Chapter VII

CONCLUSION
The re-emergence of Japan as an independent sovereign nation in April 1952 was an event of great importance in Far Eastern politics. It signified the entry of a Power with great potentialities. Of course she was no longer a strong military nation; she had already lost her prestige as one of the Great Powers; economically she was weak and prostrate; politically, though she had already started functioning within the framework of the new Constitution, she was yet to feel within her the quickening of a new, healthy political life; militarily, she had been deprived of the right to maintain armed forces, and had to depend largely on the United States for her defence; and as for her relations with the countries of South-east Asia, she was yet to find her bearings in the new post-war political structure consisting of countries like the Philippines, Indonesia and Burma, who had become independent and were imbued with a strong sense of nationalism. And yet her re-emergence was a great event, for she presented the image of a forward-looking country, determined to carve out a place for herself in the sun.

Two factors

(a) War legacies. Japan's image in Southeast Asia was affected by two factors. First, the devastation of the Second World War had left such intense bitterness in the region that Japan could not resume her relations with the countries of Southeast Asia without reference to the sad memories of the war. Though the Japanese occupation of the region had had the effect of hastening the freedom movements in Southeast Asia, Japan had encouraged nationalism only by the destruction of the previous regimes. At no stage of the
occupation had Japan positively encouraged nationalism in any of the former colonies in the region.

We have already noted that the Japanese occupation had no relevance to the independence of the Philippines, because the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 had clearly set the terms for Philippine independence. The Filipinos, having established their transitional commonwealth regime, were well on their way to seeing the dawn of full independence in 1946. The Japanese occupation came only as a break in their smooth progress towards freedom. The Japanese could still have won over the Filipinos, had they followed humane and benevolent policies towards the conquered people. But the ruthless treatment which they meted out to them served only to offend their national sentiments and encourage anti-Japanese guerilla movements.

In Indonesia, the Japanese occupation did exert some influence on the national movement, and can be held to have been responsible in some measure for the early advent of freedom in the Indies. However, we must take care not to overestimate its significance. The Japanese conceded "independence" to the Indonesians only when they were convinced that their defeat was a certainty. Moreover, the forces of nationalism had become too powerful to be ignored. The significance of the Japanese occupation to Indonesian independence lay in the barrier it erected against the return of the Dutch. It is true that the Indonesians, unlike the Filipinos, welcomed the Japanese as liberators. This was because under Dutch rule, they had already reached the final stage of desperation, and they hoped therefore that under the Japanese things would improve or at least not be worse. But the Japanese administration soon belied their
hopes. As Sjahrir wrote:

People (Indonesians) had expected them to be quite different, stronger, and more clever than the Dutchmen they had defeated. What the people saw were barbarians. Under the Japanese, the people had to endure indignities worse than any they had known before, bowing before people for whom they had only contempt in their hearts, bearing physical abuse, and being treated as though they were wholly unfeeling human beings. (1)

The nationalist leaders of Indonesia considered the Japanese occupation as a good opportunity for them to promote their cause, and to that extent, they succeeded. The Indonesians, by and large, did not have any feeling of sympathy for the Japanese at the time of their surrender.

Apart from the memories of the war, the Filipinos and Indonesians were haunted by the memories of the Japanese economic penetration of the pre-war years. They frankly expressed their misgivings in the Peace Conference.

(b) Impact of the cold war. The second factor that affected Japan's image in the Southeast Asian region was cold-war politics. Being composed of developing nations, the region naturally became a major area of East-West conflict after the end of the Second World War, and both the Power blocs tried to extend their influence among the nations of the region. When the Japanese peace treaty became a subject of cold-war politics, its implications for these nations were deep and significant.

At the end of the war, the concept of Allied occupation as embodied in the Potsdam Declaration, the Initial post-surrender policy and the Basic post-surrender policy was restrictive in

nature. During the initial years, the United States carried out the punitive phase of the occupation true to the letter and spirit of these documents, and this created a good impression on the Pacific Allies on the Far Eastern Commission. But soon American policies began to show signs of a basic change. This change was brought about by economic considerations though strategic interests were not inconsistent with it. By 1947-48, there was a growing realization on the part of American statesmen that it would not be advisable to weaken Japan any further economically, partly because they believed that any such attempt would be contrary to the occupation objectives, and partly because they were anxious to relieve themselves of the huge financial burden. Constantly hovering in the background was also the consideration that the Soviet Union posed a much greater threat than Japan, and that the latter had therefore to be strengthened. This opinion began to gain overriding importance in American strategic calculations, especially after the National Security Council decision in November 1948. The success of the Communists in China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 compelled the United States not only to expedite the drafting of the Japanese peace treaty, but also to think in terms of making Japan a "bulwark against the rising tide of communism". Japan became what Dean Acheson called a "vital link in the defence perimeter" that ran from the Aleutians to the Philippines.

Once the concept of peace crystallized, the United States made vigorous attempts to give effect to it in a treaty. Having decided on a "peace of reconciliation" she exerted the utmost pressure on her Pacific Allies to accept it. She called upon
them to show the same degree of unity in peace-making as they had shown in waging the war. She exhorted them to show greater awareness of the new threat which the Sino-Soviet bloc posed not only to them but also to Japan. Dulles argued that it was imperative to save Japan from falling a victim to the Communist bloc because he feared that a combination of Japan, China and the Soviet Union was fraught with dangers of the greatest dimensions for the whole of the Pacific and the Southeast Asian region. Though in setting the terms of the Japanese peace treaty, he had sought to satisfy primarily the wishes of Southeast Asian countries, he managed to draw up a treaty that was also considered to be in the best interests of the "free world" as a whole. The Dullesian peace sought to bring Japan closer to the Southeast Asian region by means of security and economic ties. The three bilateral security pacts which the United States had concluded with Japan, the Philippines, and Australia and New Zealand constituted the "initial steps" towards the development of an overall security alliance for the Southeast Asian region. Though even in 1951, Dulles sounded Indonesia, Burma and India on the regional security pact, they were not inclined to join any security alliance as they thought that such a step would only intensify the cold war in the region. Moreover, they were keen on maintaining their independent foreign policy without getting embroiled in the East-West conflict. The three bilateral security pacts which Dulles formulated were the utmost that he could hope to achieve under the conditions that obtained in 1951. It should be borne in mind that these three pacts served the dual need of the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. They sought to guarantee these three countries
against any possible military resurgence of Japan, as well as to protect these countries and also Japan against the Sino-Soviet bloc.

As for economic ties, Dulles hoped that his peace arrangements would bring Japan closer to the Southeast Asian region. When Japan accorded diplomatic recognition to Nationalist China, it was obvious that the Japanese economy was being oriented away from Communist China and towards the Southeast Asian region. Dulles believed that Southeast Asian countries like the Philippines and Indonesia could provide enough trade opportunities to fulfil the needs of Japan. (2)

Policies of the Sino-Soviet bloc

While American statesmen were making vigorous efforts to bring Japan closer to Southeast Asia, the Sino-Soviet bloc pursued policies which aimed at thwarting American efforts. At the outset, the Sino-Soviet bloc opposed the American method of peace-making, and demanded that a peace treaty should be formulated by a four-Power Conference. Later, when Dulles proceeded with his peace plans, it clearly saw that Southeast Asian countries, especially the Philippines and Indonesia, were dissatisfied with the terms relating to reparations and security. It hoped to use this dissatisfaction as a means to drive a wedge between the United States and the countries of Southeast Asia, and thus defeat the American plan of bringing Japan closer to the countries of the region. The tactics adopted by the Soviet Union in the Peace Conference showed her eagerness to champion the cause of countries like the Philippines

and Indonesia. Both the Soviet Union and People’s China contended that the peace treaty, along with the US-Japan security pact, would only clear the path for Japan to overrun Southeast Asian countries once again. These tactics of the Sino-Soviet bloc continued throughout the period considered in this study. Both the Soviet Union and People’s China constantly harped upon Japanese war slogans like "the Greater East Asia coprosperity sphere" and "Asia for Asians" to keep the memories of the war fresh in the minds of the countries of Southeast Asia. The Soviet Premier, Khrushchev, went so far as to attack Japan only in a major speech delivered by him in the Indonesian Parliament in February 1960.

The interplay of these two factors - the legacies of the war and the exigencies of cold-war politics - shaped the attitudes of the Philippines and Indonesia during the period of our study in varying degrees. Though there was ideological affinity between Japan and the Philippines, it was more than outweighed by the bitterness of the memories of the war in the Filipinos. Indonesia was much less emotional, but she tended to look at Japan only in terms of her ideological affinity with the United States. It is worth repeating in brief the stand taken by the two nations on their resumption of relations with Japan in 1952.

The Philippines

Few questions stirred up the Filipinos as sharply as did the question of resuming relations with Japan. The Filipino policy towards Japan during the years immediately following the end of the war was guided by two factors - reparations and security. The Filipinos believed with much justification that their country
sustained not only the greatest physical damages in the region, but also "moral traumata" at the hands of the Japanese. They feared that because of geographical proximity, their country would be the first victim again in case of a revival of Japanese militarism. At the end of the war, their attitude was therefore one of keeping Japan under heavy political and economic restrictions. When the Allied occupation authorities started implementing punitive measures, the Philippines extended her full co-operation to the United States. But later, when the United States modified her occupation objectives and sought to build up Japan economically and encourage her to regain an "international personality", the resentment of the Filipinos was vocal and unmistakable. Again, when in May 1949 the United States announced the termination of the interim reparations removals from Japan, Filipino resentment manifested itself in the strongest possible terms. Public criticism in the Philippines began to gain in strength after the announcement of the Seven-Point Memorandum by Dulles late in 1950, and it became particularly intense after the circulation of the draft treaty in March 1951. Both the documents contemplated a total waiver of reparations and the granting of the right of self-defence to Japan. The resentment of the Filipinos was based on their belief that the United States had overlooked their national interests. They openly accused the United States of granting concessions to Japan at their expense. They failed to appreciate the fact that Japan bulked much larger in the American scale of priorities and that the political importance of the Philippines "had increased in absolute but not in relative
terms". (3) The visit of Dulles to Manila in February 1951 was a turning-point in that it afforded him an opportunity to feel the pulse of the Filipinos on reparations and security. He understood that unanimity on a "treaty of reconciliation" was not as easy as it seemed on paper. He was convinced that he had to make concessions to the Filipinos on both reparations and security if he really meant to enlist their whole-hearted support for his peace arrangements. This is not to suggest that Dulles merely yielded to Filipino pressure. It should be borne in mind that the Philippines was too small a nation to bring about any perceptible change in American decision-making. But the force of the Filipino pressure has to be viewed in conjunction with that of the fervent demands which Australia and New Zealand made for their security, and which Indonesia and Burma made for reparations. After March 1951, American opinion swung in favour of meeting as far as possible the wishes of the Filipinos. The Joint Anglo-American draft circulated in July was a definite improvement upon the March draft in so far as it contained a specific clause on reparations in services even though this was not acceptable to the Filipinos. The Filipinos continued to demand terms much broader than mere reparations in services. They wanted a "freer hand" to enter into bilateral negotiations with Japan on the form and amount of reparations. In the final text of the peace treaty, considerable alterations were made so as to make it acceptable to the Filipinos and other Southeast Asian countries. The assurances which Premier

Yoshida gave in the Peace Conference further mollified the Filipinos.

(a) Security. Security was the second demand which the Filipinos made as a part of their terms in return for their support for the peace treaty. But their stand on security was far less rigid than their stand on reparations. This is not to say that the Filipinos were less concerned about their security. The crux of the matter was that the problem of security in the Far East, as the Filipinos saw it, had become more complex in 1951 than at the end of the war. In 1945, the security of the Philippines probably meant a long Allied occupation of Japan with iron-clad restrictions imposed on her. But by 1951, the political situation in the Pacific changed so much that the Filipinos realized that their security could not be adequately guaranteed by a policy of merely restraining Japan under the heels of a superior Power. They believed that they should also be protected against the new and more serious Sino-Soviet threat. In other words, during 1949-51, the Filipinos made a clear assessment of their concept of security taking into account not merely the threat posed by a possible revival of Japanese militarism but also the strong and well-knit Sino-Soviet bloc.

There is ample evidence to show that President Quirino in his scale of priorities tended to regard the threat from communism as greater than than posed by a possible revival of Japanese militarism. For one thing, the Philippines herself was facing a very difficult situation at home as a result of the Huk disturbances. Secondly, the Filipinos thought that the American presence in Japan would effectively restrain her from developing into a military state. The eloquent advocacy of President Quirino during 1949-51 for a
Pacific regional security pact on the pattern of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization showed his tendency to distinguish between the threat posed by the Communist bloc and that posed by Japan. Quirino even went to the extent of sponsoring Japan's membership in such a regional pact, as he believed that Japan herself should be protected against the influence of communism. It was his contention that if Japan came under the influence of the Communist bloc, she could pose a far greater threat to the Philippines, and that such a contingency could be averted only by making her a member of the "free world" in the Pacific. When in the middle of 1951, Dulles came out with the same concept of dual defence - defence of the Pacific Allies, including Japan, against communism, and the defence of the Allies against Japan - there was substantial agreement between him and Quirino. The bilateral security pact signed in September 1951 emphasized this dual nature of Philippine security.

Indonesia

The resumption of relations with Japan was viewed by the Indonesians not in emotional terms, but in terms of their national interests and ideology. The majority of the Indonesians desired a speedy resumption consistent with their national interests and the pursuit of an active and independent foreign policy. In terms of their national interests, they wanted adequate reparations and also guarantees for Japan's firm adherence to normal international practices in trade and fishing. In terms of their pursuing an active and independent foreign policy, most Indonesians desired a bilateral peace treaty in the place of the multilateral Japanese
peace treaty, and in this they were greatly influenced by the stand taken by India and Burma. The Indonesians succeeded in achieving both these objectives. Though the Sukiman Cabinet favoured participation in the San Francisco peace conference and actually signed the treaty, its action did not obtain the support of the majority in Indonesia. The subsequent Governments rejected the San Francisco peace treaty and decided to enter into a bilateral peace treaty. The Indonesian stand thus basically differed from the Filipino stand.

An examination of the Indonesian stand further reveals that there was little concern on their part for the security question. There is not much evidence to show that the Indonesian Government was apprehensive of the right of self-defence which the peace treaty granted to Japan. The Indonesians showed little fear either of the Communist threat or of a revival of Japanese militarism, and their attitude towards the Pacific security arrangements was unfavourable. Nor did they show any desire to keep Japan under restrictions. The Sukiman Government firmly stressed the need to release Japan from all occupation control and set her on the road to peace. It contended that no nation could be kept under surveillance for too long a period, and that the re-emergence of Japan was an important event in Asia in which Indonesia must take an active interest. It was this overriding consideration that prompted Premier Sukiman to send a delegation to San Francisco and then sign the treaty.

Japan's policies

The efforts of the Japanese Government to promote relations with Southeast Asia in general and with the Philippines and
Indonesia in particular during 1952-60 passed through two phases. The first phase covered broadly the years from 1952 to 1956. The second period covered the years of Kishi's Premiership, from February 1957 to July 1960. Caution was the characteristic mark of both phases. The only difference was that during the first phase they were made from a position of weakness, whereas in the second phase, they were made with a sense of national strength and self-confidence.

It was Premier Yoshida that set the tone of Japan's Southeast Asian policy in 1952. His policy had different facets. First, he had to project the image of a new and pacifist Japan in the region. Second, he had to explain the reasons that compelled Japan to side with the United States. This had to be done particularly in neutralist countries like Indonesia. Third, Yoshida had to counter the Sino-Soviet tactics of weaning Japan away from the countries of Southeast Asia. To this end, he worked assiduously and tried to convince the countries of Southeast Asia that it was communism that posed the greatest threat to them all. In order to check the "gravitational pull" of the Communist bloc, he advocated a regional economic co-operation scheme, on the pattern of the organization of the European Economic Community. He believed that Japan could make common cause with Southeast Asian countries under an anti-Communist banner by working in the economic sphere. It was his firm conviction that the traditional lure of the China Market for Japan would not be as irresistible as was imagined if she cultivated countries like the Philippines and Indonesia for her future trade. He therefore laid down the policy of promoting Japan's economic relations with Southeast Asian countries by normalizing diplomatic
relations with them as speedily as possible. He inaugurated a series of tortuous negotiations with the Philippines, Indonesia and Burma for the settlement of the reparations question. Though no final settlement was made either with the Philippines or with Indonesia during his Premiership, the prolonged negotiations served to clarify many moot points. (4) For instance, Japan's consent to pay reparations in capital goods was a result of those negotiations. During Hatoyama's Premiership, the same policies were pursued though he was much less anti-Communist than his predecessor. The settlement of the reparations question with the Philippines was an important achievement of Hatoyama.

During the first phase (1952-56), there were two important trends in the Southeast Asian region which had deep implications for Japan. The first was represented by the formation of the SEATO, which was an important foreign-policy objective of the Philippines. The second was represented by the Afro-Asian Conference in April 1955, of which Indonesia was one of the chief spokesmen.

(a) SEATO. As envisaged by the United States in 1951, the three bilateral security pacts that she had entered into with Japan, the Philippines, and Australia and New Zealand ultimately led to the formation of an overall Pacific security system. This system - the SEATO - came into formal existence in September 1954. Japan, however, could not become a member of it because of constitutional and other difficulties. The Japanese Constitution proved a real obstacle in that it prevented (as it does even now) Japan from sending armed forces abroad. Moreover, the United

4. An accord with Burma alone was reached during the Premiership of Yoshida.
States was worried that if Japan were included, countries like Taiwan and South Korea could not be excluded. She was, however, not prepared for this because the inclusion of Taiwan would only complicate the membership of Great Britain in the pact. The Japanese Government itself was not very enthusiastic about the SEATO despite the fact that it had extended "moral support" to it. The Yoshida Government, while supporting the concept of collective security, repeatedly stressed that Japan would not accept any military commitment overseas. It was more inclined to believe that Japan could play a role in collective action for the economic progress of the region in the belief that economic stability could check the spread of communism more effectively than military means. While stressing this point, Japanese statesmen were guided by three reasons. First, they had to pay heed to the domestic pressure in favour of pacifism. Public opinion in Japan on the SEATO was most unfriendly, and political parties were anxious to ensure that Japan was not committed even indirectly to any regional military alliance. Secondly, they were also aware that except the Philippines and Thailand, Southeast Asian countries did not favour the SEATO. Thirdly, they knew that the countries of Southeast Asia would not welcome Japan's playing a military role in the region so soon.

(b) Afro-Asian Conference. Diametrically opposed to the SEATO in nature was the Afro-Asian Conference convened in April 1955 at Bandung. After much hesitation, the Hatoyama Government decided to participate in the Conference. The Conference occupies a special place in the post-war foreign policy of Japan. It was the first
major international conference in which Japan took part after 1952. The Conference provided a good opportunity for Japan to express her pacifist intentions before that great gathering of nations. Furthermore, the peace treaty which Japan and Indonesia signed in January 1958 embodied the Bandung spirit as the basis of their future economic relations.

That the Indonesians always viewed their relations with Japan in the light of the Bandung spirit also sometimes led to misunderstanding and embitterment. The Indonesians expected Japan as a member of the Afro-Asian group to support their cause, especially on the question of West Irian. But though Japan supported the resolution about it at Bandung, her stand on the issue later became more and more equivocal. When, in August 1960, the Japanese Government gave permission for the visit of a Dutch aircraft carrier to Yokohama, the Indonesians regarded it as an unfriendly act. Inside Japan, the opposition Socialists and the Communists always argued that the foreign policy of Japan was self-contradictory in so far as it laid emphasis on the Western alliance while simultaneously professing to strive for co-operation with Asian nations. The Western alliance, they argued, would not only compel Japan to support the American cause in Asia, but also involve her in the East-West conflict, thereby depriving her of the chance to play an independent and pacifist rôle.

Second phase

Japan's relations with Southeast Asia in general and with the Philippines and Indonesia in particular assumed new significance during the Premiership of Kishi. Kishi followed the same policy of
caution but with a sense of national strength and self-confidence. The opening of diplomatic relations with the USSR (December 1956), the admission of Japan into the United Nations (December 1956), the considerable progress achieved in the matter of settling the reparations issues with Southeast Asian countries and the economic recovery of Japan — all contributed to this new national strength.

Kishi's policy of forging better and closer relations was crowned with partial success in the Philippines and Indonesia. His State visit to these countries did much to solve the problems connected with the payment of reparations to Indonesia, as well as the problems of visa and trade with the Philippines. Similarly the visits made by President Garcia and President Sukarno to Japan created better understanding between their countries and Japan. But it must be stated that at every stage, both the Philippines and Indonesia showed signs of deep suspicion and circumspection with regard to Japan's motives. Of the two, the Philippines was particularly suspicious, as witness her reaction to the Kishi plan. The same lack of trust in Japan is responsible for the non-ratification of the Philippines-Japan treaty of amity, commerce and navigation to this day. Both the Philippines and Indonesia admired Japan's industrial growth and perhaps looked up to her as a model. But they did not repose trust in Japan. There was a lurking fear in their minds that this economic strength would enable Japan to accomplish what she had failed to do by force of arms during the war.

During the period of our study, Japan's efforts were mainly confined to winning the confidence of Southeast Asian countries. There was no direct Japanese involvement in any of the outstanding
political questions of the region. In fact, Japan was averse to embroiling herself in political questions. She was content with playing a rôle in the economic field consistent with her resources. It was only in 1964 that Japan offered to mediate in the settlement of the Malaysian question and played host to a summit conference of the parties concerned in Tokyo. This was the first major Japanese initiative in Southeast Asian politics. After 1966, Japan's initiative in the economic sphere became more and more marked. The convening of the Southeast Asian Ministerial Conference in April 1966 was an outstanding instance of Japan's initiative. Both the Philippines and Indonesia have taken part in the annual ministerial conferences, held ever since. Japan's initiative in the rehabilitation of Indonesia after the fall of Sukarno is also worth mentioning. At present she is more interested in increasing her economic involvement in the region. She has learnt the supreme lesson of how to wait. Today she is not in a hurry to force her way into the region. Japanese statesmen have understood that the prime movers in the region are the peoples of Southeast Asia, and that slogans like "Greater East Asia Coprosperity" and "Asia for Asiatics" can no longer be exploited by any outside nation for its own benefit.