Chapter V

RELATIONS DURING KISHI'S PREMIERSHIP
During the three and odd years of Kishi's Premiership, Japan's relations with Southeast Asia entered upon a new and significant phase. The policy of caution maintained during the earlier years was pursued with a sense of national strength and self-confidence. At times, this sense of national strength tended to supersede caution and manifested itself in the form of a high-sounding zeal to champion the interests of Southeast Asian countries.

The aim of this chapter is to examine the Southeast Asian policy of Premier Kishi and see how it affected Japan's relations with the Philippines and Indonesia in particular.

The national strength mentioned above derived from a series of developments that took place from 1952 to 1957. Japan's position in the international community underwent a significant change when she resumed her diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in December 1956. As the Japanese Government stated in 1957, Japan, by normalizing her relations with the Soviet Union, had gained a window on the East too and had thereby regained her position as a full member of the international community. (1) She had also become a full-fledged member of the United Nations by the end of 1956, and of such other international organizations as the ECAFE, GATT and the Colombo Plan. As Subandrio, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, stated, Japan's membership in the United Nations and other bodies "constituted real strength for

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Japan's foreign policy vis-à-vis any country. (2) Furthermore, Japan had settled the reparations question with the Philippines and Burma, and was actively engaged in negotiations on the subject with Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries. As the Japanese Foreign Minister, Fujiyama, claimed, Japan had passed from the stage of settling her reparations obligations to the positive stage of rendering active economic assistance to the countries of Southeast Asia. (3) In the economic field, she had gone a long way in her objective of national reconstruction. All these factors not merely enhanced the national prestige of Japan, but enabled her to conduct her Southeast Asian policy with strength and confidence. Japan's relations with the Philippines and Indonesia during Kishi's time have to be viewed in the general framework of his Southeast Asian policy.

KISHI'S POLICY: THREE CHARACTERISTICS

Kishi's Southeast Asian policy had three important characteristics. First, like Yoshida's policy, it was anti-Communist. Second, it strove to promote Japan's economic diplomacy. Third, it sought to foster diplomatic relations with the region by encouraging an exchange of visits. (4)


4. See the Administrative speech delivered by Kishi, the acting Prime Minister, before the 26th ordinary session of the Diet, 4 February 1957. Contemporary Japan (Tokyo), vol. 24, nos 10-12, April 1957, p. 723. See also Kishi Nobusuke, "Japan in 1957", Contemporary Japan, April 1957, pp. 556-7.
Anticommunism

One of the most important methods by which Japanese statesmen sought to bring about a greater involvement of their country in the Southeast Asian region was to create a multilateral economic organization for the development of the region. In the previous chapter, we have seen how Premier Yoshida had, in November 1954, advocated such a multilateral economic agency on the pattern of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). Yoshida's advocacy was repeatedly stressed subsequently by a number of influential Japanese statesmen. (5) During the Premiership of Hatoyama, it was advocated by his Cabinet colleagues like Takasaki Tatsunosuke and Ichimada Hisato. (6) But such plans remained outlined in casual statements and were seldom seriously pursued. It was Premier Kishi who formulated what generally came to be known as Kishi's Southeast Asian Development Plan. Unlike Yoshida and others, Kishi took his plan seriously, and actively sought to implement it. As the Japan Times editorial put it: "This idea is not new to this country and indeed a certain amount has already been done along these lines. But the Prime Minister must be given the credit for endeavouring to systematise a plan that has been rather vaguely outlined up to now." (7)

Like Yoshida, Kishi contended that the greatest threat that

5. For details, see an article, "Kishi hobei to Tonan a kaihatsu", Yomiuri Shimbun(Yukan), (Tokyo), 27 April 1957. See also "Kishi Shusho no futatsu no ryoko", Sekai (Tokyo), August 1957, pp. 145-6.

6. See Tokyo Shimbun, 2 March 1956, and Mainichi Shimbun (Tokyo), 17 March 1956, respectively for their views.

Southeast Asian countries faced was communism and that unless they made rapid economic progress, they would not be in a position to withstand Communist pressure. He said:

International communism is now trying to win over Asia by exploiting the fervent spirit of nationalisms of the Asian peoples, and by appealing to their impatience to overcome poverty and privation. The communists are trying to demonstrate that their way is the quicker way to develop underdeveloped economies and to raise living standards.

Kishi wanted to prove that the "democratic method is the only way to serve the welfare and promote the happiness of mankind. We must prove that we are right." He declared:

As the most advanced industrialised nation in Asia, Japan has already shown that economic and social progress can be achieved without communist shortcut. It is my firm conviction that Japan, as a faithful member of the free world, has a useful and constructive rôle to play, particularly in Asia where the free world faces the challenge of international communism. We are resolved to play that rôle.

After two Southeast Asian tours, Premier Kishi explained the reason why he was interested in undertaking effective economic measures for the region. He said:

I was deeply impressed upon seeing at first hand the earnest efforts being made in these Southeast Asian countries for the attainment of their national aspirations. However we should bear in mind that the nationalistic movements in this area which are banded together under the banner of anti-colonialism, are liable to be easily utilised for propaganda by international communism and that this is due in large part to the weak economic basis in these countries and to the low standard of living of their peoples.

It is because of this fact I devoted considerable efforts for the early settlement of the Indonesian reparations problem which had been

pending for a long period of time and have advocated the prompt adoption of various measures designed to aid in the economic development of Southeast Asia. (9)

Kishi contended that the material progress of Southeast Asian countries constituted a "challenge as well as an opportunity. Japan as a nation of Asia has deep sympathy for the aspirations of Southeast Asian countries to prosperity and progress." (10) He stated that the economic development of Southeast Asia had a direct bearing on the peace of the world and that adequate measures had to be taken to ensure the former. This was the central theme of his Southeast Asian Development Plan. He declared:

It is my firm conviction that the peace of the world cannot be established without the development of the economies, and the enhancement of the living standards in Southeast Asian countries. Japan desires, therefore to contribute as much as possible to that end. This is the basic idea underlying the plan. (11)

One of the primary aims behind the Southeast Asian Development Plan, apart from its anti-Communist objective, was to rationalize the method of economic aid. Kishi believed that the present method of American aid on a bilateral and project-to-project basis was faulty besides being inadequate. He believed that under the project-to-project scheme, the Americans would "inevitably have their hands in the individual development programmes of aid receiving countries". Such a method, he thought,


was "incompatible with the sentiments of Southeast Asia". (12) Kishi therefore aimed at formulating a plan which would facilitate aid by making it more flexible and at the same time respect the national sentiments of Southeast Asian nations. The Southeast Asian Development Plan proposed by him was to be formulated with the financial contributions of the United States and the other "free" nations which wished to join it. Unlike the other American aid plans, which examined each project before granting aid, the Kishi Plan was aimed at eliminating such conditions as "tie up the hands" of the recipient countries. It was also aimed at providing the long-term, low-interest capital needed for the economic development of Southeast Asian countries. Funds were also to be made available for the purchase or sale of certain primary products of the area for the purpose of adjusting their demand and supply. It further envisaged the setting up of a Trade Fund to give short-term credits for the import of necessary commodities. It also contemplated the establishment of a technical training centre for extending technical assistance. (13) Kishi wanted the Plan to be organized jointly by the donors and the recipient countries. He claimed that the Plan had been inspired by the highest idealism to "promote the economic development of Asian countries". He called it "an Asian edition of the World Bank". (14)


13. See the details of the Plan given by the Japanese Embassy in Manila, Manila Times, 3 December 1957. See also "Ajia Keizai Kaihatsu Kikin", Waga Gaiko no Kinkyo 1958, p. 38.

(a) **Failure of the plan.** Unfortunately the Kishi Plan came to nothing although Kishi personally sought the support of Southeast Asian countries during his visits. The first and foremost reason for its failure was the lack of support from the United States. From the nature of the scheme, it was obvious that its success depended upon American financial support. But American statesmen were not very enthusiastic about the Plan as they were not hopeful of the Southeast Asian support for it. (15) As Takasaki Tatsunosuke, an influential member of the Kishi Cabinet, said, Kishi's idea of implementing the Southeast Asian Development Plan faced much difficulty as it entirely depended upon US funds. (16) A second reason for its failure was that its details were not properly worked out and publicized. There was much truth in what a commentator wrote:


Professor Yamamoto Noboru also shares the same view. He says, "In regard to the Kishi Plan for an Asian development fund, it will become more acceptable when it is examined and modified to come under the U.N. sponsorship than when Japan tries to make it a reality with help from only a few countries." See "Problems of Regional Economic Cooperation and Common Market in Asia", Asian Affairs (Tokyo), vol. 2, no. 3, September 1957, p. 245.
The well-advertised 'Kishi Plan' for an Asian Development Fund was formulated and announced before the details had been worked out, and without taking precaution and consulting either with the countries it was intended to benefit, or with the US which it was hoped would provide the bulk of the funds. (17)

Yet another reason for the failure of the Plan was the utter lack of enthusiasm on the part of Southeast Asian countries themselves because of their memories of the pre-war Tojo Plan. (18) Both Indonesia and the Philippines shared this view in varying degrees. Indonesia on the whole remained indifferent to the Kishi Plan.

The Indonesian reaction found expression in an editorial of the Times of Indonesia written on the eve of Premier Kishi's visit to Jakarta. It stated:

If Mr. Kishi is coming here to practise some Japanese chicanery on us, he is wasting his time, for we will have none of it. If he is coming to sell us 1957's refurbished edition of the Japanese coprosperity sphere in the garb of an Asian Development Fund, there will be no takers in Indonesia. Let us not mince words. We do not trust Japan, and anything that bears the label of 'Made in Japan' is suspect. We are being brutally frank, because we do not want Mr. Kishi to come here under any sort of illusion. (19)


18. Japanese Deputy Prime Minister Ishii Mitsujirou, who attended the Colombo Plan meeting in Saigon in the last week of October 1957, explained the Plan to Asian countries. He later stated that Asian countries were not enthusiastic about the Plan and that some countries like the Philippines suspected it as an attempt to revive the doctrine of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan Times, 1 November 1957. See also Hessell Tiltman, "Japan's Role in Southeast Asia", Asahi Evening News, 28 September 1957.

The reaction of the Philippines to the Plan was very vocal. The Filipinos regarded it as "suicidal to the Philippine interests". Their objection to the Plan was based on four considerations.

First, it was based on the fear that the Kishi Plan would make the Filipinos Japan's "economic vassals", and that Japan had now taken to a policy of peaceful economic penetration and expansion. A Filipino writer commented:

Today Japan is again in search of colonies. But instead of employing armed might as before, Japan will now use... her higher level of technology and industrial strength on the less developed regions of Asia. But the end result will be as though she had sent out armies and navies, and set up colonial administrations in these territories.

The majority of the Filipinos could not easily reconcile themselves to a plan in which Japan would take an active part. This was reflected in the opinion of a Filipino journal: "Before the Philippines can be made to join the Japan-led movement for economic uplift or any movement where Japan's hand will be seen, she must first have to be satisfied that the Japanese can be trusted." (22)

Second, the Filipinos believed that they could always rely on American assistance for their needs. This, they thought, would make economic assistance from Japan needless. Thus the Manila Times


wrote: "If credits and technical men are what we need, we can always turn to the traditional American source, or even European source without exposing ourselves to commitments that would mean pledging our natural resources as *quid pro quo.*" (23) There were also critics who argued that the Kishi Plan was nothing more than a subsidiary of the American fund. Senator Recto, for instance, alleged that the United States was helping to restore Japan "at the cost of sacrificing America's true allies in the Far East, because she needs a strong Japan as counterpoise against communist China". He put it bluntly that "what Japan had failed to accomplish by force of arms, she expects to achieve now this time under American auspices, the objective of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere through economic penetration of underdeveloped countries". (24)

Third, the Filipinos considered the Kishi Plan inadequate. The Philippine Foreign Secretary, Serrano, contended that the Kishi Plan could not fulfill the economic requirements of Southeast Asian countries which had deficit budgets. (25)

Fourth, the Filipinos were eager to form an economic bloc with other Southeast Asian nations. This desire became more and more manifest after Tunku Abdul Rahman's visit to Manila in January 1959. The Philippines and Malaya took the lead in formulating a


scheme of regional co-operation for Southeast Asia. (26) During the negotiations, the Philippines seemed bent on keeping Japan out of any regional association. This was perhaps due to the fear that Japan, once allowed in, would naturally assume its leadership. (27)

(b) Criticism of the Japanese Socialists. The Kishi Plan came in for criticism from certain Japanese opposition parties, especially the Socialist Party. The Socialists, while welcoming Kishi's interest in the region, strongly questioned the validity of his idea of promoting Japan's involvement in the region by utilizing American capital. They argued that Japan should not act as an "intermediary" for introducing American capital into the region. (28) The Socialist leader, Asanuma, said that the Kishi Plan resembled Japan's pre-war policy in the region in so far as it neglected her immediate neighbours and clung to the friendship of distant nations. He said that just as Japan had discharged the functions of a sentinel for Britain in Asia during the first two decades of this century, she again wanted to play the rôle of an "agent" for American expansion in Southeast Asia. He therefore urged Kishi to give up his "servile American policy" and to adopt

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26. For details, see J.L. Vellut, The Asian Policy of the Philippines (Canberra, 1965), pp. 57-61. It was only in August 1961 that the Association of Southeast Asian States was formed with the membership of the Philippines, Malaya and Thailand. See Yamamoto Noboru, "Technical Aid Best Form of Cooperation", Asian Affairs, January 1961, pp. 34-36.

27. Antara (Jakarta), 7 April 1960, p. 4. See similar views of Foreign Secretary Felixberto M. Serrano, Manila Times, 4 March 1958.

an "independent and peaceful policy" towards the region. (29) The Socialists further believed that the Kishi Plan was bound to fail because of the "deep pre-caution" being shown by Southeast Asian countries. (30)

**Economic diplomacy**

The second objective of Kishi's Southeast Asian Policy was to promote the economic diplomacy enunciated earlier by Yoshida. The central theme of this policy was to normalize economic relations with all countries and obtain the maximum benefits. (31)

As a part of this programme, Japan wanted to conclude treaties of amity, commerce and navigation with as many countries as possible. The earliest such attempt in Southeast Asia was made with the Philippines.

(a) **Trade protocol** At the time of the normalization of relations in May 1956, Japan and the Philippines expressed their desire to enter into negotiations for concluding a comprehensive treaty of amity, commerce and navigation. (32) After the normalization of relations, Japan continued to press for the starting of negotiations for putting on a permanent basis matters like trade and visa. But the Philippines was not inclined to

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30. Ibid.


enter into a comprehensive treaty and was only prepared to enter
into a provisional trade protocol. (33) The actual negotiations
for a trade protocol started in May 1957. The negotiations were
long and protracted. The major reason for the prolonging of
negotiations was that Japan wanted the Philippines to include the
most-favoured nation clause in the protocol. The Philippines was
not agreeable to that because of the special economic relations she
had with the United States. She further felt that the inclusion of
such a clause would tend to give the protocol the character of a
treaty which would have to be ratified by the Philippine
Congress. (34) On account of this deadlock, the prospects of a
trade protocol appeared dim. (35) In the meantime, the provisional
trade and financial agreement signed between the Philippines and
the SCAP in May 1950 and subsequently renewed periodically, expired
on 1 August 1957. As Japan was not inclined to renew it, trade
between the two countries was put on a cash basis. (36)

The negotiations for a trade protocol, however, continued,
but it was not until Japan agreed to shelve the most-favoured-
nation clause that its prospects brightened. A joint statement
issued by the Japanese Ambassador, Yukawa Morio, and the Philippine
Secretary, Serrano, on 17 September stated that any consideration of
the most-favoured-nation clause would "involve rather lengthy

33. "Furippin to no nyugoku....", n. 32.
34. Official Gazette (Manila), 30 June 1957, p. ccxciv.
36. "Nippi boeki ni kansuru kokanshokan no choin", Waga Gaiko
no kinkyo 1958, p. 97.
discussion and preclude thereby early conclusion of a Trade Protocol" and that the Japanese Panel "consented to shelve the said proposal for the time being...". (37) The exclusion of this clause facilitated the negotiations, and the trade protocol was finally signed on 7 January 1958. (38) By this protocol, Japan and the Philippines agreed to follow the principle of non-discrimination in regard to import procedures and regulations, as well as customs duties and other formalities connected therewith. The principle of non-discrimination was, however, not to apply to the benefits accorded by the Philippines to the products of the United States, as well as to those accorded by Japan to the products of the areas mentioned in Article 3 of the peace treaty. They also agreed to establish a joint committee to be convoked in Tokyo and Manila once in three months for the implementation of the agreement. They further stressed the desirability of concluding an overall treaty of amity, commerce and navigation with a view to putting the trade on a more permanent basis by way of providing for the most-favoured-nation treatment on such matters as customs duties, entry and sojourn of nationals and business activities. (33)

37. Japan Times, 18 September 1957.

38. Besides securing the exclusion of the most-favoured-nation clause, the official visit of Premier Kishi to the Philippines in December 1957 greatly improved the prospects of a protocol being signed between the two countries.

(b) Visa question. Yet another problem related to travel visas of Japanese visitors to the Philippines. After the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1956, the Japanese Government thought that it would be necessary to formulate the procedures with regard to the travel and stay of Japanese businessmen in the Philippines. As there was no immediate prospect of an overall treaty of amity and commerce, it was thought necessary to make a provisional arrangement, and with this aim, negotiations were started. (40) As in the case of trade protocol, the negotiations proved difficult and were often marred by mutual bickerings. In August 1957 Manila alleged that Japanese businessmen were utilizing transit visas to facilitate their entry into the Philippines with no actual "bonafide intention on their part to proceed in transit", and were staying on by renewing their visas. (41) There were also reports that Japanese businessmen were indulging in "illegal" activities. The Government of the Philippines also alleged that those dealing in logs seemed to lead a "high style" of living even "without subsidy from their home office in Japan". This led to an investigation by the Philippine Government into their activities. (42) The Japanese Government protested against the investigation on the ground that it was a "violation of international courtesy". (43) This was followed by certain indications that the Japanese Government was

40. "Furippin to no nyugoku....", n. 32, p. 53.


42. Japan Times, 16 April 1957.

43. Japan Times, 24 April 1957.
contemplating retaliatory measures. (44) In October 1957 there were complaints that the Japanese accorded "shabby" treatment to some Filipino visitors. It was alleged that certain Filipino businessmen who went to Japan in a French ship, "S.S. Laos", were given humiliating treatment. (45) In the same month, the Philippine Government restricted the travel of its citizens to Japan only to "official business and exceptionally meritorious cases". (46) Despite these incidents, the talks for a settlement of the visa problem were continued. In November 1957, the Philippine Foreign Secretary, Serrano, hinted that the Philippines would like to limit the number of Japanese businessmen to 200 and the duration of their stay to six months. (47) When Prime Minister Kishi visited Manila in December 1957, he discussed this issue with President Garcia. (48) It was, however, only on 24 July 1958 that Japan and the Philippines reached an agreement. The agreement provided that not more than 350 Japanese travellers could visit the Philippines annually and stay for a period not exceeding six months in the initial period with a possible extension for another six months. The accord enumerated a number of groups which were excluded from

46. **Japan Times**, 12 October 1957.
47. **Japan Times**, 25 November 1957. The Japanese Government rejected this and wanted a greater number and a longer duration.
the numerical limitation of 350. (49) It also ensured "treatment not less favo-
urable than that accorded to nationals of any third country" in matters like travel facilities and customs inspection. (50)

(c) Air accord Yet another important development was the agreement the two countries reached on air services on 2 March 1959. By this agreement Japan agreed to allow the Philippines to operate air services on the commercial air route between Tokyo and Manila. (51)

(d) Treaty of Amity and Commerce Japan and the Philippines had agreed in 1956 to conclude as early as possible a treaty of amity, commerce and navigation between them. They were not, however, able to start negotiations till the first quarter of 1960. On 17 February 1960 they reached an accord by which they agreed to initiate negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty. (52) But the negotiations which started soon after did not result in any agreement during the Premiership of Kishi. In December 1960, after many vicissitudes, an agreement was reached and a treaty was signed. The treaty, however, became a subject of great political controversy in the Philippines, and it has not yet been ratified by the


50. Article 6, ibid., p. 30.


Philippine Congress, even though it was ratified by Japan long ago. The main reason for this is the fear that the treaty would open the door too widely for Japanese goods and businessmen and that Japan would ultimately dominate the economy of the Philippines. (53)

(e) Indonesia. Like the Philippines, Indonesia tacitly agreed with Japan at the time of the normalization of relations in January 1958 to open early negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty of amity, commerce and navigation. (54) But the expected treaty did not materialize despite Kishi's eagerness in that regard. (55)

Mutual exchange of visits

A third objective of Kishi's Southeast Asian policy was to promote better relations by encouraging an exchange of visits. (56) He was the first post-war Japanese Prime Minister to


54. See the treaty of peace between Japan and Indonesia, Article III(a), Contemporary Japan, vol. 25, no. 2, April 1958, p. 304.

55. It was only during the time of Premier Ikeda that negotiations were started, and the treaty of amity and commerce between Japan and Indonesia was signed on 21 July 1961. See Contemporary Japan, vol. 27, no. 2, March 1962, pp. 358-61.

undertake two extensive tours of the region. (57) His visits to
Indonesia and the Philippines produced far-reaching results. The
immediate result of his visit to Indonesia in December 1957 was the
settlement of the reparations question which had been hanging fire
since 1952. Similarly his visit to the Philippines opened what
President Garcia called "a new era of closer friendship and more
sympathetic understanding between the Filipinos and the
Japanese". (58) His visit to Manila immediately brought about an
agreement on a trade protocol. He discussed with Garcia the
problems that strained the relations between the two nations.
The net result of Kishi's visit to Manila, wrote the Philippine
Foreign Secretary, Serrano, "was a dramatic thaw in the relation­
ship between the Filipinos and Japan followed by successful
efforts to liquidate many vexing diplomatic questions which, in
the past, had severely tried the statecraft of both countries". (59)
Both President Sukarno and President Garcia paid official visits to
Japan and were received warmly by the Japanese Government.

57. During May-June 1957, Kishi visited Burma, India, Pakistan,
Ceylon, Thailand, and Taiwan. During November-December
1957, he visited Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaya,
Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand. There was much
popular support for Kishi's Southeast Asian tours. See
4 articles in Mainichi Shimbun, 11, 12, 13, 14 May 1957.
Tokyo Shimbun published three articles by Socialist leader
Wada Hiroo, Conservative member Aoki Kazuo and business
leader Fujiyama, "Kishi shusho no Tonan A homon ni
nozomu", 3, 4, 5 May 1957. The Sankei Jiji Shimbun brought
out four articles, "Tonan A to Nihon", 10, 12, 14, 15 May
1957.

58. Garcia's speech at the dinner in honour of Premier Kishi
on 6 December 1957. Official Gazette, 15 December 1957,
p. 8530.

59. "PI Foreign Secretary Notes Improved Relations", Japan Times,
1 December 1958.
Besides, Japan also sent a number of trade and cultural delegations to the Philippines and Indonesia. While these delegations undoubtedly improved mutual relations, there was an element of reserve always noticeable on the part of the Philippines and Indonesia. (60)

POLICIES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND INDONESIA

From the above analysis, it is clear that both the Philippines and Indonesia pursued a policy of caution towards Japan in the economic field. Both were anxious to make use of the economic benefits that Japan offered, but they were at the same time careful to keep Japan in a position from where she could not exert undue pressure. The non-ratification of the treaty of amity, commerce and navigation by the Philippines, the coolness of Indonesia to such a treaty and the failure of the Kishi Plan were all instances in point. But this factor did not deter them from trying to improve their relations with Japan.

Philippines

The Nacionalista administration, which followed that of President Quirino in 1954, continued Quirino’s policy of seeking

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60. An economic mission led by Konishi Hideo in February 1957 to Manila included a military general who served in the Philippines during the war. The presence of Yanase Shochi in the Philippines at once provoked a controversy. The Filipinos demanded the immediate return of Yanase to Japan. See Manila Chronicle, 7, 8, 9 February 1957. In the Philippines, anti-Japanese feelings of the people had considerably lessened with the passage of years. In the earlier years (1950-53), Japanese visitors, including official representatives, were given police protection. But later, such intense feelings were not discernible. Nevertheless, anti-Japanese feelings did not completely disappear. This was clearly stated by Kishi soon after his return from Manila. See Asahi Shimbun, 8 December 1957.
friendship with Japan. The credit for continuing this policy goes to Presidents Magsaysay and Garcia, who wanted to keep clear of the emotions that affected Japan-Philippines relations. President Magsaysay wanted to establish closer relations with Japan. In his message to the people of Japan in May 1956, he observed:

The reparations agreement has been brought about by the desire of the Japanese Government and people to write finish so to speak, to the unhappy memories of the past, and to start out anew on a relationship of friendship and fruitful association with the Filipino people. While it is impossible materially to repay us for the losses we suffered during the war, I wish to assure you that the Filipino people appreciate the invitation to a new friendship symbolised by your reparations commitment. We appreciate the invitation and we accept it and we shall strive to keep alive and burning a new spirit of mutual understanding between our two peoples. We shall do this together with you, not only for the sake of our two countries which shall mutually profit from a renewal of political, commercial and other relations, but also because we wish to contribute to peace and stability in this part of the world. (61)

President Garcia, who succeeded Magsaysay in 1957, also pursued the same policy. He declared: "My administration is committed to a policy of friendship with our Asian neighbours. I have taken and will continue to take positive steps toward the realisation of this policy. My trip to Japan last December was made in pursuance of this objective." (62) He believed that Japan could serve Asia in three important ways. First, he wanted Japan to "lay down a completely new foundation of good relations with all Asia, so bold


and so imaginative that it will be a courageous answer to the challenge of our troubled times". (63)

Second, Garcia wanted Japan to "help protect Asia from the menace of the new imperialism that threatens the entire world. Japan will earn the gratitude of all Asians by assisting in protecting Asia from this spreading terror". (64) He contended that geographical proximity and ideological affinity had brought both Japan and the Philippines together and that they had to play "active roles" in the cause of Southeast Asian security. It was for this reason that he wanted to lead his "people in the writing of a new chapter in Japan-Philippines relations, one that shall be characterised by cordiality and friendship". (65) He told the Japanese:

As neighbours, we can be good neighbours; as fellow Asians, we can be friends; as believers in democracy and freedom, we can cooperate with others to develop a new and greater Asia liberated from all colonialism living in freedom and marching forward to new goals of progress, prosperity and contentment. (66)

Third, Garcia wanted Japan to "lead in an Asian renaissance", and to share her technological and industrial development with other Asian nations "not as conqueror and exploiter, but as an enlightened and sincere friend". (67)

64. Ibid.
66. Speech before the Japanese Emperor, n. 63, p. 552.
67. Ibid.
The policy of the Indonesian Government was also more or less on the same lines. But it lacked the ideological content that Garcia wanted to inject into Philippines-Japan relations. Like Garcia, Sukarno however, wanted greater co-operation between Japan and Indonesia. In his message to the people of Japan delivered to a group of Japanese journalists who visited Indonesia in 1959 as his guests, he declared:

Anxious to encourage and deepen ... valuable friendship, I will never lose any opportunity to increase our mutual understanding. The visit of the journalists is one such step, and I greatly hope that it will be followed by other contacts between our nations, not only in the political and economic fields, but also in the fields of culture and literature. In this way, invaluable political and economic cooperation will have a truly sound basis among our people. (68)

There were already certain trends towards better understanding between the two countries. During 1955-56, when the admission of Japan into the United Nations was considered by the General Assembly, Indonesia supported it and offered to render her "fullest cooperation" for Japan's admission. (69) In January 1958, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Fujiyama, made a proposal to his Indonesian counterpart, Subandrio, for the convening of a conference of Asian Foreign Ministers in order to alleviate tension in the world. Though nothing positive came out of this proposal, Indonesia supported it. (70) Similarly, during the first half of

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1958, Indonesia was troubled by a number of rebellions, and the Indonesian Government feared that the rebels were encouraged by certain foreign elements. At that time, Premier Djuanda wrote to Kishi explaining the immense difficulties caused by the "intervention of the foreigners" on behalf of the rebels. Kishi expressed his deep sympathy with the Indonesian Government but stated that the Indonesian problem should be solved by the Indonesians themselves and that

If any foreign country interferes with your domestic trouble, it is likely in the light of the current world situation that it might give rise to serious international complications of such magnitude as would retard the settlement of the trouble in your country and even endanger the peace of Asia and the world at large. (71)

Despite these developments, the ideological differences between Indonesia and Japan proved to be an obstacle in the forging of better and closer relations between the two countries. In the following pages, the Japanese stand on the West Irian question is discussed to show how the difference in ideology affected the relations between the two countries.

JAPAN AND WEST IRIAN

Successive Japanese Governments since 1952 had stressed that friendship with the Western bloc, closer co-operation with Asian countries, and faith in the United Nations were the three cornerstones of Japan's foreign policy. (72) It was repeatedly explained that there was no contradiction between Japan's membership


of the Western bloc and her friendship with Asian countries. (73) But in practice, Japan found it difficult to take a categorical stand on certain colonial issues, which meant taking sides in the disputes between the Western Powers and Asian States. (74) This became evident from Japan's attitude towards the West Irian question. Her failure to support the Indonesian cause categorically, embittered the Indonesians. The bitterness of the Indonesians was all the greater because other Afro-Asian countries like India, Ceylon, Burma and Pakistan extended categorical support to Indonesia.


74. It is worth recalling the words of Kase Toshikazu, who clearly explained Japan's position vis-à-vis certain colonial issues involving Asia. He said, "More delicate is perhaps our position vis-à-vis questions that involve the interests of the Asian-African group. We are a member of that group, and do share its legitimate ambitions and aspirations. Therefore it should be our policy to promote them vigorously. But in such matters as anti-colonial issues - for example Algeria and West Irian - it does not conduce to the real interests of the group if we help precipitate a conflict between the parties concerned. Difficult though it is, we must counsel moderation and exercise patience with a view to achieving an amicable solution. We understand the depth of oriental emotion. We also understand the complexity of occidental thought. This is probably our advantage in serving the cause of understanding between the orient and occident. However this requires courage and wisdom - courage not to be daunted by seemingly insuperable obstacles, and wisdom that inspires the Security Council into taking a broad humanistic view of international affairs." See a special article by Kase Toshikazu, Japan's representative in the United Nations, "Entry into the Security Council", Asahi Evening News, 2 October 1957. See also Nakamura Ko, "Japan's Role in the U.N.", The Japanese Annual of International Law 1959, no. 3, p. 93; and Ambassador Sato Naotake, "Japan among the United Nations", Contemporary Japan, vol. 29, no. 1, September 1957, pp. 1-15.
Japan's attention to the West Irian question was drawn for the first time in the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in April 1955. The Bandung Conference formed a watershed in the history of the West Irian problem. Though this issue had been a major bone of contention since 1949, it did not assume the nature of a global problem till 1953. During the earlier period (1949-53) it was an issue primarily falling within the framework of Netherlands-Indonesia relations. But after 1953, as Robert C. Bone says, "it increasingly assumed an international character as one of the prime examples of East-West conflict over the colonial issue". (75) The Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, which took over power in 1953, was determined to raise the Irian issue far above the level of a mere conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands. In 1954, the question was raised and discussed in the United Nations. The Indonesian Government stressed that the West Irian issue was essentially a colonial question, and went all out to enlist the support of the newly emerging Afro-Asian States. (76) In December 1954, when the Prime Ministers of the Colombo Powers met at Bogor, they unanimously supported the Indonesian claim to West Irian. (77) When the Afro-Asian Conference was convened in April 1955, the participating countries knew that Indonesia would seek their support to her claim to West Irian. (78) The final resolution

76. Ibid.
of the Bandung Conference "supported the position of Indonesia in the case of West Irian" and urged the Netherlands Government to "reopen negotiations as soon as possible". (79) Japan was a party to the resolution and was therefore deemed to have lent her support to the Indonesian claim. That Japan supported the Indonesian claim at Bandung was clearly admitted by the Japanese delegate in the United Nations, Miyazaki. (80)

At the 11th Session of the UN General Assembly, the West Irian question came up for discussion, and the Assembly considered a resolution sponsored by thirteen nations. This resolution called upon the President of the General Assembly to appoint a good offices commission consisting of three members with a view to assisting in the negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands for a peaceful solution of the question and urged the commission to report to the Assembly. (81) Japan supported the resolution and stated: "It is indeed distressing that these two countries have disputes over the issue of West Irian. The issue has persisted since the separation of the new Republic from the Netherlands. We have every reason to hope that the two countries will promptly come to an agreement." She warned that the issue, if unsettled, would "jeopardise the maintenance of peace and tranquility in Southeast Asia and


80. Miyazaki's speech in the UN General Assembly, GAOR, mtg 907, 21 November 1957, p. 211.

81. See the resolution in GAOR, Agenda Item 63, session 11, Question of West Irian, p. 3. See also "Kokusai rengo ni okeru katsudo. Nishi Irian mondai", Waga Gaiko no Kinkyo 1958, p. 30.
consequently in the whole world". (82)

At the 12th Session of the General Assembly, however, Japan's stand on the question turned neutral. She made it clear that though she had supported the Indonesian claim in the Bandung Conference, she no longer regarded the issue as purely colonial in nature. Miyazaki, the Japanese delegate, said:

The problem of West Irian, however, was not a mere colonial issue; it had arisen in the process of readjustment after the Second World War in the attempt to bring about some balance between divergent interests. Its origin was to be found in the divergent interpretations of the charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty, a divergency which might have been inevitable because the charter was a product of compromise. (83)

While Japan expressed her "deep sympathy" for Indonesian national feelings, she refused to agree with Indonesia that West Irian already constituted the "most eastern part of the Republic of Indonesia". (84) To accept the Indonesian claim, she argued, "could be construed as prejudging the results of negotiations". (85) She

82. See Japanese delegate Sawada's speech at the 11th Session, GAOR, First Committee Meeting, mtg 859, 25 February 1957, p. 292.

83. Miyazaki's speech, n. 80, p. 211. Article 2 of the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty laid down that "in view of the fact that it has not been possible to reconcile the views of the two parties over New Guinea", the status quo of that territory would be maintained "with the stipulation that within a year from the date of transfer of the sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia, the question of political status will be determined through negotiations between the USI and the Netherlands". But this Article 2 of the 1948 agreement later became controversial on the point of the one-year period. See Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (London, 1960), p. 239. Also Leslie H. Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch (London, 1962), pp. 111-24.

84. See "Kokusai rengo ni okeru katsudo", n. 81, p. 30.

85. Miyazaki's speech, n. 80, p. 211.
supported a nineteen-nation resolution in the General Assembly urging resumption of negotiations between the two countries with the assistance of the United Nations. (86)

The neutral stand of the Japanese Government became more and more manifest as the West Irian crisis deepened. When, in December 1957, the Indonesian Government seized Dutch property in Indonesia, the West Irian problem indeed assumed a serious proportion. (87) The seizure of Dutch property created serious problems especially for inter-island shipping. The Jakarta Government approached Japan for a loan of ships to replace the Dutch ships. It was reported on 10 December that Jakarta had approached the Japanese Government for a loan of 45 ships, including 5 tankers and 10 big fighters. (88) But no sooner did the Indonesian Government approach Tokyo than the Dutch Government got scent of it. The Dutch Ambassador in Tokyo, Jonkheer O. Reuchlin, called on the Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama, on 16 December and discussed the Indonesian request. (89) On 17 December, Fujiyama made a statement that the Japanese Government would not accede to any Indonesian request for a loan of ships. He stated that the Japanese Government would refrain from making any commitment which might intensify the Dutch-Indonesian crisis. He, however, made it clear that the ship deal could be negotiated on a private basis between

86. Ibid.
87. See Palmier, n. 83, p. 105.
88. Japan Times, 10 December 1957.
89. Japan Times, 17 December 1957.
Jakarta and Japanese private parties. (90)

With the attitude of the Japanese Government clarified, Jakarta started negotiations with the Japan Shipowners' Association. (91) The negotiations continued for a considerable time without any results. On 23 January 1958 it was finally announced that the negotiations had failed. (92) During this period of abortive negotiations, the Japanese Government carefully kept aloof. (93)

Extension of territorial waters

Similarly, the Japanese Government did not approve of Indonesia's unilateral extension of her territorial waters in December 1957 during the West Irian crisis. On 14 December 1957, Indonesia abolished the then existing delimitation of her territorial waters based on "the concept of the islands of Indonesia as separate land areas each having its own territorial waters". In its place, Indonesia claimed control of an area of over 2,000 sq miles of sea extending from Sumatra in the west to the Indonesian


91. There were criticisms in the Indonesian Parliament about the deal. It was feared that Indonesia was placing herself at the mercy of Japan. Premier Djuanda, however, allayed this misgiving. See West Irian Liberation Campaign, statement by Prime Minister Djuanda (Ministry of Information), pp. 47-48.


93. See Fujiyama's statement. Ibid. The Socialists in Japan wanted the Kishi Government to extend full assistance to Indonesia for acquiring ships. They criticised that the Western orientation of Kishi's policies came in the way of helping an Asian nation like Indonesia. See Socialist member Azukada Kazuo's speech delivered on 1 February 1958 in the House of Representatives. 28th Session. Kampo Shugiin Kaigiroku, no. 7, p. 64.
islands adjacent to New Guinea in the east. (94)

The Japanese Government protested against Indonesia's unilateral extension of her territorial waters. In its note of protest, handed on 14 January 1958 by Ohno Katsumi, Vice-Foreign Minister, to the Indonesian Government, it said that it considered the Indonesian action as unacceptable from the standpoint of international law. It declared that it would oppose any attempt to restrict the navigation of Japanese air and sea craft in the region. (95) On 23 January, Foreign Minister Fujiyama further clarified Japan's position. He reiterated Japan's opposition to the Indonesian action, but he was careful to add that the Japanese opposition "does not mean that Japan is morally backing the Dutch in their dispute with Indonesia". (96) By this time, the neutrality of Japan had become clear, and during 1958-60, she stuck to it. (97)

Karel Doorman

But this "logical approach" was put to a severe test in 1960 when the West Irian issue reached a critical stage. In April 1960, the Dutch Government announced its intention of granting independence to the people of West Irian within a period of ten years. As a prelude to it, it wanted to give training to the people of West Irian in the art of government, and announced many measures for that purpose. (98) Indonesia reacted sharply to these developments.

94. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (Bristol), vol. 11, 1957-58, p. 16043.
98. See Palmier, n. 83, p. 127.
There were indications that she might even resort to force to solve the problem. It was reported that both Indonesia and Holland were making military preparations. These events culminated in the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries on 16 August 1960. The immediate reason for the severance of diplomatic ties as stated by President Sukarno was the proposed visit in August of a Dutch aircraft carrier Karel Doorman to West Irian waters. (99) The Dutch Foreign Ministry announced that the Karel Doorman was on a showing-the-flag visit in the Pacific and would return to the Netherlands after visiting Japan, Australia and New Zealand. (100) According to its schedule, the Dutch aircraft carrier was expected to call at Yokohama Port between 8 September and 12 September 1960.

The inclusion of Japan in the itinerary of the Karel Doorman proved to be a source of great embarrassment to both Japan and Indonesia. A major diplomatic crisis soon followed on account of differences between Japan and Indonesia in regard to the scheduled visit of the aircraft carrier to Japan. To the Japanese Government, the visit of the Karel Doorman was a gesture of goodwill on the part of the Netherlands in commemoration of the 350th anniversary of the establishment of Japanese-Dutch relations. (101) On 19 May 1960 the Dutch Government sought the permission of the Kishi Government for the Karel Doorman to call at Japanese ports.

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100. Ibid.
Although Japan welcomed the goodwill visit, she apprehended that the carrier's visit might strain her relations with Indonesia. Hence she took a "reserved attitude" towards the visit. (102)

On 28 May, Fujiyama, while commenting upon the warship's visit, declared that "no force should be used by both sides, either by Indonesia or by the Dutch". (103) When the Dutch Government sent a second request to the Japanese Government for permission for the visit of the aircraft carrier, the latter found itself in a delicate position. Though well aware of a sharp reaction from Indonesia, the Japanese Government concluded that "it could not refuse such a request from the standpoint of international courtesy and practice". (104) Before the Kishi Cabinet finally gave its approval, it fell in July. The Ikeda Cabinet, which succeeded it, formally approved the visit on 8 August 1960. (105)

The decision of the Japanese Government to permit the aircraft carrier to call at Yokohama immediately touched off a diplomatic crisis. On 23 August, President Sukarno protested that the Japanese decision was an unfriendly act towards Indonesia. (106) The Indonesian Government sent Suska, an official of the Foreign Office, to Tokyo to discuss the problem with the Japanese Government. During his stay in Tokyo, Suska met the Japanese Foreign Minister, Kosaka, and requested him to cancel the

102. Ibid.
105. Ibid. See the critical comments in Sekai, "Nihon gaiko no U turn", November 1960, pp. 276-80.
visit of the Karel Doorman. Kosaka assured him that "consideration would be given in the matter in compliance with the [sic] established international practice". (107) On 30 August, it became clear that the Japanese Government was in touch with Holland regarding the subject. (108)

There was now only one week left for the arrival of the aircraft carrier at Yokohama. Meanwhile official criticism in Indonesia mounted. On 31 August, the Indonesian Parliament passed a resolution which declared that the decision of the Japanese Government to permit the Karel Doorman to call at Yokohama was in violation of the Bandung spirit and that it might seriously impair Japan-Indonesia relations. The resolution strongly urged the Indonesian Government to take firm measures against Japan in the diplomatic and economic spheres. It appealed to the Japanese Government to cancel the aircraft carrier's visit. (109) Foreign Minister Subandrio, in a speech in Parliament on 31 August, expressed the view that the decision of the Japanese Government was contrary to the policy of friendship and tolerance that Indonesia had always pursued in her relations with Japan. He warned that if Japan failed to cancel the Karel Doorman's visit, "the Indonesian Government would face the problem as it should be and the Government hopes that the nation would be prepared to bear the consequences of the action". (110)

110. Ibid., p. 9.
It was reported that as a result of this stiff Indonesian stand, Japan had decided to take certain measures to mollify the Indonesians. These measures were (a) that the Karel Doorman would not be allowed to proceed to West Irian from Japan, (b) that it would be allowed to visit Japan with only one warship accompanying it, (c) that it would be allowed to visit only one Japanese port and (d) that no official welcome would be accorded to it. (111)

But these measures did not soften the Indonesians.

Even inside Japan, there was much public criticism. The Leftists were particularly severe in their criticism. The Socialist Party declared that the decision of the Japanese Government to permit the Karel Doorman to call at Yokohama was tantamount to supporting "Dutch colonialism" and hence contrary to the wishes of the Afro-Asian countries. It therefore urged the Government to cancel the aircraft carrier's visit. (112) The Communist Party, the Sohyo, the Zengakuren and the Japan-Indonesia Society were all against the Japanese Government's decision. (113) The Sohyo and the Zengakuren were reported to be contemplating steps to stop the visit of the Karel Doorman by force. (114) The Japanese Press also was very critical of the Government's policy. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun wrote for instance: "It seems that the Foreign Office did not expect Indonesia to stiffen her attitude so much; but such a

111. Antara, 1 September 1960, p. 8.
112. See the statement of the Socialist Party, Asahi Shimbun, 3 September 1960.
113. See "Nihon gaiko no U turn", n. 105, p. 277.
114. Antara, 4 September 1960, p. 2.
lack of imagination is deplorable in view of the people's sentiments and the domestic conditions in the newly independent nations." (115) To many Japanese, the Karel Doorman episode appeared to be a "test case" for Japan's foreign policy. To those who thought that Japan would naturally support Indonesian national sentiments, the attitude of the Japanese Government came as a shock. There was strong resentment that though Japanese foreign policy was based on the premise that Japan was a member of the Asian community, the Government should have followed the American line. (116) There was also a feeling that the decision of the Japanese Government regarding the Karel Doorman was based on economic considerations such as improving trade relations with European countries. (117) But on the whole, the public wanted to know whether Japan belonged to Asia or to the West. (118)

Indonesian Reaction

In Indonesia, public opinion was worked up beyond all proportions. Both the Leftists and the Rightists were at one in expressing their resentment of the Japanese decision. The Communist Party, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council, the Indonesia-Japan Friendship Association and the Indonesian Peace Committee interpreted Japan's policy as one of "siding with the Dutch

117. Ibid., p. 279.
118. Ibid., p. 280.
colonialists. The Indonesian Youth Organization and the Indonesian Workers' Union not only criticized the Japanese Government, but got in touch with their Japanese counterparts, the Zengakureen and the Sohyo. The Indonesian Press was no less resentful of the Japanese Government. (119)

The Indonesian fury grew more intense after 1 September. There were demands for breaking off diplomatic relations with Japan. It was constantly reported that the Indonesian Ambassador in Tokyo, Bambang Sugeng, might leave for Indonesia at any moment. (120) By 4 September, however, there were indications that the Japanese Government was reconsidering the whole issue in the light of the tense situation. On 3 September, a Dutch Embassy source in Tokyo said that "something is being done, but the visit has not been cancelled so far". (121) Finally, the Japanese Government decided to postpone the visit of the Karel Doorman, and the decision was made public on 5 September. (122)

The decision of 5 September was actuated by a number of considerations. First, the Japanese Government knew that in the event of the aircraft carrier's visit, Indonesia "would be forced to sever economic relations with Japan or to withdraw its ambassador from Japan". (123) Second, it had come to the conclusion that the


120. See "Nihon gaiko no U turn", n. 105, p. 279.

121. Antara, 4 September 1960, p. 3.


123. Ibid.
aircraft carrier’s visit had already lost its nature of a goodwill visit. It therefore thought that the postponement of its visit would be "more consonant to the amity and interest of both Japan and the Netherlands". (124) Third, something had to be done to cushion mounting domestic pressure. As Miyazaki Akira, the Japanese Ambassador at The Hague, said: "I would not like to give the impression that this is a formidable threat or anything of that kind, but one never knows what may develop from such a situation." (125)

The delicate situation which the Karel Doorman episode created could have been avoided had the Japanese Government acted with greater imagination and foresight. Tokyo knew very well that it was a sensitive issue involving the future of Japan-Indonesia relations, and it ought therefore to have declined its permission to Holland at the very outset. By giving the permission, it only misread Indonesian feelings and placed itself in a situation where it could neither stick to its decision nor retrace its steps without losing prestige and grace. (126)

124. Ibid.
125. Antara, 1 September 1960, p. 3. This view was supported by a British source which said: "The Indonesian pressure was successful in leading to the cancellation of a visit by the Dutch aircraft carrier, Karel Doorman. The deciding factor in the case was presumably the Japanese Government’s fear of more riots at home, rather than of a trade embargo by Indonesia, which would not have been serious for Japan (though it might have spread to other nations in Southeast Asia)." Three Monthly Economic Review Indonesia (London), no. 29, August 1960.
126. The Indonesians welcomed the postponement of the Karel Doorman’s visit to Japan. See "Hearts in lieu of a Warship", Editorial, Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 7 September 1960. See also Ibid., 8 September 1960, for Press comments. It is worth noting that a second incident comparable to that of the Karel Doorman occurred in February 1962 when the Dutch sent soldiers to West Irian via Tokyo on board KLM planes. The Indonesians protested against the failure of the Japanese Government to stop the movement of soldiers via Tokyo to West Irian.
SINO-SOViet POLICIES

We have seen in the previous chapter how the policies of the Sino-Soviet bloc proved an obstacle to Japan's relations with Southeast Asian countries at the time of her attainment of sovereignty. Even after 1952, the Sino-Soviet bloc continued to criticize Japan's position vis-à-vis Southeast Asia. During Kishi's Premiership the criticism became particularly strong. This was due partly to the pro-American undertones of Kishi's policies and partly to the efforts of Kishi to forge closer relations with the Southeast Asian region. The Sino-Soviet bloc attacked Kishi's pro-American policies and the renewal of the Security Pact. (127) For instance, Premier Khrushchëv, who was on an official visit to Indonesia in February 1960, chose to attack Japan in a speech he delivered in the Indonesian Parliament. He criticized the renewal of the US-Japan Security Pact and told the Indonesian Parliament that Japan would once again "emerge with a Tanaka Plan". (128)

The Sino-Soviet bloc complained: "The Kishi Government is willing to enter into the service of the US and tie Japan more tightly to the American war chariot so as to pursue its policy of continued hostility to China and of expansion in the direction of


128. Antara, 27 February 1960, p. 2. See also the Soviet Union's criticism of Kishi's tour of Southeast Asian countries, republished from New Times (Moscow) in Asahi Shimbun, 9 December 1957.
of Southeast Asia." (129)

The Sino-Soviet bloc also attacked Japan's attempts to forge better relations with Southeast Asian countries. (130) The Southeast Asian Development Plan of Kishi was denounced as one designed to extend Japanese economic and political dominance over the region. (131) The Renmin Ribao editorially stated:

Through investments, loans and other methods, Japanese monopoly capital is trying to seize more mineral deposits and natural resources, expand Japan's economic influence and create conditions for establishing an 'Asian common market' or 'Pacific common market' under Japanese control.... However, it will not be smooth going for the Japanese reactionaries to expand into Southeast Asia ... the awakened people of Southeast Asian countries will never allow the Japanese reactionaries to do as they please. (132)

It was also alleged that Japan was supplying arms to Southeast Asian countries by way of reparations. It was stated that Japan "is manufacturing military planes for the Philippines and has sent air force personnel there to work as instructors. All this fully bears out the fact that the aggressive spearhead of Japanese militarism is in the first place directed against the Southeast Asian countries." (133)


131. A. Semynov, "Japan's Foreign Policy Today", International Affairs (Moscow), April 1958, p. 30.


133. "Japan is Being Dragged on to the Road of the Revival of Militarism", Editorial Renmin Ribao, 27 November 1969. Ibid., p. 112.
Indonesian Communist Party

The attitude of the Indonesian Communist Party was similar to that of the Sino-Soviet bloc. From the beginning, it harped upon the dangers of Japanese "militarism". (134) Later, during 1955-56, when Indonesia faced many internal rebellions, the Indonesian Communist Party accused Japan of extending armed assistance to the rebels. (135) After 1958, the criticisms of the Indonesian Communist Party became more and more intense and vocal. It accused Kishi of co-operating with the US effort to "militarise" Southeast Asia. It stated: "If in Europe, Germany and West Berlin are sources of international tension and of the most important US imperialist adventures, in Asia the US imperialists are continuing with their acts of aggression and subversion through Japan and through SEATO." (136) It repeatedly accused the Kishi Government of trying to form with US assistance a new regional security pact for Northeast Asia with Taiwan and South Korea. It said:

In complete disregard for the interests of the Japanese people, betraying the Bandung decisions, Kishi is shamelessly prepared to allow himself to be utilised by the US to lead the way in the creation of a new military pact, the NEATO, a


135. See Review of Indonesia, 1 November 1955, p. 19.

military alliance of the American imperialist states, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. (137)

The Indonesian Communist Party made a distinction between the Japanese Government and the Japanese people. While it severely attacked the policies of the Liberal Democratic Government of Kishi, it always complimented the Japanese people on their "heroism and perseverance". It said:

For three and a half years, the Indonesian people have experienced the oppression, ferocity and humiliation of the occupation of the fascist Japanese occupation army. In spite of this, the Indonesian people have never forgotten that there also existed a Japanese people that too suffered oppression and misery at the hands of the military fascists and were courageously fighting for social progress, democracy and peace. (138)

During 1959-60, when there was a massive opposition of the Leftist forces in Japan to the renewal of the US-Japan Security Pact, the Indonesian Communist Party supported it. Aidit said:

The struggle of the Japanese people against the 'Security Pact' is a struggle for peace in defence of democracy and against remilitarisation. The struggle is becoming more and more widespread.... The immediate response of the Indonesian people, welcoming the struggle shows that the Indonesian people's interests are at one with the struggle of the Japanese people against remilitarisation and against the danger of a new aggression from Japanese imperialism. (139)

137. Aidit's speech at the 7th Plenum of the CPI, 19-21 November 1958. Supplement Review of Indonesia, vol. 5, no. 12, December 1958, pp. 4-5. It is worth noting that this criticism about the NEATO was frequently raised by Japanese Socialists and Communists also.


139. See Aidit's speech at the 8th Plenum of the CPI, n. 136, p. 14.
Aidit called upon the Indonesian people to extend full support to the Japanese people whose demands "concern the interests of the peoples of Asia, including the Indonesian people". He stated:

The imperialism which the Japanese people are now resisting is the same as that which the Indonesian people are resisting namely American imperialism, the most criminal enemy of mankind, a force whose arms are now being utilised by the Dutch occupants of West Irian with the aim of attacking other parts of the Republic of Indonesia. (140)

THE FALL OF KISHI GOVERNMENT AND THE REACTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND INDONESIA

When Prime Minister Kishi announced his resignation on 23 June 1960 following violent political disturbances, the reaction of the Philippines and Indonesia varied in nature. (141) In the Philippines, the Foreign Office pursued a policy of "watchful waiting" towards the fluid political situation in Japan. The Philippine Foreign Secretary, Serrano, expressed his concern that "it does not augur well for the present balance of power in the area". He feared that "any disturbances in the present balance of power would be fraught with dark forebodings for the smaller nations". (142) Sanguine hopes were, however, expressed by certain Filipino leaders who believed that Japan would not go Communist or neutralist and that the political disturbances in Japan were directed more against Premier Kishi than against Japan's pro-Western policy. (143)


143. See the opinions of Senators Lorenzo Sumulong and Lorenzo Tanada. The Philippines Herald, 24, 25 June 1960.
In Indonesia, there was very little official reaction to the anti-Security-Pact disturbances and the subsequent resignation of Kishi. There were some demonstrations in Jakarta in favour of the Japanese students' organization, the Zengakuren, and other Japanese Leftist groups. These demonstrations were mainly organized by Indonesian students. (144) Indonesian students also issued a statement that Japanese students "have bravely pioneered the demonstration which has achieved huge success". (145) There were also critical remarks in the Indonesian Press regarding the political situation in Japan, and the American policies came in for attack. The Merdeka, for instance, regarded the anti-Security-Pact demonstrations in Japan as a "proof of the repeated blunders in the U.S. foreign policy in Asia". It stated that the US policy "stemming from an incorrect evaluation of things did not bring any improvement to American prestige in Asia". (146)

To conclude, Japan's relations with the Philippines and Indonesia during the Premiership of Kishi continued to be affected by the two trends, namely, the influence of cold-war politics and war memories. The ideological factor played a considerable part in Japan's relations with Indonesia as the latter looked at Japan in terms of her Western orientation. Though there was broad ideological agreement between Japan and the Philippines, the ideological affinity was more than offset by Filipino emotions. While both the Philippines and Indonesia ceased to entertain any

146. Antara, 18 June 1960, p. 10.
fear of a military threat from Japan, they were very conscious of Japan's economic might. Both admired Japan's rapid economic recovery, but they did not repose any "trust" in Japan. This trust, they believed, could be won by Japan only through her sincere deeds. This was fully recognized by Japanese statesmen too. To what extent Japan endeavoured to win the confidence and trust of the Philippines and Indonesia will be the subject of examination in the next chapter.