Chapter VII

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BACKGROUND

The Kuriles had figured in Russo-Japanese relations from the times when Japan had not been opened to the West and formal relations between the two countries had not even been inaugurated. The determination of the ownership of these islands and delineation of the frontiers had been one of the first issues settled between Russia and Japan. The Treaty of 1875 had clearly transferred the ownership of all the Kurile islands to Japan in exchange for Japan's recognition of Russian sovereignty over Sakhalin. The strategic position of these islands, however, made them an attractive prize to be claimed by the Soviet Union, in return for her participation in the Pacific War. Since Japan had taken South Sakhalin, as a war trophy, after her victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the Soviet Union wished to get it back and got President Roosevelt's promise for that also. Thus the problem of northern territories relates both to the Kuriles and South Sakhalin. However, Japan's claim of South Sakhalin is not as strong and as persistent as that of Kuriles. Although Japan quotes the Atlantic Charter and the Potsdam Agreement, to prove that the Allies
had undertaken that there would be no annexure of territories under the Cairo Declaration, the Allies intended that South Sakhalin should be surrendered by Japan, as it was a territory obtained after an aggressive War. Though Japan resents this, even this argument could not be applied to the Kuriles, as these islands came into her possession by a Treaty concluded between two Powers on an equal and mutually acceptable basis. We have already seen the circumstances in which they were signed off to the Soviet Union by President Roosevelt at Yalta. As stated by Roosevelt's advisers, there were few factors which would justify a Soviet claim to the southern Kuriles. They also forecast that such a transfer would create a situation, which a future Japan would find difficult to accept as a permanent solution, since Japan would be deprived of her fishing waters, and fortifications in southern Kuriles would be a continuing menace to her. Japan herself had been prepared to cede the North Kuriles and South Sakhalin to the Soviet Union in return for Soviet services to secure an honourable peace for Japan. Even in this offer, the South Kuriles were not included. It is not surprising, therefore, that Japan resented Soviet annexation of these territories as a payment for launching a last-minute attack on her.

At the San Francisco Conference, though Japan agreed to relinquish all her rights over the Kuriles and South Sakhalin, Premier Yoshida Shigeru clearly stated that the South Kuriles could never be treated as territories
seized by aggression and even Imperial Russia had recognised them as Japanese territory. Again, Habomai and Shikotan were part of Hokkaido, but Soviet Union occupied them on the ground that Japanese military had been stationed there. However, no revision was made in the Treaty to incorporate the above claims of Japan. At the same time, the Treaty did not specify to whom the territories would be transferred. In actual fact, the Soviet Union was in full possession of these territories and had incorporated them as part of Soviet territory.

When Japan started her negotiations with the USSR, the problem of the northern territories was considered to be one of the issues to be settled between the two countries. Nonetheless, Japan fully realised the difficulties of getting them back and even while using them as bargaining points, had resolved that a Peace Treaty could be concluded only with the restoration of Habomai and Shikotan. Still, when Japan learnt that the USA would not like her to compromise with the Soviet Union on the territorial issue, she expanded her territorial claim.

USA AND THE TERRITORIAL PROBLEM

The question of negotiations with the Soviet Union on the territorial problem hinged on the issue as to how far Japan could go without antagonising relations with the USA.
Even the Hatoyama faction, which was considered to be very keen on the early conclusion of the talks, never contemplated going ahead with the talks disregarding US opinion on the matter or at the risk of worsening relations with the USA. Hence, the Japanese Government decided to get the views of the major Treaty Powers of the San Francisco Treaty, viz., USA, UK and France on the northern territorial problem. In June-July 1955, the Japanese Government forwarded them the following two questions:

(1) Can it be stated that clause 8 of Potsdam Declaration indicates the Yalta Agreement?

(2) Can Soviet Union unilaterally claim South Sakhalin and Kuriles as her own territory under clause 8 of the Potsdam Declaration?

The reply from the USA made it clear that Habomai and Shikotan geographically, historically and legally were part of Hokkaido and not that of the Kuriles. The Yalta Agreement only indicated the purposes of the Allies and could not be considered to have final validity. Again, Yalta Agreement was not specified in the Potsdam Declaration which Japan accepted and would not, therefore, be binding upon Japan. Since the Yalta Agreement preceded the Potsdam Declaration, it could not form part of clause 8 of the Potsdam Declaration. Again, since the Potsdam Declaration had specifically stated that the final territorial limits of Japan would be decided after consideration by the
countries which participated in the Potsdam Declaration, it could not be decided unilaterally by the Soviet Union. Neither SCAPIN 677 nor Clause 2 of the San Francisco Treaty had dealt with finally the titles of the territory. As the final disposition of South Sakhalin and the Kuriles had not been settled, this was a problem which had to be settled by international agreement.

The UK gave as her informal opinion that Yalta Agreement could not be stated to be an agreement specified in clause 8 of the Potsdam Declaration. She also added that the Soviet Union could not unilaterally take possession of these territories.

France stated that the Potsdam Declaration, Cairo Agreement and Yalta Agreement only indicated the intentions of the participating nations and in order to have validity under international law, there should be either a Peace Treaty or a Joint Declaration on terms of complete equality. The Agreements would not get automatic validity. (1)

Strengthened by the above opinion of the major Treaty Powers, Japan asked in the London talks for the restoration of not only Habomai and Shikotan, but also Kunashiri and Etorofu, while the title of North Kuriles and South Sakhalin could be determined by an international conference. After the talks in London broke into a recess,

1A gist of the correspondence exchanged on this issue in Shunichi Matsumoto, Moscow ni kakeru niji (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 60-62.
the Japanese Government once again asked for some more clarifications from the USA and other Powers in October 1955.

(1) Were the leaders who participated in the Yalta Conference, while using the term "Kurile Islands", mentioned in the Agreement, aware of the historical fact that Kunashiri and Etorofu, which were very close to Hokkaido, were Japanese territory occupied only by Japanese and had never passed into foreign hands. Again, did they take into consideration the fact that in the Treaty of 1875 between Japan and Russia, only the 18 islands upto Uruppu had been included in the definition, "Kurile Islands" specifically excluding Kunashiri and Etorofu?

(2) Did the USA, which played the major role in the formation of the San Francisco Treaty, acknowledge the fact that the "Kurile Islands" mentioned in Art. 2(c) of the Treaty did not include Kunashiri and Etorofu?

Against these queries, the US State Department sent the following clarification.

The geographical limits of the Kuriles were not mentioned in the Yalta Agreement and the historical position of the Kuriles was also not discussed. The intention of the Yalta Agreement was not to concede the territories and has also no validity. There was no record to show that the signatories of the Yalta Agreement intended to sign off to Soviet Union even those territories, which were not formerly Russian territories.
The definition of Kurile Islands has not been given either in the Peace Treaty with Japan or in the minutes of the San Francisco Conference. In the opinion of the USA, any dispute arising out of "Kurile Islands" should be referred to the International Court of Justice as specified in Art. 22 of the San Francisco Treaty.

Only a future international agreement would probably decide clearly the title of South Sakhalin and Kuriles. In case there were disputes about the territorial limits comprised in these geographical names, they had to be settled through a reference to the International Court of Justice. But the implementation of this method might not be possible in the present circumstances.

Again, as an alternative to appealing to the International Court of Justice about the Kurile Islands issue, USA would have no objection if Japan achieved the restoration of the islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu by explaining to the Soviet Union that they did not form part of the Kurile Islands. But, taking into consideration the Soviet views even on Habomai and Shikotan, it appeared that the Soviet Union might not agree to this. If this attempt did not succeed, Japan might persuade the Soviet Union to institute a case jointly at the International Court of Justice for determining the limits of Kuriles. For this purpose a suitable provision could be made in the Peace Treaty. Again, as another alternative, if Japan accepted the condition
in the Soviet Peace Treaty that she would relinquish all rights in Kuriles and South Sakhalin provided the USSR agreed to the restoration of Kunashiri and Etorofu to Japan, on the ground that these islands were not part of Kuriles, then also the USA would have no objection.

However, UK and France did not entirely agree with the American views, especially on the "intention" of the Yalta Agreement. In fact, France pointed out that Art. 2(c) of the San Francisco Treaty only specified the Kuriles, but there was a reference to South Kuriles in the minutes of the Conference. France also pointed out to the reference of Kunashirir and Etorofu as South Kuriles by the Japanese representative in the Conference. At the same time, the question of reference of any dispute about the Kuriles to the International Court of Justice was binding only where there was dispute between the signatories of the San Francisco Treaty and could not be binding when the dispute arose between a signatory and a non-signatory to the Treaty.

(2)

It appears from the above that the USA, while not firmly stating that Southern Kuriles (Kunashiri and Etorofu) was Japanese territory, at the same time made clear that she would have no objection, if Japan succeeded in bargaining with the USSR and obtained Kunashiri, Etorofu, Habomai and

\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 62-64.
Shikotan in return for finally relinquishing her rights in North Kuriles and South Sakhalin in the Peace Treaty with the Soviet Union. It was only on 7 September 1956 that the USA came out with an open statement to the effect that Kunashiri and Etorofu islands (along with Habomai and Shikotan, which formed part of Hokkaido) were Japanese territory and should rightly come under the sovereignty of Japan. (3) The statement was not solicited by Japan at that time, but Dulles probably thought it wise to issue a statement indicating American support, as he felt that Japan might conclude a peace treaty only satisfied with the return of Habomai and Shikotan and signing away all the other islands. (4) The American objection to the Soviet Union taking permanent possession of these islands is understandable as this would seem to give validity to the Yalta Agreement, which was being denied by the United States. It has already been stated, in Chapter II, how the territorial provisions specified in the Yalta Agreement were agreed to on President Roosevelt's own initiative and were not concluded after due consideration by the Territorial Sub-Area Committee for the Far East, which included representatives of State, War and Navy Departments. Therefore, it is not surprising if the USA tried not to validate the Agreement especially in view


4The circumstances which led to the issue of the statement have been explained in detail in Chapter IV, pp. 259-63
of the bi-polarisation of the world and the obligations USA had taken upon herself for maintaining security in the Pacific. From the political angle also, if the territorial issue between Japan and Soviet Union were finally settled, even if it was to Japan's disadvantage, the outstanding issue between the two countries would be limited to the fishery problem. Thus the reduction of the irritants would lead to better relations between the two countries. Finally, in the Joint Declaration signed between Japan and the Soviet Union, USSR only undertook to return Habomai and Shikotan after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty.

AFTER THE DECLARATION

The Declaration was signed without resolving the dispute about the future negotiations regarding the territorial issue. Japan argued that even though a specific mention was not made in the relevant article, it was the intention that the territorial issue would be negotiated at the time of consideration of a Peace Treaty. They based their argument on the fact that the Soviet Union had allowed the publication of the Matsumoto-Gromyko correspondence, which stated clearly that the Soviet Union was prepared to consider a peace treaty, including the territorial question, after diplomatic relations were restored.
Kono's negotiations with Khrushchev make it clear that Khrushchev was against the inclusion of the words "including the territorial issue" in the draft and seemed to indicate that with the return of Habomai and Shikotan, the territorial issue should be deemed to be settled between the two countries. The Soviet Union does not seem to consider the publication of Gromyko's letter to Matsumoto as admission of a positive commitment.

In June 1957, when the Japanese Government approached the Soviet Union on the problem of fishing in Russian territorial waters around Sakhalin and Kuriles, the latter agreed to consider it but later, in February-March 1958, she tied up this issue with the Peace Treaty and urged that unless negotiations were started for a Peace Treaty, she would not be prepared to consider the issue. Japan's request to treat this issue separately was not accepted. (5) When A.A. Ishkov, Minister for Fishing Industry, visited Japan on 27 August 1958, he reiterated that an early solution could be found for the fishing problem in Soviet territorial waters, if Japan took steps for concluding a Peace Treaty. (6) Thus the Soviet Union tried to indirectly appeal to the small fishermen, who would gain if a Peace Treaty was finally concluded.

5 Sovieto Nenpo 1959, pp. 365-6.
6 Asahi, 28 August 1958.
since this would immediately enable the return of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan. The Soviet Union also hinted that, with the conclusion of a Peace Treaty, she might consider the grant of some fishing rights in the rich fishing grounds around the Kuriles. (7) A settlement of this issue would also mean safer fishing conditions for the small fishermen, who, as things stood, wantonly or inadvertently strayed into the strict twelve mile limit maintained by the Soviet Union and were liable for seizure. It cannot be denied that even the return of Habomai and Shikotan would have eased the situation a little for these small fishermen. (8)

However, Soviet Union could not achieve the same results as she did on a previous occasion. The fishermen involved were too weak a group. Again, it appears that the concessions to be gained, viz., a few fishing grounds and also Habomai and Shikotan were not attractive enough for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty signing away Southern Kuriles. The new Kishi Cabinet was not prepared to pay such a heavy price for the Peace Treaty and decided to wait. Japan also had the support of USA for her claim on the Southern Kuriles. However, she had to pay a price for her indifference to the Soviet Peace Treaty issue except on the basis of her own pre-condition. The Soviet Union used the fishery negotiations

8 Asahi, 4 April 1958. Feature article. It appears that Nemuro fishermen were keen to get back Habomai and Shikotan.
to convey her displeasure and Japan had to accept the conditions imposed.

Finally, in 1960, on the conclusion of the Revised Security Treaty between Japan and USA, the Soviet Union imposed further conditions even for the return of Habomai and Shikotan. In a memorandum dated 27 January 1960, handed over to Ambassador Kadowaki Suemitsu, the Soviet Union stated:

The Soviet Government with the consideration that the new military Treaty signed by the Japanese Government is directed against the Soviet Union as well as against the Chinese People's Republic, cannot contribute to extending the territory available for foreign troops by turning the islands over to Japan. In view of this, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state that only on the condition that all foreign troops are withdrawn from Japan and a Peace Treaty is signed between USSR and Japan, will the Habomai and Shikotan Islands be transferred to Japan ...

The Soviet move was not entirely unexpected. In an article, "Where is Japan going" in Pravda of 20 January 1960, V. Penkovsky, Commander of the Far Eastern Military District, stated that Japan had to bear the dangerous consequences of becoming an accessory to military plans that were against the will of the people. He also added that the Soviet people would find it difficult to understand that Habomai and Shikotan should be handed over to Japan so that

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they could be immediately used by foreign armed forces. (10) However, Japan's Foreign Office appears to have taken the stand that it could ignore this statement. It is true that a worsening of the relations was anticipated with the signing of the revised Security Pact with the USA, but they did not expect that Penkovsky's threat would actually be implemented. (11)

It appeared that the watch and wait policy of Japan regarding the northern territorial issue had turned to her disadvantage. While it was true that Japan did not have any power to force the issue on the Soviet Union, she, at the same time, did not anticipate that the Soviet Union would go back even on the promise she had made in the Declaration and impose another condition for their return. The protests by the Japanese Government that Soviet action amounted to interference in Japan's domestic affairs and a violation of the Joint Declaration, did not produce any results. (12)

The territorial issue was taken up again by the Japanese Government on receipt of a letter from Khrushchev by Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato. The letter was sent through Vice Premier A.I. Mikoyan, when he came to inaugurate the ...
Soviet Industrial Fair in Tokyo in August 1961. In this letter Khrushchev had indicated that the Soviet Government was prepared to consider any of the problems existing between the two countries and was also eager to place the Japanese-Soviet relations on a better footing. Taking this opportunity, Ikeda started a correspondence with the Soviet Premier, wherein he stated clearly that the obstacle in the way of conclusion of a Peace Treaty was the Soviet Union declining to restore the Japanese territories and not the existence of a Security Treaty with USA and the presence of US bases in Japan. Ikeda repeated the arguments advanced in the 1960 correspondence that a defence alliance with the USA existed even at the time of the signing of the Declaration and that the Declaration itself recognised the right of Japan to enter into any regional alliance. Again, the Security Pact was a defensive alliance based on the principles of the UN Charter and in no way threatened the security of the Soviet Union, as alleged by her. Ikeda continued that while the Soviet Union was talking in terms of abolition of military blocs, even in the Far East, she had an alliance with the People's Republic of China since 1950 and recently had concluded a Mutual Agreement with North Korea. This correspondence - which continued back and forth till Khrushchev's letter of 12 December 1961 - did not throw any new light on the problem. The Soviet Union reiterated her claim that the territorial problem was settled according to international agreement. Japan insisted that the Kuriles
could on no account be termed "spoils of aggression", which alone were meant to be taken away from Japan. Since Japan was not a party to the Yalta Agreement, this was not binding upon her. Again, the USA also made clear that the Agreement was only a statement of objectives and did not have validity. The Potsdam Agreement, which Japan accepted, had not mentioned the Yalta Agreement. Though Japan relinquished these territories in the San Francisco Treaty, this Treaty did not lay down to whom the territories would be transferred and that precisely on this very ground, the Soviet Union refused to sign the Treaty. Thus, not being a party to the Treaty, she could not claim any rights on that ground. (13) Clearly both the sides stood their own ground and no progress was made regarding the conclusion of the Peace Treaty or the settlement of the territorial problem.

In 1962, the Soviet stand on the territorial problem was explained and justified in Khrushchev's interview to the Chubu Nippon Agency and also in Moscow broadcasts. (14) It is reported that, in May 1962, when Kono Ichiro visited

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14 Moscow broadcast dated 3 February 1962 commenting on the Japanese Ministry's proposal to include Kunashiri and Etorofu in a new map of Japan stated that this move was intended to intensify the Cold War and to complicate Japanese-Soviet relations. There were also broadcasts on this problem on 4 and 20 January 1962. Nihon Soren Koryu Nenshi 1962, pp. 205-7.
Moscow in connection with the fishery negotiations, Mikoyan told him in a welcome party on 8 May that the correct line was to conclude a Peace Treaty, according to the late Hatoyama formula. (15) After that, no statement seems to have been made on this problem till suddenly on 27 September 1962, Ikeda received a further reply from Khrushchev for his letter of 15 November 1961. In this letter also the Soviet position was re-stated and Japan was rebuked for trying to create difficulties in the path of the conclusion of a Peace Treaty by raising the territorial problem. Ikeda did not reply to this letter. A note was issued by the Public Information Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the same day, summarising the discussion between Japan and the Soviet Union on the problem. (16)

1963 did not witness any new developments on this problem. The Soviet Press and Moscow broadcasts kept the issue alive by occasional articles and commentaries, but no fresh arguments were advanced.

The Soviet position on the territorial issue continues to remain unchanged even today. Japan also stands by her own interpretation of the position - that a Peace Treaty could be concluded only after the return of Habomai and Shikotan as well as the Southern Kuriles. In fact, she

15 Ibid., p. 4. An earlier Moscow broadcast of 7 March 1962 on the occasion of the third death anniversary of Hatoyama also made the same proposal.

16 Ibid., p. 4.
insists that even negotiations for a Peace Treaty could be started only on this premise. At the same time, Japan is very clear that the problem of northern territories should not be linked up with the Security Treaty with the USA. In spite of Japan's intentions to keep these two issues separate, it appears that the Soviet Union would continue to tie them up. Since the situation of the islands is strategic and involves a risk to her security, USSR feels that with their return to Japanese possession, there is no guarantee that the islands would not be included in the American base system. The restoration of Southern Kuriles to Japan is, therefore, a big concession, which the Soviet Union would be prepared to make, only if the international situation warrants that she should pay such a price for gaining Japanese goodwill and friendship. It is doubtful if even the formation of a Socialist Government in Japan would change the present position, unless the situation in the Far East demands that the Soviet Union should have Japan on her side at all costs.

JAPAN - US SECURITY TREATY

Thus we come to the final problem, viz., the attempts made by the Soviet Union to wean away Japan from over-dependence on the USA on the issue of security or at least to weaken their mutual ties. With the removal of
Hatoyama Ichiro from the political scene, there was a short spell of Ishibashi Tanzan's Cabinet which seemed to promise closer ties with the Communist Bloc. However, Ishibashi had to resign on account of his illness and Kishi Nobusuke came to power. Kishi advocated closer ties with the USA and the strengthening of the Security Pact. He openly professed his preference for Nationalist China and their rights in the mainland. He initiated talks with South Korea and agreed on reparations to South Vietnam. In other words, Kishi was bolstering up the anti-communist line in the Pacific periphery, thus proving that Japan was a very trustworthy ally of the USA, in spite of her resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Kishi's foreign policy did not contribute to better relations with the Soviet Union, rather it irritated the latter considerably. (17) This was clear during the fishery negotiations as well as on the issue of safe fishing in the northern seas. However, the Soviet pinpricks did not result in bringing about any modifications in the Japanese foreign policy. The Japanese Government went ahead with preparations

Pravda, 7 September 1957 criticised Kishi for reversing the policies of Hatoyama and Ishibashi and going against the interests of the Japanese people. Sovieto Nenpo 1959, p. 364.
for the revision of the Security Pact. The Soviet Union mounted her attacks on Japan for co-operation with the USA in her aggression against China and any possible aggression against the Soviet Union. (18) When her negative attacks did not seem to yield any results, the Soviet Union changed her tactics and advocated a policy of neutrality for Japan.

The first Soviet note to Japan advocating a policy of neutrality was handed over by A.A. Gromyko to Ambassador Suemitsu Kodowaki on 2 December 1958. The note pointed out that Japan's security lay in the denial of rearmament and war and the pursuit of a neutral policy, which alone would ensure her true independence and security. The Soviet Union also pointed out that this neutral policy would be in consonance with the spirit of the Japanese Constitution. In her reply to this note, Japan stated that though she was aligned with the "Free World", she maintained friendly relations with the Socialist World. She considered that the Soviet suggestion could even be termed an interference into the foreign policy of Japan and could in no way promote the friendly relations between the two countries.

The Soviet note seemed to be in response to Japan.

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18 Text of notes exchanged between Soviet Union and Japan on this question in May-June 1958 in Pravda 20 June 1958 in CDSP, vol. 10, no. 25, p. 16
Also see Sovieto Nenpo 1959, pp. 384-5.
initiating talks with the USA for revision of the Security Treaty in October 1958. The Soviet demand closely followed the Chinese call on 19 November 1958 for a policy of neutrality by Japan. (19) Hence, it appeared that the Soviet Union and China agreed that a positive approach of neutrality should be suggested for Japan as an alternative to US alliance and that they were also willing to allay any Japanese fears about aggression from the communist bloc by agreeing to guarantee her neutrality. This approach also would directly appeal to the large section of neutralist sentiments in Japan. In his speech at the Twenty first Congress, on 27 January 1959, Khrushchev stressed the need for creating "a zone of peace, above all, an atom-free zone in the Far East and the entire Pacific Basin". (20) The same theme was echoed in other notes to the Japanese Government. (21) Appeals were made to the Japanese people through broadcasts. In his replies to the questionnaire by the Japanese Press Service on 20 April 1959, Khrushchev explained in detail the advantage of a neutral policy in the case of Japan. He stated that such a policy would


20 Pravda, 28 January 1959 in CDSP, vol. 11, no. 4, p. 20

strengthen her independence, exalt her status in international society and also help to relieve tension in the Far East and contribute to world peace. He also pointed out that a neutral policy by Japan would lead to an amendment of the relevant clauses in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, which was directed against Japan. (22)

The Soviet Embassy in Japan too propagated the same theme. Ambassador F.S. Fedorenko in his speech at Nisso Shinzen Kyokai on 25 January 1959, pointed out that there were no conflicting interests in the case of Japan and the Soviet Union. Their differing ideologies did not prevent the development of friendly relations. The Soviet Union hoped that Japan would pursue a policy of neutrality in the interests of world peace. (23)

The Japan Communist Party (JCP) supported the Soviet call of neutrality. (24) It is interesting to note the shift in JCP's policy, as in 1951, it had clearly mentioned that international conditions showed that the communist bloc was the strong bloc. The most harmful policy

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22 Nisso Kan Juvo Kokan Bunsho, n. 18, pp. 265-70.
Also see D. Vasilyev, "Policy which meets interests of Japanese people", Izvestia, 3 May 1959 in CDSP, vol. 10, no. 18, pp. 22-23, which gives the Japanese people's favourable reaction to Khrushchev's remarks. Particular mention is made of Sohyo and the Socialist Party. Criticism is levied against those quarters which have described neutrality as dangerous.

23 "Soren no tainichi churitsuka seisaku", Chosa Geppo (Japan, Cabinet Research Office), February 1960, pp. 21-23.

was trying to follow the "free world" blindly or advocating neutrality. (25) Even in the Seventh General Convention in July 1958, the JCP criticised the policy of neutrality and called it a "make believe", conceding the weapon of labour to imperialists. But when the Soviet Union changed her tactics against Japan, JCP also advocated neutrality. (26)

When her repeated appeals for a neutral policy and her warnings of "dangerous consequences" in the event of Japan strengthening her military ties with the USA, did not deter the Kishi Government from signing the revised Security Pact with the USA, the Soviet Union played her trump card. She imposed a condition on the return of Habomai and Shikotan. To bring home to the Japanese people her strength and defence power, she fired rockets almost directly over Japan in January 1960, missiles which hit within a mile of their mark in the Pacific Ocean. She kept up her propaganda broadcasts directed against Japan reiterating the responsibility of Japan for the provocative spy planes and the new Security Treaty. She repeatedly argued that while the 1951 Security Treaty was "forced on Japan", the new Treaty was a voluntary

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26 "Soren no tainichi Churitsuka seisaku", n. 23
See also Nozako Sanzo's speech in the plenary session of the House of Councillors on 27 June 1959 and in the Budget Committee of the House of Councillors on 5 March 1960.
act and the Japanese people would have to bear the dire consequences of this act. (27)

These constant threats and intimidations might have affected the people of Japan, as they only echoed the people's fears and misgivings about the strengthening of the military alliance with the USA. However, it would be incorrect to say that it was these pressures which actually gave a sense of purpose and direction to the Security Treaty struggles. The motivations of the anti-Treaty campaign could be divided broadly into two categories, viz., one whose primary objective was blocking the Treaty and the other, who even while not in favour with the revision, placed greater emphasis on the struggle against authoritarianism. But taking the campaign as a whole,

... never before in Japan's history have the masses in the face of the abuse of power by the Government organised almost spontaneously without reference to their own personal direct interests to protest on such a large scale and for a period of so many consecutive days ... . (28)


The Soviet action, particularly, the imposition of a condition for the return of the islands was denounced by the people, as interference in the "domestic affairs" of Japan. It appears, the Japanese people felt that the struggle was an affair between the Government and the people and that the Soviet Union did not have a right to use pressure to impose her judgements on a sovereign nation. (29) They condemned the unilateral retraction of promise made in a Treaty, at the same time, making it clear that nation-wide denunciation of Soviet action did not in any way imply support to the Kishi Government. While they were willing to concede that the irresponsible actions of Kishi might have indirectly provoked Soviet interference, they were not prepared to justify Soviet action. (30) It might be concluded that the Soviet purpose of denigrating the Kishi Government, in the eyes of the people, was achieved. Yet, at the same time, she helped her own image to be tarnished, as it increased the people's distrust in her pronouncements of friendship and goodwill. Thus, the Soviet attempts could be termed to be a double failure, as neither the Treaty could be blocked, nor could she create a pro-Soviet mood in the country.


30 Asahi, 1 February 1960.
In the years that followed, the Soviet Union did not lose any opportunity of criticising Japan aligning with the USA and co-operating in her war-mongering policies, while exhorting her to contribute to peace in the Far East, by insisting on the withdrawal of foreign bases from her soil. She also played up the fears of the Japanese people about the US bases not being limited to deployment of conventional weapons, but also being equipped with nuclear missiles. The berthing of US atomic submarines at Japanese ports also gave her still another pretext to voice her suspicions and anxieties. (31) Though the peace offensive was continued, the tone gradually got softer in 1963, and also got limited to Moscow broadcasts, articles in Pravda and Izvestia, rather than in the form of notes to the Japanese Government from the Soviet leaders.

It is worth noting that even when the relations were rather bad in 1960, though it had its effect on the fishery negotiations, it did not seem to affect the trade negotiations, which opened up a new era in Soviet-Japanese

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trade. (32) The Japanese Government also did not try to block the smooth progress of these negotiations as a means of retaliation for the Soviet note regarding Habomai and Shikotan. Therefore, both the Governments seem to have been following a very realistic policy of not allowing their differences on one issue to affect all aspects of their relations. While the gradual rift in Sino-Soviet relations might have mellowed Soviet relations towards Japan, there does not appear to be any tangible evidence to show that the Soviet Union actually made some concessions to Japan in following this conciliatory policy. It should be clear that the steps taken for the improvement in trade relations were not motivated by political factors alone and the Soviet Government continued her hard bargaining in all negotiations. Even in the fishery negotiations, it is difficult to say that the Soviet Union has been making any concessions.

The good relations have, however, helped to solve some minor problems, as in the case of the Agreement about collection of sea tangle in the seas around Kaigarashima (near Habomai and Shikotan), which was signed on 10 June 1963. This Agreement was considered separately from the territorial problem and was also allowed to be settled at the people's level, the Agreement being signed by the Secretary of the Dai Nihon Susan Kai. (33)

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32 Nihon Keizai of 3 March 1960 remarks that the Soviet Union took an "unexpectedly soft position".

The permission to the Japanese to visit graves in the Soviet Union and Habomai and Shikotan can be cited as one of the instances where Soviet goodwill is displayed. Until 1959, only the Japanese Embassy staff in the Soviet Union was allowed to visit the graves in the neighbourhood of Moscow, Irkutsk, Paprovsk, etc., but visits to other places were denied even to them. In 1961, a delegation of thirtythree members of the bereaved families was permitted to visit Paprovsk and Chita. Since then, the Soviet Union has been permitting these visits annually. In 1964, on the occasion of Vice Premier Mikoyan's visit to Japan, an announcement was made permitting visits to graves in Habomai and Shikotan. Kunashiri and Etorofu continued to be prohibited areas. But in August 1969, the Soviet Union gave permission to a Japanese mission to visit graves in Kunashiri also. (34)

The Soviet Union has been trying to conclude a Cultural Agreement with Japan since 1958. In 1962, the Chairman of the Committee for Overseas Cultural Exchange, G.A. Zhukov, visited Japan and serious efforts were made to bring the Agreement to a successful conclusion. However, the Japanese Government found it difficult to concede that the expenses of the cultural delegation should be borne by the receiving country only; secondly, the insertion of a

34 Nihon Soren Koryu Nenabi 1961, p. 167
Nihon Soren Koryu Nenshi 1964, p. 70

June 1966
clause that the two Governments would assist and promote the cultural exchange even at the people's level, was interpreted by the Japanese Government as putting her under obligation and was unacceptable to her. Though the talks broke up on these issues, and there is no formal Agreement, there have been short-term agreements about specific exchange of scholars, scientists and experts and also the holding of film festivals. Apart from this, there is a regular exchange at the people's level. It appears that with the Sino-Soviet rift, the Soviet Union is competing with China in issuing invitations to various parties to visit her country. (35)

SOVIET UNION AND THE LEFTIST ELEMENTS

Among the leftist elements in Japan, an echo could be found in the Soviet line of anti-USA and anti-monopoly capital and a genuine desire to strengthen the ties and friendship with socialist countries. However, this common interest did not ensure complete subservience of all the leftist elements to the Soviet State policies which affected Japanese national interest. This becomes evident in the case of the territorial issue and the fishery problem. While the JCP supported the Soviet line on both these issues, the

35 Nihon Soren Koryu Nenshi 1962, p. 52.
The Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) found it difficult to agree with the Soviet claims completely, though their criticisms of the Socialist State were softer in tone and there was a genuine belief that the Soviet Union could be persuaded to follow a correct line. She was only provoked to follow a hard line because of the policies of the reactionary Government. However, in the case of the suspension of the nuclear tests, both the Socialist Party and the Communist Party were particularly embarrassed by the shifting policy of the Soviet Union and they found it difficult to justify Soviet action. At the Seventh Gensuikyo (Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons) Conference in August 1961, the following Resolution was passed with full Soviet approval:

Japanese people. Again, the next year, in 1962, the Soviet Union carried on a massive atmospheric explosion in Siberia, even while the Gensuikyo Conference was going on. (37) Thus, though the leftist elements were trying to promote a friendly Soviet image in Japan, some of the Soviet actions had the opposite effect.

The dispute between China and the Soviet Union was another factor, which led to a division of loyalties among the leftist leaders. The JSP while analysing the dispute stated that "the problem posed to us by the Sino-Soviet dispute is not so simple as calls for our siding with either of the two". At the same time, the following statement by them seems to sum up very aptly the Socialist views on the Soviet Union:

The Soviet Union has the tendency to claim her own national interests as the interests of the world proletariat, which may be indicative of the residue of Stalinism and to impose on other countries, areas or movements, her foreign policy based on her own national interests. In some cases, this tendency had adverse influence on the movement in a certain country, instances of which we can find in recent history.

The Socialist Party also admitted the futility of mechanically applying the ideology based on historical and social conditions of a foreign country to the peace movement waged under conditions in which Japan was actually placed. (38)

37 Ibid., pp. 121-5.

As regards the JCP (as already explained in Chapter III), the Soviet efforts to exercise their influence and to spread their ideology, through the medium of the JCP during the Occupation period, could not be termed a success. The communist movement, which managed to escape the police forces, had to operate underground and many of the leaders fled to China. Thus when the JCP was faced with a great crisis, both from pressures from the Government as well as from the disunity within its ranks, the Chinese Communist Party served as hosts, gave them guidance and also assistance. During this stage, the Soviet leaders did not particularly object to the increasing Chinese influence over the Party. However, when relations between the Soviet Union and China became strained, the USSR was very anxious that the JCP should toe the Soviet line. Even as early as 1957, JCP leaders found it difficult to accept the Soviet policies in toto, though they did not allow any open expression of their doubts and also took care that the rank and file were not posted with details of the dispute. The official line continued to be, that the dispute was a "figment of bourgeois imagination". Even when it was brought out in the open by Khrushchev, through his attack on Albania in October 1961, the JCP tried to adopt a tactic of neutralism, thus making a last bid to prevent a split in the Party. During the crisis over India, Yugoslavia and Cuba, JCP continued to keep to its basic policy of not taking sides. Yet, after the Ninth Gensuikyo Conference in August 1963, it broke
openly with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and engaged in bitter conflict. The CPSU started openly giving support to the new "Voice of Japan" group, a splinter group of the JCP, calling that group a true Marxist-Leninist Party. The Soviet Union also paid more attention to the JSP. (39)

Whatever course the future relations between the CPSU and the leftist elements in Japan took from 1964 or is likely to take in the future, the Sino-Soviet rift seemed to bring into the open the resentment about being forced to follow the Soviet policy, without questioning it, and also a tendency to stress on "independence and autonomy". It is another matter whether the leftist parties actually succeeded in establishing such an independent line. It also appears that "inter-personal relations between Japanese and Russians have rarely been marked by true warmth and intimacy even in the Communist movement", while "Japanese of different political persuasions have often found it possible to interact meaningfully with the Chinese, to understand and appreciate their thought patterns and political responses. (40)

39 For a full discussion, see Scalapino, n. 36, pp. 97 ff.

40 Ibid., p. 211.
Apart from the sympathisers of the Marxist ideology, the Japanese people in general also do not have the same approach towards the two nations of the Communist Bloc. In the case of the Soviet Union, while they have a sense of persecution, they have a guilty conscience towards China and feel some sense of obligation towards her. It appears that these attitudes also affect the Soviet image. Positive measures are not taken by the Soviet Union to erase the suspicion and distrust with which she is held among the people of Japan. In these circumstances, the support of the leftist elements in Japan is vital for the USSR to keep up her contacts with the Japanese people, and to project a favourable image of herself.