Chapter IV

RELATIONS DURING 28 APRIL 1952 - 25 FEBRUARY 1957: FIRST PHASE
A well-known Japanese writer stated in 1952:

The recent conclusion of the Japanese peace treaty has added yet another factor in international influence that affects the development of nationalism in Asia. With her possible reinstatement among the nations of the world, Japan has become more concerned over the problems of Asia. In other words, her recognition of the nationalism of her own country and of Asia has been renewed. And such a development on her part is but natural because of the fact that her rôle in Asia is an undeniable reality. (1)

The above view of the writer expressed only his optimism. In practice, Japan had to pay considerable attention to the new political and economic situation, especially in Southeast Asia, before she could make her rôle "an undeniable reality". A more objective assessment of the situation, especially in Southeast Asia, was given by Professor Itagaki Yoichi, who wrote:

The Asian attitude regarding the Japanese peace treaty is complex and subtle. If Japan does not bestow deep reflection on the thoughts and aspirations of contemporary Asia, and if Japan acts, as in the past, from the viewpoint of her own national interests, she would have to become "an uninvited guest" and virtually an "Orphan of Asia". (2)

By the time Japan regained her sovereignty, she had to face a number of problems that had a great bearing on her relations with Southeast Asian countries. (3) The first and foremost task of Japan

2. Itagaki Yoichi, "Tonan Ajia no seiji keizai josei", ibid., p. 276.
was to find "her place in the Post-War structure". (4) This was clearly stated by John Allison, the US Assistant Secretary of State, in July 1952. He stated that any examination of the future of Japan must take into consideration its strategic situation and its relationship to the present situation in Asia. It would be pleasant to ignore the question of power relationships and to consider only what would be wise and desirable from the moral, political and economic viewpoints. Unfortunately, we cannot ignore the problem created by a change in the balance of power in the Far East any more than elsewhere in the world. (5)

The "change in the balance of power" referred to by Allison lay in the new power structure that had come up in the Far East soon after the end of the Second World War. The USSR and Communist China had emerged as a formidable and well-knit ideological bloc bound together by a mutual treaty of friendship and security. Japan had lost her pre-war prestige as one of the Great Powers. The two super Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were too involved in Far Eastern politics to allow Japan to play any significant role in the near future. The power position of Japan in 1952 was well described by a Japanese writer as follows:

Japan at present has completely lost her pre-war position as one of the 'big three' or 'big five' powers. She is now a small state just recovering her independence, - an imperfect independence both politically and economically. However, what attitude she will assume towards problems arising from the existence of two conflicting worlds will be


significant not only to herself, but to the whole world situation. (6)

Two factors

While the above-mentioned power position of Japan formed the real basis on which to build up her relations with Southeast Asian countries, there were two formidable obstacles. The first was ideological in nature. The politics of the cold war had made a great impact on Southeast Asian countries like the Philippines and Indonesia, and the association of Japan with the United States was bound to affect her relations with them. Japan's close association with the United States was acceptable to the Philippines, but not to non-aligned countries like Indonesia. (7) The second obstacle was the bitterness of war memories. Neither the Philippines nor Indonesia could easily forget what she had suffered under the Japanese occupation during the Second World War. This bitterness manifested itself in the form of a fear of Japanese militarism in the initial years. But later, as years passed, and as Japan made rapid economic recovery, it was gradually replaced by a fear of Japanese economic penetration.

Cold war

The politics of the cold war affected Japan's image in Southeast Asia. Japan became a "prize" in the struggle between


the United States and the Soviet Union. We have already examined the American policy towards Japan. Now it is essential to know the policies adopted by the Sino-Soviet bloc towards Japan. An examination of the policies of the two blocs will reveal the impact of cold-war politics on Japan's post-war relations with the Southeast Asian region. As a Japanese writer rightly stated in 1952:

The contemporary Japan stands at a significant crossroad. In order to successfully confront this, it is important to grasp the doctrines of the U.S. and the Soviet Union which set the world along two camps. (8)

SINO-SOViet Policies

The Soviet Union and Communist China aimed at preventing the United States from prolonging her dominance over Japan. (9) From the beginning, they strongly objected to the American concept of peace-making. They demanded that a peace treaty should be formulated by a Four-Power conference, i.e. a conference of the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China and Britain. But the United States turned down their demand. The Soviet Union and Communist China thereupon denounced the terms of the peace treaty drafted by the United States and Britain. They endeavoured to get the treaty rejected by as many countries as possible. They tried particularly


to influence Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia, the Philippines and Burma, who were dissatisfied with certain terms of the peace treaty. They knew very well that Dulles was finding it hard to make these Southeast Asian countries reconcile themselves to the soft peace terms on security and reparations. They saw in it a good opportunity to "drive a wedge" between Southeast Asian countries and Japan, and to undo the efforts of the United States to bring Japan closer to the Southeast Asian region by means of security and economic ties. (10) They objected not only to the peace treaty, but also to the three bilateral security pacts concluded by the United States with Japan, the Philippines, and Australia and New Zealand. They alleged that the United States had in mind a separate peace treaty "for the purpose of rearming Japan and preparing a new world war of aggression for the United States Government and its satellites". (11) As for the US-Japan bilateral security pact, they stated that the Pact was "hostile toward China, and the Soviet Union, and menaces the security of those Asian states and peoples that have suffered from Japanese aggression in the past." (12) Referring to the series of bilateral security pacts, the New Times wrote in its editorial:

10. See the remarks of Takemura Tadao, "Soren no kowa kosei", Chuo Koron, October 1951, p. 38.


12. Ibid.
Again the people of Asia are faced with the threat of Japanese aggression, from which they suffered for more than half a century. Through other channels too, war is stealing upon them. Australia and New Zealand have been drawn by the American imperialists into a military bloc which is to serve as the nucleus of an aggressive Pacific Pact. (13)

The Sino-Soviet bloc in fact played upon the sufferings of Southeast Asian countries individually and pleaded for the rejection of the peace treaty. (14)

**Soviet Union and the Peace Conference**

The tactics adopted by the Soviet Union in the Peace Conference deserve special attention. She made a final effort to appeal to Southeast Asian countries to reject the peace treaty. (15)


14. To cite one instance, the anti-Japanese feelings of the Filipinos were used to oppose the peace treaty. It was stated: "No one in the Philippines has forgotten how General MacArthur returning as a 'liberator' almost immediately began to fight the Hukbalahaps and to groom the Japanese quisling Roxas for the Presidency. With these experiences, the Filipinos are under no illusion as to the future that a new alliance of Wall Street and Japanese militarism has in store for them.

No one in the Philippines forgets the devastation and atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese in Manila. Here, Dulles was burned in effigy at a mass rally. The Philippine Government, though a satellite, was driven by popular pressure to register serious reservations to the draft treaty." See C.C. Fang, "The U.S. Draft Peace Treaty with Japan Menaces all Asia", People's China, vol. 4, no. 5, 1 September 1951, p. 6.

Her opposition to the peace treaty was based on the argument that it placed no restrictions on the rearmament of Japan and contained no specific provisions on reparations. Pointing out that the national interests of Japan demanded peaceful relations between Japan and her neighbours, Andrei Gromyko, the leader of the Soviet delegation, complained that the peace treaty "goes to show that the authors of this draft are more anxious to clear the path for the rebirth of Japanese militarism and to push Japan along the path of aggression and military adventure". (16) He maintained that the peace treaty was in violation of the Potsdam Declaration and the Post-Surrender Policy Directive seeking a transformation of Japan into a peace-loving democratic state. He felt that this could be brought about only through adopting demilitarization and democratization. Demilitarization, he believed, could be brought about by vacating all foreign armed forces from Japan after the end of the occupation. But the peace treaty, while failing to achieve demilitarization, enabled the United States to march "in the re-establishment of all kinds of militarist organisations, in the construction and expansion of military, naval, and air bases in Japan and in the re-establishment of the land, naval and air forces and in the expansion and modernisation of former Japanese arsenals". (17) He, therefore, charged that the peace treaty did not contain "any guarantees

17. Ibid., p. 114.
whosoever against the rebirth of Japanese militarism, guarantees providing for the security of those countries which have suffered from aggression on the part of militarist Japan, in spite of the fact that this should be one of the principal tasks in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan". (18)

As for Japanese economy, Gromyko pleaded for its democratization. He claimed that in the past, the cause of Japanese imperialism had been promoted by an economy which served the needs of the military and that the basic resources of Japan had been directed towards the production of armaments. He therefore argued that a repetition by Japan of aggressive activities could be avoided only by incorporating in the peace treaty clauses imposing restrictions on the armed forces and the militarization of Japanese economy. Further, he pleaded that the peace treaty should place no obstacles to the development of Japan’s trade with foreign countries, because with a healthy economy Japan would be able to satisfy the just claims of Southeast Asian countries for reparations. He complained that the peace treaty did not contain anything that would secure for Japan an unhampered development of her navigation and commercial shipbuilding. He further alleged that the treaty violated the Potsdam Declaration by not including any provision facilitating Japan’s access to raw material resources. (19)

Gromyko then took up the question of reparations and appealed to the sentiments of Southeast Asian countries. He declared:

18. Ibid., p. 115.
19. Ibid., pp. 111-12.
The Draft actually ignores the legitimate claims of states that have suffered from Japanese occupation regarding the redemption by Japan for the damage that they have suffered. At the same time, providing for the redemption of losses direct by the labour of the Japanese population, it imposes a slavery-like form of reparations. (20)

In the Peace Conference, the Soviet delegation proposed a number of amendments to the treaty and contended that these amendments would be "well-liked" in the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma and India. (21) Gromyko claimed that

we have no doubt that no matter what may be the vote regarding the Soviet amendments and proposals, the Soviet proposals will find a warm welcome in the hearts of many people, and most of all, among the nations, the peoples of Asia who will understand and who will not fail to appreciate the Soviet proposals. (22)

The Soviet Union clearly perceived that there was much dissatisfaction, especially in the Philippines and Indonesia, with regard to the question of reparations. She tried to cash in on it by championing their cause. This could be seen in the amendment which the Soviet Union proposed regarding reparations. The Soviet amendment read as follows:

Japan undertakes to compensate the damages caused by military operations against the Allied or Associated Powers as well as by the occupation of territories of certain Allied and Associated Powers. The amount and the sources of payment of the reparations to be paid by Japan shall be considered at a conference of the states concerned with the

20. Ibid., p. 121.


22. Ibid., p. 340.
express participation of the nations which were subjected to Japanese occupation, namely Chinese People's Republic, Indonesia, the Philippines and Burma, with Japan being invited to the conference. (23)

The objectives of the Soviet Union at San Francisco could be summarized as follows. Firstly, she knew that Southeast Asian countries had not yet made up their minds with regard to Japan and that there was a "gap in the anti-Russian barricade of the U.S." in the region. She wanted to win over to her side countries like Indonesia and the Philippines. If that was not possible, she at least wanted them to be neutral in the conference. (24) Secondly, she wanted to isolate Japan economically from the Southeast Asian region and make her "the orphan of Asia". (25) She knew that Japan, having been deprived of the Chinese market and her former colonies, would have to look to a new region for raw materials as well as markets for her products. She also knew that the United States was planning to make Japan the "Workshop of Asia" and bring her close to Southeast Asian countries. She was, therefore, keen on thwarting the American plan by highlighting the threat posed by


25. See the remarks of Sajima Keiai and Yabe Teiji, "Soren no kowa kosei", n. 10, p. 41.
Japan thus became a "bone of contention" in the cold-war rivalry. On the one hand, the United States was interested in retaining Japan on the side of the "free world" by means of a series of security pacts, and in bringing her close to the new nations of Southeast Asia. On the other, the Sino-Soviet bloc was equally interested in weaning Japan away from the United States and Southeast Asia and in bringing her under its influence. It was under these circumstances that Japan resumed her relations with Southeast Asian countries. (27)

TWO PHASES

Japan's relations with the countries of Southeast Asia during 1952-60 had two phases. The first phase extended from

26. In this connexion, it is worthwhile to note the views of Australia expressed in the Peace Conference. The position of Australia vis-à-vis Japan resembled that of the Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries, as she had also felt the Japanese military might during the Second World War. Percy Spender, the Australian representative in the Peace Conference, said that the Soviet Union directed her remarks "principally to the nations of Asia" in order to divide them. He questioned the sincerity of the Soviet Union's concern for the security of Southeast Asian and other Pacific nations. Secondly, he questioned the right of the Soviet Union to plead on behalf of the aggrieved countries for adequate reparations since "she grabbed for her own use, with no thought for the nations she now says she desired to see compensated, countless millions of pounds of Japanese assets in Manchuria and Korea". See Percy Spender's speech in the Peace Conference, 7 September 1951. 7th Plenary Session, Verbatim Minutes, pp. 284-8.

1952 to the beginning of Kishi's Premiership, and covered the Premierships of Yoshida Shigeru, Hatoyama Ichiro and Ishibashi Tanzan. The second phase related to the Premiership of Kishi Nobusuke. The first phase covering the period from April 1952 to February 1957 was a formative period in Japan's relations with Southeast Asia. During this period, the Southeast Asian region witnessed two important developments which had a great impact on the future of the region. One was the formation of the SEATO, a military arrangement intended to stem the tide of Communism in Southeast Asia, an objective which was also a major foreign-policy goal of the Philippines. The second was the convening of the Bandung Conference, a conference aimed at expressing the solidarity of the countries of Asia and Africa, an objective which was a major foreign-policy goal of Indonesia. For Japan, both these trends carried great significance. In the following pages, the general policies of the Japanese Government towards Southeast Asia, and the reaction of the Philippines and Indonesia, are discussed.

YOSHIDA GOVERNMENT AND ITS POLICIES

The first and foremost task of the Yoshida Government was to make the aims of Japan unmistakably clear to Southeast Asian countries. Second, it was also necessary for Premier Yoshida to explain the circumstances that compelled Japan to side with the Western bloc in the cold war. This particular point had to be adequately stressed in order to mollify non-aligned Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia. Third, the Yoshida Government had also to counter the policies of the Sino-Soviet bloc and make vigorous efforts to forge closer relations with Southeast Asian countries.
The first task of the Yoshida Government in the sphere of foreign relations was to project before Southeast Asian countries a new image of Japan. It was Yoshida's intention to convince them that the "Japan of today is no longer the Japan of yesterday. We will not fail your expectation of us as a new nation dedicated to peace, democracy, and freedom." (28) Premier Yoshida knew well that the sentiments of Southeast Asian countries towards Japan were not friendly. He also knew that their attitude corresponded more or less to the attitude of European countries towards Germany at the end of the First World War. He stated that the "apprehensions that Japan might again become a menace to world peace seem to linger among the peoples who have suffered so disastrously from Japanese aggression and who have a vivid memory of the resurgence of Germany as a satanic military power under Hitler." (29) But he took pains to explain that there was no analogy between Japan and Germany. He stated:

Let me point out that there exists no analogy between Germany after World War I and Japan after World War II. Whereas the armistice of 1918 found Germany unscathed, Japan in August 1945 was a bombed and battered country of smouldering ruins. Germany possessed vast iron, coal and other natural resources, but Japan has scarcely any, and she would have to import all raw materials needed for the manufacture of munitions. Since battleships and ordnance cannot be built in secret, nor modern armies trained and maintained under cover, the Powers can easily detect any war preparations by Japan and stop them at will by simply cutting off the supply of essential commodities such as iron and steel, coal and petroleum. (30)


He expressed the determination of Japan to work for peace and save the succeeding generations from the "scourge of war". He said in the Peace Conference:

We have listened to the delegates who have recalled the terrible human sufferings and the great material destruction of the war in the Pacific. It is with feelings of sorrow that we recall the part played in that catastrophic human experience by the old Japan. I speak of the old Japan because out of the ashes of the old Japan, there has arisen a new Japan. My people have been among those who suffered greatly from the destruction and devastation of the recent war. Purged by that suffering of all untoward ambition, of all desire for the path of military conquest, my people burn now with a passionate desire to live at peace with their neighbours in the Far East and in the entire world, and to rebuild their society, so that it will in ever greater fullness yield a better life for all. (31)

He pledged that Japan would become a good member of the world community "by being first a good member of the immediate neighbourhood by contributing her full share towards its prosperity and progress". (32)

The Japanese Premier was also aware of the misgivings entertained by Southeast Asian countries, especially the Philippines and Indonesia, on the implications of Japan's re-emergence in the economic sphere. The memory of the pre-war illegal economic activities of Japan was still green in their minds. The Philippines and Indonesia made no secret of their misgivings. In the Philippines, opinion was divided on the resumption of trade with Japan. Indonesia openly stated at San Francisco that she would like to propose an amendment to the peace treaty and insist on a guarantee against

32. Ibid., p. 330.
Japan's illegal activities in international trade. (33) J.F. Dulles recognized the importance of this point and wrote in January 1952:

They [Japanese] will have the opportunity under the Treaty of Peace to make certain amends to the nations they occupied and damaged, for example, the Philippines and Indonesia. In commercial and fishing arrangements contemplated by the Treaty of Peace, and in the observance of 'internationally accepted fair trade practices', the Japanese Government and people will have ample opportunity to show that they can and will be good neighbours. (34)

Premier Yoshida therefore assured that Japan would scrupulously stand by all fair trade practices. He told the Japanese Diet:

The fear expressed by some delegates of Japanese competition after the restoration of peace is something which surprised me and which I found difficult to understand. It is unthinkable, as I stated in my acceptance speech at San Francisco, that Japan defeated in war and handicapped on all hands owing to loss of territory, scarcity of resources, war devastations of land, loss of shipping, deterioration of industrial plants and equipment, and the reparations obligations she has undertaken could ever be an economic menace to any country. As to our working conditions, we have enacted as referred to by President Truman and Mr. Dulles, labour legislation of the highest order in the world, setting up unprecedented working conditions that would have been too idealistic for the country's actual state of affairs. Again, in the peace treaty, Japan is pledged to observe all internationally accepted fair trade practices. Such being the case, it is puzzling indeed why Japan's entry into the world market should occasion any apprehension or why any restrictions should be proposed on her economic activities in the international field. (35)

He declared that Japan would strive hard to attain economic progress without causing any hindrance to other countries. He stated that

33. See Chapter II.


the Japanese people would "dedicate themselves to the task of laying the foundations for the new Japan by dint of thrift and hard work" and endeavour "to share equitably in the fruits of peace and prosperity with all countries". (36) The keynote of the Japanese peace policy towards Asia was, according to the then Japanese Ambassador in Washington, Iguchi Sadao, "enlightened statesmanship". Iguchi wrote:

I think I can speak with some conviction on this point because of the recent bitter experiences of my country. But whatever faults we may have, we Japanese are not the people who learned nothing and forgot nothing. We have learned our lesson. We have acquired the realisation that we can find our self-interest only in the common interest of the world at large, and we are anxious to make our proper contribution to that common interest.

It is in the light of this broad concept of common world interest that Japan today views her position in relation to Asia. (37)

The Japanese Government felt that it was necessary not only to state its pacifist intentions but also to counter effectively the Sino-Soviet policy of weaning Southeast Asia away from Japan. It, therefore, offered an explanation for Japan's ideological orientation towards the United States. (38) There was particular need to drive this point home to non-aligned countries

36. Ibid.
38. The Japanese Government issued on 28 April 1952 two pamphlets entitled Dokuritsu Nihon no Sekai no Ugoki and Heiwa Nihon no Anzen to Shime. The policies of the Government with regard to relations with the United States, the Communist bloc and Southeast Asia are discussed in them. The Government explained the indispensability for Japan of close friendly relations with the United States. See "Gaimusho happyo", Sangyo Keizai Shimbun (Tokyo), 29 April 1962.
like Indonesia, Burma and India. Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo said at the beginning of 1953 that the main subject of the present world was cold war or "cold peace". He therefore stressed the need to continue Japan's relations with the United States. (39)

The Yoshida Government also offered an explanation for its inability to pursue a neutral policy, like India and Indonesia. As early as 1950, it stated that Japan could not afford to pursue a neutral policy. It declared further: "We cannot please both sides in the cold war. Let us remember that an ambiguous attitude, no matter how honest, would be utilised by Communism for its own ends, and the result would be the dirge of democracy in Japan." (40)

A more forthright argument against neutralism was advanced by Foreign Minister Okazaki when he told the Japanese Diet early in 1953 that

in the world where the democratic camp and communist camp are in conflict, it is possible for nations which do not belong to either of the two camps to judge which is right and which is wrong. Furthermore, if a nation refuses to join the group which is just or to oppose the group which is wrong because of its policy of neutrality, true international justice cannot be enforced.... If a nation cannot distinguish between right and wrong, and between good and evil, that nation is not qualified to be an independent nation. It is cowardice for a nation to refuse to support the party that is in the right after reaching a decision on the question of right and wrong. Japan believes in the justness of democratic principles and therefore has determined to rise


or fall with the group of democratic nations. Japan has no intention of compromising by finding refuge in such a nebulous term as neutralism. (41)

In an attempt to counter the Sino-Soviet policy of weaning Japan away from the Southeast Asian region and also to stress the importance for Japan of her alliance with the United States, the Japanese Government stated that this alliance was actuated by considerations of self-preservation, and not by a desire to start another aggressive war, as alleged by the Sino-Soviet bloc. (42) It declared that Japan could not ignore the importance of military strength and thus run the risk of being occupied by some enemy country. Turning to the Soviet charge that Japan would once again launch an aggressive policy, Premier Yoshida declared:

Japan of today lacks the necessary basic resources of production of modern arms. And our nation would not be able to stand the levying of additional taxes for rearmament. Moreover, Japan is yet to recover from the wounds of war. We have not relaxed our vigilance over the possible revival of militarism and ultranationalism. In face of all these facts, the talk of Japanese militarism by the Soviet delegate cannot but be dismissed as a piece of absurd and groundless propaganda. (43)

Justifying Japan's alliance with the United States, Yoshida stated:


42. "Gaimusho happyo", n. 38; and Sangyo Keizai Shimbun, 29 April 1952.

Unfortunately our horizon is darkened by the menace of communism which seeks to conquer the world through insidious propaganda and infiltration and by force - by open armed aggression. That is why for protection of unarmed Japan as well as for the common defence of the Pacific, we have concluded a security pact with the United States, under which American land and air forces at our request will be stationed within and about our territory. (44)

Premier Yoshida was a staunch supporter of the concept of collective security that was drawn up by Dulles in 1951. He said that

a collective defence system is a universally adopted means to combat aggression from outside. Irresponsible militarism is still rampant. Upon her recovery of independence, an independent but unarmed Japan is obliged to seek protection in a collective defence arrangement with other nations. And to put Japan beyond the reach of aggression is one postulate to the peace of the Far East and to the peace and prosperity of the entire world. Herein lies the reason for our conclusion of a security pact with the United States. (45)

Yoshida categorically stated that he did "not know of any other means for assuring our security after the peace other than by a collective guarantee with another peace loving nation or nations - in the present case, the United States of America". (46)

The aim of the Yoshida Government was to prevent Southeast Asian countries from paying heed to the Sino-Soviet policy of keeping Japan away from that region. Premier Yoshida realized that in view of the impact of the cold war, Japan would not be able to


46. Ibid., p. 427.
trade with Communist China. The China trade, which had bulked so large in Japan's foreign trade during the pre-war years, had to be replaced by trade in a new region. It was this which made Yoshida stress the importance of Japan's trade relations with countries like the Philippines and Indonesia. As early as 1951, he wrote, "Today we have no longer any 'special influence' in China. That country itself has lost much of its production and transportation capacities during the long years of warfare. It would be a mistake to expect too much from China trade." (47) In view of this, he advocated a policy of closer relations with Southeast Asian countries. In a major policy speech in 1953, he stated:

I do not think it is necessary to dwell upon the importance of our relations with Southeast Asia, since we cannot expect much from trade with China. The Government desires to extend every possible cooperation for the prosperity of the countries of Southeast Asia in the form of capital, technique, services or otherwise, in order thus to advance further the relations of reciprocal benefit and common prosperity. (48)

Yoshida's advocacy of common action against communism

As the Sino-Soviet bloc pursued the policy of driving a Yoshida wedge between Japan and Southeast Asian countries, the Government thought it expedient to pursue a policy of driving a wedge between the Sino-Soviet bloc and those countries. It pointed out that there was a great and urgent need for Southeast Asian countries to unite and work collectively for their economic development with a view to

47. Yoshida Shigeru, "Japan and the Crisis in Asia", n. 29, p. 179.

48. Yoshida's administrative speech delivered in the Diet on 16 June 1953. See the full text of the speech, Japan Times (Tokyo), 17 June 1953.
stemming the tide of communism. In this endeavour, the Japanese Government offered to play its own rôle. Many responsible Japanese leaders advocated the idea of collective action by Japan and the countries of Southeast Asia in the economic sphere. (49) Indeed Premier Yoshida was one of the earliest to put forward this idea. He believed that the cold war had a deep impact on the developing countries of Southeast Asia, and that the destiny of the "free world" would be decided in that region. He noted that these countries were making supreme efforts to work "their way against the gravitational pull of Communist China". He declared that the whole "free world" had a "vital stake" in the progress of Southeast Asian countries. He argued, "If China's economic progress is such that she outstrips her neighbours substantially in the years ahead, the gravitational pull will be too much to resist and Southeast Asia will fall to the communists without a struggle." (50) He explained the factors that made the Chinese "gravitational pull" really strong, and pointed out how Communist China was investing massively to increase her economic potential "at a per capita: at least twice that of all current capital investment in Southeast Asia". (51) Summarizing the difficulties of Southeast Asian countries, he stated that development capital is not available on a sufficient scale within the free countries of Southeast Asia. What about foreign capital?

49. This aspect is discussed in the next chapter.


51. Ibid., p. 365.
The economic climate in the proud new nationalistic countries of the area is not at this crucial moment the kind that encourages private investment. Private investment comes later, after basic conditions have been established which bring the stability that private investors demand. But free Asia cannot afford to wait until later. (52)

He wanted a way to be found out to provide this help to Southeast Asian countries. He even advocated the setting up of an institution modelled after the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEFC). The setting up of such an institution, he said, would "mean the difference between chaos and healthy, steady progress toward solid democratic achievement". (53) Praising the European experiment, he described it as "one of the splendid examples of what can be achieved by generous and warmhearted people working with their friends in a spirit of mutual trust and realistic cooperation".

He said:

In just such a way, could the Asian nations be helped to stand on their own feet, in freedom, and to develop according to their traditions, resisting the inroads of communism. These countries have a rich and ancient cultural heritage to contribute to the free world. They must not be allowed to fail. Action less noble, less decisive than that which I have outlined will not be enough to tip the scales. There is not much time. Let us act now. (54)

What was the rôle that Yoshida assigned to Japan in his plan of saving the Southeast Asian region from the "gravitational pull" of Communist China? He said that Japan "would do everything in our power to make it succeed. As the most industrially advanced of the nations of Asia, and as Asian ourselves - we know how to fit Western techniques of human advancement to the patterns of living and local

52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., p. 366.
conditions of the East." (55) He further said that as an Asian nation, Japan understands intimately the problems of her fellow nations; we share some of these problems. All of us want a higher standard of living for our people. All of us want security and stability. All of us want to live in peace and freedom. All of us need to be truly independent and self-supporting. (56)

These policies of the Japanese Government did not receive as much sympathy in Indonesia as in the Philippines. Indonesia pursued an active and independent foreign policy, and remained

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., p. 364. In his book, Japan's Decisive Century 1867-1967, Yoshida clearly explains the lines on which the Japanese Government was thinking during 1952-54. Yoshida writes: "Another consideration prominent in our minds was the fact that the best antidote to the spread of Communism was prosperous Southeast Asia. When I visited Europe and the United States in 1954 I met Malcolm Macdonald, then the British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia. The fundamental policy of the world's free countries toward the region, I told him, should be to make a coordinated effort to hasten its economic development by contributing human and material resources. If, as a result, Southeast Asia could achieve prosperity, peace would come with it. This, in turn, would inevitably lead to an expansion of markets. Furthermore, if the populations concerned came to realise that they could make money under a free economy, but not under Communism, the overseas Chinese living in the area would disassociate themselves from communist totalitarianism; they could become instrumental in establishing communication between the people of mainland China and the rest of the human family. I often think now, in view of the close interest the United States has subsequently shown in the development of Southeast Asia, that much more could have been accomplished had the same degree of interest existed in the early 1950's". Yoshida, Japan's Decisive Century 1867-1967 (New York, 1967), pp. 88-89.

It is also worth noting that during his unofficial visit to Indonesia in December 1959, Yoshida gave expression to his anti-Communist views. In his talks with the Indonesian leaders, he called upon them to make efforts to put a halt to the "growing influence of communism" in the region. This, he thought, could be done by raising the standard of living in the region. See Antara (Jakarta), 14 December 1959, p. 1.
friendly to both the Power blocs. She was not allergic to the "gravitational pull" of Communist China and, in fact, established diplomatic relations with her. (57) But the views of the Philippines on the security of the Pacific and Southeast Asia deserve our close attention.

THE PHILIPPINES, JAPAN AND THE PACIFIC SECURITY

It has been noted in the second chapter that the post-war Philippine policy towards Japan was actuated by two considerations - reparations and security. Though the Government of the Philippines remained uncompromising on the question of reparations, it showed a measure of flexibility in the matter of security. This flexibility

57. See the views of Dr. Sunario, Indonesian Foreign Minister. Address before the Plenary Session of the 8th General Assembly of the United Nations on 18 September 1953. Indonesia and Its Foreign Policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta, 1955), pp. 26-27. Dr. Sunario stated: "There still exists the tendency toward the alignment of nations between the two major blocs through military alliances and regional groupings. While respecting the right of each nation to decide what it deems to be in its own interest, my Government in accordance with its active independent policy and with world peace as the final goal, has on many occasions emphasised the dangers involved in the trend towards the polarisation of nations. The growing reliance upon relative military strength and military alliances by the opposing forces in the cold war has resulted in a precarious equilibrium which, in many instances, tends to obscure the fundamental principles of peace upon which this organisation (U.N.O.) was founded. The mobilisation and threat of opposing military forces can lead only to increased anxiety and fear which will in turn lead to suppression of the exchange of ideas which alone can stimulate those dynamic forces required for world peace.

For all these reasons, Indonesia has decided to remain outside any such military alliances. At the same time, as a responsible member of the family of nations, it continues and furthers an active/positive policy, through peaceful means, to make world peace more attainable."
was due chiefly to two reasons. First, the Liberal Party administration under President Quirino was well aware of the changes that had occurred in the power structure of the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Being an ally of the United States, it realized that the greatest threat to the Philippines stemmed from the Sino-Soviet bloc rather than from Japan. The Huk disturbances during the initial years after the attainment of independence further strengthened this view. (58) A second reason was to be seen in the quest of President Quirino for a Pacific Union against communism. President Quirino was one of the earliest statesmen to stress the need for collective action on the part of the "free" Asian countries against the Communist threat. (59) Japan's participation in such a security organization always excited Quirino's interest.

Quirino's quest for a Pacific Union dated back to 1949. In July 1949 he gave expression to the need for a Pacific Union in clear terms. He said that the answer to the "threat of red imperialism" was a "real union of the peoples around the Pacific". (60) He declared that "some plan must be evolved to meet the impact of red


dictatorship - a new imperialism and a new slavery". (61) As for the conception of a Pacific Union, he declared that it was predicated upon the independence and sovereignty of the peoples of Southeast Asia and the countries bordering the Pacific, so that, masters of their own destiny, they can concentrate their attention to their full development as a contribution toward peace and security. I conceive this to be our greatest goal. (62)

In July 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek visited the Philippines, President Quirino discussed with him his idea of a Pacific Union. Together they "explored the possibility of bringing together the peoples of common counsel for the solution of our own internal problems and preserve our democratic institutions". (63) Their joint communiqué reiterated the need to "contain and counteract" the advance of communism. (64) It was reported that during the talks, Quirino stressed the importance of including Japan in the proposed Pacific Union because of her geographical proximity and also because Japan was facing a "distinct communist threat". But Chiang Kai-shek was not favourably disposed to Quirino's idea since he thought that Japan should wait till she got her freedom. (65)

62. Ibid., p. 256.
63. Ibid. See also Official Gazette, July 1949, p. 2797.
64. Manila Chronicle, 12 July 1949. See also Baldomero T. Olivera, "The Background of a Pacific Union", Fookien Times Yearbook (Manila, 1952), pp. 53-54.
65. Manila Chronicle, n. 64. Even as early as April 1949, President Quirino expressed the reason why he wanted Japan's membership in the projected alliance. He said, "Whether we like it or not, Japan will be our neighbour. Japan is bound to rise again, so if we can get Japan into the Pact, she will not be able to attack the Philippines, for an attack on the Philippines will be an attack against all the signers of the Pacific Pact." Manila Times, 12 April 1949.
During his visit to the United States in August 1949 Quirino discussed his idea of collective security with the authorities of the United States. (66) He reiterated that "today the most urgent problem that confronts the Philippines and the other free countries of Asia is the problem of security. It is in fact the principal problem that besets all those states that lie athwart the advancing tide of communism." (67) He stated that the advance of communism in Europe had been halted because of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He contended that the task of the "free world" would remain only "half-done" as long as Asia was exposed to communism. He told the US Senate:

Asia with its vast population which accounts for more than half that of the world and with its incalculable resources cannot and ought not to be lost to communism by default. And yet this is bound to happen unless some thing of the courage and vision that went into the forging of the democratic defences in Europe is applied to the forging of a similar system of defence in Asia. (68)

President Quirino called upon US statesmen not to "tarry too long" in redefining their attitude towards Asia, but to act promptly.

However, this idea of a union of Pacific and Southeast Asian countries did not find favour with the United States in 1949.

But the outbreak of the Korean War awakened the United States to the realities in the Pacific region. (69) It has already been


68. Ibid., pp. 271-2.

noted how the Korean War accelerated the Japanese peace treaty and also the three bilateral security pacts.

**Quirino's eagerness to normalize relations with Japan**

The conclusion of the US-Philippines bilateral security pact and the other two bilateral security pacts with Japan and with Australia and New Zealand fulfilled to some extent Quirino's idea of an overall Pacific security pact. Once the Japanese peace treaty and the US-Philippines security pact were signed in 1951, President Quirino vigorously worked towards their speedy ratification by the Philippine Senate. The efforts made by Quirino to get them ratified showed his keenness to resume normal relations with Japan.

As early as January 1952, President Quirino recommended that the Senate should consider for ratification both the Japanese peace treaty and the US-Philippines bilateral security pact. (70) Though the Senate ratified the latter, the opposition Nacionalista Party stalled the ratification of the former. (71) In July 1952, President

---


71. See *Congressional Record,* Senate, vol. 3, no. 68, 12 July 1952, p. 1162. The Quirino administration believed that the peace treaty and the bilateral security pact should be considered in a "single package" because the non-ratification of either of the two would leave the anti-Communist defence incomplete. But the opposition party refused to subscribe to this view and argued that "our refusal to ratify the Japanese Peace Treaty cannot ... be said to weaken the anti-communist defence of the Pacific because that defence does not depend even partly on Filipino-Japanese cooperation, but only on our separate individual cooperation with the United States." The stand of the Nacionalista Party was expressed by Recto that "we are voting for the ratification of this mutual defence agreement alone and with no intention of making it a part of a deal for the ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty." *Congressional Record,* Senate, vol. 3, no. 65, 7 May 1952, pp. 1048-9.
Quirino again tried to get the opposition Nacionalista Party to ratify the peace treaty. In his letter to the Senate President, Eulogio Rodriguez, he emphasized the importance of formulating a policy regarding Japan. He wanted a "courageous and manly attitude" to be taken by the Senate. (72) But his request was turned down by the Nacionalista Party. (73)

In January 1953, President Quirino in his message to the Congress once again pleaded for the ratification of the Japanese peace treaty. (74) But as the opposition Nacionalista Party, which commanded more than the requisite one-third strength in the Senate, insisted upon the settlement of reparations as a prerequisite to the normalization of relations with Japan, Quirino's attempts failed. (75) The reasons advanced by President Quirino for ratification deserve close attention.

(a) Pacific defence. The first and foremost reason was Quirino's firm belief that the normalization of relations between Japan and the Philippines would strengthen the Pacific security system. He further believed that the Japanese peace treaty was the "keystone of the structure for the security of our area" and that the three bilateral security pacts were only the adjuncts of that structure. He therefore claimed that only by ratifying the

72. Times of Indonesia (Jakarta), 15 July 1952. See also Mainichi Shimbun, 14 July 1952.
73. Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), 15 July 1952.
75. For the attitude of the Nacionalista Party, see two articles, "Hi no tainichi heiwajoyaku hijun", Mainichi Shimbun, 21 June 1952; and "Joyaku hijun e no kiun tsuyomaru", Asahi News, 21 May 1952.
Japanese peace treaty could the Philippines hope to "place itself within that plan of security and participate effectively in the coordination of the defence efforts of the countries concerned". (76)

Foreign Secretary J.M. Elizalde called upon the Senate to act on the peace treaty immediately so that Japan could become a "stabilising influence in Asia as a deterrent to further communistic imperialism". He said that if Japan, owing to harsh treatment, joined the Communist camp, she might well repeat her "past expansionist adventures in much the same way as less stronger peoples like the North Koreans have been goaded on to wage war on their peaceful neighbours not of their own free choice". (77)

**Trade** The second argument advanced by Quirino was that of trade. Foreign Secretary Elizalde pointed out that the barter trade that was entered into with the SCAP in May 1950 would expire on 28 April 1952 with the coming into effect of the Japanese peace treaty. He argued that the Philippines in fact had a favourable balance of trade with Japan and that if trade with Japan terminated on 28 April 1952, "many Philippine industries, particularly those exclusively dependent on that market will have to stop operations". (78)

---

76. Statement of the Foreign Secretary, J.M. Elizalde, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Philippine Senate, 4 April 1952, Department of Foreign Affairs Treaty Series (Manila), January 1953, p. 92. See also Yomiuri Shim bun, 5 April 1952; and Asahi Shim bun, 10 February 1953.


78. J.M. Elizalde’s statement before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 4 April 1952, n. 76, p. 93. See also President Quirino’s State of the Nation Message to the Congress, 26 January 1953. Official Gazette, January 1953, p. 41.
Besides, many Filipinos had a lurking fear that unless "free" nations like the Philippines offered trade facilities to Japan, she would turn to Communist China for greater trade. (79)

US aid Thirdly Quirino believed that the non-ratification of the peace treaty would have an adverse effect on getting aid from the United States. Elizalde pointed out that most of the aid programmes of the US Government were "integrated into the Plan of collective defence against communism". (80) He therefore feared that if the Philippines failed to ratify the Japanese peace treaty, the US Government might not show much enthusiasm about extending economic aid to the Philippines. He declared: "It would but be natural for the United States, then, to treat with more liberality those countries which are ready to identify themselves with it in matters concerning collective security than those that are not." (81)

Quirino's personality

More than the reasons enumerated above, President Quirino had adopted a policy of good neighbourliness with Japan. He maintained that Japan and the Philippines would have to live as neighbours in spite of what had happened in the past. His speech before the Philippines-Japan Youth Conference in February 1953 shows that Quirino was genuinely seeking friendship with Japan. He stated:


80. J.M. Elizalde's statement before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 4 April 1952, n. 76, p. 92.

81. Ibid.
What we need most is closer friendship, better understanding and firmer attachment. We cannot transfer the Philippines to the Atlantic Ocean, to the Indian Ocean or to Black Sea. Neither can Japan be transferred to the North Sea or South Pole. God decreed that we are neighbours. We have had misunderstandings in the past as a result of which we sacrificed lives and property, feelings of hatred and distrust were engendered; but neither the Japanese nor the Filipinos would like to bequeath to their children such feelings of bitterness and resentment. So, we do not want our children to inherit hate that had been caused by our recent sufferings at the hands of the Japanese; the Japanese people would not like either to transmit to their children the feeling of aggressiveness or cruelty to which we had been subjected in recent past. (82)

It was largely with this aim of promoting neighbourly relations with Japan that Quirino pardoned the Japanese prisoners of war in July 1953. This gesture earned him the goodwill and gratitude of the Japanese Government. (83) When he sought re-election to the


83. On 4 July 1953, 108 Japanese war criminals serving sentences at Muntinglupa prison were granted a special pardon by Quirino. By this act, those who had been sentenced to life or lesser terms were returned to Japan after release and those who had death sentences had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment to be served in Japan. On 31 July, these war criminals returned to Japan and those who had their death sentences commuted entered the Sugamo prison. The Japanese Government continued to hope for the release of the latter who numbered 52. On 23 December, shortly before relinquishing the Presidency, Quirino issued a statement that he would release them provided they never visited the Philippines in the future. The Japan Annual (Tokyo), 1955, p. 140.

Japanese Foreign Minister Okazaki called Quirino's act as one "emanating from the sublime Christian spirit as well as motivated by friendly sentiments to restore more cordial relations between the two countries". See his remarks in an article by Jose F. Imperial, Chief, Philippine Mission to Japan, "The Philippines and Japan", Fookien Times Yearbook 1953, p. 75. See also, Nakagawa Toru, Chief of the Japanese Mission in Manila, "Japan-Philippines Relations", Fookien Times Yearbook 1953, p. 74.
Philippine Presidency in 1953, friendship with Japan was one of his main election planks. (84)

The attitude of the Nacionalista Party

What were the reasons for the opposition of the Nacionalista Party to Quirino's policy? The Party refused to agree with Quirino that security was more important than reparations. It believed that the United States could take care of Philippine security and that the settlement of reparations should precede the normalization of relations with Japan. (85) Though it approved the bilateral security pact with the United States, it still expressed its sense of dissatisfaction about certain aspects of the pact. Senator Recto, the Party's "foreign policy spokesman", argued that the bilateral pact could be an adequate protection against the Communist threat. But then he pointed out that if Japan were to commit aggression, the United States could not come to the rescue of the Philippines. Senator Recto argued:

I doubt whether the U.S. will be able or will be willing to contain Japan if the latter will think of expanding itself again toward South. We must take into consideration that Japan under the Japanese Peace Treaty has lost a great part of its territories. It has lost Formosa, lost Korea, lost the Kuriles, and many other territories. It needs territories for her expanding population, and biological laws will compel it to expand toward this direction. (86)


85. See the Nacionalista Party platform for the Presidential election of 1953. Appendix A, ibid., p. 345.

Recto further argued that since the Japanese held the balance of power in Asia, they could "as the price of continued support of American cause, demand that they be allowed to develop in the Philippines and other countries of the Pacific littoral a satisfactory substitute for their lost empire in China, Formosa, Manchuria and Korea". (87)

**JAPAN AND THE SEATO**

The three bilateral security arrangements concluded in 1951 were considered by President Truman as the "initial steps" towards the development of an overall Pacific security system. (88) In 1951-52, it was considered futile to attempt an overall security pact incorporating all Southeast Asian countries. For one thing, the United States was not prepared to undertake any ambitious commitment which she would not be able to fulfil. (89) For another, countries like Indonesia and Burma were not in a mood to entertain such an idea. (90)

Nevertheless, the idea of an overall Southeast Asian security system was stressed again and again by many statesmen. (91) But it was only in 1954, following the Geneva Agreement, that the United States realized the need to set up a regional security

---

87. Ibid., p. 1054.
89. See Dunn, n. 9, p. 196.
system. (92) The SEATO was the culmination of the anxieties of the United States and her Pacific Allies to check the rise of Communism in Southeast Asia.

Japan was not included in the SEATO for obvious reasons. First, the Constitution of Japan did not provide for the maintenance and deployment of land, sea and air forces overseas. Secondly, if Japan was included, the question of including Formosa would also crop up and embarrass Britain. (93)

Though Japan was not included in the SEATO, there were suggestions to the effect that her influence should be brought to bear upon the organization. It was also expected that Japan would play a notable rôle in the economic sphere. (94) The Philippine Foreign Secretary, Carlos P. Garcia, welcomed the membership of Japan in the organization. He stated: "As there is no peace treaty between Japan and the Philippines, there is no relation between the two. But if Japan decides in future to join the SEATO, it is possible in accordance with Article 7 of the Treaty. I also desire


94. See "SEATO to Nihon no tachiba", Asahi Shimbun, 16 August 1954.

In this connexion, see MacMahon Ball's special article, "Nihon to Tonan Ajia", Sekai, October 1954. MacMahon Ball discusses the importance of Japan to the region and to the SEATO both militarily and economically. Ibid., p. 58. See also Obata Misao, "Ajia no shin josei to Nihon", Ibid., pp. 59-67.
Japan's participation." (95)

The attitude of the Japanese Government

The Yoshida Government staunchly adhered to the principle of collective security. But it systematically opposed Japan's participation in any military enterprise. On 18 June 1953, Premier Yoshida stated in the Japanese Diet that he would support the idea of creating a collective security treaty for Asia. But he made it clear that if the treaty should oblige Japan to offer military co-operation, he would oppose it. (96) Similarly, when, on 30 May 1954, Carlos P. Romulo raised the question of the Union of Asian countries, the Japanese Government extended its moral support to it. (97) Japanese Foreign Minister Okazaki stated that any alliance made for ensuring the collective defence of Asia should provide for the whole-hearted participation of all Asian countries. He declared: "The Asian must feel that in halting communist aggression,

95. See Yomiuri Shimbun, 10 September 1954. For the opinions of the Filipino Congressmen on Japan's participation in the SEATO, see Manila Chronicle, 14 September 1954.

96. Japan Times, 19 June 1953. Japanese statesmen were aware that Southeast Asian nations would not welcome any military role by Japan so soon. This was clearly stated by Conservative Party leader Ashida Hitoshi. Ashida wrote: "Any apprehensions these nations may harbour of Japan must be removed before any broadened security arrangement is achieved. To that end, a firm and convincing assurance must be given that our defence establishment will not and cannot be made the beginning of a return to a Japanese military machine patterned on pre-war models." See "Realities of Japan's Foreign Policy: The Conservative View", Japan Quarterly (Tokyo), vol. 3, no. 2, April-June 1956, pp. 148-9.

he is defending something worthwhile." (98) While the Japanese Government approved the principles behind the SEATO, it expressed its inability to join it, as the Japanese Constitution did not permit the deployment of armed forces overseas. Foreign Minister Okazaki declared in the Japanese Diet that Japan would extend her moral support to the SEATO. (99)

**Opposition of the Socialists**

Public opinion in Japan, however, did not, by and large, approve the formation of the SEATO. The opposition Socialist parties, both Leftist and Rightist, were critical of the SEATO, and opposed Japan committing herself even indirectly to the SEATO. The Left Socialists opposed the SEATO on the ground that it would divide Asia into two camps. The Leftist leader, Sata Tadataka, wrote:

> Rather than support the peace and stability of Asia, it plans to support the stability of European and American colonialism in Asia. It not only intensifies the antagonism between the western bloc and the communist bloc, but also deepens the fight between imperialism and nationalism. (100)

The Left Socialists argued that the SEATO would only help the cold war to develop into a bloody war in the region. They said that the SEATO was "anything but one which supports peace and stability; it will only lead to instability and war". (101) They demanded:


101. Ibid., p. 102.
"For the sake of peace and stability of Asia, SEATO must be dissolved. The U.S. and other foreign military bases should be dismantled and the foreign armies withdrawn." (102) They argued that the foremost need of the Asian countries was to improve their economic and cultural level, and that only security and peace among the Asian nations could promote that end. They, therefore, demanded a non-aggression pact between all Asian countries rather than a regional security pact. (103)

The Right Socialists were equally critical of the SEATO. They questioned the policy of the Japanese Government of extending "moral support" to the SEATO. They cited the example of India and Indonesia, who had opposed the SEATO. (104) They further doubted the purpose of Premier Yoshida's visit to Washington scheduled for November 1954. They asked their countrymen to be vigilant lest Japan should be "roped" into the SEATO during his visit to the United States. (105)

Apart from the Socialist parties, the attitude of the Japanese Press also was not friendly. The general feeling of the Japanese Press was that the SEATO was a military pact and that it had to be carefully examined. The military nature of the SEATO caused much disappointment to those who believed that it would lay as much emphasis on economic development as on security. It was expected that the SEATO, following the NATO, would envisage an

102. Ibid.
103. Yomiuri Shimbun, 9 September 1954.
104. See Socialist member Sone Eki's interpellation in the Diet, Asahi Shimbun, 9 September 1954.
105. Yomiuri Shimbun, 9 September 1954.
economic development programme like the Marshall Plan. Mainichi Shim bun editorially wrote: "The relation of Japan to the SEATO is a problem; if SEATO is a mere military alliance of eight countries, Japan must not participate in it. If it has the nature of an economic programme, like the Asian Marshall Plan, supported by countries like India, Japan's participation may be considered." (106) The non-participation of countries like India, Indonesia and Burma also disappointed the Japanese, and indeed this was considered a major weakness of the SEATO. (107) There was also the anxiety that the SEATO had divided "free" Asia into two parts, inasmuch as the Philippines, Pakistan and Thailand joined it, whereas countries like Indonesia, Burma and India stayed out. (108) There was also the fear that the United States would try to enlist the membership of Japan in the future. (109)

The terms of SEATO and Japan

Though Japan did not join the SEATO, she had already obtained by means of her security pact with the United States what the SEATO sought to provide for its members. The SEATO deals with two types of threats to its members. First, Article IV (1) of the SEATO


calls for united action against external aggression in the form of armed attack on any of the parties. Second, Article IV (II) of the Treaty also provides for common defence in case the integrity of a member country is threatened in any manner other than by armed attack. (110) The latter thus enables the treaty Powers to guard against any internal subversion. But it should be noted that the United States, by incorporating an understanding in the treaty, made it known to the parties that her agreement to Article IV, paragraph 1, applied only to Communist aggression though in the case of any other aggression, she would consult other parties under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph II. (111) The ANZUS Pact and the US-Philippines Security Pact are much broader in scope than the SEATO in that they do not confine themselves merely to the containment of any possible Communist threat. But they are also much narrower than the SEATO in that they do not contemplate action in the event of internal subversion. The US-Japan Security Pact of 1951 combined the features of both. Like the ANZUS Pact and the US-Philippines Pact, it did not limit the US commitment only to resisting Communist aggression. Secondly, like the SEATO, it provided for the utilization of the armed forces of the United States for "assistance ... at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers". (112) Thus Japan had already obtained from the

111. Ibid.
United States a little more than what the SEATO could offer to her - namely, US support against external aggression of any origin and US assistance against internal subversion. The fact that the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand accepted the specific American commitment only to act against Communist aggression showed that they feared communism more than anything else and were less antipathetic to Japan. In 1951, when the United States concluded the bilateral security pacts with them, they could hardly have been expected to support any specific US commitment against Communist aggression alone. Thus the acceptance of the specific American commitment in the SEATO to resist Communist aggression alone showed that the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand were less concerned about Japanese militarism.

JAPAN AND THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE (1955)

Diametrically opposed to the SEATO was the Afro-Asian Conference convened at Bandung in 1955. Unlike the SEATO, the Afro-Asian Conference appealed to all sections of the Japanese people, who wanted their Government to participate in the Conference. In some ways, the Afro-Asian Conference was a landmark in Japan's relations with Southeast Asia in general and with Indonesia in particular. Its significance lay in the fact that it was the first major international conference in which Japan took part after 1952. It was also one of the earliest opportunities for Japan to break the ice in her relations with Southeast Asia and especially with Indonesia.(113)

The Hatoyama Government adopted a policy of caution towards the Conference for a number of reasons. (114) By virtue of her economic and technological development, Japan was much more advanced than all other Afro-Asian countries. This factor undoubtedly strengthened Japan's position in the deliberations of the Conference and made her influence felt by other nations. Japan however felt greatly handicapped by the fact that her past aggressive policies were still fresh in the minds of other participating countries. This was all the more so in the case of Southeast Asian countries like the Philippines and Indonesia. Japan was also conscious of her ideological position as an ally of the United States. Further, the United States herself did not look with favour upon the Conference. She identified the Conference with India's neutralism, and probably expected her allies like Japan and the Philippines to counter it. (115) Japan was also uneasy because it was expected that the Conference would discuss such controversial issues as West Irian and Formosa. It was further believed that Indonesia was then making vigorous efforts to get the "backing" of the participating countries for her claim on West Irian. (116) Furthermore, it was clear to the Japanese Government that non-aligned countries like India and Indonesia would play a major rôle in the Conference. The presence of Communist China


also added to Japan's embarrassment. (117) The sense of caution which marked the attitude of the Hatoyama Government was reflected in the considerable delay in the decision to participate in the Conference.

**Japan's objectives**

Owing to her peculiar position, Japan could not pitch her objectives too high. Her objectives in attending the Conference were limited. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru said that the objective of Japan was "to make the purport of our peace diplomacy widely known and at the same time submit proposals with respect to economic cooperation and cultural exchanges among Asian-African nations". (118) The Conference afforded an opportunity for Japan to apologize to the affected countries for her past misdeeds. The Japanese delegate, Takasaki Tatsunosuke, declared in the Conference:

"In World War II, Japan, I regret to say, inflicted damages upon her neighbour nations, but ended by bringing untold miseries upon herself. She had re-established democracy having learned her lessons at immense costs in life and property." (119) He went on to impress upon the participating nations that Japan had now taken to the path of peace. He said that Japan had no illusion about her capacity "to solve the international disputes by force. Consequently,

---


118. Shigemitsu's speech at the 22nd Session of the Diet dated 26 March 1955. Kampo Shugiin Kaigiroku, no. 12, p. 84.

it has become our immutable policy to establish firmly peaceful democracy at home." (120) The second objective was to offer constructive proposals in the economic, social and cultural fields. The Hatoyama Government was bent upon avoiding involvement in political discussions. That the delegation was led by a leading expert in economics was clear proof of the intention of Premier Hatoyama to avoid political discussions. (121) Japan in fact took little part in the political discussions at Bandung. Her only significant action was to put forward a "peace declaration" for ensuring world peace. Though the final resolution adopted by the Conference was quite different from the Japanese proposal, still it proved Japan's peaceful disposition. (122)

The participation of Japan in the Conference was supported by all segments of the Japanese people. The ruling Conservatives in fact strongly desired that Japan should be represented by either the Foreign Minister or the Prime Minister. (123) The Socialists also held the same view. (124) The political parties hoped that the Conference would enable Japan to discuss with the Philippines and Indonesia the problems of reparations and the


121. Yomiuri Shimbun, 4 April 1955.

122. See Ueyama, n. 117, p. 293.


normalization of relations. (125) It was also suggested that Japan should take more interest in the colonial question concerning West Irian. (126) The Afro-Asian Conference in fact became the central point of Japan-Indonesia relations. When Japan and Indonesia normalized their diplomatic relations in January 1958, they agreed to conduct their future economic relations on the basis of the principles of the Bandung Conference. (127)

Both Yoshida and Hatoyama were keen on keeping out of the political and military problems of the Southeast Asian region. They took keen interest in the economic field. The entry of Japan into the Colombo Plan in October 1954 was a significant event in Japan's relations with the Southeast Asian region. (128)

**JAPAN AND REARMAMENT**

One of the important problems that confronted the Japanese Government in the initial years after 1952 was the problem of rearmament. The Japanese Government knew that this question agitated the minds of Southeast Asian countries, especially the


Philippines, in the Peace Conference. But the Conservative Government was wedded to the policy of gradual rearmament in order to reduce Japan's dependence on American military assistance. (129) The first sign of Japan's rearmament could be traced to the early years of the occupation period. On 16 November 1947, MacArthur recommended to the Japanese Government an increase in the overall strength of Japan's police force to 125,000 men making provision for a new national rural police force of 30,000 men. (130) The underlying objective of the measure was to "provide an adequate force around which might be built a modern and democratic police system". (131) But soon the attempts to increase the police force began to take on a new character. When, on 8 July 1950, MacArthur authorized the Japanese Government to establish a National Police Reserve of 75,000 men and increase the members of the Maritime Safety Agency to 18,000, there was little doubt that the measure had been taken for strategic reasons. (132) The Japanese peace treaty, which came into force on 28 April 1952, granted Japan the right of self-defence. After the end of the Allied occupation, still more significant developments took place. On 15 October 1952, the National Police Reserve became the National Safety Force. But a major development which marked a definite


131. Ibid.

132. Ibid.
drift towards rearmament came about in March 1954, when the Japanese Government introduced two bills in the Diet, one for the creation of a defence agency and another for the creation of ground, maritime and air self-defence forces. These bills, which came into operation on 1 July 1954, were in pursuance of the US-Japan Security Pact and the Defence Assistance Agreement, which wanted Japan to "assume responsibility for its own defence against direct and indirect aggression always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter". (133)

Policy of caution

At every stage of this programme, the Japanese Government acted with the greatest caution. This was clearly borne out by the remark of Foreign Minister Okazaki that

unless Japan is careful, such moves at revision may be misunderstood by various foreign countries as an attempt to revert to the old, discredited past, to revert to militarism. Therefore, a dispelling of the misunderstandings entertained by some countries particularly those of South-east Asia who still watch Japan's attitude with scepticism was and is required. (134)

The Yoshida Government time and again explained the objectives that lay behind such rearmament. Foreign Minister Okazaki, during his visit to Manila in September 1953, explained them to the Filipinos as follows:

We have not come to any conclusion about the size of Japan's defence forces, but you can rest assured that we will not be able to reach any defence strength that might cause any fear in the Philippines or any other country. As a matter of fact, it is a known fact that the Americans want to withdraw their troops now stationed in Japan and for that reason they want us to increase our defence strength, so that there shall be no anxiety about the defence of Japan. We are still telling the Americans that it is not possible to increase our defence strength in a matter of a year or two. Probably they are not satisfied with our attitude, but that is as much as to say that we are unable to build any defence strength which would cause anxiety to you or any other people. (135)

After visiting the Philippines, Indonesia and Burma, Foreign Minister Okazaki told the Japanese Diet on 19 October that the peoples of those countries recognized "Japan's need of a defence force in the interests of Asia". He also declared that he saw no signs of apprehension over the creation of such a defence force. (136)

While it would be difficult to prove the truth or otherwise of Okazaki's statement, one thing is very obvious. Neither the Philippines nor Indonesia looked with favour upon the rearmament of Japan beyond the needs of her actual self-defence. Indeed an alleged statement by Yoshida before the National Security Corps in August 1952 that Japan's army would become the leader of Asia "as hoped by the U.S.A." touched off a storm of protest in Indonesia. (137) The Indonesian Government's reaction was quick

136. Ibid., no. 297, 27 October 1953, p. 31.
and sharp. Calling the remark "imprudent", the Indonesian
Information Minister, Mononutu expressed his surprise as to how
Yoshida could make such a remark, especially at a time when both
countries were engaged in mending their strained relations. (138)
The Indonesian Press came out with vehement criticism of Yoshida's
remark. It was stated that "the claim for leadership in Asia would
only serve to invite more anti-Japanese feeling among nations, and
if the U.S.A. is also fully supporting Japan in rearming and
strengthening her war-torn industry, she too will be regarded with
suspicion by Asia." (139) The Masjumi Party organ Abadi stated:

Japan though a loser in the last war thinks
she has lost to America only and not to the
Asian nations which she regards as inferior....
The Japanese people live under the illusion
that the Indonesians regard them as friends.

The daily went on to warn the United States that her policy of
helping Japan militarily was like "feeding a cub which will later
bite the feeder". (140) This made Japanese statesmen realize
that Southeast Asian countries would never favour a military rôle
for Japan.

We have noted in this chapter that Japan, in her relations
with Southeast Asian countries, especially the Philippines and
Indonesia during this period, faced two important obstacles -
namely, the impact of cold-war politics and the memories of war

---

138. Ibid.

139. *Times of Indonesia* (Jakarta), 13 August 1952.

devastation. Both these obstacles continued to confront Japan even after 1956. Japan knew that in order to overcome these obstacles, she would have to project a new image of herself and also emphasize her commitment to peace. The period under review also brought Japan into contact with two most important trends. The first trend was represented by the formation of the SEATO, a cause which the Philippine President, Quirino most ardently championed. Though Japan was a member of the "free world", she could not join the SEATO for obvious reasons. There was complete lack of enthusiasm in Japan for the formation of a military alliance in Southeast Asia. The second trend was represented by the Afro-Asian Conference, of which the Indonesian Government was a staunch supporter. How Japan reconciled her position as a member of the "free world" with her participation in the Afro-Asian politics, and how she grappled with the problems posed by cold-war politics and war memories in her relations with Southeast Asian countries will be examined in the next chapter.