A CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY OF UPAMĀNA IN INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the thesis entitled "A CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY OF UPAMĀNA IN INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY" submitted by Sri B.C. OSULA REDDY is a record of research work done by him under my guidance and that the thesis has not previously formed the basis for the award to the candidate of any Degree or Diploma or Associateship or Fellowship or other similar title.

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In Indian Philosophy Upamāna or comparison is accorded the status of a Pramāṇa or an independent source of valid knowledge in the systems of Nyāya, Purva Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta. But when we enter into the details of the Pramāṇa as expounded in the texts, we find that the views of these three schools of the different thinkers in the same school do not coincide at all. For instance, there is a divergence of opinion regarding the nature of Upamiti or the resultant knowledge through Upamāna between the three schools. If, according to Purva Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedanta the resultant knowledge pertaining to the similarity which the remembered object bears to the directly perceived one, it is according to Nyāya the knowledge that a certain word denotes a certain class of objects. As an instance of differences in the self same systems, we find in the systems of Nyāya divergence of opinions regarding the instrumentality in Upamāṇa. Gautama equates it with the well known similarity, Vatsyayana takes it as the statement of a reliable person conveying similarity, whereas Uddyotakara thinks it as the
knowledge of the well known similarity. These views lead to the further divergence in their theories of the psychological process in Upāmāna. Thus, the development of the concept of Upāmāna even in a single system needs a comprehensive review.

Similarly, the conceptions of the other systems of Indian Philosophy who are united in their dismissal of Upāmāna as an independent means of cognition, do not absolutely coincide. Some systems bring it under inference, some under verbal testimony, some under perception while still others include it under remembrance. These divergent views regarding the reducibility of Upāmāna to one or the other of the other Pramānas deserve a thorough and systematic investigation. Moreover, the problems cropping up consequent on the validity or otherwise of the grounds for the reduction of Upāmāna to some other pramana will invoke a more fundamental doubt regarding the place of Upāmāna as a Pramāna or a means of valid knowledge itself. These problems require a sustained and serious consideration.

The present dissertation is devoted to a critical and comparative study of the problem of Upāmāna in the context of Naiyayikas, the two schools of Purva Mīmāṃsā and Advaita
Vedanta - the systems which accepted Upamāna as a valid and independent source of knowledge.

A comparative study of a Pramāna generally implies a discussion of its distinctness or identity to other means of knowledge and a critical analysis usually means a judgement on the strength and weakness of the assertions of the schools under review in the light of certain established standards or canons of reasoning. So, the word 'comparison' in the study of Upamāna should mean a parallel study of the important works of Indian Epistemology, especially those who devote considerable discussion either by way of upholding or opposing the claims of Upamāna as a valid and independent source of knowledge.

As the scope of the literature, particularly of the three systems involved in the study of Upamāna, is very extensive, the researcher is obliged to confine the work to the selected works of each of the three systems. Regarding the selection of the source, the texts which are of fundamental significance and have constructive value have been selected for the present research. The śūtras, the bhaśyas and the vārttikas as well as some celebrated works of each
system constitute the main source of the study. The works of modern eminent scholars have also been consulted for a critical, clear and comparative presentation of the subject matter. References to the nature and the problems of Upamāna occur partly in the works dealing with each of these systems such as 'The Nyāya theory of knowledge', 'Epistemology of Bhatta school of Purva Mīmāṃsā', 'Six ways of Knowing' and also in all the standard works on Indian Philosophy. The problem of Upamāna however, like the problems of any other Pramāṇa is not studied independently and systematically.

The controversies cover a fairly wide range of problems. Therefore, a definite arrangement is followed in the discussion of the problems of Upamāna. The material presented in systems wise and topic wise. The Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā conceptions of Upamāna as a valid means of knowledge are discussed first and the discussion is followed by the views of the critics of Pramāṇa who have questioned the bonafide of Upamāna as an independent means of knowledge. For this purpose a comparative study of Upamāna with the other Pramāṇas like perception and inference to which it was sought to be reduced has been instituted with a view to distinguish the Pramāṇa under consideration from these other
sources or forms of valid knowledge. This particular plan has been considered to be very useful to show all the distinguishing marks of Upaniṣada.

I have immense pleasure in expressing my hearty gratitude to my teacher and Research Supervisor, Dr. M. Veeraliah, M.A.(Mons.), Ph.D., Reader in the Department of Philosophy, Sri Venkateswara University, for his able guidance and constant encouragement in preparing this dissertation.

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INTRODUCTION
There is much difference of opinion among Indian Epistemologists as to what the ultimate source of human knowledge are. For the Cārvakas, who are radical empiricists, perception is the only valid source of knowledge and all true knowledge comes from perception. The Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas hold that perception and inference are the ultimate sources of true knowledge which include other sources like Upamāna and Sabda. According to Samkhya and the Yoga systems, Sabda or verbal testimony also should be recognised as an independent source of knowledge like perception and inference. The Samkhya includes Upamāna and Arthāpatti under inference, and Abhāva under perception. Naiyāyikas are in four of the view that there are four independent sources of knowledge, namely perception, inference, verbal testimony and Upamāna or comparison. According to them, the other sources of knowledge namely Arthāpatti and Anupālabhāḥi recognised by the systems of Māṁsa and Vedānta may be included within these four and so need not be taken as ultimate or independent sources of knowledge. The
Prabhākara school of Īśvāramiśēśa adds Arthāpatti or presumption to the list of four Pramāṇas admitted by Nyāya. The Bhaṭṭa school of Īruva Mīmāṃsā and the Advaita school of Uttara Mīmāṃsā recognised the above five Pramāṇas to the addition of Anupalabdhi or non-apprehension. According to the Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta, Arthāpatti is a separate source of knowledge, because it gives us a knowledge of facts which cannot be otherwise explained. It cannot be explained a perception or inference. According to the Advaita Vedānta and Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, Anupalabdhi is an independent Pramāṇa or ultimate source of knowledge. It is a unique cause of such a presentative knowledge of non-existence as is not due to inference or any other sources of knowledge.

Upamāna is an independent means of knowledge in the systems of Nyāya, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and the Advaita. While going through the details of Upamāna in the texts, we find that the conceptions of different schools or of the same school in different works do not absolutely coincide. For example, in the systems of Nyāya, we come across divergence of opinion regarding the instrumentality in Upamāna. Gautama equates it with the well known similarity. Vātsyāyana takes it as the statement of a reliable person conveying
similarity, whereas Udayotakara thinks it as the knowledge of the well-known similarity. These views lead to the further divergence in their theories of the psychological process in Upamāṇa. Thus, the development of the concept of Upamāṇa even in a single system needs a comprehensive review.

The Upholders of Upamāṇa as an independent means of knowledge also differ in details. For example, there is the divergence of opinion regarding the nature of resultant knowledge through Upamāṇa. The Purva Mīmāṃsā and the Advaita Vedāntins are on one side, and the Naiyāyikas on the other. According to the Purva Mīmāṃsākas, the resultant knowledge pertains to the similarity which the remembered object bears to the directly perceived one. But, according to the Naiyāyikas, it is the knowledge that a certain word denotes a certain class of objects. Thus the comparative study of the concept of Upamāṇa is still a desideratum.

Here, we propose to study the problems regarding Upamāṇa in the context of Nyāya, Purva Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta in particular and of the other systems of Indian Philosophy in general. In course of discussion, an attempt is made to co-ordinate and evaluate the answers supplied by
various systematists to the problems regarding the nature, kind process involved in Upāśna.

As the literature of each of the systems is very vast, it has compelled us to limit the study to the selected works of each of the systems. As regards the selection of the sources, the texts which are of basis importance and have constructive value are selected for the present study. I have selected as far as possible the sutras, the bhāsyas, and the vārtikas as well as some celebrated work of each system. The selection of these texts is prompted by the consideration that the sutras represents the seeds of the thought, the bhāsyas and the vārtikas indicate their development into a discipline in the form of concrete and possible criticism and the celebrated works offer a picture of a full-fledged system. The celebrated works of different systems consulted are are the manuals which contain the elaboration or compendium of what has been said in original texts of the systems. It has not been our aim to settle the chronological controversies. The latest accepted views regarding the age of the texts is generally followed. The works of modern scholars are also consulted for a clearer and critical presentation of the subject matter.
The discussions and controversies regarding the nature and status of Upaniṣad cover a wide range of problems. Therefore, a definite arrangement is followed in writing this dissertation. The thesis is prepared in Eight Chapters.

In the First Chapter entitled "Prama and Pramāṇa", the theories of different schools of Indian Philosophy regarding the nature of knowledge, the criterion of valid knowledge (Prama) and the means of valid knowledge (Pramāṇa), are discussed in brief. Regarding the essential nature of knowledge, the three main conceptions advocated by the different schools of Indian Philosophy are explained. The Nyāya view, the knowledge is an attribute of the self; the Sāmkhya-Yoga view of knowledge as a substantive modification of Buddhi and the Baudhāya and the Mīmāṃsā view that knowledge is an activity, a transitive process have been discussed.

It is generally admitted by the schools of Indian Philosophy that Prama is the true or valid knowledge. There is, however, the difference of opinion between the schools regarding the test of validity itself. Hence the several definitions of Prama as offered by the different systems are clearly explained. The views of the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika,
the Mîmâṃsā, Baudhāṇa, the Sāṁkhyā and the Jaina views of 
pramāṇa are critically explained.

The Third Part of discussion is devoted to discuss 
the theories of pramāṇa or the means of valid knowledge. 
All the systems of Indian Philosophy agree in the respect 
of the literal meaning as well as the function or the 
purpose of pramāṇa that it is conductive to the valid know-
ledge. There is, however, divergence of opinion about the 
exact nature of karāṇa of valid knowledge. A karāṇa is 
generally conceived as a special cause in producing a parti-
cular effect. The criterion of karāṇa, however, is variously 
interpreted by different systems. The views of Īśvara Vaiṣe-
śikas, the Baudhāṇa, the Jaina, the Mîmâṃsā, the Sāṁkhyā-Yoga 
and the Advaita Vedānta are presented.

The Second Chapter is entitled "The Nyāya Concep-
tion of Upamāṇa". In the first part of the present chapter, 
an earnest attempt is made to expound the Nyāya conception 
of the nature of Upamāṇa as understood and defined by the 
distinguished Nyāyayikas in the long history of Nyāya lite-
rature commencing from Gautama, the sutrakara, upto the 
contemporary period. In this connection the views of Vāt-
syāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspāti Miśra, Jayanta Bhatta have
been presented as attempts at the elucidation of the concept of Upamāna and the modifications and refinements they have suggested for the progressive understanding of the nature and implications of the original definition of the Sūtrakāra's definition of Upamāna as a Pramāṇa. The whole discussion is aimed at arriving at an understanding of what precisely Nyāya means by Upamāna as a Pramāṇa.

The Second part of the discussion undertakes to defend Upamāna as an independent Pramāṇa from attacks of rival schools of Philosophy. Here, the pattern followed is to first discuss the reasons of these rival schools for their non-acceptance of Upamāna's independent chapter and consequent inclusion of the Pramāṇa under one or the other Pramāṇas, and then to consider Nyāya objections to them. In this connections the views of Bhāṭṭa Kīmāmsā and Dvaita Vedānta that Upamāna as a case of perception, the views of the Vaiśeṣikas, the Saṅgha, the Advaita, the Visisṭadvaita and Dvaita, that Upamāna can be included under inference; the views of Sāṅkara the Visisṭadvaita Vedānta (Vedānta Deśika), the Buddha, the Saṅkhya and also Bāhṣarvajña (renowned Nyāyaśāstra himself); the views of the Vaiśeṣika that
Upamāna is but a case of Śāya or verbal testimony have been clearly presented and the Nyāya answers to all these different viewpoints have been stated with as much precision and clarity as possible.

The Third Chapter is entitled, "The Mīmāṃsā Conception of Upamāna". The Pūrva Mīmāṃsākās believe in Upamāna as a valid and independent means of knowledge. Jaimini, the author of the Mīmāṃsā sūtras does not speak of Upamāna. It is Sabara, the Bhāsyakāra, discusses the nature of Upamāna for the first time in the Mīmāṃsā literature. The present chapter is devoted to the critical discussion of Prabhākara's and Kumārila's expositions of Sabara's account of Upamāna. The discussion aims at a comparative understanding of the exponents of the two different schools of Mīmāṃsā. There is a fundamental unity of thought between the two schools regarding Upamāna with the exception of a minor difference, namely that Prabhākara considers similarity to be an independent category, while according to Kumārila similarity is but an assemblage of common features. The present discussion therefore takes up both the schools Mīmāṃsā together for a comprehensive understanding of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā concept of Upamāna.
Advaita is the third system which assigns an independent position to upamāṇa. The system accepts six means of knowledge and gives an independent status to upamāṇa. A systematic record of the six pramāṇas is given by Anandapurna, in his Nyāya Chandrika and by Dharmaraja, Adhvaryu in his Vedānta Paribhasha. The Advaita Vedanta discussion of upamāṇa is based on these two master treatises. Anandapurna defines upamiti as the knowledge of similarity which the object situated at a distance bears to that present near the observer. While explaining the psychological process in upamāṇa, Anandapurna stated that the resultant knowledge through upamāṇa refers to the cow qualified by the similarity to gavaya. Dharmaraja Adhvaryu defines upamāṇa as the instrument (kārana) of upamiti which in turn is the resultant knowledge in the form of similarity.

The Fourth Chapter is entitled "Other sources of knowledge and upamāṇa's accountability as an independent pramāṇa". It is an interesting fact concerning upamāṇa that through the Naiyāyikas and the Māmāśikas agree to accept upamāṇa as a distinct source of knowledge they are poles apart is so far as the delineation of its nature is concerned. Similarly the opponents ground for rejecting
**Upama** as a distinct means of knowledge are very much divergent. In this chapter an attempt is made to explain the general nature and distinguishing features of entire valid source grounds of knowledge (**Pramāṇa**) and some forms of cognition to which **Upamāna** is sought to be reduced. An attempt is also made to explain **Upamāna**'s accountability as a distinct sources of knowledge in the context of the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā standpoints in particular and in the wider perspective of all the relevant systems of Indian Philosophy in general.

The Fifth Chapter entitled, "Is **Upamāna** merely perceptual?" deals with the role of the perception of similarity in **Upamāna**. The Mīmāṃsākas and the Buddhists hold the Nyāya conception of **Upamāna** is a case of perception, while the Sāṁkhya system and Jayātīrtha of Advaita Vedānta consider the Mīmāṃsā concept of **Upamāna** as a case of perception. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa lays stress upon the factor of perception of similarity as the instrumental cause of **Upamāna** as viewed by Nyāya. The Buddhists strongly advocating the two means of knowledge consider sensuous observation is what helps the individual to cognise an unknown object resulting in the cognition of similarity of a known object
The Sāmkhya system and Jayatīrtha Advaita Vedānta treat the
Mīmāṃsā concept of Upanāṇa as a case of perception.

The Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsākās spare no pains
to establish their individual concepts of Upanāṇa as distinct
from perception. The respective arguments of these systems
against the attempted reduction of Upanāṇa to perception by
the different critics have been presented in this chapter.
The chief criticism of the Mīmāṃsā against the Nyāya concept
of Upanāṇa is that there is nothing new cognised by it.
Jayanta Bhaṭṭa rejects the Mīmāṃsā criticism that the percept-
sibility of a mediate fact does not necessarily prove that
the conserved means of knowledge is perception. As to the
view of Dīnāga that what is really apprehended through Upanāṇa
is neither the resemblance to a known object (cow) nor the
existence of unknown thing (gavaya) as qualified by the resem-
blish to a known object, Uddāyotakara points out that the
Buddhists view is based upon misunderstanding of the real
purpose of Upanāṇa - a misunderstanding which leads the
Buddhists to reject Upanāṇa as an independent means of know-
ledge. The Mīmāṃsākās also are not prepared to admit their
concept of Upanāṇa is a case of perception. Their main argu-
ment against the critics is that the object cognised in
Upamāṇa is not the similarity alone but similarity as located in the object which is not the contact in with the senses.

The Sixth Chapter with the caption "Can Upamāṇa be reduced to Inference?" is devoted to a comprehensive discussion regarding the inclusion of Upamāṇa in inference. The Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsākas have explained Upamāṇa in their own different ways and have criticised each other's views on the grounds of the reducibility of each other's Upamāṇa to one or the other means of valid knowledge. So, apart from the other opposing schools, the arguments regarding the inclusion of Upamāṇa in inference have also come from those who are otherwise its staunch supporters. The Vaiśeṣikas, refuse to accept Upamāṇa as an independent means of knowing and hold that it can be reduced to inference. The Prabhakara school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, the Śāṅkhya and Yoga systems also hold that the Nyāya Upamāṇa is nothing but inference. Like the Nyāya Upamāṇa, the Upamāṇa as propounded by Mīmāṃsākas has been considered by some logicians as reducible to inference.

All the Naiyāyikas, write from Gautama to Viswanatha, have been aware of the attempts on the part of the logicians
of the other systems the Vaiśeṣikas to reduced upamāna to inference. The present chapter undertakes a critical exposition of the arguments. Jayanta and other Naiyāyikas which see to serve as ample proof for the establishing the distinct character of the Nyāya upamāna. Like wise, Kāmarila Bhatta's strong opposition to attempt to reduce upamāna to inference is also critically examined. Finally the arguments of Advaita Vedānta against the inclusion of upamāna under inference have explained.

The Seventh Chapter, "Is upamāna a case of verbal testimony?" considers the question whether the pramāṇa is different from sabda or verbal testimony. The Naiyāyikas hold testimony as a statement of some authoritative person. In the Nyāya Upamana also, the statement of a reliable person plays a major role. Kāmarila of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is of the view that upamāna, as expounded by the earlier Naiyāyikas, is not different from verbal testimony. Bhaṣarvajña Naiyāyikas himself opiniones that upamāna, as expounded by the earlier Naiyāyikas is not different from verbal testimony. Since it is based upon the statement of a reliable authority. Praśāstapāla of the Vaiśeṣika system that the Nyāya upamāna is nothing other than verbal testimony. The Sākhya system is also of the opinion that it is unnecessary to the postulate
Upanāna as different from śabdā. According to Viśistadvaita, Upanāna is nothing but authoritative statement. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa of Nīrtha Mīmāṃsā is of the view that Upanāna, as expounded by the earlier Naiyāyikas, is not different from verbal testimony. After expounding arguments of all these schools and thinkers regarding the non-difference of Upanāna from verbal testimony, the chapter considers the Naiyāyika argument to prove that Upanāna is different from verbal testimony. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s reasoning striking at the root of opponents arguments is explained a considerable detail.

The Eighth Chapter entitled “Upanāna versus Smṛti and Pratyabhijñāna” regarding Upanāna versus Smṛti, it is a Mīmāṃsā concept of Upanāna, that is included in Smṛti or remembrance. Many thinkers like Bhāsarvajña, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Sridhara, Santārakṣa and Venkatapāda tried to reduce the Mīmāṃsā Upanāna to remembrance. Their main argument is that, the object of Upanāna, according to the Mīmāṃsākās, in the similarity which the remembered object bears to the object qualified by its similarity it is directly perceived one. These systematists, however, consider that such an object was cognised earlier only and is now remembered at the sight of the other object resembles it. True attempt is made to
explain the arguments of these systematists forwarded by the Mīmāṃsā defence of the independent status of Upamāna. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa argues that though we find the elements of remembrance in Upamāṇa, still it cannot be reduced to remembrance.

A study of Upamāṇa versus pratyabhijñā or recognition, is also dealt within the present chapter. Both the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃśā theories of Upamāṇa are included in pratyabhijñā or recognition by the Jaina logicians and Meghadu Suri followers of Visistadvaita. The Jaina thinkers Prabhachandra objects the Nyaya view of Upamāṇa, its according to him, it takes such form as 'this is that', 'this is different from that', 'that is like that', this is the correlate of that', and the like. So, he holds knowledge, 'a wild cow is like a cow' is recognition. The Mīmāṃsā concept of Upamāṇa is criticised on the ground since it can be very well be explained by the perception of likeness in the unknown and the memory of the known. An attempt is made to expound the respective arguments of Nyaya and the Mīmāṃsā in defence of the nature of Upamāṇa as a distinct from pratyabhijñā in the wake of the Jaina and Visistadvaita criticism of Upamāṇa.
At the end an evaluation of all the important issues of Upamāna that came up for discussion in the course of the dissertation is attempted. A comprehensive bibliography is appended.