even if the Peace Treaty was delayed, there should be an overall Peace Treaty. 16.8 per cent gave don't know answers and those who refused to give any answer constituted 0.2 per cent. The percentage favouring conclusion of an early peace Treaty rose to 66 per cent in the Mainichi Shimbun polls of December 1950. (88) This reflected only a desire to end the occupation as early as possible and gain independence and should not be interpreted as indicating support for dependence on USA. Again, the survey taken by Asahi Shimbun, among intellectuals in different fields, in December 1949 indicated that 59 per cent wanted overall peace, while 21 per cent wished for a separate peace treaty and 20 per cent stated that a simple answer could not be given. As regards the security set-up after gaining

88 Cole, n. 46, pp. 650-1, 654.
independence, 39 per cent favoured permanent neutrality, 36 per cent indicated preference for UN peace keeping operations, 7 per cent asked for regional security arrangements, 8 per cent demanded a bilateral military alliance with a particular country or a military guarantee from that country and 10 per cent stated that a simple answer was not possible. (89)

As the talks seemed to be getting into a deadlock, there was in some circles a feeling that permanent neutrality was a dream. It was better to bend to the inevitable and get an early Peace. If the Soviet Union really wanted to put an end to the cold war, she should show it by taking positive action in the peace talks. (90)

While these doubts were assailing the Japanese people, Dulles, in his personal talks with the various countries involved, was able to pinpoint the two issues in which most of the countries had their reservations, viz., Reparations and Security. Though the Dulles plan had originally ruled that no reparations would be paid, in deference to the wishes of the South East Asian countries, it was agreed that the Treaty would provide, in principle, that Japan should pay reparations but the amount of reparations


90 Sankei, 13 June 1951.
Mainichi, 22 May 1951, 12 June 1951.
Tokyo, 10 May 1951.
and the manner of payment should be left for agreement between Japan and the countries desiring it. As regards security, the United States had originally planned for a Pacific Mutual Security Pact similar to the North Atlantic Defence Treaty of 1949. However, this did not allay the fears of the Pacific Powers against future resurgence of Japan. Consequently, the United States readjusted her plans for security in the Pacific. The first Pact would be a Security Treaty between Japan and USA, the second would be a triangular Pact between the USA, Australia and New Zealand and the third would be between United States and Philippines.

Britain, Australia and New Zealand were not very happy with the provisions for complete freedom of trade for Japan. Britain wondered whether she would not be paying too heavy a price for getting Japan as an ally, since it would involve losing a great deal by having Japan as an unrestricted trading competitor. Britain also did not share the same conviction as USA that Japan should be free of all ties from Communist China. In fact, Britain hoped for eventual Japanese entry into trade relations with Communist China, as only this would relieve her of Japanese competition in South and South East Asia and other places where Britain hoped to make her export earnings. The British misgivings are understandable as having lost her colonial empire, she at least wanted to retain her hold on the commercial markets. But, finally, she had to acknowledge the superior position of the USA and fell in the US line that it would be the best
possible treaty that could be drafted. (91)

Thus, getting a general agreement from her other Allies the United States issued invitations for the Conference at San Francisco to be held on 4 September, 1951. During the Conference, by a process of skilful handling of procedures, the conveners were able to bring the Treaty to the point of signature without giving the USSR an opportunity to veto its acceptance. The Soviet Union's delegate was given full opportunity to state his case. While insisting on Communist China's right over Manchuria, Formosa and various other islands off the China coast and also the Soviet Union's right over Kuriles and Sakhalin, the Soviet delegate appealed for the return of Ryukyus and Bonins to Japan. On the question of security, the Soviet Union held that Japan should neither be allowed to maintain considerable armed forces nor to conclude a military alliance with any other country. The Soviet Union criticised the provision in the Treaty about the possibility of retaining the US armed forces on Japanese territory. She also pointed out that the defence alliance, contemplated in the Treaty, was directed against the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic. There existed no threat for Japan from her neighbouring States and the necessity for Japan to join any military bloc, allegedly

91 Collection of Official Foreign Statements, n. 77, pp. 31-54. Dunn, n. 68, pp. 115-34, 146-47.
for the purposes of self-defence, was groundless. She also proposed that the Straits of La Perouse (Soya) and Nemuro, along the entire Japanese coast, as well as the Straits of Tsugaru and Tsushima should be de-militarised and, though open to the merchant ships of all nations, should be open for only such warships which belong to the Powers adjacent to the Sea of Japan. (92) Just as in the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council, so in the San Francisco also, the Soviet Union could only publicly announce her wishes. A polite hearing was given to her views and that was all. (93)

It should be noted that in the final form of the Treaty Japan only renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa, Pescadores and also Kurile islands and that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty, as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth. No mention was made as to whom the territories would be transferred. Japan's representative, Yoshida Shigeru, however, made clear in his speech that the South Kuriles (Kunashiri and Etorofu) could never be stated as territories seized by aggression and even Imperial Russia had recognised them as Japanese territory. Again, Habomai and Shikotan were part of Hokkaido, but the Soviet Union

92 Soviet representative's speech in full in *Nisso Kokko Chosa Mondai*, n. 79, pp. 54-70, 72-75.

93 Dunn, n. 68, pp. 183-5.
occupied them on the ground that Japanese military had been
stationed there. (94) However, no revision was made in the
Treaty to incorporate the above claims of Japan and the
territory in question is still a bone of contention between
the Soviet Union and Japan.

The Soviet Union once again missed an opportunity.
She could have outbid the Allies and offered to return
Kuriles and South Sakhalin to Japan and also a Soviet-Japanese
Neutrality Treaty. While this offer might not have prevented
Yoshida affixing his signature to the San Francisco Treaty
or the Security Pact with the USA at such a late stage, it
might well have created an obstacle in the ratification of
the Treaty in the Diet. The absence of any territorial
concessions on the part of the Soviet Union reveals Soviet
unwillingness to sacrifice any of her own gains, even if it
might lead to preventing Japan from aligning with the "free
world".

The Soviet Union, frustrated in her final attempts
to achieve any changes in the political and economic structure
of Japan, decided to throw her full weight against Japan's

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94 Yoshida's speech, Nisso Kokko Chosa Mondai, n. 79, pp.75-78.
The Treaty was finally signed on 8 September 1951 by
49 nations (including Japan), while USSR, Czechoslovakia
and Poland boycotted it. On the same day, Yoshida signed
the Security Treaty with USA.
Text (both English and Japanese) in Japan, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Treaty of Peace with Japan, Security
Treaty between Japan and the United States of America
(Annotated) (Tokyo, 1951).
admittance into the family of nations, through the membership of the United Nations. Japan had to wait for four more years and for greater changes within the Soviet Union to finally break the ice between the two nations.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

For the first time in her history, Japan came under foreign occupation. But she surprised the world by her total lack of resistance to the Occupation. The US decision to allow the continuance of the Emperor system paid good dividends in effecting a peaceful surrender.

Although the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan were created, the participation of the Allies was limited to discussion on formulation of policies. Even the veto power of the Soviet Union could not prevent a US proposal being implemented, as the USA could issue interim directives to the Supreme Commander for execution of such policies. The US policy of having a controlling voice in the administration of the Occupation ensured the smooth management of the occupation administration, in spite of difference of opinion among the Allies regarding various policies. The Soviet hope, that no fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure would be effected without her participation, was killed, when the new Constitution of Japan came into force even before the Far
Eastern Commission came into being.

While the USA and USSR held similar views about demobilisation of Japan's military forces, they did not necessarily agree on all other policies. Even if a policy was approved of, the Soviet Union criticised the inefficient implementation of the policy, as in the case of her criticisms against land reform. The Supreme Commander, on his part, was extremely sensitive to any criticism and more so from the Soviet Union. The US and Soviet representatives clashed again and again in the Allied Council, the Soviet representative being accused of using the Council as a forum for the anti-US propaganda. In sum, it may be stated that the so-called Allied Occupation policies were actually American policies for Japan.

The Soviet views regarding the future set-up of Japan were necessarily formulated on the basis of socialist principles. This, in effect, meant a complete purging of reactionary elements, encouragement of progressive forces, enshrining of the irrevocable rights of labour, facilitating people's participation and nationalisation of the country's economy. The American plans of democratisation based on a capitalist economy could not, therefore, meet the Soviet demands. Yet, initially the American reform programmes were not completely unacceptable to the Soviet Union as there was a purpose of democratisation and purging of reactionary elements. However, by 1947, the Cold War was an undeniable fact and the USA started revising her retaliatory policy
towards Japan in the perspective of Soviet threat. The unstable social and economic conditions in Japan were considered to be a clear invitation to Soviet expansionism through the local communist party. The activities of communists were curbed. On the contrary, the earlier purge programme of rightist elements was discontinued. The policy initially adopted for granting the right of strike to all categories of labour was modified, in order to prevent labour strikes which might paralyse the nation. Since taking the zaibatsu dissolution to its logical conclusion was considered to retard the economic recovery of Japan, the restrictions on economic combines were watered down. The USA could also not afford to take a detached interest about Japan's recovery, as the Japanese deficits were a burden on the American tax payer. A sustained effort was made to nurture Japan's economic growth much against the wishes and misgivings of not only the Soviet Union but the other Allies as well. Thus security against communist expansion finally became the central objective of all planning with regard to Japan.

This was reflected also in the process of the formulation of the Peace Treaty with Japan. By 1949, with China falling in the Soviet orbit, the focus of US strategic planning in the Far East was on Japan. The Peace Treaty became one of the strategies for strengthening the "Free World" for security against USSR. Since the other Allies could not concede this to be sufficient justification for
signing a reconciliatory peace, the USA had to give guarantees against the resurgence of Japanese imperialism. This she accomplished by the ANZUS Pact and her treaty with the Philippines. She had to concede the demand for reparations by the countries occupied during the War, although USA herself felt that Japan did not have the ability to pay reparations. She had to give assurances to allay Great Britain's fears of Japanese commercial competition.

Japan was not drawn into the "free world" by force. As early as in 1947, the Japanese Government had asked for an alliance with the USA as a means of guaranteeing the security of her unarmed nation. The US Government's reaction to this offer at that time is not known. But it is clear that in an atmosphere of tension between the USA and the USSR, Japan decided to depend on the USA for her security. This accorded with the Japanese traditional policy of backing the winner, since USA was the stronger of the two Powers in 1947. But in 1950-51, Japan became fully conscious of her strategic importance between the "free world" and the communist world. She successfully resisted US attempts to make Japan pay for her own defence, quoting the restriction in her constitution and her economic difficulties. Thus, while ensuring her own security, she avoided a huge defence bill, which is no small way contributed to her economic recovery.

The Soviet Union did not succeed in improving her image in Japan during the Occupation days. While Japan could
appreciate the grievances and bitterness of other nations in the Allied Council, since they had actually suffered at her hands during the War, she felt that, in the case of the Soviet Union, Japan had been the hapless victim of Soviet aggression. Therefore, the harsh stand taken by the Soviet Union in the Allied Councils, as well as the knowledge that she had obtained territorial gains as a price for her aggression, was resented by the Japanese people. Hardship was also caused to the Japanese fishermen in the northern waters with the possession of the northern islands by the Soviet Union. The Japanese people found it difficult to acknowledge the Soviet right to try Japanese army personnel captured in the War as war criminals, when it was the Soviet Union which launched an offensive war against Japan. The Soviet intransigence on the question of repatriation of Japanese created anti-Soviet sentiments. The Soviet demand to try the Emperor as a war criminal showed lack of appreciation of Japanese sentiments. Finally, the attempts made by the Soviet Union to bolster up her image through the activities of the Communist Party of Japan also ended in a failure. The Soviet Union also missed an opportunity to win over Japan by not presenting a more generous peace treaty. It is clear that the Soviet Union was not prepared to make any territorial concessions to win over Japan to her side, but depended upon Japan being persuaded by the "rightness" of her cause.

With the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty, the
Soviet Union lost temporarily in her conflict with USA on the issue of gaining ascendancy over Japan. But the struggle had to go on. Even during the Occupation, Japan was not just a passive spectator to this, as is seen from her appeal to the USA for a defence alliance in 1947. However, bound by a Security Treaty with the USA and heavily depending upon trade with USA for her economic growth, which reduced her political leverage further, Japan was not in a very comfortable position with respect to her relations with her two powerful communist neighbours. Though Japan was given back her independence with the strong sponsorship of USA, she emerged as a new nation in an atmosphere of lingering suspicion about her reformed status. The Japanese Government did not have the full support of the people on her policy of casting Japan's lot with the "free world". One section of the people felt that this increased the possibility of Japan getting involved in the conflict between the two camps. Would Japan continue the "hot house existence" she had led for seven years under US patronage? Or would she evolve a suitable, flexible, responsible foreign policy after independence to meet the needs of a changing international situation?